What if we reframe a descriptive theory of names as 1- a name denotes a set of essential and unique properties and only a set of essential and unique properties of a thought x ( here we can consider a thought as an individual (person)). 2-those properties are believed to pick up some individual (or a thought). 3-if an x satisfies those properties,then x is the name's referent. 4- a referent doesn't imply the existence of the thought (or individual) refered to. 5- if x doesn't satisfy the properties, then x is not the name's referent. I think in this the descriptive theory is immune to criticisms, i like to know what you think. For the naming: we think non-perceptually a thought or we perceive a thing, so by those ways we get a thing or a thought in our mind and then we attach a name to that thought or that thing. Also it might be the case that thoughts come into our minds via telepathy. For unique part, we can say that the logic of naming is built in such a way such that naming is essentially about unique and essential properties and only unique and essential properties even if the individual who does the naming doesn't know the essential and unique properties of a thought or thing being named. For how other people know names of thoughts or individuals, we can appeal to appropriate sources of knowledge, and we can consider the common knowledge also there. And also, it seems to me that when the continental philosophers use words which they don't define, they're supposing the naming as we talked about it above.
I wonder if based on the theory one could say whether William Shakespeare did really have a link to the drama pieces edited under his name or he was a pen name person for Christopher Marlow or any other writers?
Good lecture, but one should read Kripke's very well written "Naming and Necessity" before watching it, as Bonevac goes from a criticising the descriptive theory of names to criticising Kripke's causal theory without going through the stage of defending Kripke. One can guess Kripke's position from the criticism, but one looses the power of his position this way. Some of the criticism seem also related to the pervasive problems of natural language ambiguity. Just got to the end, and it looks like that is where Kripke's full thoery is defended.
Names are not unique as every name belongs to a system of names much as individual letters belong to the collective of the alphabet and within that to other kinds of sub-groupings like consonants and vowels. Naming is one of a number of performative intentions (meaning being the intent to signify in a particular manner and not another) within the broader system of utterances which are generated from simpler elements that in combination are more complex than the words themselves. This complexity creates the illusion of uniqueness. Phrases and clauses are likewise more specific than the individual words of which they are composed. Thus the uniqueness of the name as an index of the uniqueness of its referent is a function of the possibilities of expansion from name to higher and higher levels of utterance that involve combinations over multiple sentences that form a narrative around that name. Expansion is therefore the operation that creates the effect of description. The more that is said about a name the more unique that name seems. Thus there have been many people called Aristotle and Jesus but the discourse generated but very few of them appear to be uniquely qualified as not much has been said or written about them. In the case of famous, notorious or well-known people, the singularity of the referent is subject to a multiplicity of utterance whether rumours, facts or imagined narratives.
"Expansion is therefore the operation that creates the effect of description. The more that is said about a name the more unique that name seems." Agreed
Really useful lecture, thank you.
What if we reframe a descriptive theory of names as
1- a name denotes a set of essential and unique properties and only a set of essential and unique properties of a thought x ( here we can consider a thought as an individual (person)).
2-those properties are believed to pick up some individual (or a thought).
3-if an x satisfies those properties,then x is the name's referent.
4- a referent doesn't imply the existence of the thought (or individual) refered to.
5- if x doesn't satisfy the properties, then x is not the name's referent.
I think in this the descriptive theory is immune to criticisms, i like to know what you think.
For the naming: we think non-perceptually a thought or we perceive a thing, so by those ways we get a thing or a thought in our mind and then we attach a name to that thought or that thing.
Also it might be the case that thoughts come into our minds via telepathy.
For unique part, we can say that the logic of naming is built in such a way such that naming is essentially about unique and essential properties and only unique and essential properties even if the individual who does the naming doesn't know the essential and unique properties of a thought or thing being named.
For how other people know names of thoughts or individuals, we can appeal to appropriate sources of knowledge, and we can consider the common knowledge also there.
And also, it seems to me that when the continental philosophers use words which they don't define, they're supposing the naming as we talked about it above.
I wonder if based on the theory one could say whether William Shakespeare did really have a link to the drama pieces edited under his name or he was a pen name person for Christopher Marlow or any other writers?
Jack Sparrow enters the harbor.
British Guard: Whats your name
Jack Sparrow hands the guy money: Let's forget about the name
Guard: Welcome Mr. Smith
Lol
Good lecture, but one should read Kripke's very well written "Naming and Necessity" before watching it, as Bonevac goes from a criticising the descriptive theory of names to criticising Kripke's causal theory without going through the stage of defending Kripke. One can guess Kripke's position from the criticism, but one looses the power of his position this way. Some of the criticism seem also related to the pervasive problems of natural language ambiguity.
Just got to the end, and it looks like that is where Kripke's full thoery is defended.
Names are not unique as every name belongs to a system of names much as individual letters belong to the collective of the alphabet and within that to other kinds of sub-groupings like consonants and vowels. Naming is one of a number of performative intentions (meaning being the intent to signify in a particular manner and not another) within the broader system of utterances which are generated from simpler elements that in combination are more complex than the words themselves. This complexity creates the illusion of uniqueness. Phrases and clauses are likewise more specific than the individual words of which they are composed. Thus the uniqueness of the name as an index of the uniqueness of its referent is a function of the possibilities of expansion from name to higher and higher levels of utterance that involve combinations over multiple sentences that form a narrative around that name. Expansion is therefore the operation that creates the effect of description. The more that is said about a name the more unique that name seems. Thus there have been many people called Aristotle and Jesus but the discourse generated but very few of them appear to be uniquely qualified as not much has been said or written about them. In the case of famous, notorious or well-known people, the singularity of the referent is subject to a multiplicity of utterance whether rumours, facts or imagined narratives.
You gave a longwinded linguistic explanation lmao Kripke turns it metaphysical, which is the overall point of his main work.
"Expansion is therefore the operation that creates the effect of description. The more that is said about a name the more unique that name seems."
Agreed