I thought I had free will, but when I chose the white shirt instead of the black shirt I found out the white shirt had a stain and I never could have chosen it, therefore I never had free will.
but did an evil neuroscientist put a chip in your brain in the morning forcing you to choose the black shirt regardless of the stain biasing your epistemic considerations?
As a hopeful molinist, I would love to hear Dr. Ryan Mullins respond to some of these objections. (Although I believe he admits some difficulties to be sort of unresolved I guess) Please make it happen! I know he's been here before, so it's possible. Haha.
Hi, Joe, I am a Spanish speaker but I really enjoy your content. I wanted to present an argument against classical theism based on the communicable and incommunicable attributes of God and see what you think or how classical theists might respond. I apologize in advance if my English is not the best. Anyway, here it goes and I hope it makes sense: Definitions: - Incommunicable attributes (IA): They cannot have imitations ad extra and are possessed only by God, such as infinity (in any form considered), essential eternity, immensity, absolute simplicity, absolute immutability. - Communicable attributes (CA): They have imitations ad extra (outward) and are also possessed by us, such as wisdom, will, active potency, freedom, life, knowledge. Argument: 1. If we participate in God, then we must participate in all of God's attributes, because in Him, all His attributes are the same God (DDS), and we participate in God. For example, if we participate and have to some degree the Justice of God, we necessarily also participate and have to some degree the Mercy of God, since Justice and Mercy are the same in God (and Justive and Mercy are the same too), and so with the other attributes. 2. But if this is so, then we should also have, at least to some degree, incommunicable attributes, such as immutability or His creative power, for they are also in God. 3. But it is impossible for us to have, even to any degree, these attributes, for they belong only to God, being precisely incommunicable. 4. Therefore, it is impossible for us to participate in God in general, for as stated in (1), if we participate in God, then we must participate in _all_ of God's attributes. 5. But classical theism claims that we participate in God. 6. Therefore, classical theism is false.
Isn't this just another formulation of the issue of "how can we be finite and God infinite?" and not receive a similar response? We participate imperfectly of the IA which gives rise to CA which are not possessed as such by God but are analogous to IA. CA are imperfect analogies of IA, is the response of classical theism, I think
@@natanaellizama6559 Maybe the problem is that classical theists usually define AIs as those that do not admit _any_ kind of imitation or participation to any degree.
@@marianoaguilar9517 I see. Then, yes, I think your argument does follow deductively. But then I would ask whether the classical theist holds the participation of the created entity as requiring participation of the AI? But I think this is indeed a crucial and interesting take. As a non-classical theist, this does seem like a central issue. Either we hold that the entity's participation in Being implies a modality within God(so that the entity participates modally), or a strict separation(which some theists I've talked with do this) but that seems metaphysically problematic (a form of creation ex nihilo, which seems to imply an internal distinction of Being so that some aspects are transferible to the entity while others wouldn't). I'd appreciate you letting me know how classical theists resolve this
@@natanaellizama6559 In the first premise of the argument I precisely hold that if we participate in God, then we must participate in _all_ the divine attributes, because divine simplicity precisely implies that all the attributes of God are in fact one (which is God himself). So, if we participate in God, we would also have to participate, by force, in those attributes of which we are not supposed to participate at all (IA). This is the problem I see and I honestly don't know how a classical theist can solve it for now.
Any chance you would do an in depth defense video of simple foreknowledge? I’m somewhere between it and open theism. I still have some hang ups as to how useful God having simple foreknowledge is, hence why I’d love to see a video on it.
@@Dizerner well, all of Gods properties are great making properties and so presumably all of His properties would entail at least some usefulness. If the property is useless, it is hard to understand it as a sort of great making property. I wasn’t talking about how useful it is to us but how useful it is to God. Moreover my concern here is more or less whether or not simple foreknowledge is compatible with the God of the Bible who seems to both know at least some future events and uses this knowledge to bring about His plans.
@@thoughtfultheology449 Usefulness implies some goal, it is relative term. Maximal just speaks to a degree of something. So they don't have any true logical connection as is. God has more power then he "uses" so by that definition unless God uses literally infinite power all the time, it becomes "useless" power, but if God did that, creation could not handle it. If you see knowledge the same way, I think you see that having more knowledge than God necessarily needs or uses to interact with creation does not somehow make God lesser than maximal, in fact it makes him truly maximal.
I didn’t know you were so sympathetic to simple foreknowledge, Joe! I guess I should rethink my objections to it. When I read Hasker he really convinced me that SF is useless, it just does nothing lol
Unfortunatly the nastiest soirutologys ( sorry about spelling) are also the most logically coherent. I tried to combine open theism with a Neo molinist landscape as PRIOR knowledge is logical. However, as far as I can see it, it also violates the law of personal identity. While I’m still looking into D.O., it just begs the question like with the molinists, while simply dismissing it out of hand.
I have barely any familiarity with this debate, beyond this video. So pardon me if my concerns have been addressed somewhere already, or I'm missing some basic stuff. But I'm wondering if we can divide Molinism into two main parts-- (1) the middle knowledge claim (that God knows what libertarianly free agents would do, in non-actual circumstances), and (2) the divine providence claim (that God uses this middle knowledge to achieve some fairly specific outcomes). Many of these objections seem more aimed at the divine providence claim, not so much at middle knowledge in itself. If God doesn't have middle knowledge, then the most likely reason why seems to be that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom don't exist. But it's not clear to me that CCFs are more problematic than truths about the *actual* future choices of libertarianly free agents. Of course, many people think there are problems with positing God's foreknowledge of what we will freely do in the future, e.g. because there might not be facts about future free choices, or God's knowing them might be incompatible with our freedom. But *if* these problems can be overcome (which most theists agree, except open theists and a few others), then I'm not sure why positing counterfactuals of free choices would be much *more* problematic.
*Why I reject so-called "Molinism"* If you are a fan of the theological scene, you probably have come across the term "Molinism" or someone who claims to be a "Molinist." It is often presented as an opposing alternative to Calvinist soteriology; it's basically, the idea that God considered tons of different worlds, and then chooses to make one based on how people react in it. As a Classical Armininan, I see a real difference with Molinism and the Arminian simple foreknowledge view. It's not that I deny middle knowledge, but Molinism makes a certain claim about what God uses it for. In general those who label themselves Molinists seem to be theologians who want to posit the idea that God specifically uses this middle knowledge to decide what world to actualize. I believe in classical free will and omniscience, but to suppose that God uses his knowledge of future free choices to decide whether to create possible worlds seems to me, to be wrong on two levels, both morally and logically. It is wrong for God to do this morally, for it does not allow the full freedom of self-expression in choosing for or against God, unless it adds some prior condition being met; in other words, it seems to me, God is tampering with the quality of the choice by only creating it if it is going to choose a certain thing. Thus it is not really a free expression, because it has prior conditions on it, and the quality of freedom is altered. If God were to use middle knowledge to create a world, he could simply only create people whom he knew would freely choose the good; this is a simple idea, and there is no logical problem with it. On the other hand, of course, there might be people that reject God in all possible worlds. But we Libertarians argue God can't tamper with free will, and so can't force the decision the creation makes. Deciding to make something based on what it will choose in the future is a form of tampering with freedom, a similar moral dilemma. God is being selective and manipulative over the self-expression of his creation by denying the existence of any creation that doesn't choose a certain way. The second way I think this understanding of Molinism fails, is it is logically untenable as well. The reason for this is that it is not circumstantial or peer pressure by which people decide what ultimate spiritual choices they make; there is not a way to influence or coerce them through the potential world being conceived, because these choices are not made for such shallow reasons as whether our best friend chooses Christ or not, or whether we are born in a country that accepts or prohibits the preaching of the Gospel. This "trans-world" depravity of all who would fundamentally choose to reject God means that alternate scenarios cannot decide or alter the number of saved or damned individuals. Tweaking the input factors will always have the same number of people saved and lost. Using middle knowledge is an inadequate means to pressure or manipulate people into accepting Christ, for their decisions will remain the same under any scenario, and the Bible instructs that we are not even supposed to let circumstances dictate these important spiritual choices. If you think about it, Molinism is trying to solve the problem of evil in a creative way by positing God has given everyone an optimal chance at salvation by factoring in everyone's future free will choices before creating them; this is intended to reduce the problem we all intuitively feel that God has allowed some people to be victims of other peoples' choices. But if this solution does not logically work and we notice that some people don't seem to get "a fair shake," that is, this Molinistic world hypothesis in fact leaves people in what appears to be a less than optimal state, we will not solve the problem of offense at God for what he has allowed. God has allowed people's sins to hurt other people: and fundamentally we just find that offensive, and Molinism will not somehow patch up that offense. We should not offer people a cheap solution to a perceived moral dilemma about God's actions; we should all rather seek God ourselves to overcome and develop the faith and consecration necessary to put God above the problem of evil and mystery of why he allowed Adam and others to hurt so many. And if God is creating these "pre-world" conditions for whether or not he will actualize you, he is altering the quality of the freedom, and putting constraints and conditions upon it. God decides, "I will only create Person A if they fit in to a maximally gracious world B," and thus there is preconditions upon Person A's free choice, he will only be created if he chooses a certain way. This means, Person A does not get to be created with a real un-manipulated libertarian choice of for or against God for the fundamental reason of simply choosing or rejecting God for who he is, but only if he will choose or reject God for the inferior and idolatrous reasons of how his circumstances pan out, which basis for a choice for God is thoroughly condemned in Scripture. Even if we are encouraged to consider the negative consequences sin will leave us in, we cannot simply use God as a pawn to get what we want. God would not use sinful motivations to plan worlds that determine who gets saved, and who doesn't. That's not a pure motivation for choosing or rejecting God. We don't accept God only because we experience or see evil, we accept God because by grace we realize God's worth. It is true evil can discipline or chastise us, causing us to see the terribleness of our sin, but this cannot be said to be the fundamental reason to choose God to begin with: it is merely an extra mercy to refine an impurity. Adam and Eve did not need evil to be able to make the right choice, nor to be maximally graced to make the right choice. The need for evil to chastise or persuade only comes after original sin has already forced the world to be inherently permeated with injustice. In judgment God remembers mercy, the judgments are not mercy itself. God could certainly use his middle knowledge to minimize judgments and maximally grace people under the current conditions, but not to set up the world to begin with and only create people when they choose under certain conditions. The real reason God allows evil to happen, is not just the expression of love or freedom, because those don't necessitate the amount of collateral damage, the horrific consequences that the current evil entails. God could have just zapped Adam and Eve out of existence the very moment they put their mouths on that fruit. No, God allows the consequences of evil to be so horrendous to give weight and importance to the quality of the choice as being an opportunity to glorify and honor God for who he is, an expression of God's own worth. The proper theodicy is a free will choice based on the holiness of God, not on "soul-building" properties; God's right to be glorified and devalue those who devalue him. Also realize, another tangential objection is there being no logical reason God could not use middle knowledge to simply never create beings he knows will be freely evil under this system; where is the objection when the purpose is just to maximize good choices? Or why could God not simply eliminate beings as soon as they make an evil choice, instead of allowing that evil choice to hurt other people? If allowing evil is simply to create more good instead of glorify God, where is the objection anymore? Do those evil beings God creates become the best possible world to necessarily help other beings choose better choices? That seems like justifying the ends with the means, using an evil thing to bring about a good thing; but not as a last recourse, as a primary directive! And overcoming the objection to the possibility of sin in heaven is actually surprisingly easy to overcome logically: we can choose our future choices now; since only those who have chosen not to sin will enter heaven, nothing will any longer inhibit that choice. So what am I left with under Classical Arminianism? That God foreknows choices but does not "tweak" or "alter" the conditions of creation to influence and manipulate those choices, for that would be altering the quality of the choice and devaluing it. God has to "play the cards he is dealt," as some Calvinists so poignantly like to state, and this also explains why the majority of human history seems to be quite a failure from man's side, yet God still creates it. God is willing to take "snake eyes" to allow that quality of choice to stand for what is, without deciding to create it based on how it will choose, which otherwise would not be fully and truly free in regards to the object of the choice. In the end, it may seem less interesting or exciting to simply believe that God foreknows autonomous choices and reacts in accordance to them, rather than decide to create based on foreknowing them, but it is the straight and Biblical way to harmonize sovereignty and free will. Although God does possess middle knowledge and uses it for many things, it would be wrong to determine the actualization of certain worlds to alter the number of saved and damned in some optimal way. And we must always remember God may very well not always act on all the foreknowledge he has, for he is under no moral obligation to do so. Because of the above objections I can't accept Molinism and stick with simple Arminianism.
Fascinating, I am wondering if you could please provide a concise definition of “simple foreknowledge” as I think I have heard multiple different definitions and would appreciate hearing of yours.
@@sillythewanderer4221 God knows all future happenings as a dataset unrelated to "looking at it" or any kind of processing or deriving, he knows because he is outside of time and supernatural. The most common objection by Calvinists and Open Theists is that somehow hurts free will, but it doesn't hurt free will, it just hurts their ability to understand how it harmonizes, and thus they desire to put the limitations of their own mind projected back onto God's. Knowledge is not causitive, and it's as simple as that.
@@Dizerner Thanks this seems a very reasonable view especially the “knowledge is not causitive” part. Thanks again Good day and Glory to Jesus Christ !
Great video! Now I'm curious (and a little nervous!) to know in which tier you and Daniel would place my argument against Molinism. (The argument in "If Molinism is True, What Can You Do?") :)
@@MajestyofReason Thanks! I don't know how you produce so many quality videos *and* quality papers, but it's very impressive--keep it up (for all of our sakes)!
Is there any way you can upload these new episodes to Apple Podcasts? RUclips has made it hard to listen with only headphones unless you pay for premium…
I had trouble understanding this because I never got a hold on what a CCF is, and I think I narrowed that problem to my not having an intuitive understanding of "counter factual" that matches the literature. When I hear "counter" I think "against and thus not" and therefore that "counter factual" means "not true" or "false". Is "counter factual" perhaps a name which is grand fathered in from a time when "counter" meant something else? Or am I missing some shade of meaning of "counter" which is obvious to everyone who is not me? Or I should ask, "does 'counter' mean the same thing in 'counter factual' and 'counter argument'?
No, this is an entirely understandable hangup! The name has been recognized to be misleading. The most accurate name for them is *subjunctive conditionals of creaturely freedom* . They are conditionals, in the subjunctive mood, stating what some creaturely agent *would* freely do if they *were* in certain circumstances. (And this is compatible with them *actually being* in those circumstances. Compare: a theist might say to an atheist, "if God were to exist, then God would have a morally sufficient reason for allowing all this suffering". This subjunctive conditional is compatible with God actually existing.) So the antecedent of the subjunctive conditional doesn't necessarily have to be *counter to fact* (i.e., false). It may be, but it may also not be.
Context determines content.That’s the way I see it. Change the situation, change the CCFs. Moral output exceeds ‘ incoming’ thus freewill exists. Of course, what one does is contingent on context.
Plenty of brilliant people believe in molinism but I can’t make heads or tails of it. By the way, is there a majority view among professional philosophers on this. In particular, those who have specialized in this. What’s the view on the grounding issue. The heart and sole of molinism.
P1. Pruss accepts simple foreknowledge P2. If Pruss accepts p, then p is probably true C. Ergo, simple knowledge is probably true Exceptions to P2 include causal finitism and divine simplicity, of course ;)
@@IdolKiller i command thee not to slander SF. Also if eternalism is true there’s no mystery as to how God knows the future! He’s just directly aware of it in the same way he’s directly aware of the present 🙂 (And Pruss is an eternalist!)
How does molinism avoid fatalism? Under molinism, God still decides to create a universe in which he knows everything that will happen thereby making everything destined to occur, no?
@@resurrectionnerdActualising a specific world in which all actions are known doesn’t imply that we couldn’t have done otherwise, but let’s grant for the sake of argument that’s the case. God could’ve actualised a world where certain actions are more probable but not guaranteed using middle knowledge. If there are variations in action from there, then he would know that using His free knowledge.
Fatalism is not simply the fact that certain things are "destined to occur". Fatalism is the view that everything that will occur, will do so necessarily. In molinism there are truths about the future - but they are contingent truths.
I want to focus on a very unusual and peculiar objection at 34 minutes. This video claims that "Dr Craig's response to the problem of hell is racist." This is such an odd and unfounded objection it is hard to even know where to start! To set some context: Dr Craig’s “racist proposal” is an attempt to respond to the problem of the unreached lost: Namely, how can God be both just and loving and also condemn a person who never hears the gospel, due to the fact they were born in a time and place where the gospel never reached them? To put it another way, are some “lost by geographical accident”? And if so, how is this just? Dr Craig responds by arguing that God knows, in His Middle Knowledge, that there are some people who would not be freely saved in any circumstances God could have placed them. Such persons are Transworld Damned (TD). He argues that it is at least possible that anyone who is unreached and lost in the actual world could be TD, and would not be saved in any other situation God may have placed them in. So such persons are not lost by “geographical accident”. Now consider the reconsider the claim that this is racist. Who is supposed to be racist here? The one offering the response? Or God if He works this way? Let's consider each option: Firstly, is someone racist for using this response? Surely not. Such a response is not motivated by racial prejudice. Rather, it is an attempt to explain and reconcile several apparent facts: 1 Some people never hear the gospel and they are lost. 2 God exercises at least some degree of providential control over the world. 3 God is perfectly just. Anyone who wants to affirm these facts needs to find some way to reconcile the apparent inconsistency. So we all need to do some leg work here, whatever our preferred view of providence is. This problem is not unique to molinism. One route is simply to deny 1, that the un-evangelised go to hell: There are plenty of alternatives. For example we could argue that many of the unreached are saved through general revelation and special revelation like dreams and visions (so they are not actually lost). In the case of those who don’t find God, we could argue they don’t really go to hell (e.g. annihilationism of the soul or of hell itself). Now consider 1 “Some people never hear the gospel and they are lost.” A molinist may contemplate this and feel a deep burden and compassion for those who never hear and are lost. They have no choice in the matter of who these people are, what race they are or where they live (but based on the fact we *have* heard the gospel, such unreached people inevitably belong to other cultures). In love and obedience to the gospel the molinist may even set out to share the gospel in far flung places. There is no racism here. Suppose furthermore, that God does actually work like this, ordering the world such that anyone who is lost in a time and place unreached by the gospel is TD. This is at least plausible. Would the molinist then cease to be racist, since it turns out their view was correct? Hopefully you can see the absurdity of the racism claim now. Secondly then, is God racist for providentially arranging the world in this way? Such a question could almost be answered by simply affirming God’s moral perfection. We could add that all humans are made in God’s image and also that God wishes none to perish but all to come to repentance. Note all of these facts are entirely consistent with the problem of the unreached lost. But let's press the objection a little further. Does this response to the problem of the unreached-lost make God racist? No. Consider the fact that if God is planning a world in which He uses His people (who are themselves free) to share His message to the world, naturally some places will be more exposed to the gospel and other places reached later or not at all. Where does God choose to reveal Himself first? And which places receive the gospel later? This is not an arbitrary choice for a God who is concerned with saving an optimal number of people. Surely God’s solution to this providential challenge is not a matter of just picking on a particular race because they have a different color of skin to Himself! (Excuse my joking here - I want to highlight the absurdity of the racism claim!) Consider the fact that if God knows a creaturely essence has a complete set of counterfactuals, such that they suffer from TD: That is a truth about the possible person, whatever nation or race God places them in. So God’s providential decision has nothing to do with their race and everything to do with the way they freely respond to Him in the circumstance in which they could be placed. God knows this about the person logically prior to creating them in any body or with any skin color. So there just is no racism here. This really only leaves one concern: If this is how God has in fact ordered the world, then we are required to believe something about the unreached; namely they may well suffer TD. Such a view is not racist, but I fear it could lead to a kind of unloving fatalism - an apathy to share the gospel with them. Can you see how misguided this would be! They are only unreached if no one freely chooses to take the good news of the gospel to them! By lovingly obeying our call to take the gospel to the ends of the earth, we genuinely play our part in minimizing the number of people who are unreached, we create a providential landscape that is more favorable to salvation, and if God is even able to save one person - it is so worth the journey to the ends of the earth. NOTE In the video they incorrectly discuss his response to the problem of hell (in general). Craig doesn’t discuss geographical issues in his response to the more general problem of hell.
(Part 1/2) You say: “This video claims that "Dr Craig's response to the problem of hell is racist." This is such an odd and unfounded objection it is hard to even know where to start!” We do not in video actually *claim* that his response is racist. At this point in the video, we are surveying criticisms of Craig’s response to the problem of hell. We aren’t necessarily *endorsing* them or claiming that they’re successful or true. And, in fact, when I was setting up the racist view objection, I explicitly say “I’ve seen some people bring up at this juncture w.r.t. Craig’s monist defense of hell… they say the view almost seems racist…” after which I proceed to articulate *their* objection and ask Daniel for his thoughts on their objection. This is clearly not claiming that Craig’s response is actually racist. It is bringing up an objection that others have pressed according to which the veiw is racist and examining the objection. With that being said, I will hereafter examine your responses to the objection and see whether they hold water. You say: “Dr Craig responds by arguing that God knows, in His Middle Knowledge, that there are some people who would not be freely saved in any circumstances God could have placed them. Such persons are Transworld Damned (TD).” And *why* are they like this? Why is someone such that they would freely reject the Gospel even when presented? It seems quite plausible that this is due to some epistemic or moral vice on their part. (If they were both epistemically and morally virtuous, it seems like they would - at least according to Craig - accept the Gospel.) But when we combine this observation (call it ‘O’) with observations about who, thought history, has accepted the gospel, we see that certain races (e.g., native Americans, certain tribal peoples of Africa, native Amazonians, certain Australasian peoples, Thai, etc.) have significantly disproportionately failed to accept the Gospel. Hence, given the Molinist defense together with O, it follows that those races are uniquely (in contrast to other races) epistemically or morally vicious. And - so the objection continues - it seems racist to hold that certain races are uniquely morally or epistemically vicious. That’s one way of putting the reasoning. Another way focuses on God, as you say. I’ll cover that below. You continue: “Firstly, is someone racist for using this response? Surely not. Such a response is not motivated by racial prejudice.” A view can properly be said to be racist even if its acceptance by someone is not motivated by racial prejudice. The view that blacks naturally have significantly lower IQs than whites can properly be said to be a racist view even if its acceptance by someone is not motivated by racial prejudice. (We can imagine certain theological problems whose solution implies this claim, such that someone accepts the claim not he basis of solving a certain theological puzzle. This is not a racist motivation, but they have arrived at a view that can appropriately be called racist.) Likewise, if they say certain races are uniquely morally and/or epistemically vicious compared to others - as the objection says is required by Craig’s monist defense - then this view can properly be said to be racist even if its acceptance is not motivated by racial prejudice. It’s also worth noting that annihilationism doesn’t help with this objection, since this objection doesn’t rest on sending people to hell specifically. Instead, it concerns the implications of affirming that the relevant Gospel-denying CCFs uniquely significantly characterize entire races. And nor does it help to note that molinists may in love set out to share the gospel with these unevangelized races. The person who comes to think that backs have naturally significantly lower IQ than whites as a result of solving s theological puzzle may lovingly decide to dedicate their life to educating blacks in inner cities ton improve their condition in life. This does not negate the charge that their view is still appropriately deemed racist. In any case, if we want to reserve ‘racist’ for views acceptance of which is motivated by racial prejudice, then we can simply stipulate a notion of ‘racist*’ which doesn’t require this as a necessary condition, and the objection will then simply be that Craig’s view is racist*, which by itself is problematic. Finally, you say: “Suppose furthermore, that God does actually work like this, ordering the world such that anyone who is lost in a time and place unreached by the gospel is TD. This is at least plausible. Would the molinist then cease to be racist, since it turns out their view was correct? Hopefully you can see the absurdity of the racism claim now.” This isn’t a good response. Let’s take our theological IQ racist view from earlier. The following is not a good response on their behalf: ‘Suppose furthermore, that God does actually work like this, naturally bestowing blacks with a significantly lower IQ than whites, so that [insert theological problem’s solution]. This is at least plausible. Would the proponent of this view then cease to be racist, since it turns out their view was correct? Hopefully you can see the absurdity of the racist claim now.’ This is a poor response. It’s poor partly because the very fact that the view is racist gives us reason to think it’s not true - that God *does not* work in this way. Just as God plausibly wouldn’t actualize a world with blacks having naturally significantly lower IQ than whites, he plausibly wouldn’t actualize a world with many black and brown people being uniquely vicious compared to the rest. Of course, the racist view objection might be criticized on other, independent grounds. Again, I’m not here claiming that the objection is ultimately successful. But the force of the objection is not defused by any of the responses you’ve here pushed.
(Part 2/2) Let’s now turn to the God side of the equation. You begin with this: “Secondly then, is God racist for providentially arranging the world in this way? Such a question could almost be answered by simply affirming God’s moral perfection.” I appreciate you saying ‘almost’, because this question is not adequately answered by appealing to moral perfection. The whole point is that this is a *challenge* to moral perfection. Suppose a view implies that God created billions of conscious creatures who experience nothing but pure excruciating agony every waking moment of their existence through no fault of their own. If someone objects to this view on the basis that God would be terrible for providentially orchestrating such a situation, it’s not a good response to such an objection that ‘that can’t be, because God is morally perfect!’. The whole point is that God’s moral perfection has been called into question by what he is alleged to have providentially orchestrated. Likewise, if God’s salvific plan involves damning entire races while saving a large number of white Europeans and middle easterners, then - so the objection goes - God’s plan seems to treat people of different races differently in morally significant ways. God easily could have orchestrated things differently - different races of people in different geographical locations each get a revelation of the gospel in some way, for instance. Then God would *not* be treating different races differently in morally significant ways (ways that are morally relevant to the salvation of souls). I take it that the objection is that God is therefore not being fair, or just, or something of that sort. You also say: “Consider the fact that if God knows a creaturely essence has a complete set of counterfactuals, such that they suffer from TD: That is a truth about the possible person, whatever nation or race God places them in. So God’s providential decision has nothing to do with their race and everything to do with the way they freely respond to Him in the circumstance in which they could be placed. God knows this about the person logically prior to creating them in any body or with any skin color. So there just is no racism here.” I don’t think this response succeeds either. The point is that God had a choice about which world to create compatible with the CCFs, including ones with a fair and just distribution among humanity of those damned (or, if he is dealt a sh*itty hand (as it were), with CCFs unfavorable to a fair or just distribution of damned individuals, then he had a choice to refrain from creation altogether). The point, then, is that God could have brought it about that everyone freely responds or rejects God *in ways that are approximately equally distributed among races of people*. If he chooses *not* to do that, then he seems to be doing something unjust or unfair by actualizing such a salvific distribution. Imagine I had a choice to actualize a wide variety of worlds, and I’ve narrowed down my choice to two which have about the same number of men and women. In W1, 99.5% of those saved are men. In W2, 51% of those saved are men. Ceteris paribus, it seems unfair/unjust/sexist/wrong of me to actualize W1, *even though* all the women in W1 *freely* reject or accept me, and it just so happens that the vast majority of those women freely reject me, and I choose to damn them on the basis of their free choices. What’s problematic isn’t damning on the basis of sex or race (well, that would be problematic, but that isn’t present here). Instead, what’s problematic is the proportions of people within relevant people groups whom I’ve chosen to save. Thus, I think your response here misfires. Finally, you say: “NOTE In the video they incorrectly discuss his response to the problem of hell (in general). Craig doesn’t discuss geographical issues in his response to the more general problem of hell.” This is mistaken. Nowhere do we claim that Craig himself discusses geographical issues in his response to the moral general problem of hell. We brought up geographical issues to partially subserve an objection to Craig’s view, and such an objection afflicts Craig’s view regardless of whether he himself discusses geographical issues in his response to the problem of hell. Absolutely nowhere in the video do we mischaracterize Craig’s views or responses.
@@MajestyofReason Hey, thank you for taking the time to write a detailed personal reply. I will respond to each reply in turn: Response to 1/2 Firstly you point out that you're not making a claim and only discussing this objection. Fair enough. I do think the objection is multiply flawed - and I wanted to pick up on it due to the pejorative nature of the objection - and the fact that William Lane Craig did not respond. I found that you were both quite modest and balanced with many of the arguments you analysed. In my view, the video doesn't really support the claim "molinism is false" - which I assume is just youtube strategy? Anyway, you say of the saved: "And why are they like this? Why is someone such that they would freely reject the Gospel even when presented? It seems quite plausible that this is due to some epistemic or moral vice on their part. (If they were both epistemically and morally virtuous, it seems like they would - at least according to Craig - accept the Gospel.)" This is far from obvious to me. Do you think someone like Comrade Duch can claim moral superiority over his unsaved peers? Duch was a leader in the Khmer Rouge - he interrogated, torchured and murdered people in one of the most brutal genocides of recent history. And yet he has now repented and has a relationship with Jesus. I find it highly implausible that he can claim any moral superiority over his unsaved peers. But then, why think any other saved person can claim any moral superiority just because they haven't committed genocide? Now notice something interesting: You yourself argue (1) that there is plausibly some moral virtue to accepting the gospel and (2) many races disproportionately reject the gospel (e.g., native Americans, certain tribal peoples of Africa, native Amazonians, certain Australasian peoples, Thai, etc.). If these two facts are true, your conclusion seems to follow that "certain races are uniquely morally or epistemically vicious." Now notice that if (1) and (2) are in fact true, they are true independent of our view of providence. Someone could even be an atheist and affirm (1) and (2)! So this argument does nothing to support the claim that "molinism is racist". (1) and (2) are not claims that are particular to the molinist view. Also note that Craig's view is not about those cultures that "disproportionately reject the gospel" - rather his apologetic is concerned with those who are don't actually hear the gospel and yet are condemned to hell. Such persons are not necessarily restricted to those cultures where a higher proportion of people reject the gospel. So again, the racism objection fails. Now you move on to argue: "The view that blacks naturally have significantly lower IQs than whites can properly be said to be a racist view even if its acceptance by someone is not motivated by racial prejudice." Again, I disagree. Suppose it were actually true that "black people have a significantly lower IQ that white people" - what is racist? The fact itself? Or believing the fact? Can fact themselves be racist? Isn't racism the characteristic of a person rather than a fact? Surely racism is it more about how you select, use, interpret and act upon facts. Do you select only some facts and ignore background and context? Do you share facts with a goal of suppression, subjection or violence? etc... Consider an example; what if an educational leader hears this fact about IQ and decides to invest more money in black communities to improve education and opportunities? Would it really be appropriate to call this person racist? If so, then I think the racist claim is just unobjectionable. There are clearly good racists and bad racists out there (which seems absurd to me). You say "It’s also worth noting that annihilationism doesn’t help with this objection, since this objection doesn’t rest on sending people to hell specifically." I agree here annihilationism doesn't address the racial objection (which I was not intending it to). Rather annihilationism blunts the force of the objection that it is unfair for God to condemn the unevangelised to hell - since such persons only cease to exist rather than face eternal conscious torment (this is actually the correct context of Craig's TD argument... more on this later). "...nor does it help to note that molinists may in love set out to share the gospel with these unevangelized races. The person who comes to think that backs have naturally significantly lower IQ than whites as a result of solving s theological puzzle may lovingly decide to dedicate their life to educating blacks in inner cities ton improve their condition in life. This does not negate the charge that their view is still appropriately deemed racist." I disagree. Suppose someone discovers a difference in IQ between races and they are motivated to lovingly serve disadvantaged communities - should they really be categorised by the same title as nationalists and extremists who attack and vilify these communities? And if we do this, doesn't that somewhat dampen the term "racist" when we use it for cases of negative discrimination and hate? And finally I respond by arguing, what if God has actually used His middle knowledge such that persons who are unevangelised and lost are also TD. You say "This is a poor response. It’s poor partly because the very fact that the view is racist gives us reason to think it’s not true - that God does not work in this way." I see what you mean - but I think you miss my point which is more nuanced: My point is this. facts on their own are not (and cannot be) racist. The act of simply believing a fact is also not racist. So if God really does work in the way Craig has suggested, there is nothing racist about the person believing this. Note in my answer I then continued to address whether God would be racist for ordering the world in this way (it is best to distinguish this as a separate question so we don't confuse matters further).
@@MajestyofReason Response to 2/2 Jumping straight in. You say "Suppose a view implies that God created billions of conscious creatures who experience nothing but pure excruciating agony every waking moment of their existence through no fault of their own." Sure, this would obviously not be compatible with God's moral perfection. However it is far from obvious that an unequal distribution of *freely* saved and *freely* lost persons across different races is incompatible with God's moral perfection. If we think so, then perhaps it is our unreasonable expectations of God's fairness and our dubious notions of perfection that we need to call into question, rather than God's character. That is why I claim that we could almost respond simply by affirming these truths about God's perfect and His nature. You say "Likewise, if God’s salvific plan involves damning entire races while saving a large number of white Europeans and middle easterners, then - so the objection goes - God’s plan seems to treat people of different races differently in morally significant ways." On molinism, I don't think God's salvific plan does involve "damning entire races": Consider the fact that molinism is consistent with all of the following propositions: 1 God does not will that any perish but that all would come to repentance. 2 God provides sufficient grace and revelation to every person for their salvation. 3 God can and does find ways to reveal Himself where the gospel does not reach people 4 A proportion of people in non-western and European countries do in fact find salvation and come to know Jesus as Lord and saviour. You go on to say: "The point, then, is that God could have brought it about that everyone freely responds or rejects God in ways that are approximately equally distributed among races of people" Why do you think this is the case? Remember that God does not determine the truth value of CCFs, so there is nothing God can do to guarantee this will be the case. You mention that God could refrain from creating altogether? Seriously?! Do you really think that the apparent variation in those who come to know God in the actual world, should be reason enough for God to refrain from creating at all? This could be the most extreme case of "equality-of-outcome gone too far"! Furthermore, How do you know that it is not the case that any world with a more equal distribution of salvation would not suffer from other defects? For example, such more-equal-worlds may exist but may have a lower proportion of saved relative to unsaved people. Should God allow a greater proportion of lost in favour of a more equal distribution across races? Or such worlds may exist but they may all be seriously under populated. Should God under-populate a world so as to ensure it meets our standards of equality? Or such worlds may exist but they may also have greater amounts of suffering and misery. Would additional suffering be worth it, so God can say - at least there is equal salvation throughout the world? Now recall, I argued that "God’s providential decision has nothing to do with race and everything to do with the way they freely respond to Him in the circumstance in which they could be placed." And you dismissed this by saying that "The point is that God had a choice about which world to create compatible with the CCFs, including ones with a fair and just distribution among humanity of those damned" But this simply misses the point. If Craig's response to the problem of the unreached lost is valid, then God's choice about creating the person is based on their true CCFs and it is both logically and chronologically prior to that person having any race at all. To put it another way, how can you be racist against someone who has no race?! (i.e. an insubstantiated creaturely essence). And Finally... Reading your responses I do think you have misundestood Craig's work - even if you didn't mean to mischaracterize it. You say "Nowhere do we claim that Craig himself discusses geographical issues in his response to the moral general problem of hell. We brought up geographical issues to partially subserve an objection to Craig’s view, and such an objection afflicts Craig’s view regardless of whether he himself discusses geographical issues in his response to the problem of hell. Absolutely nowhere in the video do we mischaracterize Craig’s views or responses." Sure, so we agree that Craig is not concerned with the geography of salvation (or indeed the racial issues of salvation). It is the objector who raises this concern. Your misunderstanding is in the fact that you simply label this as "The problem of hell" (in general). What Craig is addressing in His work on the issue is the problem of the unreached lost (How can God be both perfectly fair and yet allow some to perish without having received the good news of the gospel?). The fact that you haven't addressed this issue in either of your responses shows that you haven't really understood Craig's work on the issue. Thank u again for taking the time to respond to my lengthy message. If you do have time, I would be very interested to hear your thoughts. Thank you for making such a deep and interesting video and may God bless you
And doesn't seem useful. "I knew that the child would set fire to the nursery but i want children to be able to express themselves so that's why everyone sleeps outside now. Aren't I great?" It's granting God superhuman insight as an excuse for him to not act with minimal responsibility.
Listening to this video, I am even more astonished at the mental gymnastics that Christians have to put themselves through, to explain why this alleged deity allegedly created this reality the way it did. And that they have to keep coming up with ways to limit what this god CAN do, or WHY it wants to or doesn’t, etc. I mean, Simon Biles can’t even begin to compete!
The concept of divine foreknowledge is incoherent with a timeless God. There is no such thing as foreknowledge, only knowledge. God simply knows every fact about every point in time. Indeed, when God created time, he must have created everything simultaneously from his reference frame. Literally, everything is being directly created by God right now, even these very words.
@@gabri41200 You're missing the point. God can't have created time if everything is just a single eternal moment for God. If there is no temporal succession, God cannot move from the state of "not having created" to "created." In your view, creation must be co-eternal. Everything is happening at once, which means there cannot be a sequence of events (I guess our perception that there is must be illusory).
@@Uryvichk indeed, my usage of "when" was merely figurative. But the central idea here is that God must have created everything all at once. Literally everything, even your thoughts.
As soon as I saw Daniel's glasses, I knew this conversation was gonna be epic.
Your “logic” is UNDERWHELMING, Sir. 🙄
He was my phil teacher freshman year, wish I got into phil before taking his class. I'm a phil major now, partially to his credit :)
I thought I had free will, but when I chose the white shirt instead of the black shirt I found out the white shirt had a stain and I never could have chosen it, therefore I never had free will.
but did an evil neuroscientist put a chip in your brain in the morning forcing you to choose the black shirt regardless of the stain biasing your epistemic considerations?
I go to the university Daniel teaches at. Will be starting graduate school this year!
super dope!! best of luck :)
I just graduated from the same school! Will still likely be in the department this Fall. Hope to see you there!
@@anthonyrowden “hey, is your name Bilbo Swaggins?”
As a hopeful molinist, I would love to hear Dr. Ryan Mullins respond to some of these objections. (Although I believe he admits some difficulties to be sort of unresolved I guess)
Please make it happen! I know he's been here before, so it's possible. Haha.
I am hoping I can find time to put together a written response to this video - I will post in the comments if I get a chance :-)
@@PeterTryonLet me know if you do!
Hi, Joe, I am a Spanish speaker but I really enjoy your content. I wanted to present an argument against classical theism based on the communicable and incommunicable attributes of God and see what you think or how classical theists might respond. I apologize in advance if my English is not the best. Anyway, here it goes and I hope it makes sense:
Definitions:
- Incommunicable attributes (IA): They cannot have imitations ad extra and are possessed only by God, such as infinity (in any form considered), essential eternity, immensity, absolute simplicity, absolute immutability.
- Communicable attributes (CA): They have imitations ad extra (outward) and are also possessed by us, such as wisdom, will, active potency, freedom, life, knowledge.
Argument:
1. If we participate in God, then we must participate in all of God's attributes, because in Him, all His attributes are the same God (DDS), and we participate in God. For example, if we participate and have to some degree the Justice of God, we necessarily also participate and have to some degree the Mercy of God, since Justice and Mercy are the same in God (and Justive and Mercy are the same too), and so with the other attributes.
2. But if this is so, then we should also have, at least to some degree, incommunicable attributes, such as immutability or His creative power, for they are also in God.
3. But it is impossible for us to have, even to any degree, these attributes, for they belong only to God, being precisely incommunicable.
4. Therefore, it is impossible for us to participate in God in general, for as stated in (1), if we participate in God, then we must participate in _all_ of God's attributes.
5. But classical theism claims that we participate in God.
6. Therefore, classical theism is false.
Isn't this just another formulation of the issue of "how can we be finite and God infinite?" and not receive a similar response? We participate imperfectly of the IA which gives rise to CA which are not possessed as such by God but are analogous to IA. CA are imperfect analogies of IA, is the response of classical theism, I think
@@natanaellizama6559 Maybe the problem is that classical theists usually define AIs as those that do not admit _any_ kind of imitation or participation to any degree.
@@marianoaguilar9517
I see. Then, yes, I think your argument does follow deductively. But then I would ask whether the classical theist holds the participation of the created entity as requiring participation of the AI? But I think this is indeed a crucial and interesting take. As a non-classical theist, this does seem like a central issue.
Either we hold that the entity's participation in Being implies a modality within God(so that the entity participates modally), or a strict separation(which some theists I've talked with do this) but that seems metaphysically problematic (a form of creation ex nihilo, which seems to imply an internal distinction of Being so that some aspects are transferible to the entity while others wouldn't).
I'd appreciate you letting me know how classical theists resolve this
@@natanaellizama6559 In the first premise of the argument I precisely hold that if we participate in God, then we must participate in _all_ the divine attributes, because divine simplicity precisely implies that all the attributes of God are in fact one (which is God himself). So, if we participate in God, we would also have to participate, by force, in those attributes of which we are not supposed to participate at all (IA). This is the problem I see and I honestly don't know how a classical theist can solve it for now.
I’d love to see a discussion on this (and other topics) with Matthew Adlestein!
Awesome video, Thank you Dr. Rubio!
Craig is NOT a Molonist. You should invite Christian Wagner on, he made a video on that.
So excited for this 🫡
Any chance you would do an in depth defense video of simple foreknowledge? I’m somewhere between it and open theism. I still have some hang ups as to how useful God having simple foreknowledge is, hence why I’d love to see a video on it.
Useful? God's attributes are not predicated on their "usefulness" to us.
@@Dizerner well, all of Gods properties are great making properties and so presumably all of His properties would entail at least some usefulness. If the property is useless, it is hard to understand it as a sort of great making property. I wasn’t talking about how useful it is to us but how useful it is to God. Moreover my concern here is more or less whether or not simple foreknowledge is compatible with the God of the Bible who seems to both know at least some future events and uses this knowledge to bring about His plans.
@@thoughtfultheology449 Usefulness implies some goal, it is relative term. Maximal just speaks to a degree of something. So they don't have any true logical connection as is. God has more power then he "uses" so by that definition unless God uses literally infinite power all the time, it becomes "useless" power, but if God did that, creation could not handle it. If you see knowledge the same way, I think you see that having more knowledge than God necessarily needs or uses to interact with creation does not somehow make God lesser than maximal, in fact it makes him truly maximal.
@@Dizerner your missing my point but I digress.
@@thoughtfultheology449 I smacked your point dead on with a bullseye, but I digress.
I didn’t know you were so sympathetic to simple foreknowledge, Joe! I guess I should rethink my objections to it. When I read Hasker he really convinced me that SF is useless, it just does nothing lol
I think I read some of Hasker’s paper awhile back, but tell me why you find it useless.
Unfortunatly the nastiest soirutologys ( sorry about spelling) are also the most logically coherent.
I tried to combine open theism with a Neo molinist landscape as PRIOR knowledge is logical.
However, as far as I can see it, it also violates the law of personal identity.
While I’m still looking into D.O., it just begs the question like with the molinists, while simply dismissing it out of hand.
I have barely any familiarity with this debate, beyond this video. So pardon me if my concerns have been addressed somewhere already, or I'm missing some basic stuff. But I'm wondering if we can divide Molinism into two main parts-- (1) the middle knowledge claim (that God knows what libertarianly free agents would do, in non-actual circumstances), and (2) the divine providence claim (that God uses this middle knowledge to achieve some fairly specific outcomes). Many of these objections seem more aimed at the divine providence claim, not so much at middle knowledge in itself.
If God doesn't have middle knowledge, then the most likely reason why seems to be that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom don't exist. But it's not clear to me that CCFs are more problematic than truths about the *actual* future choices of libertarianly free agents. Of course, many people think there are problems with positing God's foreknowledge of what we will freely do in the future, e.g. because there might not be facts about future free choices, or God's knowing them might be incompatible with our freedom. But *if* these problems can be overcome (which most theists agree, except open theists and a few others), then I'm not sure why positing counterfactuals of free choices would be much *more* problematic.
This is dope ❤
I could follow most of this, but I feel like I missed something when you guys started talking about "true true counterfactuals"?
*Why I reject so-called "Molinism"*
If you are a fan of the theological scene, you probably have come across the term "Molinism" or someone who claims to be a "Molinist." It is often presented as an opposing alternative to Calvinist soteriology; it's basically, the idea that God considered tons of different worlds, and then chooses to make one based on how people react in it. As a Classical Armininan, I see a real difference with Molinism and the Arminian simple foreknowledge view. It's not that I deny middle knowledge, but Molinism makes a certain claim about what God uses it for. In general those who label themselves Molinists seem to be theologians who want to posit the idea that God specifically uses this middle knowledge to decide what world to actualize. I believe in classical free will and omniscience, but to suppose that God uses his knowledge of future free choices to decide whether to create possible worlds seems to me, to be wrong on two levels, both morally and logically.
It is wrong for God to do this morally, for it does not allow the full freedom of self-expression in choosing for or against God, unless it adds some prior condition being met; in other words, it seems to me, God is tampering with the quality of the choice by only creating it if it is going to choose a certain thing. Thus it is not really a free expression, because it has prior conditions on it, and the quality of freedom is altered. If God were to use middle knowledge to create a world, he could simply only create people whom he knew would freely choose the good; this is a simple idea, and there is no logical problem with it. On the other hand, of course, there might be people that reject God in all possible worlds. But we Libertarians argue God can't tamper with free will, and so can't force the decision the creation makes. Deciding to make something based on what it will choose in the future is a form of tampering with freedom, a similar moral dilemma. God is being selective and manipulative over the self-expression of his creation by denying the existence of any creation that doesn't choose a certain way.
The second way I think this understanding of Molinism fails, is it is logically untenable as well. The reason for this is that it is not circumstantial or peer pressure by which people decide what ultimate spiritual choices they make; there is not a way to influence or coerce them through the potential world being conceived, because these choices are not made for such shallow reasons as whether our best friend chooses Christ or not, or whether we are born in a country that accepts or prohibits the preaching of the Gospel. This "trans-world" depravity of all who would fundamentally choose to reject God means that alternate scenarios cannot decide or alter the number of saved or damned individuals. Tweaking the input factors will always have the same number of people saved and lost. Using middle knowledge is an inadequate means to pressure or manipulate people into accepting Christ, for their decisions will remain the same under any scenario, and the Bible instructs that we are not even supposed to let circumstances dictate these important spiritual choices.
If you think about it, Molinism is trying to solve the problem of evil in a creative way by positing God has given everyone an optimal chance at salvation by factoring in everyone's future free will choices before creating them; this is intended to reduce the problem we all intuitively feel that God has allowed some people to be victims of other peoples' choices. But if this solution does not logically work and we notice that some people don't seem to get "a fair shake," that is, this Molinistic world hypothesis in fact leaves people in what appears to be a less than optimal state, we will not solve the problem of offense at God for what he has allowed. God has allowed people's sins to hurt other people: and fundamentally we just find that offensive, and Molinism will not somehow patch up that offense. We should not offer people a cheap solution to a perceived moral dilemma about God's actions; we should all rather seek God ourselves to overcome and develop the faith and consecration necessary to put God above the problem of evil and mystery of why he allowed Adam and others to hurt so many.
And if God is creating these "pre-world" conditions for whether or not he will actualize you, he is altering the quality of the freedom, and putting constraints and conditions upon it. God decides, "I will only create Person A if they fit in to a maximally gracious world B," and thus there is preconditions upon Person A's free choice, he will only be created if he chooses a certain way. This means, Person A does not get to be created with a real un-manipulated libertarian choice of for or against God for the fundamental reason of simply choosing or rejecting God for who he is, but only if he will choose or reject God for the inferior and idolatrous reasons of how his circumstances pan out, which basis for a choice for God is thoroughly condemned in Scripture. Even if we are encouraged to consider the negative consequences sin will leave us in, we cannot simply use God as a pawn to get what we want.
God would not use sinful motivations to plan worlds that determine who gets saved, and who doesn't. That's not a pure motivation for choosing or rejecting God. We don't accept God only because we experience or see evil, we accept God because by grace we realize God's worth. It is true evil can discipline or chastise us, causing us to see the terribleness of our sin, but this cannot be said to be the fundamental reason to choose God to begin with: it is merely an extra mercy to refine an impurity. Adam and Eve did not need evil to be able to make the right choice, nor to be maximally graced to make the right choice. The need for evil to chastise or persuade only comes after original sin has already forced the world to be inherently permeated with injustice. In judgment God remembers mercy, the judgments are not mercy itself.
God could certainly use his middle knowledge to minimize judgments and maximally grace people under the current conditions, but not to set up the world to begin with and only create people when they choose under certain conditions. The real reason God allows evil to happen, is not just the expression of love or freedom, because those don't necessitate the amount of collateral damage, the horrific consequences that the current evil entails. God could have just zapped Adam and Eve out of existence the very moment they put their mouths on that fruit. No, God allows the consequences of evil to be so horrendous to give weight and importance to the quality of the choice as being an opportunity to glorify and honor God for who he is, an expression of God's own worth. The proper theodicy is a free will choice based on the holiness of God, not on "soul-building" properties; God's right to be glorified and devalue those who devalue him.
Also realize, another tangential objection is there being no logical reason God could not use middle knowledge to simply never create beings he knows will be freely evil under this system; where is the objection when the purpose is just to maximize good choices? Or why could God not simply eliminate beings as soon as they make an evil choice, instead of allowing that evil choice to hurt other people? If allowing evil is simply to create more good instead of glorify God, where is the objection anymore? Do those evil beings God creates become the best possible world to necessarily help other beings choose better choices? That seems like justifying the ends with the means, using an evil thing to bring about a good thing; but not as a last recourse, as a primary directive! And overcoming the objection to the possibility of sin in heaven is actually surprisingly easy to overcome logically: we can choose our future choices now; since only those who have chosen not to sin will enter heaven, nothing will any longer inhibit that choice.
So what am I left with under Classical Arminianism? That God foreknows choices but does not "tweak" or "alter" the conditions of creation to influence and manipulate those choices, for that would be altering the quality of the choice and devaluing it. God has to "play the cards he is dealt," as some Calvinists so poignantly like to state, and this also explains why the majority of human history seems to be quite a failure from man's side, yet God still creates it. God is willing to take "snake eyes" to allow that quality of choice to stand for what is, without deciding to create it based on how it will choose, which otherwise would not be fully and truly free in regards to the object of the choice. In the end, it may seem less interesting or exciting to simply believe that God foreknows autonomous choices and reacts in accordance to them, rather than decide to create based on foreknowing them, but it is the straight and Biblical way to harmonize sovereignty and free will. Although God does possess middle knowledge and uses it for many things, it would be wrong to determine the actualization of certain worlds to alter the number of saved and damned in some optimal way. And we must always remember God may very well not always act on all the foreknowledge he has, for he is under no moral obligation to do so. Because of the above objections I can't accept Molinism and stick with simple Arminianism.
Fascinating, I am wondering if you could please provide a concise definition of “simple foreknowledge” as I think I have heard multiple different definitions and would appreciate hearing of yours.
@@sillythewanderer4221 God knows all future happenings as a dataset unrelated to "looking at it" or any kind of processing or deriving, he knows because he is outside of time and supernatural. The most common objection by Calvinists and Open Theists is that somehow hurts free will, but it doesn't hurt free will, it just hurts their ability to understand how it harmonizes, and thus they desire to put the limitations of their own mind projected back onto God's. Knowledge is not causitive, and it's as simple as that.
@@Dizerner Thanks this seems a very reasonable view especially the “knowledge is not causitive” part. Thanks again
Good day and Glory to Jesus Christ !
Even the Russian judge would give the Molinist 10s for mental gymnastics.
Great video! Now I'm curious (and a little nervous!) to know in which tier you and Daniel would place my argument against Molinism. (The argument in "If Molinism is True, What Can You Do?") :)
@@andrewlaw9872 glad you watched the video, Andrew! Your paper is great 🙂
@@MajestyofReason Thanks! I don't know how you produce so many quality videos *and* quality papers, but it's very impressive--keep it up (for all of our sakes)!
Is there any way you can upload these new episodes to Apple Podcasts? RUclips has made it hard to listen with only headphones unless you pay for premium…
@@pmispeed2 l’ll try to convince my helper to do it!
@@MajestyofReason Much appreciated. I really enjoy listening to your show, keep up the good work!
You could use something called NewPipe. An opensource frontend for RUclips. With it you can play only audio.
I had trouble understanding this because I never got a hold on what a CCF is, and I think I narrowed that problem to my not having an intuitive understanding of "counter factual" that matches the literature. When I hear "counter" I think "against and thus not" and therefore that "counter factual" means "not true" or "false". Is "counter factual" perhaps a name which is grand fathered in from a time when "counter" meant something else? Or am I missing some shade of meaning of "counter" which is obvious to everyone who is not me?
Or I should ask, "does 'counter' mean the same thing in 'counter factual' and 'counter argument'?
No, this is an entirely understandable hangup! The name has been recognized to be misleading. The most accurate name for them is *subjunctive conditionals of creaturely freedom* . They are conditionals, in the subjunctive mood, stating what some creaturely agent *would* freely do if they *were* in certain circumstances. (And this is compatible with them *actually being* in those circumstances. Compare: a theist might say to an atheist, "if God were to exist, then God would have a morally sufficient reason for allowing all this suffering". This subjunctive conditional is compatible with God actually existing.) So the antecedent of the subjunctive conditional doesn't necessarily have to be *counter to fact* (i.e., false). It may be, but it may also not be.
Context determines content.That’s the way I see it.
Change the situation, change the CCFs.
Moral output exceeds ‘ incoming’ thus freewill exists.
Of course, what one does is contingent on context.
If free will is predictable based on the nature and circumstance, does that mean God's choice of creation was predictable?
Plenty of brilliant people believe in molinism but I can’t make heads or tails of it.
By the way, is there a majority view among professional philosophers on this. In particular, those who have specialized in this.
What’s the view on the grounding issue. The heart and sole of molinism.
Joe can you make a video about analytic philosophy and logical positivism
Yes, yes it is.
Have Klaas Kraay on and you'll complete the Ryerson/TMU phil of religion trifecta.
Klaas Kraay? More like Klaasy Bae.
😎 Moment
Wake up baby, new Joe Schmid just dropped
Always wanted to know why you didn't like molinism and instead opted for something more simple 🙃.
Is it accepted that Plantinga's FWD relies on Molinism being true? If so, that seems like a big issue for the FWD.
Oh, and #COYG
Craig is so funny on this. He's got:
middle-knowledge
feasible
optimal ratio of saved
counterfactuals
What is this?
Craig's favorite argument: the argument from lots of arguments.
TMD must be achieved
Dynamic Omniscience for the win. Kick Calvinism, Simple Foreknowledge and Molinism to the curb
dont hurt simple foreknowledge 😓
P1. Pruss accepts simple foreknowledge
P2. If Pruss accepts p, then p is probably true
C. Ergo, simple knowledge is probably true
Exceptions to P2 include causal finitism and divine simplicity, of course ;)
@@MajestyofReasonNgl knowing that Pruss excepts SF raises its probability quite a bit
@@MajestyofReason better call the police, SF has gone missing, last seen entering an old white van with "Appeal to Mystery" written on the side.
@@IdolKiller i command thee not to slander SF. Also if eternalism is true there’s no mystery as to how God knows the future! He’s just directly aware of it in the same way he’s directly aware of the present 🙂 (And Pruss is an eternalist!)
How does molinism avoid fatalism? Under molinism, God still decides to create a universe in which he knows everything that will happen thereby making everything destined to occur, no?
God knowing it doesn’t necessarily mean it was fated. It’s still us determining our decisions.
@@MACHO_CHICO It's the knowing _plus the decision to create_ a specific world where everything is known vs another world or creating nothing at all.
@@resurrectionnerdActualising a specific world in which all actions are known doesn’t imply that we couldn’t have done otherwise, but let’s grant for the sake of argument that’s the case. God could’ve actualised a world where certain actions are more probable but not guaranteed using middle knowledge. If there are variations in action from there, then he would know that using His free knowledge.
@@MACHO_CHICO That sounds like you're subtracting from omniscience and would imply that God is playing dice with the universe.
Fatalism is not simply the fact that certain things are "destined to occur". Fatalism is the view that everything that will occur, will do so necessarily. In molinism there are truths about the future - but they are contingent truths.
The!
I want to focus on a very unusual and peculiar objection at 34 minutes. This video claims that "Dr Craig's response to the problem of hell is racist." This is such an odd and unfounded objection it is hard to even know where to start!
To set some context: Dr Craig’s “racist proposal” is an attempt to respond to the problem of the unreached lost: Namely, how can God be both just and loving and also condemn a person who never hears the gospel, due to the fact they were born in a time and place where the gospel never reached them? To put it another way, are some “lost by geographical accident”? And if so, how is this just?
Dr Craig responds by arguing that God knows, in His Middle Knowledge, that there are some people who would not be freely saved in any circumstances God could have placed them. Such persons are Transworld Damned (TD). He argues that it is at least possible that anyone who is unreached and lost in the actual world could be TD, and would not be saved in any other situation God may have placed them in. So such persons are not lost by “geographical accident”.
Now consider the reconsider the claim that this is racist. Who is supposed to be racist here? The one offering the response? Or God if He works this way? Let's consider each option:
Firstly, is someone racist for using this response? Surely not. Such a response is not motivated by racial prejudice. Rather, it is an attempt to explain and reconcile several apparent facts: 1 Some people never hear the gospel and they are lost. 2 God exercises at least some degree of providential control over the world. 3 God is perfectly just. Anyone who wants to affirm these facts needs to find some way to reconcile the apparent inconsistency. So we all need to do some leg work here, whatever our preferred view of providence is. This problem is not unique to molinism.
One route is simply to deny 1, that the un-evangelised go to hell: There are plenty of alternatives. For example we could argue that many of the unreached are saved through general revelation and special revelation like dreams and visions (so they are not actually lost). In the case of those who don’t find God, we could argue they don’t really go to hell (e.g. annihilationism of the soul or of hell itself).
Now consider 1 “Some people never hear the gospel and they are lost.” A molinist may contemplate this and feel a deep burden and compassion for those who never hear and are lost. They have no choice in the matter of who these people are, what race they are or where they live (but based on the fact we *have* heard the gospel, such unreached people inevitably belong to other cultures). In love and obedience to the gospel the molinist may even set out to share the gospel in far flung places. There is no racism here.
Suppose furthermore, that God does actually work like this, ordering the world such that anyone who is lost in a time and place unreached by the gospel is TD. This is at least plausible. Would the molinist then cease to be racist, since it turns out their view was correct? Hopefully you can see the absurdity of the racism claim now.
Secondly then, is God racist for providentially arranging the world in this way? Such a question could almost be answered by simply affirming God’s moral perfection. We could add that all humans are made in God’s image and also that God wishes none to perish but all to come to repentance. Note all of these facts are entirely consistent with the problem of the unreached lost. But let's press the objection a little further. Does this response to the problem of the unreached-lost make God racist?
No. Consider the fact that if God is planning a world in which He uses His people (who are themselves free) to share His message to the world, naturally some places will be more exposed to the gospel and other places reached later or not at all. Where does God choose to reveal Himself first? And which places receive the gospel later? This is not an arbitrary choice for a God who is concerned with saving an optimal number of people. Surely God’s solution to this providential challenge is not a matter of just picking on a particular race because they have a different color of skin to Himself! (Excuse my joking here - I want to highlight the absurdity of the racism claim!)
Consider the fact that if God knows a creaturely essence has a complete set of counterfactuals, such that they suffer from TD: That is a truth about the possible person, whatever nation or race God places them in. So God’s providential decision has nothing to do with their race and everything to do with the way they freely respond to Him in the circumstance in which they could be placed. God knows this about the person logically prior to creating them in any body or with any skin color. So there just is no racism here.
This really only leaves one concern: If this is how God has in fact ordered the world, then we are required to believe something about the unreached; namely they may well suffer TD. Such a view is not racist, but I fear it could lead to a kind of unloving fatalism - an apathy to share the gospel with them. Can you see how misguided this would be! They are only unreached if no one freely chooses to take the good news of the gospel to them! By lovingly obeying our call to take the gospel to the ends of the earth, we genuinely play our part in minimizing the number of people who are unreached, we create a providential landscape that is more favorable to salvation, and if God is even able to save one person - it is so worth the journey to the ends of the earth.
NOTE In the video they incorrectly discuss his response to the problem of hell (in general). Craig doesn’t discuss geographical issues in his response to the more general problem of hell.
(Part 1/2) You say: “This video claims that "Dr Craig's response to the problem of hell is racist." This is such an odd and unfounded objection it is hard to even know where to start!”
We do not in video actually *claim* that his response is racist. At this point in the video, we are surveying criticisms of Craig’s response to the problem of hell. We aren’t necessarily *endorsing* them or claiming that they’re successful or true. And, in fact, when I was setting up the racist view objection, I explicitly say “I’ve seen some people bring up at this juncture w.r.t. Craig’s monist defense of hell… they say the view almost seems racist…” after which I proceed to articulate *their* objection and ask Daniel for his thoughts on their objection. This is clearly not claiming that Craig’s response is actually racist. It is bringing up an objection that others have pressed according to which the veiw is racist and examining the objection.
With that being said, I will hereafter examine your responses to the objection and see whether they hold water.
You say: “Dr Craig responds by arguing that God knows, in His Middle Knowledge, that there are some people who would not be freely saved in any circumstances God could have placed them. Such persons are Transworld Damned (TD).”
And *why* are they like this? Why is someone such that they would freely reject the Gospel even when presented? It seems quite plausible that this is due to some epistemic or moral vice on their part. (If they were both epistemically and morally virtuous, it seems like they would - at least according to Craig - accept the Gospel.) But when we combine this observation (call it ‘O’) with observations about who, thought history, has accepted the gospel, we see that certain races (e.g., native Americans, certain tribal peoples of Africa, native Amazonians, certain Australasian peoples, Thai, etc.) have significantly disproportionately failed to accept the Gospel. Hence, given the Molinist defense together with O, it follows that those races are uniquely (in contrast to other races) epistemically or morally vicious. And - so the objection continues - it seems racist to hold that certain races are uniquely morally or epistemically vicious.
That’s one way of putting the reasoning. Another way focuses on God, as you say. I’ll cover that below.
You continue: “Firstly, is someone racist for using this response? Surely not. Such a response is not motivated by racial prejudice.”
A view can properly be said to be racist even if its acceptance by someone is not motivated by racial prejudice. The view that blacks naturally have significantly lower IQs than whites can properly be said to be a racist view even if its acceptance by someone is not motivated by racial prejudice. (We can imagine certain theological problems whose solution implies this claim, such that someone accepts the claim not he basis of solving a certain theological puzzle. This is not a racist motivation, but they have arrived at a view that can appropriately be called racist.) Likewise, if they say certain races are uniquely morally and/or epistemically vicious compared to others - as the objection says is required by Craig’s monist defense - then this view can properly be said to be racist even if its acceptance is not motivated by racial prejudice.
It’s also worth noting that annihilationism doesn’t help with this objection, since this objection doesn’t rest on sending people to hell specifically. Instead, it concerns the implications of affirming that the relevant Gospel-denying CCFs uniquely significantly characterize entire races. And nor does it help to note that molinists may in love set out to share the gospel with these unevangelized races. The person who comes to think that backs have naturally significantly lower IQ than whites as a result of solving s theological puzzle may lovingly decide to dedicate their life to educating blacks in inner cities ton improve their condition in life. This does not negate the charge that their view is still appropriately deemed racist.
In any case, if we want to reserve ‘racist’ for views acceptance of which is motivated by racial prejudice, then we can simply stipulate a notion of ‘racist*’ which doesn’t require this as a necessary condition, and the objection will then simply be that Craig’s view is racist*, which by itself is problematic.
Finally, you say: “Suppose furthermore, that God does actually work like this, ordering the world such that anyone who is lost in a time and place unreached by the gospel is TD. This is at least plausible. Would the molinist then cease to be racist, since it turns out their view was correct? Hopefully you can see the absurdity of the racism claim now.”
This isn’t a good response. Let’s take our theological IQ racist view from earlier. The following is not a good response on their behalf:
‘Suppose furthermore, that God does actually work like this, naturally bestowing blacks with a significantly lower IQ than whites, so that [insert theological problem’s solution]. This is at least plausible. Would the proponent of this view then cease to be racist, since it turns out their view was correct? Hopefully you can see the absurdity of the racist claim now.’
This is a poor response. It’s poor partly because the very fact that the view is racist gives us reason to think it’s not true - that God *does not* work in this way. Just as God plausibly wouldn’t actualize a world with blacks having naturally significantly lower IQ than whites, he plausibly wouldn’t actualize a world with many black and brown people being uniquely vicious compared to the rest.
Of course, the racist view objection might be criticized on other, independent grounds. Again, I’m not here claiming that the objection is ultimately successful. But the force of the objection is not defused by any of the responses you’ve here pushed.
(Part 2/2) Let’s now turn to the God side of the equation. You begin with this: “Secondly then, is God racist for providentially arranging the world in this way? Such a question could almost be answered by simply affirming God’s moral perfection.”
I appreciate you saying ‘almost’, because this question is not adequately answered by appealing to moral perfection. The whole point is that this is a *challenge* to moral perfection. Suppose a view implies that God created billions of conscious creatures who experience nothing but pure excruciating agony every waking moment of their existence through no fault of their own. If someone objects to this view on the basis that God would be terrible for providentially orchestrating such a situation, it’s not a good response to such an objection that ‘that can’t be, because God is morally perfect!’. The whole point is that God’s moral perfection has been called into question by what he is alleged to have providentially orchestrated. Likewise, if God’s salvific plan involves damning entire races while saving a large number of white Europeans and middle easterners, then - so the objection goes - God’s plan seems to treat people of different races differently in morally significant ways. God easily could have orchestrated things differently - different races of people in different geographical locations each get a revelation of the gospel in some way, for instance. Then God would *not* be treating different races differently in morally significant ways (ways that are morally relevant to the salvation of souls). I take it that the objection is that God is therefore not being fair, or just, or something of that sort.
You also say: “Consider the fact that if God knows a creaturely essence has a complete set of counterfactuals, such that they suffer from TD: That is a truth about the possible person, whatever nation or race God places them in. So God’s providential decision has nothing to do with their race and everything to do with the way they freely respond to Him in the circumstance in which they could be placed. God knows this about the person logically prior to creating them in any body or with any skin color. So there just is no racism here.”
I don’t think this response succeeds either. The point is that God had a choice about which world to create compatible with the CCFs, including ones with a fair and just distribution among humanity of those damned (or, if he is dealt a sh*itty hand (as it were), with CCFs unfavorable to a fair or just distribution of damned individuals, then he had a choice to refrain from creation altogether). The point, then, is that God could have brought it about that everyone freely responds or rejects God *in ways that are approximately equally distributed among races of people*. If he chooses *not* to do that, then he seems to be doing something unjust or unfair by actualizing such a salvific distribution.
Imagine I had a choice to actualize a wide variety of worlds, and I’ve narrowed down my choice to two which have about the same number of men and women. In W1, 99.5% of those saved are men. In W2, 51% of those saved are men. Ceteris paribus, it seems unfair/unjust/sexist/wrong of me to actualize W1, *even though* all the women in W1 *freely* reject or accept me, and it just so happens that the vast majority of those women freely reject me, and I choose to damn them on the basis of their free choices. What’s problematic isn’t damning on the basis of sex or race (well, that would be problematic, but that isn’t present here). Instead, what’s problematic is the proportions of people within relevant people groups whom I’ve chosen to save. Thus, I think your response here misfires.
Finally, you say: “NOTE In the video they incorrectly discuss his response to the problem of hell (in general). Craig doesn’t discuss geographical issues in his response to the more general problem of hell.”
This is mistaken. Nowhere do we claim that Craig himself discusses geographical issues in his response to the moral general problem of hell. We brought up geographical issues to partially subserve an objection to Craig’s view, and such an objection afflicts Craig’s view regardless of whether he himself discusses geographical issues in his response to the problem of hell. Absolutely nowhere in the video do we mischaracterize Craig’s views or responses.
@@MajestyofReason Hey, thank you for taking the time to write a detailed personal reply. I will respond to each reply in turn: Response to 1/2
Firstly you point out that you're not making a claim and only discussing this objection. Fair enough. I do think the objection is multiply flawed - and I wanted to pick up on it due to the pejorative nature of the objection - and the fact that William Lane Craig did not respond. I found that you were both quite modest and balanced with many of the arguments you analysed. In my view, the video doesn't really support the claim "molinism is false" - which I assume is just youtube strategy?
Anyway, you say of the saved: "And why are they like this? Why is someone such that they would freely reject the Gospel even when presented? It seems quite plausible that this is due to some epistemic or moral vice on their part. (If they were both epistemically and morally virtuous, it seems like they would - at least according to Craig - accept the Gospel.)"
This is far from obvious to me. Do you think someone like Comrade Duch can claim moral superiority over his unsaved peers? Duch was a leader in the Khmer Rouge - he interrogated, torchured and murdered people in one of the most brutal genocides of recent history. And yet he has now repented and has a relationship with Jesus. I find it highly implausible that he can claim any moral superiority over his unsaved peers. But then, why think any other saved person can claim any moral superiority just because they haven't committed genocide?
Now notice something interesting: You yourself argue (1) that there is plausibly some moral virtue to accepting the gospel and (2) many races disproportionately reject the gospel (e.g., native Americans, certain tribal peoples of Africa, native Amazonians, certain Australasian peoples, Thai, etc.). If these two facts are true, your conclusion seems to follow that "certain races are uniquely morally or epistemically vicious." Now notice that if (1) and (2) are in fact true, they are true independent of our view of providence. Someone could even be an atheist and affirm (1) and (2)! So this argument does nothing to support the claim that "molinism is racist". (1) and (2) are not claims that are particular to the molinist view.
Also note that Craig's view is not about those cultures that "disproportionately reject the gospel" - rather his apologetic is concerned with those who are don't actually hear the gospel and yet are condemned to hell. Such persons are not necessarily restricted to those cultures where a higher proportion of people reject the gospel. So again, the racism objection fails.
Now you move on to argue: "The view that blacks naturally have significantly lower IQs than whites can properly be said to be a racist view even if its acceptance by someone is not motivated by racial prejudice."
Again, I disagree. Suppose it were actually true that "black people have a significantly lower IQ that white people" - what is racist? The fact itself? Or believing the fact? Can fact themselves be racist? Isn't racism the characteristic of a person rather than a fact? Surely racism is it more about how you select, use, interpret and act upon facts. Do you select only some facts and ignore background and context? Do you share facts with a goal of suppression, subjection or violence? etc... Consider an example; what if an educational leader hears this fact about IQ and decides to invest more money in black communities to improve education and opportunities? Would it really be appropriate to call this person racist? If so, then I think the racist claim is just unobjectionable. There are clearly good racists and bad racists out there (which seems absurd to me).
You say "It’s also worth noting that annihilationism doesn’t help with this objection, since this objection doesn’t rest on sending people to hell specifically."
I agree here annihilationism doesn't address the racial objection (which I was not intending it to). Rather annihilationism blunts the force of the objection that it is unfair for God to condemn the unevangelised to hell - since such persons only cease to exist rather than face eternal conscious torment (this is actually the correct context of Craig's TD argument... more on this later).
"...nor does it help to note that molinists may in love set out to share the gospel with these unevangelized races. The person who comes to think that backs have naturally significantly lower IQ than whites as a result of solving s theological puzzle may lovingly decide to dedicate their life to educating blacks in inner cities ton improve their condition in life. This does not negate the charge that their view is still appropriately deemed racist."
I disagree. Suppose someone discovers a difference in IQ between races and they are motivated to lovingly serve disadvantaged communities - should they really be categorised by the same title as nationalists and extremists who attack and vilify these communities? And if we do this, doesn't that somewhat dampen the term "racist" when we use it for cases of negative discrimination and hate?
And finally I respond by arguing, what if God has actually used His middle knowledge such that persons who are unevangelised and lost are also TD.
You say "This is a poor response. It’s poor partly because the very fact that the view is racist gives us reason to think it’s not true - that God does not work in this way."
I see what you mean - but I think you miss my point which is more nuanced: My point is this. facts on their own are not (and cannot be) racist. The act of simply believing a fact is also not racist. So if God really does work in the way Craig has suggested, there is nothing racist about the person believing this. Note in my answer I then continued to address whether God would be racist for ordering the world in this way (it is best to distinguish this as a separate question so we don't confuse matters further).
@@MajestyofReason Response to 2/2
Jumping straight in. You say "Suppose a view implies that God created billions of conscious creatures who experience nothing but pure excruciating agony every waking moment of their existence through no fault of their own."
Sure, this would obviously not be compatible with God's moral perfection. However it is far from obvious that an unequal distribution of *freely* saved and *freely* lost persons across different races is incompatible with God's moral perfection. If we think so, then perhaps it is our unreasonable expectations of God's fairness and our dubious notions of perfection that we need to call into question, rather than God's character. That is why I claim that we could almost respond simply by affirming these truths about God's perfect and His nature.
You say "Likewise, if God’s salvific plan involves damning entire races while saving a large number of white Europeans and middle easterners, then - so the objection goes - God’s plan seems to treat people of different races differently in morally significant ways."
On molinism, I don't think God's salvific plan does involve "damning entire races": Consider the fact that molinism is consistent with all of the following propositions: 1 God does not will that any perish but that all would come to repentance. 2 God provides sufficient grace and revelation to every person for their salvation. 3 God can and does find ways to reveal Himself where the gospel does not reach people 4 A proportion of people in non-western and European countries do in fact find salvation and come to know Jesus as Lord and saviour.
You go on to say: "The point, then, is that God could have brought it about that everyone freely responds or rejects God in ways that are approximately equally distributed among races of people"
Why do you think this is the case? Remember that God does not determine the truth value of CCFs, so there is nothing God can do to guarantee this will be the case. You mention that God could refrain from creating altogether? Seriously?! Do you really think that the apparent variation in those who come to know God in the actual world, should be reason enough for God to refrain from creating at all? This could be the most extreme case of "equality-of-outcome gone too far"!
Furthermore, How do you know that it is not the case that any world with a more equal distribution of salvation would not suffer from other defects? For example, such more-equal-worlds may exist but may have a lower proportion of saved relative to unsaved people. Should God allow a greater proportion of lost in favour of a more equal distribution across races? Or such worlds may exist but they may all be seriously under populated. Should God under-populate a world so as to ensure it meets our standards of equality? Or such worlds may exist but they may also have greater amounts of suffering and misery. Would additional suffering be worth it, so God can say - at least there is equal salvation throughout the world?
Now recall, I argued that "God’s providential decision has nothing to do with race and everything to do with the way they freely respond to Him in the circumstance in which they could be placed." And you dismissed this by saying that "The point is that God had a choice about which world to create compatible with the CCFs, including ones with a fair and just distribution among humanity of those damned"
But this simply misses the point. If Craig's response to the problem of the unreached lost is valid, then God's choice about creating the person is based on their true CCFs and it is both logically and chronologically prior to that person having any race at all. To put it another way, how can you be racist against someone who has no race?! (i.e. an insubstantiated creaturely essence).
And Finally... Reading your responses I do think you have misundestood Craig's work - even if you didn't mean to mischaracterize it. You say "Nowhere do we claim that Craig himself discusses geographical issues in his response to the moral general problem of hell. We brought up geographical issues to partially subserve an objection to Craig’s view, and such an objection afflicts Craig’s view regardless of whether he himself discusses geographical issues in his response to the problem of hell. Absolutely nowhere in the video do we mischaracterize Craig’s views or responses."
Sure, so we agree that Craig is not concerned with the geography of salvation (or indeed the racial issues of salvation). It is the objector who raises this concern. Your misunderstanding is in the fact that you simply label this as "The problem of hell" (in general). What Craig is addressing in His work on the issue is the problem of the unreached lost (How can God be both perfectly fair and yet allow some to perish without having received the good news of the gospel?). The fact that you haven't addressed this issue in either of your responses shows that you haven't really understood Craig's work on the issue.
Thank u again for taking the time to respond to my lengthy message. If you do have time, I would be very interested to hear your thoughts. Thank you for making such a deep and interesting video and may God bless you
It seems so ad-hoc. Leave it for the theists.
And doesn't seem useful. "I knew that the child would set fire to the nursery but i want children to be able to express themselves so that's why everyone sleeps outside now. Aren't I great?" It's granting God superhuman insight as an excuse for him to not act with minimal responsibility.
Listening to this video, I am even more astonished at the mental gymnastics that Christians have to put themselves through, to explain why this alleged deity allegedly created this reality the way it did. And that they have to keep coming up with ways to limit what this god CAN do, or WHY it wants to or doesn’t, etc. I mean, Simon Biles can’t even begin to compete!
The concept of divine foreknowledge is incoherent with a timeless God. There is no such thing as foreknowledge, only knowledge. God simply knows every fact about every point in time. Indeed, when God created time, he must have created everything simultaneously from his reference frame. Literally, everything is being directly created by God right now, even these very words.
When did God create time?
@@Uryvichk now
@@Uryvichk the time is being created now
@@gabri41200 You're missing the point. God can't have created time if everything is just a single eternal moment for God. If there is no temporal succession, God cannot move from the state of "not having created" to "created." In your view, creation must be co-eternal. Everything is happening at once, which means there cannot be a sequence of events (I guess our perception that there is must be illusory).
@@Uryvichk indeed, my usage of "when" was merely figurative. But the central idea here is that God must have created everything all at once. Literally everything, even your thoughts.
Man Daniel Rubio is so smart. But he needs to take some speaking lessons. He has such a distracting cadence!
I suspect it's probably some sort of speech impediment, not just an unusual way of speaking. I could be wrong though.
I actually really like his speech cadence.
@@fanghur might be. In this case I'm kinda an asshole am I? Shit. In any case. His mind is absolutely brilliant