I have a friend who has schizophrenia. She went to the psychiatrist and he asked her, "Do you hear voices that aren't there?" So she asked him, "If I hear them, then how do I know they're not there?" It totally blew the psychiatrist's mind.
Your friend should know that they're not there because she's the only one hearing them and there's also no other evidence that someone outside her mind is producing the voices.
I actually watched this video twice, just to be sure I wasn't missing anything. There wasn't really any clear "metaphysics" in it, nor was there any clear statement of specific paradoxes. You also took 7 minutes to basically say what was tantamount to "hallucinations feel a lot like the real thing." Uh, yeah, no kidding. Does anyone even dispute this? Then you finally finished with the idea that sense data is really all any of us are aware of at the end of the day, and not the "real" external world of physical stuff. Again, NO KIDDING. Who on Earth disputes this? If this is supposed to be for beginners, then that's fine. But you're losing them immediately because you're taking really roundabout paths to establish very basic ideas in needlessly complicated ways with zero context. If it's *not* supposed to be for beginners, then you're working very hard just to establish ideas that quite literally everyone with basic education already understands. I therefore have no idea who this video is supposed to be intended for or what I'm supposed to get out of this discussion. I also noticed that this is a "part 2" video, which presumes that we've all seen part 1. I actually had to work to find it, because it was apparently published 7 months ago and is long-since lost in the void of 50 other vids published since then. So even if I did watch it, I've long-since forgotten what it was about or what we're building up to. I'm sorry, but I really tried to find something positive in this video. All I can say is that you have a remarkable talent for trivializing the momentous and complicating the obvious. Philosophy is really great stuff, but hardly anyone ever realizes it because we have to wade through so much crap just to get basic ideas explained neatly and clearly. It's inexcusable and accomplishes nothing other than to drive people away from the subject out of sheer boredom.
Philosophical Overdose *Actually, a lot of philosophers nowadays do dispute the idea* Am I supposed to know this? Who are they? What are the arguments? How seriously are they taken? How do they contextually fit into this video?
Philosophical Overdose That's exactly the kind of information that would really help this kind of video. Without something to contrast the argument against, it just comes off as a bunch of nit-picking over nothing. For instance, who disputes this? What are they claiming? How does this argument negate their claims? What practical relevance does it have?
How does that sense datum theory contradict materalism? How I understand it sense data are generated by your sensory organs experiencing real object or by private immaterial unshared objects. That sounds for me like a rather convoluted way to say thoughts generated by your brain without sensory input through your sensory organs. When these private objects are generated by your brain, this does not contradict materialism but we are still cut of from the physical world, because we can not reliably determine whether sense data come from our sesory organs or are generated as private objects within our brains. Or maybe I misunderstood the video. Either way, I don't get
Philosophical Overdose *This mental sense datum has certain properties, including the property of being red.* It's not that the sense datum "has the property of being red." The sense datum is literally "red itself." They are the same thing. "Red" is an element of the set of "sense data." *However, on the materialist view* There is no "however." Materialism is perfectly okay with this. You're making stuff up. *But, nonphysical entities are incompatible with materialism* Says who? You're just making more stuff up again. Materialism is perfectly happy to allow for "red" to exist as an experience. It just doesn't exist in any objective sense of the word. So if you want to get technical, it's not that red "exists" or "does not exist." Rather, you would say that a sentient agent merely "experiences red."
I personally, clinically experience private sense data. The clinical comparison leaves me (possibly me alone I admit) a bit troubled. To me, the experiences of hearing someone speak and hearing an internal voice do feel distinct. I've never looked around the room for a voice in my mind and have never upped my medication in response to speaking to someone (except my doctor but that's a special case). I do apologize. this comment feels like nit-picking, and you made an approachable comparison. I guess this comment is more for myself.
THE WAY THAT THE TOLTECTS ''SEE'' DIRECTLY PHYSICAL OBJECTS COULD BE A NICE WAY TO ''UNDERSTAND'' PERCEPTION ( SEE ''THE FIRE FROM WITHIN , CARLOS CASTANEDA)
but sense data isn't "nonphysical". computer science gives us a fairly good understanding about what information is and how it behaves. we know how to implement the abstract mechanisms we use in math and logic within machines. the whole materialism/idealism divide is long over. "material" processes can be simulated, "ideas" can be computed.
sofias. orange Not so. You are arguing as though physicalism isn't logically self-refuting. The problem is that . . . it technically/literally/truthfully is self-refuting.
I'm no psychiatrist, so take this with a whole canister of salt, but...what if schizophrenia is simply a diminished or absent ability to check or question the pareidolia we all occasionally experience?
But just because we can be "wrong" sometimes, it doesn't follow that we can't ever directly perceive things. For example, it's certainly possible to misunderstand (ie misinterpret) what somebody says to us, but it doesn't follow that we never truly understand utterances. See McDowell/Wittgenstein on (so-called) private sensations (Philosophical Investigations ~§250), or Sartre on other minds (Being and Nothingness ~350)
For practicalities sake that is true, but to be pedantic, something will always be lost (or changed) in translation. We may perceive things enough, but not necessarily directly.
I disagree. How can we then know if we are only wrong occasionally or ‘sometimes’ if I can’t be sure of what I’m seeing sometimes then why is it alright to suddenly begin to see everything correctly again until I suddenly become aware once again of falsity in my perception. This is where I see why Descartes went in his search for what is true and real. My idea definitely leads to immediate scepticism of the world but I would rather that than ignorantly believe everything I see is true to my perception when I know that I could be wrong almost all the time.
Since we don't truly perceive objects, but only sense data, we are in fact all brains in jars. The brain-in-a-jar question ought to be, not "Am I a brain a jar?" but "Do my sense perceptions have some kind of necessary relation to an external reality?"
I think that it's a paradox because you can trust what you see as a means to interpret reality, but you cannot trust what you see as a means to interpret reality.
It's rather misleading to talk about "seeing sense data", as sense data doesn't exist outside of its own perception. This is a peculiarity of the english language, whereby "lightning flashes" as though lightning were an object that performs an action, then ceases to exist.
A halucinated dagger doesn't look the same when you try to cut something with it. If Macbeth had used a hallucinated dagger to kill King Duncan the play would have been a lot less dramatic. So even from a purely sensory level the experience of a hallucinated dagger won't be the same.
You could extend this argument to any other sense, including touch. It's only looking at one in particular so that pithy, irrelevant ""answers"" like this one don't muddy the waters.
You're perception of reality is a hallucinated vivid dream. It just so happens to correspond to what others you're hallucinating also claim they are perceiving
![PHILOSOPHY - Epistemology: Paradoxes of Perception #1 (Argument from Illusion) [HD]](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/bs2pTBkJCxQ/mqdefault.jpg)
I have a friend who has schizophrenia. She went to the psychiatrist and he asked her, "Do you hear voices that aren't there?" So she asked him, "If I hear them, then how do I know they're not there?" It totally blew the psychiatrist's mind.
so profound
Your friend should know that they're not there because she's the only one hearing them and there's also no other evidence that someone outside her mind is producing the voices.
@@alittax soo you disprove the sense data using... sense data? 😉
@@daman7387
Yes, using sense data and logic. :)
I actually watched this video twice, just to be sure I wasn't missing anything. There wasn't really any clear "metaphysics" in it, nor was there any clear statement of specific paradoxes. You also took 7 minutes to basically say what was tantamount to "hallucinations feel a lot like the real thing." Uh, yeah, no kidding. Does anyone even dispute this? Then you finally finished with the idea that sense data is really all any of us are aware of at the end of the day, and not the "real" external world of physical stuff.
Again, NO KIDDING. Who on Earth disputes this?
If this is supposed to be for beginners, then that's fine. But you're losing them immediately because you're taking really roundabout paths to establish very basic ideas in needlessly complicated ways with zero context. If it's *not* supposed to be for beginners, then you're working very hard just to establish ideas that quite literally everyone with basic education already understands. I therefore have no idea who this video is supposed to be intended for or what I'm supposed to get out of this discussion.
I also noticed that this is a "part 2" video, which presumes that we've all seen part 1. I actually had to work to find it, because it was apparently published 7 months ago and is long-since lost in the void of 50 other vids published since then. So even if I did watch it, I've long-since forgotten what it was about or what we're building up to.
I'm sorry, but I really tried to find something positive in this video. All I can say is that you have a remarkable talent for trivializing the momentous and complicating the obvious. Philosophy is really great stuff, but hardly anyone ever realizes it because we have to wade through so much crap just to get basic ideas explained neatly and clearly. It's inexcusable and accomplishes nothing other than to drive people away from the subject out of sheer boredom.
Philosophical Overdose
*Actually, a lot of philosophers nowadays do dispute the idea*
Am I supposed to know this? Who are they? What are the arguments? How seriously are they taken? How do they contextually fit into this video?
Philosophical Overdose
That's exactly the kind of information that would really help this kind of video. Without something to contrast the argument against, it just comes off as a bunch of nit-picking over nothing. For instance, who disputes this? What are they claiming? How does this argument negate their claims? What practical relevance does it have?
+AntiCitizenX Got to agree, sadly. Hardly revelatory, barely insightful - badly presented even if it was.
How does that sense datum theory contradict materalism? How I understand it sense data are generated by your sensory organs experiencing real object or by private immaterial unshared objects. That sounds for me like a rather convoluted way to say thoughts generated by your brain without sensory input through your sensory organs. When these private objects are generated by your brain, this does not contradict materialism but we are still cut of from the physical world, because we can not reliably determine whether sense data come from our sesory organs or are generated as private objects within our brains.
Or maybe I misunderstood the video.
Either way, I don't get
Philosophical Overdose
*This mental sense datum has certain properties, including the property of being red.*
It's not that the sense datum "has the property of being red." The sense datum is literally "red itself." They are the same thing. "Red" is an element of the set of "sense data."
*However, on the materialist view*
There is no "however." Materialism is perfectly okay with this. You're making stuff up.
*But, nonphysical entities are incompatible with materialism*
Says who? You're just making more stuff up again. Materialism is perfectly happy to allow for "red" to exist as an experience. It just doesn't exist in any objective sense of the word. So if you want to get technical, it's not that red "exists" or "does not exist." Rather, you would say that a sentient agent merely "experiences red."
I personally, clinically experience private sense data. The clinical comparison leaves me (possibly me alone I admit) a bit troubled. To me, the experiences of hearing someone speak and hearing an internal voice do feel distinct. I've never looked around the room for a voice in my mind and have never upped my medication in response to speaking to someone (except my doctor but that's a special case). I do apologize. this comment feels like nit-picking, and you made an approachable comparison. I guess this comment is more for myself.
definitely not nit-picking. thanks for sharing. :)
THE WAY THAT THE TOLTECTS ''SEE'' DIRECTLY PHYSICAL OBJECTS COULD BE A NICE WAY TO ''UNDERSTAND'' PERCEPTION ( SEE ''THE FIRE FROM WITHIN , CARLOS CASTANEDA)
What in the world, subtle or large, would this understanding affect?
+Philosophical Overdose You are absolutely 100% correct.
but sense data isn't "nonphysical". computer science gives us a fairly good understanding about what information is and how it behaves. we know how to implement the abstract mechanisms we use in math and logic within machines. the whole materialism/idealism divide is long over. "material" processes can be simulated, "ideas" can be computed.
sofias. orange Not so. You are arguing as though physicalism isn't logically self-refuting. The problem is that . . . it technically/literally/truthfully is self-refuting.
TruthUnadulterated ...
I'm no psychiatrist, so take this with a whole canister of salt, but...what if schizophrenia is simply a diminished or absent ability to check or question the pareidolia we all occasionally experience?
But just because we can be "wrong" sometimes, it doesn't follow that we can't ever directly perceive things.
For example, it's certainly possible to misunderstand (ie misinterpret) what somebody says to us, but it doesn't follow that we never truly understand utterances.
See McDowell/Wittgenstein on (so-called) private sensations (Philosophical Investigations ~§250), or Sartre on other minds (Being and Nothingness ~350)
For practicalities sake that is true, but to be pedantic, something will always be lost (or changed) in translation.
We may perceive things enough, but not necessarily directly.
It becomes more problematic when you're perceiving things from afar or distorted; implying why or how they are distorted can be problematic
I disagree. How can we then know if we are only wrong occasionally or ‘sometimes’ if I can’t be sure of what I’m seeing sometimes then why is it alright to suddenly begin to see everything correctly again until I suddenly become aware once again of falsity in my perception. This is where I see why Descartes went in his search for what is true and real. My idea definitely leads to immediate scepticism of the world but I would rather that than ignorantly believe everything I see is true to my perception when I know that I could be wrong almost all the time.
so you can never tell the difference between perception and reality?
Since we don't truly perceive objects, but only sense data, we are in fact all brains in jars. The brain-in-a-jar question ought to be, not "Am I a brain a jar?" but "Do my sense perceptions have some kind of necessary relation to an external reality?"
how do we know that all this isn't sense datum
That's called solipsism.
This was an interesting argument. But I failed to understand how it was a paradox.
I think that it's a paradox because you can trust what you see as a means to interpret reality, but you cannot trust what you see as a means to interpret reality.
@@patricktessier7238 Ah okay! Thanks.
It's rather misleading to talk about "seeing sense data", as sense data doesn't exist outside of its own perception. This is a peculiarity of the english language, whereby "lightning flashes" as though lightning were an object that performs an action, then ceases to exist.
A halucinated dagger doesn't look the same when you try to cut something with it. If Macbeth had used a hallucinated dagger to kill King Duncan the play would have been a lot less dramatic. So even from a purely sensory level the experience of a hallucinated dagger won't be the same.
You could extend this argument to any other sense, including touch. It's only looking at one in particular so that pithy, irrelevant ""answers"" like this one don't muddy the waters.
Why wouldn't a hallucination be the same as a particularly vivid dream, which almost everyone has had and knows how real they can seem?
You're perception of reality is a hallucinated vivid dream. It just so happens to correspond to what others you're hallucinating also claim they are perceiving
@@MRKetter81 what's your empirical proof for this?
i apreciate this channel a lot, but this particular video.... i donno, it's just so badly done; it also feels unfinished and/or unrequested
probably because this video made you uncomfortable.
Wait a minute now... Am I experiencing déja vù?