Thanks for this Victor - a really excellent, fun talk! Causal presentism sounds really interesting, and definitely worth exploring more. That said, I've a worry that, given causal presentism, lots of intuitively true claims about the past will come out false. For example, the causal laws are presumably general, meaning that they don't say anything about particular individuals (e.g., they say something like 'for any F, if the F is G, then ...'). This means that we won't be able to derive past claims about particular individuals. So, 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' is false because the only way we could derive it would be if the laws said something about the specific individual Caesar (and/or, if we take it to be an individual, the Rubicon river). Maybe we can talk about this in your session! -Nathan Wildman
Het wordt binnenkort *eindelijk* gepubliceerd in het Tijdschrift voor Filosofie. (Dat nummer heeft om de een of andere reden zeer veel vertraging opgelopen.)
Hmm, your video is 3 years old. Does it locate my current comment in the past, the present or in the future? The point I want to make is this: we know the past as a collection of facts that took place and are recorded as such, like in the history books. But those facts were a result of choices made in each instant of time which, when the time was in its present mode, was allowing multiple choices. This way each choice that was actually made constituted just one of multiple (if not infinite) possibilities. Exactly as what we're facing in the present. Taking the above into the account, the fabric of the past and of the present, seems to consist of exactly the same component - probability rather than pre-determined certainty. The only difference being that we don't have history books regarding the present or the future. This way the presentism applies to every point in time, regardless it's historical location.
Thanks for this Victor - a really excellent, fun talk! Causal presentism sounds really interesting, and definitely worth exploring more. That said, I've a worry that, given causal presentism, lots of intuitively true claims about the past will come out false. For example, the causal laws are presumably general, meaning that they don't say anything about particular individuals (e.g., they say something like 'for any F, if the F is G, then ...'). This means that we won't be able to derive past claims about particular individuals. So, 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' is false because the only way we could derive it would be if the laws said something about the specific individual Caesar (and/or, if we take it to be an individual, the Rubicon river). Maybe we can talk about this in your session! -Nathan Wildman
Is het artikel/magazine nog ergens te vinden? Kwam het op google niet tegen
Het wordt binnenkort *eindelijk* gepubliceerd in het Tijdschrift voor Filosofie. (Dat nummer heeft om de een of andere reden zeer veel vertraging opgelopen.)
Hmm, your video is 3 years old. Does it locate my current comment in the past, the present or in the future?
The point I want to make is this: we know the past as a collection of facts that took place and are recorded as such, like in the history books. But those facts were a result of choices made in each instant of time which, when the time was in its present mode, was allowing multiple choices. This way each choice that was actually made constituted just one of multiple (if not infinite) possibilities. Exactly as what we're facing in the present.
Taking the above into the account, the fabric of the past and of the present, seems to consist of exactly the same component - probability rather than pre-determined certainty. The only difference being that we don't have history books regarding the present or the future.
This way the presentism applies to every point in time, regardless it's historical location.
Indeterminate free will makes no sense whatsoever. Indeterminacy lacks any component of agency. I do not see why you think you are a compatibilist.