Considering the fact that if you take his reductionist approach you won't find an explanation for consciousness either, I'm not sure it rules out the possibility of an agent capable of making decisions. There is already one clear example of that approach not revealing the entire reality of the situation (even if consciousness isn't capable of "free will" in itself).
Dennett is such a third-rate philosopher. If all thought is completely materially-determined, so are the thoughts of the philosophy of material-determinism. If all the thoughts of materialist determinism are, themselves, materially determined, why would we have any belief they could be true? All such materialistic epistemological theories cut off the branch upon which they themselves sit. For anything to be true, the mind must have a realm of freedom - however small or large - within which to operate. Hence, there is no materialistic refutation of the reality of free-will.
Did Dennett not reverse himself to a great extent in his later years. He seems now to hold a compatibilism of some sort, though I never understood his exact reasoning. He was dead clear here, that he WAS not a compatibilist.
Whether one considers free will in some libertarian sense or in something akin to hard/super determinism is wholly indistinguishable from and hence irrelevant to the experience of free will. So any explanatory distinction is just an arbitrarily adopted epistemological position.
that's like saying "whether the earth goes around the sun or the sun goes around the earth is wholly indistinguishable and hence irrelevant to our experience". it may not be relevant in every context, but that doesn't mean it's not vital in some. free will beliefs have important consequences for moral judgements, for justifications of blame and punishment, for experience and understanding of guilt, etc. The fact that people live their lives everyday without being bothered by the question of free will does not mean that the different epistemological positions are without consequence.
@@oOneszaOo No it’s not the same as the earth sun relationship being indistinguishable and hence irrelevant to our experience. That relationship is objectively discernable and indeed its early misunderstanding did cause all manner of not only many different significant beliefs but also many different significant cultural practices. The essential difference between that and the nature of free will is that the nature of free will is not objectively discernable but only discernable through our subjective experience. Our experience having free will is undeniable and as its foundational status cannot be determined views adopted in respect of its foundation can only be arbitrarily adopted epistemological positions. Any psychological implications for those adopting specific views about free will are wholly irrelevant in respect of the nature of free will itself. Worry caused by arbitrary belief about the unknowable foundational nature of free will is very far down on the list of potential psychological problems that can manifest for those self-imprisoned by irrational belief.
@@coniferviveur3788 the problem is not primarily psychological, it's social/cultural because of the foundational nature of free will beliefs for systems of morality and justice. different cultural beliefs about free will cause different significant cultural practices in these regards (blame, punishment, guilt and so on), arguably more so than facts about the earth's rotation. to say that the difference hinges on its being objectively discernable is confusing facts and values. there is more cultural value attached to free will beliefs TODAY than there is to many empirical facts that are simply taken for granted. obviously, scientific paradigm shifts / discoveries impact culture, but that is because of the value we attach to them, not because of their intrinsically subject-indpendent nature. western culture has attached great value to free will for a long time just as it has attached great value to the concept of marriage, neither of which has any basis in "objective" reality.
@@oOneszaOo Value is indeed attached to our belief in free will but as value is subjective it is hence psychological in nature. People have an innate prevailing and persistent experience of free will and therefore cultural and societal norms have evolved to incorporate this value since these norms are a reflection of cultural and societal constituent groupings. Objective empirical facts are irrelevant to free will since free will is wholly subjective. People can attach whatever value they choose to free will just as people can attach whatever value they choose to any subjective experience. Scientific facts are not taken for granted or based on cultural/ascetic/religious/popularity/value considerations but are grounded on objective verification - that is what makes them facts. People are not free to choose empirical facts although they are free to ignore facts they find inconvenient or incompatible with their personal subjective beliefs and views. Cultural values can be and often are influenced by objective empirical facts but this varies culture by culture depending on what is accepted as fact and its assigned relative importance. Whatever value any individual or culture places upon free will is determined by arbitrary criteria. But the point is that the fundamental nature of free will is unknown and probably unknowable. So all there is in that respect are various competing epistemological positions which are all predicted on conjectural premises. This is my original point and while there may be cultural considerations of value associated with belief in free will it is simply irrelevant.
The political implications of this are that people should not be given choices; they should be ordered about according to what is objectively right, and that happiness or unhappiness are illusions.
Oh he's saying cause and effect are external forces that fix our destinies. Is he Hegelian or Marxist ? Because he's talking like em. And it feels like he's talking about dialectics as external force.
this argument already happened almost four centuries ago between Descartes and Malebranche. what's new here?
Considering the fact that if you take his reductionist approach you won't find an explanation for consciousness either, I'm not sure it rules out the possibility of an agent capable of making decisions. There is already one clear example of that approach not revealing the entire reality of the situation (even if consciousness isn't capable of "free will" in itself).
Does Dennet ever address the Mary’s room thought experiment?
Dennett is such a third-rate philosopher. If all thought is completely materially-determined, so are the thoughts of the philosophy of material-determinism. If all the thoughts of materialist determinism are, themselves, materially determined, why would we have any belief they could be true? All such materialistic epistemological theories cut off the branch upon which they themselves sit. For anything to be true, the mind must have a realm of freedom - however small or large - within which to operate. Hence, there is no materialistic refutation of the reality of free-will.
Did Dennett not reverse himself to a great extent in his later years. He seems now to hold a compatibilism of some sort, though I never understood his exact reasoning. He was dead clear here, that he WAS not a compatibilist.
He's always been a compatibilist and nothing he says here suggests otherwise.
Whether one considers free will in some libertarian sense or in something akin to hard/super determinism is wholly indistinguishable from and hence irrelevant to the experience of free will. So any explanatory distinction is just an arbitrarily adopted epistemological position.
that's like saying "whether the earth goes around the sun or the sun goes around the earth is wholly indistinguishable and hence irrelevant to our experience". it may not be relevant in every context, but that doesn't mean it's not vital in some. free will beliefs have important consequences for moral judgements, for justifications of blame and punishment, for experience and understanding of guilt, etc. The fact that people live their lives everyday without being bothered by the question of free will does not mean that the different epistemological positions are without consequence.
@@oOneszaOo No it’s not the same as the earth sun relationship being indistinguishable and hence irrelevant to our experience. That relationship is objectively discernable and indeed its early misunderstanding did cause all manner of not only many different significant beliefs but also many different significant cultural practices. The essential difference between that and the nature of free will is that the nature of free will is not objectively discernable but only discernable through our subjective experience.
Our experience having free will is undeniable and as its foundational status cannot be determined views adopted in respect of its foundation can only be arbitrarily adopted epistemological positions. Any psychological implications for those adopting specific views about free will are wholly irrelevant in respect of the nature of free will itself. Worry caused by arbitrary belief about the unknowable foundational nature of free will is very far down on the list of potential psychological problems that can manifest for those self-imprisoned by irrational belief.
@@coniferviveur3788 the problem is not primarily psychological, it's social/cultural because of the foundational nature of free will beliefs for systems of morality and justice. different cultural beliefs about free will cause different significant cultural practices in these regards (blame, punishment, guilt and so on), arguably more so than facts about the earth's rotation. to say that the difference hinges on its being objectively discernable is confusing facts and values. there is more cultural value attached to free will beliefs TODAY than there is to many empirical facts that are simply taken for granted. obviously, scientific paradigm shifts / discoveries impact culture, but that is because of the value we attach to them, not because of their intrinsically subject-indpendent nature. western culture has attached great value to free will for a long time just as it has attached great value to the concept of marriage, neither of which has any basis in "objective" reality.
@@oOneszaOo Value is indeed attached to our belief in free will but as value is subjective it is hence psychological in nature. People have an innate prevailing and persistent experience of free will and therefore cultural and societal norms have evolved to incorporate this value since these norms are a reflection of cultural and societal constituent groupings.
Objective empirical facts are irrelevant to free will since free will is wholly subjective. People can attach whatever value they choose to free will just as people can attach whatever value they choose to any subjective experience. Scientific facts are not taken for granted or based on cultural/ascetic/religious/popularity/value considerations but are grounded on objective verification - that is what makes them facts. People are not free to choose empirical facts although they are free to ignore facts they find inconvenient or incompatible with their personal subjective beliefs and views.
Cultural values can be and often are influenced by objective empirical facts but this varies culture by culture depending on what is accepted as fact and its assigned relative importance. Whatever value any individual or culture places upon free will is determined by arbitrary criteria. But the point is that the fundamental nature of free will is unknown and probably unknowable. So all there is in that respect are various competing epistemological positions which are all predicted on conjectural premises. This is my original point and while there may be cultural considerations of value associated with belief in free will it is simply irrelevant.
Free will? 🌍 ✨️
The political implications of this are that people should not be given choices; they should be ordered about according to what is objectively right, and that happiness or unhappiness are illusions.
Oh he's saying cause and effect are external forces that fix our destinies. Is he Hegelian or Marxist ? Because he's talking like em. And it feels like he's talking about dialectics as external force.