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Dear World War Two team, I have noticed that WaH has not been released past week nor this one. I hope there's nothing wrong with Spartacus and/or the team. I love your job, specially WaH. I wish to all of you the best.
@@Nodice055 Good question! Some speculations--they've already had such significant casualties that most of the trained aviators are dead. Or, perhaps the pilots were reporting much more significant successes than in reality (we know it happened elsewhere, and by both sides) so they thought the losses were justified. Finally, it might simply be that the same martial spirit that possessed the Army to launch hopeless bonzai attacks also compelled their attacks here.
My father was one of only 50 American glider pilots that flew with the Brits in the invasion. Wind blew them way off course, their own navy shot down a bunch of them, and he ended up crashing in the ocean about a mile off shore and floating around in his canvas and balsa wood airplane with 16 t,British glider infantry for about 12 hours until they got picked up by a destroyer. He said "after that, I was a combat veteran!"..he still had Normandy, Southern France, and two flights in Market-Garden to go...
T. J. Payeur Wow, that must have been an incredible set of experiences for him. Thank you for sharing a bit about his service, I can't imagine the terror of coming down crash landing a glider.
@@daddius I'd bet that they damned sure did..they were a pretty close knit bunch, the only people in the whole Armed Forces flying airplanes without engines in to combat....
I've read about pretty much all the major campaigns of WWII and yet had no idea that the invasion of Sicily was THIS big and complex compared to the Battle of Normandy. There's really no end to the things one could learn from this channel. I'd already been eagerly waiting for the coming week in anticipation of them covering Operation Citadel for a long time. Now Operation Husky has just added to that anticipation.
There is some debate on which amphibious invasion was the largest in history. There was as much force used in the invasion of Sicily as in Normandy but we don't know for certain.
Wow, I had no idea that Husky was so complex and was pulled off despite so many difficulties. The latest of many new things I've learned about WW2 thanks to this series.
I had no idea Husky was so much bigger than Overlord. It also was an issue that everything in the Med was somewhat diminished to prepare for Normandy. On the flip side, I have never read that Overlord needed to be limited for operations anywhere else. Of course one of the reasons Husky worked so well is Patton, who turned a flank role into the star position, and injected an element of good competition with old Monty. Look at the Brits at Normandy; Monty sat in front of Caen for 2-3 months. Could this have been partly because Patton wasn't there!? hmmm When Patton did arrive, Monty suddenly was able to move. I know there are many other factors, but I never miss an opportunity to poke at Monty. :)
@@TheGunderian I'm comfortable enough for you to poke a bit of fun Monty's way, but there were some pretty significant differences in the units faced by the Brit's v the US forces prior to the breakout and a later meeting up at Falaise.
Busy summer ahead for my grandmother's brothers, on opposite sides of the world. One would lead Operation Cottage, the August move to recapture Kiska from the Japanese. Her other brother would be in Operation Husky, as a motorcycle messenger for General Patton. He (and his cycle) survived the war. Although he has since passed, his Harley-Davidson still resides in his garage.
Another interesting thing to note this week on June 26 1943 is that aircraft designer Clarence Johnson and his team at Lockheed in California in the United States will begin work on the first airframe of the *XP-80 Shooting Star prototype jet fighter* . They would eventually be able to produce the airframe in just 143 days, although the testing program would prove very dangerous with Lockheed test pilot Milo Burcham killed while on one of the test flights. Even America's top flying ace in the war, Richard Bong, would die while testing one of the P-80 fighters just before the end of the war. It saw very limited service in Italy doing reconnaissance missions near the end of the war but would see widespread combat service in the Korean War.
And the Whittle Engine that was used was built here in Lynn, MA at the GE Riverworks plant. My Grandfather's group in the forge had a small part to play in the manufacturing of the engine. The forge was making superchargers for the Air Corps, which gave then the experience needed to make the compressors. When the jet engine was shipped out, they put a fake propeller on the front to throw off any spies. They also had to make frequent stops during shipping to rotate the main shaft and keep the bearings lubricated.
You raised a very good point about Operation Husky. Had it, or something similar to it not happened, without the experience in logistics and amphibious operations it gave, I wonder if D-Day would have even been possible.
Yes. Not to underrate Husky, but it wasn't the fist large amphibious operation carried out by the Allies during the Second World War. The Allies had done so successfully in the Pacific, and faced many of the same hurdles with planning & difficulties with execution. Officers involved in planning amphibious operations in the Pacific could be reallocated to the European theater for planning of amphibious operations there, in an alternate history where Husky never happened. As it was a few officers who had experience in planning such operations in the Pacific were involved in preparations for the Normandy invasion. (not sure if that was also the case with Husky)
@@lycaonpictus9662 The issue I have with your argument though is that you can't really compare amphibious assaults in the Pacific with those in Europe, apart from both being assaults over sea, they had nothing else in common. In the Pacific there were not nearly as many troops landed as in Europe, not nearly as many tanks and vehicles were used, both of which put a huge strain on logistics which is critical. The terrain was vastly different, the jungles of the Pacific posed different challenges to the Atlantic wall in Europe. Most crucially, in the Pacific you had mainly the Americans taking on Japan, in Europe it was a combined effort of both the Americans & British, as well as men from other countries like Canada, and working with allies is not something the commanders in the Pacific had to worry about, apart from those on New Guinea.
I don't envy those Soldiers fighting in Operation Cartwheel. That was right down along the equator in some of the thickest jungle and worst conditions imaginable. With the taking of those islands and the Corps of Engineers building the airbases so quickly it showed the US Army was certainly capable of completing any task asked of it.
find a book - Touched By Fire by Eric Bergerud. Pretty descriptive. What the South Pacific lacked in scale vs. the European theatre it made up for in adversity and ferocity.
@@johnc2438 I am sure the Seabees came in handy on the smaller islands that needed infrastructure. However, they did not compare to the capabilities of the Army's Engineer Construction Battalions. Who do you think built the big B-29 airfields around the Pacific Theater? Anderson AFB on Guam was originally carved out of coral and volcanic rock by the Corps of Engineers. My father led a Company of heavy construction equipment operators that was involved in that project after the island was taken. He was also a Combat Engineer that was in the initial assaults on both Guam and Okinawa.
@@Mondo762 You raise a valuable point. I get the feeling that most casual followers of WW2 Pacific history likely assume that the SeaBees pretty much did "all" construction work in the Pacific. The US army corps of engineers & construction units have been the unsung heroes of many a conflict & even peace that the US has been involved in. Moving men & material successfully around involves logistics. For that you need bases of operational supply, roads, rail, airfields, water, bridges, barracks, showers, hospitals etc. Along with constructing defensive lines, or clearing out enemy defences.
@@Conn30Mtenor Back when Guadalcanal & Stalingrad were both being fought simultaneously in the channel's timeline, you'd occasionally see posts underrating the former because the scale was so much smaller. Such posts ignored all the titanic logistical complexities involved in deploying an army thousands of miles or kilometers from home, to remote quarters of the world were there was practically no modern infrastructure, and then needing to keeping those troops supplied. All of that also consumes a massive amount of fuel. That is of also before getting into the fact that the enemy does not want you allow you to do any of those things, has a powerful fleet and air forces capable of preventing it, and will fully commit both to that endeavor. Some seemed to think that if Germany and the Soviet Union had been fighting over the Solomons instead, assuming of course that either possessed a capability to launch combined naval, ground, and air campaigns thousands of kilometers across open ocean from their home countries - and neither did historically - that the campaign would have featured larger land armies. Tl;dr: Many amateur military history buffs fail to appreciate logistics.
When looking at the war in the Atlantic, remember that most allied mariners survived the sinkings. A U-boot went down with its entire crew. 17 vs 20 losses is far more catastrophic than the numbers infer.
There was a time when losing three U-boats in return for sinking 20 ships would have been seen as a Pyrrhic German victory at best. Losing nearly as many U-boats as ships sunk was a German disaster.
I recall hearing that U-Boat crews suffered the highest loss % of any combat arm in all countries in WWII. To give this some perspective, this is higher than Soviet Penal detachments, which were run at MG42s stationed behind minefields. The effect of tying down Western Allied ships and production were in such a massive ratio, that the loss of Kriegmaine crews were acceptable. They were all heroes to the Volk.
@@TheGunderian RAF Bomber Command crews had something like a 50-60% fatality rate in WW2. If the bomber was hit they had maybe a 15% chance of escaping the aircraft by parachute, compared to 50% for US bomber aircrew. (RAF bombers were more fragile and inflammable than American ones, although they carried more bombs, and also it is probably harder to bail out of a stricken aircraft at night than in daytime.)
@@stevekaczynski3793 That is a painfully high % for those crews. My instincts tell me that US air crews may have seen bailing out as part of the job, whereas our allies(e.g. the Poles) stuck with a damaged plane longer. It is not to say US crews were any less brave, but they knew that there were thousands of planes in reserve, so no need to save one. Being in the war a few years longer, plus London being bombed from 1940, may have instilled a higher level of mission commitment to people living right there. Before posting above, I searched for exact numbers on U-Boat crew deaths. Turns out its indicated by boat lost, and crew stats are hard to pin down. Accidents like drowning accounted for more than you would think, and these are for subs that were not sunk! Without knowing this for a fact, my guess is that German sub crew losses in total were about 3,000 give or take a thousand. I seem to recall Brit bomber losses in the area of 50K. Both of these weapon systems are strategic in nature and purely offensive, and both caused far more loss to their enemies than the costs of operation.
@@TheGunderian The Lancaster, usually considered the best British heavy bomber, was a death trap in an emergency. There was a small escape hatch under the bomb aimer's position at the front that was barely wide enough for a man in full flight gear to get through. I believe it was the main escape route for the five crew at the front of the plane (pilot, bomb aimer, navigator, flight engineer and wireless operator) and inadequate for this.
I didnt know about the size of husky. Just the numbers game is so high and compared to normandy so little time to prepare. Its realy a milestone that the allies were able to pull this one off
His Medal of Honor citation: "For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as demolition sergeant serving with the 21st Marines, 3d Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces on Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, 23 February 1945. Quick to volunteer his services when our tanks were maneuvering vainly to open a lane for the infantry through the network of reinforced concrete pillboxes, buried mines, and black volcanic sands, Cpl. Williams daringly went forward alone to attempt the reduction of devastating machine-gun fire from the unyielding positions. Covered only by four riflemen, he fought desperately for four hours under terrific enemy small-arms fire and repeatedly returned to his own lines to prepare demolition charges and obtain serviced flamethrowers, struggling back, frequently to the rear of hostile emplacements, to wipe out one position after another. On one occasion, he daringly mounted a pillbox to insert the nozzle of his flamethrower through the air vent, killing the occupants, and silencing the gun; on another he grimly charged enemy riflemen who attempted to stop him with bayonets and destroyed them with a burst of flame from his weapon. His unyielding determination and extraordinary heroism in the face of ruthless enemy resistance were directly instrumental in neutralizing one of the most fanatically defended Japanese strongpoints encountered by his regiment and aided vitally in enabling his company to reach its objective. Cpl. Williams' aggressive fighting spirit and valiant devotion to duty throughout this fiercely contested action sustain and enhance the highest traditions of the U.S. Naval Service."
@@WorldWarTwo I have the originals and also have them on disc but the scan onto the disc needs a lot of reworking. I have always wanted to publish them and here I am 71 years old and have not done it yet. My Dad, my uncle's brother, said that Uncle Jack would go into his room after work and type page after page until sometime in 1946 he completed his memoirs. It was his way of dealing with things, I believe as he never talked about the war except that he "hated the Japs." Not politically correct but that is a direct quote from him. He was a very mellow person and never married.
4:23 this is a bizarre trend in German Naval history. The same thing happened in WWI, after Dogger Bank. Rather then realize that Beaty knew exactly where Hipper’s fleet was going to be because the German naval codes had been cracked, they became obsessed with the idea of a spy in Wilhelmshaven.
Its easy to say that in hindsight. But its not always that clear. E.g. Doggerbank was a single incident. In 1944 Operation Market Garden failed because the germans moved their best armoured corps to Arnhem just in time to defeat the allies. How did they know that the attack was coming? They must have known because why else would they move their best forces to such a quiet area? Turns out the germans knew nothing, they actually expected the next allied attack to happen in the south led by Patton. But they believed they had enough time to give their best units some R&R so they would be fresh when they had to stop Patton. And Arnhem was such a quite area, perfect for some chillout time. So they just got lucky. Another point would be the Battle of Jutland. Again it appeared the british knew exactly what the germans where planning. Was it possible that they had broken the german naval code? Simple answer from the german side: No, because if they had they would have destroyed the entire High Seas Fleet on the morning of June 1st. Scheer had radioed his intentions to head for Horns Reef, but the Grand Fleet failed to cut him off. So clearly they didn't know. Actually the british had cracked the code, but they mishandled the information so badly that it made no impact. A more serious point is the U-Boat campaign of WW2 because here it weren't single incidents but more then enough indicators that the germans actually accepted that the radio messages must be the problem. But they assumed the britished hadn't cracked the code but were locating the senders by radio-direction finding. They actually tried to test that theory by isolating a part of their staff and handing them only the data they thought the british could obtain via RDF. The officers were to try to track the movement of the wolfpacks and as it turned out they could with sufficent accuracy to allow for convoys to evade. As a result the germans now focused on shortening their radio messages to make RDF impossible (they failed). I find this actually interesting because it means that even if the allies had not cracked the codes it might not have changed much.
@@gildor8866 But the British weren't very good at concealing their countermoves against German U-Boats. Proper analysis of British counterattacks in 1941 would have likely revealed the breaking of German Enigma and Hydra codes. But the Abwehr and other German intelligence agencies were not very good at analysis work, a consequence of German military culture's concentration upon Operational and Theater level staff officers doing all of the intelligence reviews. This decentralized almost all analysis work, while leaving no method or system for communication between these isolated tactical and strategic islands. Individual officers could discern individual vulnerabilities, but no system existed for their feedback, and there was no system to collate Individual insight into a complete picture. This is part of the reason why there were so many operational failures due to faulty intelligence. U-boat commanders could see Royal Navy ships showing up way too many times in the wrong place to be coincidental. And the ability of the Allies to repeatedly surprise German commanders (Sicily, Normandy and Operation Bagration) demonstrated a rigid fixation upon WAG assumptions about Allied capabilities, while ignoring and discouraging objections to that orthodoxy. Axis commanders KNEW Normandy was the weak link in the Atlantic Wall, but remained fixated upon Pas-de-Calais. Army Group Center was the weakest of all the German AGs in the USSR in June 1944, and yet German commanders assumed that the Soviet were going to attack the strongest part of their line in Ukraine. The Germans practically invented the whole "military intelligence is an oxymoron" trope.
@@petergray7576 I agree that germans commanders lacked flexibility once they had set on an assumed course of action they expected the enemy to take. Pas de Calais was the best place for the invasion due to the shortest distance to britain which eased logistics and air-support. So they decided thats where the allies were going to land and focused their efforts there to the detriment of other places. Actually Normandy wasn't the weak link, the Bretagne was even less defended, but then it was even further away from Britain. Same wit Russia in 1944: it wasn't that the germans expected the russians to attack in the south despite Army Group Center being the weakest AG, it was the weakest AG because the germans expected the russians to attack in the south and distributed their strengths accordingly. It appears the upper echelons had little regard for the enemy daring to adapt to their preparations
That bit at the end shows why the Western Allies could pull something like Husky off. You had coordination, numbers and sufficient skill and efficiency from everyone in these service areas, in other words, the operational level. This is something WWII historian James Holland talks about a lot in his books (also wrote one on Sicily). The Allies had decent armies, control of the skies and the seas at this point which were essential for something like Husky succeeding. On the Axis side, only Japan had this potential but the Army and Navy viewed each other as rivals rather than partners, costing them dearly. It’s the reason why Germany failed to win the war outright in 1940 as they were too land centric and threw far more into their army, than their other services.
@@vule92994 It did not stop them to build big and new battleships like Bismarck or Tirpitz or scores of U-Boats much later. The potential to develop German Navy was wasted because German naval commanders like Raeder were old school classic heavy surface battleship types in the expense of amphibious operations or air / sea coordination and priorty of resources before the war were diverted to develop and enlarge German Army and Luftwaffe first. German Navy had been Cinderella Service
The German navy 1940 was no match for the British. Aslo the fall of France was quick so no real perparations had been made for a quick follow up invasion of Britain anyway. As you said no focus on the sea or .. long range fighter aircraft even.
I have to disagree; what you call the operational level. The Western Allies almost never achieved significant operational victories, if they had, the war would have been over much faster. The Allies could coordinate land, air and naval assets in an impressive and overpowering way, but that isn't the so called operational level, that's combined arms warfare. Sure combined arms is a prerequisite for operational success, but operations in ww2 is military action at corps-level and above. Allied operations are thoroughly planned and executed but rarely achieve major victories by themselves or have the flexibility to take full advantage of motorised maneuver forces. El-Alamein was a classic set-piece battle with exact planning and huge barrages, but it did not destroy Rommel, it merely unhinged his line and forced a retreat. Tunisia saw protracted combat against inferior forces where allied forces couldn't exploit breakthroughs until the end. Normandie turned into a slug, and only operation cobra seems to be an actual true operational level victory where divisions, corps and armies were coordinated to full effect. The Soviets learned the bloody way, even though they had a solid theoretical basis, and were the only ones to rival the german mastery of the operational art. Neither the UK nor the US did ever achieve anything comparable to Bagration or the following leaping offensives throug Poland. The Germans lost in 1940 because Britain didn't capitulate (thank you) and not because they ficused on the Army. No amount of investment in the navy would have made sealion possible and the Luftwaffe already recieved a larger share of german industry than the Army.
Just wanted to say I've been following this series since the beginning. And it's still one of the best documentary series I've ever watched Not only is it incredibly detailed and well written, but you guys seem to have so much fun doing it 🤣 Loving the Churchill sponsor video 🤣 and I saw Indy in the unkillable soldier music video, you looked like you were having so much fun 🤣
Xtreme Techer Thank you for your dedicated support. We're glad to have so many wonderful people such as yourself in our audience, so we can help keep the memory of this time alive. Stay tuned
well, my Mothers Father was born June 11, 1914, (two weeks before the Archduke & his wife were assassinated in Sarajevo), His Daughter, (my Mother), was born June 23, 1941, (the day after 'barbarossa' was launched), & I was born June 13, 1959. the three of us used to celebrate one birthday, together.
great to see another episode. even if i feel depressed or alone, this series goes on like life. its almost cheers one up to see this series every Saturday. so much death, and carnage, heroic deeds and people working hard, in a strange way i feel sublime and warmth watching this series. its always fun to see all the little details in day by day history. i have a feeling every comment gets read, i'm not looking for pity or a reply, i just wanted to leave a comment, for a wonderful series and great youtube channel. carry on
Gothicc senpai I'm very glad that our series can provide you come comfort in those rougher times. Life is not easy, and it's this simple shared humanity we share that we strive to highlight in our episodes. Thank you for joining us so diligently & as John Prine would say, I wish you all the best.
I love it when people manage to accidentally coordinate all the important events of the year in July. And I missed the premiere... because I was watching the unlisted from Patreon. Damn my eyes.
Appreciated the comparison between Operations Husky & Overlord. Underlines the skill of the Allies & makes a mockery of Nazi boasts of their competence & efficiency when one reflects on their flailing with Operation Sealion.
I totally agree. In these series the team has put a lot of effort to bust the muth that Nazi commanders were super tactical minds and organisational genius. The only channel that has up so much effort for that is the Armchair Historian.
And with Operation Bagration coming next year, not only is that myth going to be further disproven, but we will also see some of the best tactical and strategical Soviet victories of the entire war.
Up to this point I always thought the force used in Husky was about half that landed at Normandy, but now I realize the true magnitude of this operation. What an incredible feat to assemble, transport, land and supply all those men and equipment with less preparation than Overlord! Kudos to you guys and the TimeGhost Army for making this awesome series possible.
jerry Thank you for your kind words. Our team works hard but we couldn't do it without the support of the TimeGhost Army! Tell your friends! www.patreon.com/join/timeghosthistory
Man these next few weeks are gonna big in terms of battlefield coverage. Citadel and Husky? Occurring virtually simultaneously? That’s never really dawned on me till now. Really hyped for next week.
Hands down this is my favourite channel on RUclips and I think one of the bests or even the beat channel. Years of years of amazing content! I happy that I can support this channel via timeghost
Another brilliant episode! My grandfather served in the 1st marine division and he was at Guadalcanal and New Georgia. When you showed the footage of the jungle I can't imagine trying to hike through that. Keep up the great work!
Thanks for the suggestion about turning the video off before getting future knowledge. Obviously we all pretty much know what's going to happen in general terms, but learning the details week by week has been very enjoyable, so thanks for the opportunity to keep it that way.
These Torch , Husky , Avalanche , landing onSalerno (and Gallipoli 30 years before ) were all trial and learn lessons /coursres that Allies used to perfect amphibious operations
I'm thinking that the matter is finally put to rest... the HUSKY landing was bigger than the NORMANDY landing . Ever since I first read that fact in a TIME/LIFE BOOK : THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN WW2 , when I was a teenager... I've searched for a definitive answer . I was a believer in the data of 175,000 allied troops being landed for HUSKY , while 156,000 went ashore on June 6,1944 but I've kept running into sources stating that NORMANDY, held all the records for amphibious landings. I'm going to stand with you as my final reputable historical source that has finally given me the undeniable facts. Thank you for all the meticulous research that is done by this channel and the other affiliated channels/videos . You guys are so professional . These videos are important in highlighting the facts of the most devastating, destructive war in human history... but also teaches us to NEVER FORGET. NEVER REPEAT THE MADNESS. I love you guys and your great videos . Thanks, again.
Genaro You flatter us. It's truly only with the support of viewers like you & the TimeGhost Army that we're able to produce this series to follow this immense war. Thank you for watching & please stay tuned
You folks need to do a special episode on the air war in the South Pacific, where more Allied planes were lost to "operational losses" than to enemy action. Prior to the war, if a pilot was sick with malaria, he was banned from flying until he had two years without symptoms. Needless to say, that went out the window. The navigational instruments consisted of a pencil, a wristwatch, a map, slide rule and the compass. So many of these men flew over the sea, never to be seen again. Planes slammed into the mountains of PNG in the fog. Substandard air bases, bad food, humid weather and no leave like their compatriots in Europe.
Wow, it does sound like Operation Husky needs more recognition on just how complex it was. This is exactly why this channel's amazing and the best documentary series ever made.
Great job prepping us for the Sicilian campaign, gang. And I've been looking forward to your coverage of the post-Guadalcanal Solomons campaign, since that's also been an under-appreciated slice of the South Pacific side of the war.
Just a heads up, at 8:19 the mention of Mannstein leaving the USSR, the date on the top left of the picture reads "June, 943" I have to thank you guys for your efforts. I learn so much about the war in the Pacific. Admittedly, my main focus when studying WW2 has been on the European Theater and the Eastern Front. Your videos had been a great source of knowledge in the Pacific theater.
One of the great things about our chronological format is the perspective it allows us in covering the whole globe. We can see these immense operations ramping up concurrently, and it helps give some sense of the relative forces involved.
We are elated! The level of support from this community is humbling and staggering. Combined with the fantastic respectful discussions, this makes the TimeGhost Army the best audience in the world.
"It was Zhukov's challenge to overwhelm him with simultaneous thrusts." Kinda like that SNL sketch where Patrick Swayze and Chris Farley compete to become Chippendales dancers.
Oooh, June 1916, Brusilov, Isonzo (Insert Cadorna vs Hötzendorf here, the greatest generals of the Central powers and Entente respectively), Verdun, the Somme, the Salonika Front, and the Libyan front?
Not to decry Stephen Ambrose, but I think you did an excellent job with this episode and the way you talked about Husky. While Stephen made some great books, they would have you think that there was no major war before D-Day.
I really appreciate the coverage you're giving Operation Husky, especially the comparison between Husky and Overlord. I'm also looking forward to seeing your comparison between Operation Husky (with the limited timeframe to plan, prepare, and ship the men and materiel) and Operation Market-Garden, which had a similar limited timeframe to plan, etc. and turned into a debacle. Now I'm wondering if Monty got it in his head that if he could do it and succeed in Husky he could do it and succeed in Market-Garden. I'm also looking forward to your coverage of Operation Dragoon, the Allied invasion of southern France. I remember asking a historian at the US Army War College, if Overlord had failed, would we have gone ahead with Dragoon? His answer was emphatically "Yes!" and that even if Overlord failed, Dragoon would have succeeded in opening a second front with the Germans, just on France's southern coast instead of the Normandy coast.
Only one amphibious assault during the Second World War was ever defeated on the beaches, and that was the first Japanese attempt to storm Wake Island, arrogantly conducted without adequate air support. The second attempt, which included greater naval support and air power, ultimately succeeded, albeit after high casualties from a ferocious but ultimately doomed defense of the island. On that note the odds are probably in favor of that historian's assessment of Dragoon going ahead anyway & succeeding being correct. Air and naval superiority are nearly impossible for a defending force to adequately counter and the establishment of a beachhead, so long as the operation is planned and executed competently, is almost assured.
@@lycaonpictus9662 Anzio landings , Operation Shingle , was also initially a disappointment ended up with an isolated tied up beachead for four months between January - May 1944 till it was was relieved and reunited with Allied advance from south after Allies won Fourth Battle of Cassino and advanced into Liri valley
Growing up this what schools taught me about WW2. Poland 1939, France 1940, Battle of Britain, mentions of Atlantic war, Pearl Harbor, Normandy 1944, Battle of the Bulge, mention of Yalta conference, Iwo Jima and Okinawa and finally Hiroshima and Nagasaki. All talked about in less than 20 pages.
What do operations Cartwheel, Husky, and Citadel have in common? They all sound like rejected names for fancy cat toys, but instead, they were just purrfectly planned military maneuvers! 🐱💥
On 21 June 1943 the army, navy, and air force staffs convened a series of meetings for the presentation of plans for Operation HUSKY , invasion of Sicily. These meetings are the source of much consternation among both historians and army and naval commanders. Patton in particular was concerned with the absence of specific support commitments for the assault forces. At a 22 June intelligence briefing the air forces noted that the level of fighter support for the assaults would depend upon the scale of enemy opposition in the air. The Western Task Force’s after action report references similar complaints. More specifically, Admiral Henry K. Hewitt was disappointed that the ranking air officer with the task force was not empowered to order air strength into the assault area. He could only request air support through a target committee in North Africa that needed 12 hours’ notice to approve and organize the mission. The US Navy’s official historian notes that Spaatz, the NAAF commander and ranking USAAF officer in theater, refused a request for an officer with this authority subsequent to rejecting another request for Hewitt himself to have authority over some air power. While Eisenhower later defended the air force plan on the grounds that it needed to remain flexible against a fleeting target, US Navy historian Samuel E. Morison is adamant that the true culprit was an air force doctrine of non-cooperation. American historian Carlo D’Este lamented that the air forces remained focused on air superiority despite the excellent close air support example pioneered by the Desert Air Force in North Africa. The Tactical Air Force would remain uncommitted so that it could be used to support the Strategic Air Force in its battle against Axis air strength. Tedder’s plan structured the air force’s battle in three phases. Phase I encompassed a series of preparatory operations meant to shape the battlespace for the landings. It placed heavy emphasis on the neutralization of Axis air power by targeting aerodromes. It also targeted enemy lines of communication to and from Sicily, while dispersing these efforts to Sardinia and the mainland in an effort to disguise the intending Allied objective. Phase I would see the final stages of the development of Malta and Gozo as offensive bases for the Allied air forces. Furthermore, the Allies would take and establish air bases on the Italian islands of Pantelleria and Lampedusa to supplement their efforts to support HUSKY. Phase II concerned the assault itself. Axis aerodromes remained as the primary bomber effort. Secondarily, bombers would work to prevent the island’s reinforcement and/or eastward movement of Axis formations on the island. Fighters based at Malta, Gozo, and Pantelleria would provide air cover the landing areas. Phase III focused on the buildup of Allied air power on Sicily alongside efforts to support the island’s reduction. It included the movement of the Tactical Air Force’s fighter squadrons to Sicily and the activation of its commands ashore. The tactical bomber force would move to Malta from North Africa and operate from there until space was available on Sicilian airfields. In general, bomber operations were to continue attacks on enemy airfields, prevent enemy movement on the island, prevent Axis reinforcement through Palermo or Messina, and provide direct support to the ground forces. Eagles over Husky - Alexander Fitzgerald-Black
The problem that US Army and US Navy commanders - and historians - had with Tedder’s plan was its continued focus on the Axis air forces as a primary objective. Tedder did little to cater to their desire for information on what support they should expect during the landings. Which targets should the army expect the air force to strike and when? Tedder’s attitude was for the army to “tell us what you want and we’ll do it in our own way.” One US Army general described Tedder’s plan as “a most masterful piece of uninformed prevarication, totally unrelated to the Naval and Military Joint Plan.” Montgomery’s biographer, Nigel Hamilton, went as far as to charge Tedder (and Admiral Cunningham) with sabotaging direct support to the army. Tedder had sound military reasons though for his decision to focus on air superiority in all three phases. He wanted to maintain flexibility for his air forces to respond to the weight of enemy activity in accordance with the doctrine he and Coningham had developed in the desert. Tedder's fault was not in unsound military thinking, but rather in his failure to provide the army and navy with anything more than “lofty assurances,” as Coningham’s biographer notes. This perpetuated the mistrust later resulting in the army and navy’s criticism of the air force plan. If Montgomery’s biographer found Tedder guilty of sabotage, the situation was quite different for the British general Montgomery himself commanding Eighth Army for landing south of Sicily, who had what was possibly the most nuanced understanding of air force cooperation among his army peers. If he was disappointed with the air force’s plan he seems to have quickly remedied this by requesting that Eighth Army have on call air support to block enemy movement in the vicinity of Avola. Air commanders agreed to add three Desert Air Force Kittyhawk squadrons to Malta’s already crowded airfields to meet this requirement. In essence, Montgomery understood the present doctrine adhered to by Coningham and Tedder. This doctrine prioritized air support as follows: air superiority, air interdiction, and close air support. Montgomery understood from his experience in North Africa that the best targets for fighter-bombers were soft-skinned vehicles and that perhaps the best contribution these assets could make was in delaying enemy reinforcement and resupply of the front. He also understood that air superiority must have priority. In his last minute notes on how the battle must go Montgomery noted that the air force still had an air battle to win, meaning that his army was not going to receive “El-Hamma type air support. this time” (when Eighth Army under his command burst through Tebega Gap , cut through El Hamma and Gabes road and overflanked then captured Mareth Line during Operation Supercharge II in March 1943 thanks to excellent tactical air to ground support of Desert Air Force) This attitude was likely based on communications and established relationships with air commanders, including Tedder who, as we will see in the next chapter, was concerned about the lack of enemy air activity in the days before the invasion. Much like the wider operational planning that went before it, although the air force plan was not to everyone’s liking, it proved effective. Perhaps more importantly, it was aligned with the Allied strategy for the Mediterranean and the Combined Bomber Offensive outlined at Casablanca and beyond. Eagles over Husky - Alexander Fitzgerald-Black
Romenian dictator Antonescau visited Mussolini in Venice in 29 June 1943 for four days and inquired Mussolini to be "Man of Munich" again (acquire image of middle man of peace just like in Munich Conferance in 1938) and get a seperate peace from Allies , emphasing worsening strategic position of Germany in every front , unfortunetely Mussolini first seemed to agree then vaccilated then forgotten that instead got into trivalities , six days later Allies landed Sicily
The problem that US Army and US Navy commanders - and historians - had with Tedder’s plan was its continued focus on the Axis air forces as a primary objective. Tedder did little to cater to their desire for information on what support they should expect during the landings. Which targets should the army expect the air force to strike and when? Tedder’s attitude was for the army to “tell us what you want and we’ll do it in our own way.” One US Army general described Tedder’s plan as “a most masterful piece of uninformed prevarication, totally unrelated to the Naval and Military Joint Plan.” Montgomery’s biographer, Nigel Hamilton, went as far as to charge Tedder (and Admiral Cunningham) with sabotaging direct support to the army. Tedder had sound military reasons though for his decision to focus on air superiority in all three phases. He wanted to maintain flexibility for his air forces to respond to the weight of enemy activity in accordance with the doctrine he and Coningham had developed in the desert. Tedder's fault was not in unsound military thinking, but rather in his failure to provide the army and navy with anything more than “lofty assurances,” as Coningham’s biographer notes. This perpetuated the mistrust later resulting in the army and navy’s criticism of the air force plan. If Montgomery’s biographer found Tedder guilty of sabotage, the situation was quite different for the British general Montgomery himself commanding Eighth Army for landing south of Sicily, who had what was possibly the most nuanced understanding of air force cooperation among his army peers. If he was disappointed with the air force’s plan he seems to have quickly remedied this by requesting that Eighth Army have on call air support to block enemy movement in the vicinity of Avola. Air commanders agreed to add three Desert Air Force Kittyhawk squadrons to Malta’s already crowded airfields to meet this requirement. In essence, Montgomery understood the present doctrine adhered to by Coningham and Tedder. This doctrine prioritized air support as follows: air superiority, air interdiction, and close air support. Montgomery understood from his experience in North Africa that the best targets for fighter-bombers were soft-skinned vehicles and that perhaps the best contribution these assets could make was in delaying enemy reinforcement and resupply of the front. He also understood that air superiority must have priority. In his last minute notes on how the battle must go Montgomery noted that the air force still had an air battle to win, meaning that his army was not going to receive “El-Hamma type air support. this time” (when Eighth Army under his command burst through Tebega Gap , cut through El Hamma and Gabes road and overflanked then captured Mareth Line during Operation Supercharge II in March 1943 thanks to excellent tactical air to ground support of Desert Air Force) This attitude was likely based on communications and established relationships with air commanders, including Tedder who, as we will see in the next chapter, was concerned about the lack of enemy air activity in the days before the invasion. Much like the wider operational planning that went before it, although the air force plan was not to everyone’s liking, it proved effective. Perhaps more importantly, it was aligned with the Allied strategy for the Mediterranean and the Combined Bomber Offensive outlined at Casablanca and beyond. Eagles over Husky - Alexander Fitzgerald-Black
Hi Indy Another wonderfull week. Especially operation husky statistics is huge.. Nightmare for logistics. But some how they managed it. Awaiting for next week. Thanks..
@@WorldWarTwo Your videos are actually are an activity of life to me. And also, this episode came out at a time when I was literally upset and broke, so Mr. Neidell literally came to my aid. Thanks for your videos, if my monetary issues improve, I promise to join TimeGhost Army and fund you in Patreon.
@@WorldWarTwo I think by this time of the war he was a navigator/bombardier flying in Bostons (A-20). He started off as a navigator/bombardier in Blenheim IVs in 1941. I believe his squadron transitioned to Wellingtons sometime in 1942, and he was the navigator on one of those on the first night of El Alamein. The squadron then transitioned to Bostons, which he was flying for the remainder of his time in service (until mustered out in late 1943 or early 1944 due to illness). I might still have his log book or service record somewhere in my files, but I have never made an effort to locate it.
That's great information. If you do have his log book, there are veterans groups that would be interested in it. Possibly his unit's historical society or VFA office would be a good place to check.
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As of July 1, 1943 the Germans had 1,152,148 dead and approximately 3,450,000 wounded on the Eastern Front.
Dear World War Two team,
I have noticed that WaH has not been released past week nor this one. I hope there's nothing wrong with Spartacus and/or the team. I love your job, specially WaH. I wish to all of you the best.
@@Nodice055 Good question! Some speculations--they've already had such significant casualties that most of the trained aviators are dead. Or, perhaps the pilots were reporting much more significant successes than in reality (we know it happened elsewhere, and by both sides) so they thought the losses were justified. Finally, it might simply be that the same martial spirit that possessed the Army to launch hopeless bonzai attacks also compelled their attacks here.
@@ramonribascasasayas7877 they talk about it on the community tab. It's because one of their members has some health issues
Indy is such a gentleman, giving spoiler warnings on a history lesson.
I am so excited for who wins
@JZ's BFF We play both sides, so we always come out on top !!
My father was one of only 50 American glider pilots that flew with the Brits in the invasion. Wind blew them way off course, their own navy shot down a bunch of them, and he ended up crashing in the ocean about a mile off shore and floating around in his canvas and balsa wood airplane with 16 t,British glider infantry for about 12 hours until they got picked up by a destroyer. He said "after that, I was a combat veteran!"..he still had Normandy, Southern France, and two flights in Market-Garden to go...
T. J. Payeur Wow, that must have been an incredible set of experiences for him. Thank you for sharing a bit about his service, I can't imagine the terror of coming down crash landing a glider.
They were released too early by the Dakotas
My Great Grandfather was a glider pilot with the 40th Troop Carrier Squadron. I wonder if they ever came across one another.
Your father was a main character then!
@@daddius I'd bet that they damned sure did..they were a pretty close knit bunch, the only people in the whole Armed Forces flying airplanes without engines in to combat....
I've read about pretty much all the major campaigns of WWII and yet had no idea that the invasion of Sicily was THIS big and complex compared to the Battle of Normandy. There's really no end to the things one could learn from this channel. I'd already been eagerly waiting for the coming week in anticipation of them covering Operation Citadel for a long time. Now Operation Husky has just added to that anticipation.
There is some debate on which amphibious invasion was the largest in history. There was as much force used in the invasion of Sicily as in Normandy but we don't know for certain.
@@BHuang92 Okinawa was the largest amphibious invasion in history.
@@Anthony-jo7up It was the largest in the Pacific Theater, but not overall. Only 60,000 landed on L-Day (Operation Iceberg's D-Day).
Wow, I had no idea that Husky was so complex and was pulled off despite so many difficulties. The latest of many new things I've learned about WW2 thanks to this series.
Thank you for watching, Derek. Let's see what else they can pull off. Stay tuned
I had no idea Husky was so much bigger than Overlord. It also was an issue that everything in the Med was somewhat diminished to prepare for Normandy. On the flip side, I have never read that Overlord needed to be limited for operations anywhere else. Of course one of the reasons Husky worked so well is Patton, who turned a flank role into the star position, and injected an element of good competition with old Monty. Look at the Brits at Normandy; Monty sat in front of Caen for 2-3 months. Could this have been partly because Patton wasn't there!? hmmm When Patton did arrive, Monty suddenly was able to move. I know there are many other factors, but I never miss an opportunity to poke at Monty. :)
same here and Sicily is much lesser known. 2 huge Naval operations on other sides of the planet
Same here!
@@TheGunderian I'm comfortable enough for you to poke a bit of fun Monty's way, but there were some pretty significant differences in the units faced by the Brit's v the US forces prior to the breakout and a later meeting up at Falaise.
Busy summer ahead for my grandmother's brothers, on opposite sides of the world. One would lead Operation Cottage, the August move to recapture Kiska from the Japanese. Her other brother would be in Operation Husky, as a motorcycle messenger for General Patton. He (and his cycle) survived the war. Although he has since passed, his Harley-Davidson still resides in his garage.
Thank you for sharing a bit about your grandmother's brothers time in the war. May they rest in peace.
Another interesting thing to note this week on June 26 1943 is that aircraft designer Clarence Johnson and his team at Lockheed in California in the United States will begin work on the first airframe of the *XP-80 Shooting Star prototype jet fighter* . They would eventually be able to produce the airframe in just 143 days, although the testing program would prove very dangerous with Lockheed test pilot Milo Burcham killed while on one of the test flights. Even America's top flying ace in the war, Richard Bong, would die while testing one of the P-80 fighters just before the end of the war. It saw very limited service in Italy doing reconnaissance missions near the end of the war but would see widespread combat service in the Korean War.
And the Whittle Engine that was used was built here in Lynn, MA at the GE Riverworks plant. My Grandfather's group in the forge had a small part to play in the manufacturing of the engine. The forge was making superchargers for the Air Corps, which gave then the experience needed to make the compressors.
When the jet engine was shipped out, they put a fake propeller on the front to throw off any spies. They also had to make frequent stops during shipping to rotate the main shaft and keep the bearings lubricated.
@@stevenwhite7763 Oh that's a very interesting story, especially on the fake propeller. Thanks for sharing!
Thanks Dickson, you always bring great info. See you next time
IIRC it’s been claimed that a P-80 was responsible for the first jet-on-jet combat victory against a MiG-15.
Thank you for pointing out the significance and scale of the invasion of Sicily.
Thank you for watching, Eleanor
Man I had no idea the Sicily landings were actually bigger than the Normandy ones.
You raised a very good point about Operation Husky. Had it, or something similar to it not happened, without the experience in logistics and amphibious operations it gave, I wonder if D-Day would have even been possible.
Yes.
Not to underrate Husky, but it wasn't the fist large amphibious operation carried out by the Allies during the Second World War. The Allies had done so successfully in the Pacific, and faced many of the same hurdles with planning & difficulties with execution.
Officers involved in planning amphibious operations in the Pacific could be reallocated to the European theater for planning of amphibious operations there, in an alternate history where Husky never happened. As it was a few officers who had experience in planning such operations in the Pacific were involved in preparations for the Normandy invasion. (not sure if that was also the case with Husky)
@@lycaonpictus9662 The issue I have with your argument though is that you can't really compare amphibious assaults in the Pacific with those in Europe, apart from both being assaults over sea, they had nothing else in common. In the Pacific there were not nearly as many troops landed as in Europe, not nearly as many tanks and vehicles were used, both of which put a huge strain on logistics which is critical. The terrain was vastly different, the jungles of the Pacific posed different challenges to the Atlantic wall in Europe. Most crucially, in the Pacific you had mainly the Americans taking on Japan, in Europe it was a combined effort of both the Americans & British, as well as men from other countries like Canada, and working with allies is not something the commanders in the Pacific had to worry about, apart from those on New Guinea.
8:22 that's a rather high quality photo for 942 AD
I don't envy those Soldiers fighting in Operation Cartwheel. That was right down along the equator in some of the thickest jungle and worst conditions imaginable. With the taking of those islands and the Corps of Engineers building the airbases so quickly it showed the US Army was certainly capable of completing any task asked of it.
find a book - Touched By Fire by Eric Bergerud. Pretty descriptive. What the South Pacific lacked in scale vs. the European theatre it made up for in adversity and ferocity.
...and don't forget the contributions of the Navy's newly formed construction battalions -- aka CBs' or Seabees.
@@johnc2438 I am sure the Seabees came in handy on the smaller islands that needed infrastructure. However, they did not compare to the capabilities of the Army's Engineer Construction Battalions. Who do you think built the big B-29 airfields around the Pacific Theater? Anderson AFB on Guam was originally carved out of coral and volcanic rock by the Corps of Engineers. My father led a Company of heavy construction equipment operators that was involved in that project after the island was taken. He was also a Combat Engineer that was in the initial assaults on both Guam and Okinawa.
@@Mondo762 You raise a valuable point. I get the feeling that most casual followers of WW2 Pacific history likely assume that the SeaBees pretty much did "all" construction work in the Pacific.
The US army corps of engineers & construction units have been the unsung heroes of many a conflict & even peace that the US has been involved in.
Moving men & material successfully around involves logistics. For that you need bases of operational supply, roads, rail, airfields, water, bridges, barracks, showers, hospitals etc. Along with constructing defensive lines, or clearing out enemy defences.
@@Conn30Mtenor Back when Guadalcanal & Stalingrad were both being fought simultaneously in the channel's timeline, you'd occasionally see posts underrating the former because the scale was so much smaller. Such posts ignored all the titanic logistical complexities involved in deploying an army thousands of miles or kilometers from home, to remote quarters of the world were there was practically no modern infrastructure, and then needing to keeping those troops supplied. All of that also consumes a massive amount of fuel.
That is of also before getting into the fact that the enemy does not want you allow you to do any of those things, has a powerful fleet and air forces capable of preventing it, and will fully commit both to that endeavor.
Some seemed to think that if Germany and the Soviet Union had been fighting over the Solomons instead, assuming of course that either possessed a capability to launch combined naval, ground, and air campaigns thousands of kilometers across open ocean from their home countries - and neither did historically - that the campaign would have featured larger land armies.
Tl;dr: Many amateur military history buffs fail to appreciate logistics.
When looking at the war in the Atlantic, remember that most allied mariners survived the sinkings. A U-boot went down with its entire crew. 17 vs 20 losses is far more catastrophic than the numbers infer.
There was a time when losing three U-boats in return for sinking 20 ships would have been seen as a Pyrrhic German victory at best. Losing nearly as many U-boats as ships sunk was a German disaster.
I recall hearing that U-Boat crews suffered the highest loss % of any combat arm in all countries in WWII. To give this some perspective, this is higher than Soviet Penal detachments, which were run at MG42s stationed behind minefields. The effect of tying down Western Allied ships and production were in such a massive ratio, that the loss of Kriegmaine crews were acceptable. They were all heroes to the Volk.
@@TheGunderian RAF Bomber Command crews had something like a 50-60% fatality rate in WW2. If the bomber was hit they had maybe a 15% chance of escaping the aircraft by parachute, compared to 50% for US bomber aircrew. (RAF bombers were more fragile and inflammable than American ones, although they carried more bombs, and also it is probably harder to bail out of a stricken aircraft at night than in daytime.)
@@stevekaczynski3793 That is a painfully high % for those crews. My instincts tell me that US air crews may have seen bailing out as part of the job, whereas our allies(e.g. the Poles) stuck with a damaged plane longer. It is not to say US crews were any less brave, but they knew that there were thousands of planes in reserve, so no need to save one. Being in the war a few years longer, plus London being bombed from 1940, may have instilled a higher level of mission commitment to people living right there.
Before posting above, I searched for exact numbers on U-Boat crew deaths. Turns out its indicated by boat lost, and crew stats are hard to pin down. Accidents like drowning accounted for more than you would think, and these are for subs that were not sunk! Without knowing this for a fact, my guess is that German sub crew losses in total were about 3,000 give or take a thousand. I seem to recall Brit bomber losses in the area of 50K. Both of these weapon systems are strategic in nature and purely offensive, and both caused far more loss to their enemies than the costs of operation.
@@TheGunderian The Lancaster, usually considered the best British heavy bomber, was a death trap in an emergency. There was a small escape hatch under the bomb aimer's position at the front that was barely wide enough for a man in full flight gear to get through. I believe it was the main escape route for the five crew at the front of the plane (pilot, bomb aimer, navigator, flight engineer and wireless operator) and inadequate for this.
I didnt know about the size of husky. Just the numbers game is so high and compared to normandy so little time to prepare. Its realy a milestone that the allies were able to pull this one off
Stay tuned to see what else the Allies have up their sleeve
Woody Williams passed away last week. He was the last living Medal of Honor Recipient from WWII.
Thank you for sharing about him. Never forget
His Medal of Honor citation:
"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as demolition sergeant serving with the 21st Marines, 3d Marine Division, in action against enemy Japanese forces on Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, 23 February 1945. Quick to volunteer his services when our tanks were maneuvering vainly to open a lane for the infantry through the network of reinforced concrete pillboxes, buried mines, and black volcanic sands, Cpl. Williams daringly went forward alone to attempt the reduction of devastating machine-gun fire from the unyielding positions. Covered only by four riflemen, he fought desperately for four hours under terrific enemy small-arms fire and repeatedly returned to his own lines to prepare demolition charges and obtain serviced flamethrowers, struggling back, frequently to the rear of hostile emplacements, to wipe out one position after another. On one occasion, he daringly mounted a pillbox to insert the nozzle of his flamethrower through the air vent, killing the occupants, and silencing the gun; on another he grimly charged enemy riflemen who attempted to stop him with bayonets and destroyed them with a burst of flame from his weapon. His unyielding determination and extraordinary heroism in the face of ruthless enemy resistance were directly instrumental in neutralizing one of the most fanatically defended Japanese strongpoints encountered by his regiment and aided vitally in enabling his company to reach its objective. Cpl. Williams' aggressive fighting spirit and valiant devotion to duty throughout this fiercely contested action sustain and enhance the highest traditions of the U.S. Naval Service."
Lycaon Thank you.
One of the few times PT boats successfully attack a ship with torpedoes and it turns out to be the flagship of the American assault force.
I think they were fairly successful during the Guadalcanal campaign. But yes, torpedoes now finally working.
@@dogawful Looking forward to seeing the US submarines go ham on the Japanese merchantmen and the IJN later this year.
@@dogawful Japanese torpedoes generally did work. It was US ones that had shown flaws, notably at Midway, not rectified until 1943.
@@stevekaczynski3793 Yes, I was commenting on the American torpedoes.
My uncle was wounded on New Georgia 43rd Div , 169 RCT,Company D. He wrote his memoirs which include New Georgia.
Thanks for sharing a bit about him, Ken. Are those memoirs available anywhere?
@@WorldWarTwo I have the originals and also have them on disc but the scan onto the disc needs a lot of reworking. I have always wanted to publish them and here I am 71 years old and have not done it yet. My Dad, my uncle's brother, said that Uncle Jack would go into his room after work and type page after page until sometime in 1946 he completed his memoirs. It was his way of dealing with things, I believe as he never talked about the war except that he "hated the Japs." Not politically correct but that is a direct quote from him. He was a very mellow person and never married.
Kudos to the fly that continued to fly reconnaissance over Indy's head during the entire broadcast.
4:23 this is a bizarre trend in German Naval history. The same thing happened in WWI, after Dogger Bank. Rather then realize that Beaty knew exactly where Hipper’s fleet was going to be because the German naval codes had been cracked, they became obsessed with the idea of a spy in Wilhelmshaven.
I think it is the result of hubris.
Its easy to say that in hindsight. But its not always that clear. E.g. Doggerbank was a single incident. In 1944 Operation Market Garden failed because the germans moved their best armoured corps to Arnhem just in time to defeat the allies. How did they know that the attack was coming? They must have known because why else would they move their best forces to such a quiet area? Turns out the germans knew nothing, they actually expected the next allied attack to happen in the south led by Patton. But they believed they had enough time to give their best units some R&R so they would be fresh when they had to stop Patton. And Arnhem was such a quite area, perfect for some chillout time. So they just got lucky.
Another point would be the Battle of Jutland. Again it appeared the british knew exactly what the germans where planning. Was it possible that they had broken the german naval code? Simple answer from the german side: No, because if they had they would have destroyed the entire High Seas Fleet on the morning of June 1st. Scheer had radioed his intentions to head for Horns Reef, but the Grand Fleet failed to cut him off. So clearly they didn't know. Actually the british had cracked the code, but they mishandled the information so badly that it made no impact.
A more serious point is the U-Boat campaign of WW2 because here it weren't single incidents but more then enough indicators that the germans actually accepted that the radio messages must be the problem. But they assumed the britished hadn't cracked the code but were locating the senders by radio-direction finding. They actually tried to test that theory by isolating a part of their staff and handing them only the data they thought the british could obtain via RDF. The officers were to try to track the movement of the wolfpacks and as it turned out they could with sufficent accuracy to allow for convoys to evade. As a result the germans now focused on shortening their radio messages to make RDF impossible (they failed). I find this actually interesting because it means that even if the allies had not cracked the codes it might not have changed much.
@@gildor8866 But the British weren't very good at concealing their countermoves against German U-Boats. Proper analysis of British counterattacks in 1941 would have likely revealed the breaking of German Enigma and Hydra codes. But the Abwehr and other German intelligence agencies were not very good at analysis work, a consequence of German military culture's concentration upon Operational and Theater level staff officers doing all of the intelligence reviews. This decentralized almost all analysis work, while leaving no method or system for communication between these isolated tactical and strategic islands. Individual officers could discern individual vulnerabilities, but no system existed for their feedback, and there was no system to collate Individual insight into a complete picture. This is part of the reason why there were so many operational failures due to faulty intelligence.
U-boat commanders could see Royal Navy ships showing up way too many times in the wrong place to be coincidental. And the ability of the Allies to repeatedly surprise German commanders (Sicily, Normandy and Operation Bagration) demonstrated a rigid fixation upon WAG assumptions about Allied capabilities, while ignoring and discouraging objections to that orthodoxy. Axis commanders KNEW Normandy was the weak link in the Atlantic Wall, but remained fixated upon Pas-de-Calais. Army Group Center was the weakest of all the German AGs in the USSR in June 1944, and yet German commanders assumed that the Soviet were going to attack the strongest part of their line in Ukraine. The Germans practically invented the whole "military intelligence is an oxymoron" trope.
It is as though they were paranoid about HUMINT (human intelligence) when they should have been paranoid about SIGINT (signals intelligence).
@@petergray7576 I agree that germans commanders lacked flexibility once they had set on an assumed course of action they expected the enemy to take. Pas de Calais was the best place for the invasion due to the shortest distance to britain which eased logistics and air-support. So they decided thats where the allies were going to land and focused their efforts there to the detriment of other places. Actually Normandy wasn't the weak link, the Bretagne was even less defended, but then it was even further away from Britain. Same wit Russia in 1944: it wasn't that the germans expected the russians to attack in the south despite Army Group Center being the weakest AG, it was the weakest AG because the germans expected the russians to attack in the south and distributed their strengths accordingly. It appears the upper echelons had little regard for the enemy daring to adapt to their preparations
At 13:10, a fly flew across your bow Indy from port to starboard.
Indie needs a fly swatter in the shape of a P38 lightening to deal with these bandits.
It returned at 15:16 🪰
@@danw9464 Mission completed!😆
3 days until Citadel, 8 days until Husky, 10 days until Prokhorovka... this is gonna be one hell of a month
I'm really glad that there's Polish flag behind Indy now. Thank you for this.
🇵🇱
That bit at the end shows why the Western Allies could pull something like Husky off. You had coordination, numbers and sufficient skill and efficiency from everyone in these service areas, in other words, the operational level. This is something WWII historian James Holland talks about a lot in his books (also wrote one on Sicily). The Allies had decent armies, control of the skies and the seas at this point which were essential for something like Husky succeeding. On the Axis side, only Japan had this potential but the Army and Navy viewed each other as rivals rather than partners, costing them dearly. It’s the reason why Germany failed to win the war outright in 1940 as they were too land centric and threw far more into their army, than their other services.
well to be fair germany was limited by versai treaty especially in regards to naval armament.
@@vule92994 It did not stop them to build big and new battleships like Bismarck or Tirpitz or scores of U-Boats much later. The potential to develop German Navy was wasted because German naval commanders like Raeder were old school classic heavy surface battleship types in the expense of amphibious operations or air / sea coordination and priorty of resources before the war were diverted to develop and enlarge German Army and Luftwaffe first. German Navy had been Cinderella Service
The German navy 1940 was no match for the British. Aslo the fall of France was quick so no real perparations had been made for a quick follow up invasion of Britain anyway.
As you said no focus on the sea or .. long range fighter aircraft even.
It's no surprise the German army was "land centric". Before the war, they had never planned on invading Britain or even fighting in the Mediterranean.
I have to disagree; what you call the operational level. The Western Allies almost never achieved significant operational victories, if they had, the war would have been over much faster.
The Allies could coordinate land, air and naval assets in an impressive and overpowering way, but that isn't the so called operational level, that's combined arms warfare.
Sure combined arms is a prerequisite for operational success, but operations in ww2 is military action at corps-level and above.
Allied operations are thoroughly planned and executed but rarely achieve major victories by themselves or have the flexibility to take full advantage of motorised maneuver forces.
El-Alamein was a classic set-piece battle with exact planning and huge barrages, but it did not destroy Rommel, it merely unhinged his line and forced a retreat.
Tunisia saw protracted combat against inferior forces where allied forces couldn't exploit breakthroughs until the end.
Normandie turned into a slug, and only operation cobra seems to be an actual true operational level victory where divisions, corps and armies were coordinated to full effect.
The Soviets learned the bloody way, even though they had a solid theoretical basis, and were the only ones to rival the german mastery of the operational art.
Neither the UK nor the US did ever achieve anything comparable to Bagration or the following leaping offensives throug Poland.
The Germans lost in 1940 because Britain didn't capitulate (thank you) and not because they ficused on the Army. No amount of investment in the navy would have made sealion possible and the Luftwaffe already recieved a larger share of german industry than the Army.
Final High school exam this Monday but I won't lose the episode no Matter what, thanks for the dedication you all put in these episodes!
Pietro Good luck on your exam my friend. Focus on that, watch the show afterwards!!
Just wanted to say I've been following this series since the beginning. And it's still one of the best documentary series I've ever watched
Not only is it incredibly detailed and well written, but you guys seem to have so much fun doing it 🤣
Loving the Churchill sponsor video 🤣 and I saw Indy in the unkillable soldier music video, you looked like you were having so much fun 🤣
Xtreme Techer Thank you for your dedicated support. We're glad to have so many wonderful people such as yourself in our audience, so we can help keep the memory of this time alive. Stay tuned
Benefit of being born in June, all the major offensives start in my birth month.
Jack Thanks for making the month of June less offensive with your birth & presence!
Hopefully you're not a wehraboo
Well I was born on 22 of June...
well, my Mothers Father was born June 11, 1914, (two weeks before the Archduke & his wife were assassinated in Sarajevo), His Daughter, (my Mother), was born June 23, 1941, (the day after 'barbarossa' was launched), & I was born June 13, 1959. the three of us used to celebrate one birthday, together.
@@stanbrekston dodged a bullet...unlike the archduke
Thanks for adding Miles when showing distance between to points..
great to see another episode. even if i feel depressed or alone, this series goes on like life. its almost cheers one up to see this series every Saturday. so much death, and carnage, heroic deeds and people working hard, in a strange way i feel sublime and warmth watching this series. its always fun to see all the little details in day by day history. i have a feeling every comment gets read, i'm not looking for pity or a reply, i just wanted to leave a comment, for a wonderful series and great youtube channel. carry on
Gothicc senpai I'm very glad that our series can provide you come comfort in those rougher times. Life is not easy, and it's this simple shared humanity we share that we strive to highlight in our episodes. Thank you for joining us so diligently & as John Prine would say, I wish you all the best.
This was my dad's war. Solomon Island's MARINE. It's nostalgia. ❤❤
@@KoolT i hope he's ok, this was no ordinary war. stay blessed and semper fi
I love it when people manage to accidentally coordinate all the important events of the year in July.
And I missed the premiere... because I was watching the unlisted from Patreon. Damn my eyes.
Appreciated the comparison between Operations Husky & Overlord. Underlines the skill of the Allies & makes a mockery of Nazi boasts of their competence & efficiency when one reflects on their flailing with Operation Sealion.
I totally agree. In these series the team has put a lot of effort to bust the muth that Nazi commanders were super tactical minds and organisational genius. The only channel that has up so much effort for that is the Armchair Historian.
And with Operation Bagration coming next year, not only is that myth going to be further disproven, but we will also see some of the best tactical and strategical Soviet victories of the entire war.
It has far less to do with fighting skills and much more so about resources, logistics and intelligence services.
Up to this point I always thought the force used in Husky was about half that landed at Normandy, but now I realize the true magnitude of this operation. What an incredible feat to assemble, transport, land and supply all those men and equipment with less preparation than Overlord!
Kudos to you guys and the TimeGhost Army for making this awesome series possible.
jerry Thank you for your kind words. Our team works hard but we couldn't do it without the support of the TimeGhost Army! Tell your friends! www.patreon.com/join/timeghosthistory
Man these next few weeks are gonna big in terms of battlefield coverage. Citadel and Husky? Occurring virtually simultaneously? That’s never really dawned on me till now.
Really hyped for next week.
Stay tuned for it & stay hyped
Hands down this is my favourite channel on RUclips and I think one of the bests or even the beat channel. Years of years of amazing content! I happy that I can support this channel via timeghost
We can't thank you enough for your support! WE couldn't do it without you in the TimeGhost Army
By coincidence I just watch your video about june 1916 of the great war before watching this one and 0:18 really got me.
The Year of Battles. Another great series of tragedies. Never forget
Another brilliant episode! My grandfather served in the 1st marine division and he was at Guadalcanal and New Georgia. When you showed the footage of the jungle I can't imagine trying to hike through that. Keep up the great work!
Thanks Thomas! I appreciate you sharing a bit about your grandfather's service in the Pacific. That must have been unbelievably difficult.
1st Marine Division let's go
Thanks for the suggestion about turning the video off before getting future knowledge. Obviously we all pretty much know what's going to happen in general terms, but learning the details week by week has been very enjoyable, so thanks for the opportunity to keep it that way.
Thanks nickzilla, we appreciate your feedback. And your commitment to the timeline! Stay tuned
Not to mention that the planning staff for Overlord had the benefit of the lessons learned from Husky. And Torch for that matter.
These Torch , Husky , Avalanche , landing onSalerno (and Gallipoli 30 years before ) were all trial and learn lessons /coursres that Allies used to perfect amphibious operations
Your ending segment about Husky was an excellent idea !
Thank you, glad you liked it!
Would have been so cool a special episode directly from Sicily, plus it is very nice there in July😌
Manuel This intern volunteers to go!
I'm thinking that the matter is finally put to rest... the HUSKY landing was bigger than the NORMANDY landing . Ever since I first read that fact in a TIME/LIFE BOOK : THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN WW2 , when I was a teenager... I've searched for a definitive answer . I was a believer in the data of 175,000 allied troops being landed for HUSKY , while 156,000 went ashore on June 6,1944 but I've kept running into sources stating that NORMANDY, held all the records for amphibious landings. I'm going to stand with you as my final reputable historical source that has finally given me the undeniable facts. Thank you for all the meticulous research that is done by this channel and the other affiliated channels/videos . You guys are so professional . These videos are important in highlighting the facts of the most devastating, destructive war in human history... but also teaches us to NEVER FORGET. NEVER REPEAT THE MADNESS. I love you guys and your great videos . Thanks, again.
Genaro You flatter us. It's truly only with the support of viewers like you & the TimeGhost Army that we're able to produce this series to follow this immense war. Thank you for watching & please stay tuned
12:52 "if you don't want to see the results, look away now!"
Thanks!
Thanks for watching, Leo!
You folks need to do a special episode on the air war in the South Pacific, where more Allied planes were lost to "operational losses" than to enemy action. Prior to the war, if a pilot was sick with malaria, he was banned from flying until he had two years without symptoms. Needless to say, that went out the window. The navigational instruments consisted of a pencil, a wristwatch, a map, slide rule and the compass. So many of these men flew over the sea, never to be seen again. Planes slammed into the mountains of PNG in the fog. Substandard air bases, bad food, humid weather and no leave like their compatriots in Europe.
@Charles Burnham That's not a bad idea for a topic we could dive a little deeper in to! I will jot it down for future consideration
THANK YOU FOR A WONDERFUL AND FACTUAL SHOW....WELL DONE INDY AND TEAM...
Thank you, duckncover
You delivered a fine video Indy. I loved it.
Thanks for watching, BB
@@WorldWarTwo---Your welcome
That side-by-side image of Indy and Konstantin Rokossovsky makes them look like long lost brothers.
🤔
Congratulations on +750K subscribers! Time gosht army, you deserve this and more.
Never forget!
I've started taking notice of this when they were at 617k.
THANK YOU!! We couldn't do it without you
@@WorldWarTwo ❤️
@@stanbrekston I started in 1916 (2016). When Indy was doing WW1.
Wow, it does sound like Operation Husky needs more recognition on just how complex it was. This is exactly why this channel's amazing and the best documentary series ever made.
Thank you, my Scholarly friend.
Great job prepping us for the Sicilian campaign, gang. And I've been looking forward to your coverage of the post-Guadalcanal Solomons campaign, since that's also been an under-appreciated slice of the South Pacific side of the war.
Yeshead Thank you for watching, glad you enjoyed it & stay tuned for even more coverage from the Pacific
Just a heads up, at 8:19 the mention of Mannstein leaving the USSR, the date on the top left of the picture reads "June, 943"
I have to thank you guys for your efforts. I learn so much about the war in the Pacific. Admittedly, my main focus when studying WW2 has been on the European Theater and the Eastern Front. Your videos had been a great source of knowledge in the Pacific theater.
Thank you for watching, Jay
Let the grind of island hopping begin
I wonder how long it will take
Cheers to the TimeGhost!
You , sir , are a great storyteller
Thanks for watching, sparkplug. Be sure to check out all our episodes, and subscribe to see more each week!
Just another excellent, thoughtful episode from the best channel on RUclips. Thank you as always.
Thank you WE Kurtz. You're the best audience on RUclips
It’s still surreal how close these major operations are too each other
One of the great things about our chronological format is the perspective it allows us in covering the whole globe. We can see these immense operations ramping up concurrently, and it helps give some sense of the relative forces involved.
We need a supercut of Indy saying "Ehhhhhh?!!?!?" into the phone in the opening second of every video
The invasion of Sicily was a massive feat and always gets overlooked.
Interesting point about Sicily, I had no idea it was such a large effort.
Yay a new episode! KBO
Quote at around 5:30 said "damp ill slopes" instead of "damp hill slopes". 8:24 (date banner should say "1943" not "943".
I had no idea that Husky involved more men than Overlord.
Thank you for this.
☮
That's probably the largest officer expansion I've seen for the Time Ghost Army in quite some time.
We are elated! The level of support from this community is humbling and staggering. Combined with the fantastic respectful discussions, this makes the TimeGhost Army the best audience in the world.
Into context is truly the next step, applying history to present situations.
Thank you for watching
I say it every week, brilliant narration 😀
Thank you for watching every week, Jason. Stay tuned
The june 1916 joke really got me i'm not gonna lie lmao
"It was Zhukov's challenge to overwhelm him with simultaneous thrusts."
Kinda like that SNL sketch where Patrick Swayze and Chris Farley compete to become Chippendales dancers.
My great uncle died in New Georgia
Thank you for sharing about him, Bill. May he rest in peace.
Thank you for educating me about Operation Husky vs Operation Neptune
Thank you for watching & helping us remember this history
Oooh, June 1916, Brusilov, Isonzo (Insert Cadorna vs Hötzendorf here, the greatest generals of the Central powers and Entente respectively), Verdun, the Somme, the Salonika Front, and the Libyan front?
The month the war turned hellish
Armchair Historian had a video on the battles of the Izonzo. Nice refresher and summary from the Great War coverage by Indy.
Not to decry Stephen Ambrose, but I think you did an excellent job with this episode and the way you talked about Husky. While Stephen made some great books, they would have you think that there was no major war before D-Day.
Thank you for watching.
Indy's hilarious Churchill impression is surely worth a few bob a month
Yes SteelZenith! Tell your friends! www.patreon.com/join/timeghosthistory
So happy it's coming early today !
the fly is the mvp of this episode
I really appreciate the coverage you're giving Operation Husky, especially the comparison between Husky and Overlord. I'm also looking forward to seeing your comparison between Operation Husky (with the limited timeframe to plan, prepare, and ship the men and materiel) and Operation Market-Garden, which had a similar limited timeframe to plan, etc. and turned into a debacle. Now I'm wondering if Monty got it in his head that if he could do it and succeed in Husky he could do it and succeed in Market-Garden.
I'm also looking forward to your coverage of Operation Dragoon, the Allied invasion of southern France. I remember asking a historian at the US Army War College, if Overlord had failed, would we have gone ahead with Dragoon? His answer was emphatically "Yes!" and that even if Overlord failed, Dragoon would have succeeded in opening a second front with the Germans, just on France's southern coast instead of the Normandy coast.
Jim Thanks for watching, please stay tuned for all that coverage going forward.
Only one amphibious assault during the Second World War was ever defeated on the beaches, and that was the first Japanese attempt to storm Wake Island, arrogantly conducted without adequate air support. The second attempt, which included greater naval support and air power, ultimately succeeded, albeit after high casualties from a ferocious but ultimately doomed defense of the island.
On that note the odds are probably in favor of that historian's assessment of Dragoon going ahead anyway & succeeding being correct. Air and naval superiority are nearly impossible for a defending force to adequately counter and the establishment of a beachhead, so long as the operation is planned and executed competently, is almost assured.
@@lycaonpictus9662 Anzio landings , Operation Shingle , was also initially a disappointment ended up with an isolated tied up beachead for four months between January - May 1944 till it was was relieved and reunited with Allied advance from south after Allies won Fourth Battle of Cassino and advanced into Liri valley
Growing up this what schools taught me about WW2. Poland 1939, France 1940, Battle of Britain, mentions of Atlantic war, Pearl Harbor, Normandy 1944, Battle of the Bulge, mention of Yalta conference, Iwo Jima and Okinawa and finally Hiroshima and Nagasaki. All talked about in less than 20 pages.
Another great episode, thank all of you and keep up the good work
Thank you for your very kind words Joshua. Stay tuned for more every week my friend
So it begins.
Stay tuned for all of it. Thanks for watching, Hannah
What do operations Cartwheel, Husky, and Citadel have in common?
They all sound like rejected names for fancy cat toys, but instead, they were just purrfectly planned military maneuvers! 🐱💥
On 21 June 1943 the army, navy, and air force staffs convened a series of meetings for the presentation of plans for Operation HUSKY , invasion of Sicily. These meetings are the source of much consternation among both historians and army and naval commanders. Patton in particular was concerned with the absence of specific support commitments for the assault forces. At a 22 June intelligence briefing the air forces noted that the level of fighter support for the assaults would depend upon the scale of enemy opposition in the air. The Western Task Force’s after action report references similar complaints. More specifically, Admiral Henry K. Hewitt was disappointed that the ranking air officer with the task force was not empowered to order air strength into the assault area. He could only request air support through a target committee in North Africa that needed 12 hours’ notice to approve and organize the mission. The US Navy’s official historian notes that Spaatz, the NAAF commander and ranking USAAF officer in theater, refused a request for an officer with this authority subsequent to rejecting another request for Hewitt himself to have authority over some air power. While Eisenhower later defended the air force plan on the grounds that it needed to remain flexible against a fleeting target, US Navy historian Samuel E. Morison is adamant that the true culprit was an air force doctrine of non-cooperation.
American historian Carlo D’Este lamented that the air forces remained focused on air superiority despite the excellent close air support example pioneered by the Desert Air Force in North Africa. The Tactical Air Force would remain uncommitted so that it could be used to support the Strategic Air Force in its battle against Axis air strength. Tedder’s plan structured the air force’s battle in three phases. Phase I encompassed a series of preparatory operations meant to shape the battlespace for the landings. It placed heavy emphasis on the neutralization of Axis air power by targeting aerodromes. It also targeted enemy lines of communication to and from Sicily, while dispersing these efforts to Sardinia and the mainland in an effort to disguise the intending Allied objective.
Phase I would see the final stages of the development of Malta and Gozo as offensive bases for the Allied air forces. Furthermore, the Allies would take and establish air bases on the Italian islands of Pantelleria and Lampedusa to supplement their efforts to support HUSKY. Phase II concerned the assault itself. Axis aerodromes remained as the primary bomber effort. Secondarily, bombers would work to prevent the island’s reinforcement and/or eastward movement of Axis formations on the island. Fighters based at Malta, Gozo, and Pantelleria would provide air cover the landing areas. Phase III focused on the buildup of Allied air power on Sicily alongside efforts to support the island’s reduction. It included the movement of the Tactical Air Force’s fighter squadrons to Sicily and the activation of its commands ashore. The tactical bomber force would move to Malta from North Africa and operate from there until space was available on Sicilian airfields.
In general, bomber operations were to continue attacks on enemy airfields, prevent enemy movement on the island, prevent Axis reinforcement through Palermo or Messina, and provide direct support to the ground forces.
Eagles over Husky - Alexander Fitzgerald-Black
The problem that US Army and US Navy commanders - and historians - had with Tedder’s plan was its continued focus on the Axis air forces as a primary objective. Tedder did little to cater to their desire for information on what support they should expect during the landings. Which targets should the army expect the air force to strike and when? Tedder’s attitude was for the army to “tell us what you want and we’ll do it in our own way.” One US Army general described Tedder’s plan as “a most masterful piece of uninformed prevarication, totally unrelated to the Naval and Military Joint Plan.” Montgomery’s biographer, Nigel Hamilton, went as far as to charge Tedder (and Admiral Cunningham) with sabotaging direct support to the army.
Tedder had sound military reasons though for his decision to focus on air superiority in all three phases. He wanted to maintain flexibility for his air forces to respond to the weight of enemy activity in accordance with the doctrine he and Coningham had developed in the desert. Tedder's fault was not in unsound military thinking, but rather in his failure to provide the army and navy with anything more than “lofty assurances,” as Coningham’s biographer notes. This perpetuated the mistrust later resulting in the army and navy’s criticism of the air force plan.
If Montgomery’s biographer found Tedder guilty of sabotage, the situation was quite different for the British general Montgomery himself commanding Eighth Army for landing south of Sicily, who had what was possibly the most nuanced understanding of air force cooperation among his army peers. If he was disappointed with the air force’s plan he seems to have quickly remedied this by requesting that Eighth Army have on call air support to block enemy movement in the vicinity of Avola. Air commanders agreed to add three Desert Air Force Kittyhawk squadrons to Malta’s already crowded airfields to meet this requirement. In essence, Montgomery understood the present doctrine adhered to by Coningham and Tedder. This doctrine prioritized air support as follows: air superiority, air interdiction, and close air support. Montgomery understood from his experience in North Africa that the best targets for fighter-bombers were soft-skinned vehicles and that perhaps the best contribution these assets could make was in delaying enemy reinforcement and resupply of the front. He also understood that air superiority must have priority. In his last minute notes on how the battle must go Montgomery noted that the air force still had an air battle to win, meaning that his army was not going to receive “El-Hamma type air support. this time” (when Eighth Army under his command burst through Tebega Gap , cut through El Hamma and Gabes road and overflanked then captured Mareth Line during Operation Supercharge II in March 1943 thanks to excellent tactical air to ground support of Desert Air Force) This attitude was likely based on communications and established relationships with air commanders, including Tedder who, as we will see in the next chapter, was concerned about the lack of enemy air activity in the days before the invasion.
Much like the wider operational planning that went before it, although the air force plan was not to everyone’s liking, it proved effective. Perhaps more importantly, it was aligned with the Allied strategy for the Mediterranean and the Combined Bomber Offensive outlined at Casablanca and beyond.
Eagles over Husky - Alexander Fitzgerald-Black
Happy Canada weekend!
🇨🇦
Another great video. Thanks.
Thank you Lewis
Romenian dictator Antonescau visited Mussolini in Venice in 29 June 1943 for four days and inquired Mussolini to be "Man of Munich" again (acquire image of middle man of peace just like in Munich Conferance in 1938) and get a seperate peace from Allies , emphasing worsening strategic position of Germany in every front , unfortunetely Mussolini first seemed to agree then vaccilated then forgotten that instead got into trivalities , six days later Allies landed Sicily
That fly could not get enough of Indy.
The problem that US Army and US Navy commanders - and historians - had with Tedder’s plan was its continued focus on the Axis air forces as a primary objective. Tedder did little to cater to their desire for information on what support they should expect during the landings. Which targets should the army expect the air force to strike and when? Tedder’s attitude was for the army to “tell us what you want and we’ll do it in our own way.” One US Army general described Tedder’s plan as “a most masterful piece of uninformed prevarication, totally unrelated to the Naval and Military Joint Plan.” Montgomery’s biographer, Nigel Hamilton, went as far as to charge Tedder (and Admiral Cunningham) with sabotaging direct support to the army.
Tedder had sound military reasons though for his decision to focus on air superiority in all three phases. He wanted to maintain flexibility for his air forces to respond to the weight of enemy activity in accordance with the doctrine he and Coningham had developed in the desert. Tedder's fault was not in unsound military thinking, but rather in his failure to provide the army and navy with anything more than “lofty assurances,” as Coningham’s biographer notes. This perpetuated the mistrust later resulting in the army and navy’s criticism of the air force plan.
If Montgomery’s biographer found Tedder guilty of sabotage, the situation was quite different for the British general Montgomery himself commanding Eighth Army for landing south of Sicily, who had what was possibly the most nuanced understanding of air force cooperation among his army peers. If he was disappointed with the air force’s plan he seems to have quickly remedied this by requesting that Eighth Army have on call air support to block enemy movement in the vicinity of Avola. Air commanders agreed to add three Desert Air Force Kittyhawk squadrons to Malta’s already crowded airfields to meet this requirement. In essence, Montgomery understood the present doctrine adhered to by Coningham and Tedder. This doctrine prioritized air support as follows: air superiority, air interdiction, and close air support. Montgomery understood from his experience in North Africa that the best targets for fighter-bombers were soft-skinned vehicles and that perhaps the best contribution these assets could make was in delaying enemy reinforcement and resupply of the front. He also understood that air superiority must have priority. In his last minute notes on how the battle must go Montgomery noted that the air force still had an air battle to win, meaning that his army was not going to receive “El-Hamma type air support. this time” (when Eighth Army under his command burst through Tebega Gap , cut through El Hamma and Gabes road and overflanked then captured Mareth Line during Operation Supercharge II in March 1943 thanks to excellent tactical air to ground support of Desert Air Force) This attitude was likely based on communications and established relationships with air commanders, including Tedder who, as we will see in the next chapter, was concerned about the lack of enemy air activity in the days before the invasion.
Much like the wider operational planning that went before it, although the air force plan was not to everyone’s liking, it proved effective. Perhaps more importantly, it was aligned with the Allied strategy for the Mediterranean and the Combined Bomber Offensive outlined at Casablanca and beyond.
Eagles over Husky - Alexander Fitzgerald-Black
The Winston Churchill impression is good and funny
Thanks Uzoma, glad you enjoy it
As always, another great episode!!! Thank you!!! 👍👍
Thank you for watching as always, Riki!
Loving the TGA sponsors
Thanks Samuel. It's only with their sponsorship that this channel is able to maintain our high production standards. Stay tuned for more
Love this channel. Great job everyone! Wow. Love yii oh ur show.
Kawy Thowy We love you too. Thank you for watching
13:10 A german scout plane sneaks past indy to relay vital information about Operation Husky
My grandfather fought in Italy. Unfortunately I don't know much about his experiences there.
the Allies sinking their own ship and still being victorious! That's the spirit!
Great "Husky/Overlord" comparison!!
Thank you!
Wow, did not know that about Husky, so Italy was sidefront but still perky !
Hi Indy
Another wonderfull week.
Especially operation husky statistics is huge..
Nightmare for logistics. But some how they managed it.
Awaiting for next week.
Thanks..
NAVEEN RAJ Thank you for your loyal viewership. See you next time
I didn't know Antonescu was thinking of bailing out of the Axis as early as summer 1943.
Graphics look great. Like the ship moving on the map. 👍
Thanks Evil Spock 🖖
Enlisted has an upcoming map which is New Georgia ❤. Thanks for the vid : D
" How often do they get alright?"
That joke made my day Mr. Neidell, thanks for that:)))
Thanks for watching, Anatoly
@@WorldWarTwo Your videos are actually are an activity of life to me. And also, this episode came out at a time when I was literally upset and broke, so Mr. Neidell literally came to my aid.
Thanks for your videos, if my monetary issues improve, I promise to join TimeGhost Army and fund you in Patreon.
Anatoly I hope you're doing well my friend, and I'm very glad to hear this channel could be of some help & stability for you. Take care.
My father flew missions for the RAF over Sicily and Italy in support of Husky.
Nicholas Thank you for sharing about him. Do you know what he flew?
@@WorldWarTwo I think by this time of the war he was a navigator/bombardier flying in Bostons (A-20). He started off as a navigator/bombardier in Blenheim IVs in 1941. I believe his squadron transitioned to Wellingtons sometime in 1942, and he was the navigator on one of those on the first night of El Alamein. The squadron then transitioned to Bostons, which he was flying for the remainder of his time in service (until mustered out in late 1943 or early 1944 due to illness). I might still have his log book or service record somewhere in my files, but I have never made an effort to locate it.
That's great information. If you do have his log book, there are veterans groups that would be interested in it. Possibly his unit's historical society or VFA office would be a good place to check.
Maybe I'm crazy but that was the funniest phone call intro from Indy 😂
Husky walked so Normandy can run