These 3 lectures on "Russell's Theory of Descriptions" were very lucid and you made the topic enjoyable. Thank you so much!! However, you mention that you will take up some points in the next video. I too remember seeing this just 3-4 days ago but today I am unable to access it. Could you please send me the link to your next video in this series ? Thanks!
I haven't done the next video yet. I'll get round to it at some point, though I'm not sure when. (If there's any particular information you need to know urgently, send me a PM, and I'll do my best to answer or point you in the direction of an answer.)
Thank you for another lucid exposition! Eminently helpful. Humbly, may I submit two broad points. The one, aquick remark as to your note circa 22:40 ff.: Is not the issue at hand that the treatment of existence as a predicate is itself problematic? Put otherwise, is denotation itself not an existential affirmation? This possibly dovetails with Brentano's suggestion that judgement does not in fact consist in predication or association, but in precisely an existential declaration. So, "The present king of France is bald" only becomes problematic when it is treated as judgement, rather than a mere proposition? (Thinking out loud, so I'm uncertain where that leads). The other broad point concerns the effort to construe proper names as abbreviated descriptions. What occurs to me here is that there is that there is a distinction between specification and description:: the latter process presumes the former, which are demarcated by simple assignation of a sign to a referent. Note that in the case of proper names, all which has occurred is such a mere assignation. This finds reflection in the actual "substance" of the referent is irrelevant to the name invoked. Bob can be assigned to any entity whatsoever. However, such freedom of predication is no longer available when it comes to description: here there most be a display of the property affirmed by the description by predication if it is to be valid. So, the assignment of "red" can only be directed to entities which display redness. To put it in yet another way, descriptive terms have a content which delimit their extension. Proper names do not.
Regarding the scope of the negation on the 'Ex(Kx & (Ay(Ky ->y=x) & Bx))', couldn't we also give it the interpretation that 'no thing is the present king of france and bald', so that Ax ¬(Kx &Bx)? Also you have taught me a lot of logic and you are absolutely awesome.
maybe i got something wrong ,but in the syllogism with the blue car shouldnt the second premise go "the blue car which smith is standing by is the fastest car in town" or that just goes without saying?..the way its put there seems incomplete by the way love your videos,great work
When talking about substitution you point out that 1a and 2a attribute different beliefs to Derek. That is surely correct, but is that all that needs to be shown? Isn't the problem that we should not be able to infer 2a from 1a? (via substitution). How does Russell's analysis show what is wrong with this inference? Perhaps I misunderstood you. Perhaps you did not really try to demonstrate how Russell solves the problem here. Is your view that Russell cannot solve it, in the end? Because he does not take account of the fact that one can also substitute definite descriptions?
Thanks for making these videos! I'm an undergraduate in philosophy and these have been great for reviewing for exams!
Very helpful--struggled to understand the 1905 article until I watched this. Thanks for posting it!
You are among my favourite persons of the world. Thank you for this great and detail-oriented presentation!
Thanks for a great video, now I'm off to drag myself through Strawson, Grice, Donnellan and Kripke...
Glad it helped, thanks for the comment!
Thanks for your excellent help! I'm writing an essay on this and it made NO sense until I found your video :D
This video series saved my life! Thank you so much for your excellent work!
These 3 lectures on "Russell's Theory of Descriptions" were very lucid and you made the topic enjoyable. Thank you so much!! However, you mention that you will take up some points in the next video. I too remember seeing this just 3-4 days ago but today I am unable to access it. Could you please send me the link to your next video in this series ? Thanks!
I haven't done the next video yet. I'll get round to it at some point, though I'm not sure when. (If there's any particular information you need to know urgently, send me a PM, and I'll do my best to answer or point you in the direction of an answer.)
Thank you so much for your response...have you made the next video we talked about in our last communication ?
@@KaneB "8 years ago" RIP
I found this video immensely helpful. Thanks for taking the time to do it.
Another brilliant video. Thank you for making these.
Thank you for another lucid exposition! Eminently helpful. Humbly, may I submit two broad points. The one, aquick remark as to your note circa 22:40 ff.: Is not the issue at hand that the treatment of existence as a predicate is itself problematic? Put otherwise, is denotation itself not an existential affirmation? This possibly dovetails with Brentano's suggestion that judgement does not in fact consist in predication or association, but in precisely an existential declaration. So, "The present king of France is bald" only becomes problematic when it is treated as judgement, rather than a mere proposition? (Thinking out loud, so I'm uncertain where that leads). The other broad point concerns the effort to construe proper names as abbreviated descriptions. What occurs to me here is that there is that there is a distinction between specification and description:: the latter process presumes the former, which are demarcated by simple assignation of a sign to a referent. Note that in the case of proper names, all which has occurred is such a mere assignation. This finds reflection in the actual "substance" of the referent is irrelevant to the name invoked. Bob can be assigned to any entity whatsoever. However, such freedom of predication is no longer available when it comes to description: here there most be a display of the property affirmed by the description by predication if it is to be valid. So, the assignment of "red" can only be directed to entities which display redness. To put it in yet another way, descriptive terms have a content which delimit their extension. Proper names do not.
I’m writing an essay and you’ve saved me
Kane why does Bertrand Russell introduces the notion of C(x) is always/sometimes true at the outset???
Excellent videos, parts 1 to 3.
thank you very much! this was super useful!
Fantastic set of videos, thank you very much. I feel I have a fighting chance at my final exam now. :)
Regarding the scope of the negation on the 'Ex(Kx & (Ay(Ky ->y=x) & Bx))', couldn't we also give it the interpretation that 'no thing is the present king of france and bald', so that Ax ¬(Kx &Bx)? Also you have taught me a lot of logic and you are absolutely awesome.
maybe i got something wrong ,but in the syllogism with the blue car shouldnt the second premise go "the blue car which smith is standing by is the fastest car in town" or that just goes without saying?..the way its put there seems incomplete
by the way love your videos,great work
Thanks for the videos. Keep it up
5:32 After five weeks struggling at Chapter 5 of Russell's The Problems of Philosophy, I finally get it. OMG.
Where's the part 4 video? Does it have a different title?
Thank you!
you said "...we will take up some of the criticisms and defenses of this theory in the next video..."
Good stuff. When is the next video coming?
Thank you soooo much you saved my grade
Do you have the slides for these lectures? can you post them online please?
I'm afraid I don't have them. Once the videos are completed, I delete the slides and the script.
I downloaded 'Jing' - it's a screen capture app for desktops. Made my own slide print-out of all these slides :)
thank you !!!
When talking about substitution you point out that 1a and 2a attribute different beliefs to Derek. That is surely correct, but is that all that needs to be shown? Isn't the problem that we should not be able to infer 2a from 1a? (via substitution). How does Russell's analysis show what is wrong with this inference? Perhaps I misunderstood you. Perhaps you did not really try to demonstrate how Russell solves the problem here. Is your view that Russell cannot solve it, in the end? Because he does not take account of the fact that one can also substitute definite descriptions?
very useful!
Didn think we would talk so much about gerbils.
where's part 4???
You saved me
That existence is not a predicate is not an irrelevant technical point!