It seems strange to me for Russ Shafer-Landau to say "Global skepticism is the view that there is no objective truth at all, anywhere". I would have thought skepticism is a position regarding knowledge rather than truth. That is, there may be plenty of truths but we just can't know them.
What is called moral skepticism is also referred to as moral relativism. In a video about moral skepticism vs moral objectivism, he describes the basis for this naming and association with skepticism
I was thinking that maybe we don’t need any extra premises for GS and GR. I think this because both rules use an objective standard. For GS we could say that it says that all claims are subjectively true. So it wouldn’t be subjectively true that all claims are subjectively true. That’s self defeating. The pushback would be that GS is just subjectively true, but that thinking insists on an objective standard. That it is not subjectively true that GS is subjectively true. My point is that no matter how you see it, there’s an appeal to objective standards, contrary to saying that there’s are no such things.
I’m a little confused about whether relativists/subjectivists are making claims about “truth” or claims about “validity”. I understand their argument like I understand how it is “true” that the angles of a triangle add to 180 in Euclidean space, and not 180 outside of Euclidean space. Both are true relative to a frame, but not relative to all possible contexts.
Links to the other videos mentioned: - The difference between arguments and conclusions: ruclips.net/video/GAYn5v5E20s/видео.html - The fallacious move from different perspectives to relativism about truth: ruclips.net/video/9eodr-9V6Z8/видео.html
A question that comes to mind is: suppose there are no objective facts, globally, let's just assume this for the sake of the argument, would there be a way in our logical system and in our language, to point to this fact convincingly? The answer given in the video above is, well, no. And the point was well made and I believe there isn't one indeed. Does this mean there *are* objective facts, or does this mean there is a possible shortcoming in our language?
I think I would need some more explanation in how this first sentence self-refutes. It assumes that a guy that can't be trusted can never say something true, but how can you assume that ? Maybe sometimes he tells the truth ? It feels like the logic just assumes that all actors always play "in character" if I may say. I don't see how someone that can't be trusted can never do something that's true ? This logic just seem to assume a lot of stuff and in my head, the guy can be right even though he's in the group. The sentence stays ambiguous yes, but the person can still be saying the truth and can be trusted on that one as people don't always play "in character". People aren't a mathematics formula, they're not fixed and never changed. Though, I do fully understand the later examples of self-refutness in the video, it's just the first one that I don't get as it's treating humans as absolutes.
The conclusion isn't about the truth of what the professor says. "If you can trust what I say, you can't trust what I say." Just because you can't trust him, doesn't mean he can't say something true. A way to flesh out the argument is "If it is true that you can trust what I say, it is not true that you can trust what I say."
What about Mackie’s opening statement “there are no objective values”, isn’t this an objective ‘value’ since it’s an attitude that is universal... making it objective in some way? Or necessarily objective (since it must always obtain). Is it self-refuting?
No, it's not self-refuting because even though that statement is clearly meant to be objectively true, it is not a value statement. It is a statement of non-normative fact. Saying 'x is wrong' is a value statement. Saying 'x does not exist' is not a value statement.
@@profjeffreykaplanthank you! So it is objectively true, but it’s allowed to be since it isn’t appealing to a “queer” reality? Also, what do you think of the ‘companions in guilt’ argument? Do you think that in virtue of epistemic error theory being self-refuting moral error theory is false (since it proves that categorically normative facts can exist)? Or would you say that it doesn’t necessarily follow.
I have a problem with the ‘entails’ example. Eg “Black holes are pink entails black holes are visible” Where visible means light bounces off it. Light does not bounce off black holes.
Not an expert, but I think you're refuting a claim that's not being made there...such as "all colors are visible", "black isn't visible", "black isn't a color". He used the green grass/pink grass example to illustrate some claims entail others
@@NomadicIsaac hi - I’m saying the example he gives is not an example of entailment, because the truth of ‘X is colour Y’ does not guarantee the truth of the claim ‘X is visible’. ‘X is colour Y’ does not entail ‘X is visible’. It’s just a bad example/illustration of entailment. Some other examples to illustrate that it’s a bad example.. : X = the abominable snowman (not 100% sure) or X = my imaginary friend’s hair. My imaginary friends hair is brown entails my imaginary friend is visible.. I think that’s false
I remember an old medical T.V. show where this one disturbed young man was diagnosed as dyslexic when the doctor saw him reading a book he was holding up to a mirror. I didn't know what dyslexia was but I knew eyeballs don't work like that.
I think the advice is only self refuting in a specific context. However, if by saying you can trust me, he is implicitly referring to himself as the exception and by referring to a specific set of college professors, not all. I agree moral skepticism by itself is not self refuting. Have you done a video on Pyrrhonian moral skepticism?
It's easy to "refute" something if you completely misdefine it. I will not waste my time trying to explain everything, but I will say that skepticism is NOT when you say that there are no objective truths about anything. Skepticism is when the knowledge about any truth is not possible to anyone right now or always impossible.
Here "Global subjectivism" was defined to mean "all beliefs are true", or rather a statement equivalent with this. My impression of subjectivism an subjectivists is that the perspective is something more similar to "your belief in X and my belief in not-X can both be true". Someone trained in the dark arts of logic may then suggest that (a) everything follows from a false statement*; and (b) "X and not-X" is false; and thus (c) all statements are true, including "global subjectivism is false"; implying (d) either X and not-X are never true simultaneously, or global subjectivism is false. But since the first statement is simply the negation of global subjectivism, in either case global subjectivism is false-even without assuming that anyone believes global subjectivism to be false. (*) because my textbook on logic says so (and proves it; proof omitted from this youtube comment). Isn't it fun to play around with fixpoints and negation? 😄
What do you mean by "truth relative to a individual person / to a society". Does this just mean that there are no objective truths, but the people in that society think that some things are true? How would that be different from global nihilism?
@@RickJaeger Ok, if the statement "green is a pleasant color" is a subjective truth, and is subjectively true for you, then the statement "green is a pleasant color to you" would be an objectively true statement. So if subjective moral truths exist, automatically some objective moral truths exist, by constructing them similar to this example. And this would imply moral realism. Does that argument even work?
@@resiknoiro7506 Further, I don't think you can convert subjective truths into objective truths, according to such people, by just saying "to you." I have dealt with radical subjectivists and unfortunately not the clever kind, so I can't help any further.
I don't get the argument against global subjectivism. Why does it imply that "whatever person believes is true for them"? For example, if someone believes that Earth is flat, I would think that he is mistaken and the correct belive for him to have is that the Earth is also round for him individualy.
That is because you are not a global subjectivist. A global subjectivist would say that someone who believes the earth is flat is right from their perspective, and you are right from yours, and neither of you is more right than the other.
I feel like the argument against universal skepticism is way more complicated than it needs to be. There’s no need to appeal to objective vs. subjective truths (putting aside that “subjective truth” is an oxymoron). If someone claims that universal skepticism is true, they immediately destroy their argument, period. Because if it’s true that there are no universal truths, then it can’t be the case that the statement “There are no universal truths” is universally true.
Subjective truth isn't an oxymoron. Taste seems to be a subjective truth. Even if you were to dissect me and infer what my tastes would be, you'd do so by comparing it to other's subjective experiences - how else would you know what brain activity would be indicative of my taste? In other words: how can subjective experience ever be assessed as a mind-independent truth? Relative truth is also still an interesting case. Consider Newton's laws of mechanics. Here, speed is not objective; it is dependent on one's reference frame. Hence, relative truths exist If there are subjective/relative truths, can there not be subjective/relative falsehoods? And is it then not sensible to consider nihilism on objective, relative, and subjective accounts?
@@captainzork6109 fair points, but I still don't see how it makes "subjective truths" relevant without defining "truth" as needing to contain subjective features. If it can be defined exactly how and why you can be reliably predicted to experience "x" once you establish the relevant background conditions, in what sense is that a "subjective" truth? I mean, it's true that you're the subject having the experience (and I'll grant you the fair use of the term in that context), but that itself is still objectively true. So even with regard to taste or what sort of music you may like, the objective truth of that is that conscious creatures DO experience things; that simply IS the case. That they have varying experiences within an experiential domain has no bearing on whether they do or do not have an experience within an experiential domain. So I still find the idea of a "subjective truth" to be oxymoronic, particularly in the service in which they're trying to press it in this video.
@@captainzork6109, two more things: First, thanks for the thoughtful reply. I appreciate a thoughtful conversation. Second, I’ll grant you that I’m possibly being too rigid in my utility of the term “truth”. I see “truth” simply as what is the case. Conversely, when I hear something like “subjective truth”, I imagine someone believing that they are someone/thing that they objectively are not (someone thinking they’re Napoleon, say). It’s true that they’re having an experience, but it’s not true at all that they are Napoleon. Their “truth” is entirely local to them, and thus not “true” all. But as I say, maybe I’m being too rigid with it. I’m open to that conversation.
@@Dionysus3883 Yes! That's exactly what I mean. - So here I guess I'm going to make a case for subjective experience being real and truth-apt - Their subjective experience is still their subjective experience. But the attributes and contents of their subjective experience is still "what is the case", even if it does not align with the rest of reality And to assess someone's tastes, such as in music, you may want to use a brain scanner using their subjective experience as the criterion. But of course they could also just tell you. Then, whether their report of whether they like a certain song is conveying the truth or not depends on how it compares to their subjective experience. Then again, this depends on what you mean with truth. Are you looking for a comprehensive answer? Or just a mere impression? Do you wish for their entire personality to pass judgment on the song? Or, if they are referring to their experience of the past, and are thus accessing the memory traces of their experience, would you be satisfied if they just accessed memory which assesses a single aspect of the song? Or, perhaps you'd want them to simply give you a rating. Sure can! Let's just convert the subjective experience into what they understand the rating to mean, and open one's measurement up for even more steps of interpretation! (Admittedly, though, psychometricians have thought about this carefully, and using scales could work if done with due care.) I guess the only truth you can really access is the measurement - whether it's direct measurement with a scanner, or their own measurement, reported via words or a rating. So yeah, even the self could be "wrong" or inaccurate about one's internal experiences. But the fact they had a subjective experience is undeniable. And there is a correct answer to the question "what were the attributes or contents of that subjective experience?" It's just that the idiosyncratic, local, and dynamic nature of it makes that truth impossible to assess Then again, the same is the case for the smallest particles in the universe. Strictly speaking, we will always fall short in terms of precision or accuracy Finally, an important realization, by the way, is that even if someone has an emotional reaction about something I don't think is a good reason, the fact they're not making sense does not change the fact they are having that experience. Their subjective experience is still real, even if it's based on something which is not real. So, their subjective experience also still has consequences, such as stress and other things. They can even know they're being irrational, and still have that experience! Thus, their experience should still, in a sense, be taken seriously. Placebos are another example of a subjective experience having real effects, even if the person knows they're getting placebo treatment. All in all, given the centrality and potent nature subjective experiences seem to have, the idea they are not truth-apt is difficult to readily accept, at the very least (Sorry if my writing is a bit chaotic and long, or does not make complete sense. My brain is a bit fried atm)
Within the limits of our language the sentence, "There is no truth," is nonsense. But the idea that there is no truth is still possible if we suspend the limits of our communication and our perceptions of the possible extents of truth and reality. I recognize that I have only our language to express that in, but the possibility still exists beyond graphic representations.
I think I'm confused about the relation between global and objective, it seems like Global skepticism could defeat itself right off the bat, because it would say it is not objectively true. You could say that it's true with some form of limitations, like subjectively or relatively, or anything else you could possibly think of, but if there's some exception, possible exception or additional requirement making it not always true, it's would no longer global. Also attacking Global Nihilium, Global subjectivism and Global relativism, feels like it's attacking arguments for it when you could attack the conclusion. Though I'm guessing I'm understanding "global" in a more absolute sense that is really is. Like it's saying "unconditional, but only under some conditions" and a contraction. Perhaps reading "global" as "unconditional, always applies, no exceptions" is wrong, otherwise global skepticism would defeat itself right away. A limited "global" feels a bit underwhelming, but I guess that's why it wasn't done.
Global skepticism is definitely a weird one. It seems self defeating, but since it attacks the very foundation of philosophical arguments it is perfectly comfortable against this argument. When provided an argument that GS is self defeating, a skeptic could easily respond that said argument only works if you assume that GS is false.
Supposing global subjectivism is true and then having one person believe it is false does not render it false globally, since the whole premise of global subjectivism is that truth is relative to individuals. So global subjectivism would be false to that one person, not globally.
The main problem with 'global subjectivism' is actually linguistic. If there is no such thing/concept as objective truth, and everything is subjective, the terms "objective" and "subjective" cease to have a comprehensible meaning. The conclusion ought to be, therefore, that what is the least subjective must be deemed objective, so we are back to square one.
@@waggishsagacity7947 Words do no have inherent meaning. They only have meaning between individuals that speak that language. Global subjectivism is not at odds with language, since language is by its nature subjective. Global subjectivism does not meaan people can't share beliefs and likewise objectivism does not necessarily apply to popular beliefs since those have changed with time. Objectivism is not a popularity contest since if truth exists it would not change with the whims of culture.
Thanks for the video! That said, I am not sure about Moral skepticism or moral relativism not being self refuting. My reason is that a claim like "Whether murder is wrong, is subjective" seems at first glance to be a moral fact - it is after all a claim about the morality of murder. Yet if that is a moral fact then the claim, "all moral truths are subjective" would almost certainly also be a moral fact. And if that is a moral fact then "MS is not true" is true for anyone who disbelieves in MS if MS is true. Which would generate a similar contradiction as with the GS cases. Moral relativism would have basically the same issue. The only way I see out would be for the moral skeptic to claim that facts like "Whether murder is wrong, is subjective" is not actually a moral fact or a moral truth claim. And that seems wrong.... On the point of nihilism (or moral nihilism), the argument I offered seems less plausible. But there is still something there that troubles me. Specifically, if a moral fact is a fact that has the property of being about moral truth claims. (hmmm... not sure if that is exactly right) Then the claim that there are no moral facts, does itself seem to be a fact about moral truth claims - namely that there aren't any. And that would amount to a contradiction. Of course we could make up some incoherent nonsense concept, Smoral facts, and ask whether the same thing would prove that smoral facts must exist. That obviously is a false conclusion as we stipulated that Smoral facts to be an incoherent non-sense concept. Yet, my thought would be that moral facts might have a bizarre quasi ontological argument style property of necessarily existing if the concept of morality is not incoherent. And, I might add, morality does not seem to be incoherent, at least not intuitively.
Based on my limited education about the study of ethics, it seems that claims such as "all moral truths are subjective" and "there are no moral facts" are not ethical claims, but meta-ethical ones. It's a technical distinction, and I'm not sure how well I understand it, but it answers your questions, which means it's a useful distinction.
Yes, you found the point. ‘There are no universal moral facts’ is not a moral claim, and would not be a moral fact if it were true. It’s a claim about reality. You can’t use the claim ‘there are no universal moral facts’ to judge the morality of any specific action.
@@samueldimmock694 Hey Samuel, Yes that is the way out. The question comes down to whether or not it is true, however. The mere fact that the claim "all moral truths are subjective" is a metaethical claim does not prima facie exclude it from also being an ethical claim any more than being four-legged excludes something from being brown. Such a point would have to be argued. The issue that I have is that specific claims like "Whether murder is wrong, is subjective" appears to be an ethical claim and not a metaethical claim. Also ethical claims can seemingly be aggregated such that we could say that "Whether murder is wrong and whether stealing is wrong, are subjective" would still be an ethical claim, (and also not a metaethical claim.) Yet if that is correct then almost certainly a claim that aggregates all ethical claims is itself also an ethical claim and so "all moral truths are subjective" is an ethical claim independent of its being a metaethical claim. Anyways, thanks for the reply.
What is the idea of truth if not the idea that certain things ought to be believed? Does the concept of truth itself not become meaningless absent of the binding moral premise that people ought to believe in it? Does the very act of advocating for a position, not in of itself, presume that the position should be supported?
Still, if the college professor makes a logically incoherent argument, perhaps that's a reason not to trust them. Then again, it's a reason to trust them, because they let you know that college professors can't be trusted. Then again... 🤣😅
How does a belief in objective Truths imply the belief in Objective Moral Truths? You assumes that moral skepticism is a belief that subjective morality exist. The moral skeptic denies all moral language as being a feature of our existence. We believe there are acts and behaviors that some people claim as Moral but nothing more than a name given to a description of behavior.
I understand the reasoning behind why global nihilism and global relativism are false but I don't think that the argument against global subjectivism is convincing. Global subjectivism purports that truths are dependent on the individual. To say that this entails that the statement "Global subjectivism is false" because at least 1 person believes it is extremely misleading because it does not include enough information. In truth global subjectivism actually entails the statement: "Global subjectivism is false to Shafer-Landau.", but this statement doesn't contradict the statement: "Global subjectivism is true to me.", thus global subjectivism is not self refuting. One example of this is in the statement: "In basketball, a layup is worth 2 points", following Shafer-Landau's reasoning, this statement would be self defeating since almost every time basketball is played in the street, layups are worth 1 point. The statement is not self defeating, it merely lacks information.
This is a strange use of the term "skepticism". Typically, skepticism refers to the idea that you can't know something, with moral skepticism meaning that it is impossible to know moral truths, and global skepticism meaning that it is impossible to know anything. Neither of these imply the respective forms of nonrealism, since it is possible for there to be objective facts about a topic even if it is impossible to know them. And skepticism is also not implied by nonrealism (except for the nihilist varieties), since it is still possible to know subjective or relative facts. I wonder why you used the unusual terminology, since it could make the video a little confusing to someone who is expecting a video about the more common definition of moral skepticism.
Hmm. This seems like a misunderstanding of subjectivism and relativism here. Just because there are possible dependent/relative truths under subjectivism and relativism does not mean, that every thought/belief that a subject has or that is dependent/relative to a subject, culture or other metric, is actually true. This would be especially be true of beliefs that try to break the tenets of subjectivism or relativism, since the dependent/relative truths are trying to be non-dependent/non-relative, which is not allowed. The belief of an individual under subjectivism, "that moral subjectivism is false", is thus blatantly false non-matter if the subject is the basis for truth. The mistake is like saying that Anti-global-skepticism means that everything is true. Therefore, it is self-defeating because there are at least two people that disagree. It is an obvious misunderstanding and Strawman. This seems to have happened here.
Relativism is not the claim that some truths are relative to specific cultures, it is the claim that all truths are relative to specific cultures. In the video he uses the example of what is polite or rude as something that varies between cultures. It is uncontroversial that some things vary, what he is arguing against is the claim that everything does. Now, you may not hold the view he is arguing against here, but that doesn’t make it a straw man. It just means that you aren’t a relativist by the definition being used here. Some people do believe it.
@@tyruskarmesin5418 Am not a relativist. Moral or truth wise. I think you are misunderstanding my objection. My objection is, that just because something is relative to a specific culture, that does not make it true. Just because something needs to be A to be true, does not mean that everything that is A is true. Other rules still apply that can make things that are A false. For example, the rules of logic. And specifically under relativism anti-relative statements are automatically false. That means that a culture having an anti-relative statement does not break relativism. There is still the problem of defining logic and relativism (as a non-relative principle) in a way that allows them to exist without internal contradictions.
@@darkreflectionsstudio4506 The relativist position is that all truths are relative to cultures. If any fact is universally true, regardless of culture, than relativism is not true. This includes the truth of relativism. In relativism, there is no standard to judge statements that is not particular to a given culture. So yes, 'A', that is, a statement being believed by a culture, is both sufficient and necessary for the statement to be true. This means that if a culture believes that relativism is false, then relativism is false for that culture, according to relativism.
Hmm, if global nihilism is true then there is no one who could say its false since 'logic' itself works under assumptions that themselves are untrue (according to global nihilism). I don't think that it can defeat itself since it makes logic itself actually crumble. Awesome video though!
This is the first time I've ever heard of skepticism being defined that way. I've only heard it defined as the view that a claim should be proven true with evidence before being accepted as true. Therefore, moral objectivism has to be proven true before it can be accepted as true. You can't prove moral objectivism true by refuting arguments for moral skepticism. You have to provide a logical argument that moral objectivism is true.
The argument isn’t whether or not Earth is round. It's a globe. Globes might be round, but not all round objects are globes. It's kind of like global skepticism vs moral skepticism.
Good presentation. I would add that this argumentative technique -- trying to weaken a position by defeating the worst argument AGAINST it, is what the famous "Straw Man" fallacy is, and that's worth pointing out. You try to defeat an opponent by taking the worst argument on the other side (sometimes a false argument) and then attacking that argument, which is a "straw man." The fallacy is to assume that because you've defeated one argument, that you've defeated all other possible arguments.. But anyway, Moral Skepticism, pushed to its logical extreme IS self-refuting. It's like saying, "The meaning of life is that there is no meaning." That is obviously self-refuting. So is Nietzsche's statement "There are no unqualified truths." But is Nietzsche's statement itself an unqualified truth, or is it *relatively* or *sometimes* true? If yes, that there may be cases in which it is not true; and therefore you can have SOME unqualified truths. But if it itself is an unqualified truth, then the statement has refuted itself. Similarly with Moral Skepticism. The problem with the moral skeptics is that they face the dilemma of: "Do we tolerate the intolerant"? And that is a dilemma that is a very real thing, not just a word game. Although I'm normally a liberal, there is the dilemma of extreme woke-ism: do they defend radical Islam? If they don't, they worry they aren't woke enough. But if they DO defend radical Islam, they have to defend the people who would take away rights from women and deny free speech.
“Do we tolerate the intolerant” is a practical and specific moral question. It is unrelated to the meta ethical question about moral skepticism. A moral skeptic could say “There is no objective moral truth, but my morality says we should tolerate everyone no matter what” or they could say “There is no objective moral truth, but my morality says we should reject dangerous ideologies” or they could say “There is no objective moral truth, but my morality says we should execute anyone who wears the color blue.” Moral skepticism is a meta ethical position, not an ethical one, and it is compatible with any specific moral claim. It does not imply any degree of tolerance for opposing ideologies. That could only be a part of an individual’s moral code, which is a separate thing.
Why make a question that is obviously answered by a no. Skepticism is by definition about doubt. It doesn't make an assertion, therefore it is never self refuting. You might argue that skeptics strive for something they can't achieve, but that doesn't make skepticism self refuting. What is next? "Are bachelors married?" (no, but they have other problems)
Global subjectivism, at least the way it's presented here, doesn't seem to be self-refuting in the same way that global nihilism and global relativism are. If global nihilism is true, then nothing is true, including global nihilism. Okay, so global nihilism isn't true. If global relativism is true, then nothing is true if a given society believes that nothing is true. Every society believes that some things are true. Okay, so global relativism isn't true. If global subjectivism is true, then nothing is true for Shafer-Landau if Shafer-Landau believes that nothing is true. Shafer-Landau believes that some things are true. Okay, so global subjectivism isn't true *for Shafer-Landau*. That seems to me to be insufficient to say that global subjectivism is self-refuting, for anyone other than Shafer-Landau. Global subjectivism (as presented here) says that different things are true for different individuals. Therefore, global subjectivism is true for individuals who believe it is true, just as much as it is not true for Shafer-Landau and others who believe it is not true, if we take global subjectivism as the starting point (that incompatible beliefs held by separate individuals can both be true). It might be circular reasoning, but so is the alleged self-refutation presented: "Global subjectivism is false because I as an individual believe global subjectivism is not true," presupposes that the central idea of global subjectivism (that separate individuals' mutually exclusive beliefs can both be true) is false. You have to take a denial of global subjectivism as a starting point for this to work. What seems necessary to refute global subjectivism is a proof that incompatible beliefs held by separate individuals cannot both be true. But this would be an external refutation of global subjectivism, not a self-refutation. Which would undermine the point of this video (that global subjectivism is self-refuting so it cannot be a basis for global skepticism so that cannot be the basis of moral skepticism). Unless I am missing something here. (Incidentally, this seems to suggest that if there was a society that believed nothing was true, then global relativism would also be true *for that society,* making global relativism also not self-refuting *for that society.* This seems arguable since we would need to survey every society to prove that such a society didn't exist - at least, I can imagine a society composed entirely of global relativists. But this is different from the claims being made in the video - which is that no such society exists for global relativism, yet there is the implicit assumption that such individuals exist for global subjectivism.) P.S. I would also be interested to know what to call the belief that there are objective truths, but that human beings only have access to subjective truths through our senses (and arguably through reason as well), and that no one can actually prove objective truths, so any belief is inherently subjective, as far as we can possibly know. Some version of this seems more plausible to me personally than either global or moral objectivism or global or moral subjectivism (as defined here).
By stating that global subjectivism is true, you have claimed an objective standard. The problem with all of the theories to challenge objective morality so far is that they all rely on objective morality to begin with. To be specific, the statement 'X is true' must mean that truth exists.
Okay, I think that is actually a more solid argument than the one in the video. I still don't think it addresses the possibility, which seems to me the most likely, that there is objective truth, and only subjective perceptions or conceptions of it - which is in a way a reconciliation of the paradox. Global objectivism may be true, but if it is only subjectively accessible to each of us, it would practically speaking be the case that global subjectivism were true.
@@zoe_gevalt If you can perceive something, it objectively exists to some extent would be my argument. Perhaps a better example would be unicorns as an idea exist because someone created it. This is not to say the creature is real but rather the concept is.
Global Subjectivism means the belief is true for the individual. Landau believes its false then for him it is false that does not refute its claim. If you think deeply enough about it, it proves all people will believe their own truths it doesnt make what they believe globally true just true to them. So while its a fact Landau believes its false, him believing that only makes it false for him or others with that belief it doesnt refute or represent that its false globally because there will be others who believe its true. This isnt a paradox it only actually adds to the proof that Global Subjectivism is true.
Think of it this way. If everyone believed Global Subjectivism was true, then it would be an Objective truth and it would prove the entire argument false. Different individuals HAVE TO hold both views that its true/false for GS to be true. BUT if everyone believed it was false, it would have to be false for the same reason stated above.
You make a good argument that global subjectivism is not self refuting. At the end you seem to imply that this is evidence of global subjectivism being true though. This doesn't work, since you started with that assumption. Showing "if X is true then X is true" isn't evidence for X. Maybe you didn't mean that and I am just overanalyzing though 😂
Isn't moral skepticism a bit self-refuting? Self-refuting lite. It refers to, talks about, "morals", "ethics", "moral thoughts" "actions" etc. Things that may or may not have an underlying Moral Truth behind them. But also things which a competent speaker of English can recognise, categories, distinguish from thoughts and actions which aren't subject to moral judgement; argue about what's in or out or a gray area. So, so far as someone is a competent speaker, one tacitly must understand somethings that are true about moral judgements, actions, thoughts etc that are universal; otherwise the words would stop working.
Not really, that's just a category that we have created. Lets come up with a new term "Mondowling." It refers to actions taken with a banana, like peeling it, eating it, making muffins, etc, actions taken with a car, like driving, parking, crashing, etc, and actions taken with a finger, like pointing, insulting, mucous removing, etc. Now any time we are talking about any of those actions, in spite of the fact that they don't seem to have anything to do with each other, we can say that we are talking about Mondowling. Does that mean that there is some objective Mondowling of the universe? Maybe, but it seems a little silly.
@@bouncycastle955 Exactly. It's not "just" a category. It's a category. You can change the word. Change the language. But if the word is usable, there *must* be some way to identify what's in or out of the category. For what's it's worth, my argument is basically Wittgenstein, language games etc.
@@DrLogical987 No, it is _just_ a category. I defined Mondowling. So far as I'm aware, no one has ever created that category before, but both of us could effortlessly use it now if we had some reason to. There is a very easy way to identify what's in and what's out, it's easy to use, but I just plucked it out of the air, it doesn't map to anything objective. It's amazing to me that people don't recognize Wittgenstein for the obvious troll he was. No, it isn't worth anything.
@@bouncycastle955 ok. You have defined some random wird. You have endowed it with a or some fact. So? So a skeptic cannot claim there are no facts about it. See? To miss quote Wittgenstein, that of which you do not understand, you should not speak.
@@DrLogical987 no, I haven't endowed it with a fact, I've defined it. There is no 'it' it's just a word. I know Wittgenstein very well, he was trolling the philosophical world. Theres a reason the great majority of philosophers don't take him seriously anymore.
"Moral Nihilism is True" can be rephrased into "There are no good or bad, right or wrong". This is a moral statement, and therefore it is self-refuting.
_"Unicorn skepticism is true" can be rephrased to "there are no unicorns." This is a unicorn statement and therefore it is self-refuting._ A moral claim is something that asserts what course of action (or outcome) is "right" or "good", not merely any time someone uses the word "morality" in a sentence. Moral nihilism denies that good and bad exist, it doesnt apply a good or bad value to doing so, and so fails to qualify as a moral claim. In much the same way that the word "unicorn" in a sentence doesnt make that sentence a unicorn, the word "moral" in a claim doesnt make that sentence a moral claim.
@@fieldrequired283 Good catch. A theory about something doesn't have to have the thing it is about apart of itself. A theory about irrationality isn't itself irrational. A theory about war isn't itself an instance of war.
This video just made me realize that we see truth as distinct from morality, whereas aspects of morality such as honesty, sincerity, and even accountability and responsibility have to do with truth. Is truth really amoral? For example, in this day and age you can be called immoral for referring to a transgender "woman" as "he", or for calling an overweight person "fat". In fact, it seems that the more overweight a person is, the more insulting (and therefore "immoral") it is to describe them as "fat". It appears that we have tried as much as possible to distance morality from objective truths, and to associate it mostly with subjective truth. Even laws are coming under attack because of this. The definition of life or a human being has become relative, and as a result, abortion has become legal. The definition of murder has become relative, and therefore there are debates concerning legalizing euthanasia. In my opinion, a society's treatment of truth will always reflect its moral state. If a society despises objective truth, then it will also despise objective morality, which in my opinion is the only legitimate form of morality. Subjective morality or moral relativism isn't morality at all. And the fact that we despise terrorists (who are following their own subjective moral principles), is a good indication that we all realize that objective morality is "more moral" and more rational than subjective morality.
There have been true things that are rude and irresponsible to say for longer than the concept of diplomacy has existed. Additionally, every word is made up. People using language differently from how you were raised to use it doesnt make them objectively wrong any more than someone pointing at a small, white, feathered avian farm animal and saying "pollo" makes them objectively wrong. There are many words you can use to describe the same things, but some words have hurtful connotations. If you have the choice of multiple words that describe the same thing, and you choose the ones that hurt people, you're being a dick. It's that easy.
The most logical person I have seen in my life. Wonderful teaching. Thank you so much for your videos.
Thanks for this - I was hollering about the Global part of GS throughout so I am very glad you addressed it at the end! Love your videos.
Thanks!
Wow wonderful explanation sir.... lots of love
It seems strange to me for Russ Shafer-Landau to say "Global skepticism is the view that there is no objective truth at all, anywhere". I would have thought skepticism is a position regarding knowledge rather than truth. That is, there may be plenty of truths but we just can't know them.
What is called moral skepticism is also referred to as moral relativism. In a video about moral skepticism vs moral objectivism, he describes the basis for this naming and association with skepticism
I was thinking that maybe we don’t need any extra premises for GS and GR. I think this because both rules use an objective standard. For GS we could say that it says that all claims are subjectively true. So it wouldn’t be subjectively true that all claims are subjectively true. That’s self defeating.
The pushback would be that GS is just subjectively true, but that thinking insists on an objective standard. That it is not subjectively true that GS is subjectively true.
My point is that no matter how you see it, there’s an appeal to objective standards, contrary to saying that there’s are no such things.
I agree with that first statement they cant be trusted, though your point still stands.
I’m a little confused about whether relativists/subjectivists are making claims about “truth” or claims about “validity”. I understand their argument like I understand how it is “true” that the angles of a triangle add to 180 in Euclidean space, and not 180 outside of Euclidean space. Both are true relative to a frame, but not relative to all possible contexts.
I don't think they are making any claims about truth or reality but making claims about the claims made about truth or reality. Get what I'm saying?
Links to the other videos mentioned:
- The difference between arguments and conclusions: ruclips.net/video/GAYn5v5E20s/видео.html
- The fallacious move from different perspectives to relativism about truth: ruclips.net/video/9eodr-9V6Z8/видео.html
Thank you! The video is on private so I couldn't find it...
Global skepticism isn't the claim that there are no objective truths, but rather the claim that our beliefs are never justified.
A question that comes to mind is: suppose there are no objective facts, globally, let's just assume this for the sake of the argument, would there be a way in our logical system and in our language, to point to this fact convincingly? The answer given in the video above is, well, no. And the point was well made and I believe there isn't one indeed. Does this mean there *are* objective facts, or does this mean there is a possible shortcoming in our language?
I see that you write backwards with a left hand. When you write forwards, do you use your right or your left?
I am always baffled people actually think this. It's like they just take for granted what they see without question.
I think I would need some more explanation in how this first sentence self-refutes. It assumes that a guy that can't be trusted can never say something true, but how can you assume that ? Maybe sometimes he tells the truth ? It feels like the logic just assumes that all actors always play "in character" if I may say. I don't see how someone that can't be trusted can never do something that's true ? This logic just seem to assume a lot of stuff and in my head, the guy can be right even though he's in the group. The sentence stays ambiguous yes, but the person can still be saying the truth and can be trusted on that one as people don't always play "in character". People aren't a mathematics formula, they're not fixed and never changed.
Though, I do fully understand the later examples of self-refutness in the video, it's just the first one that I don't get as it's treating humans as absolutes.
The conclusion isn't about the truth of what the professor says. "If you can trust what I say, you can't trust what I say." Just because you can't trust him, doesn't mean he can't say something true.
A way to flesh out the argument is "If it is true that you can trust what I say, it is not true that you can trust what I say."
What about Mackie’s opening statement “there are no objective values”, isn’t this an objective ‘value’ since it’s an attitude that is universal... making it objective in some way? Or necessarily objective (since it must always obtain). Is it self-refuting?
No, it's not self-refuting because even though that statement is clearly meant to be objectively true, it is not a value statement. It is a statement of non-normative fact. Saying 'x is wrong' is a value statement. Saying 'x does not exist' is not a value statement.
@@profjeffreykaplanthank you! So it is objectively true, but it’s allowed to be since it isn’t appealing to a “queer” reality? Also, what do you think of the ‘companions in guilt’ argument? Do you think that in virtue of epistemic error theory being self-refuting moral error theory is false (since it proves that categorically normative facts can exist)? Or would you say that it doesn’t necessarily follow.
I have a problem with the ‘entails’ example. Eg “Black holes are pink entails black holes are visible” Where visible means light bounces off it.
Light does not bounce off black holes.
Not an expert, but I think you're refuting a claim that's not being made there...such as "all colors are visible", "black isn't visible", "black isn't a color". He used the green grass/pink grass example to illustrate some claims entail others
@@NomadicIsaac hi - I’m saying the example he gives is not an example of entailment, because the truth of ‘X is colour Y’ does not guarantee the truth of the claim ‘X is visible’. ‘X is colour Y’ does not entail ‘X is visible’. It’s just a bad example/illustration of entailment. Some other examples to illustrate that it’s a bad example.. : X = the abominable snowman (not 100% sure) or X = my imaginary friend’s hair.
My imaginary friends hair is brown entails my imaginary friend is visible.. I think that’s false
Your imaginary friend's hair is not brown.
My grass is decidedly brown
Also isn’t Global Skepticism guaranteeing its own truth?
So that makes it self defeating at the outset.
are you writing backwards my guy
I am not. But it sure looks that way. Here is a video I made explaining how it works: ruclips.net/video/6_d44bla_GA/видео.html
@@profjeffreykaplan My guess, before I look at the video, is that you are right-handed and we are looking at a reflection.
I remember an old medical T.V. show where this one disturbed young man was diagnosed as dyslexic when the doctor saw him reading a book he was holding up to a mirror. I didn't know what dyslexia was but I knew eyeballs don't work like that.
Kyle Hill does write backwards, both in Because Science, and on his self-titled YT channel
He’s goated
I think the advice is only self refuting in a specific context. However, if by saying you can trust me, he is implicitly referring to himself as the exception and by referring to a specific set of college professors, not all.
I agree moral skepticism by itself is not self refuting. Have you done a video on Pyrrhonian moral skepticism?
It's easy to "refute" something if you completely misdefine it. I will not waste my time trying to explain everything, but I will say that skepticism is NOT when you say that there are no objective truths about anything. Skepticism is when the knowledge about any truth is not possible to anyone right now or always impossible.
Here "Global subjectivism" was defined to mean "all beliefs are true", or rather a statement equivalent with this.
My impression of subjectivism an subjectivists is that the perspective is something more similar to "your belief in X and my belief in not-X can both be true". Someone trained in the dark arts of logic may then suggest that (a) everything follows from a false statement*; and (b) "X and not-X" is false; and thus (c) all statements are true, including "global subjectivism is false"; implying (d) either X and not-X are never true simultaneously, or global subjectivism is false. But since the first statement is simply the negation of global subjectivism, in either case global subjectivism is false-even without assuming that anyone believes global subjectivism to be false.
(*) because my textbook on logic says so (and proves it; proof omitted from this youtube comment).
Isn't it fun to play around with fixpoints and negation? 😄
What do you mean by "truth relative to a individual person / to a society". Does this just mean that there are no objective truths, but the people in that society think that some things are true? How would that be different from global nihilism?
A subjective truth would be something like green is a pleasant color to me.
@@RickJaeger Ok, if the statement "green is a pleasant color" is a subjective truth, and is subjectively true for you,
then the statement "green is a pleasant color to you" would be an objectively true statement.
So if subjective moral truths exist, automatically some objective moral truths exist, by constructing them similar to this example. And this would imply moral realism.
Does that argument even work?
@@resiknoiro7506 It wouldn't be objectively true. You could never know it objectively.
@@resiknoiro7506 Further, I don't think you can convert subjective truths into objective truths, according to such people, by just saying "to you." I have dealt with radical subjectivists and unfortunately not the clever kind, so I can't help any further.
@@RickJaeger why shouldn't you be able to construct those kind of statements?
I don't get the argument against global subjectivism. Why does it imply that "whatever person believes is true for them"? For example, if someone believes that Earth is flat, I would think that he is mistaken and the correct belive for him to have is that the Earth is also round for him individualy.
That is because you are not a global subjectivist. A global subjectivist would say that someone who believes the earth is flat is right from their perspective, and you are right from yours, and neither of you is more right than the other.
"well, except for the nihilist" that's usually how it goes xD
Oh no!! He popped up again.
Nihilism is true. And it is especially true that there is much meaning to be found in telling everyone that there is no intrinsic truth to be found.
@@markvictor8776 Like it means something to me.
I feel like the argument against universal skepticism is way more complicated than it needs to be. There’s no need to appeal to objective vs. subjective truths (putting aside that “subjective truth” is an oxymoron). If someone claims that universal skepticism is true, they immediately destroy their argument, period. Because if it’s true that there are no universal truths, then it can’t be the case that the statement “There are no universal truths” is universally true.
Subjective truth isn't an oxymoron. Taste seems to be a subjective truth. Even if you were to dissect me and infer what my tastes would be, you'd do so by comparing it to other's subjective experiences - how else would you know what brain activity would be indicative of my taste? In other words: how can subjective experience ever be assessed as a mind-independent truth?
Relative truth is also still an interesting case. Consider Newton's laws of mechanics. Here, speed is not objective; it is dependent on one's reference frame. Hence, relative truths exist
If there are subjective/relative truths, can there not be subjective/relative falsehoods? And is it then not sensible to consider nihilism on objective, relative, and subjective accounts?
@@captainzork6109 fair points, but I still don't see how it makes "subjective truths" relevant without defining "truth" as needing to contain subjective features. If it can be defined exactly how and why you can be reliably predicted to experience "x" once you establish the relevant background conditions, in what sense is that a "subjective" truth? I mean, it's true that you're the subject having the experience (and I'll grant you the fair use of the term in that context), but that itself is still objectively true.
So even with regard to taste or what sort of music you may like, the objective truth of that is that conscious creatures DO experience things; that simply IS the case. That they have varying experiences within an experiential domain has no bearing on whether they do or do not have an experience within an experiential domain. So I still find the idea of a "subjective truth" to be oxymoronic, particularly in the service in which they're trying to press it in this video.
@@captainzork6109, two more things:
First, thanks for the thoughtful reply. I appreciate a thoughtful conversation.
Second, I’ll grant you that I’m possibly being too rigid in my utility of the term “truth”. I see “truth” simply as what is the case. Conversely, when I hear something like “subjective truth”, I imagine someone believing that they are someone/thing that they objectively are not (someone thinking they’re Napoleon, say). It’s true that they’re having an experience, but it’s not true at all that they are Napoleon. Their “truth” is entirely local to them, and thus not “true” all.
But as I say, maybe I’m being too rigid with it. I’m open to that conversation.
@@Dionysus3883 Yes! That's exactly what I mean.
- So here I guess I'm going to make a case for subjective experience being real and truth-apt -
Their subjective experience is still their subjective experience. But the attributes and contents of their subjective experience is still "what is the case", even if it does not align with the rest of reality
And to assess someone's tastes, such as in music, you may want to use a brain scanner using their subjective experience as the criterion. But of course they could also just tell you. Then, whether their report of whether they like a certain song is conveying the truth or not depends on how it compares to their subjective experience.
Then again, this depends on what you mean with truth. Are you looking for a comprehensive answer? Or just a mere impression? Do you wish for their entire personality to pass judgment on the song? Or, if they are referring to their experience of the past, and are thus accessing the memory traces of their experience, would you be satisfied if they just accessed memory which assesses a single aspect of the song?
Or, perhaps you'd want them to simply give you a rating. Sure can! Let's just convert the subjective experience into what they understand the rating to mean, and open one's measurement up for even more steps of interpretation! (Admittedly, though, psychometricians have thought about this carefully, and using scales could work if done with due care.)
I guess the only truth you can really access is the measurement - whether it's direct measurement with a scanner, or their own measurement, reported via words or a rating. So yeah, even the self could be "wrong" or inaccurate about one's internal experiences. But the fact they had a subjective experience is undeniable. And there is a correct answer to the question "what were the attributes or contents of that subjective experience?" It's just that the idiosyncratic, local, and dynamic nature of it makes that truth impossible to assess
Then again, the same is the case for the smallest particles in the universe. Strictly speaking, we will always fall short in terms of precision or accuracy
Finally, an important realization, by the way, is that even if someone has an emotional reaction about something I don't think is a good reason, the fact they're not making sense does not change the fact they are having that experience. Their subjective experience is still real, even if it's based on something which is not real. So, their subjective experience also still has consequences, such as stress and other things. They can even know they're being irrational, and still have that experience! Thus, their experience should still, in a sense, be taken seriously.
Placebos are another example of a subjective experience having real effects, even if the person knows they're getting placebo treatment.
All in all, given the centrality and potent nature subjective experiences seem to have, the idea they are not truth-apt is difficult to readily accept, at the very least
(Sorry if my writing is a bit chaotic and long, or does not make complete sense. My brain is a bit fried atm)
@@captainzork6109you know what? I’m sold. Subjective truth isn’t an oxymoron. 👍
Thanks again for the thoughtful comments. 🙂
Within the limits of our language the sentence, "There is no truth," is nonsense. But the idea that there is no truth is still possible if we suspend the limits of our communication and our perceptions of the possible extents of truth and reality. I recognize that I have only our language to express that in, but the possibility still exists beyond graphic representations.
I think I'm confused about the relation between global and objective, it seems like Global skepticism could defeat itself right off the bat, because it would say it is not objectively true. You could say that it's true with some form of limitations, like subjectively or relatively, or anything else you could possibly think of, but if there's some exception, possible exception or additional requirement making it not always true, it's would no longer global. Also attacking Global Nihilium, Global subjectivism and Global relativism, feels like it's attacking arguments for it when you could attack the conclusion. Though I'm guessing I'm understanding "global" in a more absolute sense that is really is. Like it's saying "unconditional, but only under some conditions" and a contraction. Perhaps reading "global" as "unconditional, always applies, no exceptions" is wrong, otherwise global skepticism would defeat itself right away. A limited "global" feels a bit underwhelming, but I guess that's why it wasn't done.
Global skepticism is definitely a weird one. It seems self defeating, but since it attacks the very foundation of philosophical arguments it is perfectly comfortable against this argument. When provided an argument that GS is self defeating, a skeptic could easily respond that said argument only works if you assume that GS is false.
Supposing global subjectivism is true and then having one person believe it is false does not render it false globally, since the whole premise of global subjectivism is that truth is relative to individuals. So global subjectivism would be false to that one person, not globally.
The main problem with 'global subjectivism' is actually linguistic. If there is no such thing/concept as objective truth, and everything is subjective, the terms "objective" and "subjective" cease to have a comprehensible meaning. The conclusion ought to be, therefore, that what is the least subjective must be deemed objective, so we are back to square one.
@@waggishsagacity7947 Words do no have inherent meaning. They only have meaning between individuals that speak that language. Global subjectivism is not at odds with language, since language is by its nature subjective.
Global subjectivism does not meaan people can't share beliefs and likewise objectivism does not necessarily apply to popular beliefs since those have changed with time. Objectivism is not a popularity contest since if truth exists it would not change with the whims of culture.
But that is a circular reasoning
Global subjectivism is not false because global subjectivism is true
No, calling it global means it is true for everyone - it is absolute. If it is not true for one person, it is not global -> it is not true.
Thanks for the video!
That said, I am not sure about Moral skepticism or moral relativism not being self refuting. My reason is that a claim like "Whether murder is wrong, is subjective" seems at first glance to be a moral fact - it is after all a claim about the morality of murder. Yet if that is a moral fact then the claim, "all moral truths are subjective" would almost certainly also be a moral fact. And if that is a moral fact then "MS is not true" is true for anyone who disbelieves in MS if MS is true. Which would generate a similar contradiction as with the GS cases. Moral relativism would have basically the same issue.
The only way I see out would be for the moral skeptic to claim that facts like "Whether murder is wrong, is subjective" is not actually a moral fact or a moral truth claim. And that seems wrong....
On the point of nihilism (or moral nihilism), the argument I offered seems less plausible. But there is still something there that troubles me. Specifically, if a moral fact is a fact that has the property of being about moral truth claims. (hmmm... not sure if that is exactly right) Then the claim that there are no moral facts, does itself seem to be a fact about moral truth claims - namely that there aren't any. And that would amount to a contradiction. Of course we could make up some incoherent nonsense concept, Smoral facts, and ask whether the same thing would prove that smoral facts must exist. That obviously is a false conclusion as we stipulated that Smoral facts to be an incoherent non-sense concept. Yet, my thought would be that moral facts might have a bizarre quasi ontological argument style property of necessarily existing if the concept of morality is not incoherent. And, I might add, morality does not seem to be incoherent, at least not intuitively.
Based on my limited education about the study of ethics, it seems that claims such as "all moral truths are subjective" and "there are no moral facts" are not ethical claims, but meta-ethical ones. It's a technical distinction, and I'm not sure how well I understand it, but it answers your questions, which means it's a useful distinction.
Yes, you found the point. ‘There are no universal moral facts’ is not a moral claim, and would not be a moral fact if it were true. It’s a claim about reality. You can’t use the claim ‘there are no universal moral facts’ to judge the morality of any specific action.
@@samueldimmock694 Hey Samuel,
Yes that is the way out. The question comes down to whether or not it is true, however. The mere fact that the claim "all moral truths are subjective" is a metaethical claim does not prima facie exclude it from also being an ethical claim any more than being four-legged excludes something from being brown. Such a point would have to be argued.
The issue that I have is that specific claims like "Whether murder is wrong, is subjective" appears to be an ethical claim and not a metaethical claim. Also ethical claims can seemingly be aggregated such that we could say that "Whether murder is wrong and whether stealing is wrong, are subjective" would still be an ethical claim, (and also not a metaethical claim.) Yet if that is correct then almost certainly a claim that aggregates all ethical claims is itself also an ethical claim and so "all moral truths are subjective" is an ethical claim independent of its being a metaethical claim.
Anyways, thanks for the reply.
Well, I for one am very skeptical towards the validity of this global skepticism thingy. Of course there are facts, I mean, wtf.
What is the idea of truth if not the idea that certain things ought to be believed? Does the concept of truth itself not become meaningless absent of the binding moral premise that people ought to believe in it? Does the very act of advocating for a position, not in of itself, presume that the position should be supported?
Still, if the college professor makes a logically incoherent argument, perhaps that's a reason not to trust them. Then again, it's a reason to trust them, because they let you know that college professors can't be trusted. Then again... 🤣😅
How does a belief in objective Truths imply the belief in Objective Moral Truths? You assumes that moral skepticism is a belief that subjective morality exist. The moral skeptic denies all moral language as being a feature of our existence. We believe there are acts and behaviors that some people claim as Moral but nothing more than a name given to a description of behavior.
Ah. I guess epistemic nihilism, subjectivism, and relativism refute themselves as well then?
I understand the reasoning behind why global nihilism and global relativism are false but I don't think that the argument against global subjectivism is convincing. Global subjectivism purports that truths are dependent on the individual. To say that this entails that the statement "Global subjectivism is false" because at least 1 person believes it is extremely misleading because it does not include enough information.
In truth global subjectivism actually entails the statement: "Global subjectivism is false to Shafer-Landau.", but this statement doesn't contradict the statement: "Global subjectivism is true to me.", thus global subjectivism is not self refuting.
One example of this is in the statement: "In basketball, a layup is worth 2 points", following Shafer-Landau's reasoning, this statement would be self defeating since almost every time basketball is played in the street, layups are worth 1 point. The statement is not self defeating, it merely lacks information.
This is a strange use of the term "skepticism". Typically, skepticism refers to the idea that you can't know something, with moral skepticism meaning that it is impossible to know moral truths, and global skepticism meaning that it is impossible to know anything. Neither of these imply the respective forms of nonrealism, since it is possible for there to be objective facts about a topic even if it is impossible to know them. And skepticism is also not implied by nonrealism (except for the nihilist varieties), since it is still possible to know subjective or relative facts. I wonder why you used the unusual terminology, since it could make the video a little confusing to someone who is expecting a video about the more common definition of moral skepticism.
Hmm. This seems like a misunderstanding of subjectivism and relativism here. Just because there are possible dependent/relative truths under subjectivism and relativism does not mean, that every thought/belief that a subject has or that is dependent/relative to a subject, culture or other metric, is actually true.
This would be especially be true of beliefs that try to break the tenets of subjectivism or relativism, since the dependent/relative truths are trying to be non-dependent/non-relative, which is not allowed.
The belief of an individual under subjectivism, "that moral subjectivism is false", is thus blatantly false non-matter if the subject is the basis for truth.
The mistake is like saying that Anti-global-skepticism means that everything is true. Therefore, it is self-defeating because there are at least two people that disagree. It is an obvious misunderstanding and Strawman. This seems to have happened here.
Relativism is not the claim that some truths are relative to specific cultures, it is the claim that all truths are relative to specific cultures. In the video he uses the example of what is polite or rude as something that varies between cultures. It is uncontroversial that some things vary, what he is arguing against is the claim that everything does.
Now, you may not hold the view he is arguing against here, but that doesn’t make it a straw man. It just means that you aren’t a relativist by the definition being used here. Some people do believe it.
@@tyruskarmesin5418 Am not a relativist. Moral or truth wise.
I think you are misunderstanding my objection. My objection is, that just because something is relative to a specific culture, that does not make it true. Just because something needs to be A to be true, does not mean that everything that is A is true.
Other rules still apply that can make things that are A false. For example, the rules of logic. And specifically under relativism anti-relative statements are automatically false.
That means that a culture having an anti-relative statement does not break relativism.
There is still the problem of defining logic and relativism (as a non-relative principle) in a way that allows them to exist without internal contradictions.
@@darkreflectionsstudio4506 The relativist position is that all truths are relative to cultures. If any fact is universally true, regardless of culture, than relativism is not true. This includes the truth of relativism.
In relativism, there is no standard to judge statements that is not particular to a given culture. So yes, 'A', that is, a statement being believed by a culture, is both sufficient and necessary for the statement to be true. This means that if a culture believes that relativism is false, then relativism is false for that culture, according to relativism.
Hmm, if global nihilism is true then there is no one who could say its false since 'logic' itself works under assumptions that themselves are untrue (according to global nihilism). I don't think that it can defeat itself since it makes logic itself actually crumble. Awesome video though!
This is the first time I've ever heard of skepticism being defined that way. I've only heard it defined as the view that a claim should be proven true with evidence before being accepted as true. Therefore, moral objectivism has to be proven true before it can be accepted as true. You can't prove moral objectivism true by refuting arguments for moral skepticism. You have to provide a logical argument that moral objectivism is true.
That definition is the colloquial usage of skepticism. The one used in this video has always been the definition used by philosophers
@@jonathanjernigan3865 Fair enough. I wouldn't know.
I've heard nihilism defined as "there is no reality, but if there were it would suck."
That sounds like something Žižek would say
The argument isn’t whether or not Earth is round. It's a globe. Globes might be round, but not all round objects are globes. It's kind of like global skepticism vs moral skepticism.
Good presentation. I would add that this argumentative technique -- trying to weaken a position by defeating the worst argument AGAINST it, is what the famous "Straw Man" fallacy is, and that's worth pointing out. You try to defeat an opponent by taking the worst argument on the other side (sometimes a false argument) and then attacking that argument, which is a "straw man." The fallacy is to assume that because you've defeated one argument, that you've defeated all other possible arguments..
But anyway, Moral Skepticism, pushed to its logical extreme IS self-refuting. It's like saying, "The meaning of life is that there is no meaning." That is obviously self-refuting. So is Nietzsche's statement "There are no unqualified truths." But is Nietzsche's statement itself an unqualified truth, or is it *relatively* or *sometimes* true? If yes, that there may be cases in which it is not true; and therefore you can have SOME unqualified truths. But if it itself is an unqualified truth, then the statement has refuted itself.
Similarly with Moral Skepticism. The problem with the moral skeptics is that they face the dilemma of: "Do we tolerate the intolerant"? And that is a dilemma that is a very real thing, not just a word game. Although I'm normally a liberal, there is the dilemma of extreme woke-ism: do they defend radical Islam? If they don't, they worry they aren't woke enough. But if they DO defend radical Islam, they have to defend the people who would take away rights from women and deny free speech.
“Do we tolerate the intolerant” is a practical and specific moral question. It is unrelated to the meta ethical question about moral skepticism. A moral skeptic could say “There is no objective moral truth, but my morality says we should tolerate everyone no matter what” or they could say “There is no objective moral truth, but my morality says we should reject dangerous ideologies” or they could say “There is no objective moral truth, but my morality says we should execute anyone who wears the color blue.”
Moral skepticism is a meta ethical position, not an ethical one, and it is compatible with any specific moral claim. It does not imply any degree of tolerance for opposing ideologies. That could only be a part of an individual’s moral code, which is a separate thing.
Ok, I believe that you got a haircut at the end of the video, I am going to need more evidence if I am to believe you changed clothes.
Why make a question that is obviously answered by a no. Skepticism is by definition about doubt. It doesn't make an assertion, therefore it is never self refuting. You might argue that skeptics strive for something they can't achieve, but that doesn't make skepticism self refuting.
What is next? "Are bachelors married?" (no, but they have other problems)
Global subjectivism, at least the way it's presented here, doesn't seem to be self-refuting in the same way that global nihilism and global relativism are.
If global nihilism is true, then nothing is true, including global nihilism. Okay, so global nihilism isn't true.
If global relativism is true, then nothing is true if a given society believes that nothing is true. Every society believes that some things are true. Okay, so global relativism isn't true.
If global subjectivism is true, then nothing is true for Shafer-Landau if Shafer-Landau believes that nothing is true. Shafer-Landau believes that some things are true. Okay, so global subjectivism isn't true *for Shafer-Landau*. That seems to me to be insufficient to say that global subjectivism is self-refuting, for anyone other than Shafer-Landau. Global subjectivism (as presented here) says that different things are true for different individuals. Therefore, global subjectivism is true for individuals who believe it is true, just as much as it is not true for Shafer-Landau and others who believe it is not true, if we take global subjectivism as the starting point (that incompatible beliefs held by separate individuals can both be true).
It might be circular reasoning, but so is the alleged self-refutation presented: "Global subjectivism is false because I as an individual believe global subjectivism is not true," presupposes that the central idea of global subjectivism (that separate individuals' mutually exclusive beliefs can both be true) is false. You have to take a denial of global subjectivism as a starting point for this to work.
What seems necessary to refute global subjectivism is a proof that incompatible beliefs held by separate individuals cannot both be true. But this would be an external refutation of global subjectivism, not a self-refutation. Which would undermine the point of this video (that global subjectivism is self-refuting so it cannot be a basis for global skepticism so that cannot be the basis of moral skepticism). Unless I am missing something here.
(Incidentally, this seems to suggest that if there was a society that believed nothing was true, then global relativism would also be true *for that society,* making global relativism also not self-refuting *for that society.* This seems arguable since we would need to survey every society to prove that such a society didn't exist - at least, I can imagine a society composed entirely of global relativists. But this is different from the claims being made in the video - which is that no such society exists for global relativism, yet there is the implicit assumption that such individuals exist for global subjectivism.)
P.S. I would also be interested to know what to call the belief that there are objective truths, but that human beings only have access to subjective truths through our senses (and arguably through reason as well), and that no one can actually prove objective truths, so any belief is inherently subjective, as far as we can possibly know. Some version of this seems more plausible to me personally than either global or moral objectivism or global or moral subjectivism (as defined here).
By stating that global subjectivism is true, you have claimed an objective standard. The problem with all of the theories to challenge objective morality so far is that they all rely on objective morality to begin with.
To be specific, the statement 'X is true' must mean that truth exists.
Okay, I think that is actually a more solid argument than the one in the video. I still don't think it addresses the possibility, which seems to me the most likely, that there is objective truth, and only subjective perceptions or conceptions of it - which is in a way a reconciliation of the paradox. Global objectivism may be true, but if it is only subjectively accessible to each of us, it would practically speaking be the case that global subjectivism were true.
@@zoe_gevalt If you can perceive something, it objectively exists to some extent would be my argument.
Perhaps a better example would be unicorns as an idea exist because someone created it. This is not to say the creature is real but rather the concept is.
O b j e c t i v e truth 🥴 🥴 🥴
Global Subjectivism means the belief is true for the individual. Landau believes its false then for him it is false that does not refute its claim. If you think deeply enough about it, it proves all people will believe their own truths it doesnt make what they believe globally true just true to them. So while its a fact Landau believes its false, him believing that only makes it false for him or others with that belief it doesnt refute or represent that its false globally because there will be others who believe its true. This isnt a paradox it only actually adds to the proof that Global Subjectivism is true.
Think of it this way. If everyone believed Global Subjectivism was true, then it would be an Objective truth and it would prove the entire argument false. Different individuals HAVE TO hold both views that its true/false for GS to be true. BUT if everyone believed it was false, it would have to be false for the same reason stated above.
You make a good argument that global subjectivism is not self refuting. At the end you seem to imply that this is evidence of global subjectivism being true though. This doesn't work, since you started with that assumption. Showing "if X is true then X is true" isn't evidence for X.
Maybe you didn't mean that and I am just overanalyzing though 😂
For as many of your videos I see, I still don't know if you like pickles or not. 🥒
Isn't moral skepticism a bit self-refuting? Self-refuting lite.
It refers to, talks about, "morals", "ethics", "moral thoughts" "actions" etc. Things that may or may not have an underlying Moral Truth behind them. But also things which a competent speaker of English can recognise, categories, distinguish from thoughts and actions which aren't subject to moral judgement; argue about what's in or out or a gray area. So, so far as someone is a competent speaker, one tacitly must understand somethings that are true about moral judgements, actions, thoughts etc that are universal; otherwise the words would stop working.
Not really, that's just a category that we have created. Lets come up with a new term "Mondowling." It refers to actions taken with a banana, like peeling it, eating it, making muffins, etc, actions taken with a car, like driving, parking, crashing, etc, and actions taken with a finger, like pointing, insulting, mucous removing, etc. Now any time we are talking about any of those actions, in spite of the fact that they don't seem to have anything to do with each other, we can say that we are talking about Mondowling. Does that mean that there is some objective Mondowling of the universe? Maybe, but it seems a little silly.
@@bouncycastle955
Exactly. It's not "just" a category. It's a category. You can change the word. Change the language. But if the word is usable, there *must* be some way to identify what's in or out of the category.
For what's it's worth, my argument is basically Wittgenstein, language games etc.
@@DrLogical987 No, it is _just_ a category. I defined Mondowling. So far as I'm aware, no one has ever created that category before, but both of us could effortlessly use it now if we had some reason to. There is a very easy way to identify what's in and what's out, it's easy to use, but I just plucked it out of the air, it doesn't map to anything objective.
It's amazing to me that people don't recognize Wittgenstein for the obvious troll he was. No, it isn't worth anything.
@@bouncycastle955 ok.
You have defined some random wird. You have endowed it with a or some fact. So? So a skeptic cannot claim there are no facts about it. See?
To miss quote Wittgenstein, that of which you do not understand, you should not speak.
@@DrLogical987 no, I haven't endowed it with a fact, I've defined it. There is no 'it' it's just a word.
I know Wittgenstein very well, he was trolling the philosophical world. Theres a reason the great majority of philosophers don't take him seriously anymore.
"Moral Nihilism is True" can be rephrased into "There are no good or bad, right or wrong". This is a moral statement, and therefore it is self-refuting.
_"Unicorn skepticism is true" can be rephrased to "there are no unicorns." This is a unicorn statement and therefore it is self-refuting._
A moral claim is something that asserts what course of action (or outcome) is "right" or "good", not merely any time someone uses the word "morality" in a sentence.
Moral nihilism denies that good and bad exist, it doesnt apply a good or bad value to doing so, and so fails to qualify as a moral claim.
In much the same way that the word "unicorn" in a sentence doesnt make that sentence a unicorn, the word "moral" in a claim doesnt make that sentence a moral claim.
@@fieldrequired283 Good catch. A theory about something doesn't have to have the thing it is about apart of itself. A theory about irrationality isn't itself irrational. A theory about war isn't itself an instance of war.
This video just made me realize that we see truth as distinct from morality, whereas aspects of morality such as honesty, sincerity, and even accountability and responsibility have to do with truth.
Is truth really amoral? For example, in this day and age you can be called immoral for referring to a transgender "woman" as "he", or for calling an overweight person "fat". In fact, it seems that the more overweight a person is, the more insulting (and therefore "immoral") it is to describe them as "fat".
It appears that we have tried as much as possible to distance morality from objective truths, and to associate it mostly with subjective truth. Even laws are coming under attack because of this. The definition of life or a human being has become relative, and as a result, abortion has become legal. The definition of murder has become relative, and therefore there are debates concerning legalizing euthanasia.
In my opinion, a society's treatment of truth will always reflect its moral state. If a society despises objective truth, then it will also despise objective morality, which in my opinion is the only legitimate form of morality. Subjective morality or moral relativism isn't morality at all. And the fact that we despise terrorists (who are following their own subjective moral principles), is a good indication that we all realize that objective morality is "more moral" and more rational than subjective morality.
There have been true things that are rude and irresponsible to say for longer than the concept of diplomacy has existed.
Additionally, every word is made up. People using language differently from how you were raised to use it doesnt make them objectively wrong any more than someone pointing at a small, white, feathered avian farm animal and saying "pollo" makes them objectively wrong.
There are many words you can use to describe the same things, but some words have hurtful connotations. If you have the choice of multiple words that describe the same thing, and you choose the ones that hurt people, you're being a dick. It's that easy.