John Lundstrom brought something out (a pretty long time ago, one of his earlier books, so this isn't "late-breaking" analysis) that I've not seen discussed elsewhere, at least not so clearly as he did. He showed pretty convincingly that, long before the Japanese Midway plan had been picked up by the codebreakers, Nimitz had already been seeking a "Midway-like" battle, i.e., a large-scale confrontation between the IJN and USN carrier forces, for some time. It's well-known that LEX (TF 11) and YOR (TF 17) fought at Coral Sea while ENT/HOR (TF 16), steaming southward, were too far away to become a factor...that's standard fare found in probably any account of that battle. Lundstrom pointed out, however, that Nimitz well knew that TF 16 would not arrive in time for that initial contest vs the Japanese Port Moresby invasion attempt. Instead, he was sending them down for follow-on battles he thought likely to occur. We know now that Yamamoto was already firmly set on the Midway operation. CarDiv 5 (Shokaku/Zuikaku) was rather grudgingly allocated to Inoue's South Seas Fleet for MO, with no plan or intent to commit any more carrier forces in that theater for the time being. Nimitz, however, did not (yet) know this; from the US perspective, it was known that the Japanese were coming for Moresby, and very likely wanted to continue a major South Pacific effort toward Noumea, Samoa, and Fiji. Which was accurate enough; that was indeed what Inoue's intent was - in fact his orders from above. So Nimitz was fully aware that the initial carrier clash at Coral Sea was going to be 2-vs-2. He was sending TF 16 down, committing more carriers for that campaign, because he thought it highly likely that the IJN would also commit more carriers. It appeared that the South Pacific was developing into the IJN's main thrust of effort, as in fact both Japan's Naval HQ and South Seas Fleet (Inoue) very much wanted. The irony of all this is that Yamamoto's Midway operation was conceived in the first place to solve the strategic/operational problem of "how do we entice the US carriers into battle so that we can destroy them?". When all along, that solution was right there in front of him: continue already-existing plans to push further into the South Pacific and cut that communications line to Australia. US carrier operations for months (Feb Rabaul raid, Mar Lae-Salamua raid, and of course Coral Sea itself) had given ample indication that Nimitz and the USN would likely oblige Yamamoto with the carrier battle he sought. And Nimitz was doing exactly that. He wanted a big carrier scrap just as much as Yamamoto did (within his famous "calculated risk" mindset, looking for a favorable opportunity, of course). None of these basic facts are new, but I've never read anyone - before or since - connect them together in an analysis quite the way Lundstrom did...in 1978 (his "The First South Pacific Campaign").
I agree with giving some degree of praise to the 2019 Midway film. Obviously there were some glaring inaccuracies, and many of those did fall under the general heading of "amping up the action and explosions just to make it look more exciting". *However,* when I was watching it, I could clearly recognize numerous events and lines of dialogue from books like Ian Toll's _Pacific Crucible,_ John Lundstrom's _First Team,_ and of course _Shattered Sword._ At least some people involved with the production of that film did make the effort to actually read through the most up-to-date scholarship on the Battle of Midway and the early part of the Pacific War generally, which is a substantial step up from what we often see with "historical" films. Obviously some people in the production did prioritize "more explosions", "edgier main characters", and "fewer computer models" over historical accuracy, but some of the actual research still does come through - Jon's mention of the Japanese hangar decks is a good example.
I can't think of a WWII movie made in the last 20 years that has the level of accuracy found in the 2019 Midway. My only problem is that it has comic book characters. It is also an "odd" movie, made when WWII was losing Hollywood's favor. Last one I recall has a zombie tie-in. I'm glad somebody went ahead and made Midway.
Jon did some consulting for the 2019 film. He did reinforce that the Japanese attack force still had the bombers and strike aircraft in the hanger decks, and not spotted on the flight deck at 10:20 a.m.
midway (76) is why I’m here trying to educate myself. I’ve had the honor of standing at ground Zero Hiroshima (twice) and at Pearl harbor. I’d like to know all the pacific stories. Whats your thought on the original movie?
Awesome discussion -- thanks! Couple comments: John's opening summation ends with a comment that the Guadalcanal campaign does "grave damage to the Japanese", but let's not forget that the US Navy got its nose severely bloodied as well. It's not like we came out of Midway having figured everything out. There were still many lessons left to learn. I was also surprised Trent's lesson learned did not include "Carrier air power rules!" Although perhaps that was a sort of "duh" for all concerned, even back then.
You are missing the impact of the American victory at Midway that sunk four FLEET carriers of the Japanese navy. If the Americans had lost big at Midway the Japanese fleet could have sailed into San Francisco Bay and blown it to hell. The same goes for Long Beach, San Diego and maybe even the Panama Canal. If that had happened you have a very different WWII.
@@lurking0death The west coast certainly would have been vulnerable for a period of time but attacking the west coast of the United States in 1942 would have been a logistical nightmare for the IJN. Obviously Hawaii was the next very difficult target and that operation would have tied Japan down for a long time. As far as the west coast goes the Navy would have had the time and resources and recovered enough to protect the USA mainland. The real risk was Guadalcanal, Port Moresby, French Polynesia and Fiji island. If the Imperial Japanese plans were realized Australia would have been isolated and Japan would have solidified their raw material sources for the long term. That begs the question, what would the western pacific geopolitical environment look like 70 years later if Midway resulted in all US carriers being sunk rather than 4 IJN frontline carriers being sunk?
Jack Fletcher got on Admiral King’s bad side. There’s a story there. I don’t know what it is. It being Washington DC I suspect Fletcher, a cruiser-destroyer officer, recieved the jealousy of the airedale admirals for being a task force commander. So Fletcher was demoted to commander of a naval district
@@Idahoguy10157 If Fletcher wasn't liked because he was not a pilot, then I don't understand how Spruance (another non-flyer) was able to command Task Force 58 later in the war. I have always believed many were simply jealous of Fletcher either because of his time in DC, winning the Medal of Honor (which Fletcher himself believed was undeserving), or commanding at Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons.
@@spudskie3907 …. The story I’ve read is Halsey was hospitalized and Nimitz needed a replacement NOW. Halsey recommended Spruance. With the caveat Spruance bring Miles Browning. Browning has Halsey’s right hand man at air operations.
@@Idahoguy10157 Yes....I know very well the story of how Spruance got the job commanding TF 16 prior to Midway. I am talking about afterwards. Many did not like Fletcher commanding carriers because he was not an aviator. Well...Spruance was not a pilot, yet he was allowed to command TF 58 later in the war.
@@spudskie3907 …Yes. Spruance was chosen by Admiral Nimitz. As for his reassignment stateside by Admiral King…IDK. I’ve read somewhere King was disappointed in, or disliked, Spruance. Or both. Apparently Nimitz couldn’t have objected too hard about it. I am glad historians are recognizing Spruance’s contributions of 1942.
In this discussion it was never mentioned that the Japanese positioned a submarine picket line between Midway and the Hawaiian islands to watch for any movement by the US Navy towards Midway but the picket line set up one day late verse Yamamoto’s plan. That one day delay allowed the carriers to leave Pearl undetected. I would have loved to hear comments on this failure by the Japanese & it’s importance.
I listened to this whole discussion. I am a voracious reader and student of WW2. I served 20 years on active duty as an intelligence analyst. I may not know as much as these historians about all the smaller stuff about the battle of Midway because I spend a lot of time reading about the Eastern Front. However, I have read quite few of the US Army Green books on WW2 and have Eliot Morrison's Naval history of WW2 collection. Most of these I have read along the way. My issue is simply in June, 1942 that Admiral Nimitz had to fight, inflict harm on the Japanese fleet regardless of the cost. The Coral Sea was a costly battle for both the Americans and the Japanese. Heavy Japanese aircrew/pilot losses at the Coral Sea with two damaged carriers meant only four carriers made the trip to Midway. I disagree with the assessment that Nimitz held the carriers there at Point Luck just in case to see how the battle was going. Admiral Nimitz had to hit the Japanese fleet as hard as could regardless of the cost to America. The Japanese fleet just had to be stopped even if Nimitz lost all three carriers it didn't matter. Admiral Nimitz could NOT afford to let the Japanese get away with another raid on American soil, even if it was just the atoll of Midway. Admiral Nimitz had to send all the carriers, including the patched up Yorktown, to Midway to fight the Japanese carriers regardless of the cost. Say for the sake of argument the US Navy had all three American carriers sunk in the battle but sank four Japanese carriers. It still would still have been worth it. America could NOT afford to look WEAK. The carriers were expendable assets just like the pilots and warplanes were expendable assets for the critical battle. The critical battle was at Midway. If NImitz lost his job, if the Navy had lost all its carriers with heavy losses of crew with all the warplanes lost, it just didn't matter. The fact that the Yorktown was patched up so quickly reinforces the logic of this point. Nimitz had to bet everything on this Midway hand to stand and fight, to stop the Japanese naval fleet while inflicting losses on the Japanese. The Japanese had been kicking the Americans around the whole Pacific for about six months. The Japanese fleet had to be stopped even if it meant the loss of all three US Navy carriers. There was no "saving the carriers" for a later day battle. Midway was the critical "later day battle" that Clauswitz talks about the reason soldiers are fed, housed and trained is for their expenditure at the critical battle. Nimitz had to fight, make a stand and really hurt the Japanese fleet because politically for moral purposes to keep the war effort going, there was no other choice. It would have been a disaster to have not fought with everything America had at Midway. It would have been a disaster politically, for America's prestige and for the war effort in general had Nimitz not fought at Midway. Nimitz knew that if he got the Japanese fleet by surprise under sustained air attacks from three carriers and from warplanes from Midway he had a good chance to inflict major damage and stop the Japanese advance. The fact most of the crew of the Lexington was saved when it sank was a major plus. We were building more carriers and planes while training thousands of pilots. We could have afforded losing all three carriers as long as equal damage was done to the Japanese I think Admiral King and FDR would have kept Nimitz on as commander of the Pacific fleet. The US Navy had to slug it out with the Japanese fleet somewhere in the Pacific Midway and later Guadalcanal were those two places. Warships, men and warplanes are all expendable assets in a major war. Sure you want to avoid squandering your Navy and trained men in useless battles. However, I argue strongly Midway was a battle America just had to fight, win, lose or draw. Admiral Nimitz had much less flexibility than was discussed here.
I remember seeing a documentary about just how overwhelming American war production was in the four years of WW II. In just the number of carriers, America had 99 at its disposal mid 1945. Even the loss of the Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet would have made little effect in the overall outcome of the Pacific theater.
The one 'What if?' question I have always had about the Battle of Midway was the suicide (?) run on an American bomber at the Akagi's bridge on the morning of June 4th, as was depicted in 2019's MIDWAY. Had the bomber been successful at crashing into the Akagi and killing Nagumo, Admiral Yamaguchi, onboard the Hiryu, would have assumed command. Yamaguchi was widely considered a 'hawk' as opposed to Nagumo being a 'dove'. What if Yamaguchi had not hesitated when word first came from the Japanese scout planes about American ships, as Nagumo did, and took the narrow window of opportunity that presented itself to spot and launch the approximately 50 Val dive bombers on his four carriers, even though they were armed with high-explosive bombs instead of the more lethal armour-piercing bombs because of the second attack on Midway previously planned? These were the best pilots that the Japanese had, and seeing the damage that the Hiryu's 17 Vals inflicted later on the Yorktown, those 50(ish) Vals could have seriously damaged all three U.S. carriers. Plus, those planes and their Zero escorts would probably have spotted the dive bombers enroute to the Japanese fleet and alerted Yamaguchi in time for him to order more fighters up high to await them. Makes you glad that the bomber missed, eh?
I have to be a little critical here, people think Spruance won that battle because experts like yourself went a hour and twelve minutes into a discussion without even mentioning Fletcher at all.
Exactly, Fletcher's command style was perfect for that time. He was a very intelligent man who knew his strengths and his weaknesses. Having spent his whole life in the navy serving on surface combatant ships, he knew he had to draw on all the current operational knowledge from the commanders and air group pilots to get up to speed faster. Under his leadership, working with the men actually flying, he made launches faster by putting the carrier a few dergrees off of heading straight into the wind. This cleared the turbulant air away from the next plane in line. Also, working with commanders Pederson and Arnold, they threw the book out on dated launching strike procedures, transformed, and greatly increased the Yorktown's strike range with that innovative running rendezvous. We can't really hold Spruance accountable for the disasterous launch procedure of Enterprise during that morning strike on kido butai, as he had no knowledge of flight operations, and relied heavily on Browning, having only been carrier command for a few days because Halsey was seriously ill. Unfortunately, Browning was a JCL officer with very little knowledge of recent flying procedures, and thought he knew better than his pilots flying very different, and much evolved planes. TF-16's strike groups got seperated, VF-6's planes ended up escorting VT-8, losing sight of them at a crucial time causing them to fly usessly high up, while VT-8 was getting slaughtered. VB-6, VB-8, VS-8 and VF-8 lost many planes because Enterprise was no where near the stated point option position given by it's air departement. Only Yorktown's strike managed to attack the kido butai as a cohesive group, and split the defence as was the preferred method of attack. Looking at this video, the ghosts of early historians like Morrison, Bates and Innis still reign. Thankfully, John Lundsrom set the record straight. Fletcher is the most effective carrier commander in history, and no amount of ignorance is going to change that. Sadly he never got the credit he deserved, but people like Lundsrom will eventually make the masses see.
@@duncani3095 I agree with this statement you made, 100% "Fletcher is the most effective carrier commander in history." @Scott L And the mention of Fletcher was almost an afterthought here. Very disappointing...
Sorry, but Fletcher had neither daring nor tactical skills - any apparent advantage that he provided was most likely by pure luck [ happenstance ] or orders that decided to obey....
@@jakefarra7537- Sir, The tactical and operational successes that the Navy did ultimately enjoy in 1942 were under the leadership, and in good measure, thanks to, Frank Fletcher. History sets forth the evidence of this simply by showing he was in command of these successful operations at that time. Even passing temporary command to Spruance at end of the Battle of Midway was an intelligent mature operational last minute decision. Keep in mind, carrier warfare had never been conducted by the United States Navy up to this point in history. Everything and every decision made was ground breaking. The man did an exceptional job against an enemy that at the point in time had strategic momentum and had not lost a fight against any allied force thrown against him. As to your previous comment, what supporting data do you bring to your comments that would fairly criticize Admiral Fletcher; data that would support and back up such a negative and mediocre appraisal of the man?
To add importance to what Trent said, the 40 MM BOFORS, to put it simply, it literally shot down aircraft with it's new high tech Radar Fire Control Systems along with 5 inch 38's, which were already deadly to anything flying, but now with it's rudimentary radar controlled proximity fuse that lethality is multiplied by an order of 5 (or better).
Outstanding discussion. Your dealing with the ‘might have beens’ engendered reflection on how many lives might have been changed had the turn of the tide signaled by the U.S. victory at Midway been delayed by six months or a year, and the war extended well into 1946. My own father had been provisionally accepted (as he described it) as a Naval Aviation Cadet, with training expected to began after he graduated from High School in 1945. Suspension of that program after VE Day led to his enlisting in the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) instead, shortly after his high school graduation in 1945. His first USAAF / USAF stint (1945-1948) was served mainly in Alaska, his second stint (1950-1952) was at CONUS Air Force bases.
Unfortunately for Yamamoto, the US Navy didn't even read that script. Perhaps if he had dispatched a copy to Honolulu by air and dropped it on CINCPAC?
Oh ? Well that concept means it was doomed to not achieve the great victory Yamamamoto wanted. Actually Yamamato told Nagumo to keep the half of each carriers airgroup ready to attack American carriers if they showed up. BUT ok, americans contribute a bit with the buildup on Midway, but its Nagumo that goes right off script, and prepares the second half to bomb Midway, which means they are not ready to attack carriers ... The thing about the "script for the US" is the whatif, if the invasion of Midway had gone ahead... What was it really going to do ? The americans weren't going to rush illprepared underpowered ships to Midway to get destroyed... Think about it.. Kido Butai strikes Midway. so what, pacific fleet rushes ships to midway piecemeal.. ??? no they will harass and reconnoitre . Submarines will weaken their ships.. they will suffer attrition.. So it would be better for Yamamato to keep his Kido Butai safe, and use a far more valuable target for a decisive battle.. eg Threaten Brisbane Australia ? Thats why Roosevelt and Pentagon cannot understand Midway.. its not valuable enough, what is going on ??? decisive battle at Midway ? What it won't do for Nimitz is prepare his carriers for any future big battles.... it doesn't let King tell Roosevelt that the Navy can defend Hawaii, andbetter to keep the carriers to defend California ? ... Losing Midway may mean a retreat from Hawaii to defend the contiguous 48.. Macarthur might be given the Pacific fleet entirely.. and that would be.. a death sentence for most of the navy.. and no good strategically. and the timing thing is there, Nimitz King Roosevelt need to know now .. not next year, if the american carriers can deal with the Kido Butai ? and when will they do this crazy plan again ?? take the opportunity now, or retreat to California ?? and run a war of attritition with Indonesia, PNG, Australia as the battlefield. So the decisive Battle.. Nimitz, King agree that that japanese have a poor ability to win a battle... the script thing is an example.. they are sure to go off script when they shouldn't and stay on script when they shouldn't... they didnt know exactly how, but they would have to try the ambush and test them out. And for morale and to save lives (protection..prevent a Battle of Hawaii of Battle of Brisbane etc), save Midway.
@@leong108 I suspect that Yamamoto had met many of America's French politicians and didn't realize that America had handed off control of the military campaign to someone else. You might not have gotten the memo--French and American military establishments share the fatal flaw of being controlled by French politicians. That's how the "finest army in the world" kept getting defeated war after war.
Yes, but see my comment above. In short, sure it's a horrible plan, but name a better one. Yamamoto knows that there are hundreds of aircraft carriers coming off the USA ways in the coming years with all the support ships, personnel and planes to match. He knows Japan is an island that can be throttled by subs. He knows Japan has no chance unless they manage to convince the USA to stop fighting. If you are in Yamamoto's shoes what would you do differently? Oh, and if you are going to assume that the USN is reading your codes and therefor assume that the USN is waiting at Midway, then wouldn't you just wave the white flag?
Yamamoto deserves a huge pile of credit. 1) Symonds makes it clear that Yamamoto's plan was to draw out the USN carriers and sink them. This seems like a darn good plan for getting the USA to quit the Pacific until Hitler was defeated, and hope the USA would not be eager to kick Japan out of its conquests. Go ahead and name an obviously better plan for coming out ahead in this war. 2) They make it clear that Nimitz was not going to take battle unless the calculated risk was worth it, but then they criticize Yamamoto for not bringing Zuikaku and speculate that that would have made a big difference. They also said that Nimitz was concerned about that 5th carrier. In other words, it sounds like Yamamoto got it right. Maybe the better solution is to have Zuikaku come along, but stay away and hopefully not spotted until the USN carriers have been detected. 3) In Shattered Sword, they criticize Yamamoto's dispositions, but the USN did discover the invasion transports and not the Yamato led battle force. So the goal of making it clear to the USN that Japan was going to invade Midway and not just raid it was a success. 4) They make it clear that breaking the IJN codes was amazing and thus the Japanese were reasonable to assume that the USA did not know they were coming and thus it is totally logical to assume that the USN carriers won't be there that morning. 5) They hedged on whether a draw at Midway would have had no major impact on the outcome of the war. They agree that maybe the USA would have grown tired of fighting Japan. In other words, they agree that Yamamoto's hope of getting the USA to stop fighting had merit if the carriers were sunk. 6) They criticize the Japanese fixation on a decisive battle, but Japan must have a decisive battle. "decisive" does not mean lopsided victory, it means that it makes a decision on the war. The Japanese have to have that. They know they cannot win a war of attrition. They must get a lopsided victory and hope that it is decisive at getting the USA to stop fighting.
Twice in the video Symonds says Spruance was told to "head west" if things are going bad at Midway. I assume he meant "head east", because is west is out in the Pacific toward Japan. That would make no sense. East is back toward the US.
Im quite convinced that the massive increase in interest in The Pacific War comes from a collective bubbling feeling that the next big one will be Pacific War 2.
@@coleparker Which moves specifically? The only aggression in the Pacific would be those by the US from thousand of miles away. The US has been launching offensives after ofensives all over the globe over the last 50 years. It just got its behind kicked in Afghanistan and is still knee deep in Iraq and now Ukraine. Like imperial Japan, the US is at the zenith of its military power but does not have the industrial power to sustain it. How long did it took to repair Yorktown after Coral Sea? And what happened after the fire on Bonhomme Richard? You consider it "too expensive to repair" and prefer to build a new ship. Corruption from within ensures that the US will lose the next war.
@@賴志偉-d7h Movement into Cambodia, to begin building a deep Water Navy Base, the establishment of fortified artificial islands near the Spratly islands and incidents near the Philippines and Australia, are similar to the moves Imperial Japan made in 1941 and 42 against Dutch Indonesia, and French Indochina, and finally the British territories in Hong Kong, and Singapore. The movement of Chinese in the Solomon Islands, and the economic advances into Chile, and Central America are similar to the strategy that Imperial Japan pursued not only in WWII but also was similar to their strategy in Mexico in 1917 and 1918 (cite The Zimmermann Telegram Tuchman. As for the Yorktown and Bonhmme Richard incident? You can hardly compare the two. First the main damage to the Yorktown was structural, its flight deck, which while requiring massive work, could be patched together fairly fast, while the damage to the Richard was more extensive and required almost total overhaul to its structure, and all the computer systems within it. This would have required more time and effort than that on the Yorktown. Secondly the need for the Yorktown was greater than Richard, as it was more of a first strikes weapon platform and the immediate danger imposed by the IJN. Lastly, the Richard, as I understand it, was nearing the end of its lifespan, thus it would be better to replace it with a new ship rather than putting more money than it was worth to repair it. Finally, do you honestly believe there is no corruption in the Armed forces of the Peoples Republic of China? Especially in their equivalent JCOS levels?
The TBD Devastator’s biggest fault was the terrible mk13 torpedo it carried. US Navy submarines at Midway were handicapped by their defective mk14 torpedoes. This failure isn’t mentioned.
Only a few Japanese civilians knew about the Midway defeat. One company that did and made a fortune was Nomura Securities who shorted the Tokyo Stock Market. I know as Economic Officer at Embassy in Tokyo 1980s I was told this by my Japanese friends in the market.
It is interesting in war and sports how comparatively small advantages can work towards a binary result. Your assessment of the shipboard data (assuming it is authentic) was amazing and certainly puts Fuchida in his place. However, having heavily armed planes beneath the decks when the US struck may well have been worse than having them on deck. It is my understanding that explosives are more effective in a confined space as the resulting pressure is greater. Could it be that a lot of the damage was due to that orientation? Furthermore, one can image the sheer hell that would have occurred below decks when the strikes occurred and perhaps this is a better explanation why the IJN lost so many mechanics etc when the Kaga was destroyed. The hardiness of a ship in combat is of course due to its construction, how it was hit, how it was fought and damage control. Perhaps, the USN had more practical approach to damage control, knowing they were new at this, that their ships were going to receive damage, but to try to minimize it. If such is supported above then you get smart ideas like the CO2 in the fuel lines. Remember, this was implemented after Coral Sea only a week or two before Midway. For me, this seems like this innovation was adopted at light speed, something feel good for the ratings who were listened to in this situation. I don't know anything about the physical structure of the US carriers compared the those of the IJN in the ability to sustain torpedo damage etc. Again, the location of any torpedo strike was just luck anyway, especially from any torpedo bomber (aka flying coffins). So, I get that the tone of this is pro USN and yes they were the good guys, but if we are having an intellectual discussion of the war then passions should be set aside. The IJN built solid boats as well and even with the damage they all suffered on 04 June they were all sunk later by IJN forces. However, IMHO, for the IJN, it was just too far and too exposed to try to tow a partial wreck back home. Adm. Spruance was placed in an impossible situation. I am quite sure that the crew of the Enterprise would not respect his leadership given that he had not commanded a carrier before. Halsey should have done something about that, perhaps he did dunno. Anyhow, I don't think that Spruance did anything amazing to the 'win' the battle nor did he behave badly. I think when you launch your planes from so far away and in an uncoordinated fashion it was just luck that they caught the IJN with their CAP down. The USN had broken the codes, but in war as well as other forms of combat often success comes first from being able to at least in part being able to read the other man's cards. Everybody was doing it, but the US made more of it and then used 'codetalkers' to stump them completely. Same in Europe. Without Bletchley park things would have last much longer and probably the nuclear bombs would have been used on Berlin. In any competition, the result is luck based on percentages of skill, construction, intelligence, leadership and all the rest. In a battle, I would expect that it is fought by the pilots and the gunners. The brass hats are to provide the training and the equipment and the grand strategy. I think with a generally competent force, the leaders are less able to 'win' a battle, but they sure as hell can lose one.
The central revelation of "Shattered Sword"- namely, that all of the Japanese attack aircraft were in the hangars of the carriers when the dive bomber attack began- is not true. What the authors relied on a primary source- Senshi Sosho- which is not the official history that they claimed it to be. 1. The authors omitted the USSBS statement of Soryu’s executive officer (Cmdr. Hisaishi Ohara), who said that Soryu’s 1st wave of the strike against the U.S. carriers was on the flight deck awaiting the order to launch when the ship was attacked. This corroborates the statements of U.S. diver bomber pilots and gunners that Soryu’s flight deck had many aircraft spotted aft. 2. They also omitted the statement of Kaga’s air officer (Lt. Cmdr. Takahisa Amagai), who said that Kaga had approximately 30 aircraft in her hangars, six fighters in the air, and the rest (approximately 20 aircraft) on her flight deck when the ship was attacked. This corroborates the statement of Cmdr. McClusky, who said that Kaga’s flight deck was covered with aircraft. 3. They passed over in silence the 20- minute gap between the end of the dive bomber attacks at 1030 and the start of the launch of Hiryu’s retaliatory strike at 1050. Even had they jumped into action instantly, the Japanese could not possibly have spotted 24 aircraft in just 20 minutes- and this doesn’t take into account briefing the aircrews or warming up aircraft engines. 4. So far as I’m aware, there is no clear statement from any aviator to the effect that they had a clear and unobstructed view of the flight decks of these carriers when they were attacked and that they were empty- or almost empty. In any case, statements from former Japanese aviators were taken decades after the battle when they were in their 70s and 80s- and possibly 90s. Memories fade with time. Lastly, senior officers- unlike deck crew or pilots- are responsible for knowing the status of the ship’s air group. This is the primary reason why they- and not enlisted deck crew or pilots- were questioned as part of the USSBS. The reason why the statements of Soryu’s and Kaga’s senior surviving officers were left out of Shattered Sword is simple enough. They are contemporary Japanese sources whose statements directly contradict the claim of the two authors that all of the attack aircraft were in the hangars of the carriers when they were attacked. In fact, only Akagi’s attack aircraft were in her hangars when she was attacked.
Finally someone has said Cpt Mitscher of the Hornet was responsible for the loss of the Yorktown. Once I learned about the "flight to no where" from the Hornet and the lack of after action reports by Mitscher and his air group commander as required by Navy regulations I was outraged. Mitscher should have not only been fired but never allowed to command again. He was not essential to the war effort and others could have commanded in his place in 1944. I am in good company if Adm Spruance thought the same.
Make that two people who agree with Parshall and I second your additional thoughts. It's quite possible that Nimitz was influenced by what he witnessed while a cadet at the academy. A major published work, the "History of the United States Navy, whose third volume was released while he was a plebe, covered the Spanish-American war and criticized, very rudely, the mishandling of naval forces by a "commodore" subordinate to the US Fleet Commander in that region. Long story short, there was a protracted court of inquiry covered extensively by the newspapers. This, it appears, affected Nimitz's view of how issues resulting from command decisions should be handled. He was said to have vowed to never subject anyone subordinate to his command to potentially the same dog and pony show, no matter the circumstances.
I'm really curious to know something. After Corral Sea, Yorktown was so shot up she needed at least two weeks to repair. Nimitz then ordered her put to sea again in 48 hours. It's fine to issue an order, and in Hollywood it's fine to wave a magic wand and accomplish the impossible on a movie screen, but in the real world, getting two weeks worth of battle damage repair crammed into two days sounds completely unrealistic, yet, that's what the shipyard did. How did they get that done?
@22:00 they talk about Japan's inability to have a coherent strategy. Right, they explained the problem in the sentence "The Japanese". They did not say Tojo's strategy, or Hitler's strategy or, Rosevelt's or Stalin's. They are pointing out the fundamental problem with the Japanese government at that time. It was run by the military that had two major factions, the navy and army that did not get along. These are committee decisions, but worse, that committee that is being influenced by factions of lower level officers that are willing to fabricate conflicts and kill leaders that get in their way. The very fact that Japan was in a war against the USA proves they have no strategy. They know they cannot win. They know they can only get out of this war ahead if they convince the USA to stop fighting before Japan is wiped off the map. Which leads me to why I think these historians need to give Yamamoto a big heaping of credit.
You showed TBFs. I thought they were not yet in service then. TBDs were used, and SBDs. It seems to me that when an unfortunate thing happens, some poor lower-level officer is relieved as a way for his superiors to say, "Not my fault. He did it!" and thereby protect themselves. I was never a victim of that myself--perhaps I wasn't important enough to be a sufficient blame-taker. The one time I did relieve a subordinate it was because of repeated failure to keep me informed even when counseled as to exactly what I wanted to see each day.
I was wondering John partial I think I’ve watched and listened to him many times and I know he’s an American and you have three other Americans that you say are world renowned in this subject and I was wondering why do I never hear Japanese historians talk about these battles
I always wanted to ask John and Craig, whether they would think that the "invasion force" going into the Alutians, could have been considered a safeguard, in case that something bad would happen to Nagumo's carriers. - Another question is whether could have been possible, even though the japanese doctrine tells him to use the biggest hammer that he's got., Could have moved with anticipation the planes that were in reserve, flying into another deck to allow the returning Midway operation to land more comfortably and rapidly. - the other items that were not mentioned was the McCluskey persecution of the Arashi, leading into to kiddo butai location. - I think that is the most decisive factor of the battle, - and equivalent to Dick Best's action over the Akagi. - In my humbe opinion. - Last and not least, when later in the war the Yammomoto inspection flight is intercepted, i would have heart the plane and capture Yammamoto instead of directly killing him. - That would probably would have been some sort of interesting interrogation.
NAGUMO'S offensive was doommed from the start @ Midway. Just think for an assumed moment, a second wave was launched from his decks to "finish" Midway. Question really is what would that wave would have encounter in the way in and in the way in, and in the way back. Here is my view: in the way in the jspanese surprise factor is gone and the americans are prepared. On the way back this attack wave coming back from Midway, would have found their carriers burning, out of fuel and without alternative to ditching in front of the burning kiddo buttai.
With the Russia/Ukraine war in play, I can get a feel for how the Allied public must have felt. We dont know how the R/U war will end and hope only for the best. WW2 was indeed a WORLD WAR. WW1, Really was not. Midway, as the one panelist said, would only have served as a Glimmer of hope. Other experts have pointed to the vast industrial capacity of the US as the lynch pin that achieved eventual success. I agree. The decisive battle was Dec 7. When the Japanese struck that morning, they opened up a Hornets nest. Americas terrible resolve WAS a sleeping giant. We entered the Pacific war in carrier parity with the Japanese of approximately 6 to 6 . By wars end, We had about 100 to Japans 25. Wiki the rest and you'll see.
The percentage of American torpedo bombers lost at Midway seems to have been about the same. Army B-26 bombers--two or three lost out of four. PBY--managed to avoid losses while operating as a torpedo bomber. TBF Avengers--five out of six lost. The problem was unsupported torpedo bomber attacks, not so much the type of torpedo plane.
True. If TBFs were on the carriers though, the limitations of speed and range of the TBD would be gone. The TBFs would have been able to fly higher and faster towards the target and be kept in sight easier by the overhead fighters. Would any these improvements be recognized right away by the aircraft carrier captains and air group commanders is a question though.
@@robertdendooven7258 I agree--the TBD was on the way out due to performance. I'm arguing that the TBD loss rate and the TBF loss rate were close enough that using the TBD loss rate as the main reason for replacement was deceptive. If I remember correctly, the TBD production line had already been shut down. TBD bombers had performed credibly in both high-altitude and torpedo bombing missions prior to Midway. The best-performing torpedo bomber might be the PBY because the single PBY that attempted a torpedo attack seems to have both survived and hit its target--but the torpedo was a dud. I was surprised to learn that the Nordan bomb sight had been developed by the US Navy for use in its flying boats and carrier-based torpedo bombers. I've seen multiple Nordans and the portable part looked like a handful. Then there's the parts that link the Nordan to the aircraft--more bulk and more weight. The TBF was more heavily armed than the TBD--one forward-firing .30 caliber machine gun (yes, THIRTY caliber), one .30 caliber in a ventral firing "tunnel" for attacks from below, and that .AN/M2 Caliber .50 aircraft gun in that cramped power-operated dorsal turret. Despite that heavy armament and flying in formation both for defensive use and to get a good bomb pattern on target, the TBF/TBM needed fighter escort to survive Imperial Japanese Navy Combat Air Patrols--and Midway was the first indication. The TBD did well earlier because those formations either achieved total surprise (no fighter opposition) or because the torpedo bombers had fighter escort--at Coral Sea the TBDs managed to coordinate their attacks with the SBDs while the Wildcats took on the few Japanese fighters. At Midway, the improved TBF wasn't able to fight on its own through enemy Combat Air Patrol fighters. It was said that the TBD's targets could run away from the slow TBD--but at least it wasn't the T4M that Heinlein flew in at the Sunday, 7 February 1932 Fleet Problem XIII fleet problem that was an exercise surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The T4M was said to take off at 65 MPH, fly at 65 MPH, and land at 65 MPH.
@@katharinelong5472 True. But they gave their crews better survivability and more flexibility to those planning airstrikes from carriers. Sometimes the torpedo did work in 1942 though. There were a few hits by torpedo bombers on Japanese ships in the Guadalcanal campaign.
the thing is the Kongo class would have been chewed up the heavy cruise used an 8 inch version of the Mark 7 Super Heavy which is 100 pounds heavier than any 8 inch armor piercing projectile just the one Kongo is chewed up in the battle of Guadalcanal on the first by just one 8-inch cruiser now see 2 Kongo versus several 8-inch cruisers the Kongo wore very light-armored they had better night radar than the Kongos, and they fired faster a night battle would have hurt both side
The Guadalcanal campaign started 2 months later, I wonder what effect that had on that campaign. Also if that campaign had kicked off before this battle would they have woke up and realized Midway is a sideshow and the south and their oil supply line the real show and canceled this sideshow. Other than this battle the Japanese created, Midway had little effect on the war and it basically another Johnson Atoll as a place to do scouting from, in fact Johnson was probably more valuable as a stop on the south Pacific route.
Imagine the Americans invaded Guadalcanal 2-3 months earlier. So Guadalcanal switched Japanese navy priority to the Southwest Pacific. Could the Pacific Fleet have ambushed four Japanese aircraft carriers in that theater? Japan had island based asserts in the Solomons. It would very difficult for Nimitz to get his 3-4 carriers there undetected by the Japanese. Plus the steaming distance to the SW Pacific from Pearl Harbor is four (?) times what there were from PH too Point Luck.
I was stationed on Johnston Atoll. It is approximately 800 miles WSW of Oahu. The Atoll was attacked several times by the Japanese, however nothing serious. It was mostly used as a refueling base for aircraft in transit and sub base. It was part of the Hawaiian Islands Defense Perimeter, Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra. I honestly think the Japanese capture would have been much different than Wake. Midway was heavily reinforced and wouldn't been an easy capture. Also Midway was a lot closer to Hawaii, and seriously a long way from the Japanese supply line. Japanese Midway would have been an American punching bag. Anything they built would have been bombed. Resupply would have been from submarine, since it would have been easy pickings for American submarine forces to sink surface ships defending or resupplying Midway. The Solomons were much more important, as they were a jumping off point for the Japanese to grab Samoa, blocking the supply route to Australia.
@@timf2279 …. Midway for Yamamoto was bait. To which the Pacific Fleet would respond with Carriers. Letting the Japanese keep Guadalcanal endangered shipping to Australia. Australia couldn’t be allowed to be isolated from the Americas.
midway and Guadalcanal changed the air group by changing the bomber squadron to a fighter bomber squadron letting the carrier have one squadron to protect the carrier and one full squadron of fighters to protect the bomber on the attack at the battle of the Philippine Sea Task Force 58 hellcats outnumber the total of all Japanese carrier planes
----- The Japanese probably would have eaten all the gooney birds and they would be extinct now. They wouldn't have enough capability to keep the Japanese troops bellies even slightly full.
Very high stakes. If the Americans lost the battle, the Japanese fleet could have sailed right into San Francisco Bay and blown it to bits. Same with the west coast en toto and maybe even the Panama Canal.
The 2019 Midway movie totally ignored the Naval fighter squadrons. Kids just learning about this battle will wonder why the Americans didn’t use fighters.
As the movie had as its main setting the USS Enterprise...her fighter squadron did not really do much at all at Midway. Only Yorktown's fighters did much at the battle.
IMHO, is the IJN had brought all 5 fleet CV and also the 2 others they didn't in another group with the fast BB somewhere close behind, with the 4 slow BB & Hosho where the Main BB force was, then Nimitz would have backed off. Point Luck was chosen to give Nimitz time to make new decisions. The same if Yorktown could not be ready, he would have ordered the other 2 CV to turn and sail away with the IJN never knowing they were ever out there. . . . Obviously, I disagree with Rexfrom MN below. Losing all 3 CV would have also ment many of the men on them. it would have made moral in the US plummet. The Essex class with not be available until '43, '44, and even '45. It would make the war last another year. at least and cot many more lives.
4:25 Nagano was right 1- USA first operation is in Guadalcanal, confirming the Salomon Islands was the weakest spot of the Japanese perimeter 2- Hitting closer to Hawaii at Midway is contrary to the japanese strategy of forcing the USnavy to sail a *long distance* , whittle them on the way with torpedos and night attacks, and do the "kantai kessen" 3- The US fleet *did not sail out* to recover the whole of the Phillipines.. it certaintly would not sail out for a miserable atoll (13:00) 4- Threatening Australia was more important than taking Midway. Threatening Australia (huge coastline, many targets) would tie up (a lot of) allied resources for defense, resources that would the *not be available* for offense. Also could create friction between Royal Navy and USNavy goals 5- 19:00 If you are arguing for an easy "land grab" in the Alleutians because they *MAY* bomb north Japan (meh🤷) .. land grab the Solomons where you *KNOW* they can bomb Rabaul (which is vital) All the above without even throwing in the possibility of compromised codes. 🧑🦯 Disclaimer: Totally monday quarterback talking with 80 years of hindsight and perfect knowledge. Not saying I am good/better.
John Lundstrom brought something out (a pretty long time ago, one of his earlier books, so this isn't "late-breaking" analysis) that I've not seen discussed elsewhere, at least not so clearly as he did. He showed pretty convincingly that, long before the Japanese Midway plan had been picked up by the codebreakers, Nimitz had already been seeking a "Midway-like" battle, i.e., a large-scale confrontation between the IJN and USN carrier forces, for some time.
It's well-known that LEX (TF 11) and YOR (TF 17) fought at Coral Sea while ENT/HOR (TF 16), steaming southward, were too far away to become a factor...that's standard fare found in probably any account of that battle. Lundstrom pointed out, however, that Nimitz well knew that TF 16 would not arrive in time for that initial contest vs the Japanese Port Moresby invasion attempt. Instead, he was sending them down for follow-on battles he thought likely to occur. We know now that Yamamoto was already firmly set on the Midway operation. CarDiv 5 (Shokaku/Zuikaku) was rather grudgingly allocated to Inoue's South Seas Fleet for MO, with no plan or intent to commit any more carrier forces in that theater for the time being.
Nimitz, however, did not (yet) know this; from the US perspective, it was known that the Japanese were coming for Moresby, and very likely wanted to continue a major South Pacific effort toward Noumea, Samoa, and Fiji. Which was accurate enough; that was indeed what Inoue's intent was - in fact his orders from above. So Nimitz was fully aware that the initial carrier clash at Coral Sea was going to be 2-vs-2. He was sending TF 16 down, committing more carriers for that campaign, because he thought it highly likely that the IJN would also commit more carriers. It appeared that the South Pacific was developing into the IJN's main thrust of effort, as in fact both Japan's Naval HQ and South Seas Fleet (Inoue) very much wanted.
The irony of all this is that Yamamoto's Midway operation was conceived in the first place to solve the strategic/operational problem of "how do we entice the US carriers into battle so that we can destroy them?". When all along, that solution was right there in front of him: continue already-existing plans to push further into the South Pacific and cut that communications line to Australia. US carrier operations for months (Feb Rabaul raid, Mar Lae-Salamua raid, and of course Coral Sea itself) had given ample indication that Nimitz and the USN would likely oblige Yamamoto with the carrier battle he sought. And Nimitz was doing exactly that. He wanted a big carrier scrap just as much as Yamamoto did (within his famous "calculated risk" mindset, looking for a favorable opportunity, of course).
None of these basic facts are new, but I've never read anyone - before or since - connect them together in an analysis quite the way Lundstrom did...in 1978 (his "The First South Pacific Campaign").
Jon has done a great job shedding light onto this epic battle. Kudos
Smart people are just so cool!!! Enjoyed every second of this! Thanks guys.
I agree with giving some degree of praise to the 2019 Midway film. Obviously there were some glaring inaccuracies, and many of those did fall under the general heading of "amping up the action and explosions just to make it look more exciting". *However,* when I was watching it, I could clearly recognize numerous events and lines of dialogue from books like Ian Toll's _Pacific Crucible,_ John Lundstrom's _First Team,_ and of course _Shattered Sword._ At least some people involved with the production of that film did make the effort to actually read through the most up-to-date scholarship on the Battle of Midway and the early part of the Pacific War generally, which is a substantial step up from what we often see with "historical" films. Obviously some people in the production did prioritize "more explosions", "edgier main characters", and "fewer computer models" over historical accuracy, but some of the actual research still does come through - Jon's mention of the Japanese hangar decks is a good example.
I can't think of a WWII movie made in the last 20 years that has the level of accuracy found in the 2019 Midway. My only problem is that it has comic book characters. It is also an "odd" movie, made when WWII was losing Hollywood's favor. Last one I recall has a zombie tie-in. I'm glad somebody went ahead and made Midway.
Jon did some consulting for the 2019 film. He did reinforce that the Japanese attack force still had the bombers and strike aircraft in the hanger decks, and not spotted on the flight deck at 10:20 a.m.
midway (76) is why I’m here trying to educate myself. I’ve had the honor of standing at ground Zero Hiroshima (twice) and at Pearl harbor. I’d like to know all the pacific stories.
Whats your thought on the original movie?
What a treat, what a gift.
I am new to being obsessed with the battle of Midway. This discussion is wonderful, thank you!
Man me too! Are there many of us obsessees?
@@timdd9880 Mine came after I retired. I think it is an older male thing.
Awesome discussion -- thanks! Couple comments: John's opening summation ends with a comment that the Guadalcanal campaign does "grave damage to the Japanese", but let's not forget that the US Navy got its nose severely bloodied as well. It's not like we came out of Midway having figured everything out. There were still many lessons left to learn. I was also surprised Trent's lesson learned did not include "Carrier air power rules!" Although perhaps that was a sort of "duh" for all concerned, even back then.
You are missing the impact of the American victory at Midway that sunk four FLEET carriers of the Japanese navy. If the Americans had lost big at Midway the Japanese fleet could have sailed into San Francisco Bay and blown it to hell. The same goes for Long Beach, San Diego and maybe even the Panama Canal. If that had happened you have a very different WWII.
@@lurking0death The west coast certainly would have been vulnerable for a period of time but attacking the west coast of the United States in 1942 would have been a logistical nightmare for the IJN. Obviously Hawaii was the next very difficult target and that operation would have tied Japan down for a long time. As far as the west coast goes the Navy would have had the time and resources and recovered enough to protect the USA mainland. The real risk was Guadalcanal, Port Moresby, French Polynesia and Fiji island. If the Imperial Japanese plans were realized Australia would have been isolated and Japan would have solidified their raw material sources for the long term. That begs the question, what would the western pacific geopolitical environment look like 70 years later if Midway resulted in all US carriers being sunk rather than 4 IJN frontline carriers being sunk?
Fletcher has been criminally underrated by historians.
Jack Fletcher got on Admiral King’s bad side. There’s a story there. I don’t know what it is. It being Washington DC I suspect Fletcher, a cruiser-destroyer officer, recieved the jealousy of the airedale admirals for being a task force commander. So Fletcher was demoted to commander of a naval district
@@Idahoguy10157 If Fletcher wasn't liked because he was not a pilot, then I don't understand how Spruance (another non-flyer) was able to command Task Force 58 later in the war. I have always believed many were simply jealous of Fletcher either because of his time in DC, winning the Medal of Honor (which Fletcher himself believed was undeserving), or commanding at Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons.
@@spudskie3907 …. The story I’ve read is Halsey was hospitalized and Nimitz needed a replacement NOW. Halsey recommended Spruance. With the caveat Spruance bring Miles Browning. Browning has Halsey’s right hand man at air operations.
@@Idahoguy10157 Yes....I know very well the story of how Spruance got the job commanding TF 16 prior to Midway. I am talking about afterwards. Many did not like Fletcher commanding carriers because he was not an aviator. Well...Spruance was not a pilot, yet he was allowed to command TF 58 later in the war.
@@spudskie3907 …Yes. Spruance was chosen by Admiral Nimitz. As for his reassignment stateside by Admiral King…IDK. I’ve read somewhere King was disappointed in, or disliked, Spruance. Or both. Apparently Nimitz couldn’t have objected too hard about it. I am glad historians are recognizing Spruance’s contributions of 1942.
In this discussion it was never mentioned that the Japanese positioned a submarine picket line between Midway and the Hawaiian islands to watch for any movement by the US Navy towards Midway but the picket line set up one day late verse Yamamoto’s plan. That one day delay allowed the carriers to leave Pearl undetected. I would have loved to hear comments on this failure by the Japanese & it’s importance.
how do you know that ?
Thoroughly enjoyed every minute. Ate it all up. Nice job gentlemen !
Just had the opportunity to watch this terrific discussion! I found it to be very enjoyable & interesting! Thank you so much!
Wow...absolute gold. Thank you guys.
Nimitz picked and supported the most appropriate and capable people which few leaders in major public companies do.
I listened to this whole discussion. I am a voracious reader and student of WW2. I served 20 years on active duty as an intelligence analyst. I may not know as much as these historians about all the smaller stuff about the battle of Midway because I spend a lot of time reading about the Eastern Front. However, I have read quite few of the US Army Green books on WW2 and have Eliot Morrison's Naval history of WW2 collection. Most of these I have read along the way. My issue is simply in June, 1942 that Admiral Nimitz had to fight, inflict harm on the Japanese fleet regardless of the cost. The Coral Sea was a costly battle for both the Americans and the Japanese. Heavy Japanese aircrew/pilot losses at the Coral Sea with two damaged carriers meant only four carriers made the trip to Midway.
I disagree with the assessment that Nimitz held the carriers there at Point Luck just in case to see how the battle was going. Admiral Nimitz had to hit the Japanese fleet as hard as could regardless of the cost to America. The Japanese fleet just had to be stopped even if Nimitz lost all three carriers it didn't matter. Admiral Nimitz could NOT afford to let the Japanese get away with another raid on American soil, even if it was just the atoll of Midway. Admiral Nimitz had to send all the carriers, including the patched up Yorktown, to Midway to fight the Japanese carriers regardless of the cost. Say for the sake of argument the US Navy had all three American carriers sunk in the battle but sank four Japanese carriers. It still would still have been worth it. America could NOT afford to look WEAK. The carriers were expendable assets just like the pilots and warplanes were expendable assets for the critical battle. The critical battle was at Midway. If NImitz lost his job, if the Navy had lost all its carriers with heavy losses of crew with all the warplanes lost, it just didn't matter. The fact that the Yorktown was patched up so quickly reinforces the logic of this point. Nimitz had to bet everything on this Midway hand to stand and fight, to stop the Japanese naval fleet while inflicting losses on the Japanese.
The Japanese had been kicking the Americans around the whole Pacific for about six months. The Japanese fleet had to be stopped even if it meant the loss of all three US Navy carriers. There was no "saving the carriers" for a later day battle. Midway was the critical "later day battle" that Clauswitz talks about the reason soldiers are fed, housed and trained is for their expenditure at the critical battle. Nimitz had to fight, make a stand and really hurt the Japanese fleet because politically for moral purposes to keep the war effort going, there was no other choice. It would have been a disaster to have not fought with everything America had at Midway. It would have been a disaster politically, for America's prestige and for the war effort in general had Nimitz not fought at Midway. Nimitz knew that if he got the Japanese fleet by surprise under sustained air attacks from three carriers and from warplanes from Midway he had a good chance to inflict major damage and stop the Japanese advance. The fact most of the crew of the Lexington was saved when it sank was a major plus. We were building more carriers and planes while training thousands of pilots. We could have afforded losing all three carriers as long as equal damage was done to the Japanese I think Admiral King and FDR would have kept Nimitz on as commander of the Pacific fleet. The US Navy had to slug it out with the Japanese fleet somewhere in the Pacific Midway and later Guadalcanal were those two places. Warships, men and warplanes are all expendable assets in a major war. Sure you want to avoid squandering your Navy and trained men in useless battles. However, I argue strongly Midway was a battle America just had to fight, win, lose or draw. Admiral Nimitz had much less flexibility than was discussed here.
Thank you for your points and service. Huzzah !
I remember seeing a documentary about just how overwhelming American war production was in the four years of WW II. In just the number of carriers, America had 99 at its disposal mid 1945. Even the loss of the Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet would have made little effect in the overall outcome of the Pacific theater.
sorry but I have to agree with Jon's assessment of Adm. Marc Mitscher.
Read several of the books, sen the stuff on youtube. This is the one to rule them all.
Outstanding!
Thanks guys
Agreed
😀
What an Excellent Discussion, my YT Favs. are all almost these kinds of programs and why YT decided to Now put this on my notifications is beyond me.
The one 'What if?' question I have always had about the Battle of Midway was the suicide (?) run on an American bomber at the Akagi's bridge on the morning of June 4th, as was depicted in 2019's MIDWAY. Had the bomber been successful at crashing into the Akagi and killing Nagumo, Admiral Yamaguchi, onboard the Hiryu, would have assumed command. Yamaguchi was widely considered a 'hawk' as opposed to Nagumo being a 'dove'. What if Yamaguchi had not hesitated when word first came from the Japanese scout planes about American ships, as Nagumo did, and took the narrow window of opportunity that presented itself to spot and launch the approximately 50 Val dive bombers on his four carriers, even though they were armed with high-explosive bombs instead of the more lethal armour-piercing bombs because of the second attack on Midway previously planned? These were the best pilots that the Japanese had, and seeing the damage that the Hiryu's 17 Vals inflicted later on the Yorktown, those 50(ish) Vals could have seriously damaged all three U.S. carriers. Plus, those planes and their Zero escorts would probably have spotted the dive bombers enroute to the Japanese fleet and alerted Yamaguchi in time for him to order more fighters up high to await them. Makes you glad that the bomber missed, eh?
Yorktown was crucial to our success at Midway as neither the 1) Midway Island air group nor 2) USS Hornet was effective on June 4.
True. Yorktown and Enterprise were the only effective Carriers
But Hornet and Midway did create a lot of distraction and delays for Japanese.
All three books, and all three authors, are full of insights. Buy them, support these guys, and learn a lot.
No, I mean l LOT.
Really found this enjoyable and informative. Thank you all.
I have to be a little critical here, people think Spruance won that battle because experts like yourself went a hour and twelve minutes into a discussion without even mentioning Fletcher at all.
Exactly, Fletcher's command style was perfect for that time. He was a very intelligent man who knew his strengths and his weaknesses. Having spent his whole life in the navy serving on surface combatant ships, he knew he had to draw on all the current operational knowledge from the commanders and air group pilots to get up to speed faster. Under his leadership, working with the men actually flying, he made launches faster by putting the carrier a few dergrees off of heading straight into the wind. This cleared the turbulant air away from the next plane in line. Also, working with commanders Pederson and Arnold, they threw the book out on dated launching strike procedures, transformed, and greatly increased the Yorktown's strike range with that innovative running rendezvous. We can't really hold Spruance accountable for the disasterous launch procedure of Enterprise during that morning strike on kido butai, as he had no knowledge of flight operations, and relied heavily on Browning, having only been carrier command for a few days because Halsey was seriously ill. Unfortunately, Browning was a JCL officer with very little knowledge of recent flying procedures, and thought he knew better than his pilots flying very different, and much evolved planes. TF-16's strike groups got seperated, VF-6's planes ended up escorting VT-8, losing sight of them at a crucial time causing them to fly usessly high up, while VT-8 was getting slaughtered. VB-6, VB-8, VS-8 and VF-8 lost many planes because Enterprise was no where near the stated point option position given by it's air departement. Only Yorktown's strike managed to attack the kido butai as a cohesive group, and split the defence as was the preferred method of attack.
Looking at this video, the ghosts of early historians like Morrison, Bates and Innis still reign.
Thankfully, John Lundsrom set the record straight. Fletcher is the most effective carrier commander in history, and no amount of ignorance is going to change that. Sadly he never got the credit he deserved, but people like Lundsrom will eventually make the masses see.
@@duncani3095 I agree with this statement you made, 100% "Fletcher is the most effective carrier commander in history."
@Scott L And the mention of Fletcher was almost an afterthought here. Very disappointing...
And at 1:12 they were generous with Fletcher so not sure what the problem is.
Sorry, but Fletcher had neither daring nor tactical skills - any apparent advantage that he provided was most likely by pure luck [ happenstance ] or orders that decided to obey....
@@jakefarra7537- Sir, The tactical and operational successes that the Navy did ultimately enjoy in 1942 were under the leadership, and in good measure, thanks to, Frank Fletcher. History sets forth the evidence of this simply by showing he was in command of these successful operations at that time. Even passing temporary command to Spruance at end of the Battle of Midway was an intelligent mature operational last minute decision.
Keep in mind, carrier warfare had never been conducted by the United States Navy up to this point in history. Everything and every decision made was ground breaking. The man did an exceptional job against an enemy that at the point in time had strategic momentum and had not lost a fight against any allied force thrown against him.
As to your previous comment, what supporting data do you bring to your comments that would fairly criticize Admiral Fletcher; data that would support and back up such a negative and mediocre appraisal of the man?
Fabulous discussions!
To add importance to what Trent said, the 40 MM BOFORS, to put it simply, it literally shot down aircraft with it's new high tech Radar Fire Control Systems along with 5 inch 38's, which were already deadly to anything flying, but now with it's rudimentary radar controlled proximity fuse that lethality is multiplied by an order of 5 (or better).
Great event!! Thank you all!!!
This is awesome! Thanks!
Very impressive round table.
Outstanding discussion. Your dealing with the ‘might have beens’ engendered reflection on how many lives might have been changed had the turn of the tide signaled by the U.S. victory at Midway been delayed by six months or a year, and the war extended well into 1946. My own father had been provisionally accepted (as he described it) as a Naval Aviation Cadet, with training expected to began after he graduated from High School in 1945. Suspension of that program after VE Day led to his enlisting in the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) instead, shortly after his high school graduation in 1945. His first USAAF / USAF stint (1945-1948) was served mainly in Alaska, his second stint (1950-1952) was at CONUS Air Force bases.
"We can achieve a great victory, providing Nimitz and Halsey do exactly what you expect."
Nagumo Chuichi (James Shigeta) in "Midway" (1976)
The worst part of Yamamoto's plan is that it included a script for the US fleet.
Unfortunately for Yamamoto, the US Navy didn't even read that script. Perhaps if he had dispatched a copy to Honolulu by air and dropped it on CINCPAC?
Oh ? Well that concept means it was doomed to not achieve the great victory Yamamamoto wanted. Actually Yamamato told Nagumo to keep the half of each carriers airgroup ready to attack American carriers if they showed up. BUT ok, americans contribute a bit with the buildup on Midway, but its Nagumo that goes right off script, and prepares the second half to bomb Midway, which means they are not ready to attack carriers ... The thing about the "script for the US" is the whatif, if the invasion of Midway had gone ahead... What was it really going to do ? The americans weren't going to rush illprepared underpowered ships to Midway to get destroyed... Think about it.. Kido Butai strikes Midway. so what, pacific fleet rushes ships to midway piecemeal.. ??? no they will harass and reconnoitre . Submarines will weaken their ships.. they will suffer attrition.. So it would be better for Yamamato to keep his Kido Butai safe, and use a far more valuable target for a decisive battle.. eg Threaten Brisbane Australia ? Thats why Roosevelt and Pentagon cannot understand Midway.. its not valuable enough, what is going on ??? decisive battle at Midway ? What it won't do for Nimitz is prepare his carriers for any future big battles.... it doesn't let King tell Roosevelt that the Navy can defend Hawaii, andbetter to keep the carriers to defend California ? ... Losing Midway may mean a retreat from Hawaii to defend the contiguous 48.. Macarthur might be given the Pacific fleet entirely.. and that would be.. a death sentence for most of the navy.. and no good strategically. and the timing thing is there, Nimitz King Roosevelt need to know now .. not next year, if the american carriers can deal with the Kido Butai ? and when will they do this crazy plan again ?? take the opportunity now, or retreat to California ?? and run a war of attritition with Indonesia, PNG, Australia as the battlefield. So the decisive Battle.. Nimitz, King agree that that japanese have a poor ability to win a battle... the script thing is an example.. they are sure to go off script when they shouldn't and stay on script when they shouldn't... they didnt know exactly how, but they would have to try the ambush and test them out. And for morale and to save lives (protection..prevent a Battle of Hawaii of Battle of Brisbane etc), save Midway.
@@leong108 I suspect that Yamamoto had met many of America's French politicians and didn't realize that America had handed off control of the military campaign to someone else. You might not have gotten the memo--French and American military establishments share the fatal flaw of being controlled by French politicians. That's how the "finest army in the world" kept getting defeated war after war.
Yes, but see my comment above. In short, sure it's a horrible plan, but name a better one. Yamamoto knows that there are hundreds of aircraft carriers coming off the USA ways in the coming years with all the support ships, personnel and planes to match. He knows Japan is an island that can be throttled by subs. He knows Japan has no chance unless they manage to convince the USA to stop fighting. If you are in Yamamoto's shoes what would you do differently? Oh, and if you are going to assume that the USN is reading your codes and therefor assume that the USN is waiting at Midway, then wouldn't you just wave the white flag?
Thank you, gentlemen. This was an awesome video. I thought that I knew a lot about the Midway battle. But, I was wrong!
Yamamoto deserves a huge pile of credit.
1) Symonds makes it clear that Yamamoto's plan was to draw out the USN carriers and sink them. This seems like a darn good plan for getting the USA to quit the Pacific until Hitler was defeated, and hope the USA would not be eager to kick Japan out of its conquests. Go ahead and name an obviously better plan for coming out ahead in this war.
2) They make it clear that Nimitz was not going to take battle unless the calculated risk was worth it, but then they criticize Yamamoto for not bringing Zuikaku and speculate that that would have made a big difference. They also said that Nimitz was concerned about that 5th carrier. In other words, it sounds like Yamamoto got it right. Maybe the better solution is to have Zuikaku come along, but stay away and hopefully not spotted until the USN carriers have been detected.
3) In Shattered Sword, they criticize Yamamoto's dispositions, but the USN did discover the invasion transports and not the Yamato led battle force. So the goal of making it clear to the USN that Japan was going to invade Midway and not just raid it was a success.
4) They make it clear that breaking the IJN codes was amazing and thus the Japanese were reasonable to assume that the USA did not know they were coming and thus it is totally logical to assume that the USN carriers won't be there that morning.
5) They hedged on whether a draw at Midway would have had no major impact on the outcome of the war. They agree that maybe the USA would have grown tired of fighting Japan. In other words, they agree that Yamamoto's hope of getting the USA to stop fighting had merit if the carriers were sunk.
6) They criticize the Japanese fixation on a decisive battle, but Japan must have a decisive battle. "decisive" does not mean lopsided victory, it means that it makes a decision on the war. The Japanese have to have that. They know they cannot win a war of attrition. They must get a lopsided victory and hope that it is decisive at getting the USA to stop fighting.
Great presentation, thank you.
Great discussion!
Twice in the video Symonds says Spruance was told to "head west" if things are going bad at Midway. I assume he meant "head east", because is west is out in the Pacific toward Japan. That would make no sense. East is back toward the US.
Im quite convinced that the massive increase in interest in The Pacific War comes from a collective bubbling feeling that the next big one will be Pacific War 2.
I agree. We can see China paralleling some of the same moves and strategic goals as the Imperial Japanese Armed forces had in WWII
@@coleparker Which moves specifically? The only aggression in the Pacific would be those by the US from thousand of miles away. The US has been launching offensives after ofensives all over the globe over the last 50 years. It just got its behind kicked in Afghanistan and is still knee deep in Iraq and now Ukraine. Like imperial Japan, the US is at the zenith of its military power but does not have the industrial power to sustain it. How long did it took to repair Yorktown after Coral Sea? And what happened after the fire on Bonhomme Richard? You consider it "too expensive to repair" and prefer to build a new ship. Corruption from within ensures that the US will lose the next war.
@@賴志偉-d7h Movement into Cambodia, to begin building a deep Water Navy Base, the establishment of fortified artificial islands near the Spratly islands and incidents near the Philippines and Australia, are similar to the moves Imperial Japan made in 1941 and 42 against Dutch Indonesia, and French Indochina, and finally the British territories in Hong Kong, and Singapore. The movement of Chinese in the Solomon Islands, and the economic advances into Chile, and Central America are similar to the strategy that Imperial Japan pursued not only in WWII but also was similar to their strategy in Mexico in 1917 and 1918 (cite The Zimmermann Telegram Tuchman.
As for the Yorktown and Bonhmme Richard incident? You can hardly compare the two. First the main damage to the Yorktown was structural, its flight deck, which while requiring massive work, could be patched together fairly fast, while the damage to the Richard was more extensive and required almost total overhaul to its structure, and all the computer systems within it. This would have required more time and effort than that on the Yorktown. Secondly the need for the Yorktown was greater than Richard, as it was more of a first strikes weapon platform and the immediate danger imposed by the IJN. Lastly, the Richard, as I understand it, was nearing the end of its lifespan, thus it would be better to replace it with a new ship rather than putting more money than it was worth to repair it.
Finally, do you honestly believe there is no corruption in the Armed forces of the Peoples Republic of China? Especially in their equivalent JCOS levels?
The TBD Devastator’s biggest fault was the terrible mk13 torpedo it carried. US Navy submarines at Midway were handicapped by their defective mk14 torpedoes. This failure isn’t mentioned.
Only a few Japanese civilians knew about the Midway defeat. One company that did and made a fortune was Nomura Securities who shorted the Tokyo Stock Market. I know as Economic Officer at Embassy in Tokyo 1980s I was told this by my Japanese friends in the market.
It is interesting in war and sports how comparatively small advantages can work towards a binary result. Your assessment of the shipboard data (assuming it is authentic) was amazing and certainly puts Fuchida in his place. However, having heavily armed planes beneath the decks when the US struck may well have been worse than having them on deck. It is my understanding that explosives are more effective in a confined space as the resulting pressure is greater. Could it be that a lot of the damage was due to that orientation? Furthermore, one can image the sheer hell that would have occurred below decks when the strikes occurred and perhaps this is a better explanation why the IJN lost so many mechanics etc when the Kaga was destroyed.
The hardiness of a ship in combat is of course due to its construction, how it was hit, how it was fought and damage control. Perhaps, the USN had more practical approach to damage control, knowing they were new at this, that their ships were going to receive damage, but to try to minimize it. If such is supported above then you get smart ideas like the CO2 in the fuel lines. Remember, this was implemented after Coral Sea only a week or two before Midway. For me, this seems like this innovation was adopted at light speed, something feel good for the ratings who were listened to in this situation.
I don't know anything about the physical structure of the US carriers compared the those of the IJN in the ability to sustain torpedo damage etc. Again, the location of any torpedo strike was just luck anyway, especially from any torpedo bomber (aka flying coffins). So, I get that the tone of this is pro USN and yes they were the good guys, but if we are having an intellectual discussion of the war then passions should be set aside. The IJN built solid boats as well and even with the damage they all suffered on 04 June they were all sunk later by IJN forces. However, IMHO, for the IJN, it was just too far and too exposed to try to tow a partial wreck back home.
Adm. Spruance was placed in an impossible situation. I am quite sure that the crew of the Enterprise would not respect his leadership given that he had not commanded a carrier before. Halsey should have done something about that, perhaps he did dunno. Anyhow, I don't think that Spruance did anything amazing to the 'win' the battle nor did he behave badly. I think when you launch your planes from so far away and in an uncoordinated fashion it was just luck that they caught the IJN with their CAP down. The USN had broken the codes, but in war as well as other forms of combat often success comes first from being able to at least in part being able to read the other man's cards. Everybody was doing it, but the US made more of it and then used 'codetalkers' to stump them completely. Same in Europe. Without Bletchley park things would have last much longer and probably the nuclear bombs would have been used on Berlin.
In any competition, the result is luck based on percentages of skill, construction, intelligence, leadership and all the rest. In a battle, I would expect that it is fought by the pilots and the gunners. The brass hats are to provide the training and the equipment and the grand strategy. I think with a generally competent force, the leaders are less able to 'win' a battle, but they sure as hell can lose one.
The central revelation of "Shattered Sword"- namely, that all of the Japanese attack aircraft were in the hangars of the carriers when the dive bomber attack began- is not true. What the authors relied on a primary source- Senshi Sosho- which is not the official history that they claimed it to be.
1. The authors omitted the USSBS statement of Soryu’s executive officer (Cmdr. Hisaishi Ohara), who said that Soryu’s 1st wave of the strike against the U.S. carriers was on the flight deck awaiting the order to launch when the ship was attacked. This corroborates the statements of U.S. diver bomber pilots and gunners that Soryu’s flight deck had many aircraft spotted aft.
2. They also omitted the statement of Kaga’s air officer (Lt. Cmdr. Takahisa Amagai), who said that Kaga had approximately 30 aircraft in her hangars, six fighters in the air, and the rest (approximately 20 aircraft) on her flight deck when the ship was attacked. This corroborates the statement of Cmdr. McClusky, who said that Kaga’s flight deck was covered with aircraft.
3. They passed over in silence the 20- minute gap between the end of the dive bomber attacks at 1030 and the start of the launch of Hiryu’s retaliatory strike at 1050. Even had they jumped into action instantly, the Japanese could not possibly have spotted 24 aircraft in just 20 minutes- and this doesn’t take into account briefing the aircrews or warming up aircraft engines.
4. So far as I’m aware, there is no clear statement from any aviator to the effect that they had a clear and unobstructed view of the flight decks of these carriers when they were attacked and that they were empty- or almost empty. In any case, statements from former Japanese aviators were taken decades after the battle when they were in their 70s and 80s- and possibly 90s. Memories fade with time. Lastly, senior officers- unlike deck crew or pilots- are responsible for knowing the status of the ship’s air group. This is the primary reason why they- and not enlisted deck crew or pilots- were questioned as part of the USSBS.
The reason why the statements of Soryu’s and Kaga’s senior surviving officers were left out of Shattered Sword is simple enough. They are contemporary Japanese sources whose statements directly contradict the claim of the two authors that all of the attack aircraft were in the hangars of the carriers when they were attacked. In fact, only Akagi’s attack aircraft were in her hangars when she was attacked.
Finally someone has said Cpt Mitscher of the Hornet was responsible for the loss of the Yorktown. Once I learned about the "flight to no where" from the Hornet and the lack of after action reports by Mitscher and his air group commander as required by Navy regulations I was outraged. Mitscher should have not only been fired but never allowed to command again. He was not essential to the war effort and others could have commanded in his place in 1944. I am in good company if Adm Spruance thought the same.
Make that two people who agree with Parshall and I second your additional thoughts. It's quite possible that Nimitz was influenced by what he witnessed while a cadet at the academy. A major published work, the "History of the United States Navy, whose third volume was released while he was a plebe, covered the Spanish-American war and criticized, very rudely, the mishandling of naval forces by a "commodore" subordinate to the US Fleet Commander in that region. Long story short, there was a protracted court of inquiry covered extensively by the newspapers. This, it appears, affected Nimitz's view of how issues resulting from command decisions should be handled. He was said to have vowed to never subject anyone subordinate to his command to potentially the same dog and pony show, no matter the circumstances.
I'm really curious to know something. After Corral Sea, Yorktown was so shot up she needed at least two weeks to repair. Nimitz then ordered her put to sea again in 48 hours. It's fine to issue an order, and in Hollywood it's fine to wave a magic wand and accomplish the impossible on a movie screen, but in the real world, getting two weeks worth of battle damage repair crammed into two days sounds completely unrealistic, yet, that's what the shipyard did. How did they get that done?
Repaired what was really important and left the rest of the damage unrepaired.
Civilian repair crews embarked with the Yorktown embarkation. They where there for the battle.
Wow... how great. Too bad kids don't see this.
Under where can I find NY Times President FDR editorial criticism how bad he managing World War 2? Thank you in advance
Excellent. Thank you.
Why were the bombers based at Midway so ineffective against the Japanese fleet? Can you bomb Midway(if taken) from Oahu with B17s?
Oh Yeah!
@22:00 they talk about Japan's inability to have a coherent strategy. Right, they explained the problem in the sentence "The Japanese". They did not say Tojo's strategy, or Hitler's strategy or, Rosevelt's or Stalin's. They are pointing out the fundamental problem with the Japanese government at that time. It was run by the military that had two major factions, the navy and army that did not get along. These are committee decisions, but worse, that committee that is being influenced by factions of lower level officers that are willing to fabricate conflicts and kill leaders that get in their way. The very fact that Japan was in a war against the USA proves they have no strategy. They know they cannot win. They know they can only get out of this war ahead if they convince the USA to stop fighting before Japan is wiped off the map. Which leads me to why I think these historians need to give Yamamoto a big heaping of credit.
You showed TBFs. I thought they were not yet in service then. TBDs were used, and SBDs.
It seems to me that when an unfortunate thing happens, some poor lower-level officer is relieved as a way for his superiors to say, "Not my fault. He did it!" and thereby protect themselves. I was never a victim of that myself--perhaps I wasn't important enough to be a sufficient blame-taker. The one time I did relieve a subordinate it was because of repeated failure to keep me informed even when counseled as to exactly what I wanted to see each day.
I was wondering John partial I think I’ve watched and listened to him many times and I know he’s an American and you have three other Americans that you say are world renowned in this subject and I was wondering why do I never hear Japanese historians talk about these battles
I always wanted to ask John and Craig, whether they would think that the "invasion force" going into the Alutians, could have been considered a safeguard, in case that something bad would happen to Nagumo's carriers. -
Another question is whether could have been possible, even though the japanese doctrine tells him to use the biggest hammer that he's got., Could have moved with anticipation the planes that were in reserve,
flying into another deck to allow the returning Midway operation to land more comfortably and rapidly.
- the other items that were not mentioned was the McCluskey persecution of the Arashi, leading into to
kiddo butai location. - I think that is the most decisive factor of the battle, - and equivalent to Dick Best's action over the Akagi. - In my humbe opinion. -
Last and not least, when later in the war the Yammomoto inspection flight is intercepted, i would have heart the plane and capture Yammamoto instead of directly killing him. - That would probably would have been some sort of interesting interrogation.
NAGUMO'S offensive was doommed from the start @ Midway. Just think for an assumed moment, a second wave was launched from his decks to "finish" Midway. Question really is what would that wave would have encounter in the way in and in the way in, and in the way back. Here is my view: in the way in the jspanese surprise factor is gone and the americans are prepared. On the way back this attack wave coming back from Midway, would have found their carriers burning, out of fuel and without alternative to ditching in front of the burning kiddo buttai.
Interesting historical prospective
Thank you for the discussion.. You need to fix the audio, it's terrible. ❤🇺🇸
JP rides again
With the Russia/Ukraine war in play, I can get a feel for how the Allied public must have felt. We dont know how the R/U war will end and hope only for the best. WW2 was indeed a WORLD WAR. WW1, Really was not. Midway, as the one panelist said, would only have served as a
Glimmer of hope. Other experts have pointed to the vast industrial capacity of the US as the lynch pin that achieved eventual success. I agree.
The decisive battle was Dec 7.
When the Japanese struck that morning, they opened up a Hornets nest. Americas terrible resolve WAS a sleeping giant.
We entered the Pacific war in carrier parity with the Japanese of approximately 6 to 6 . By wars end,
We had about 100 to Japans 25.
Wiki the rest and you'll see.
The percentage of American torpedo bombers lost at Midway seems to have been about the same. Army B-26 bombers--two or three lost out of four. PBY--managed to avoid losses while operating as a torpedo bomber. TBF Avengers--five out of six lost. The problem was unsupported torpedo bomber attacks, not so much the type of torpedo plane.
True. If TBFs were on the carriers though, the limitations of speed and range of the TBD would be gone. The TBFs would have been able to fly higher and faster towards the target and be kept in sight easier by the overhead fighters. Would any these improvements be recognized right away by the aircraft carrier captains and air group commanders is a question though.
@@robertdendooven7258 I agree--the TBD was on the way out due to performance. I'm arguing that the TBD loss rate and the TBF loss rate were close enough that using the TBD loss rate as the main reason for replacement was deceptive. If I remember correctly, the TBD production line had already been shut down. TBD bombers had performed credibly in both high-altitude and torpedo bombing missions prior to Midway. The best-performing torpedo bomber might be the PBY because the single PBY that attempted a torpedo attack seems to have both survived and hit its target--but the torpedo was a dud.
I was surprised to learn that the Nordan bomb sight had been developed by the US Navy for use in its flying boats and carrier-based torpedo bombers. I've seen multiple Nordans and the portable part looked like a handful. Then there's the parts that link the Nordan to the aircraft--more bulk and more weight. The TBF was more heavily armed than the TBD--one forward-firing .30 caliber machine gun (yes, THIRTY caliber), one .30 caliber in a ventral firing "tunnel" for attacks from below, and that .AN/M2 Caliber .50 aircraft gun in that cramped power-operated dorsal turret. Despite that heavy armament and flying in formation both for defensive use and to get a good bomb pattern on target, the TBF/TBM needed fighter escort to survive Imperial Japanese Navy Combat Air Patrols--and Midway was the first indication. The TBD did well earlier because those formations either achieved total surprise (no fighter opposition) or because the torpedo bombers had fighter escort--at Coral Sea the TBDs managed to coordinate their attacks with the SBDs while the Wildcats took on the few Japanese fighters.
At Midway, the improved TBF wasn't able to fight on its own through enemy Combat Air Patrol fighters. It was said that the TBD's targets could run away from the slow TBD--but at least it wasn't the T4M that Heinlein flew in at the Sunday, 7 February 1932 Fleet Problem XIII fleet problem that was an exercise surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The T4M was said to take off at 65 MPH, fly at 65 MPH, and land at 65 MPH.
@@robertdendooven7258 the TBF’s speed and altitude advantages were negated in practice by the deficiencies of the torpedo.
@@katharinelong5472 True. But they gave their crews better survivability and more flexibility to those planning airstrikes from carriers.
Sometimes the torpedo did work in 1942 though. There were a few hits by torpedo bombers on Japanese ships in the Guadalcanal campaign.
the thing is the Kongo class would have been chewed up the heavy cruise used an 8 inch version of the Mark 7 Super Heavy which is 100 pounds heavier than any 8 inch armor piercing projectile
just the one Kongo is chewed up in the battle of Guadalcanal on the first by just one 8-inch cruiser now see 2 Kongo versus several 8-inch cruisers
the Kongo wore very light-armored they had better night radar than the Kongos, and they fired faster a night battle would have hurt both side
The Guadalcanal campaign started 2 months later, I wonder what effect that had on that campaign. Also if that campaign had kicked off before this battle would they have woke up and realized Midway is a sideshow and the south and their oil supply line the real show and canceled this sideshow. Other than this battle the Japanese created, Midway had little effect on the war and it basically another Johnson Atoll as a place to do scouting from, in fact Johnson was probably more valuable as a stop on the south Pacific route.
Imagine the Americans invaded Guadalcanal 2-3 months earlier. So Guadalcanal switched Japanese navy priority to the Southwest Pacific. Could the Pacific Fleet have ambushed four Japanese aircraft carriers in that theater? Japan had island based asserts in the Solomons. It would very difficult for Nimitz to get his 3-4 carriers there undetected by the Japanese. Plus the steaming distance to the SW Pacific from Pearl Harbor is four (?) times what there were from PH too Point Luck.
I was stationed on Johnston Atoll. It is approximately 800 miles WSW of Oahu. The Atoll was attacked several times by the Japanese, however nothing serious. It was mostly used as a refueling base for aircraft in transit and sub base. It was part of the Hawaiian Islands Defense Perimeter, Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra. I honestly think the Japanese capture would have been much different than Wake. Midway was heavily reinforced and wouldn't been an easy capture. Also Midway was a lot closer to Hawaii, and seriously a long way from the Japanese supply line. Japanese Midway would have been an American punching bag.
Anything they built would have been bombed. Resupply would have been from submarine, since it would have been easy pickings for American submarine forces to sink surface ships defending or resupplying Midway.
The Solomons were much more important, as they were a jumping off point for the Japanese to grab Samoa, blocking the supply route to Australia.
@@timf2279 …. Midway for Yamamoto was bait. To which the Pacific Fleet would respond with Carriers. Letting the Japanese keep Guadalcanal endangered shipping to Australia. Australia couldn’t be allowed to be isolated from the Americas.
@@Idahoguy10157 yes I know this I was responding myko.
@@timf2279 … wasn’t criticism. i was agreeing
midway and Guadalcanal changed the air group by changing the bomber squadron to a fighter bomber squadron letting the carrier have one squadron to protect the carrier and one full squadron of fighters to protect the bomber on the attack
at the battle of the Philippine Sea Task Force 58 hellcats outnumber the total of all Japanese carrier planes
Also ------Let us give Thanks to God, his STRONG ARM was on OUR SIDE!
----- The Japanese probably would have eaten all the gooney birds and they would be extinct now. They wouldn't have enough capability to keep the Japanese troops bellies even slightly full.
Very high stakes. If the Americans lost the battle, the Japanese fleet could have sailed right into San Francisco Bay and blown it to bits. Same with the west coast en toto and maybe even the Panama Canal.
The 2019 Midway movie totally ignored the Naval fighter squadrons. Kids just learning about this battle will wonder why the Americans didn’t use fighters.
As the movie had as its main setting the USS Enterprise...her fighter squadron did not really do much at all at Midway. Only Yorktown's fighters did much at the battle.
I really wish they would name a carrier after Halsey even though he made a huge gaffe during the invasion of the Phillipines.
Wow
IMHO, is the IJN had brought all 5 fleet CV and also the 2 others they didn't in another group with the fast BB somewhere close behind, with the 4 slow BB & Hosho where the Main BB force was, then Nimitz would have backed off. Point Luck was chosen to give Nimitz time to make new decisions. The same if Yorktown could not be ready, he would have ordered the other 2 CV to turn and sail away with the IJN never knowing they were ever out there.
. . . Obviously, I disagree with Rexfrom MN below. Losing all 3 CV would have also ment many of the men on them. it would have made moral in the US plummet. The Essex class with not be available until '43, '44, and even '45. It would make the war last another year. at least and cot many more lives.
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As heavily reinforced Midway atoll is with troops and guns I doubt that a Japanese amphibious landing could be successful
4:25 Nagano was right
1- USA first operation is in Guadalcanal, confirming the Salomon Islands was the weakest spot of the Japanese perimeter
2- Hitting closer to Hawaii at Midway is contrary to the japanese strategy of forcing the USnavy to sail a *long distance* , whittle them on the way with torpedos and night attacks, and do the "kantai kessen"
3- The US fleet *did not sail out* to recover the whole of the Phillipines.. it certaintly would not sail out for a miserable atoll (13:00)
4- Threatening Australia was more important than taking Midway. Threatening Australia (huge coastline, many targets) would tie up (a lot of) allied resources for defense, resources that would the *not be available* for offense. Also could create friction between Royal Navy and USNavy goals
5- 19:00 If you are arguing for an easy "land grab" in the Alleutians because they *MAY* bomb north Japan (meh🤷) .. land grab the Solomons where you *KNOW* they can bomb Rabaul (which is vital)
All the above without even throwing in the possibility of compromised codes. 🧑🦯
Disclaimer: Totally monday quarterback talking with 80 years of hindsight and perfect knowledge. Not saying I am good/better.
Jorktaun. Haman