i think that philosophy in this century is all about "talking" and "giving weird theories" without any specific proves or something that make it seems real.
I think eliminative materialism stands on a shaky ground. It still has to explain why mental states persist or appear even after we argue that these are mistaken. Reductionism is superior. It concludes these do not exist in themselves but admit of an existence (phenomenological or "must) in relation to underlying constituents.
Thank you. So, is my brain understanding correctly that reductive vs eliminative materialism is another way of talking about the epiphenomenalism debate, please? What do we gain from positing a sort of mental reality with its own ontological status if it cannot influence the energetic world we do know exists? Don’t the Churchlands concede that the sort of everyday “folk” language we use to describe complex (largely not [yet] completely understood) is merely the most convenient way of talking about what happens when these brain states occur since: I. we are not all neuroscientists, II. neuroscientists don’t understand the reality of the brain completely [indeed, neurology as a medical science is indisputably still in its inchoate phases in which neurologists often throw modalities at ailments until finding which works best for the patient… or give up and inadequately mask symptoms instead of fighting insurance or allowing patient autonomy to accept the possibility of a minuscule risk in our overly litigatious society], III. if they did understand, we laypeople interlocutors would still have to have a basic grasp of the technical language they are using to describe what “ire,” “bliss,” etc. refer to in brain activity, and finally IV. such technically correct language would take too much time in quotidian conversation? If so, saying their “beliefs” that eliminative materialism is true and epiphenomenalism is pointless are self-referentially incoherent is misguided. I don’t get the idea from reading “Striking a Nerve,” which I confess to not having finished after I “felt frustrated” that she was writing about how to face the upsetting “facts” science doesn’t have much treatment available for Klinefelter or MS (Testosterone or hCG with aromatase inhibitors or PLEX and/or IVIg w/ possible rituximab, etc. do a pretty damn good job compared to when she was growing up in rural Canada!), that she’s being epistemically arrogance. She is simply claiming that even if neuroscience is barely out of the Dark Ages, we don’t have any better, if any, other, dependable ways to repeatably demonstrate any realities outside of empirical science. I think “emotional”/emotive reactions to eliminative reductionism can be vehement; people (even our brains) are creatures of habit, our brain functions we call beliefs being no exception. I’m “glad” that this didn’t stop the MacArthur Fellowship form awarding Patricia their genius grant, and I suspect future people will share this brain state.
Great example of when philosophy losses its usefulness; to reject a theory in the hope that a better theory comes along without evidence that contradicts it, gains us nothing.
I completely disagree. Philosophical matters are best understood when they are thoroughly broken down. Repetition is a part of the process! I'm sure you could find more condensed material if you wanted to.
I don't agree, thought, have opinions, say that trees exist. they are still theories. “we cannot escape meaning” (Lionel naccache) To think is to theorize. it's so funny. the brain never stops its stories.
The latest idiocy to show up. Just as bad as the Behaviorism of the past century which N. Chomsky, thankfully, refuted as the gibberish it was. Hopefully, someone will show up to refute this nonsense. What has happened to philosophy, once a respected profession with great minds discussing ideas. Now we have a reductionist who wants to inform us that we really do not have minds, we just think we have. Enough. I would not usually advise taking a controlled substance but P. Churchland may benefit from one.
i think that philosophy in this century is all about "talking" and "giving weird theories" without any specific proves or something that make it seems real.
I think eliminative materialism stands on a shaky ground. It still has to explain why mental states persist or appear even after we argue that these are mistaken. Reductionism is superior. It concludes these do not exist in themselves but admit of an existence (phenomenological or "must) in relation to underlying constituents.
Well done.
Thanks, a very timely topic in the era of AI chat assistants becoming so powerful!
Cool video! Thank you for motivating the various positions in the debate with such great clarity!
An example of how ideology can lead you to the most ludicrously self-refuting ideas.
Thank you. So, is my brain understanding correctly that reductive vs eliminative materialism is another way of talking about the epiphenomenalism debate, please?
What do we gain from positing a sort of mental reality with its own ontological status if it cannot influence the energetic world we do know exists?
Don’t the Churchlands concede that the sort of everyday “folk” language we use to describe complex (largely not [yet] completely understood) is merely the most convenient way of talking about what happens when these brain states occur since: I. we are not all neuroscientists, II. neuroscientists don’t understand the reality of the brain completely [indeed, neurology as a medical science is indisputably still in its inchoate phases in which neurologists often throw modalities at ailments until finding which works best for the patient… or give up and inadequately mask symptoms instead of fighting insurance or allowing patient autonomy to accept the possibility of a minuscule risk in our overly litigatious society], III. if they did understand, we laypeople interlocutors would still have to have a basic grasp of the technical language they are using to describe what “ire,” “bliss,” etc. refer to in brain activity, and finally IV. such technically correct language would take too much time in quotidian conversation?
If so, saying their “beliefs” that eliminative materialism is true and epiphenomenalism is pointless are self-referentially incoherent is misguided.
I don’t get the idea from reading “Striking a Nerve,” which I confess to not having finished after I “felt frustrated” that she was writing about how to face the upsetting “facts” science doesn’t have much treatment available for Klinefelter or MS (Testosterone or hCG with aromatase inhibitors or PLEX and/or IVIg w/ possible rituximab, etc. do a pretty damn good job compared to when she was growing up in rural Canada!), that she’s being epistemically arrogance. She is simply claiming that even if neuroscience is barely out of the Dark Ages, we don’t have any better, if any, other, dependable ways to repeatably demonstrate any realities outside of empirical science.
I think “emotional”/emotive reactions to eliminative reductionism can be vehement; people (even our brains) are creatures of habit, our brain functions we call beliefs being no exception. I’m “glad” that this didn’t stop the MacArthur Fellowship form awarding Patricia their genius grant, and I suspect future people will share this brain state.
Great example of when philosophy losses its usefulness; to reject a theory in the hope that a better theory comes along without evidence that contradicts it, gains us nothing.
Interesting topic, but a lot of completely unnecessary waffle/repetition. He could've covered all the same material in about half the time!
I completely disagree. Philosophical matters are best understood when they are thoroughly broken down. Repetition is a part of the process! I'm sure you could find more condensed material if you wanted to.
I don't agree, thought, have opinions, say that trees exist. they are still theories. “we cannot escape meaning” (Lionel naccache)
To think is to theorize. it's so funny. the brain never stops its stories.
The latest idiocy to show up. Just as bad as the Behaviorism of the past century which N. Chomsky, thankfully, refuted as the gibberish it was. Hopefully, someone will show up to refute this nonsense. What has happened to philosophy, once a respected profession with great minds discussing ideas.
Now we have a reductionist who wants to inform us that we really do not have minds, we just think we have. Enough. I would not usually advise taking a controlled substance but P. Churchland may benefit from one.