No matter what, even if Stuart caught up to Lee on, say, June 30th, the mistake of not gaining the high ground on July 1st, couldn’t have been prevented by Stuart
The mistake on July 1st was NOT not gaining the high ground. The mistake was getting involved in a general engagement. Had they not done so, Lee could have felt free to choose when and where he engaged the union troops. But once they were engaged, well, he could not withdraw.
@@alperdue2704 Expect he couldn't because he didn't have Stuart's calvary which left him blind. Had he gone south like Longsteet suggested he would have ran into union refinforcents.
@@ctafrance He specifically ORDERED not to get involved in a major battle, but they didn't know that there was more than just that cavalry brigade, BECAUSE they had no scouts. While Stuart's (not "Steward/Stewart") raiding was important, and I commend him for trying to make it back, he simply was in the habit of being WAY too far ahead. He should have sent at least 3 guys with multiple horses each ahead, to try and get around and ahead of the Union army. Since they had multiple horses each, they would have had a good chance of pulling it off, and unlikely that Union cavalry themselves would've caught them all, esp. if he sent more than 3. Considering he captured wagons with teams, he should have had spare horses.
@@youtubemodsaresnowflakelef7692 IIRC, Stuart didn't capture the wagon train until June 30th in Hanover, PA or maybe it was an added, final portion there from an earlier capture in Rockville, MD. If so I will stand corrected.
Longstreet blamed Stuart for Gettysburg but Col. Mosby who had first hand knowledge of Stuarts orders from Gen. Lee corrected Longstreet as detailed in his memoirs.
The thing is, it was Stuart's responsibility to keep tabs on the Union army and prevent Lee from being surprised by them. Had Stuart been less focused on creating havoc, he would have noticed that Meade was moving quickly to intercept Lee, and would have been in a position to potentially prevent the loss at Gettysburg. That was the primary responsibility of cavalry. Yes, Lee's orders were relaxed, and yes, Stuart was attempting to confuse the AotP command. But at the end of the day, Stuart was well aware of his primary objective, and failed to perform. That failure cost the AoNV the ability to avoid the engagement at Gettysburg. Bottom line is, I agree in part. Stuart does not bear all the blame. He is to blame for the battle taking place at Gettysburg. But once the battle was engaged, it was Lee's own failure to perform that lost the battle. There is plenty of blame to go around.
I like your summation here. The video goes further to reinforce the point that Stuart was very surprised that Lee was that far west. Sounds to me like a bad assumption. Something that a cavalry commander should have avoided. Just my two cents.
No this was all on Lee. Lee had enough men on horses to screen and keep an eye on the union army. He didn't believe in screening calvary. Name a single campaign he used it to hide or recon the union army. He though it gave his own position away. It was nice in the south where lee could just ask the people if the had seen union forces and many people would ride to tell Lee. Not so in the north. This was the 2nd time Lee was surprised the union was coming in force. The same thing happen in the Maryland campaign. Lee only had inexperienced horsemen because he left better ones back on the border. That groups leader had pissed off stuart and he tried to give him crap jobs. Lee approved those actions.
This is largely untrue. You should read Lee's orders to Stuart. He gave him inconsistent directives, and trusted Stuart to make a judgment call as to what he should do. Lee gave him two different orders depending on whether or not the Union Army was on the move. If it was not, he told him exactly where he wanted him. If it was, he gave him discretion to ride around the Union Army, but also stay of Ewell's right to screen and recon. It was not really possible to do both if the Union Army moved aggressively north, and Lee seems to believe that they would not based on past experience. Stuart opted to ride around the Union Army, but this was a bad judgment call on his part. He had to loop eastward much too far, and then could not get back to Lee. Contrary to Lee's expectation, Hooker marched northward aggressively, and cut off Stuart from returning promptly back to Lee. He ended up going clear to Carlisle to finally get around the Union Army. He was also slowed by many wagons captured toward the end of his ride. In any event, Stuart was not expected back until June 28. By then Lee was in trouble, which he learned that day from Longstreet's spy. The Union Army was already well across the Potomac and dangerously close at Frederick, Maryland. Lee's army was badly strung out over 80 miles, and in danger of defeat in detail. Lee ordered an immediate concentration of the army at Cashtown, only 10 miles west of Gettysburg. This was a point equidistant to the strung out elements of his army. That set up the meeting engagement at Gettysburg. Even if Stuart had returned on June 28 as expected, it made no difference. Lee had blinded himself by sending Stuart out when he in fact most needed to know the exact movements of the Union Army prior to June 28. Stuart's continued absence on June 29 through July 1 also hurt, but he hardly set up the crucial problem, which had fully ripened by June 28. Another point is that there were 7 brigades of cavalry. Stuart took 3 experienced brigades. He left 2 further experienced brigades guarding passes out of spite - he was in a tiff with those commanders, and gave them this lowly duty. That left 2 inexperienced brigades with Lee that he did not trust, and did not use. They should have been left to guard passes so that Lee would have some good cavalry. Here is the key order, allegedly written by a staff officer, but presumably read by Lee before sending it to Stuart. “If General Hooker’s army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him, and withdraw with three others, but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountains tomorrow night, cross as Shepherdstown next day, and move over to Frederickstown. You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell’s troops, collecting information, provisions, etc.” [
@@dmbeaster you do not understand what Stuart was told by Lee when Lee took over the army that his primary responsibility was always to make sure Lee knew what the enemy army was doing. All the excuse making in the world does not change that
Read Lee's written orders to Stuart. Lee gave Stuart two objectives, and not one. Both coincided in time. Stuart lacked the strength to accomplish both simultaneously or the time to accomplish first one and then the other. I don't know where you got the idea from, but obtaining information on enemy strength and location was not automatically a default priority objective for cavalry commanders. That is defined by mission orders. See Grierson's orders from Grant in early 1863 as an example. He sent two messengers to Lee informing him that the AotP was moving north. Both failed to reach Lee.
I’ll add- If you think about the Confederates need for supplies, Stuart not even knowing that Lee was in Gettysburg, not aware he was engaging, not even expecting him to engage so soon, it would have been foolish not to take the time to grab whatever supplies they could- and it was kind of a lot they got. Just think if they hadn’t been fighting, and Stuart were to show up two days earlier with no supplies. People would have been going-“We cannot even feed our guys and you just left 150 wagons of supplies and came here instead????”
Oh, sure. That explains why Lee told Stuart that the wagons he had gotten were 'an impediment to me now." Lee's army was more than well fed in the golden land of plenty at the time. The only need for wagons was for carrying the surplus back to the starving south and Lee had already picked up all that he could handle in that regard. Having Stuart at hand on the first day of battle, or even before, could have been enormously helpful to Lee. How, for instance, the battle might have gone if Stuart had posted himself on Cemetery Ridge before Union Cavalry were on the scene? How about if Stuart had been around on day two to attack the Union supply wagons behind Big Round Top? The possibilities are mind- numbing.
I don’t think a movie is a great source for anything but a quote. Based on his movements and that of the Federal army he simply was in the wrong place at the wrong time. Not a surprise given they were in enemy territory.
@@douglyons2678 You raise a very valid point. Lee didn't fare so well outside of a state where the general population was on his side and more than happy to inform both Lee and his officers about whatever it might have been they had learned of the enemy. It can be a very significant advantage, though it was true in the south that slaves provided a great deal of important information to US troops.
@@thomasjamison2050 Lee specifically ordered Stuart to gather both information and provisions- objectives which were mutually exclusive since gathering the latter would impede Stuart's ability to obtain the former. Since these two objectives coincided in time, Stuart couldn't obtain first one and then the other. Stuart tried to carry out Lee's orders and predictably failed. Moreover, the lack of information from Stuart because of these orders led directly to the unexpected meeting engagement on 1 July, which was a disaster for Lee since it ruined his plan of campaign. This fiasco was Lee's fault.
@@manilajohn0182Mhmm. General Lee had no business, lighting into General Stuart the way that he did, based on this new evidence that he, through an order that he gave to General Stuart, was the one in the wrong in this case, not General Stuart!
I presume they were slowed down further by the 125 supply wagons. As Lee's army had invaded the North my understanding is that they were well supplied by the northern farms.
@@bobking7311 Stuart's Horse Artillery arrived @ East Cavalry Field commanded by Capt. James Breathed & engaged w/ a battery of four M1861 3" (76mm) Ordnance Rifles. Shell wght was 9.5 lbs & combined barrel & carriage wght was 1,720 lbs.
Stuart's mistake was pushing on to Carlyle and not keeping some sort of contact with Lee. He had the ability to use scouts to know where Lee was. Great video
Agreed. Stuart's primary tasking was to provide intelligence on Union troop movements. A standing position that needed to be adhered to at all times was to ensure that no more than an overnight's ride to be able to reconnect with Lee's forces. This would necessitate perpetual, real-time reassessment of Stuart's and Lee's movements.
@@ThomasFromTN I agree. 125 wagons of supplies in a land flowing with milk and honey were extraneous to say the least. It was his job to know where Lee was. That's why the cavalry exists .
Stuart sent two (or three, I don't remember offhand) messengers to make contact with Lee and inform him of the AotPs movement northward. None of them got through to Lee. The entire issue was Lee's mistake because he gave Stuart two objectives (to gather information and provisions for the army) for one force. Moreover, these two objectives coincided in time, so that Stuart was unable to accomplish first one and then the other- and his force was far too small to accomplish both simultaneously.
Interesting. Hard to say what I'd have done differently in his position. He honestly didn't know that Gettysburg was the place to go because it was never the plan.
Neither side had intended to fight at Gettysburg. The best explanation why the battle ended up being fought here is that it was the convergence of so many roads along which troops of both side were moving.
I respectfully disagree with the common misperception that Lee did not intend to fight at Gettysburg. Read "Memoirs of Robert E. Lee" by A.L. Long, Military Secretary to Lee, pp.267. Freely availble on the web. This plan is corroborated by Ewell (oooops meant Trimble), who also indicated that on a different occasion Lee indicated his plan was to fight "in the vacinity of Gettysburg" . Lee got caught with his pants down and it looks even worse since he planned to fight in that area, hence the efforts to discount those accounts.
@@antoninuspius1747 Lee should have defined a specific rendezvous time and place, before dividing his force. Stuart should have requested this from Lee before riding off on his own. The plan may change rapidly and unexpectedly but the absence of a plan is a recipe for confusion.
@@davidwilliam9681 Totally agree. And what's worse, and what you kind of allude to, there is no evidence Lee actually told his corps commanders anything about his plans. How can you do that?
Those wagons came in very handy on Lee's retreat. They were also filled with forage, allowing Stuart to keep his column more compact and together - otherwise he would have had to spread his troops out more to live off the land and been libel to defeat in detail if caught, such as at Hanover.
yeah i am sure 125 wagons made all the difference in the world. Lee would have been completely destroyed in his retreat without those 125 indeispensible wagons. What came in handy on the retreat was Meade's caution and inability to be aggressive
As is often the case, there's plenty of blame to go around here. Stuart, while facing the obstacles pointed out here, could have made a better effort to keep tabs on Lee and reunite sooner. And Lee, if he'd listened to Longstreet, could have moved his army after the first day of battle, to find a better place to engage, and also allow time to reunite with Stuart.
I've read a great deal about this, but no one seems to take into account Lee's own words on the subject. The deteriorating state of the Army of Northern Virginia and the looming financial and political crisis in Richmond had convinced Lee that it was time to press their advantage and force a decisive battle. Longstreet's advise was prudent, but it would not have brought them closer to a decisive victory. Lee was convinced he did not have time for further delay, and that their past success against superior forces was a strong indicator that they could overwhelm Meade's relatively comparable army. The fact that they came so close on the second day of the battle is enough to convince me that Lee was not entirely in error.
@@TheSimianDeity Lee was entirely in error, because decisive battle was not plausible. Victory on the second day was never going to lead to the AoP's collapse. Meade had good ground to retreat to, and reinforcements on the way. With the benefit of hindsight, even if Lee pulled off a miracle at Gettysburg, the ANV would still have had to retreat and it would have been a repeat of Sharpsburg: a tactical victory on the field of battle that Lincoln would transmute into a strategic victory in the political sphere. The only real change is Lincoln would have been obliged to talk up Grant's capture of Vicksburg and Rosecrans' successes in Tennessee. Either way, the ANV marches home.
Thank you for revisiting this subject! Gen. Stuart was doing exactly as Lee wanted - wrecking stuff and wreaking havoc on the Federals. In addition, Lee wasn't calvary blinded as some historians want to keep perpetuating - he had a couple of divisions.
If that was what Lee wanted, then Lee wanted the wrong thing. The cavalry needs to be between the two main forces and screen their own side. Stuart didn‘t do that. If Lee had other cavalry, he certainly didn‘t use them for it, either. As a result, Meade‘s army was the only one with a functioning cavalry screen, which meant they knew where Lee‘s army was and what it was doing, whereas Lee continued to have no idea where the Federals were and ended up fighting on his enemies‘ terms. Maybe Lee is ultimately more at fault than Stuart. He is the army commander, after all, and ultimately the one giving the instructions and picking his officers. But what seems clear is that both of them catastrophically misunderstood the primary task the cavalry was needed for and failed to make sure that it was doing that.
@@N2Dressage001 having a couple of leftover regiments doesn‘t constitute sufficient cavalry force when it comes to screening an entire army 80.000 that‘s coming up against a similar-sized force. Meade‘s Army has 36 whole regiments of cavalry. Buford alone has a whole division. Whatever cavalry forces Stuart left behind had exactly zero chance of driving Buford‘s troopers from their superior position, or of successfully screening Hill or Ewell‘s movements from him. None. It‘s only if Stuart is there himself, with a good chunk of his main force that would solve the problem. If Stuart drives the Federal Cavalry out of Gettysburg, they will be denied the superior ground and more importantly become blind to Lee‘s movements. Then Lee can concentrate his forces freely, and move again before the Federals know about it, maybe even force Reynolds into a battle on Lee‘s terms. That‘s what having cavalry can do for you. That is to say, actually having cavalry. But it needs to be a force large enough to actually deal with Buford. Settling the matter with „BuT LeE hAd CaVaLrY“ is what a lawyer or a pedant would answer. Or a politician. But it‘s not a military solution to a military problem.
I am 52 yrs pld and have had a fascination with the un-Civil War since elementary school and in particular the Southeren Armies. The way you break down to even the smallest of details, the movements and individuals involved therein, are so absorbing and comprehensive that I am not only learning but thouroughly entertained in rge process. I feel as though i am right there, in the moment, sweating tired and yet ready to fight. Keep up the outstanding work please.
Col. John Mosby-Now THERE'S a real Character! I like this guy! Once, he boldly and audaciously made his way into a Union Commander's Tent, and aroused that Commander from his sleep. He asked the Union Commander as to whether he had heard of Col. John Mosby, which caused the Union Commander to ask:"Why? Have you got him"?!? Col. Mosby replied:"No. He's got you"! Mosby's Raiders were some of the most successful Calvarymen that ever rode horses! 😁😁😁
There is an interesting (IMO) video by a gentleman at the U.S. Army War College who critically talks about Stuart's brigade assignments - i.e. the "regular" brigades of Beverly Robertson and Grumble Jones being used to guard the AoV's flank/LOC.
Lee did have those two other brigades. G.Jones being fresh off a successful raid in W.VA.He could have used a contigent from one or both for scouting for the Union Army. Lee had grown too dependent on Stuart, albeit for good reason but he had other options.
@@michaelzann6485 yes his mistake at Gettysburg was he trusted Longstreet and Stuart. The only one he could truly trust was Jackson. His mistake putting too much faith in Stuart.
Agree. He mentions how the brigades that Stuart left to guard the gaps were led by guys that Stuart hated (and vice versa) and that they were inexperienced. Good video.
Great video. No one can understand Gettysburg campaign without understanding CSA President Jefferson Davis' dire concern over the coming fall of Vicksburg, Mississippi. Lee and Davis met in Richmond after Chancellorsville victory. Davis wanted Lee to send large portion of his Army to save Vicksburg. Lee talked him out of this, and instead outlined plan to march his Army toward Harrisburg Pennsylvania capital threaten Baltimore, and Washington draw out and defeat Union Army of the Potomac. Then March on Washington DC force peace talks. This plan under estimated the resolve of the Northern States. Capturing DC would likely have brought more Union troops toward Richmond. The South wanted Lincoln to lose 1864 Presidential election, and hoped France and or England would recognize and support them. This never happened. After July 4, 1863 the North had the momentum and Lincoln, Grant, Sherman, Sheridan and many others would seize the initiative with greater numbers, industrial power, and resources...
There was never a plan to capture Washington. The city had a ring of forts around it, all manned with heavy artillery. It was impregnable. Even if there had been no forts, the Confederates just didn't have enough troops to take the city and hold it. Look at what happened at Gettysburg. They couldn't even take Cemetery Hill.
@@genes.3285 Perhaps you are right but supposedly they drafted a letter than was to be delivered to Lincoln upon defeat of Union Army of the Potomac north of DC. Perhaps Lee would have gone for Baltimore instead if he beat the Army of the Potomac but that never happened. Lee acted recklessly on July 2nd and July 3rd because they were desperate for a big victory with Vicksburg about to fall. Don't forget Jefferson Davis was a Mississippi native. Losing the Mississippi River divided the Confederate states in half..
Davis and Lee never wanted to capture Philadelphia or Baltimore, just threaten these cities and force the Federal Army to attack them. The Rebel army did very well on defense, and that was the campaign's purpose. But Lee discarded his own plan and went on the offense at Gettysburg. Longstreet was right.
Lee's goal was always to destroy the northern army. He was dissatified with his Chancellorsville victory because the northern army, although badly mauled, was able to escape. If Lee could take the fight to the north and beat the northern army in battle and capture Harrisburg, it might weaken northern resolve into seeking capitulation with the south. Lee retreated after his loss at Gettysburg on July 3rd and on July 4th Vicksburg was taken by the Union, effectively cutting the South in two and giving the North control of the Mississippi. The high tide of the Confederacy had been reached. Following his Gettysburg defeat Lee sent a letter to Jeff Davis offering his resignation as commander of the Army of N.VA. Davis refused the request.
Stuart did exactly what he was told. He never intentionally left Lee blind, although that was in essence of his ride of noteriety, but he had to stay away from the federals, as a consequence of the enemy not knowing what or where he was headed. Even the best planned events change when the enemy gets involved.
@@robertm.9633 Stuart had 7 brigades of cavalry. Two of those brigade commanders (Jones and Robertson) were rivals. Thinking this would be The Last Battle, he left those two to guard Lee's supply line so they wouldn't be participants in the final glorious battle. He took the other 3 experienced brigades with him. The last two (Jenkins and Imboden) were unreliable in Lee's eyes. There is a very interesting video about this: ruclips.net/video/lrXxz4iniRs/видео.html (particularly after the 20th minutes).
@@Zimster2000 Stuart left Lee with sufficient cavalry. It is Lee's job to understand the disposition of the cavalry left to him, and take corrective action as necessary. Lee simply failed at his job here.
The biggest problem was the fact that Stuart failed to get behind Union lines during Pickett's charge. He was stopped by George Custer who had 400 cavalry vs Stuart's 4,000 cavalry. Had Stuart not been stopped by Custer, Pickett's charge might have had a chance. Without Stuart's cavalry the charge was futile.
I agree. There has been much written about Stuart’s failure on the third day. That was where he takes some of the blame. Custer should not have been able to stop Stuart, but he did. This Stuart never arrives to hit the Union rear, and Picket was left to carry out the attack alone.
Stuart's cavalry ended up riding into sort of a funnel once some of his units were spotted in the open by Custer. Stuart was in column formation with 3 full brigades; Custer to his front with 4 regiments forming the Michigan Brigade. In the woods on Stuart's right was the 1st NJ Cavalry, fighting on foot, firing into Stuart's flank. On Stuart's left the 2nd PA Cavalry was doing the same from other woods. Custer deployed one regiment equipped with new repeating rifles as skirmishers and led 3 charges with his others. It was like a hornets nest attacking the head of a snake, as Stuart could not bring his full force to the fight. My great great uncle was with the 1st NJ Cavalry at Gettysburg and lived through the war.
Interesting you bring up Stuart's failure to get behind the Union lines. I think an under-appreciated fact is that, once Stuart was on the scene, Lee FINALLY had what he was lacking - eyes that could assess the flanks. Had STuart, or ANY competent calvary, been able to reconnoiter around the Union left prior to 2 July, they might have actually attempted the turning movement both Hood and Longstreet wanted. Without those eyes, it seems Lee never felt comfortable trying to turn the Union left due to a lack of solid info of what lay in that direction - another Corp perhaps? Just as he was strategically blind for most of the campaign, Lee was tactically blind for much of the first 2 days, and had no real intel as to the position of the entire Union army.
That Charge had no chance. There waa not enough infantry left to take and hold Cemetery Ridge. Calvary alone could not take and hold that position. The static nature of a holding action nullified Stuart's greatest advantage mobility.
Gen. Lee simply wasn't listening to one of the absolute best Officers that ever fought for the Confederacy. He, and others, simply thought that Gen. Stuart was automatically guilty as charged. Gen. Lee made blunder after blunder, culminating with Pickett's Charge on the Afternoon of July 3. How he and the Confederates that survived that disastrous campaign is beyond me.
@@bushwhackerinc.4668 I actually have to agree with you on that! Tell you what, though...our Nation lost a lot of good men during that horrible atrocity known as the Civil War. Some wore Blue, and some wore Gray. I guess that I just don't understand just what happened to Gen. Lee, that's all. Some say that he had been sick on the way up to Gettysburg, and there was at least one report that he may have, at some point, suffered a slight Heart Attack. I do hope that that's not what happened. All I can say is that something went wrong...and yet, the Confederacy lived on for almost Two more years. I've been known to state that, if the South had had the Supplies and Manpower that the North did, they'd of won the Civil War within the first 6 months of that awful conflict. Can you imagine, too, (& I say this just as an example), having to fight against a Union Regiment, and finding out later on, to your shock and horror, that one of the bullets that you fired had actually killed someone that you knew and loved, perhaps a Brother, a Son, or even a Father, a Nephew, or even a Cousin? Things like that happened during the Civil War, and it still brings me personally to tears, just thinking about it. I agree with Gen. Lee:"We are adrift on a Sea of Blood, and I want it to end"! May we never forget the horrors of that War...or of any other War! What in the World was ever so "Civil" about War, anyway? Sorry for being so long in my text to you, Sir. I just thought you should know that I agree with you, but that War really isn't the answer. Too much blood is shed that way, and too many lives were lost in that dark Four Year Period. We must ensure that this never happens again!
A very good video once more Have History will Travel. If I may suggest? Is a video comparing Custer and Merritt or Buford and Kilpatrick as cavalry commanders for the Union? What say you?
Custer was the absolute best during the Civil War. He beat off Stuart at Gettysburg, altering the outcome there. He also slammed the back door shut on Lee at Appomattox, sealing off his last line of retreat. This forced Lee's surrender. In between he fought fiercely and never lost an engagement. For his part at Appomattox, Grant gave Custer's wife the table the surrender was signed on. While Custer was a true national hero in the Civil War, I am no fan of him out west.
I would say Alfred Pleasonton is underrated in this category, a good deal of credit for the notable improvement of the cavalry is his and under him it scored its first notable successes against whom had been until then the undisputed masters of that field; too bad he was one of those nasty intriguing generals so fond of mudslinging and related conducts of that sort and thus was rightfully sacked from the Army of the Potomac and sent to the Western Theather, where he still showed competence while dealing with Price's forces in 1864.
@@g.sergiusfidenas6650 A good point . Until he came along infantry would holler out: "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" at passing cavalry. Previously the cavalry was used mostly for scouting. Unlike Custer however, he never personally altered the outcome of any major battles.
The bottom line is Meade got his forces moving much quicker and in unison than Lee expected and it hindered Stuarts ride around their flank that he had become so famous for. To put it in the old military adage; the federals got there with the mostest the soonest.
Too frequently Meade's decisions and abilities are called into question. Many think he should have pressed ANV more after the battle; but both armies were wrecked and exhausted after Gettysburg. Also as Lee pointed out about Meade (I am paraphrasing) He is a capable commander who will make no error in my front. If I make an error he will exploit it. Lee made many errors during the campaign and Meade was able to exploit them. The interior lines and the ability of junior commanders within the Army of Potomac to make important tactical were critical to the Union victory.
Enjoyed the video and the comments. It amazes me how Lee made so many mistakes during this confrontation and possibly the worst decision was to not push harder on the round tops. Instead it looks like he was just throwing his troops into the meat grinder which in my view cost him the battle. With Lee making decisions like that, and ignoring advice from from Longstreet and others, the battle was doomed regardless of what Stuart had done.
Idk if you can say Lee made “so many mistakes” during the Gettysburg campaign. In reality he was making decisions on the information he had at the time, which was sparse and inaccurate. Lee did NOT want an engagement anywhere in the vicinity of Gettysburg. He wanted to capture Harrisburg and live off the land while forcing the Union army to attack him. AP Hill and Heth’s poor decisions, along with no cavalry reconnaissance led to the failure of that mission. Lee only concentrated to prevent from being attacked in detail, because he initially believed the Federal army was at least 2 days behind him and was shocked when he learned they were actually within 2 hours of his position. Lee did make a mistake with his confusing orders to Ewell about taking the high ground southeast of Gettysburg. However, a competent general would’ve recognized their importance just as Lee already had. Stonewall Jackson would’ve attacked and taken those hills without a second’s thought but Ewell was not Jackson. Lee did not disengage after the First Day for several reasons starting with he was advised NOT to make a flanking maneuver by nearly all of his senior commanders except Longstreet. Also, Lee still didn’t know the full position of the Union Army and was still trying to fully concentrate his own forces. What little intelligence they did have reported that Union left flank was weak and in the open which made it a perfect target. It wasn’t known until Longstreet began to engage that they realized the reports were inaccurate. Sickles stupidly moving his men forward gave Longstreet an opportunity, but the Union left flank was extended nearly a mile further south than reported, and was in force. However, had Longstreet attacked on time at 12pm as originally planned he still could’ve exploited this because the Round Tops were essentially undefended. “Pete the slow” pouted and didn’t properly scout where he needed to position his men beforehand, and wound up taking a wrong route which delayed him by nearly 4 hours. The Union troops that defended Little Round Top didn’t arrive until about 10-15 minutes before the Confederates engaged them. Longstreet being late had allowed Meade to shift troops to his right and reinforce his defenses against Ewell’s attack. Both Ewell and Longstreet were supposed to attack at the same time to prevent that from occurring, but only Ewell attacked as planned. This allowed Meade to rush troops to his left as Longstreet approached because Ewell’s attacks were fizzling out. Again, failure of subordinates to properly follow orders and poor reconnaissance due to lack of calvary. Now in all fairness, Lee owns the failure of the Third Day. Under no circumstances was Pickett’s Charge a good idea or strategy, regardless of artillery and timing. Lee was mad at his failure to dislodge Meade and had his dander up and made a very poor decision that rests solely with him. While the attack did in fact split the Union line there simply wasn’t enough men after covering the 1 mile slaughter pen of Cemetery Ridge to take the position. Longstreet was correct that it would’ve taken 30,000 men for that attack to have any real chance of success. Also, Lee had no troops or plan in place to exploit the possible breakthrough as well. No 12,500 men will run an army of 93,000 off the field. Period. Other forgotten facts include: 1. There were Union troops in force protecting the far left flank from a flanking maneuver so Longstreet’s plan wasn’t as sound as he believed. Granted, it still would’ve been a better option than Pickett’s Charge but it was flawed. 2. The limited calvary under Lee before Stuart’s return were inexperienced and were primarily guarding the mountain passes, supply lines, performing rear guard actions as the army concentrated, and conducting some reconnaissance in front of Ewell. Stuart’s absence did play a major factor in the Battle of Gettysburg. 3. The Battle of Gettysburg was NOT an all out Union victory as the revisionists try to claim. The battle was in fact a tactical stalemate as both armies remained intact and holding their positions. The Confederates won 2 of the 3 days and had routed the Union army on the First Day. Gettysburg was a strategic Union victory as Meade had repulsed Lee’s invasion and forced him to retire to Virginia. Had Lee continued on his offensive same as Grant did in the Overland campaign then Gettysburg would’ve been labeled as inconclusive same as the Battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania Courthouse, North Anna, etc. are listed. Lee repulsed Grant at each of those battles but didn’t get to claim victory per historians because Grant continued his offensive. 5. George Meade was a very competent general and he outmaneuvered Lee and soundly exploited the Confederate mistakes. Meade deserves more credit for winning Gettysburg than the usual historic platform of Lee losing the battle. Lee himself knew Meade was a good commander in his own writings. As a whole was Lee better than Meade? Yes, but he wasn’t perfect and yes he did make mistakes as well at Gettysburg that he owns.
@@rebelracing88 I agree with many of your points but as anyone knows anything about the military, the commander is ultimately to blame for anything gone right or wrong. Lees problem was that he thought that he could win every battle and that flaw caused many other flaws to happen, and from there it was doomed. Lee probably knew that it wasn’t a good idea to pull off a big battle like this but did it anyway. I also think there are too many people that give their idea of things that happened and we will honestly never know the truth. What did come out of this battle was a big morale boost for the union forces while the southern states took a big toll in number of good forces lost, and leaders. I also personally think that things were pushed too fast to get results. It is always possible that if Lee had been more cautious and given himself a real look at the battlefield, he may have just left, but that cockiness in him clouded his judgment. That is simply my opinion which means nothing. Regardless of who actually claimed a victory, it was definitely a defining moment in the war and it’s my belief that although it was pretty much a stalemate, the north came out on top. With that said, I am not condemning what you posted, or completely dismissing your view, I am simply giving my look at what happened.
Have found a few from among the Gettysburg Historical people. Point seems to be, earlier in the war Custer was employed as an Engineer-type commander and did really well, and at Gettysburg was with the cavalry and equally did really well in the areas close and west, slightly south of Culps Hill in what is now known as Cavalry Fields. Those were against Stuart and happened after Stuart was back and was sent to cut up and disrupt the Union there.
Those who have have studied Custer know that on June 27, 1863, he was in command of but a single troop of cavalry. Suddenly orders came through making him a Brigadier General in command of 4 regiments composing the Michigan Brigade. Whether this was a mistake or not is arguable, but the fact remains Custer jumped 4 ranks and made the most of the opportunity. He had fought with with extreme valor in smaller, previous cavalry engagements.
Thanks very much for this information about General Stuart!! I have always wondered exactly what happened, I knew that he had brought all of the ambulances to that great battle of Gettysburg. History is fantastic, especially this time period.
I have long wondered if time had made a scapegoat of Stuart. As you said Stuart wasn't without culpability but it doesn't seem that he deserves all the blame he gets. Additionally it seems at times Lee's orders appear to be to fluid. I know this was his style & worked with stonewall but Stuart was not Stonewall; neither was ewell. I think Lee's tendency to give commanders leeway in their decisions may have come back to bite him.
Too bad Lee didn't have a couple biplanes to observe the enemy. It is easy to forget in a very modern age how different those times were. The telegraph was the most modern innovation. To know size, composition and location of enemy forces was not an easy thing until engaged in actual battle.
Do you think the fact that Stuart decided to leave Beverly Robertson behind had anything to do with the fact that he was once engaged to the person Jeb Stuart married who happened to come from Carlisle? Did his strong dislike of Jones and the fact he did not want him promoted in the first place also influence his decision? I don't question his tactics, I question his leadership decision to leave behind the two regular cavalry brigades guarding the line of communication while attaching the "irregular" cavalry to Lee's army as that decision would seem to be based on personal dislike and not what was best for the army.
Stewart had 5 Brigades. He took 3 on an authorized circle of the Union Army (which he had done twice before, but those Union formations where not moving). His previous movements he was away only 3 to 5 days respectively. It took him 10 days to encircle Union Army who were to Lee's surprise already north of the river. Everyone focuses on the "ride" but the real error was the 2 BDEs left behind. One was commanded by "Grumble" Jones who despised Stewart (I'm sure the feeling was mutual). Jones and the other "irregular" BDEs commander (I can't remember his name) did not cover himself in glory the days before Gettysburg. He did not screen the gaps; he was not in contact with Stewart. Just a note about Lee, he was the type of officer who gave his subordinates lots of latitude, it's one of his great personality traits but it also failed to serve him on several occasions. When he authorized Stewart to ride around the union army, I'm sure that he had expected him to do in less than 5 days (But he did not articulate that to his subordinate, something for all leaders to learn from), He did it again when he ordered Ewell (who had replaced the now dead Jackson) to "Take that hill if practicable." Well, an order like that to Jackson would have meant, take that hill. To Ewell it meant something different.
Wasn’t it said that Jackson and Lee were more or less on the same wave length so the “If Practicable” order had been relayed to Jackson, he’d understand it as act on his own initiative? Ewell had big shoes to fill and he wanted to be cautious as he’d only been a Corps commander for about a couple weeks up to that point.
To be honest, Ewell had been a great brigadier general, but it takes time for most to grow into being a great corps commander. Gen. Ewell hadn't gotten the time he needed to become great in that role. Also, the battle at Gettysburg surprised the heck out of both sides, and with the change in the generals on the Union side unknown to Lee and complicating his plan to draw the Union in to a battle that would allow him to win big versus Union forces.
@@davidburroughs2244 I agree with most of what you said, but it is my understanding is that Longstreet's spy Harrison informed him of the change, and Longstreet was able to relay this information to Lee the day prior. Lee had something to say about Meade being a different kind of general than Hooker, but I don't remember what exactly he said.
@@lufsolitaire5351 Yeah, that's one of the big "ifs" of the battle. It's worth remembering that if Jackson/Ewell *did* attack, his Corps would be up against Union cavalry - often equipped with repeating rifles or breechloaders, Berdan's Sharpshooters - equipped to a man with breach-loaders, the famous Iron Brigade, and other forces all on high ground. Given what the Lighting Brigade accomplished on the defensive with their repeaters (Western Theatre, Army of the Cumberland) That composition of forces is nothing to sneeze at. It's possible that Jackson/Ewell would have taken the high ground if he tried, but it's possible that he would've destroyed the better part of his forces in the effort. Of course, I personally wouldn't know either way.
Well, Lee said Gettysburg was on him, at the time but in the years to come his followers would never say that and I do not believe he took steps to correct them. I believe he let people blame others when he should not have done so.
Thank you for this video and information. Very enlightening. I'll bet the Stonewall Jackson would have come to Stuart's defense in this situation. In fact, Jackson would have foreseen the logistical nightmare that would have ensued when Stuart was given his original orders. Just my guess. Great channel. Thanks again.
WHY !!!!!!DO YOU YANKS KEEP PUTTING THE !!!! IN FRONT OF A MANS BLOODY NAME !!! STONEWALL JACKSON !!!NOT THE !!!STONWALL JACKSON 😣😣😣😣😣😣😣😣MENTAL I HAVE AN 1894 AMERICAN BOOK ON YOUR CIVIL WAR and THE CONFEDERATE Troops CALLED thire MOTHERS MUM 😅😅😅😅😅PROPER ENGLISH STOCK !!! WE SHOULD NEVER HAVE LOST YORKTOWN IN 1781 😣g
Stuart was surprised at brandy station. Lee's orders were not precise. He wanted to make up for being caught off guard. Lee was blind. It was both of theirs fault.
Stuarts folly was giving Lee irregular cavalry units instead of the remaining regular veteran cavalry units to scout Less flanks.Lee distrusted irregulars because of their lack of experience in battle and scouting,so Lee hardly used them.It all boiled from a great dislike between Stuart and his subordinate officers. Stuart placed his petty revenge over Lee's plan to hopefully create an end to the war.
I'm not sure Jackson was Lee's favorite corps commander, but he was certainly his best (with a nod to Longstreet who is also extremely capable). With Jackson dying when he did at least he could be reincarnated when his country (the USA) needed him as George S. Patton.
Patton lost either his paternal grandfather or great uncle in Pickett's Charge @ Gettysburg; I can't remember which. Then, one or the other was lost @ the 3rd Battle of Winchester in 1864. Both were Colonels of Virginia Infantry Regiments.
I would love to see a series made on all the sequence of events leading up to, including the Battle of Gettysburg. It's the most fascinating period of the civil war and so little is known. At least by most Americans. Young people don't seem to have the hunger for American history today. We need teachers to inspire students.
I live near and grew up in Harrisburg Pa., the objective of this campaign. You would not believe the amount of people here that don't know the closest battle to Harrisburg happened in Camp Hill Pa. (albeit, a minor skirmish),just ten miles away. And Mechanicsburg Pa. was the furthest town north occupied by the Confederates.
Back in the late 1960s, our big Eighth grade trip was to Gettysburg for the day. Although the school had the best of intentions, it was a total waste. As 14 year olds, we cared nothing of the history, but only of goofing off, buying candy, and checking out the girls. (But I did hear the terms "Little Round Top" and "Big Round Top" for the first time and never forgot them.)
Heros von Borcke vigorously defended Stuart's actions in his book and stated that Stuart was following the orders given to him by Lee. It seems that Lee's supporters were just trying to find any scapegoat they could, be it Longstreet, Stuart, Ewell, etc to deflect the blame of the loss at Gettysburg off of Lee. But Lee admitted out loud for many to hear that it was all his fault, he took responsibility, so why so many others try to shift the blame onto other people?
Because they wanted Lee's admission of guilt to be a mere noble gesture, taking blame for his subordinates' mistakes. And they wanted to do that to make Lee into an icon of perfection, and thereby somehow vindicate the Southern cause.
Von Borcke was also a personal friend of Stuart’s, something of a glory hound, and not considered to be the most reliable of sources. I just read a biography of Stuart that seemed to be very balanced in its presentation, and here’s what I took away: Lee’s orders were vague and flexible, so Stuart took them in the way that suited his personality the most... as most of us would. He did very much like having his name in the papers, and he very much enjoyed raiding, so it’s not surprising that he took the dramatic raiding option instead of the less dramatic screening option.
@@mjfleming319 So did Lee's orders give Stuart the option to screen for his army? If so, that would be odd considering Stuart was not even with Lee's army. Lee had an entirely different cavalry unit with his army. Stuart rode in the other direction and circled the Union army. If Lee wanted Stuart to screen and be his "eyes" then why did Lee take another cavalry unit with him and why did he allow Stuart to go in an entirely different direction. Some may say well Lee didn't know Stuart was going to go in the other direction, so after a few days of Lee not seeing Stuart he never asked where he was or asked anyone to find him? Stuart had rode around the Union army previously, so it isn't like Lee didn't know Stuart had the ability to do such a thing. No, i believe the Lost Cause supporters after the Civil War had to find a scapegoat for why the battle at Gettysburg was lost and Stuart was just one of several the blame was put on, they wanted to blame everyone except Lee. Even Lee admitted after Pickett's charge that it was all his fault, was he referring to just the charge itself or the entire battle? No man is prefect and certainly no generals, neither Stuart or Lee.
@@mjfleming319 If you look further down in the comments section here you will see i discussed this matter with others 10 months ago and I was asking questions about the cavalry units with Lee's army, which apparently those cavalry units never left VA until right before the battle of Gettysburg. By the time Lee entered PA, surely he realized Stuart wasn't anywhere near his army, so why didn't he bring the other cavalry with him into PA? None of this makes any sense to me. Personally, my opinion on the matter, and i guess we will never know the truth, but everyone has their opinion as the old saying goes. My opinion is Lee told Stuart to go in the direction that he did and knew perfectly well that Stuart was circling back behind the Union army. I think he asked Stuart to do this to confuse the Union army of his intentions and to harass the Union army from their backside. But after Lee's army blindly ran into the Union army at Gettysburg and a battle started, which Lee claimed he didn't want to happen, that Lee or Lee's supporters or both had to find someone to blame for his mistake of not bringing the cavalry units near his army with him out of VA. Then some how, the entire lose of the battle is placed on Stuart by some people which is totally ridiculous. While others blame Longstreet or Ewell or Heth or Euart or Hill or anyone besides Lee. Lee was a good general, but nobody is prefect and he made mistakes in the Gettysburg campaign and it's time people admitted that in my opinion.
@@1i1HrnPrpPplEater I just read Jefferey D. Wert’s biography of Stuart and of course he devotes a good deal of space to this question. Wert’s conclusion, which I find persuasive, is that Lee’s orders gave Stuart just enough discretion to go raiding, which is what he really liked to do. So it really doesn’t reflect well on either general, and it certainly doesn’t turn Stuart into a scapegoat. The two commands left behind were supposed to screen Lee’s flank and rear, and they accomplished that. But I just don’t remember why they didn’t move northward faster. I guess I’ll have to reread.
We all forget in hindsight these military leaders were flying blind, no instant radio communication no telegraphing for the southern troops, the fog of war and unpredictable and volatile circumstances leave room for a lot of conjecture. nothing was going according to a precise plan, and that was Lee's style, the cards just stacked up against Lee as the battle was begun sooner than expected in a place not chosen.
Thanks for the video. One question. If Lee was waiting on Stuart to be his "eyes and ears" why didn't he explicitly say so in his orders. "Go find the enemy for me." Simple enough, right? And if he was to report his finding to Lee, how would Stuart make his reports to Lee? According to this video, he had trouble finding Lee, moving away from Gettysburg based on a rumor.
Isn't an additional issue with Jeb Stuart is that he was absent from Lee's army for 8 days? Most of what I've read is that Lee sanctioned Jeb Stuart's ride, but expected him to return to the army in 4/5 days, not 8.
Excelent run down. I'd like to add that part of Lee's strategy was to disperse the AoP so as to attack them in detail before they could concentrate. Its why Lee pushed Ewell to the Sesquhanna and allowed Stewart to do what he did. The screw up occured when Lee ordered Ewell back to Gettysburg and Stewart missed that boat and went clear up to Carlise to link up, which of couse never happened.
I haven't seen it documented that Lee's strategy was to disperse the AoP and attack it in detail. More that the idea was to use the "offensive defensive" where they found suitable ground and enticed the AoP to attack them in a strongly held position.
@@bobking7311 You would be partly mistaken. Lee certainly did *not* want to allow the AoP to assemble. He had a much better chance of essentially annihilating them (which was his documented goal), by having his army assembled, in place, and ready to engage the elements of the AoP "in detail" as they arrived.
There should have been a division of responsibilities: part of Stuart’s unit committed to recon for Lee’s army ONLY, the rest to mischief among the bluebellys.
There was, I think. 3 brigades to go with Jeb, and 2 brigades to remain with the main army. It's after they separated Jeb and the boys with him had to deal with a Union that had gotten far better than expected and countered him pretty well but couldn't stop him. Some where down in these comments is a war college's take on his orders and actions.
There were 7 brigades of cavalry, total, with the Army of Northern Virginia. Stuart assigned 3 to go with him. Of the 4 remaining, two were "regulars" and two were "irregulars". Stuart assigned the two brigades of regulars, whom Lee trusted, to guard the supply routes. Stuart assigned the two brigades of irregulars, whom Lee considered ill-trained, undisciplined and unreliable, to accompany the army. Lee did not deploy them as a general would normally deploy cavalry because he did not trust them. You might well ask why Stuart would do such a thing. There appear to be two reasons: he expected to be back with Lee in 3-4 days (as was the case when he did the same thing twice in 1862) with all the necessary intelligence, and he detested the two commanders of the regular brigades (Robertson and Jones), making him reluctant to assign them to any duty which might make them look good.
Great details. I think when he was delayed in the beginning waiting for federals to clear and then again at Hanover it put him behind schedule. Because Buford had the perfect screen on the Union left he engaged the army a lot sooner than anyone expected. Stuart was still hearing for the eastern link up and lost another day searching. The entire confederate experience at Gettysburg is defined by failure of command and control. A bit more coordination and I think Lee had a good chance at a significant victory. Such are the winds of fortune.
Meade took over then reacted according to the book. He beat Lee to GB and that is the end of it. Longstreet expected as much or he knew to claim he did after the fact. Stuart could have easily been there before Hill attacked Buford and Reynolds. It would not have changed the plan of Lee. The only thing that went wrong was Lee allowing Ewell to keep Johnson at Culps Hill instead of moving him around to the right of Anderson to reenforce McLaws. Longstreet could have still called a halt to it if he had Johnson and Anderson on the afternoon of the 2nd. Wright and Wilcox might have been able to dislodge Hancock with the help of Johnson’s brigades. Stuart was not a critical piece of the problem. Hancock and Sedgwick were the problems.
I heard a lecturer at Carlyle say that Stuart left his two best regiments back to guard the logistics train because he didn’t like the commanders and didn’t want them in on the win. The two he brought were militia and not trusted by Lee, so he didn’t take their reports on Little Round Top being key terrain seriously.
Stuart's tardiness didn't cost the Confederates, nor did his lack of intelligence. Imboden had cavalry with Lee too and he could have been used to screen and scout despite being inexperienced. it would have at least given Lee warning to pull Ewell back to Chambersburg and fortify there to force the Union to attack him.
I do not fault Stuart's actions until the third day at Gettysburg. It is then that he bears partial blame for the loss of the battle. Lee had a brilliant battle plan for the 3rd day. Stuart was sent on a wide sweep around the Union Army and was to attack the Union rear at its center at the same time Picket's force attacked from the front. The 3rd element was an artillery barrage commanded by Col. Alexander with 45 guns. He was to concentrate his fire on the point of attack and inflict as much damage as possible before Stuart and Pickett struck. The attack was to be a giant pincer movement designed to cut Meade's army into two. Alexander failed in that his barrage overshot the crest where the Bluecoats were, and mostly fell harmlessly on the reverse slope. Officers under Stuart were ordered to remain concealed by moving through the woods at the Union rear. Some units moved into the open and were spotted by Custer who commanded the 4 regiments of the Michigan Brigade. One regiment at a time, Custer led 3 charges against the head of Stuart's column and stopped him cold. Both Stuart with a much larger force than Custer, and Alexander failed to accomplish their objectives and Pickett's men were slaughtered as a result.
I might add that after Stuart failed to reach the Union rear there is not a single written report, letter, or diary entry about the cavalry battle by Stuart or any of his officers between 3 July 1863 and 1864. Why the complete silence on the matter? I submit that it was because he was ought fought by a much smaller force, which resulted in Pickett's infantry being decimated. Moreover the General that beat him (Custer) only a few days before had only been a Captain in command of a single troop of cavalry. Yet with an assist from the 1st NJ and 3rd PA cavalry fighting dismounted on the flanks, Custer stopped Stuart's Cavalry Corps with a single brigade.
It comes down to one things. Did JEB do what he was told to do? Also, did he send his location was in the 48 hours prior to the battle. The one thing to factor in is that some of the information on JEB where abouts comes from the "lost cause" and are in fact incorrect.
From what I understand Stuart's Ego had been tarnished after Union Cavalry had surprised him and forced his retreat. In order to compensate he attempted to get around the Union force undetected, a move he had previously done in another campaign that won him renown.
He had done it twice, in 1862. IIRC, the first in May, and the second in October. Both were quite successful, but then the Army of the Potomac wasn't on the move during those two episodes.
@06:50 you failed to mention the important fact that a column of Stuart's Cavalry rode all the way to Harrisburg and burned the large wooden railroad bridge there and thus broke the main Union railroad link East-West.
I'm very glad. Thank you so much for watching and supporting the channel. Please consider subscribing if you have not done so already and check out my other videos.
Great video...I’m ten months late to the party, but I really enjoyed it. I have a question: I know Stuart was ambitious, competitive, and very image-conscious - not always a bad thing to have some swagger in a cavalry officer. I’ve always wondered how aware he was of Grierson’s recent raid in Mississippi, and if he felt pressure to outdo his Union counterpart’s dramatic success. I’ve similarly wondered if Lee felt pressure to outdo Grant’s Vicksburg campaign. I can’t prove either case, but Lee and Stuart were classic southern aristocrats, and acutely aware of matters of honor and pride. How would it feel to such noble gentlemen to be outdone in their profession by a piano teacher (Grierson) and a “drunk” (Grant)? Did some of that pressure lead to mistakes? It’s just a thought.
I am not sure of the effect of Grierson's raid on Stuart. However, I do believe Grant's Vicksburg campaign played partially into Lee's move into PA. While Vicksburg fell the day after Gettysburg ended, it was evident well before that how Grant's campaign would end. Lee would have had high troop morale after winning Fredricksburg and then Chancellorsville, but he knew the damage being done out West. Grant effectively split the Confederacy in half depriving the Eastern half of the CSA of the much needed agriculture capabilites in the West along with troops and other supplies. Lee may have understood that the CSA would fall if the north did not capitulate, which I believe was the entire point of his invasion into PA.
The strategic objective of Lee's movement north was to achieve enough of a success to relieve Union pressure on the Confederate defenders at Vicksburg. This was hashed out by the Confederate leadership in mid- May after Lee had already objected to any reduction in the strength of his army to send west and had instead recommended a forward movement of his army (which was then literally starving in its position along the Rappahannock River). The operational objective was to forage off of enemy territory and restock the army's supply train. The major errors of the campaign were all made by Lee. None his subordinates failed him during the campaign. The only minor errors which they made were: 1) Stuart's wasting of a few hours in paroling Union prisoners, and; 2) Longstreet's failure to realize that Lee's plan of campaign had been ruined by the meeting engagement on 1 July. Although Lee made a number of errors during the campaign, his decisions during the battle (after he gained control of it) were the only ones open to him.
I think there was a problem with Lee in that he believed all his generals would know what Lee planned and would act as if they had received orders. Lee expected to much of his generals and it cost him.
Bottom line is, Stuart fell victim to the same fate as so many other competent military commanders before and since have: the indefinite, conflicting orders coming from one or more superior officers. Lee was notorious for giving ambiguous orders and Longstreet was no Stonewall Jackson, but rather a field general who performed well only when the circumstances began in his favor. Even for the time, sure, Stuart's movements should have yielded more intelligence and linked up with Ewell sooner in spite of the AOTP's whereabouts prior to Gettysburg, but Lee and Longstreet both deserve the lion's share of the blame for Jeb's cavalry arriving at the battle too late to make any measurable impact. The scene from the movie where Lee chews out Stuart without giving him a chance to deliver his report because "there was no time for that" always bothered me because I wanted to hear Jeb's side of the story.
Stuart ran into extreme difficulty while still in Northern Virginia. The rear of the federal army was obstructing his progress. At that time, the logical thing to do would have been to reverse direction and catch up with Lee, protecting his right flank and scouting ahead. Stuart was lucky not to have lost his entire cavalry force. Other than that, the invasion itself was foolhardy. In a nutshell, Lee destroyed the offensive striking power of the AofNV in only 13 months, from June '62 to July '63, mostly due to the lack of imagination on his part. He tactics were Napoleonic; too many frontal charges, not enough oblique attacks.
Attempting to win a Napoleonic style total destruction of an enemy army was Lee's error. His army simply did not have the ability or resources to secure such a victory. Chancellorsville represented his best chance at that kind of victory and his failure to accomplish it there should have gotten it across to him that he could not do it. Instead, he became convinced that he could destroy the Army of the Potomac. His 'victories' were mostly Pyrrhic, making him, not Grant, the most effective commander the Union had. He probably shortened the war by a couple of years all by himself.
Exactly! And-When General Lee confronted General Stuart about where he'd been, and said that the supply wagons that General Stuart had brought,were an impediment to him now, he was covering his own hide! He gave General Stuart no chance to defend himself! I have a feeling that, for a moment, things got really ugly! The tension between these two must've been sky-high! But, all things considered, I think that General Lee finally realized that it truly was his own fault, not General Stuart's.
Stewart did exactly what Cavalry is suppose to do, Lee was too impatient, even Longstreet told him and had doubts of attacking a mile wide open field. As long as Lee was on the defensive he was fine but when he crossed into the north it went downhill.
Mam, I do not inconsentant thoughts, the fact is and still was Lee went on the offence in a land he was not familiar with and practically lost the war, even Longstreet argued and tried several times for him not to go through with it.
He in modern terms would be on a recon mission, it does not matter where he is, it only matters that he reports back to Lee on the enemy's location, today this would be a SALUTE report. (Size Activity Location , Unit type, Time and Equipment) also the movement of the enemy should also be included.
I always suspect that Stuart was at least to some degree trying to compensate for the embarrassment and near-disaster he suffered at Brandy Station shortly before departing on what would become the Gettysburg Campaign.
That was most definitely ex- post- facto finger- pointing in order to shift responsibility away from the actual reasons for the Confederate defeat. By that same kind of rationale, one could accuse Lee of trying to compensate for his defeat at Antietam.
@@manilajohn0182 You are reading way more into my comment than what is actually there. I never said,nor do I believe that Stuart's late arrival at Gettysburg was instrumental in the Confederate defeat. Lee in fact did have other cavalry units there, they were just not of the same level of experience and quality as that of most of Stuart's Cavalry. In my opinion two things(among others) contributed to Lee's defeat there. 1) Lack of energetic action by Ewell on the north end to take Culp's Hill,and 2) Lee's over-confidence in his troops at Pickett's Charge.
@@jamcam2760 I never said that you believed that Stuart's late arrival was instrumental in the Confederate defeat. I referred specifically to Stuart's alleged compensating. My point is that just because other people claimed that Stuart was doing that doesn't make it a fact. That's all.
Lee left himself blind when he sent Stuart to ride around the Union army. Hooker, and then Meade, actually had a general knowledge of where Lee's army was with the Union cavalry screen.
correct, Lee’s orders should have been to either screen his army, or, have Stuart attack the columns of marching Union infantry, cavalry is highly effective against formations such as these, overall, it was simply a diversionary raid which failed in its purpose in diverting the enemies attention.
Stuart went with only 3 of the 7 cavalry brigades in the Army of Northern Virginia. Of the remaining 4, Stuart did screw up by assigning the 2 brigades Lee would have trusted (regulars) to guard the supply lines, while assigning two brigades that Lee did not trust (irregulars) to accompany the army. The two commanders of the regular brigades hated Stuart, and he despised them. Stuart based his assignments on spite, rather than the good of the army. Since he had twice before ridden around the Army of the Potomac, with great success, and been back in 3-4 days, he likely figured there would be no harm. He was mistaken.
In my reading of the logistics of this move, I saw that the wagons captured were loaded with grains. Those grains allowed the horses to eat high calorie food in place instead of having to spread out for foraging each night. So the effect on movement speed was a wash. They moved no faster or slower (at least that is what I read). I believe it was an expert on Gettysburg logistics that I got this from. Sorry I can't remember the exact source.
There's been talk about a so-called Union Victory at Brandy Station, but not so; Stuart's surprised cavalry ultimately repulsed Pleasanton's attack. Pleasanton's Union Cavalry lost twice as many men there.
The Confederate campaign failed primarily because of a critical mistake made not by Stuart, but by Lee. The strategic objective of the campaign was to achieve a victory great enough to force the Union to lift the siege of Vicksburg. This was hashed out by Lee and the Confederate political leadership in Richmond in mid- May. But Lee stated in his after action report that he had never intended to fight a major battle so far from his base unless attacked. From this, it's clear enough that Lee intended to maneuver so as to entice the AotP into attacking the AoNV. This is also the likely reason why, on 1 July, Lee cautioned his corps commanders not to bring on a general engagement until the army was concentrated. In effect, Lee was attempting to carry out a strategically offensive, but tactically defensive campaign- a difficult task when it's remembered that the army was foraging off of the enemy countryside. But maneuvering so as to encourage an attack by the AotP required accurate, up- to- date- information on the strength and location of the AotP. This is where Lee made the critical mistake of the campaign. He violated the military axiom of "one force, one objective" and issued two objectives to Stuart. In two separate letters, he instructed Stuart to gather both information and provisions- the former being critical toward accomplishing the strategic objective of the campaign, and the latter facilitating the operational objective of the campaign. Lee failed to clarify which of these objectives was the primary one, and compounded this error by emphasizing that Stuart was to "...collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army", rather than simply directing Stuart to forage for his three cavalry brigades only. Worse still was the fact that these two objectives coincided in time. Stuart couldn't first accomplish one, and then the other; he was forced to accomplish them both simultaneously. What nailed the coffin shut on Stuart's task was that gathering information required mobility which only his cavalry could provide- but gathering provisions was guaranteed to impede that mobility. So, the more that Stuart gathered provisions, the less was he able to gather information- and this is in fact exactly what happened during the campaign. After he captured the Union supply train, Stuart's advance slowed to a comparative crawl. The resulting lack of information which Lee required about the AotP led directly to the meeting engagement of 1 July. This minor victory was actually a disaster for Lee, because it effectively ruined his plan of campaign. By going over to the tactical offensive, Lee assumed a tactical initiative which he had never wanted. This minor defeat suffered by the AotP all but guaranteed that Union forces would not be carrying out an attack on the AoNV- particularly since they were led by a new commander- in- chief. This minor success on 1 July, combined with the pressure of time (from the situation at Vicksburg) led Lee into the tactical offensive again on 2 July. By 3 July, Lee's only options were a continuation of the tactical offensive or the abandonment of the campaign- because although Longstreet's proposal was doable (if tactical in nature), it was highly unlikely to encourage Meade to attack.
There was something deeper than just Stuart being absent. Stuart had 7 brigades under his command. But he only took 3 brigades with him on his end run around the Army of the Potomac. He left four other cavalry brigades with Lee, so Lee should have had enough cavalry to be his eyes and ears and thus avoid the surprise he had at Gettysburg. Of the four, two were veterans and regulars, and two were inexperienced and rather irregular. Lee didn't trust those two brigades, and he didn't use them for intelligence gathering. But who did Stuart leave behind to guard Lee's supply lines, and thus be unavailable to Lee? The veterans and regulars, led by the experienced and capable brigadier generals Jones and Robertson! And why? Stuart had serious personal issues with both of them -- he left them there so they would not be able to get any glory in the upcoming fight. Stuart could have had a profound positive influence over the outcome of Gettysburg (from the Confederate point of view), had he acted maturely instead of childishly in how he assigned the men under his command. Granted that Grumble Jones was a big jerk and few liked him -- he was still a capable cavalry commander. And why was Stuart torqued off at Robertson? Because Robertson had once been engaged to Stuart's wife, and Stuart's testosterone (and his apparent insecurity over his wife's former fiancée) had gotten the best of him. But I'm glad for it. It would not have been well had Lee won at Gettysburg, or wherever the ultimate battle might have been fought.
I'm not sure about that. I know it's all supposition at this point but there is some interesting ideas of what would have happened if the south had achieved independence and co-existed along with the north rather than being having been destroyed by it. Looking at the current state of this country I'm not sure we could be in any worse shape for sure. Slavery would not have lasted much longer as it was already becoming less productive and cost efficient than modern technology coming on the scene.
It puzzles me that Stuart came in close proximity to unguarded Washington DC without making an attempt to capture Lincoln himself. Meade wasn't the only Northerner who could sign a Surrender and Lincoln could do it too.
Stuart failed miserably to follow Lee's written order which was to cross the Potomac preferably at " the Point of Rocks" and then " feel the right of the army" while advancing north. Instead, Stuart tried to replicate his dramatic " ride around the army" which he did to McClellan earlier in the war and FAILED, getting separated and trapped by the entire Union army, which was BETWEEN him and Lee ! Then, he led his cavalry down a narrow lane through the woods on July 3rd at the Rummel Farm, only to be met with headlong suicide charges of the Michigan 7th Cavalry, led by George Custer. These 750 Wolverines stopped Stuart's entire force before they could emerge successfully from the wooded lane !! Lee's plan of a "pincer movement" between Pickett and Stuart was ruined......and Lee ordered Pickett to DESTROY his battlefield report which listed the failings of the other commanders during his charge.
Well, Have History Will Travel, first time I think I got you without pants on (without your facts). What was Stuart wrote to Robertson as an order exactly? When was the last time Robertson did anything like that to Stuart knowledge? Was it expected he would fail on this mission or was he expected to accomplish like he was Stuart himself? Why was Robertson chosen to execute those orders anyway? What else could be done instead?
I'm not knowledgeable about Civil War specifics, BUT it APPEARS that rather than have ONE MAIN CALVARY FORCE separate from The Main Body in such a Campaign, that AT LEAST ONE smaller Calvary Unit should have been attached to each Corp to SCOUT and MAINTAIN contact with EACH CORP and of course REPORT to the Overall Commander....Lee.. .Meade. QUESTION: Did each Corp in the Army of Northern Virginia have such organic cavalry assigned??? If so, they needed more. (If I had been a Corp Commander, I would have had such mounted units act as "radar" in all directions of my Corp....reporting regularly on what was ahead, and to my flanks and behind.) EXCELLENT VIDEO. INFORMATIVE. Completely changes The Movie Narrative.
By the time of the American Civil War, cavalry were no longer required to be attached to each infantry corps- because they were no longer the threat to infantry that they were during the Napoleonic Wars.
@@krismurphy7711 Cavalry always have been an army's primary scouting arm. That said, reconnaissance was not automatically the primary task of cavalry. A good example of this was Union Colonel Benjamin Grierson's 1863 raid into Confederate territory. His primary objective was to divert Confederate attention from the area of Vicksburg by wreaking havoc in Confederate territory- which he did. In this case, gathering information on enemy strength and location was a secondary objective. Stuart in the Gettysburg campaign is yet another example. Lee gave Stuart two objectives for one force- both of which coincided in time. Stuart lacked the strength to accomplish both objectives simultaneously, or the time to accomplish first one and then the other. Stuart attempted to accomplish both and predictably failed. This was the fatal error of the campaign.
The death of Stonewall Jackson prior to Gettysburg IMHO was a huge factor in the Southern loss there. Jackson's ability to maneuver a large number of forces with speed, precision, and aggressiveness would have made a huge difference. Plus, Jackson and Stuart, though, complete opposites in a personal manner, they were still very close friends. I believe Jackson and Stuart together would have been unstoppable. IMO.
Set aside his postwar reputation and instead remember Jackson's complete failure during the Seven Days' Battles, my friend. Jackson was a good commanding general without a doubt. That said, he was also unstable, had poor relations with many of his subordinates, and was court martial- prone. When the position of Lieutenant General rank became available in late 1862, Lee was careful to ensure that Longstreet had a one- day seniority over Jackson. Just sayin...
I think that Stuarts failed attack on the third day, which was stopped by Custer, was the final blow to JEBs reputation in the Gettysburg battle. Had Stuart not attacked in a column and that actually gotten behind the American Army lines in the middle as Picket attacked the front; the American lines would have most likely broken in the middle. The American Army had strong interior lines, but the battle would most likely have lasted at least another day, and most likely with the American Army pulling back. I am no great historian, but overall, JEB was a train wreck at Gettysburg.
A few hundred Confederates breached the Union line- while approximately 20,000 Union reinforcements were converging on that spot. Pickett's Charge was going nowhere, and Stuart alone wasn't going to change the course of the battle.
@@manilajohn0182Agreed! Too many people want to blame General Stuart for this, or for that, or for something else. The Confederates should've never even gone to Gettysburg, in the first place! That entire campaign was a major fiasco, from start to finish! Orders weren't followed, as it refers to General Heth not getting into a scrap, with any Union Companies.. but he told General Lee afterwards, that when his Troops saw some Yankees, they got their dander up, and disobeyed orders, and, before General Heth knew it, he was tangled with half of the Union Army! That was one incident. And look what it led to. Nevertheless, the Confederates pretty much won the day, regardless. The other two days? Nope! After everything was said and done, concerning the Gettysburg Campaign, you can bet your sweet bippy, that General Lee, and the Confederate Army, were glad to get back to Virginia!
A huge issue was that Lee didn’t trust the cavalry that Stuart left with the army. Stuart’s mistake was not leaving Cavalry commanders whom Lee would trust and use effectively
You can't change the fact that Stuart failed in his vital mission to let Lee know where the Union army was. Being blind probably cost Lee the battle. Union cavalry not only found Lee's army but seize the high ground and got the message to Meade fast enough so they could fight on the high ground.
I have animated battle maps of both of those battles. I break the engagements down to the regimental level so you can follow your ancestor through the battle.
there's a gentleman on here, Joe Ryan I believe, that makes a compelling case that Gettysburg was always Lee's objective rather than some happy accident that both armies encountered each other there. I suggest watching his videos on the subject, many are thought provoking.
On July 2nd, Lee told Stuart to attack behind Union forces at Cemetary Ridge. He had over 3,000 troops. Only because of a headlong charge by George Armstrong Custer and his Michigan brigades with 400 men was this effect vanquished. None of what I just wrote was revealed in this video.
I learned many years ago I am a descendent of that family on my mothers side. He would have been a great uncle (x 9? not sure how many generations) My mothers great uncle had letters passed down through the generations. These letters have now been donated to a museum in Texas years ago. Names have changed over the years but the lineage is still on going. My Grandmothers maiden name was Stuart, originally from Virginia.
They were stationed to guard the gaps in the mountains. On the march north they prevented scouts from spying on Lee's movements and if Lee was repulsed to protect his line of retreat. Robertson did play an important part in fighting a rear guard action against the Union cavalry that followed Lee's retreat.
I think we often forget that Stuart and Lee both did not expect the Union army to move as quickly as they did. My personal opinion is that Lee's order to cross behind Union forces was leaving a lot to chance if the Union army acted unexpectedly. Not to mention the cavalry should have stayed between the two forces if their main job was reconnaissance. But Lee wanted Stuart to do more than that.
Agreed. Lee gave an order for a not primarily reconnaissance mission, and Stuart carried it out successfully. Stuart asked for permission to try and do a run around of the AoP, and Lee gave the order. Stuart had made such circling movements of the AoP twice before, and it took 3 days. This time the AoP was larger, more sprawling, on the move, and had a much more formidable cavalry element of its own. So it took 6 days. What is there to complain about? The rest is excuse-making to shield Lee from shouldering the consequences of his own orders.
The historical record is crystal clear that Stuart was not simply given the task of reconnaissance. Stuart was in fact given 'two' tasks- to gather both information and provisions. This was the critical mistake of the campaign, and it was made not by Stuart, but by Lee. Worse still, Lee failed to specify which of these two objectives was a priority. This mattered greatly. Obtaining information on the strength and location of the AotP was critical to Lee's plan of campaign (which was to entice the AotP to attack the AoNV)- and particularly so since the AoNV was foraging and could not remain in any one place for more than 3-5 days. However, obtaining provisions was the operational objective of the campaign. The importance which Lee attached to Stuart's gathering of provisions can be seen in an order which Lee sent to Stuart, in which Lee told Stuart to gather "...all the supplies that you can for the use of the army". These two objectives coincided in time, so that Stuart could not accomplish first one and then the other. He had to accomplish both simultaneously- and with just three brigades. Since gathering provisions would inevitably slow the advance of his cavalry and make the gathering of information more difficult (and this is in fact what happened), Lee's violation of "One force, one objective" was a death sentence for the campaign. Lee's resulting lack of information on the strength and location of the AotP led directly to the meeting engagement of 1 July- which completely ruined his plan of campaign by casting the tactical initiative on to Lee.
Lee's expectations of his subordinates was that they interpret his strategic-level orders and develop and execute the appropriate tactics to accomplish the mission in support of that strategy. Stonewall was superb at this; the attrition of leadership left Lee with good battalion-level commanders who found themselves to be mediocre commanders of Corps.
No matter what, even if Stuart caught up to Lee on, say, June 30th, the mistake of not gaining the high ground on July 1st, couldn’t have been prevented by Stuart
The mistake on July 1st was NOT not gaining the high ground. The mistake was getting involved in a general engagement. Had they not done so, Lee could have felt free to choose when and where he engaged the union troops. But once they were engaged, well, he could not withdraw.
@@ctafrance Should have followed Longsteet’s suggestion to withdraw and pick the location for battle.
@@alperdue2704 Expect he couldn't because he didn't have Stuart's calvary which left him blind. Had he gone south like Longsteet suggested he would have ran into union refinforcents.
@@ctafrance He specifically ORDERED not to get involved in a major battle, but they didn't know that there was more than just that cavalry brigade, BECAUSE they had no scouts.
While Stuart's (not "Steward/Stewart") raiding was important, and I commend him for trying to make it back, he simply was in the habit of being WAY too far ahead. He should have sent at least 3 guys with multiple horses each ahead, to try and get around and ahead of the Union army.
Since they had multiple horses each, they would have had a good chance of pulling it off, and unlikely that Union cavalry themselves would've caught them all, esp. if he sent more than 3.
Considering he captured wagons with teams, he should have had spare horses.
@@youtubemodsaresnowflakelef7692
IIRC, Stuart didn't capture the wagon train until June 30th in Hanover, PA or maybe it was an added, final portion there from an earlier capture in Rockville, MD. If so I will stand corrected.
Longstreet blamed Stuart for Gettysburg but Col. Mosby who had first hand knowledge of Stuarts orders from Gen. Lee corrected Longstreet as detailed in his memoirs.
Thanks. Didn't know.
Longstreet stabbed the CSA in the back after the War.
Longstreet polished his own brass in his memoirs, published well after the major participants had passed.
@@E.C.2 Longstreet was Grant's best buddy. Makes sense. He had a stellar career after the war.
The thing is, it was Stuart's responsibility to keep tabs on the Union army and prevent Lee from being surprised by them. Had Stuart been less focused on creating havoc, he would have noticed that Meade was moving quickly to intercept Lee, and would have been in a position to potentially prevent the loss at Gettysburg. That was the primary responsibility of cavalry. Yes, Lee's orders were relaxed, and yes, Stuart was attempting to confuse the AotP command. But at the end of the day, Stuart was well aware of his primary objective, and failed to perform. That failure cost the AoNV the ability to avoid the engagement at Gettysburg.
Bottom line is, I agree in part. Stuart does not bear all the blame. He is to blame for the battle taking place at Gettysburg. But once the battle was engaged, it was Lee's own failure to perform that lost the battle. There is plenty of blame to go around.
I like your summation here. The video goes further to reinforce the point that Stuart was very surprised that Lee was that far west. Sounds to me like a bad assumption. Something that a cavalry commander should have avoided. Just my two cents.
No this was all on Lee. Lee had enough men on horses to screen and keep an eye on the union army.
He didn't believe in screening calvary. Name a single campaign he used it to hide or recon the union army. He though it gave his own position away.
It was nice in the south where lee could just ask the people if the had seen union forces and many people would ride to tell Lee. Not so in the north. This was the 2nd time Lee was surprised the union was coming in force. The same thing happen in the Maryland campaign.
Lee only had inexperienced horsemen because he left better ones back on the border. That groups leader had pissed off stuart and he tried to give him crap jobs. Lee approved those actions.
This is largely untrue. You should read Lee's orders to Stuart. He gave him inconsistent directives, and trusted Stuart to make a judgment call as to what he should do. Lee gave him two different orders depending on whether or not the Union Army was on the move. If it was not, he told him exactly where he wanted him. If it was, he gave him discretion to ride around the Union Army, but also stay of Ewell's right to screen and recon. It was not really possible to do both if the Union Army moved aggressively north, and Lee seems to believe that they would not based on past experience.
Stuart opted to ride around the Union Army, but this was a bad judgment call on his part. He had to loop eastward much too far, and then could not get back to Lee. Contrary to Lee's expectation, Hooker marched northward aggressively, and cut off Stuart from returning promptly back to Lee. He ended up going clear to Carlisle to finally get around the Union Army. He was also slowed by many wagons captured toward the end of his ride.
In any event, Stuart was not expected back until June 28. By then Lee was in trouble, which he learned that day from Longstreet's spy. The Union Army was already well across the Potomac and dangerously close at Frederick, Maryland. Lee's army was badly strung out over 80 miles, and in danger of defeat in detail. Lee ordered an immediate concentration of the army at Cashtown, only 10 miles west of Gettysburg. This was a point equidistant to the strung out elements of his army. That set up the meeting engagement at Gettysburg.
Even if Stuart had returned on June 28 as expected, it made no difference. Lee had blinded himself by sending Stuart out when he in fact most needed to know the exact movements of the Union Army prior to June 28. Stuart's continued absence on June 29 through July 1 also hurt, but he hardly set up the crucial problem, which had fully ripened by June 28.
Another point is that there were 7 brigades of cavalry. Stuart took 3 experienced brigades. He left 2 further experienced brigades guarding passes out of spite - he was in a tiff with those commanders, and gave them this lowly duty. That left 2 inexperienced brigades with Lee that he did not trust, and did not use. They should have been left to guard passes so that Lee would have some good cavalry.
Here is the key order, allegedly written by a staff officer, but presumably read by Lee before sending it to Stuart.
“If General Hooker’s army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him, and withdraw with three others, but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountains tomorrow night, cross as Shepherdstown next day, and move over to Frederickstown.
You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell’s troops, collecting information, provisions, etc.” [
@@dmbeaster you do not understand what Stuart was told by Lee when Lee took over the army that his primary responsibility was always to make sure Lee knew what the enemy army was doing. All the excuse making in the world does not change that
Read Lee's written orders to Stuart. Lee gave Stuart two objectives, and not one. Both coincided in time. Stuart lacked the strength to accomplish both simultaneously or the time to accomplish first one and then the other. I don't know where you got the idea from, but obtaining information on enemy strength and location was not automatically a default priority objective for cavalry commanders. That is defined by mission orders. See Grierson's orders from Grant in early 1863 as an example. He sent two messengers to Lee informing him that the AotP was moving north. Both failed to reach Lee.
I’ll add- If you think about the Confederates need for supplies, Stuart not even knowing that Lee was in Gettysburg, not aware he was engaging, not even expecting him to engage so soon, it would have been foolish not to take the time to grab whatever supplies they could- and it was kind of a lot they got.
Just think if they hadn’t been fighting, and Stuart were to show up two days earlier with no supplies. People would have been going-“We cannot even feed our guys and you just left 150 wagons of supplies and came here instead????”
Oh, sure. That explains why Lee told Stuart that the wagons he had gotten were 'an impediment to me now." Lee's army was more than well fed in the golden land of plenty at the time. The only need for wagons was for carrying the surplus back to the starving south and Lee had already picked up all that he could handle in that regard. Having Stuart at hand on the first day of battle, or even before, could have been enormously helpful to Lee. How, for instance, the battle might have gone if Stuart had posted himself on Cemetery Ridge before Union Cavalry were on the scene? How about if Stuart had been around on day two to attack the Union supply wagons behind Big Round Top? The possibilities are mind- numbing.
I don’t think a movie is a great source for anything but a quote.
Based on his movements and that of the Federal army he simply was in the wrong place at the wrong time. Not a surprise given they were in enemy territory.
@@douglyons2678 You raise a very valid point. Lee didn't fare so well outside of a state where the general population was on his side and more than happy to inform both Lee and his officers about whatever it might have been they had learned of the enemy. It can be a very significant advantage, though it was true in the south that slaves provided a great deal of important information to US troops.
@@thomasjamison2050 True. I think Ewell had done a pretty darn good job of collecting supplies during his sweep to the Susquehanna
@@thomasjamison2050 Lee specifically ordered Stuart to gather both information and provisions- objectives which were mutually exclusive since gathering the latter would impede Stuart's ability to obtain the former. Since these two objectives coincided in time, Stuart couldn't obtain first one and then the other. Stuart tried to carry out Lee's orders and predictably failed.
Moreover, the lack of information from Stuart because of these orders led directly to the unexpected meeting engagement on 1 July, which was a disaster for Lee since it ruined his plan of campaign. This fiasco was Lee's fault.
I knew Stuart had gotten supplies but not to that extent. 100 wagons is a significant amount and would slow him considerably.
Lee ordered Stuart to obtain both information and provisions. Big mistake.
@@manilajohn0182Mhmm. General Lee had no business, lighting into General Stuart the way that he did, based on this new evidence that he, through an order that he gave to General Stuart, was the one in the wrong in this case, not General Stuart!
With all of the difficulty’s moving artillery it is amazing they got there so quickly!!
I presume they were slowed down further by the 125 supply wagons. As Lee's army had invaded the North my understanding is that they were well supplied by the northern farms.
I always thought horse artillery was of the light, easily harnessed & towed variety, like maybe 6-9 pounders
@@bobking7311
Stuart's Horse Artillery arrived @ East Cavalry Field commanded by Capt. James Breathed & engaged w/ a battery of four M1861 3" (76mm) Ordnance Rifles. Shell wght was 9.5 lbs & combined barrel & carriage wght was 1,720 lbs.
It was hot and dry in the days leading up to the battle. The roads would have been perfect for fast movement.
Stuart's mistake was pushing on to Carlyle and not keeping some sort of contact with Lee. He had the ability to use scouts to know where Lee was. Great video
Exactly, he could have sent small parties with reports back to the main army but neglected to.
Agreed. Stuart's primary tasking was to provide intelligence on Union troop movements. A standing position that needed to be adhered to at all times was to ensure that no more than an overnight's ride to be able to reconnect with Lee's forces. This would necessitate perpetual, real-time reassessment of Stuart's and Lee's movements.
@@ThomasFromTN I agree. 125 wagons of supplies in a land flowing with milk and honey were extraneous to say the least. It was his job to know where Lee was. That's why the cavalry exists .
Properly spelled 'Carlisle'. The other one is in UK.
Stuart sent two (or three, I don't remember offhand) messengers to make contact with Lee and inform him of the AotPs movement northward. None of them got through to Lee. The entire issue was Lee's mistake because he gave Stuart two objectives (to gather information and provisions for the army) for one force. Moreover, these two objectives coincided in time, so that Stuart was unable to accomplish first one and then the other- and his force was far too small to accomplish both simultaneously.
Interesting. Hard to say what I'd have done differently in his position. He honestly didn't know that Gettysburg was the place to go because it was never the plan.
Neither side had intended to fight at Gettysburg. The best explanation why the battle ended up being fought here is that it was the convergence of so many roads along which troops of both side were moving.
trying consoldate lees army ended in a battle fog off war
I respectfully disagree with the common misperception that Lee did not intend to fight at Gettysburg. Read "Memoirs of Robert E. Lee" by A.L. Long, Military Secretary to Lee, pp.267. Freely availble on the web. This plan is corroborated by Ewell (oooops meant Trimble), who also indicated that on a different occasion Lee indicated his plan was to fight "in the vacinity of Gettysburg" . Lee got caught with his pants down and it looks even worse since he planned to fight in that area, hence the efforts to discount those accounts.
@@antoninuspius1747 Lee should have defined a specific rendezvous time and place, before dividing his force. Stuart should have requested this from Lee before riding off on his own. The plan may change rapidly and unexpectedly but the absence of a plan is a recipe for confusion.
@@davidwilliam9681 Totally agree. And what's worse, and what you kind of allude to, there is no evidence Lee actually told his corps commanders anything about his plans. How can you do that?
Those wagons came in very handy on Lee's retreat. They were also filled with forage, allowing Stuart to keep his column more compact and together - otherwise he would have had to spread his troops out more to live off the land and been libel to defeat in detail if caught, such as at Hanover.
Actually probably to haul the wounded as well.
yeah i am sure 125 wagons made all the difference in the world. Lee would have been completely destroyed in his retreat without those 125 indeispensible wagons. What came in handy on the retreat was Meade's caution and inability to be aggressive
@@bobber0623 actually those wagon's were very valuable especially after losing Vicksburg they needed all the supplies they could get.
From what I read he was raiding. One of his troopers said it is hard to turn away that many wagons when your army is starving half the time.
He was not meant to raid but get on Ewell's flank soon as possible and protect it.
As is often the case, there's plenty of blame to go around here. Stuart, while facing the obstacles pointed out here, could have made a better effort to keep tabs on Lee and reunite sooner. And Lee, if he'd listened to Longstreet, could have moved his army after the first day of battle, to find a better place to engage, and also allow time to reunite with Stuart.
I've read a great deal about this, but no one seems to take into account Lee's own words on the subject.
The deteriorating state of the Army of Northern Virginia and the looming financial and political crisis in Richmond had convinced Lee that it was time to press their advantage and force a decisive battle. Longstreet's advise was prudent, but it would not have brought them closer to a decisive victory. Lee was convinced he did not have time for further delay, and that their past success against superior forces was a strong indicator that they could overwhelm Meade's relatively comparable army. The fact that they came so close on the second day of the battle is enough to convince me that Lee was not entirely in error.
Fog of war at it worst in a time of sparse near realtime comms.
@@TheSimianDeity Lee was entirely in error, because decisive battle was not plausible. Victory on the second day was never going to lead to the AoP's collapse. Meade had good ground to retreat to, and reinforcements on the way.
With the benefit of hindsight, even if Lee pulled off a miracle at Gettysburg, the ANV would still have had to retreat and it would have been a repeat of Sharpsburg: a tactical victory on the field of battle that Lincoln would transmute into a strategic victory in the political sphere. The only real change is Lincoln would have been obliged to talk up Grant's capture of Vicksburg and Rosecrans' successes in Tennessee. Either way, the ANV marches home.
Thank you for revisiting this subject! Gen. Stuart was doing exactly as Lee wanted - wrecking stuff and wreaking havoc on the Federals. In addition, Lee wasn't calvary blinded as some historians want to keep perpetuating - he had a couple of divisions.
You are very welcome.
If that was what Lee wanted, then Lee wanted the wrong thing. The cavalry needs to be between the two main forces and screen their own side. Stuart didn‘t do that. If Lee had other cavalry, he certainly didn‘t use them for it, either.
As a result, Meade‘s army was the only one with a functioning cavalry screen, which meant they knew where Lee‘s army was and what it was doing, whereas Lee continued to have no idea where the Federals were and ended up fighting on his enemies‘ terms.
Maybe Lee is ultimately more at fault than Stuart. He is the army commander, after all, and ultimately the one giving the instructions and picking his officers.
But what seems clear is that both of them catastrophically misunderstood the primary task the cavalry was needed for and failed to make sure that it was doing that.
@@raylast3873 Lee had cavalry.
@@N2Dressage001 having a couple of leftover regiments doesn‘t constitute sufficient cavalry force when it comes to screening an entire army 80.000 that‘s coming up against a similar-sized force. Meade‘s Army has 36 whole regiments of cavalry.
Buford alone has a whole division. Whatever cavalry forces Stuart left behind had exactly zero chance of driving Buford‘s troopers from their superior position, or of successfully screening Hill or Ewell‘s movements from him. None. It‘s only if Stuart is there himself, with a good chunk of his main force that would solve the problem. If Stuart drives the Federal Cavalry out of Gettysburg, they will be denied the superior ground and more importantly become blind to Lee‘s movements. Then Lee can concentrate his forces freely, and move again before the Federals know about it, maybe even force Reynolds into a battle on Lee‘s terms.
That‘s what having cavalry can do for you. That is to say, actually having cavalry. But it needs to be a force large enough to actually deal with Buford.
Settling the matter with „BuT LeE hAd CaVaLrY“ is what a lawyer or a pedant would answer. Or a politician. But it‘s not a military solution to a military problem.
I am 52 yrs pld and have had a fascination with the un-Civil War since elementary school and in particular the Southeren Armies. The way you break down to even the smallest of details, the movements and individuals involved therein, are so absorbing and comprehensive that I am not only learning but thouroughly entertained in rge process. I feel as though i am right there, in the moment, sweating tired and yet ready to fight. Keep up the outstanding work please.
Thank you so much for the kind words and support! I'm so happy that my break downs help.
Have you watched Steve Knotts lecture at the Carlisle War college on this as well. You both do a great job of giving insight into the absence.
I'm curious as to why you left out John Mosby's part in Stewart's absence. His personal account helps to vindicate Stewart further
Col. John Mosby-Now THERE'S a real Character! I like this guy! Once, he boldly and audaciously made his way into a Union Commander's Tent, and aroused that Commander from his sleep. He asked the Union Commander as to whether he had heard of Col. John Mosby, which caused the Union Commander to ask:"Why? Have you got him"?!? Col. Mosby replied:"No. He's got you"!
Mosby's Raiders were some of the most successful Calvarymen that ever rode horses! 😁😁😁
Mosby's account to acuracy is frequently call into question by many scholars.
@@kurtgreaser988 ...or hirelings..
There is an interesting (IMO) video by a gentleman at the U.S. Army War College who critically talks about Stuart's brigade assignments - i.e. the "regular" brigades of Beverly Robertson and Grumble Jones being used to guard the AoV's flank/LOC.
Lee did have those two other brigades. G.Jones being fresh off a successful raid in W.VA.He could have used a contigent from one or both for scouting for the Union Army. Lee had grown too dependent on Stuart, albeit for good reason but he had other options.
@@michaelzann6485 yes his mistake at Gettysburg was he trusted Longstreet and Stuart. The only one he could truly trust was Jackson. His mistake putting too much faith in Stuart.
Agree. He mentions how the brigades that Stuart left to guard the gaps were led by guys that Stuart hated (and vice versa) and that they were inexperienced. Good video.
@@bobber0623 Sure- like he trusted Jackson during the Seven Days' Battles, when Jackson completely failed Lee because of his religious zealotry.
Great video. No one can understand Gettysburg campaign without understanding CSA President Jefferson Davis' dire concern over the coming fall of Vicksburg, Mississippi. Lee and Davis met in Richmond after Chancellorsville victory. Davis wanted Lee to send large portion of his Army to save Vicksburg. Lee talked him out of this, and instead outlined plan to march his Army toward Harrisburg Pennsylvania capital threaten Baltimore, and Washington draw out and defeat Union Army of the Potomac. Then March on Washington DC force peace talks. This plan under estimated the resolve of the Northern States. Capturing DC would likely have brought more Union troops toward Richmond. The South wanted Lincoln to lose 1864 Presidential election, and hoped France and or England would recognize and support them. This never happened. After July 4, 1863 the North had the momentum and Lincoln, Grant, Sherman, Sheridan and many others would seize the initiative with greater numbers, industrial power, and resources...
There was never a plan to capture Washington. The city had a ring of forts around it, all manned with heavy artillery. It was impregnable. Even if there had been no forts, the Confederates just didn't have enough troops to take the city and hold it.
Look at what happened at Gettysburg. They couldn't even take Cemetery Hill.
@@genes.3285 Perhaps you are right but supposedly they drafted a letter than was to be delivered to Lincoln upon defeat of Union Army of the Potomac north of DC. Perhaps Lee would have gone for Baltimore instead if he beat the Army of the Potomac but that never happened. Lee acted recklessly on July 2nd and July 3rd because they were desperate for a big victory with Vicksburg about to fall. Don't forget Jefferson Davis was a Mississippi native. Losing the Mississippi River divided the Confederate states in half..
@genes.3285 Yes, Lee wanted to threaten Washington, not capture it. And yes, more you look at that plan, more it looks like a gamble.
Davis and Lee never wanted to capture Philadelphia or Baltimore, just threaten these cities and force the Federal Army to attack them. The Rebel army did very well on defense, and that was the campaign's purpose. But Lee discarded his own plan and went on the offense at Gettysburg. Longstreet was right.
Lee's goal was always to destroy the northern army. He was dissatified with his Chancellorsville victory because the northern army, although badly mauled, was able to escape. If Lee could take the fight to the north and beat the northern army in battle and capture Harrisburg, it might weaken northern resolve into seeking capitulation with the south. Lee retreated after his loss at Gettysburg on July 3rd and on July 4th Vicksburg was taken by the Union, effectively cutting the South in two and giving the North control of the Mississippi. The high tide of the Confederacy had been reached. Following his Gettysburg defeat Lee sent a letter to Jeff Davis offering his resignation as commander of the Army of N.VA. Davis refused the request.
Keep them coming PLEASE
Stuart did exactly what he was told. He never intentionally left Lee blind, although that was in essence of his ride of noteriety, but he had to stay away from the federals, as a consequence of the enemy not knowing what or where he was headed. Even the best planned events change when the enemy gets involved.
Lee had cavalry left with him and chose not to use them. Hard to lay all the blame with Stuart.
@@robertm.9633 Stuart had 7 brigades of cavalry. Two of those brigade commanders (Jones and Robertson) were rivals. Thinking this would be The Last Battle, he left those two to guard Lee's supply line so they wouldn't be participants in the final glorious battle. He took the other 3 experienced brigades with him. The last two (Jenkins and Imboden) were unreliable in Lee's eyes. There is a very interesting video about this: ruclips.net/video/lrXxz4iniRs/видео.html (particularly after the 20th minutes).
War is a fluid situation you can't predict everything
@@billedwards6985 Everybody has a plan until they get punched in the face General Mike Tyson
@@Zimster2000 Stuart left Lee with sufficient cavalry. It is Lee's job to understand the disposition of the cavalry left to him, and take corrective action as necessary. Lee simply failed at his job here.
The biggest problem was the fact that Stuart failed to get behind Union lines during Pickett's charge. He was stopped by George Custer who had 400 cavalry vs Stuart's 4,000 cavalry. Had Stuart not been stopped by Custer, Pickett's charge might have had a chance. Without Stuart's cavalry the charge was futile.
I agree. There has been much written about Stuart’s failure on the third day. That was where he takes some of the blame. Custer should not have been able to stop Stuart, but he did. This Stuart never arrives to hit the Union rear, and Picket was left to carry out the attack alone.
Stuart's cavalry ended up riding into sort of a funnel once some of his units were spotted in the open by Custer. Stuart was in column formation with 3 full brigades; Custer to his front with 4 regiments forming the Michigan Brigade. In the woods on Stuart's right was the 1st NJ Cavalry, fighting on foot, firing into Stuart's flank. On Stuart's left the 2nd PA Cavalry was doing the same from other woods. Custer deployed one regiment equipped with new repeating rifles as skirmishers and led 3 charges with his others. It was like a hornets nest attacking the head of a snake, as Stuart could not bring his full force to the fight. My great great uncle was with the 1st NJ Cavalry at Gettysburg and lived through the war.
Interesting you bring up Stuart's failure to get behind the Union lines. I think an under-appreciated fact is that, once Stuart was on the scene, Lee FINALLY had what he was lacking - eyes that could assess the flanks. Had STuart, or ANY competent calvary, been able to reconnoiter around the Union left prior to 2 July, they might have actually attempted the turning movement both Hood and Longstreet wanted. Without those eyes, it seems Lee never felt comfortable trying to turn the Union left due to a lack of solid info of what lay in that direction - another Corp perhaps?
Just as he was strategically blind for most of the campaign, Lee was tactically blind for much of the first 2 days, and had no real intel as to the position of the entire Union army.
That Charge had no chance. There waa not enough infantry left to take and hold Cemetery Ridge. Calvary alone could not take and hold that position. The static nature of a holding action nullified Stuart's greatest advantage mobility.
Have History Will Travel: Although the title includes "The Vindication of Stuart"-
General Lee: There will be none of that, there is no time!
Gen. Lee simply wasn't listening to one of the absolute best Officers that ever fought for the Confederacy. He, and others, simply thought that Gen. Stuart was automatically guilty as charged. Gen. Lee made blunder after blunder, culminating with Pickett's Charge on the Afternoon of July 3. How he and the Confederates that survived that disastrous campaign is beyond me.
Argh, Sheen made him short, pudgy, and sound like he was from Georgia or something. in reality he had a Northern Neck (VA) accent!
@@ronaldshank7589 southern grit, thats how
@@bushwhackerinc.4668 I actually have to agree with you on that! Tell you what, though...our Nation lost a lot of good men during that horrible atrocity known as the Civil War. Some wore Blue, and some wore Gray. I guess that I just don't understand just what happened to Gen. Lee, that's all. Some say that he had been sick on the way up to Gettysburg, and there was at least one report that he may have, at some point, suffered a slight Heart Attack. I do hope that that's not what happened. All I can say is that something went wrong...and yet, the Confederacy lived on for almost Two more years. I've been known to state that, if the South had had the Supplies and Manpower that the North did, they'd of won the Civil War within the first 6 months of that awful conflict. Can you imagine, too, (& I say this just as an example), having to fight against a Union Regiment, and finding out later on, to your shock and horror, that one of the bullets that you fired had actually killed someone that you knew and loved, perhaps a Brother, a Son, or even a Father, a Nephew, or even a Cousin? Things like that happened during the Civil War, and it still brings me personally to tears, just thinking about it. I agree with Gen. Lee:"We are adrift on a Sea of Blood, and I want it to end"! May we never forget the horrors of that War...or of any other War! What in the World was ever so "Civil" about War, anyway? Sorry for being so long in my text to you, Sir. I just thought you should know that I agree with you, but that War really isn't the answer. Too much blood is shed that way, and too many lives were lost in that dark Four Year Period. We must ensure that this never happens again!
@@ronaldshank7589 well said
A very good video once more Have History will Travel. If I may suggest? Is a video comparing Custer and Merritt or Buford and Kilpatrick as cavalry commanders for the Union? What say you?
Custer was the absolute best during the Civil War. He beat off Stuart at Gettysburg, altering the outcome there. He also slammed the back door shut on Lee at Appomattox, sealing off his last line of retreat. This forced Lee's surrender. In between he fought fiercely and never lost an engagement. For his part at Appomattox, Grant gave Custer's wife the table the surrender was signed on. While Custer was a true national hero in the Civil War, I am no fan of him out west.
That sounds like an interesting topic for a video!
What about Grierson or Sheridan?
I would say Alfred Pleasonton is underrated in this category, a good deal of credit for the notable improvement of the cavalry is his and under him it scored its first notable successes against whom had been until then the undisputed masters of that field; too bad he was one of those nasty intriguing generals so fond of mudslinging and related conducts of that sort and thus was rightfully sacked from the Army of the Potomac and sent to the Western Theather, where he still showed competence while dealing with Price's forces in 1864.
@@g.sergiusfidenas6650 A good point . Until he came along infantry would holler out: "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" at passing cavalry. Previously the cavalry was used mostly for scouting. Unlike Custer however, he never personally altered the outcome of any major battles.
The bottom line is Meade got his forces moving much quicker and in unison than Lee expected and it hindered Stuarts ride around their flank that he had become so famous for. To put it in the old military adage; the federals got there with the mostest the soonest.
Too frequently Meade's decisions and abilities are called into question. Many think he should have pressed ANV more after the battle; but both armies were wrecked and exhausted after Gettysburg.
Also as Lee pointed out about Meade (I am paraphrasing)
He is a capable commander who will make no error in my front. If I make an error he will exploit it.
Lee made many errors during the campaign and Meade was able to exploit them. The interior lines and the ability of junior commanders within the Army of Potomac to make important tactical were critical to the Union victory.
Enjoyed the video and the comments. It amazes me how Lee made so many mistakes during this confrontation and possibly the worst decision was to not push harder on the round tops. Instead it looks like he was just throwing his troops into the meat grinder which in my view cost him the battle. With Lee making decisions like that, and ignoring advice from from Longstreet and others, the battle was doomed regardless of what Stuart had done.
Idk if you can say Lee made “so many mistakes” during the Gettysburg campaign. In reality he was making decisions on the information he had at the time, which was sparse and inaccurate.
Lee did NOT want an engagement anywhere in the vicinity of Gettysburg. He wanted to capture Harrisburg and live off the land while forcing the Union army to attack him. AP Hill and Heth’s poor decisions, along with no cavalry reconnaissance led to the failure of that mission. Lee only concentrated to prevent from being attacked in detail, because he initially believed the Federal army was at least 2 days behind him and was shocked when he learned they were actually within 2 hours of his position. Lee did make a mistake with his confusing orders to Ewell about taking the high ground southeast of Gettysburg. However, a competent general would’ve recognized their importance just as Lee already had. Stonewall Jackson would’ve attacked and taken those hills without a second’s thought but Ewell was not Jackson.
Lee did not disengage after the First Day for several reasons starting with he was advised NOT to make a flanking maneuver by nearly all of his senior commanders except Longstreet. Also, Lee still didn’t know the full position of the Union Army and was still trying to fully concentrate his own forces. What little intelligence they did have reported that Union left flank was weak and in the open which made it a perfect target. It wasn’t known until Longstreet began to engage that they realized the reports were inaccurate. Sickles stupidly moving his men forward gave Longstreet an opportunity, but the Union left flank was extended nearly a mile further south than reported, and was in force.
However, had Longstreet attacked on time at 12pm as originally planned he still could’ve exploited this because the Round Tops were essentially undefended. “Pete the slow” pouted and didn’t properly scout where he needed to position his men beforehand, and wound up taking a wrong route which delayed him by nearly 4 hours. The Union troops that defended Little Round Top didn’t arrive until about 10-15 minutes before the Confederates engaged them. Longstreet being late had allowed Meade to shift troops to his right and reinforce his defenses against Ewell’s attack. Both Ewell and Longstreet were supposed to attack at the same time to prevent that from occurring, but only Ewell attacked as planned. This allowed Meade to rush troops to his left as Longstreet approached because Ewell’s attacks were fizzling out. Again, failure of subordinates to properly follow orders and poor reconnaissance due to lack of calvary.
Now in all fairness, Lee owns the failure of the Third Day. Under no circumstances was Pickett’s Charge a good idea or strategy, regardless of artillery and timing. Lee was mad at his failure to dislodge Meade and had his dander up and made a very poor decision that rests solely with him. While the attack did in fact split the Union line there simply wasn’t enough men after covering the 1 mile slaughter pen of Cemetery Ridge to take the position. Longstreet was correct that it would’ve taken 30,000 men for that attack to have any real chance of success. Also, Lee had no troops or plan in place to exploit the possible breakthrough as well. No 12,500 men will run an army of 93,000 off the field. Period.
Other forgotten facts include:
1. There were Union troops in force protecting the far left flank from a flanking maneuver so Longstreet’s plan wasn’t as sound as he believed. Granted, it still would’ve been a better option than Pickett’s Charge but it was flawed.
2. The limited calvary under Lee before Stuart’s return were inexperienced and were primarily guarding the mountain passes, supply lines, performing rear guard actions as the army concentrated, and conducting some reconnaissance in front of Ewell. Stuart’s absence did play a major factor in the Battle of Gettysburg.
3. The Battle of Gettysburg was NOT an all out Union victory as the revisionists try to claim. The battle was in fact a tactical stalemate as both armies remained intact and holding their positions. The Confederates won 2 of the 3 days and had routed the Union army on the First Day. Gettysburg was a strategic Union victory as Meade had repulsed Lee’s invasion and forced him to retire to Virginia. Had Lee continued on his offensive same as Grant did in the Overland campaign then Gettysburg would’ve been labeled as inconclusive same as the Battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania Courthouse, North Anna, etc. are listed. Lee repulsed Grant at each of those battles but didn’t get to claim victory per historians because Grant continued his offensive.
5. George Meade was a very competent general and he outmaneuvered Lee and soundly exploited the Confederate mistakes. Meade deserves more credit for winning Gettysburg than the usual historic platform of Lee losing the battle. Lee himself knew Meade was a good commander in his own writings. As a whole was Lee better than Meade? Yes, but he wasn’t perfect and yes he did make mistakes as well at Gettysburg that he owns.
@@rebelracing88 I agree with many of your points but as anyone knows anything about the military, the commander is ultimately to blame for anything gone right or wrong. Lees problem was that he thought that he could win every battle and that flaw caused many other flaws to happen, and from there it was doomed. Lee probably knew that it wasn’t a good idea to pull off a big battle like this but did it anyway. I also think there are too many people that give their idea of things that happened and we will honestly never know the truth. What did come out of this battle was a big morale boost for the union forces while the southern states took a big toll in number of good forces lost, and leaders. I also personally think that things were pushed too fast to get results. It is always possible that if Lee had been more cautious and given himself a real look at the battlefield, he may have just left, but that cockiness in him clouded his judgment. That is simply my opinion which means nothing. Regardless of who actually claimed a victory, it was definitely a defining moment in the war and it’s my belief that although it was pretty much a stalemate, the north came out on top. With that said, I am not condemning what you posted, or completely dismissing your view, I am simply giving my look at what happened.
Will you do an article on Custer at Gettysburg. There are older pieces. After a visit Gettysburg, a few years ago, Custer seems to being erased...
Have found a few from among the Gettysburg Historical people. Point seems to be, earlier in the war Custer was employed as an Engineer-type commander and did really well, and at Gettysburg was with the cavalry and equally did really well in the areas close and west, slightly south of Culps Hill in what is now known as Cavalry Fields. Those were against Stuart and happened after Stuart was back and was sent to cut up and disrupt the Union there.
Those who have have studied Custer know that on June 27, 1863, he was in command of but a single troop of cavalry. Suddenly orders came through making him a Brigadier General in command of 4 regiments composing the Michigan Brigade. Whether this was a mistake or not is arguable, but the fact remains Custer jumped 4 ranks and made the most of the opportunity. He had fought with with extreme valor in smaller, previous cavalry engagements.
The Souix erased Custer.
Thanks very much for this information about General Stuart!! I have always wondered exactly what happened, I knew that he had brought all of the ambulances to that great battle of Gettysburg. History is fantastic, especially this time period.
I have long wondered if time had made a scapegoat of Stuart. As you said Stuart wasn't without culpability but it doesn't seem that he deserves all the blame he gets. Additionally it seems at times Lee's orders appear to be to fluid. I know this was his style & worked with stonewall but Stuart was not Stonewall; neither was ewell. I think Lee's tendency to give commanders leeway in their decisions may have come back to bite him.
Being a traitor did that.
Agreed. Two words that may have doomed the battle “if practicable “.
Too bad Lee didn't have a couple biplanes to observe the enemy. It is easy to forget in a very modern age how different those times were. The telegraph was the most modern innovation. To know size, composition and location of enemy forces was not an easy thing until engaged in actual battle.
@@bobporch Cavalry and scouts were the eyes of the army.
@@joshschneider9766Really !! being a traitor ?
Do you think the fact that Stuart decided to leave Beverly Robertson behind had anything to do with the fact that he was once engaged to the person Jeb Stuart married who happened to come from Carlisle? Did his strong dislike of Jones and the fact he did not want him promoted in the first place also influence his decision? I don't question his tactics, I question his leadership decision to leave behind the two regular cavalry brigades guarding the line of communication while attaching the "irregular" cavalry to Lee's army as that decision would seem to be based on personal dislike and not what was best for the army.
Stewart had 5 Brigades. He took 3 on an authorized circle of the Union Army (which he had done twice before, but those Union formations where not moving). His previous movements he was away only 3 to 5 days respectively. It took him 10 days to encircle Union Army who were to Lee's surprise already north of the river. Everyone focuses on the "ride" but the real error was the 2 BDEs left behind. One was commanded by "Grumble" Jones who despised Stewart (I'm sure the feeling was mutual). Jones and the other "irregular" BDEs commander (I can't remember his name) did not cover himself in glory the days before Gettysburg. He did not screen the gaps; he was not in contact with Stewart. Just a note about Lee, he was the type of officer who gave his subordinates lots of latitude, it's one of his great personality traits but it also failed to serve him on several occasions. When he authorized Stewart to ride around the union army, I'm sure that he had expected him to do in less than 5 days (But he did not articulate that to his subordinate, something for all leaders to learn from), He did it again when he ordered Ewell (who had replaced the now dead Jackson) to "Take that hill if practicable." Well, an order like that to Jackson would have meant, take that hill. To Ewell it meant something different.
Gettysburg was definitely on Lee, he said so himself. Losing Jackson at Chancellorsville was the beginning of the end
Wasn’t it said that Jackson and Lee were more or less on the same wave length so the “If Practicable” order had been relayed to Jackson, he’d understand it as act on his own initiative? Ewell had big shoes to fill and he wanted to be cautious as he’d only been a Corps commander for about a couple weeks up to that point.
To be honest, Ewell had been a great brigadier general, but it takes time for most to grow into being a great corps commander. Gen. Ewell hadn't gotten the time he needed to become great in that role. Also, the battle at Gettysburg surprised the heck out of both sides, and with the change in the generals on the Union side unknown to Lee and complicating his plan to draw the Union in to a battle that would allow him to win big versus Union forces.
@@davidburroughs2244 I agree with most of what you said, but it is my understanding is that Longstreet's spy Harrison informed him of the change, and Longstreet was able to relay this information to Lee the day prior. Lee had something to say about Meade being a different kind of general than Hooker, but I don't remember what exactly he said.
@@lufsolitaire5351 Yeah, that's one of the big "ifs" of the battle. It's worth remembering that if Jackson/Ewell *did* attack, his Corps would be up against Union cavalry - often equipped with repeating rifles or breechloaders, Berdan's Sharpshooters - equipped to a man with breach-loaders, the famous Iron Brigade, and other forces all on high ground. Given what the Lighting Brigade accomplished on the defensive with their repeaters (Western Theatre, Army of the Cumberland) That composition of forces is nothing to sneeze at. It's possible that Jackson/Ewell would have taken the high ground if he tried, but it's possible that he would've destroyed the better part of his forces in the effort. Of course, I personally wouldn't know either way.
Well, Lee said Gettysburg was on him, at the time but in the years to come his followers would never say that and I do not believe he took steps to correct them. I believe he let people blame others when he should not have done so.
Good stuff and much needed confirmation. Sadly a loss always needs a scapegoat…! Thanks for posting.
You're very welcome. Please check out my other videos and consider subscribing if you have not done so already.
Thank you for this video and information. Very enlightening. I'll bet the Stonewall Jackson would have come to Stuart's defense in this situation. In fact, Jackson would have foreseen the logistical nightmare that would have ensued when Stuart was given his original orders. Just my guess. Great channel. Thanks again.
WHY !!!!!!DO YOU YANKS KEEP PUTTING THE !!!! IN FRONT OF A MANS BLOODY NAME !!! STONEWALL JACKSON !!!NOT THE !!!STONWALL JACKSON 😣😣😣😣😣😣😣😣MENTAL I HAVE AN 1894 AMERICAN BOOK ON YOUR CIVIL WAR and THE CONFEDERATE Troops CALLED thire MOTHERS MUM 😅😅😅😅😅PROPER ENGLISH STOCK !!! WE SHOULD NEVER HAVE LOST YORKTOWN IN 1781 😣g
Lee messed up badly with Gettysburg in many ways.
Stuart was surprised at brandy station. Lee's orders were not precise. He wanted to make up for being caught off guard. Lee was blind. It was both of theirs fault.
Stuarts folly was giving Lee irregular cavalry units instead of the remaining regular veteran cavalry units to scout Less flanks.Lee distrusted irregulars because of their lack of experience in battle and scouting,so Lee hardly used them.It all boiled from a great dislike between Stuart and his subordinate officers. Stuart placed his petty revenge over Lee's plan to hopefully create an end to the war.
Well, that's a big part of the "Cavalry missing" at Gburg.
I'm not sure Jackson was Lee's favorite corps commander, but he was certainly his best (with a nod to Longstreet who is also extremely capable). With Jackson dying when he did at least he could be reincarnated when his country (the USA) needed him as George S. Patton.
Patton lost either his paternal grandfather or great uncle in Pickett's Charge @ Gettysburg; I can't remember which. Then, one or the other was lost @ the 3rd Battle of Winchester in 1864. Both were Colonels of Virginia Infantry Regiments.
I would love to see a series made on all the sequence of events leading up to, including the Battle of Gettysburg. It's the most fascinating period of the civil war and so little is known. At least by most Americans. Young people don't seem to have the hunger for American history today. We need teachers to inspire students.
I live near and grew up in Harrisburg Pa., the objective of this campaign. You would not believe the amount of people here that don't know the closest battle to Harrisburg happened in Camp Hill Pa. (albeit, a minor skirmish),just ten miles away. And Mechanicsburg Pa. was the furthest town north occupied by the Confederates.
Back in the late 1960s, our big Eighth grade trip was to Gettysburg for the day. Although the school had the best of intentions, it was a total waste. As 14 year olds, we cared nothing of the history, but only of goofing off, buying candy, and checking out the girls. (But I did hear the terms "Little Round Top" and "Big Round Top" for the first time and never forgot them.)
Heros von Borcke vigorously defended Stuart's actions in his book and stated that Stuart was following the orders given to him by Lee. It seems that Lee's supporters were just trying to find any scapegoat they could, be it Longstreet, Stuart, Ewell, etc to deflect the blame of the loss at Gettysburg off of Lee. But Lee admitted out loud for many to hear that it was all his fault, he took responsibility, so why so many others try to shift the blame onto other people?
Because they wanted Lee's admission of guilt to be a mere noble gesture, taking blame for his subordinates' mistakes. And they wanted to do that to make Lee into an icon of perfection, and thereby somehow vindicate the Southern cause.
Von Borcke was also a personal friend of Stuart’s, something of a glory hound, and not considered to be the most reliable of sources. I just read a biography of Stuart that seemed to be very balanced in its presentation, and here’s what I took away: Lee’s orders were vague and flexible, so Stuart took them in the way that suited his personality the most... as most of us would. He did very much like having his name in the papers, and he very much enjoyed raiding, so it’s not surprising that he took the dramatic raiding option instead of the less dramatic screening option.
@@mjfleming319 So did Lee's orders give Stuart the option to screen for his army? If so, that would be odd considering Stuart was not even with Lee's army. Lee had an entirely different cavalry unit with his army. Stuart rode in the other direction and circled the Union army. If Lee wanted Stuart to screen and be his "eyes" then why did Lee take another cavalry unit with him and why did he allow Stuart to go in an entirely different direction. Some may say well Lee didn't know Stuart was going to go in the other direction, so after a few days of Lee not seeing Stuart he never asked where he was or asked anyone to find him? Stuart had rode around the Union army previously, so it isn't like Lee didn't know Stuart had the ability to do such a thing. No, i believe the Lost Cause supporters after the Civil War had to find a scapegoat for why the battle at Gettysburg was lost and Stuart was just one of several the blame was put on, they wanted to blame everyone except Lee. Even Lee admitted after Pickett's charge that it was all his fault, was he referring to just the charge itself or the entire battle? No man is prefect and certainly no generals, neither Stuart or Lee.
@@mjfleming319 If you look further down in the comments section here you will see i discussed this matter with others 10 months ago and I was asking questions about the cavalry units with Lee's army, which apparently those cavalry units never left VA until right before the battle of Gettysburg. By the time Lee entered PA, surely he realized Stuart wasn't anywhere near his army, so why didn't he bring the other cavalry with him into PA? None of this makes any sense to me. Personally, my opinion on the matter, and i guess we will never know the truth, but everyone has their opinion as the old saying goes. My opinion is Lee told Stuart to go in the direction that he did and knew perfectly well that Stuart was circling back behind the Union army. I think he asked Stuart to do this to confuse the Union army of his intentions and to harass the Union army from their backside. But after Lee's army blindly ran into the Union army at Gettysburg and a battle started, which Lee claimed he didn't want to happen, that Lee or Lee's supporters or both had to find someone to blame for his mistake of not bringing the cavalry units near his army with him out of VA. Then some how, the entire lose of the battle is placed on Stuart by some people which is totally ridiculous. While others blame Longstreet or Ewell or Heth or Euart or Hill or anyone besides Lee. Lee was a good general, but nobody is prefect and he made mistakes in the Gettysburg campaign and it's time people admitted that in my opinion.
@@1i1HrnPrpPplEater I just read Jefferey D. Wert’s biography of Stuart and of course he devotes a good deal of space to this question. Wert’s conclusion, which I find persuasive, is that Lee’s orders gave Stuart just enough discretion to go raiding, which is what he really liked to do. So it really doesn’t reflect well on either general, and it certainly doesn’t turn Stuart into a scapegoat.
The two commands left behind were supposed to screen Lee’s flank and rear, and they accomplished that. But I just don’t remember why they didn’t move northward faster. I guess I’ll have to reread.
We all forget in hindsight these military leaders were flying blind, no instant radio communication no telegraphing for the southern troops, the fog of war and unpredictable and volatile circumstances leave room for a lot of conjecture. nothing was going according to a precise plan, and that was Lee's style, the cards just stacked up against Lee as the battle was begun sooner than expected in a place not chosen.
Thanks for the video. One question. If Lee was waiting on Stuart to be his "eyes and ears" why didn't he explicitly say so in his orders. "Go find the enemy for me." Simple enough, right? And if he was to report his finding to Lee, how would Stuart make his reports to Lee? According to this video, he had trouble finding Lee, moving away from Gettysburg based on a rumor.
very good presentation never herd of this on tv thank you sir.
my whole life i believed he let em down. now it’s clear. thanks hero. let’s all get the word out. great job. thanks.
Isn't an additional issue with Jeb Stuart is that he was absent from Lee's army for 8 days? Most of what I've read is that Lee sanctioned Jeb Stuart's ride, but expected him to return to the army in 4/5 days, not 8.
Excelent run down. I'd like to add that part of Lee's strategy was to disperse the AoP so as to attack them in detail before they could concentrate. Its why Lee pushed Ewell to the Sesquhanna and allowed Stewart to do what he did. The screw up occured when Lee ordered Ewell back to Gettysburg and Stewart missed that boat and went clear up to Carlise to link up, which of couse never happened.
I haven't seen it documented that Lee's strategy was to disperse the AoP and attack it in detail. More that the idea was to use the "offensive defensive" where they found suitable ground and enticed the AoP to attack them in a strongly held position.
@@bobking7311 You would be partly mistaken. Lee certainly did *not* want to allow the AoP to assemble. He had a much better chance of essentially annihilating them (which was his documented goal), by having his army assembled, in place, and ready to engage the elements of the AoP "in detail" as they arrived.
Lee specifically stated in his after- action report that "It had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our base unless attacked".
There should have been a division of responsibilities: part of Stuart’s unit committed to recon for Lee’s army ONLY, the rest to mischief among the bluebellys.
There was, I think. 3 brigades to go with Jeb, and 2 brigades to remain with the main army. It's after they separated Jeb and the boys with him had to deal with a Union that had gotten far better than expected and countered him pretty well but couldn't stop him. Some where down in these comments is a war college's take on his orders and actions.
There were 7 brigades of cavalry, total, with the Army of Northern Virginia. Stuart assigned 3 to go with him. Of the 4 remaining, two were "regulars" and two were "irregulars". Stuart assigned the two brigades of regulars, whom Lee trusted, to guard the supply routes. Stuart assigned the two brigades of irregulars, whom Lee considered ill-trained, undisciplined and unreliable, to accompany the army. Lee did not deploy them as a general would normally deploy cavalry because he did not trust them. You might well ask why Stuart would do such a thing. There appear to be two reasons: he expected to be back with Lee in 3-4 days (as was the case when he did the same thing twice in 1862) with all the necessary intelligence, and he detested the two commanders of the regular brigades (Robertson and Jones), making him reluctant to assign them to any duty which might make them look good.
Great video, awesome channel
Thank you so much.
Great details. I think when he was delayed in the beginning waiting for federals to clear and then again at Hanover it put him behind schedule. Because Buford had the perfect screen on the Union left he engaged the army a lot sooner than anyone expected. Stuart was still hearing for the eastern link up and lost another day searching. The entire confederate experience at Gettysburg is defined by failure of command and control. A bit more coordination and I think Lee had a good chance at a significant victory. Such are the winds of fortune.
Meade took over then reacted according to the book. He beat Lee to GB and that is the end of it. Longstreet expected as much or he knew to claim he did after the fact. Stuart could have easily been there before Hill attacked Buford and Reynolds. It would not have changed the plan of Lee. The only thing that went wrong was Lee allowing Ewell to keep Johnson at Culps Hill instead of moving him around to the right of Anderson to reenforce McLaws. Longstreet could have still called a halt to it if he had Johnson and Anderson on the afternoon of the 2nd. Wright and Wilcox might have been able to dislodge Hancock with the help of Johnson’s brigades. Stuart was not a critical piece of the problem. Hancock and Sedgwick were the problems.
I heard a lecturer at Carlyle say that Stuart left his two best regiments back to guard the logistics train because he didn’t like the commanders and didn’t want them in on the win. The two he brought were militia and not trusted by Lee, so he didn’t take their reports on Little Round Top being key terrain seriously.
Stuart's tardiness didn't cost the Confederates, nor did his lack of intelligence. Imboden had cavalry with Lee too and he could have been used to screen and scout despite being inexperienced. it would have at least given Lee warning to pull Ewell back to Chambersburg and fortify there to force the Union to attack him.
I do not fault Stuart's actions until the third day at Gettysburg. It is then that he bears partial blame for the loss of the battle. Lee had a brilliant battle plan for the 3rd day. Stuart was sent on a wide sweep around the Union Army and was to attack the Union rear at its center at the same time Picket's force attacked from the front. The 3rd element was an artillery barrage commanded by Col. Alexander with 45 guns. He was to concentrate his fire on the point of attack and inflict as much damage as possible before Stuart and Pickett struck. The attack was to be a giant pincer movement designed to cut Meade's army into two. Alexander failed in that his barrage overshot the crest where the Bluecoats were, and mostly fell harmlessly on the reverse slope. Officers under Stuart were ordered to remain concealed by moving through the woods at the Union rear. Some units moved into the open and were spotted by Custer who commanded the 4 regiments of the Michigan Brigade. One regiment at a time, Custer led 3 charges against the head of Stuart's column and stopped him cold. Both Stuart with a much larger force than Custer, and Alexander failed to accomplish their objectives and Pickett's men were slaughtered as a result.
HaHaHa... more myths. Stuarts orders was to cover the flank. Nothing more. And he did that job just fine.
@@thomasbaagaard Do you read history from comic books?
I might add that after Stuart failed to reach the Union rear there is not a single written report, letter, or diary entry about the cavalry battle by Stuart or any of his officers between 3 July 1863 and 1864. Why the complete silence on the matter? I submit that it was because he was ought fought by a much smaller force, which resulted in Pickett's infantry being decimated. Moreover the General that beat him (Custer) only a few days before had only been a Captain in command of a single troop of cavalry. Yet with an assist from the 1st NJ and 3rd PA cavalry fighting dismounted on the flanks, Custer stopped Stuart's Cavalry Corps with a single brigade.
A very good video that has produced much interesting discussion.
It comes down to one things. Did JEB do what he was told to do? Also, did he send his location was in the 48 hours prior to the battle. The one thing to factor in is that some of the information on JEB where abouts comes from the "lost cause" and are in fact incorrect.
From what I understand Stuart's Ego had been tarnished after Union Cavalry had surprised him and forced his retreat. In order to compensate he attempted to get around the Union force undetected, a move he had previously done in another campaign that won him renown.
He had done it twice, in 1862. IIRC, the first in May, and the second in October. Both were quite successful, but then the Army of the Potomac wasn't on the move during those two episodes.
@06:50 you failed to mention the important fact that a column of Stuart's Cavalry rode all the way to Harrisburg and burned the large wooden railroad bridge there and thus broke the main Union railroad link East-West.
Very good explanation of these actions. I learned something new today.
I'm very glad. Thank you so much for watching and supporting the channel. Please consider subscribing if you have not done so already and check out my other videos.
Great video...I’m ten months late to the party, but I really enjoyed it. I have a question: I know Stuart was ambitious, competitive, and very image-conscious - not always a bad thing to have some swagger in a cavalry officer. I’ve always wondered how aware he was of Grierson’s recent raid in Mississippi, and if he felt pressure to outdo his Union counterpart’s dramatic success. I’ve similarly wondered if Lee felt pressure to outdo Grant’s Vicksburg campaign. I can’t prove either case, but Lee and Stuart were classic southern aristocrats, and acutely aware of matters of honor and pride. How would it feel to such noble gentlemen to be outdone in their profession by a piano teacher (Grierson) and a “drunk” (Grant)? Did some of that pressure lead to mistakes? It’s just a thought.
I am not sure of the effect of Grierson's raid on Stuart. However, I do believe Grant's Vicksburg campaign played partially into Lee's move into PA. While Vicksburg fell the day after Gettysburg ended, it was evident well before that how Grant's campaign would end. Lee would have had high troop morale after winning Fredricksburg and then Chancellorsville, but he knew the damage being done out West. Grant effectively split the Confederacy in half depriving the Eastern half of the CSA of the much needed agriculture capabilites in the West along with troops and other supplies. Lee may have understood that the CSA would fall if the north did not capitulate, which I believe was the entire point of his invasion into PA.
The strategic objective of Lee's movement north was to achieve enough of a success to relieve Union pressure on the Confederate defenders at Vicksburg. This was hashed out by the Confederate leadership in mid- May after Lee had already objected to any reduction in the strength of his army to send west and had instead recommended a forward movement of his army (which was then literally starving in its position along the Rappahannock River).
The operational objective was to forage off of enemy territory and restock the army's supply train. The major errors of the campaign were all made by Lee. None his subordinates failed him during the campaign. The only minor errors which they made were:
1) Stuart's wasting of a few hours in paroling Union prisoners, and;
2) Longstreet's failure to realize that Lee's plan of campaign had been ruined by the meeting engagement on 1 July.
Although Lee made a number of errors during the campaign, his decisions during the battle (after he gained control of it) were the only ones open to him.
I think there was a problem with Lee in that he believed all his generals would know what Lee planned and would act as if they had received orders. Lee expected to much of his generals and it cost him.
Question: Is there any version of your outro out there to download? I really like it :)
Bottom line is, Stuart fell victim to the same fate as so many other competent military commanders before and since have: the indefinite, conflicting orders coming from one or more superior officers. Lee was notorious for giving ambiguous orders and Longstreet was no Stonewall Jackson, but rather a field general who performed well only when the circumstances began in his favor. Even for the time, sure, Stuart's movements should have yielded more intelligence and linked up with Ewell sooner in spite of the AOTP's whereabouts prior to Gettysburg, but Lee and Longstreet both deserve the lion's share of the blame for Jeb's cavalry arriving at the battle too late to make any measurable impact. The scene from the movie where Lee chews out Stuart without giving him a chance to deliver his report because "there was no time for that" always bothered me because I wanted to hear Jeb's side of the story.
Stuart ran into extreme difficulty while still in Northern Virginia. The rear of the federal army was obstructing his progress. At that time, the logical thing to do would have been to reverse direction and catch up with Lee, protecting his right flank and scouting ahead. Stuart was lucky not to have lost his entire cavalry force.
Other than that, the invasion itself was foolhardy. In a nutshell, Lee destroyed the offensive striking power of the AofNV in only 13 months, from June '62 to July '63, mostly due to the lack of imagination on his part. He tactics were Napoleonic; too many frontal charges, not enough oblique attacks.
Attempting to win a Napoleonic style total destruction of an enemy army was Lee's error. His army simply did not have the ability or resources to secure such a victory. Chancellorsville represented his best chance at that kind of victory and his failure to accomplish it there should have gotten it across to him that he could not do it. Instead, he became convinced that he could destroy the Army of the Potomac. His 'victories' were mostly Pyrrhic, making him, not Grant, the most effective commander the Union had. He probably shortened the war by a couple of years all by himself.
Man, this was something else. Stuart was hardly at fault for what happened at Gettysburg. He was doing what Lee wanted.
Exactly! And-When General Lee confronted General Stuart about where he'd been, and said that the supply wagons that General Stuart had brought,were an impediment to him now, he was covering his own hide! He gave General Stuart no chance to defend himself! I have a feeling that, for a moment, things got really ugly! The tension between these two must've been sky-high! But, all things considered, I think that General Lee finally realized that it truly was his own fault, not General Stuart's.
thanks for all the work in this video, exceptional maps.
I'm so glad you enjoyed it. Please check out my other videos.
Stewart did exactly what Cavalry is suppose to do, Lee was too impatient, even Longstreet told him and had doubts of attacking a mile wide open field. As long as Lee was on the defensive he was fine but when he crossed into the north it went downhill.
The thing is Lee should have never tried to attack accross an open field with a fence in the middle in range of howetzers.
Cognitive Dissonance!
Mam, I do not inconsentant thoughts, the fact is and still was Lee went on the offence in a land he was not familiar with and practically lost the war, even Longstreet argued and tried several times for him not to go through with it.
Great video, thanks!!
You are very welcome.
He in modern terms would be on a recon mission, it does not matter where he is, it only matters that he reports back to Lee on the enemy's location, today this would be a SALUTE report. (Size Activity Location , Unit type, Time and Equipment) also the movement of the enemy should also be included.
I always suspect that Stuart was at least to some degree trying to compensate for the embarrassment and near-disaster he suffered at Brandy Station shortly before departing on what would become the Gettysburg Campaign.
That was most definitely ex- post- facto finger- pointing in order to shift responsibility away from the actual reasons for the Confederate defeat. By that same kind of rationale, one could accuse Lee of trying to compensate for his defeat at Antietam.
@@manilajohn0182 You are reading way more into my comment than what is actually there. I never said,nor do I believe that Stuart's late arrival at Gettysburg was instrumental in the Confederate defeat. Lee in fact did have other cavalry units there, they were just not of the same level of experience and quality as that of most of Stuart's Cavalry. In my opinion two things(among others) contributed to Lee's defeat there. 1) Lack of energetic action by Ewell on the north end to take Culp's Hill,and 2) Lee's over-confidence in his troops at Pickett's Charge.
@@jamcam2760 I never said that you believed that Stuart's late arrival was instrumental in the Confederate defeat. I referred specifically to Stuart's alleged compensating. My point is that just because other people claimed that Stuart was doing that doesn't make it a fact. That's all.
For more on this get: "Plenty of Blame to Go Around: Jeb Stuart's Controversial Ride to Gettysburg"
by Eric J. Wittenberg
Lee left himself blind when he sent Stuart to ride around the Union army. Hooker, and then Meade, actually had a general knowledge of where Lee's army was with the Union cavalry screen.
correct, Lee’s orders should have been to either screen his army, or, have Stuart attack the columns of marching Union infantry, cavalry is highly effective against formations such as these, overall, it was simply a diversionary raid which failed in its purpose in diverting the enemies attention.
Lee himself criticized Hooker sending off his cavalry during the Chancellorsville campaign, then, less than 3 months later, did the exact same thing.
Stuart went with only 3 of the 7 cavalry brigades in the Army of Northern Virginia. Of the remaining 4, Stuart did screw up by assigning the 2 brigades Lee would have trusted (regulars) to guard the supply lines, while assigning two brigades that Lee did not trust (irregulars) to accompany the army. The two commanders of the regular brigades hated Stuart, and he despised them. Stuart based his assignments on spite, rather than the good of the army. Since he had twice before ridden around the Army of the Potomac, with great success, and been back in 3-4 days, he likely figured there would be no harm. He was mistaken.
In my reading of the logistics of this move, I saw that the wagons captured were loaded with grains. Those grains allowed the horses to eat high calorie food in place instead of having to spread out for foraging each night. So the effect on movement speed was a wash. They moved no faster or slower (at least that is what I read). I believe it was an expert on Gettysburg logistics that I got this from. Sorry I can't remember the exact source.
There's been talk about a so-called Union Victory at Brandy Station, but not so; Stuart's surprised cavalry ultimately repulsed Pleasanton's attack. Pleasanton's Union Cavalry lost twice as many men there.
But it did slow down Stuart. I believe Delaware cavalry were involved on the Union side
Stuart was the Rommel of the ACW, with no superiors he felt he needed to send riders to dispatch messages to.
Not to mention that Longstreet wanted to relocate the army to ground where they had the advantage. This would have put Stuart in the battle sooner.
The Confederate campaign failed primarily because of a critical mistake made not by Stuart, but by Lee.
The strategic objective of the campaign was to achieve a victory great enough to force the Union to lift the siege of Vicksburg. This was hashed out by Lee and the Confederate political leadership in Richmond in mid- May.
But Lee stated in his after action report that he had never intended to fight a major battle so far from his base unless attacked. From this, it's clear enough that Lee intended to maneuver so as to entice the AotP into attacking the AoNV. This is also the likely reason why, on 1 July, Lee cautioned his corps commanders not to bring on a general engagement until the army was concentrated. In effect, Lee was attempting to carry out a strategically offensive, but tactically defensive campaign- a difficult task when it's remembered that the army was foraging off of the enemy countryside. But maneuvering so as to encourage an attack by the AotP required accurate, up- to- date- information on the strength and location of the AotP.
This is where Lee made the critical mistake of the campaign. He violated the military axiom of "one force, one objective" and issued two objectives to Stuart. In two separate letters, he instructed Stuart to gather both information and provisions- the former being critical toward accomplishing the strategic objective of the campaign, and the latter facilitating the operational objective of the campaign. Lee failed to clarify which of these objectives was the primary one, and compounded this error by emphasizing that Stuart was to "...collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army", rather than simply directing Stuart to forage for his three cavalry brigades only.
Worse still was the fact that these two objectives coincided in time. Stuart couldn't first accomplish one, and then the other; he was forced to accomplish them both simultaneously. What nailed the coffin shut on Stuart's task was that gathering information required mobility which only his cavalry could provide- but gathering provisions was guaranteed to impede that mobility. So, the more that Stuart gathered provisions, the less was he able to gather information- and this is in fact exactly what happened during the campaign. After he captured the Union supply train, Stuart's advance slowed to a comparative crawl.
The resulting lack of information which Lee required about the AotP led directly to the meeting engagement of 1 July. This minor victory was actually a disaster for Lee, because it effectively ruined his plan of campaign. By going over to the tactical offensive, Lee assumed a tactical initiative which he had never wanted. This minor defeat suffered by the AotP all but guaranteed that Union forces would not be carrying out an attack on the AoNV- particularly since they were led by a new commander- in- chief.
This minor success on 1 July, combined with the pressure of time (from the situation at Vicksburg) led Lee into the tactical offensive again on 2 July. By 3 July, Lee's only options were a continuation of the tactical offensive or the abandonment of the campaign- because although Longstreet's proposal was doable (if tactical in nature), it was highly unlikely to encourage Meade to attack.
The most relevant comment in this section. Well done.
Great analysis and presentation as always, but please note that 'chasm' is pronounced 'kasm', like 'choir' is pronounced 'kwire'. Thanks.
There was something deeper than just Stuart being absent. Stuart had 7 brigades under his command. But he only took 3 brigades with him on his end run around the Army of the Potomac. He left four other cavalry brigades with Lee, so Lee should have had enough cavalry to be his eyes and ears and thus avoid the surprise he had at Gettysburg. Of the four, two were veterans and regulars, and two were inexperienced and rather irregular. Lee didn't trust those two brigades, and he didn't use them for intelligence gathering. But who did Stuart leave behind to guard Lee's supply lines, and thus be unavailable to Lee? The veterans and regulars, led by the experienced and capable brigadier generals Jones and Robertson! And why? Stuart had serious personal issues with both of them -- he left them there so they would not be able to get any glory in the upcoming fight. Stuart could have had a profound positive influence over the outcome of Gettysburg (from the Confederate point of view), had he acted maturely instead of childishly in how he assigned the men under his command. Granted that Grumble Jones was a big jerk and few liked him -- he was still a capable cavalry commander. And why was Stuart torqued off at Robertson? Because Robertson had once been engaged to Stuart's wife, and Stuart's testosterone (and his apparent insecurity over his wife's former fiancée) had gotten the best of him.
But I'm glad for it. It would not have been well had Lee won at Gettysburg, or wherever the ultimate battle might have been fought.
I'm not sure about that. I know it's all supposition at this point but there is some interesting ideas of what would have happened if the south had achieved independence and co-existed along with the north rather than being having been destroyed by it. Looking at the current state of this country I'm not sure we could be in any worse shape for sure. Slavery would not have lasted much longer as it was already becoming less productive and cost efficient than modern technology coming on the scene.
@@carlhelms595
Harry Turtledove wrote a whole series of alternative history novels over what if the South had won. It's quite interesting.
It puzzles me that Stuart came in close proximity to unguarded Washington DC without making an attempt to capture Lincoln himself. Meade wasn't the only Northerner who could sign a Surrender and Lincoln could do it too.
Washington D.C. was ringed by fortifications and was not unguarded.
That's the "Have Gun, Will Travel" music!
Yes it is. One of my favorites
great video. Thank you
@grammens123 thank you so much for watching!
Do you have the music credit for this? I could listen to this music all day.
Stuart failed miserably to follow Lee's written order which was to cross the Potomac preferably at " the Point of Rocks" and then " feel the right of the army" while advancing north. Instead, Stuart tried to replicate his dramatic " ride around the army" which he did to McClellan earlier in the war and FAILED, getting separated and trapped by the entire Union army, which was BETWEEN him and Lee ! Then, he led his cavalry down a narrow lane through the woods on July 3rd at the Rummel Farm, only to be met with headlong suicide charges of the Michigan 7th Cavalry, led by George Custer. These 750 Wolverines stopped Stuart's entire force before they could emerge successfully from the wooded lane !! Lee's plan of a "pincer movement" between Pickett and Stuart was ruined......and Lee ordered Pickett to DESTROY his battlefield report which listed the failings of the other commanders during his charge.
Well, Have History Will Travel, first time I think I got you without pants on (without your facts). What was Stuart wrote to Robertson as an order exactly? When was the last time Robertson did anything like that to Stuart knowledge? Was it expected he would fail on this mission or was he expected to accomplish like he was Stuart himself? Why was Robertson chosen to execute those orders anyway? What else could be done instead?
I'm not knowledgeable about Civil War specifics, BUT it APPEARS that rather than have ONE MAIN CALVARY FORCE separate from The Main Body in such a Campaign, that AT LEAST ONE smaller Calvary Unit should have been attached to each Corp to SCOUT and MAINTAIN contact with EACH CORP and of course REPORT to the Overall Commander....Lee.. .Meade. QUESTION: Did each Corp in the Army of Northern Virginia have such organic cavalry assigned??? If so, they needed more. (If I had been a Corp Commander, I would have had such mounted units act as "radar" in all directions of my Corp....reporting regularly on what was ahead, and to my flanks and behind.) EXCELLENT VIDEO. INFORMATIVE. Completely changes The Movie Narrative.
By the time of the American Civil War, cavalry were no longer required to be attached to each infantry corps- because they were no longer the threat to infantry that they were during the Napoleonic Wars.
@@manilajohn0182 By then though, they were “the eyes of the army”
@@krismurphy7711 Cavalry always have been an army's primary scouting arm. That said, reconnaissance was not automatically the primary task of cavalry. A good example of this was Union Colonel Benjamin Grierson's 1863 raid into Confederate territory. His primary objective was to divert Confederate attention from the area of Vicksburg by wreaking havoc in Confederate territory- which he did. In this case, gathering information on enemy strength and location was a secondary objective.
Stuart in the Gettysburg campaign is yet another example. Lee gave Stuart two objectives for one force- both of which coincided in time. Stuart lacked the strength to accomplish both objectives simultaneously, or the time to accomplish first one and then the other. Stuart attempted to accomplish both and predictably failed. This was the fatal error of the campaign.
From my research jeb was humble warrior that was not at all afraid to ask assistance from his peers
The death of Stonewall Jackson prior to Gettysburg IMHO was a huge factor in the Southern loss there. Jackson's ability to maneuver a large number of forces with speed, precision, and aggressiveness would have made a huge difference.
Plus, Jackson and Stuart, though, complete opposites in a personal manner, they were still very close friends. I believe Jackson and Stuart together would have been unstoppable. IMO.
Check out my video entitled What if Jackson Survived. I think you'll enjoy it.
Set aside his postwar reputation and instead remember Jackson's complete failure during the Seven Days' Battles, my friend. Jackson was a good commanding general without a doubt. That said, he was also unstable, had poor relations with many of his subordinates, and was court martial- prone. When the position of Lieutenant General rank became available in late 1862, Lee was careful to ensure that Longstreet had a one- day seniority over Jackson. Just sayin...
I think that Stuarts failed attack on the third day, which was stopped by Custer, was the final blow to JEBs reputation in the Gettysburg battle. Had Stuart not attacked in a column and that actually gotten behind the American Army lines in the middle as Picket attacked the front; the American lines would have most likely broken in the middle.
The American Army had strong interior lines, but the battle would most likely have lasted at least another day, and most likely with the American Army pulling back.
I am no great historian, but overall, JEB was a train wreck at Gettysburg.
A few hundred Confederates breached the Union line- while approximately 20,000 Union reinforcements were converging on that spot. Pickett's Charge was going nowhere, and Stuart alone wasn't going to change the course of the battle.
@@manilajohn0182Agreed! Too many people want to blame General Stuart for this, or for that, or for something else. The Confederates should've never even gone to Gettysburg, in the first place! That entire campaign was a major fiasco, from start to finish! Orders weren't followed, as it refers to General Heth not getting into a scrap, with any Union Companies.. but he told General Lee afterwards, that when his Troops saw some Yankees, they got their dander up, and disobeyed orders, and, before General Heth knew it, he was tangled with half of the Union Army!
That was one incident. And look what it led to.
Nevertheless, the Confederates pretty much won the day, regardless. The other two days?
Nope!
After everything was said and done, concerning the Gettysburg Campaign, you can bet your sweet bippy, that General Lee, and the Confederate Army, were glad to get back to Virginia!
A huge issue was that Lee didn’t trust the cavalry that Stuart left with the army. Stuart’s mistake was not leaving Cavalry commanders whom Lee would trust and use effectively
You can't change the fact that Stuart failed in his vital mission to let Lee know where the Union army was. Being blind probably cost Lee the battle. Union cavalry not only found Lee's army but seize the high ground and got the message to Meade fast enough so they could fight on the high ground.
Love the video as usual plz keep it up lol 👍🏾👍🏾👍🏾
My 3x greatgrandfather William Adam Reed fought at Antietam,and with Lee,at Gettysburg. He survived both.
I have animated battle maps of both of those battles. I break the engagements down to the regimental level so you can follow your ancestor through the battle.
there's a gentleman on here, Joe Ryan I believe, that makes a compelling case that Gettysburg was always Lee's objective rather than some happy accident that both armies encountered each other there. I suggest watching his videos on the subject, many are thought provoking.
Ryan's mistaken. Gettysburg was valueless to the Confederacy, and Lee was preparing to move on Harrisburg.
On July 2nd, Lee told Stuart to attack behind Union forces at Cemetary Ridge. He had over 3,000 troops. Only because of a headlong charge by George Armstrong Custer and his Michigan brigades with 400 men was this effect vanquished. None of what I just wrote was revealed in this video.
I searched down this far in the comments to see yours about Custers charge. Had you not made it I would have been compelled to do so.
I think this video is specifically about the lead up to the battle, and all the controversies about Stuart's absence.
We need more ..it was ..great so far
Does anyone know the song that starts at 1:00?
Stuart was afraid of pitched battles and thus avoided it.
I learned many years ago I am a descendent of that family on my mothers side. He would have been a great uncle (x 9? not sure how many generations) My mothers great uncle had letters passed down through the generations. These letters have now been donated to a museum in Texas years ago. Names have changed over the years but the lineage is still on going. My Grandmothers maiden name was Stuart, originally from Virginia.
Lee just made too many poor decisions on this move north, including his orders to Stuart.
Interesting and very informative.
It's amazing how close Stuart was to the capital.
Why didn't the other 2 Calvary units that Stuart left behind proceed to Gettysburg?
They were stationed to guard the gaps in the mountains. On the march north they prevented scouts from spying on Lee's movements and if Lee was repulsed to protect his line of retreat. Robertson did play an important part in fighting a rear guard action against the Union cavalry that followed Lee's retreat.
I think we often forget that Stuart and Lee both did not expect the Union army to move as quickly as they did. My personal opinion is that Lee's order to cross behind Union forces was leaving a lot to chance if the Union army acted unexpectedly. Not to mention the cavalry should have stayed between the two forces if their main job was reconnaissance. But Lee wanted Stuart to do more than that.
Agreed. Lee gave an order for a not primarily reconnaissance mission, and Stuart carried it out successfully.
Stuart asked for permission to try and do a run around of the AoP, and Lee gave the order. Stuart had made such circling movements of the AoP twice before, and it took 3 days. This time the AoP was larger, more sprawling, on the move, and had a much more formidable cavalry element of its own. So it took 6 days. What is there to complain about?
The rest is excuse-making to shield Lee from shouldering the consequences of his own orders.
The historical record is crystal clear that Stuart was not simply given the task of reconnaissance. Stuart was in fact given 'two' tasks- to gather both information and provisions. This was the critical mistake of the campaign, and it was made not by Stuart, but by Lee.
Worse still, Lee failed to specify which of these two objectives was a priority. This mattered greatly. Obtaining information on the strength and location of the AotP was critical to Lee's plan of campaign (which was to entice the AotP to attack the AoNV)- and particularly so since the AoNV was foraging and could not remain in any one place for more than 3-5 days. However, obtaining provisions was the operational objective of the campaign. The importance which Lee attached to Stuart's gathering of provisions can be seen in an order which Lee sent to Stuart, in which Lee told Stuart to gather "...all the supplies that you can for the use of the army".
These two objectives coincided in time, so that Stuart could not accomplish first one and then the other. He had to accomplish both simultaneously- and with just three brigades. Since gathering provisions would inevitably slow the advance of his cavalry and make the gathering of information more difficult (and this is in fact what happened), Lee's violation of "One force, one objective" was a death sentence for the campaign.
Lee's resulting lack of information on the strength and location of the AotP led directly to the meeting engagement of 1 July- which completely ruined his plan of campaign by casting the tactical initiative on to Lee.
Lee's expectations of his subordinates was that they interpret his strategic-level orders and develop and execute the appropriate tactics to accomplish the mission in support of that strategy. Stonewall was superb at this; the attrition of leadership left Lee with good battalion-level commanders who found themselves to be mediocre commanders of Corps.
Actually, Jackson 'wasn't' superb at it at all. He completely failed Lee during the Seven Days' Battles- primarily because of his religious zealotry.