It’s kind of funny this city states fought so fiercely against each other for so little territory and power and then only a few decades a relatively backwater power would conquer most of “known” world.
A lot of people who like history, love to imagine what they would do in these situations. Its great to hear you give the perspective of both sides in these videos. Not just covering what happened in these wars, but the why. Your one of the most unique history tubers on the site, keep up the great work!
I find it painfully obvious that the thing Pericles was deathly afraid of was overextension. He could sustain a long war near indefinitely, he could choke the Sparta-Corinth coalition with his naval power, he could perform short-term raids, he could goad the enemy into long and fruitless expeditions to reach the far-reaching colonies, he could play the political differences within the alliance and hope for instability to capitalize on, he could wait for Argos to join in, he could wait for an opportunity to defeat his enemies in detail, but all that would be in vain had he done the very stupid thing of trying to make moves that expend his resources without a really good reason to.
This is a pretty deft summary of the geo-strategic nature of land powers and sea powers. Even with a political, economic, and military system that was outdated for the time (it was built to win the annual summer raiding battles for arable lands between cities, not attritional battles of the Peloponessian and Corinthian War), the Spartans managed to eventually overcome the deadlock thanks to Athenian hubris and relative political instability. It is quite interesting as the Peloponessian War effectively demonstrates the limits of sea power in containing a land locked power and draws parallels to the similar situation that played out during the Cold War. The starting positions obviously were slightly different but the overarching strategic planning and decisions were very similar.
Considering the war was lost by means of plague imported from Egyptian grain, the Peloponessian serves as a terrible demonstration of sea versus land power limits, more a reminder that one has little ability to interlude in either one's own fate or that of one's fellow, despite even the strenuous effort to maintain or extinguish a flame by means of statehood.
@@0MVR_0 Or a Machiavellian interpretation - Athenian strategy had the effect of maximizing the role of forces outside their control - that of disease, and that of political stability and overall strategic cohesiveness in the event of Pericles' death. And this was a logical outgrowth of their faith in their sea power and long walls.
@@0MVR_0 I think that the largest contributing factor to the fall of Athens and the collapse of the Delian league was the invasion of Sicily which resulted in the loss of nearly half the Athenian citizen body, the entire fleet, and the loss of influential poltiical leaders. This created political chaos at home, military weakness, and massive financial burdens. While Athens was able to stabilize and rebuild one last fleet, they were now on the back foot in the war of naval attrition. They could not risk losing this final fleet so they could only fight defensively and couldn't follow up any victories. Combined with the political instability in the late Athenian democracy, there wasn't much they could do once the Persians started bank rolling the Spartan navy. It was only a matter of time before the whole house of cards came down and Athens would lose control of the seas, access to its empire, and grain imports. In summary: over extension and hubris lead to Athen's downfall. If certain decisions were deferred, the Athenians might have been able to keep Sparta politically isolated and change the risk analysis of the Persians for bankrolling Sparta. The Athenians may have been able to force terms on Sparta by nimbling away at the edges of Spartan territory like the earlier peace of Nicias. Instead they went all in on a proxy war that allowed their enemies the ability to defeat them in detail at only a modest risk to themselves. With all that being said, the Spartan situation wasn't much better. They lost nearly half their citizen population in a disastrous earthquake before the start of the Archidamian War. This and the subsequent wars against Athens and Thebes lead to a terminal demographic decline that eventually destroyed the state after all the attempts to reverse this trend failed.
History can be likened to a revolving door. It will go round and round forever, with people many centuries removed making the same decisions that lead to the same results. And it will continue this trend until someone learns from history and strikes off through the opening, leading to either a new revolving door or back to the old one.
Thank god you're back! Was worried you might have been arrested during the Hong Kong protests. Knowing your view of Geopolitics I know you probably participated in the protests to make it as hard as possible for China to enforce their law on Hong Kong.
Well judging from the state of China’s econ now I think the geoeconomics video I did was probably the worst thing I did to them. I have my concerns abt direction of hk protests which is mainly what I’ve been ruminating on.
@@StrategyStuff Glad to see you back and not in the custody of Hong Kong "law enforcement". That geoeconomics video is great, by the way. I use it in one of the classes that I teach.
I'm going to make a 3-parter on that covering strategies of protest/revolution. Not sure if you're a Hong Konger but I've been increasingly disconcerted about the insistence of 'being water' to the point of NOT having any overarching organization. Without it, these protests run on blood (i.e. the angry mobilization caused by it). As an example, local commentators all credit PolyU battle w/winning District Council elections, HKHRDA etc, but back then they were all screaming for students to leave before they get hurt. No blood, no mobilization - it's perverse but that's what the dynamic is like. This means that from a strategic POV, protests are also being driven by govt incompetence - if govt simply waited protestors out this thing would have been over in 2 months. So continued 'be water' = protestors are not in charge of their own destiny. I argue organization is the way that protestors can do long-term mobilization that isn't 100% reliant on outrage. Of course easier said than done and that's why 'be water' is the deceptively simple solution.
@@StrategyStuff I live in Singapore so it's interesting to see another Asian Tiger face these sorts of issues as Singaporean democracy isn't exactly the freest in the world although the government structure is still very different from HK. Then again, Singapore is to an extent taking advantage of business moving out of HK.
I recognized the Cantonese twang because I have several Chinese friends, but your grammar was so solid I still figured you for living in the West, well done. While I studied in England as well, I came out sounding very posh because of what the profs sounded like at King's, so most anglophone people can still tell I'm not British. One word of advice though, if you plan on making any more videos of the ancient world. C is almost always pronounced the K way as opposed to the S way. Though the S way has an annoying way of working itself into documentaries and audiobooks (mostly because pronouncing Caesar with an S became the standard), prior to the Middle Ages C was practically always pronounced as K in names and titles.
Thanks for the advice. I suppose you were referring to the pronunciation of Thucydides? I tend to prefer the common pronunciations for the more well-known proper nouns
Question: what was Persian and Megas Helas interests a this early stage ? What did the greeks from the boot of Italy factor in the early stage of the war ? Very interesting, I really appreciate your videos. Thank you for your great work.
The Greeks in Sicily basically wanted no part of the war in Greece, despite Athens and Sparta trying to bring them into the war. Persia's interest in Greece post-Xerxes was just to make sure the Greeks didn't stir up more trouble in their western provinces, particularly Egypt. Athenian naval strength prevented Persia from taking the measures needed for internal security and so Persia undoubtedly wanted them cut down to size.
Are these army numbers reasonable? The 'Roman' ruled Balkans could seemingly only mobilise 25 000 to at most 50 000 men judging by Byzantine army numbers after Manzikert and Licinius battle against Maxentius Daia. Venice could mobilise 20 000 troops when they controlled vast trade networks across the mediterranean. How could these few cities mobilise so many men?
I recognise that the geo-strategic conclusions of the video are equally valid irrelevant of the magnitude of these army sizes. But that one could still make an advanced thesis on the administrative and geographical distinctions cause these alleged disparities in army sizes, and this could be very useful in analysing geo-strategic situations.
Well we should consider that for all intents and purposes, Ancient Greek armies were basically militias of Ancient Greek cities that comprised the majority of the adult male population excluding the elderly. Since they supplied their own equipment the state doesn't need to do that expensive task. Training of these troops wouldn't also really be an issue since most Ancient Greek armies were mainly undisciplined since the Ancient Greeks believed so much in individual liberty that being controlled and subordinated by a commander to train them was unthinkable. The only exception to this rule was Sparta who did train their troops and could march in formation which was a shock to other Greek armies which can be described as well-armoured mobs with some ranged units and a small amount of cavalry.
Right, so I checked the sources of the 60k Peloponnesians number (from Henderson's 'Great War') and they come from Plutarch's bio of Pericles, so it + Thucydides' numbers (e.g. 40k ATH in Syracuse) are always subject to ancient exaggeration. That said, the outsized mobilization nos. of Greek armies came at the cost of logistical reach - neither the Byzantines nor the Romans would have found marching from S -> N Greece difficult, unlike even Sparta. Outside of Athens, Greek armies of the time could stay in the field only c. 1 month before they had to leave. The other side of this is that if the decisive battles is going to be fought in your neighborhood, then it makes sense to mobilize everybody for 1-2 days to maximize chances of victory. Once you get to actual long-term campaigns the numbers drop off - Alexander's army crossing into Persia was c.35k men
James Tang I don't think that's the primary reason behind these number disparities, mainly because the theory that Greek hoplites were almost entirely "quantity over quality" wouldn't explain how well the Persian wars went. If these were mere mobs in hoplite gear, they wouldn't seem capable of fighting effectively against an outnumbering opponent. But that's exactly what happened in Plataea for instance.
I wonder if Greece could have won against Macedon, when Athens had been the victor in the Peloponnesian war. Athenenian culture and economy was much more outgoing and expansionist than Spartan. Athens really could have built a big empire.
Athens could only afford 1 battle. And the battle had to be a decisive battle against at least 2/3 of the league’s forces. Simply impossible, they have no Alexander or Caesar type character to overcome their shitty position
I have never seen this channel before and it just showed up in my Recommended feed. I though "oh, like hell I'm going to watch a 26 minute video from someone I don't even know". Turns out I had to update some files so I let it play while they updated and boy am I impressed, fantastic content. The files already updated but I stayed to watch this until the end.
the biggest question I have is how Peloponiasian league was organized, and who was its biggest benefactor? Sparta, Thebes or Corinth? Sparta took a leadership role in a conflict started by Corinth and Corcyra. Even after a 30 years peace agreement its was forced to fight again because Thebes and Corinth were not happy with the results. Was it those two cities that were seeking to become nxt hegemon of Greece? If look at Thebes fighting Sparta after the peloponisian war, that might be the case.
Peloponnesian League's organization was loose w/its main purpose being to mobilize Sparta's allies for war; quite unlike Delian League in this respect. Also unlike DL, Sparta was more 'first among equals' in PL - because it needed the support of its allies to actually do anything. So PL had a lot of discussion, defection etc as mentioned. Sparta was still its biggest benefactor of PL bc w/o it, it would have a much tougher time maintaining hegemony w/o steady allies.
@@StrategyStuff the irony is not lost on me here. Athens (democracy) leads a despotic empire, in its own favor, while Sparta (monarchy) is a leader of democratic alliance. :) Did Corith of Thebes sent armies or fleets for combined operations?
Corinth sent ships but not enough to make a dent in Athenian navy. Thebes basically fought its own war and even took over some Spartan outposts that it wanted.
Strategy Stuff : i got half-question half-observation. according to this video ( ruclips.net/video/smHMobjTjBA/видео.html ) greek colonisazation of the Med was done largly by native Ioanin greeks (who later became led by Athens) then by Dorian greeks, who later become led by Sparta and Corinth and in less extent by anatolian greeks in northern Med, who consolidate their power in Thebes. if you compare major revolts against Delian league, with map of origins of colonies, then you msy notice that it was Dorian and Anatolians (mostly) who revolted. So perhaps the core of Peloponisian war was not only in "hard power" or grand ambitions. Perhaps there is an underlying competition of greek family trees?
Of course was some ethnic tension, which is why Sparta and Athens were so worried that the Dorian Syracusans would help Sparta (and Thebes would later punish Boeotian towns for the crime of 'Atticizing'). But Ionians revolted with similar intensity against Athens (Samos before the PW; Chios during); and the Corinthian colony of Corcyra fought vs Corinth, so it's not all about ethnicity.
Seems like a lot of suppositions are made here and you have forgotten the human angle of the conflict. The war was not universally popular in both states and neither had as yet irredeemably hurt each other before the war. To the point where it was Corinth that agitated for it and threatened to secede from the Sparta alliance. As such Both Athens and Sparta could both be Phlegmatic in their starting effort as there was every possibility of peace. Why would Pericles destroy any good will from the Pelopenesians when he might just hold out long enough for them to see reason while maintaining a vigilant watch for secession among the tributary states and allies. That this did not take place was the great Tragedy for the former allies of the Persian war.
Suppositions are almost a given with analysing history. Your viewpoint is valid and I’ve presented aspects of your case in the 1st video. That said I think we can overestimate the contingent aspects of this war to the detriment of the long term or even - dare we say it - irrational causes (‘fear’) that, in Thucydides opinion, made war inevitable. And if war was long-term inevitable then pericles’ attempt to stall for peace might not have been the optimal move imho.
Second question is what about Persians? Did the presence and function of Delian league actually stopped the possibility of Persian invasion? How did persians managed to help Spartans build 3 navies and nobody in Greece did not called Spartans a traitors?! How many of those ships belonged to Corith or Thebes? why on earth, Spartans instead of ships would not buy a siege weapons and techniques from Persian or Egyptians?? that would be so much cheaper and easier to conquer the Athens than going into seafearing business.
As I will explain in next video, Persians were NOT going to stir up hornet's nest of war w/Athens unless Sparta demonstrated that it could actually hurt the city. Thucydides constantly reminds us that by PW most Greeks disliked Athens and right from the outset they were happy to use 'barbarian' help to bring Athens down. Corinth constantly exaggerated its ability to fight Athens on sea and Syracusan help never came. Sparta's siege weakness was an inherent fault of its military organization - couldn't stay on field for long. Storming forts would also cost too much precious Spartan soldiers. They would buy the equipment soon enough but that wasn't the main problem for Sparta (or Greeks in general) re: siege.
Strategy Stuff : that opens the question, why despite Sparts inability to effectively siege Athens and storm its walls, Persians eventually did helped them. But i ll patiently wait for your next video. :)
short answer is the the Persian power in Asia minor was shattered in the previous generation under Kimon and the Delian League. The Phonecian navies would not dare to sale west of Cyprus until the Athenians and Spartans had undermined each other thoroughly. Secondly nothing that is expedient to a great empire is inconsistent. No Greek or anyone really (think nazi's working with communists in ww2) would think twice about taking money or help from anyone else as long as they could get away with it. The Spartans were ready to sell the Eastern Greeks to the Great King and only under extreme pressure renegotiated their treaty with Persia. To the third point Sparta was a Quasi- Feudal/Militant/Communist state (i know right?!?!) but they had no national treasury and required contributions from allies and defeated enemies to pay for things. They also used barter and iron money among themselves. Even if they bought siege equipment (which was unnecessary) They needed skilled and trained crew to operate it, maintain it and skilled engineers to set them up properly. This would take months to set up and do. In which time the athenians could ravage and devastate any city they choose and for sparta especially long absence from home could be catastrophic do to the real possibility of a Helot revolt at home. Do to these factors a lengthy siege of Athens was simply impossible during most of the war and especially when athens ruled the seas and could not be starved out. The allies had different governments and economic systems. They could not afford to buy much, until later in the war and they became very unpopular because of the contributions. As such they needed Persian money to maintain a navy with which to match the Athenian. While at the beginning of the war most states used the equivalent of Feudal levies or militias that were raised for a short time but returned home soon after to protect their lands and work in their shops and farms by the end of the war many states employed mercenaries who fought year round and they would become a major theme of Mediterranean warfare. there is off course much more to it but hope it helps
Could you do a video about Hannibal's strategy against Rome, or in general the Punic Wars
I know it is kind of randomly asking but do anybody know of a good site to watch new tv shows online?
It’s kind of funny this city states fought so fiercely against each other for so little territory and power and then only a few decades a relatively backwater power would conquer most of “known” world.
They were fighting for scraps, Philuppus and Alexander went for the whole cake
At external common enemy does wonders for unity
An external common enemy does wonders for unity
that backwater power won because of brilliancy :) otherwise they wouldn't make it.
Didn't realise you were from HK, from your accent I thought you might be American.
He does but I also think he has a slight Hong Konger accent the more you listen to him speak.
@Hulagu Mongke
Well then, quite the weird unprompted response...
The fuck?
An American...in spirit!
A lot of people who like history, love to imagine what they would do in these situations. Its great to hear you give the perspective of both sides in these videos. Not just covering what happened in these wars, but the why. Your one of the most unique history tubers on the site, keep up the great work!
I was wondering a few days ago when you’d upload again
I find it painfully obvious that the thing Pericles was deathly afraid of was overextension. He could sustain a long war near indefinitely, he could choke the Sparta-Corinth coalition with his naval power, he could perform short-term raids, he could goad the enemy into long and fruitless expeditions to reach the far-reaching colonies, he could play the political differences within the alliance and hope for instability to capitalize on, he could wait for Argos to join in, he could wait for an opportunity to defeat his enemies in detail, but all that would be in vain had he done the very stupid thing of trying to make moves that expend his resources without a really good reason to.
Between you and Historia Civilis ....I don’t know who takes longer to upload. Lol. I love both of you tho.
This is a pretty deft summary of the geo-strategic nature of land powers and sea powers. Even with a political, economic, and military system that was outdated for the time (it was built to win the annual summer raiding battles for arable lands between cities, not attritional battles of the Peloponessian and Corinthian War), the Spartans managed to eventually overcome the deadlock thanks to Athenian hubris and relative political instability. It is quite interesting as the Peloponessian War effectively demonstrates the limits of sea power in containing a land locked power and draws parallels to the similar situation that played out during the Cold War. The starting positions obviously were slightly different but the overarching strategic planning and decisions were very similar.
Considering the war was lost by means of plague imported from Egyptian grain,
the Peloponessian serves as a terrible demonstration of sea versus land power limits,
more a reminder that one has little ability to interlude in either one's own fate or that of one's fellow,
despite even the strenuous effort to maintain or extinguish a flame by means of statehood.
@@0MVR_0 Or a Machiavellian interpretation - Athenian strategy had the effect of maximizing the role of forces outside their control - that of disease, and that of political stability and overall strategic cohesiveness in the event of Pericles' death. And this was a logical outgrowth of their faith in their sea power and long walls.
@@0MVR_0 I think that the largest contributing factor to the fall of Athens and the collapse of the Delian league was the invasion of Sicily which resulted in the loss of nearly half the Athenian citizen body, the entire fleet, and the loss of influential poltiical leaders.
This created political chaos at home, military weakness, and massive financial burdens.
While Athens was able to stabilize and rebuild one last fleet, they were now on the back foot in the war of naval attrition. They could not risk losing this final fleet so they could only fight defensively and couldn't follow up any victories.
Combined with the political instability in the late Athenian democracy, there wasn't much they could do once the Persians started bank rolling the Spartan navy. It was only a matter of time before the whole house of cards came down and Athens would lose control of the seas, access to its empire, and grain imports.
In summary: over extension and hubris lead to Athen's downfall. If certain decisions were deferred, the Athenians might have been able to keep Sparta politically isolated and change the risk analysis of the Persians for bankrolling Sparta. The Athenians may have been able to force terms on Sparta by nimbling away at the edges of Spartan territory like the earlier peace of Nicias. Instead they went all in on a proxy war that allowed their enemies the ability to defeat them in detail at only a modest risk to themselves.
With all that being said, the Spartan situation wasn't much better. They lost nearly half their citizen population in a disastrous earthquake before the start of the Archidamian War. This and the subsequent wars against Athens and Thebes lead to a terminal demographic decline that eventually destroyed the state after all the attempts to reverse this trend failed.
History can be likened to a revolving door. It will go round and round forever, with people many centuries removed making the same decisions that lead to the same results. And it will continue this trend until someone learns from history and strikes off through the opening, leading to either a new revolving door or back to the old one.
@@nicholaswalsh4462 until AI becomes powerful enough to enslave (or replace) humanity
I love your analysis. It's so insightful and deep. You are such a smart person. Keep it up
Beautiful analysis. As clear, detailed and seemingly dispassionate as that of Thucydides. :)
Thank god you're back! Was worried you might have been arrested during the Hong Kong protests. Knowing your view of Geopolitics I know you probably participated in the protests to make it as hard as possible for China to enforce their law on Hong Kong.
Well judging from the state of China’s econ now I think the geoeconomics video I did was probably the worst thing I did to them. I have my concerns abt direction of hk protests which is mainly what I’ve been ruminating on.
@@StrategyStuff Glad to see you back and not in the custody of Hong Kong "law enforcement". That geoeconomics video is great, by the way. I use it in one of the classes that I teach.
@@StrategyStuff Is it possible to hear your thoughts on the direction of the protests?
I'm going to make a 3-parter on that covering strategies of protest/revolution. Not sure if you're a Hong Konger but I've been increasingly disconcerted about the insistence of 'being water' to the point of NOT having any overarching organization.
Without it, these protests run on blood (i.e. the angry mobilization caused by it). As an example, local commentators all credit PolyU battle w/winning District Council elections, HKHRDA etc, but back then they were all screaming for students to leave before they get hurt. No blood, no mobilization - it's perverse but that's what the dynamic is like.
This means that from a strategic POV, protests are also being driven by govt incompetence - if govt simply waited protestors out this thing would have been over in 2 months. So continued 'be water' = protestors are not in charge of their own destiny.
I argue organization is the way that protestors can do long-term mobilization that isn't 100% reliant on outrage. Of course easier said than done and that's why 'be water' is the deceptively simple solution.
@@StrategyStuff I live in Singapore so it's interesting to see another Asian Tiger face these sorts of issues as Singaporean democracy isn't exactly the freest in the world although the government structure is still very different from HK. Then again, Singapore is to an extent taking advantage of business moving out of HK.
I recognized the Cantonese twang because I have several Chinese friends, but your grammar was so solid I still figured you for living in the West, well done. While I studied in England as well, I came out sounding very posh because of what the profs sounded like at King's, so most anglophone people can still tell I'm not British. One word of advice though, if you plan on making any more videos of the ancient world. C is almost always pronounced the K way as opposed to the S way. Though the S way has an annoying way of working itself into documentaries and audiobooks (mostly because pronouncing Caesar with an S became the standard), prior to the Middle Ages C was practically always pronounced as K in names and titles.
Thanks for the advice. I suppose you were referring to the pronunciation of Thucydides? I tend to prefer the common pronunciations for the more well-known proper nouns
Man as i watch this. i can imagine the joy of the Persian king. playing with greeks like puppets
But they got screwed later.
Are you from Hong Kong? Your english is so clean that i assumes you were from somewhere in the english-speaking world, or the nordics/netherlands.
Studied in UK for years. On a writing level my English is better than Canto.
@@StrategyStuff Hahah it makes sense why your pronounciation of chinese names in other videos were so good now.
And i really appreciate the videos.
Strategy Stuff I don't think British English is as clear as your, though.
Strategy Stuff 竟六个月没做视频，看来是参与了。
I absolutely love your channel, and love watching your videos. God bless the protesters in Hong Kong, and support from the USA! :)
Shorewall....This is really embarrassing for you. Remember January 6, 2021 Capitol Hill invasion by Americans. Please remove your comment.
Question: what was Persian and Megas Helas interests a this early stage ?
What did the greeks from the boot of Italy factor in the early stage of the war ?
Very interesting, I really appreciate your videos.
Thank you for your great work.
The Greeks in Sicily basically wanted no part of the war in Greece, despite Athens and Sparta trying to bring them into the war. Persia's interest in Greece post-Xerxes was just to make sure the Greeks didn't stir up more trouble in their western provinces, particularly Egypt. Athenian naval strength prevented Persia from taking the measures needed for internal security and so Persia undoubtedly wanted them cut down to size.
Strategy STuff and Navigable Rivers!!!
Are these army numbers reasonable? The 'Roman' ruled Balkans could seemingly only mobilise 25 000 to at most 50 000 men judging by Byzantine army numbers after Manzikert and Licinius battle against Maxentius Daia. Venice could mobilise 20 000 troops when they controlled vast trade networks across the mediterranean. How could these few cities mobilise so many men?
I recognise that the geo-strategic conclusions of the video are equally valid irrelevant of the magnitude of these army sizes. But that one could still make an advanced thesis on the administrative and geographical distinctions cause these alleged disparities in army sizes, and this could be very useful in analysing geo-strategic situations.
Well we should consider that for all intents and purposes, Ancient Greek armies were basically militias of Ancient Greek cities that comprised the majority of the adult male population excluding the elderly. Since they supplied their own equipment the state doesn't need to do that expensive task. Training of these troops wouldn't also really be an issue since most Ancient Greek armies were mainly undisciplined since the Ancient Greeks believed so much in individual liberty that being controlled and subordinated by a commander to train them was unthinkable. The only exception to this rule was Sparta who did train their troops and could march in formation which was a shock to other Greek armies which can be described as well-armoured mobs with some ranged units and a small amount of cavalry.
Right, so I checked the sources of the 60k Peloponnesians number (from Henderson's 'Great War') and they come from Plutarch's bio of Pericles, so it + Thucydides' numbers (e.g. 40k ATH in Syracuse) are always subject to ancient exaggeration. That said, the outsized mobilization nos. of Greek armies came at the cost of logistical reach - neither the Byzantines nor the Romans would have found marching from S -> N Greece difficult, unlike even Sparta. Outside of Athens, Greek armies of the time could stay in the field only c. 1 month before they had to leave.
The other side of this is that if the decisive battles is going to be fought in your neighborhood, then it makes sense to mobilize everybody for 1-2 days to maximize chances of victory.
Once you get to actual long-term campaigns the numbers drop off - Alexander's army crossing into Persia was c.35k men
Strategy Stuff Thank you so much for that rationalisation!
James Tang I don't think that's the primary reason behind these number disparities, mainly because the theory that Greek hoplites were almost entirely "quantity over quality" wouldn't explain how well the Persian wars went. If these were mere mobs in hoplite gear, they wouldn't seem capable of fighting effectively against an outnumbering opponent. But that's exactly what happened in Plataea for instance.
i see upload i give a like
I'm glad you are safe and sound, consider the current situation in HK. Great video as always.
Stay strong Hong Kong!
YES MORE VIDEOS PLEASE.
Amazing as always.
Glad to see this channel back after six months.
Speaking of Democracy’s god bless Hong Kong in keeping theirs!
Strange comment
I love the amount of detail that goes into these videos
Good stuff man, thanks for your work!
I wonder if Greece could have won against Macedon, when Athens had been the victor in the Peloponnesian war. Athenenian culture and economy was much more outgoing and expansionist than Spartan. Athens really could have built a big empire.
Man, I was wondering when you would make your next video
Athens could only afford 1 battle. And the battle had to be a decisive battle against at least 2/3 of the league’s forces. Simply impossible, they have no Alexander or Caesar type character to overcome their shitty position
been listening to prof.kagan lectures on the pelponnesian war. these shows of yours are excellent
He lives!
Athens' strategy was strange for sure
A guy living in Hong Kong, making a video about Greek democracy, goes missing. Precarious
I have never seen this channel before and it just showed up in my Recommended feed. I though "oh, like hell I'm going to watch a 26 minute video from someone I don't even know". Turns out I had to update some files so I let it play while they updated and boy am I impressed, fantastic content.
The files already updated but I stayed to watch this until the end.
Came back to make sure I liked it.
Always love watching your videos
Don't say western coast of T, that coast is Greece for us, and a place of captivity.
Say Anatolia.
I love this channel. You are the best and I hope your channel blows up soon
Could you do strategic picture of nazi germany in WW2?
Great Video
Stay safe!
Love HK!
the biggest question I have is how Peloponiasian league was organized, and who was its biggest benefactor? Sparta, Thebes or Corinth? Sparta took a leadership role in a conflict started by Corinth and Corcyra. Even after a 30 years peace agreement its was forced to fight again because Thebes and Corinth were not happy with the results. Was it those two cities that were seeking to become nxt hegemon of Greece? If look at Thebes fighting Sparta after the peloponisian war, that might be the case.
Peloponnesian League's organization was loose w/its main purpose being to mobilize Sparta's allies for war; quite unlike Delian League in this respect. Also unlike DL, Sparta was more 'first among equals' in PL - because it needed the support of its allies to actually do anything. So PL had a lot of discussion, defection etc as mentioned. Sparta was still its biggest benefactor of PL bc w/o it, it would have a much tougher time maintaining hegemony w/o steady allies.
@@StrategyStuff the irony is not lost on me here. Athens (democracy) leads a despotic empire, in its own favor, while Sparta (monarchy) is a leader of democratic alliance. :) Did Corith of Thebes sent armies or fleets for combined operations?
Corinth sent ships but not enough to make a dent in Athenian navy. Thebes basically fought its own war and even took over some Spartan outposts that it wanted.
Strategy Stuff : i got half-question half-observation. according to this video ( ruclips.net/video/smHMobjTjBA/видео.html ) greek colonisazation of the Med was done largly by native Ioanin greeks (who later became led by Athens) then by Dorian greeks, who later become led by Sparta and Corinth and in less extent by anatolian greeks in northern Med, who consolidate their power in Thebes. if you compare major revolts against Delian league, with map of origins of colonies, then you msy notice that it was Dorian and Anatolians (mostly) who revolted. So perhaps the core of Peloponisian war was not only in "hard power" or grand ambitions. Perhaps there is an underlying competition of greek family trees?
Of course was some ethnic tension, which is why Sparta and Athens were so worried that the Dorian Syracusans would help Sparta (and Thebes would later punish Boeotian towns for the crime of 'Atticizing'). But Ionians revolted with similar intensity against Athens (Samos before the PW; Chios during); and the Corinthian colony of Corcyra fought vs Corinth, so it's not all about ethnicity.
Stunning video as always. Best of luck in your current situation.
Well you been busy then!
EY you're back i love this stuff
Great video! Nice work
I really love this channel
thank you so much for uploading, big fan of your channel and all your work.
100 likes. From athens of all places
awesome video!
Great stuff
You exist!
glad you're back
Your back! I love your content!
This is very well done.
You’re from HK too? :D
Love to see that Navy is always determinant in any war. Be safe in HK, blessings 🙏 and thanks for this video 👌
Athens was only vulnerable from the Sea. Sparta could be taken from land any time (no port, not great walls either…).
Thank you for upload
Great video!
Very excited for this series.
Assassin's Creed odeyssey 🤣
loved
Awesome!!
Imagine what THEY could've done if they didn't fight each other
Thanks
this is one of the most in-depth videos i have ever seen
been waiting for a new post for ages
Seems like a lot of suppositions are made here and you have forgotten the human angle of the conflict. The war was not universally popular in both states and neither had as yet irredeemably hurt each other before the war. To the point where it was Corinth that agitated for it and threatened to secede from the Sparta alliance. As such Both Athens and Sparta could both be Phlegmatic in their starting effort as there was every possibility of peace. Why would Pericles destroy any good will from the Pelopenesians when he might just hold out long enough for them to see reason while maintaining a vigilant watch for secession among the tributary states and allies. That this did not take place was the great Tragedy for the former allies of the Persian war.
Suppositions are almost a given with analysing history. Your viewpoint is valid and I’ve presented aspects of your case in the 1st video. That said I think we can overestimate the contingent aspects of this war to the detriment of the long term or even - dare we say it - irrational causes (‘fear’) that, in Thucydides opinion, made war inevitable. And if war was long-term inevitable then pericles’ attempt to stall for peace might not have been the optimal move imho.
Second question is what about Persians? Did the presence and function of Delian league actually stopped the possibility of Persian invasion? How did persians managed to help Spartans build 3 navies and nobody in Greece did not called Spartans a traitors?! How many of those ships belonged to Corith or Thebes? why on earth, Spartans instead of ships would not buy a siege weapons and techniques from Persian or Egyptians?? that would be so much cheaper and easier to conquer the Athens than going into seafearing business.
As I will explain in next video, Persians were NOT going to stir up hornet's nest of war w/Athens unless Sparta demonstrated that it could actually hurt the city.
Thucydides constantly reminds us that by PW most Greeks disliked Athens and right from the outset they were happy to use 'barbarian' help to bring Athens down. Corinth constantly exaggerated its ability to fight Athens on sea and Syracusan help never came.
Sparta's siege weakness was an inherent fault of its military organization - couldn't stay on field for long. Storming forts would also cost too much precious Spartan soldiers. They would buy the equipment soon enough but that wasn't the main problem for Sparta (or Greeks in general) re: siege.
Strategy Stuff : that opens the question, why despite Sparts inability to effectively siege Athens and storm its walls, Persians eventually did helped them. But i ll patiently wait for your next video. :)
short answer is the the Persian power in Asia minor was shattered in the previous generation under Kimon and the Delian League. The Phonecian navies would not dare to sale west of Cyprus until the Athenians and Spartans had undermined each other thoroughly.
Secondly nothing that is expedient to a great empire is inconsistent. No Greek or anyone really (think nazi's working with communists in ww2) would think twice about taking money or help from anyone else as long as they could get away with it. The Spartans were ready to sell the Eastern Greeks to the Great King and only under extreme pressure renegotiated their treaty with Persia.
To the third point Sparta was a Quasi- Feudal/Militant/Communist state (i know right?!?!) but they had no national treasury and required contributions from allies and defeated enemies to pay for things. They also used barter and iron money among themselves. Even if they bought siege equipment (which was unnecessary) They needed skilled and trained crew to operate it, maintain it and skilled engineers to set them up properly. This would take months to set up and do. In which time the athenians could ravage and devastate any city they choose and for sparta especially long absence from home could be catastrophic do to the real possibility of a Helot revolt at home. Do to these factors a lengthy siege of Athens was simply impossible during most of the war and especially when athens ruled the seas and could not be starved out. The allies had different governments and economic systems.
They could not afford to buy much, until later in the war and they became very unpopular because of the contributions. As such they needed Persian money to maintain a navy with which to match the Athenian. While at the beginning of the war most states used the equivalent of Feudal levies or militias that were raised for a short time but returned home soon after to protect their lands and work in their shops and farms by the end of the war many states employed mercenaries who fought year round and they would become a major theme of Mediterranean warfare.
there is off course much more to it but hope it helps
Hong Kong geopolitics would be really interesting and insightful. Good luck out there!
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Spartan logic
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Sparta! Helles!!