Open Order Revolution - Infantry
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- Опубликовано: 28 сен 2024
- Between the Crimean War and the First World War there was a major transformation in infantry tactics, namely the change from closed order formation for the regular infantry to an open order. This video gives a general insight into open order vs. closed order, which is usually not really covered directly.
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» SOURCES «
English, John A.; Gudmundsson, Bruce I.; On Infantry. The Military Profession. Revised Edition. Praeger: Westport, Connecticut, 1994
Knox, MacGegor (ed.); Murry, Williamson: The dynamics of military revolution. 1300-2050. Cambridge University Press: New York, 2003.
Searle, Alaric (Ed.): Genesis, Employment, Aftermath: First World War Tanks and the New Warfare, 1900-1945. Helion & Company Limited: Solihull, UK (2015)
Linnenkohl, Hans: Vom Einzelschuss zur Feuerwalze. Der Wettlauf zwischen Technik und Taktik im Ersten Weltkrieg. Bernard & Graefe Verlag: Koblenz, 1990.
Nosworthy, Brent: Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies. Constable: London, UK, 1997.
Hughes, B. P.: Firepower - Weapon Effectiveness on the Battlefield, 1630-1850. Sarpedon: New York, 1974 (1997)
Ortenburg, Georg: Waffen der Einigungskriege 1848-1871. Bechtermünz: Augsburg, 1990 (2005)
Ortenburg, Georg: Waffen der Millionenheere 1871.1914. Bechtermünz: Augsburg, 1992 (2005)
» CREDITS & SPECIAL THX «
Song: Ethan Meixsell - Demilitarized Zone
#MilitaryHistory #infantry #OpenOrder
About 1870, my comments are based on this article from Showalter, particularly this passage:
"At Wörth a single charge cost more men than the entire army had lost at Königgrätz. At St. Privat the Prussian Guard suffered 30 percent casualties in an advance in columns up an open hillside - the longest mile in the Guard's history. But Prussian officers learned swiftly. Mass and élan gave way to flexible formations supported with concentrated artillery fire.” (Showalter, Dennis E.: The Prusso-German RMA, 1840-1841. In: Knox, MacGegor (ed.); Murray, Williamson: The dynamics of military revolution. 1300-2050. Cambridge University Press: New York, 2003. p. 112)
Yet, one of my Patreon supporters, who is very well read on the Franco-Prussian War (1870/71) pointed out that this might not be the best example, see his answer to this comment for more information.
Why is this 1 day ago ?
@Golden Patreon's get early access.
Patreons
It makes me wonder why the machine gun wasn't better realized in WW1, if there were men like Rudyard Kipling, talking about how "We have the maxim gun, and they do not."
According to what I know, battle of Königgrätz was lost for Austria because of wrong tactics. Austrians had Lorenz rifles, which were more accurate and had longer range, but because of older Stosstactics they only fired few times and then charged.
11:30 Since back when Thebes figured out how to beat the Spartans, armies had tried to mass infantry an a crucial point and overwhelm the enemy. This was the specialty of Napoleon's Guards. But this only worked because the infantry formations were only at risk from artillery until they closed to very short distances with the enemy. By the 1860s infantry formations would take heavy casualties from opposing infantry while still over 100 meters away. It was the loss of this SAFE maneuver area that FORCED armies to adopt a more open formation.
The battlefield is increasingly becoming more and more empty. The more the weapons lethality increases, the more the forces need to be dispersed and victory needs to be achieved by concentrated fire on the right place. The frontages of units steadily increased in this period after centuries where the footprint on the ground was always the same. Most important revolution of the modern age in military operations.
@Northfield Stradford True a lot changed but in my opinion the most impactfull event was that units on a geographic map started to occupy a space rather than being a point on the map. The whole nature of maneuvering the units on the field changed. If you go to my channel and look for the history of the division series, I cover this.
There are many trends at play here.
A division is expected to cover a broader part of the front now than in the past, and it is perhaps possible now when firepower have increased so much. And the amount of lead flying in the air is increasing constantly. But at the same time it gets harder and harder to kill an enemy. On average did it take 400 shots to hit an enemy during Napoleons days. 20.000 during the Manchurian wars, 200.000 during WWII, and 600.000 rounds per killed enemy solidier in Vietnam. The battle ranges is also decreasing as the enemy tries to get closer to their enemy so he will not try to kill him with superior firepower from artillery or air power out of risk of hitting their own troops - as in Vietnam.
@Northfield Stradford ye totally right the valour and individual virtue gone completely,
along with the industrialization of society
and torn from their roots desperate enclosured millions into the bottomless machine maw of fledgling corporate capitalism in peace, or the trenches at war (lining the same pockets) from flamboyant fighters to colorless grey collar operator-crew of the death&ruin factory... at least in even in the darkest feudalism only the 1% of society, even tho they were posessing all wealth, were doing all this to themselves only, look how many still buy today how nationalism, that to them only ever meant grinding entire people down to stubs (who would fill it with new meaning? definetely not the enclosured factory worker) and the late 1700s revolutions actually weren't a maso(ret)nic construct, but the revival of archaic white values...
Yup, the Spanish Square used to dominate until increasingly deadly artillery forced it into being obsolete.
communications technology as well. Very necessary when combined with concealment and cover against the weapon systems developed.
The reason for close order in the Napoleonic age was to resist a cavalry charge partly by means of firepower, but mainly by the mass of a solid formation of men with bayonets often in a square formation. The cavalry could not penetrate the close order formation. Open order troops were simply ridden down by cavalry and were restricted to operating in cover or near close order troops that could defend them from cavalry.
As firepower increased in rate of fire, accuracy and range through the 19th Century so close order infantry became far more vulnerable. So infantry was eventually forced to deploy in open order and started using cover more and eventually started digging trenches. At the same time the increased firepower also reduced the threat from cavalry which could be driven off much more easily even by firepower.
Open order worked with a few small units in the Napoleonic era because they were nearby large closed order infantry blocks. More importantly the closed order infantry were necessary to protect artillery from calvary.
Not just cavalry but even just massed infantry bayonet charges.
@@MBKill3rCat If you are a skirmisher and face a mass bayonet charge, you can probably outrun them better than you can outrun a horse, so I don't think mass bayonets force a musket using unit to close up.
@@alex_zetsu @Alex Zetsu This thread isn't just about skirmishers. In the case of skirmishers, yes, they can usually withdraw when threatened with a bayonet charge.
6:40 "the stripper clip was introduced" The detachable box magazine and the en-bloc clip were both invented (by Lee and Mannlicher respectively) before the stripper clip.
yeah, my mistake.
I think he meant "magazines" in general
I was just wondering about this the other day.
I came to the conclusion than the scale(area) of battle depends on the reliable range of the common soldier.
Once the melee weapons were the best and most reliable thing available so the battlefields, and the area of combat was small. As archers etc ere not as easy to train and find.
And then as the range of reliable weaponry increased. The area of battle field also increased. And the theaters of operations spread out. But the tactics still remained roughly the same.
Except the medieval and later fortifications proves that can't be the case. You had castles that controlled entire regions.
"You had a very strong grip on your man..." Niiiicee
Just a clarification for everyone that's wondering: 'shooting together' is a Germanism (jmnd. zusammenschießen) which means to gun them down. Sorry, sometimes our German->English skills aren't the yellow from the egg.
when did I said that?
cause I usually don't use the phrase "zusammenschießen" as such it would make little sense to translate it. I guess I actually meant that units/troops were shooting together, but errors occasionally happen, would be great to know.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized so you where thinking more of something like volley fire or coordinated fire?
My favourite broken translation of a related German saying is the weirdly ubiquitous "Hello together!", mistranslated from "Hallo zusammen!" (hello everyone). I keep both seeing and hearing this almost daily when talking with German clients, who are otherwise perfectly fluent in English. It is so pervasive that in some German-headquartered companies, even the non-German speakers use it extensively.
I would need the time-stamp, cause I am not going to rewatch the whole video.
For a second there I thought your video read 'open border revolution'
I actually heard myself several times say "open border" during the editing. I am all for open order, yet, not for open border.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized based and redpilled
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized we gotta found the Open Order society and save the civilized word from this unchivalric digital hybrid-war-cradlekampf zeitgest, once even arbalests/crossbows were banned by the clergy for being 'unchristian', and what do we have now, psyops deathrays and weatherweapons, from fancy uniforms now dressed in mud, as the females of the birds, not even having to see the enemy to kill it, just press a button on a smoking mirror... my ideal is the (ironically) less-to-non lethal martial culture of the precolumbian mesoamericas! cheers&beers C['''''''']
Unfair! The title is Open Order Revolution, but the thumbnail shows an EVOLUTION to open order. How can I properly troll when you mislead me like that? lol
8:12 Interesting point about the machine gun. Hadn't considered that.
Great video! I would like to check further in that subject.
You mentioned Machine Guns and that wasn't the main purpose of the video, but I feel like I should mention another reason officers thought they had "enough" firepower might be because the Mitrailleuse didn't perform so well in the Franco Prussian war, so why waste all the ammo when it doesn't even deliver? I think the main problem might have been horizontal traverse of the gun was limited. What good is fire power if you can't even aim it without moving a giant carriage? Of course, I guess someone could say "Sure the Marder III was powerful, but it had a high silhouette and it doesn't even have a turret. What good is it if to aim you have to reposition the entire vehicle?" so high firepower little traversal might be viable, but it is a strike against the Mitrailleuse. And if the officers post war looked back at the Mitrailleuse's performance, it sure seems like the extra firepower isn't needed.
Why didn't they use more small mortars? They are far easier to built than precision rifles and can deal quite some area effect either through shrapnel or smoke (burning eyes, difficulty breathing).
I can't see how closed formations survived as a concept that long.
I think that inaccuaracy of muskets reqiers formation, after napoleonic era, lack of large scale wars, probably made it so there was no practical improvement
@@simeonnovkov7921 I get that, but wouldn´t it be too risky, when I had an open formation with less men, but a decent ammount of mortars to charge on me with a closed formation?
Mortars were probably pretty expensive, and unless they were coehorn-size, also very heavy. They would also cause supply problems, I think.
My answere would be weight. You need to carry more weight with lots of small mortars. The Ammo is heavier, and you need more powder. And still you have to equip every soldier with a personal weapon for hand to hand combat.
Mortars are less easy to aim and for the weight of 1 mortar and it's ammo ect. you can carry loads of musket balls and powder for muskets.
And with the weight of the mortars you don't move as fast as with your musket.
I thought Closer Order formation battles are now generally used to described the style of battle with the blocks of men, whether they are spread out or shoulder to shoulder doesn't really matter when comparing it to (early) modern warfare. Or has this style of battle another name?
The Minié myth.... Claude-Étienne Minié, did not invent the bullet that often got his name. And was not the first to invent a rifle musket.
The first rifle muskets was developed in the late 1830ties and early 1840ties.
First with the Delvigne system, then the Thouvenin system.
At the battle of Isted in July 1850 about 80% of the Rebel Slesvig-Holstein army had rifle muskets and 25% of the danish government forces had them. (using the Thouvenin system)
And most of the fighting was done in open order.
And Claude-Étienne Minié, did not invent the bullet that often got his name. He just suggested adding a small iron cup in the base of the Delvigne's bullet.
(a cup that is really not needed as we know today)
There where others who invented similar bullets. including William Greener and John Norton.
What Captain Minié did do was getting the french army to adopt a rifle he designed.
The british army in comparison ignored the development and didn't get interested until the french started to use minié's rifle... then they panics and quickly got the P1851 into production.
Cooler Bart
There is a typo on the first slide: it's "ORdre Mixte" instead of "Odre Mixte".
@Northfield Stradford Really? I didn't know that :)
Respectively...The MG did not die. see 1914. Kinda recks his argument. Training any soldier is the most effective element to success of any doctrine. Believe me receiving fire is no fun and will change your mind.
?
Nobody said the MG did die, actually quite to the contrary.
You could argue that now everybody got a MG with the assault rifle. The HMG died, outside of bunkers and vehicles and made place for general purpose MGs and LMGs. I think that is caused mainly by changing tactics (blitzkrieg,...), and more accurate artillery
Would you ever see use of closed order infantry nowadays? I would think not, especially in open warfare because the enemy armor, artillery, and air power would destroy your units. I don't know? What modern day cases would see a use of closed order tactics?
The only modern use that comes to my mind is a parade.
Not really military and combat related, but the only thing I can come up with is crowd control (i.e. riot police)
Augenblick! Don't we still use the close order in defense, but only on a larger scale? During the Eighties the Cavalry (US) screened ahead of the main line of defense, in order to slow down or channel the enemy forces. The infantry of modern era would set up in the same way as our ancestors, but only with more long ranged weapons. Since I was never really training in offensive operation, I and only assume that theory of massed firepower would still be effect. Okay, thats my fifteen seconds of fame. Party on gentlemen!
I don't think that qualifies as "close order" or are you talking about formations of soldiers almost shoulder to shoulder 3 rows deep? (on an open field mind you)
Such an epic accent
Fank you too
Control is easy, select all army and A-click.
I wish the written quotations would stay on the screen for a few (5) seconds longer. It would make it easier to read them.
They use " Walley fire" :D Couldn't hold myself there :D.
Well, at least it wasn't waffle fire 😂
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized Or Waffle Walley Wire
A perfect example of this transistion in warfare, is the Prussian-Danish war in 1864. The Prussians were equiped with needle guns, but had a lot of problems with broken needles. The Danes were equiped with muskets, but had the advantage of good defensive positions. In the end, Cannons and numbers decided the outcome, not the infantry guns- BUT an evaluation of the battlefield at Dybbøl shows, that most Danish casualties from small arms was by a shot in the head, while most Prussians died with a bayonet in the stomach.
Closed order was about control. With colors, standards and guidons soldiers knew where where their leaders were and bugle calls told them what to do. Picket's charge at Gettysburg signaled the end of close order but there was a missing component that did not arrive until WWII; the tactical radio. This gave commanders the means to control soldiers he could not see.
Could there be a chapter II on this subject as the infantry tactics developed during WWI at platoon- and squad levels.? Like how half the squad keeps the enemy's heads down with fire superiority while the other half flanks and closes in to hand granade distance.? Bitte..? Könnte es möglich sein.? :)
And has stuck there since, unfortunately. The West has ignored infiltration tactics to its detriment.
done it already with the Stoßtrupptaktik - Stormtrooper Tactics video on my main channel.
“Even more important, they were able to see
that technology had forced a fundamental change in the character
of warfare itself, and they began thinking in terms which we
would today call operational. In retrospect, their views seem
to make much more sense for modern warfare not only at the end
of the 19th century, but for much of the 20tn century as well.”
Understanding Change: Sigismund Von Schlichting and the Operational Level of War
archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA215567?q=Donald+Cranz
Holey Shit. I can actually understand him if I set the playback speed to 1.5x.
I don't have any issues even at 2x... In fact it seems even a bit more clear lol
Thank you MHV for your dedication and attention to detail. You make the best videos of this kind
I think the most important developments was the machine gun and barbed wire. Armies began the war in 1914 with German troops marching in columns when the military band played "preussens gloria", and the french attacked with the red-blue uniforms. But soon would those old traditions be swept away with all mass death during failed attacks against the barbed wire in no mans land and a few machine guns that ate up entire formations in a short period of time.
And it was no longer practical to dress colourful and march orderly. This trend had of course begun earlier, as in for example the Boer war. But now had the old way of war finally died out.
The role of artillery was also perhaps a little bit smaller than in earlier wars. There existed no radios that was light enough to carry for frontline troops, so that fire support could be co-ordinated. So artillery was limited to the visual range of the eyes like in earlier wars. And the lack of mobilization for a war economy would make the frontline silent in the end of 1914 and early 1915 because all powers had used up their peacetime stockpiles of artillery shells, and more had to be produced before artillery bombardment could begin again. And Russia never succeded in building any war economy so their artillery was pretty much silent for the rest of the war.
Western European countries was able to produce large numbers of grenades, but they were only effective against targets that had not digged in. And the lack of radio and mobility of the artillery made impossible to support attacking troops even if they would be able to punch deep into enemy territory.
The only thing that was really effective against barbed wire was to bombard it with thousands of high-explosive artillery shells or to drive over it with tanks. Otherwise it was pretty much a hopeless task to get through.
So why were 75% of casualties in WWI inflicted by artillery? That ratio has not really dropped much. The revolution in Artillery during this period shaped the battle at least as much as the revolution of the infantry firearm. Take the Field Artillery, the most famous WWI piece was of course the French 75, though all sides had their own version. This was a quick firing artillery piece that could fire 12 - 20 (depending on the piece and crew training) rounds a MINUTE. Consider that for a moment, that is a field artillery piece that has the same rate of fire as the infantrymans rifle.
Then add long range howitzers to that, the steady upscaling of the bore size of mobile artillery, the increased power of the charge componant as more effective explosives were introduced thus increasing the blast effect of the shells those artillery fired,and the list goes on.
The way they got around the lack of communication was by massively pre-planning their artillery bombardments, and by using extensive pre-registered defensive fire plans that could be initiated by the infantry simply firing a group of flares.
As for grenades being ineffective against dug in troops? Why then were the 1918 British and Commonwealth Infantry platoons centred around their Lewis guns and Grenadier Squads? The Hand Grenade was EXTREMELY effective in Trench Warfare. Trench warfare is basically CQB, and the Hand Grenade is still an extremely effective tool in CQB. An infantry assault on an enemy trench late WWI would be preceeded by the grenadiers lobbing as many grenades as possible in as short a time as possible into the trench. This was not principally to kill the enemy (though it would often do just that), but to keep their heads down and keep them in cover. The assault would go in. Once a stretch of trench was taken they would use bomb teams (grenadiers) heading both directions and supported by riflemen, mortars and the Lewis guns to clear the trenches and dugouts. The Germans and French used the same kind of tactics. Hand Grenades were one of the infantrymans PRINCIPLE weapons in WWI, you see pictures of Grenadiers carrying multiple bags of grenades, each bag holding 10 - 20 grenades each. The huge number of these weapons used does not support your statement that they were ineffective, quite the opposite.
This is not to say the machinegun and barbed wire were not important, they were, as was reinforced concrete (a material that was fairly new in 1914), but other technologies were equally as important. Really the only group of technologies that did not advance as fast as weapons and defensive technologies were communications technologies. Thus the smallest radios in 1918 had to be carried by lorries, and you are NOT taking a wheeled vehicle across No Mans Land. They *did* try mounting some in tanks, but the vibrations destroyed the radios. As a result, attacking infantry of 1914 - 1918 were limited to using Passenger pigeons and runners as their principle methods of communications with HQ.
If you think that statistics is the same thing as reality, then you are frankly not very smart.
Young men are more often victims to street violance than women and elderly. Why?
Because women and elderly knows that they are not as capable of defending themselves so they rather stay
at home and don't take any risks of getting hurt. So if eveyone then stayd home, then crime statistics would show low numbers, but would that mean that crime is not a problem? Of course not. Crime is so serious that people would stay home because they are afraid to go out.
So if people don't go out and make suicidal attacks against barbed wire and machine guns, that doesn't
mean that they are increadibly effective weapons on a first world war battlefield.
On the contrary. They were the driving force on how tactics were formed at this time, and all war-winning strategies had to adapt to this fact if there would be any hope of getting any success.
First world war was not a war mainly about artillery duels. It was a war when armies desperatly tried to find ways to silence enemy machine guns and pass through barbed wire... and solutions of all kinds were tested to fix this problem, like bomarding an area for an entire week with a million artillery shells.
"The way they got around the lack of communication was by massively pre-planning their artillery bombardments,
and by using extensive pre-registered defensive fire plans that could be initiated by the infantry simply firing a group of flares."
Armies tried these solutions, and they almost never worked.
Sometimes they failed because the enemy was sitting behind the front line or deep underneath the ground,
and the infantry would therefore not take any serious losses and could easily repulse any infantry attacks after the bombardment had started. You could of course keep on firing with your artillery once your own infantry had started attacking, but that would also lead to more losses among your own men as your artillery would accidentaly hit your own men.
Furthermore was timing of a bombarment very difficult to get right, as you don't know all the factors in the fog of war about the future weather, the enemy strength and such. So if your men attack too fast they get crushed by their own artillery, and if they cannot keep up with the time schedule then the artillery would be uneffective as well.
And in the early war years did Generals have to learn those lessons above the hard way. And gigantic battles with hundreds of thousands of men lost also failed for other reasons. Like the lack of High-explosives to destroy the barbed wirse in no mans land. And barbed wire was a huge problem. It is not just something you can fix with a little scissor. It was something nearly impossible to get rid of. And entire armies could stuck in front of it an not get through, while enemy machine guns ripped people apart.
ruclips.net/video/8hQ-otfHZx8/видео.html
And even if your attack was succesful, then your biggest still lie ahead. How would you repulse an enemy counter attack?
In the first world war was a counter-attack the most powerful force on the battlefield. More powerful than defence or assualt. And the enemy was not stupid. He would see that you was about the breakthough at one part of the frontline, so he would concentrate more forces to the area.
So once your men had punched through the last line of defence, then he would swiftly launch a counter-attack before your men had a chance to rest and organize or dig yourself into the ground and get reinforcements.
He would bombard you with arty and then attack you. And your own artillery would be too far away behind to be of any help. And nor would you have any way of communicating and directing your artillery fire from such far ranges. And moving artillery up through the no-mans-land moonland scape was difficult and time consuming, and it would not be able to keep up with the attacking infantry.
So once the offensive had been done, there was really not much plans what to do next.
So the enemy always had all the good cards at his hands. And it was these counter-offensives that made the first world this war of largly static frontlines that it is known for.
Because every progress usally was destroyed as fast as it had been created.
The idea of cutting barbed wire by artillery was literally hit and miss, many barrages failed, forcing troops to use the real counter: wire cutters. Unfortunately wire cutters are a detriment when confronted by riflemen and machine gun positions. Tanks give a useful wire cutting barrier and themselves flattered the barbed wire making access easier without troops exposing themselves to fire.
Actually reading the captions auto generated from your accent, is quite funny... 😜
Actually they understand order as water (no offense, just joking...)😆
The interesting thing about changes in tactics is the fact that big wars occurring between peer powers are very rare; only once per generation or two. The intervening years were usually short war where the dominant power just steamroll over the weaker side. Also, the intervening years were also generally a time when weapons technology changes rather quickly; usually originated from outside the military itself, yet the tactics usually don't catch up. That was how the Americans used Napoleonic tactics in the age where rifles were a lot more accurate and effective and how Europe killed millions of its soldiers in WWI.
Only a big, bloody war necessitate the changes in tactics. Big bloody wars happens rarely, that's why innovation in tactics seems "revolutionary". However, if you zoom out a bit then the trend is rather clear.
Once upon a time, the only method to increase projected "firepower" is to pack in more men or use a longer line. The swordmen in the back line can't contribute much to the ongoing struggle, except to swap out in the case the front guy got killed or tired. Spears may allow the rear one or two lines to fight, too. Once the lines are engaged, archers can't shoot over the head of their own troops once the line make contacts. Battles were more breadth-based.
Early gunpowders were also direct fire for most parts; and that's how muskets need to have its men in line to do something.
The technological/tactical changes in modern war has largely been how to extend the battle into the depth. Observation and communication is to allow massing of firepower from the depth of your own side and hitting the enemy's depth, too. Tactics is to solve the problem of how to mass rifles, machineguns, short and long range mortars, assault guns, howitzers, rocket artillery, airstrikes, and most recently cruise missiles and ICBM all at once. You can no longer "maneuver" around the enemy's flank to get a flank on the enemy army; rather, you need to create a flanking opportunity to flank and encircle the enemy. You need to exploit in his depth. Likewise, in the defense, you can no longer have a long defensive line; but rather defense in depth.
That is what I think the evolution of military technology and tactics has been: to increase the battle in the depth while maintaining the front. To attack successfully, you need to array your firepower in your depth to shield them from the enemy's fire and mass all of that firepower throughout your depth to achieve victory. To defend successfully, you also need to array your defense in the depth.
Effect before cover?
Heard that as a conscript (not too long ago), so still in use. Verkan före skydd....
mee too, but long ago in a different Country :-)
He really is the best
The German drill regulations of 1906 states, "If the company is to advance to the charge in close order, the bayonet is fixed and at the command." Also the french attacked in columns in 1914 because of élan vital. Please explain why they did that? There must be a good reasons.
In the Soviet and later Russian combat manuals, without much change since WWII, the "riflemen chain" is still described as the "main" type of formation for an infantry squad during the offensive. Basically, a squad dismounts from the vehicle within a few hundred meters from the enemy trench, moves in a line, 6-8 meters between the soldiers, at 5-6 km/h speed. At the 30-40 meter distance, they throw their grenades and run into the trench. Such formation, supposedly, provides for a maximum speed and firepower. Although, the instructors did not make a secret about the chances to survive such a carnage! ;) Supposedly, there are alternative, less wasteful of human lives types of formation, but they only teach the specialized infantry officers about them. ;)
2 Things: 1. Wirkung vor Deckung (effect before cover): I learned that as a concript too, but the meaning was different to what you described. What we learned was that "In fighting you should choose your position by judging where you can have the biggest effect not by where you have the best cover."
2. Training & Drill: I would be interested in your definition of both. Because you mention of both in this video is a bit strange to me:
Drill is a form of training to get something done without having to think about it. The purpose for this is that in a situation where your brain is occupied otherwise you still are able to accomplish tasks you are drilled in. How to load/reload your weapon, how to run and take cover again. (Vorwärts-Sprung-Deckung).... In My opinion Training is a less intensive Drill.
btw.: was unten weiter jemand erklären will ist, daß das englische Wort für Präzision aufs A am Anfang betont wird.
Look at Picket's charge. Very sad. Shoulder to shoulder marching across open country into cannon and rifle fire on a prepared position.
There seems to be a correlation of the ancient Greek 'heroic' fighting (personal initiative) vs the classical Greek 'phalanx' fighting (cohesion, support and trust) in this
Great topic. I've always wondering about that transition.
Great video. Thanks for posting.
@ 5:14
No: BREECHLOADING rifles did that. So not only were the shots more accurate, more of them were being fired. The Minie ball simply allowed a rifle to be loaded as quickly as a musket; it wasn't faster than a musket. And anyway, the range wasn't much greater; only the accuracy (and this required extensive training, since the shots--while truer--tended to arc more than with a musket). The loose-order units were the natural conclusion.
That's why the US Civil War saw so little innovation in terms of the line formation till the last year of the war, but the Austro-Prussian War did. Tellingly, the US army didn't consider open order as a default formation till 1866, when the army switched to breechloaders (and had, by then, acquired experience with repeaters and breechloaders in the Civil War). In 1866, one officer suggested putting the men in open order, single rank, with mixed repeaters and breechloaders. The open order was adopted, but the repeaters had to wait till the 1890's.
ac' ur ac y
Modern weapons (rifles/repeating rifles/machine guns/rapid-fire, long-range artillery) made closed order suicide - although some learned this sooner that others. End of analysis.
Zusammenschiessen - to shoot together
I love this austrian-english.
My previous personal general understanding
Hunting (camouflage, field craft, Ghillie suits) Skirmishers / Marksman (Americas etc.)
Machine gun (formations, spacing)
Vehicles (mobility)
Trench warfare (defense in depth) counter attacks
Camouflage
Ghillie suits are very effective.
I think are superior to camouflage print patterns.
Infra red reducing, light, breathable modern materials.
Combat shooting is another recent advance.
Training
Communications (technology)
Ghillie suits are rare on the battlefield and very expensive, but using nets and taking local foliage to cam with is quite an effective alternative
@@thisghy8126 Natural foliage goes limp and dies quickly (a huge mess and leaves a lot of sign). Environments like Europe, desert (types), jungle (types) and snow don't change much at all. It's a fallacy that you have to change camo that much. The only problem is they don't make it. (Not impressed with today's Airsoft junk). IR is a serious problem. Modern materials can reduce your visibility.
@@highchamp1 true, but you should change the foliage to suit your surroundings constantly, and when it starts to fade as well.
There is some pretty cool multi-spectral clothing/cam nets out there now that could change things a bit
This discussion completely missed the political/social changes necessary for open order combat. Coming out of the Seven Years Wars European armies had difficulty with soldiers outside of the direct control of the commander. Quasi-drafted and pressed mercenaries could not camp near the woods because they would melt away. The American Revolution exposed the need for skirmishers. The Nationalism of the Napoleonic Wars allowed for much more active and motivated soldiers. Less direct control was necessary because there was an element of commitment of the individual soldiers to the larger national goals.
nope, I didn't I stated that there are several requirements for open order.
> European armies had difficulty with soldiers outside of the direct control of the commander.
as stated in the video.
> Quasi-drafted and pressed mercenaries could not camp near the woods because they would melt away.
also mentioned
> The American Revolution exposed the need for skirmishers.
didn't mention that one
> Less direct control was necessary because there was an element of
> commitment of the individual soldiers to the larger national goals.
uhm what? I think you mean "possible" not "necessary". Yet, again I pretty much stated that the old "drill" was not working and "training" and "education" were the key.
My point is to have an open order formation, in the context of nineteenth century European warfare, one must have a nationalist army. A nationalist army is a necessary but not a sufficient prerequisite.
You need a loyal army, but that is only one of the many requirements.
You sound rather American-biased. Knowledge flowed from Europe to America, and not the other way. The idea that anyone in Europe was taking notes of how Americans fought is not realistic.
Also, the Americans lost every battle to the British army. Untill they hired a few European (Prussian) drill instructors who drilled the rebels into closed order, disciplined units.
There are also numerous examples proving you wrong about nationalism. Many armies were motivated by other things than nationalism. Religious motivation for example. In pre-medieval times you had the Germanic concept of honour. Honour was so important that death was a small price to pay; at Hastings, not a single huskarl of the Saxons survived the battle, not one. All of them stood and died rather than flee, live, and lose honour.
I myself descend from people who inherited collective land rights granted by Count Floris V of Holland. This elevation in a time when paying to use land and having tiny plots yourself, or none at all, was common, was such a massive influence that people from this region, Het Gooi, fought as fanatics for the count. When Floris V was captured, the peasants from two villages, Bussum and Huizen, rose up. Their total population was 350 and Huizen was a day's walk away from the battlefield so only those who ran could've made it realistically, so how many fighters? At most 80?
Yet when encountering the peasants' barricade on the road, one baron decided to murder Floris, according to the only account of the battle, causing a roar to rise from the peasants, who immediatly charged forward. They slaughtered a warparty of three counts, a baron, and their retainers. That must've easily been 60-150 professional and equipped soldiers. The nobles escaped with one retainer, but all others were butchered by peasants with just their tools, and fanatical loyalty, at their disposal.
Yet all of this did not involve any national identity.
how did infantry in Open Order formation defend themselves from light cavalry skirmishers?
I would imagine one advantage of the closed order was it is less vulnerable for cavalry attacks.
Open order would make you more vulnerable to cavalry attacks, but at the same time rifle technology had improved to accurate breach loading weapons which could pour fire into the charge to break it up.
If we're talking about a cavalry skirmish line and not a massed charge the answer is to adopt a kneeling or sitting position thus reducing your exposure at the same time providing a more stable fire position. The premise being that it's harder to hit a smaller stationery target while moving than to hit a larger moving target while stationery.
You can avoid cavalry attack by lying on the ground. This is why, during this period, cavalry sabres got longer and straighter.
On YT, there's a video called 1914 British Cavalry Drill where you can see the cavalry training to stab people one the ground by thrusting down and quickly swinging their arm back to keep the sword from sticking. This is similar to the sport called "tent pegging".
@Northfield Stradford I think it happened before that. During the American Civil War cavalry was used for scouting, raiding and cavalry vs cavalry engagements, but charging infantry was just not a thing done despite what some movies show. The rifled musket allowed the infantry to get off two or three shots before the cavalry reached the infantry lines.
@Communist Red Demon Horde The best way to stop a cav charge is to give them as taste of canister with your artillery. Works great on troops too.
It's not so much between the Crimean war and WW1, in the sense that the were precursors of open order were already seen in the Napoleonic wars and other wars fought between the Napoleonic wars and the Crimean war. Spain for example, despite using close order, added an extra layout of flexibility as the units were trained to change formations quickly, fight when the formation is disbanded, reform the formation... Also most infantry used early rifles ("fusiles") and a mixture between standart infantry tactics and guerrilla tactics. I don't know the case for other armies, but for Spain, the "revolution" (or better said evolution) started in the 1800s.
In the First Carlist War (1833-1840, civil war) the Spanish Liberal general Baldomero Espartero used superior movility and flexibility to defeat the Carlists in several battles. For example, in 1836 he defeated the Carlist attack on Bilbao at the battle of Luchana: es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Batalla_de_Luchana
This battle, on which the Liberals (Isabelinos, as they supported Isabella II) were fighting on difficult terrain against an entrenched enemy, and he turned it into a battle for positions. The "cazadores" (light infantry) and the river gunboats were key on that operation, as well as the weather. In general, the favourite tactic of Espartero was to quickly take advantageous positions and use them to pound the enemy.