Hi prof. Informative video...i am writing a thesis on critiquing law as integrity, could you please suggest what are the challenges and pitfalls of Dworkin's concept of law as integrity? It will be helpful. Thanks.
Well, I interpret Dworkin here as trying to bridge the gap between two poles: (a) critical legal studies Critical Legal Studies: ruclips.net/video/frpszqiQh7g/видео.html, and (b) extreme formalism ruclips.net/video/77gPTnYmcE0/видео.html
@@GeorgeTsouris not really while Dworkin accepts Neil Maccormick's sort of idea on the institutional facts as grounding legal rights, what he says, is this is an overall moral practice. This is what I object. There are absolute moral duties and pro tanto moral duties, while pro tanto moral duties are subjective leading to disagreement prima facie. Absolute moral duties takes into account the universalizability of morality and moral principles that are sort of Kantian categorical imperatives. But as long as a rule of recognition recognizes them there is no problem. For what Dworkin implies is contrary, that moral considerations can sometimes override legal obligations. Especially in light of persistent moral disagreement, what Dworkin is implicitly trying to convey is break the law for moral considerations. Nonetheless, Dworkin's approach brings ideological judicial biases that are presupposed to weaponize the judiciary as is seen through current examples of the Roberts Court especially with the abortion ban. Dworkin commits slippery slope fallacy by tying morality to its undesirable ends especially creating judges replacing reasons of elected officials when it comes to their judicial decision making. Legal normativity is different from normative ethics as normative ethics ties moral outcomes to deontogical or consequalist approaches, legal normativity is about the law's inherent legitimate authority which is accepted by the capability of guiding action of citizens based on those reasons, which would otherwise not have been had it not been "legal" notwithstanding the evaluative criteria of morality which is separate from these legal reasons. The practical efficacy in guidance should be to solve coordination problems in the legal society among officials than bringing uncertainty through abstract moral principles. As Raz would advocate for while he knows fully well the epistemic constraints of Dworkin's philosophy that law's authoritativeness accounts for the normative force that is distinct from individual moral judgements and precepts that cloud the content of law as a necessary component. Raz would allow for service conception of authority to be guided by right reasons for action on the reasons that are already known to the individuals. So Dworkin while you say is bridging the gap, I don't agree with your assessment, he is actually creating a divide in critical legal theory by further pushing society to a blackhole which is confusing the citizens to understand the reasons to deconstruct and criticize existing power structures, while not recognizing the institutional competence of law (formalist-originalist conception).
Perhaps… and that’s why the Critical Legal Studies camp feels like the whole legal system is incoherent… but Dworkin, here, is trying to salvage coherence.
![NOSFERATU - Official Trailer [HD] - Only In Theaters December 25](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/nulvWqYUM8k/mqdefault.jpg)
This is really excellent - So rare to find a video of this quality not behind a pay wall.
I’m glad you enjoyed it!
Hi prof. Informative video...i am writing a thesis on critiquing law as integrity, could you please suggest what are the challenges and pitfalls of Dworkin's concept of law as integrity? It will be helpful. Thanks.
Well, I interpret Dworkin here as trying to bridge the gap between two poles:
(a) critical legal studies Critical Legal Studies:
ruclips.net/video/frpszqiQh7g/видео.html, and
(b) extreme formalism
ruclips.net/video/77gPTnYmcE0/видео.html
@@GeorgeTsouris not really while Dworkin accepts Neil Maccormick's sort of idea on the institutional facts as grounding legal rights, what he says, is this is an overall moral practice. This is what I object. There are absolute moral duties and pro tanto moral duties, while pro tanto moral duties are subjective leading to disagreement prima facie. Absolute moral duties takes into account the universalizability of morality and moral principles that are sort of Kantian categorical imperatives. But as long as a rule of recognition recognizes them there is no problem. For what Dworkin implies is contrary, that moral considerations can sometimes override legal obligations. Especially in light of persistent moral disagreement, what Dworkin is implicitly trying to convey is break the law for moral considerations. Nonetheless, Dworkin's approach brings ideological judicial biases that are presupposed to weaponize the judiciary as is seen through current examples of the Roberts Court especially with the abortion ban. Dworkin commits slippery slope fallacy by tying morality to its undesirable ends especially creating judges replacing reasons of elected officials when it comes to their judicial decision making. Legal normativity is different from normative ethics as normative ethics ties moral outcomes to deontogical or consequalist approaches, legal normativity is about the law's inherent legitimate authority which is accepted by the capability of guiding action of citizens based on those reasons, which would otherwise not have been had it not been "legal" notwithstanding the evaluative criteria of morality which is separate from these legal reasons. The practical efficacy in guidance should be to solve coordination problems in the legal society among officials than bringing uncertainty through abstract moral principles. As Raz would advocate for while he knows fully well the epistemic constraints of Dworkin's philosophy that law's authoritativeness accounts for the normative force that is distinct from individual moral judgements and precepts that cloud the content of law as a necessary component. Raz would allow for service conception of authority to be guided by right reasons for action on the reasons that are already known to the individuals. So Dworkin while you say is bridging the gap, I don't agree with your assessment, he is actually creating a divide in critical legal theory by further pushing society to a blackhole which is confusing the citizens to understand the reasons to deconstruct and criticize existing power structures, while not recognizing the institutional competence of law (formalist-originalist conception).
We are living in international anarchy or hegemony, is this the best humans can do???
I take Dworkin as implying that we can always do better, and we continue to strive towards doing better...
thank you!!!!!!!!1
You're welcome!
Is Brown coherent with Plessy? No! Wro g example, kid.
Perhaps… and that’s why the Critical Legal Studies camp feels like the whole legal system is incoherent… but Dworkin, here, is trying to salvage coherence.