Firstly a fascinating video. You have Summerised neatly what I had observed based on my study of British military history. Despite starting your video with some equivaction, I think in the end you gave a strong justification and summary of what British military strategy should be. I think that those times when Britain has deployed large armies have been confined to the last two World wars (excluding pre 17th century wars), and frankly ww1 is an example of why Britain should avoid large scale land warfare. Playing to our strengths of maritime and economic warfare make sense. Actually however you touched on something in the video, but did not expand on it, even more important is the 'peacetime' grand strategy (Perhaps a bit disappointing given your channels title). What Britain expended most of it's energy doing over the last 400 years was preventing war. Preventing it by weakening potential rivals, dividing them, aligning with them, always ensuring a balance of power. Peace is always better than war provided that the peace works for British interests. Keeping the seven seas open and free for commerce, enabling the movement of goods and people, allowing free trade (at least in British terms), these were the hallmarks of British strategy. Defending British interests with vigour, such that potential rivals knew the cost of open warfare was not worth it. A classic feature of British maritime power was overseas basis. This allowed Britain to send forces at very short notice to any trouble spot anywhere in the world, in the days before jet travel.
I think the ability to field 3 divisions is something to aim for. It's a good career and keeps a healthy armament industry. It's not wasted money having decent armed forces
I saw a man reconfigure the British army with only the addition of 4 thousand extra troops to make such a 3 Division army Structure. Through reconfiguring units and re assigning equipment he created 2 Regular Divisions. The 1st UK continuing to be the Light and Expeditionary division, having 4 Brigades. And the 3 UK Division having 2 Armoured and 2 Mechanized Brigades. Then having a 2 UK division, made up from the Army reserve. I thought that it was a pretty excellent idea.
I agree, it is perhaps informative that it was Britain developed the likes of the Commandos, SAS, and the Chindits, and for that matter earlier the Royal Marines as a maritime raiding force that meant nowhere where there was water was free from potential attack.
I can't speak to grand strategic thinking. But as a former British Army NCO. I have seen the abilities at unit and sub-unit level down to section level of other countries. They have not impressed me although there are some who are similar but still different to us. I don't know if there is a cultural element to it? But getting it done, common sense, quietly without a song and a dance or theatrics seems to be our strong point. also at our best when it goes wrong compared to others.
I'm not sure if their is a British Way of War, per se, bit there certainly a British way of fighting. I served fora period of 20 years between 1983 and 2003 in the Royal Air Force Regiment. I joined for two reasons, firstly for the adventure, and secondly to be a professional soldier. It occurs to me that we are at our best when things are at their worst, and in between times fall back to the position of "doing the best we can to be professional in the circumstances. This might not always be enough. However it served me well through Northern Ireland, Belize, Gulf '91 and the whole former Yugoslavia mess and some post '99 Hong Kong stuff. Is that enough? I don't know , I demonstrated my political beliefs at the ballot box, not at " the muzzle of a rifle" to misquote a famous aphorism of Chaorman Mao. It seems to me that many of the comments here are making quantities arguments rather than qualitive one. History might suggest that we have been as good as required more often than not.
Liddell Hart’s insane poisoning of the well when it comes to Great War historiography is something that should be noted. So much of the modern conception of the First World War in both the laymen and unfortunately professional historical realm has become one of “lions and donkeys” in some significant part due to him.
When Corbett and Hart were writing Britain had a near monopoly on world trade that was instantly apply able in the first week of any war. WW1 is interesting as while trade with Germany virtually ceased as soon as the war started Lloyds of London notice an uptick in trade with the Nordics, Denmark and the Netherlands pretty much equal to the trade no longer going directly to Germany. Obviously this was simply a way of circumventing the blockade* and so trade with those nations was reduced simply by Lloyds of London refusing to insure shipping to those nations unless they were pretty sure that the goods were not being passed on to Germany and the Central powers. Obviously today the UK does not enjoy this monopoly but it does enjoy being a senior member of NATO and while out of the EU still a partner with those nations. So while it cannot on its own drive such a blockade it can through its member ship of like minded clubs achieve the same. *It has been noted that in cases of luxury British cars that there was an increase in car sales in those central Asian nations neighbouring Russia equal to the number of cars no longer sold to Russia since the sanctions imposed over the Ukraine! That needs to be knocked on the head.
There is no Swedish way of war that i know of but there is a Swedish way of fighting thats very much shaped by the armies under Charles XII and Gustavus Adolphus. And that is that you are very active even if you are inferior because if you cause problems for the oponent he has less time to create problems for you. Swedish units like to be offensive whenever possible on the tactical level. I have heard this descrobed as the Lutheran work ethic from swedish civil society manifesting itself
Corbett and your last analysis of the modern British military were spot on. Over time, a nation's military is only as strong as the nation's economy, and on the flip side, a nation's economy is only as strong as a nation's military, or organizational safety-- NATO
@@PMMagro The US has the biggest military and the biggest economy. When the Brits ruled the world, they had the biggest navy. You can't have one without the other or you will collapse like the Soviets. We are lucky to be in a stable world right now. I often wonder what if the Nazis had joined the Russians instead of fighting them. They would not have been defeated-maybe some kind of ceasefire. They would have been joined by the Japs. The world would look very different. Just sayin....
Corbit seems very oposed to Churchill in the use of amphiious forces. In both wars Churchill gathered the royal marine components into regular land units which did little. Something we know cost the UK Norway in 1940
Fascinating discussion. I think it's true that we do the unexpected and that puts our enemy's on the back foot. However Our navy, army and air force are I believe much depleted, and frankly all three arms are in a very sorry state these days. If there is a British way to fight wars we can't even begin to do this at the moment.
Excellent! Wrongly, I had not paid much attention to David French's book in the past. I realise now I should go back to it and read it more carefully. Thank you!
Hitler thought the English would stick to the logical maritime strategy and a deal could be struck. Im sure he would have been willing to let the English occupy northern France (Calais) and the west of Belgium up to the Scheld river (the old border of the Holy Roman Empire) to assure them. He was flabbergasted the British were willing to throw away their empire to "win" the war. It was the moral thing to do. But he was right in this of course, it was inevitable the empire would be lost in time because of that decision.
Hitler admired the British Empire and wanted the land version of it in Europe. Don’t forget the British had the first concentration camps and happily massacred unarmed Indians and Africans to preserve their Empire. If some in the British cabinet had their way, Britain would have vacated Europe and kept its overseas territories much like the Vichy French kept their African and Asian territories. What would have happened when the Japanese inevitably attacked the USA due to oil embargoes is another question. I believe the Japanese still would have taken Malaya, Singapore and Borneo but left India alone as Nazi Germany was an ally and would have not wanted Japan to attack the UK’s largest overseas dependency.
@@andrewcombe8907 To say British had the first concentration camps is misleading as this associates it as being the same as the concentration camps in Germany - this was not the case, they were never set up with the same intention of the German concentration camps for forced labour or later as death camps . It was to remove the civilian population from the areas of the fighting and so they could not give support to the opposition, its true people died in the camps but those deaths were from poor planning, management and logistics to support such large camps in those regions
The colonial era was ending irrespective of the war though WW2 certainly accelerated that end. Like slavery, colonialism was morally indefensible in Western democracies and the burgeoning movements of the colonized peoples toward independence made that independence inevitable.
you keep referring to the English, there is no such thing as an English Army, Navy or Airforce, are you aware there were more soldiers from the Indian sub continent in the British army than British people in WW2, the largest volunteer army in history
The UK had NO chance without TONS of American help. 100's of AIM 9 missiles were provided clandestinely by the USN. Without those missiles they wouldn't have racked up so many kills. (17 of the 20 air to air kills were with Sidewinders.) Mind you at the time the US was officially aligned with Argentina because of the drug war. But Reagan had a thing for old bags like Marge so we got very involved. We redirected an oil tanker and refueled the UK taskforce otherwise their attack would have ended off the shores of Ascension island. We also supplied millions of gallons of aviation fuel, thousands of mortar rounds, 10's of thousands of small arms rounds, tempoary runway grating. Not to mention we moved a spy satellite to monitor the area. (This significantly shortened the satellites life span. ) All because someone tried to come between an Englishman and his sheep!
Good video. When considering anything Liddell Hart wrote I would strongly recommend reading John J. Mearsheimer's 1988 book "Liddell Hart and the Weight of History". Hart wrote so much stuff between WW1 and 2, some of it contradictory, that it was easy for him to go back afterwards and "cherry pick" the bits he had got right about the coming war and thus cement his reputation.
It’s very interesting to hear that considering how Britain has been neglecting its navy these last decades. And also to be revised since the UK’s GDP share of the world is significantly smaller now.
British, in my humble opinion have a tradition of making excellent professional navy (and later air force) as they had policy of denying enemy even ability to land on the Isles as best ground defence. Land forces oscillated between small, professional expeditionary forces and large armies capable of fighting continental powers, as the need arose. In the XX century such need arose three times, once with WW1, second time in WW2, and finally in the Cold War. I expect return of Russia as a threat might warrant at least some revival of the large army concept, especially as Russian naval and air force sink (in the case of Navy, often literally, see Black Sea campaign of Ukrainian war) ever more into decay and irrelevance, while Russia remains land based threat by simple virtue of mass of soldiers and equipment, which, while decimated in fields of Ukraine , still counts in thousands of MBTs, AFVs and artillery pieces.
Twice. Britain has not maintained a large, Continental style Army during the Cold War. Conscription was loosened after WWII, and came to an end in 1963. Even prior to that though National Service as it was called was not the kind of full scale conscription we saw during the World Wars. Its scale was hugely reduced and was only used to maintain military numbers as much as possible until the UK had fully withdrawn from all its former colonies. As for returning to a full scale conscription? Unlikely. Unless you can magic up enough MBT's for example for say three or four Armoured Divisions large scale conscription is essentially worthless in the UK. We just do not have the industrial capacity to build the weapons and equipment for a large scale Army, and it would take years, if not decades to rebuild that capability, especially in critical areas for conscription, such as Armoured Vehicle construction.
Another great presentation, and I, on the whole, agree with what was said, but sadly no mention of that zone inbetween sea and land - Amphibious Assault - which I believe is an essential british capability, but many think AA's days are numbered due to modern warfare techniques. I disagree. I would love to see your view of AA ops and to use the british Falklands campaign as a case study of AA generally. In my view, AA is probably the most challenging combined manoeuvre op mountable involving subs, intelligence, destroyers, frigates, aircraft carriers, aircraft, helicopter carriers, helo ops, assault ships, landing ships, marines, air assault troops, various armour, etc. Huge! Thanks again for you presentations, they're very enjoyable.
Nice work, Michael. I really enjoy these. Given these great periods of time (1688 - 2000) over 300 years - would any nation have a truly consistent way of war? I doubt it. Every war is unique, the circumstances & goals will be different in each, and technology forces change. And, is “muddle through” really a way of war? Maybe very loosely. That basically means “try to find a way to win.” Isn’t that every society’s way of war? Looks like I need to read some of these texts. My wife is going to love me buying more books.
An interesting episode. It was the case that the British emphasised naval and later naval and air power over a land army. The home island was rather small and relatively resource poor with the exceptions of coal and agriculture. Clear shipping lanes to their vast colonies were paramount to maintain British wealth and international standing. It’s also interesting that in the last two major European land wars Britain initially responded by sending quite a small well trained expeditionary force that was quickly decimated which led to the formation of a large powerful army that was pivotal to eventual victory. The prevailing Western European strategy of the last 3/4 of a century seemed to be to create NATO then let the US be responsible for security while we spend our money on civilian infrastructure and social programs. I wonder if the British will recalculate with a trend toward isolationism and a more pro Russian regime in the US.
Corbett was…in my opinion too focused on Victorian Britain. Yes, the strategic need for Britain to have a Low Countries free from a threatening is a primary security aim. But there more than just that to the reasons why British troops fought at Malplaquet (1709), Waterloo (1815), and Mons (1914) all with in a two hour drive. But the part that Corbett and Liddell Hart miss is that Britain has to fight on land to keep their allies who both of these authors who like to throw around like cannon fodder , in the fight. If the maritime strategy worked, why did the Napoleanic Wars end in 1815 after Waterloo? Where a large Allied army with a sizeable British contingent under a British general won? Marlborough led a similar force a century before over the same terrain. Muddling is a typical British strategy that’s true. Same as counting on the colonials to serve as some of that cannon fodder. But I contrast the research of NAM Rodger’s and his stories of how Britain built its naval power and how it sometimes was effective and sometimes not. Good video. Good food for thought.
The British (read as English) way of war is all about sowing discord amongst the enemy, espionage and counter espionage, assassination, blackmail, etc. That is the most consistent way they have waged war since the 1400s. It is the one ares where they are still arguably on par or better than even the Americans, particularly in the realm of human intelligence.
@@drno4837well that’s ridiculous as there are a lot more english than irish scottish and welsh, and the irish are too busy being nazi sympathisers to actually fight
Excellent! I think you missed out the contribution of Royal Marines and Special Forces. We are very good at raiding and working with friendly forces in different cultures and countries. Ireland has also taught us how to work militarily alongside an evolving political process. "Hearts and Minds" is too simplistic a term for this.
I think that Britain has been adaptable in terms of its strategy purely in response to the threat to the homeland from the continent. In Napoleonic warfare, Britain maintained a naval strategy because that was what was necessary to prevent a French invasion of the mainland. The same is seen in WW2 after the collapse of the British expeditionary force. But in scenarios where the threat to the homeland is limited Britain can dabble more heavily in continental affairs such as in WW1, the latter stages of WW2 and the Cold War. Nuclear weapons meant that there was no real possibility of an invasion of the homeland and therefore it was acceptable to adopt a continental approach. This thesis really depends upon the fact that Britains strategic focus lies in Europe, but Britain is still so connected to it economically and societally that I believe it still holds.
Interesting and balanced analysis. Resources will now and in the future constrain and determine our military forces and our war-fighting strategy. As we no longer have the wealth or power that could be wielded in the 18th to 20th centuries the strategies available then are no longer applicable except in alliance. We have to determine where and how we can best apply our resources and expertise within the alliance structure we are committed to. Our geographic position makes us well suited to maritime operations in the Atlantic, North Sea and the Greenland/Iceland/Norway gap. Our overseas possessions are useful bases for force projection of a limited expeditionary nature across the globe ergo amphibious strike and raiding is an area well suited to both our resources and traditions. Perhaps we need to look further in to our past for inspiration, to the pre imperial age where we were a small island off the coast of larger powers yet still contrived to punch above our weight?
I am only a 1/3 through, but the discussion on economic warfare to defeat Germany in WWI reminded me that Britain did have a realistic, possibly workable(?), early war plan to break Germany financially. I’m being lazy here and I’m not looking anything up, but again it is my recollection that they started to implement it, and it was effective, but the problem was is the plan would’ve broken the allies economies too. I don’t know if Michael mentioned this. I hope he does but I would be interested to see how this plays into the British way of war thesis. But in closing, this is an interesting academic discussion but not currently relevant. In their own words, the British have said that they will never go to war without America. Now that would be an interesting addition to this talk.
By 1916 Britain was broke, Treasury reserves were at zero. If it hadn’t been for American money and their seizure of German assets in 1917 Britain couldn’t afford to pay to continue the war. The 1918 August advance, planned and led by the Australians, was crucial because all the allied governments were heading to a fiscal cliff in 1919 that would have meant withdrawing financial support for France and being unable to continue to fund a stalemate or the blockade. It was a very near thing, as they used to say.
A huge change in Britain's strategic position over time that you didn't mention is Britain's wealth relative to other countries. Prior to the second world war, Britain was a very wealthy country relative to those on the continent. Since the second world war, Britain has ended up being in the middle of the pack. Wealth is good for adaptability. Navies are relatively capital intensive and manpower light. From a strategic planning perspective, it needs to be asked whether britain will continue to be in the middle of the western pack, or whether britain will return to its pre-war, modern norm. I lean towards the latter, I think that changes in the global economy will benefit britain more than the continental countries, i think that the relatively strong performance of e.g. france and italy is built on unsustainable levels of public spending, and the british labour force is probably higher quality than those of france and italy, but there are obviously counterarguments and exogenous factors.
I absolutely agree with the first part of your comment, but I don’t really understand the bases for your opinions/conclusions in the second part. The UK has run a larger deficit (albeit pre-debt servicing costs, which for Italy and France derive from much older borrowing sprees, which the UK has instead embarked on more recently) than Italy and France for much of the last decade, and labour productivity has largely been aligned to, if not lower than, those two countries’. Britain’s pre-war wealth was largely driven by two key factors unlikely to come back: coal as primary energy source, and empire. Britain’s economy is now disproportionately reliant on financial services and internal consumption compared to the Continent’s high-quality and innovative manufacturing, which to me does not really show a fundamental resilience to any sort of shock like the ones we are likely to experience more and more. On a more anecdotal side, being a dual national I’ve also had the pleasure of working both in the UK and (albeit briefly) in Italy and, insofar as professional services are concerned, I’d argue that British workers make for excellent specialists, but very poor generalists compared to Italian ones. I don’t think Britain will be able to ever detach itself again from the “middle of the pack” purely on economic grounds, but it can do so if we start making more decisive prioritisation decisions on what we really want our armed forces to do and not simply throw money left right and centre in the hope of being able to do a bit of everything, poorly.
The problem is Britian isn't really a international trading power, most of its trade is with European countries with the big exception of the United States, but that makes sense because Britain and the US are part of the North Atlantic region. Along with big trading wars between China and the US, international trade is increasingly getting deprioritised in favour of domestic tarrifs and other protectionist policies, so for Britain to persue internationalism now probably won't be very positive for the economy like it was in the 90's and early 2000's. Personanly I think the best thing Britain needs to do is bolster domestic manufacturing, reduce reliance on foreign powers for energy and materials and focus on exporting goods to generate wealth while cutting imports.
@@edbucci5216 I don't think it makes any sense to remove debt servicing from government spending. Britain does have a productivity problem, although the productivity gap is exaggerated by unsustainable public spending on the continent. Britain also has a much brighter demographic future than countries on the continent, with the exception of France, but France struggles with integration a lot more than the UK. The UK would be well served by more manufacturing, as it is it does as much as Italy, less than France and Germany, but European manufacturing doesn't look like it has a positive future in general. In general it doesn't have as good an environment as East Asian manufacturing, and it has totally failed to transition to next generation products like chips and EVs. "Coal and empire" is very reductive. Britain did not become rich because of empire, it got empire because it was rich. Empire then made it richer. During the 19th and 20th centuries, the UK had a really strong service sector, providing the capital and engineering expertise for a huge amount of overseas infrastructure, both within and outside of the empire.
@JumboGaming001 most of everyone's trade is with the EU, US or China. Those are the world's largest economies. Nowadays, for the first time in the post industrial era, we seem to be in a world where developing countries will outgrow developed ones. The UK is in a strong position to capitalise on that, with its strong courts and financial sector. We're yet to see whether increased trade with the rest of the developed world will outstrip decreased trade with the EU post-brexit. Potentially following the US too closely regarding china is one of the big exogenous events that could really screw over the British economy. Increased protectionism is in goods, not services, so that benefits the UK if anything. Increased protectionism is as a result of discontent in "left behind" segments of western societies.
@@wiliam74984 There is no doubt Britain needs to capitalise on trade deals with South America and Africa to gain access to cheap resources to make Britains manufacturing more competitive internationally. But will UK trade with europe be outstripped with trade from South America, Africa and Asia? I say no, because its cheaper for a cargo vessel to run from a port in England to a port in Germany than it is to run a ship all the way from Britain to Japan. Plus British military assets will be incredibly vulnerable trying to protect British Far-east Asian trade in a war where as its much cheaper and easier for Britain to protect trade in the Atlantic and Western Europe.
When I think of the British way of war, I think of overwhelming firepower- the arrow storm at Agincourt, the broadsides at Trafalgar, the firestorms at Hamburg and Dresden.
It goes beyond that. it's having the best soldiers, airmen and sailors lead by the best generals and admirals and fighting with courage, determination and humor.
That firepower depended on logistics, and the ability to fund it. Henry V planned his campaign superbly and had massive credit amongst merchants, Trafalgar was possible because of the foundation of the Bank of England (and growth of empire & economy), Dresden (as a symbol of WWII) was an extension of that system.
During WW2 the conventional wisdom was that the British were partial to set piece engagements that utilized significant bombardment artillery & air followed by armoured and infantry assault. In contrast the Americans were more adept at maneuver and exploitation though they were also rich in artillery/air assets.
The British way of war - every campaign begins with a disaster. Primary examples include The Battle of France/Dunkirk and the destruction of the main column before the Battle of Rourke's Drift.
Just from a person who reads history for fun I’ve gathered the overall strategy is: A large navy to protect the island and a professional marine force to tip the scales of continental wars to ensure nobody else has a large enough navy to attack the island. Obviously today the strategy is to cling to NATO and use diplomacy. Since the navy is no longer large enough to defend the island by itself.
I would argue that the modern British strategy is a combo of naval power and quality ground/marine forces over quantity, leaving NATO to bring the numbers for a continental war. Of course, decades of peacetime underfunding and complacency means that the UK can develop new next-gen ships, aircraft, weapons, and strategies, but can no longer afford to produce them in sufficient quantities or in a timely fashion. Meanwhile, cultural and political changes mean that each branch of the military struggles to recruit for even their relatively small forces.
@@Roman_Eagle The British population has been exponentially smaller and the British navy exponentially larger in the past. Battleships have always been just as expensive (i do agree, ruinously expensive) relative to the budgets of the time. The issue is only political will. Don't let them fool you.
@@casey203 Oh, I agree that political will is lacking when it comes to inadequate funding for the UK military and Navy. For instance, HMS Victory (a quite standard 1st-rate ship of the line) cost 6% of the GDP for the year she was built, and we can only spare 2.3% in 2025. However, costs have also changed, for comparison, HMS Queen Elizabeth cost an estimated £6B whereas the UK GDP is estimated at £2.54T, I can't be bothered to calculate the GDP % but it sure isn't 6%, But think what the UK defence would be capable of if we spent what both NATO and several previous defence secretaries have advised and requested of Chancalors, 5%. A matter of extreme pertinence with WW3 within sight, the Theusideties trap set between the great powers, and the UK involved in conflicts around the world, such as in arming Ukraine.
Ultimately the 'British Way of War' will have changed drastically in a post-1945 world. And pursuing a maritime strategy needs to come with asterisks attached. For much of our history, we have been one of the worlds major global powers (or occasionally, the global power). We always had a seat at the top table and had vast colonial possessions & trade lanes to protect from hostile incursions. Come round to 1945, and the entire global power dynamic began to really change and Britain's role in the world with it. Today, our Armed Forces need to be a lot more expeditionary in nature. Today, the role of our navy will change massively. Whilst historically it was concerned with protecting the isles, colonial possessions & trade lanes, we don't need to worry as much about any of those today since we will have the United States protecting free flow of trade (even if they are flirting with more isolationist & protectionist ideals). When we look at our threats, our Navy requires something else entirely. It's much more likely we'll be needed to protect and secure the Baltic Sea in the European theatre. Look to the Indo-Pacific region, we're much more likely to be part of a much larger multinational task force to assist the United States Navy in a war with China. When looking at these 2 key threats, we don't need as much of a large naval focus since we'll either be fighting second-rate naval powers (i.e. Russia) or assisting the major global navy (USN) in their fight against China. At that point the consideration is do we want a 'dual-theatre navy' (i.e. A navy that could deploy to both the Indo-Pacific & Europe and sustain both) or do we want a single-theatre navy. At which point, I'm more inclined to side with the latter. Since I am very doubtful the USN will require our help in the pacific. If the USN won't require our help, we could very well stick with a navy which focuses on locking down the Baltic Sea against a second-rate naval power. At which point, our 'maritime strategy' seems a lot more affordable, and could allow us to additionally sustain a significant Army. I am conscious of the fact this sounds dangerously close to the Armed Forces specialising in the Baltics, which is where N.Drummonds idea of a dual-division Army with a focus on both light & heavy warfare comes into play. Allowing the UK to still engage in Counter-Insurgency operations comparable to that in Iraq or Afghanistan, which I have no doubt we'll need to at some point in the future. Or indeed other various roles a light force would need to fulfil.
Do not forget about the Russian northern fleet with all its submarines, I think Britain should focus a lot on patrolling between Greenland an Norway so the Atlantic does not become terribly infested
The measure of Britain’s insignificance at the end of WWII is the occupation of Japan, where Britain cannot afford to participate unless Australia pays for it. Britain then finds itself under Australian command, its judiciary in the war crime trials subservient to the Australians who also prevent the British embassy from reopening until 1952.
@chillithegerman870 Russian submarines don't have a good track record of functioning well beyond their territorial waters, mostly due to corruption eating the budget and corners getting cut that leave the vessel far worse off than it should be. As an aside here, FRANCE'S NAVY could likely fight and win against Russia's entire fleet without other nations' intervention, and France has likely the third or maybe the fourth best navy in NATO which should say something. Basically Russia as a naval power is insignificant with the only scary ship they have in service being the Kuznetzov, or however you spelt that cursed ships name, and that's only scary because of the ecological disaster it'll leave behind when sunk with every other ship falling into one of three catagories: corruption damaged (corruption has sapped the money needed for modernisation and/or repairs leaving the ship unusable) ignored (lack of money being dedicated in the first place leaves these ships unmaintained) 'acceptable' (technically seaworthy / somehow actually seaworthy for an example of an 'acceptable' vessel see the Ukrainian cultural heritage site the sunken Moskova, which was the FLAGSHIP OF *THEIR MOST INTERNATIONALLY NOTED FLEET,* and if the degree of maintenance done on that poor ship is any indication than none of Russia's ships are being adequately maintained). (Unless you were talking about the hidden ability of Russian ships to magically transform themselves into submarines then you can disregard this comment _sarcasm_ ).
@@chillithegerman870 Well see that too deeply concerns the United States since they require the free ability to both trade, and to transport troops. So the GIUK gap is something else entirely and not something the UK would be solely responsible for. Personally, I am of the opinion that Canada should take up far more responsibility for protecting the arctic.
And bang on about blitz spirit and other jingoism. After all the straits of Dover where the British Army escaped from France in 1940 defeat was one thing capture would have been another. Yet an army of young men comes over and we can't see how we have fallen
Britain was normally a small country on an island with limited natural resources of its own. It therefore needed a good fleet, larger allies for continental warfare and a means of paying for both.
Britain's natural resources aren't limited, even if we fail to make use of them these days. A good example that comes to mind is the wool industry which exported cloth (often in exchange for wine etc) to the continent for centuries, nowadays it costs more to shear the sheep than the value of the wool; the Romans established tin mining in Cornwall I believe. However the current political milieu demands that we wring our hands about climate change rather than extract gas via fracking for instance.
The UK is the only place on earth that has an abundance of natural resources located in such a small geographic space. It resulted on being first off the block to the Industrial Revolution before most Countries even existed and whilst many of them are still dealing with Revolutions. On a side note Coutts Bank is the second oldest bank in the world and it has a few ££££ in its coffers.
Corbett at a time of Empiric power. UK exports what now? What is the size of the merchant fleet? The largest vessels, QE class and LPD, we can only set one each to sea at the same time. But American F-15's are flying over the house right now at low level in the dark, @$5000 an hour each. We don't even have a small arms factory any more it was closed down, and we sold H&K back to Germany. We aren't buying any more Typhoons either. One tranche has been retired, not even replacing them. Taiwanese sea cables just been cut as well. Will the Pax Americana hold in 2025? South China sea lanes must be kept open. Japanese fleet will get bigger. So Corbett is still right, about maritime strategy. Did you watch the Bridge Colby interview with Tucker? He has been appointed Undersecretary for policy. Expect focus on China, and Europe will have to deal with Ukraine.
Its a question if the british way of war would look now, during a period when they are no longer the most powerful and well connected economy on earth. A lot of the economic warfare that Britain used to wield is now firmly out of Britains hand and today (honestly for 70 years already) a tool of the US. So what does Britain do if it can no longer do these things?
The problem with these theories re WWI is that Germany probably would have beaten France without a major British commitment to Flanders, maybe not in 1914 but surely by 1916. Further, Churchill’s indirect approach led to the fiasco at Gallipoli in WWI (and in WWII would have led to dithering in the Balkans in 1944 if the US and Soviets hadn’t insisted on a landing in NW Europe). Fast forward to today - Britain no longer has the economic/industrial or naval power to pull off a maritime approach to war and needs something g new for the 21st century. Still a focus on the Royal Navy and Air Force (with a small expeditionary force) today might make more sense. But all of this is trumped by having a decent economic and industrial policy - the UK is pretty rapidly slipping from genteel poverty to straight out poverty. Fixing (or eliminating) the NHS and re-industrializing the north would do more for Britain’s power than fiddling with army recruiting or procurement.
If you eliminate the NHS you will fundamentally weaken the economy. It is the most cost effective health system in the developed world. £/population/GDP. With more expensive or less healthcare you weaken both your capacity to spend on war and your availability of, and willingness, of the people to fight.
Finnish opinion: army is too small if its size (total active force and trained reserves) is less than about a fifth of the total population of the country.
If we applied this to the UK today, that would require an army of around 13.5 million people. That would be almost three times the size of the combined armed forces (Army, Navy, RAF) of the UK at their highest strengths during WW2 (5.1 million).
You must realise that Finland and the UK are just different in this respect. Finland has a land mass 50% larger than the UK, with a population 1/12 of the UK, and shares an enormous land border with Russia.
@@julius9055 Sure, but this was a comment on a video about the UK. I understand why Finland has a large body of reservists, but its silly to apply the same criteria to other countries with much larger populations and different circumstances.
I fear that most of the western militaries are glass cannons. They may be hard hitting once, but they cannot take a hit without shattering. In any real near pear conflict they will be overran quickly as they have no way of rebuilding their power in any meaningful time.
Might be, Britain did guarantee Belgium in case of a German invasion in WW1, and Britain during the Glourious Revolution saw the replacement of the Catholic Stuart Dynasty with a Protestant Dutch born Orange Dynasty, so perhaps that played an important role in keeping Britian interested in Dutch affairs and vice versa?
@JumboGaming001 Worth noting that James II was the only Stuart Catholic monarch during his reign (although Charles II did convert on his deathbed). While religious turmoil was part of the Civil War, Charles I was Anglican and the main dissenters of his rule were Reformists (rather than Protestants) such as Scottish Covenanters and English Puritans. James I, while baptised a Catholic by his mother, Mary - Queen of Scots, was raised from an early age as a member of the Protestant Church of Scotland, following the forced abdication of his mother. Mary II was also Anglican. Religion absolutely played its part in the strife of 17th century in Britain and Ireland, but more important was the supremacy of the crown vs parliament.
British way of war? Sure it does exist. British way of war always was a strategic approach, therefore the focus never was on the military by itself but on politics, with the result that the British armed forces (especially the land forces) always were very mediocre and never on par with their continental adversaries such as the French, not to mention the Germans. The real strength of the Brits always was politics. The British always mastered the field of politics, there is no country with better politicians than Britain. The key factor of the British way of war is, only (no matter what) go to war with very strong allies and even when you already have strong allies on your side look for even more in order to let them do the heavy lifitng of land warfare. This concept always was highly succesful. With the view on the Brits it becomes clear that for winning wars constantly you need two things: strong allies which you only can get by making good politics and furthermore you need a good geography.
@@AndrewTeale-cy3dw Splendid Isolation was possible because of the outstanding geograpghy England, as an island nation, has. The performance of the English armed forces always was (and still is) very mediocre, no wonder, because (as I wrote above) the English approach to war always was a strategic one, never one on tactical level. The masters in the art of warfare, i.e. tactics are the Germans, in this particular field the Brits were not just mediocre they even were very bad. The Brits never were a soldierly people, this is true for the Germans. The strength of the Brits always were politics.
@@kodor1146 Repeating the same nonsense doesn't make it any better. You obviously have no understanding of splendid isolation. You have conveniently ignored Pax Britannica. Your level of understanding would make You an excellent candidate for Imperial domination by the British. As for the German masters of War, their strategic goals were at best stupid and at worst horrific. Tactically they failed again and again and again.
Thanks for the video, Michael. Corbett's book and Lambert's book are both in my reading pile, not sure which of the two to tackle first. On the British Army, Nick Drummond has a nice video that you may already have seen that looks at how to reorganise it and where to invest to get the most bang for your buck: ruclips.net/video/nGLwEnkGgCE/видео.html
@@CliSwe The only thing that draws me towards Gordon's version is that in Gaelic 'ch' is pronounced kinda like k as in loch. Also the Gaelic surname MacLachlan is I believe pronounced like 'MagLoklan'
Thanks for this! Very useful framing. I recently listened to an interview with Andrew Lambert on the School of War podcast. ruclips.net/video/zAS-5O9Eqc8/видео.html is the link to the YT version. Also, the US Naval War College just posted and award to, and a lecture by Prof Lambert. I haven't listened to it yet but look forward to it. Here is the link I hope: ruclips.net/video/N4Iyts41Kf4/видео.html Keep up the good work and fresh perspectives.
British way of war: 1. rely exclusively on haphazard improvisation and dumb luck 2. only go to war against people who are even more incompetent than you. 3. if (or rather when) you fail, get a greater power than you (USA) to fight your enemy for you
The British way of war is to lose most of the battles before finally somehow winning the war. They do this to by letting the sons of the landed gentry run the war badly and impotently for the first two years until finally talented people would be put in charge who will win it- barely. England lost the American Revolution because they never really had capable leadership eithor in power in England or in leading their armies in the colonies.
British training and professionalism combined with their strong airforce and navy in the hands of Russia's psudo-militia style of army combined with German quality manufacturing. Yup, combined these three basically cover the weaknesses of each other: the UK struggles with production of vast quantities of equipment whilst Russia struggles with the quality of it's equipment this gets covered by the German's implementing their own manufacturing practices for Russia, allowing Russia to supply all three with masses of high quality equipment. the Germans and Russians both struggle with naval forces and airforces, which get largely covered by the UK prioritising those aspects of warfare. Russia struggles with corruption and discipline within its armed forces that British instructors and drill Sargents could aid with rooting out. Overall I give such an alliance less than a decade before they could fight any other alliance and likely come out on top, only exclusions being over large alliances I.e 'the whole of Europe' or 'all other NATO countries' and alliances between a strong arms producer and China and/or India simply down to the sheer quantity of people those nations could mobilise and then equip.
Firstly a fascinating video. You have Summerised neatly what I had observed based on my study of British military history. Despite starting your video with some equivaction, I think in the end you gave a strong justification and summary of what British military strategy should be.
I think that those times when Britain has deployed large armies have been confined to the last two World wars (excluding pre 17th century wars), and frankly ww1 is an example of why Britain should avoid large scale land warfare.
Playing to our strengths of maritime and economic warfare make sense. Actually however you touched on something in the video, but did not expand on it, even more important is the 'peacetime' grand strategy (Perhaps a bit disappointing given your channels title). What Britain expended most of it's energy doing over the last 400 years was preventing war. Preventing it by weakening potential rivals, dividing them, aligning with them, always ensuring a balance of power. Peace is always better than war provided that the peace works for British interests. Keeping the seven seas open and free for commerce, enabling the movement of goods and people, allowing free trade (at least in British terms), these were the hallmarks of British strategy. Defending British interests with vigour, such that potential rivals knew the cost of open warfare was not worth it.
A classic feature of British maritime power was overseas basis. This allowed Britain to send forces at very short notice to any trouble spot anywhere in the world, in the days before jet travel.
great comment on the Pax Brittanica.
I think the ability to field 3 divisions is something to aim for. It's a good career and keeps a healthy armament industry. It's not wasted money having decent armed forces
I saw a man reconfigure the British army with only the addition of 4 thousand extra troops to make such a 3 Division army Structure. Through reconfiguring units and re assigning equipment he created 2 Regular Divisions. The 1st UK continuing to be the Light and Expeditionary division, having 4 Brigades. And the 3 UK Division having 2 Armoured and 2 Mechanized Brigades.
Then having a 2 UK division, made up from the Army reserve. I thought that it was a pretty excellent idea.
Economy of force with an emphasis on information and intelligence I’d say is one of the central tenets of the British way of war.
I agree, it is perhaps informative that it was Britain developed the likes of the Commandos, SAS, and the Chindits, and for that matter earlier the Royal Marines as a maritime raiding force that meant nowhere where there was water was free from potential attack.
I can't speak to grand strategic thinking. But as a former British Army NCO. I have seen the abilities at unit and sub-unit level down to section level of other countries. They have not impressed me although there are some who are similar but still different to us. I don't know if there is a cultural element to it? But getting it done, common sense, quietly without a song and a dance or theatrics seems to be our strong point. also at our best when it goes wrong compared to others.
You wanted to be a soldier so you joined the raf reg 🧐💀
@lachlanchester8142 that 5 miles of death will make you stand toe to toe with the para and royal marine
@@tobiasgriffin well you need to be at that level to guard the camp in Cyprus
@@lachlanchester8142 🤣😂😂🤣
@@tobiasgriffin That's why I didn't join the Ref.. Sorry RAF Regt it was to hard don't think I could have cut the mustard mate lol..
I'm not sure if their is a British Way of War, per se, bit there certainly a British way of fighting. I served fora period of 20 years between 1983 and 2003 in the Royal Air Force Regiment. I joined for two reasons, firstly for the adventure, and secondly to be a professional soldier. It occurs to me that we are at our best when things are at their worst, and in between times fall back to the position of "doing the best we can to be professional in the circumstances. This might not always be enough. However it served me well through Northern Ireland, Belize, Gulf '91 and the whole former Yugoslavia mess and some post '99 Hong Kong stuff. Is that enough? I don't know , I demonstrated my political beliefs at the ballot box, not at " the muzzle of a rifle" to misquote a famous aphorism of Chaorman Mao. It seems to me that many of the comments here are making quantities arguments rather than qualitive one. History might suggest that we have been as good as required more often than not.
Liddell Hart’s insane poisoning of the well when it comes to Great War historiography is something that should be noted. So much of the modern conception of the First World War in both the laymen and unfortunately professional historical realm has become one of “lions and donkeys” in some significant part due to him.
And why is his opinion "poisoning of the well"? Genuine question, not looking for ad hom attacks.
Just replying to get notified by any replies to DrzBa
When Corbett and Hart were writing Britain had a near monopoly on world trade that was instantly apply able in the first week of any war. WW1 is interesting as while trade with Germany virtually ceased as soon as the war started Lloyds of London notice an uptick in trade with the Nordics, Denmark and the Netherlands pretty much equal to the trade no longer going directly to Germany. Obviously this was simply a way of circumventing the blockade* and so trade with those nations was reduced simply by Lloyds of London refusing to insure shipping to those nations unless they were pretty sure that the goods were not being passed on to Germany and the Central powers. Obviously today the UK does not enjoy this monopoly but it does enjoy being a senior member of NATO and while out of the EU still a partner with those nations. So while it cannot on its own drive such a blockade it can through its member ship of like minded clubs achieve the same. *It has been noted that in cases of luxury British cars that there was an increase in car sales in those central Asian nations neighbouring Russia equal to the number of cars no longer sold to Russia since the sanctions imposed over the Ukraine! That needs to be knocked on the head.
Banker's war
There is no Swedish way of war that i know of but there is a Swedish way of fighting thats very much shaped by the armies under Charles XII and Gustavus Adolphus.
And that is that you are very active even if you are inferior because if you cause problems for the oponent he has less time to create problems for you. Swedish units like to be offensive whenever possible on the tactical level.
I have heard this descrobed as the Lutheran work ethic from swedish civil society manifesting itself
@AdurianJ Interesting perspective.
Corbett and your last analysis of the modern British military were spot on. Over time, a nation's military is only as strong as the nation's economy, and on the flip side, a nation's economy is only as strong as a nation's military, or organizational safety-- NATO
The economy is not built on the military. it isa necessity but it does not really help the economy.
@@PMMagro The US has the biggest military and the biggest economy. When the Brits ruled the world, they had the biggest navy. You can't have one without the other or you will collapse like the Soviets. We are lucky to be in a stable world right now. I often wonder what if the Nazis had joined the Russians instead of fighting them. They would not have been defeated-maybe some kind of ceasefire. They would have been joined by the Japs. The world would look very different. Just sayin....
Corbit seems very oposed to Churchill in the use of amphiious forces.
In both wars Churchill gathered the royal marine components into regular land units which did little.
Something we know cost the UK Norway in 1940
Fascinating discussion. I think it's true that we do the unexpected and that puts our enemy's on the back foot. However Our navy, army and air force are I believe much depleted, and frankly all three arms are in a very sorry state these days. If there is a British way to fight wars we can't even begin to do this at the moment.
Excellent! Wrongly, I had not paid much attention to David French's book in the past. I realise now I should go back to it and read it more carefully. Thank you!
Hitler thought the English would stick to the logical maritime strategy and a deal could be struck. Im sure he would have been willing to let the English occupy northern France (Calais) and the west of Belgium up to the Scheld river (the old border of the Holy Roman Empire) to assure them. He was flabbergasted the British were willing to throw away their empire to "win" the war. It was the moral thing to do. But he was right in this of course, it was inevitable the empire would be lost in time because of that decision.
Hitler admired the British Empire and wanted the land version of it in Europe. Don’t forget the British had the first concentration camps and happily massacred unarmed Indians and Africans to preserve their Empire. If some in the British cabinet had their way, Britain would have vacated Europe and kept its overseas territories much like the Vichy French kept their African and Asian territories. What would have happened when the Japanese inevitably attacked the USA due to oil embargoes is another question. I believe the Japanese still would have taken Malaya, Singapore and Borneo but left India alone as Nazi Germany was an ally and would have not wanted Japan to attack the UK’s largest overseas dependency.
@@andrewcombe8907 To say British had the first concentration camps is misleading as this associates it as being the same as the concentration camps in Germany - this was not the case, they were never set up with the same intention of the German concentration camps for forced labour or later as death camps . It was to remove the civilian population from the areas of the fighting and so they could not give support to the opposition, its true people died in the camps but those deaths were from poor planning, management and logistics to support such large camps in those regions
The colonial era was ending irrespective of the war though WW2 certainly accelerated that end. Like slavery, colonialism was morally indefensible in Western democracies and the burgeoning movements of the colonized peoples toward independence made that independence inevitable.
@@Chiller11 indeed, cutting a deal with Germany in WW1 or WW2 would only have postponed the process for perhaps a couple of decades.
you keep referring to the English, there is no such thing as an English Army, Navy or Airforce, are you aware there were more soldiers from the Indian sub continent in the British army than British people in WW2, the largest volunteer army in history
Just look how they took the Falkland islands, navel, ground and air,
Outstanding.
*retook
Haha I spend hours on navel intelligence each day.
*Naval.
@@thehum1000 They took down my navel joke! Why RUclips, why?
The UK had NO chance without TONS of American help. 100's of AIM 9 missiles were provided clandestinely by the USN. Without those missiles they wouldn't have racked up so many kills. (17 of the 20 air to air kills were with Sidewinders.)
Mind you at the time the US was officially aligned with Argentina because of the drug war. But Reagan had a thing for old bags like Marge so we got very involved.
We redirected an oil tanker and refueled the UK taskforce otherwise their attack would have ended off the shores of Ascension island. We also supplied millions of gallons of aviation fuel, thousands of mortar rounds, 10's of thousands of small arms rounds, tempoary runway grating. Not to mention we moved a spy satellite to monitor the area. (This significantly shortened the satellites life span. )
All because someone tried to come between an Englishman and his sheep!
Good video. When considering anything Liddell Hart wrote I would strongly recommend reading John J. Mearsheimer's 1988 book "Liddell Hart and the Weight of History". Hart wrote so much stuff between WW1 and 2, some of it contradictory, that it was easy for him to go back afterwards and "cherry pick" the bits he had got right about the coming war and thus cement his reputation.
It’s very interesting to hear that considering how Britain has been neglecting its navy these last decades.
And also to be revised since the UK’s GDP share of the world is significantly smaller now.
This video is even better on second viewing. Thanks for your insight.
British, in my humble opinion have a tradition of making excellent professional navy (and later air force) as they had policy of denying enemy even ability to land on the Isles as best ground defence. Land forces oscillated between small, professional expeditionary forces and large armies capable of fighting continental powers, as the need arose. In the XX century such need arose three times, once with WW1, second time in WW2, and finally in the Cold War. I expect return of Russia as a threat might warrant at least some revival of the large army concept, especially as Russian naval and air force sink (in the case of Navy, often literally, see Black Sea campaign of Ukrainian war) ever more into decay and irrelevance, while Russia remains land based threat by simple virtue of mass of soldiers and equipment, which, while decimated in fields of Ukraine , still counts in thousands of MBTs, AFVs and artillery pieces.
Twice. Britain has not maintained a large, Continental style Army during the Cold War. Conscription was loosened after WWII, and came to an end in 1963. Even prior to that though National Service as it was called was not the kind of full scale conscription we saw during the World Wars. Its scale was hugely reduced and was only used to maintain military numbers as much as possible until the UK had fully withdrawn from all its former colonies.
As for returning to a full scale conscription? Unlikely. Unless you can magic up enough MBT's for example for say three or four Armoured Divisions large scale conscription is essentially worthless in the UK. We just do not have the industrial capacity to build the weapons and equipment for a large scale Army, and it would take years, if not decades to rebuild that capability, especially in critical areas for conscription, such as Armoured Vehicle construction.
Look at the falklands campaign, its got it all.
Another great presentation, and I, on the whole, agree with what was said, but sadly no mention of that zone inbetween sea and land - Amphibious Assault - which I believe is an essential british capability, but many think AA's days are numbered due to modern warfare techniques. I disagree.
I would love to see your view of AA ops and to use the british Falklands campaign as a case study of AA generally.
In my view, AA is probably the most challenging combined manoeuvre op mountable involving subs, intelligence, destroyers, frigates, aircraft carriers, aircraft, helicopter carriers, helo ops, assault ships, landing ships, marines, air assault troops, various armour, etc.
Huge!
Thanks again for you presentations, they're very enjoyable.
I think the JEF is the proof of purchase in you being right about protecting the Baltics and Nordics.
British way of war:
1. Tea
2. They don’t like it up’em
Don’t Panic!!!
Good ol’ Jonesey.
That's how America won our independence. We put #1 in the harbor.
Nice work, Michael. I really enjoy these.
Given these great periods of time (1688 - 2000) over 300 years - would any nation have a truly consistent way of war? I doubt it. Every war is unique, the circumstances & goals will be different in each, and technology forces change.
And, is “muddle through” really a way of war? Maybe very loosely. That basically means “try to find a way to win.” Isn’t that every society’s way of war?
Looks like I need to read some of these texts. My wife is going to love me buying more books.
Robert Citino would say yes ;)
An interesting episode. It was the case that the British emphasised naval and later naval and air power over a land army. The home island was rather small and relatively resource poor with the exceptions of coal and agriculture. Clear shipping lanes to their vast colonies were paramount to maintain British wealth and international standing. It’s also interesting that in the last two major European land wars Britain initially responded by sending quite a small well trained expeditionary force that was quickly decimated which led to the formation of a large powerful army that was pivotal to eventual victory. The prevailing Western European strategy of the last 3/4 of a century seemed to be to create NATO then let the US be responsible for security while we spend our money on civilian infrastructure and social programs. I wonder if the British will recalculate with a trend toward isolationism and a more pro Russian regime in the US.
Corbett was…in my opinion too focused on Victorian Britain.
Yes, the strategic need for Britain to have a Low Countries free from a threatening is a primary security aim.
But there more than just that to the reasons why British troops fought at Malplaquet (1709), Waterloo (1815), and Mons (1914) all with in a two hour drive.
But the part that Corbett and Liddell Hart miss is that Britain has to fight on land to keep their allies who both of these authors who like to throw around like cannon fodder , in the fight.
If the maritime strategy worked, why did the Napoleanic Wars end in 1815 after Waterloo? Where a large Allied army with a sizeable British contingent under a British general won?
Marlborough led a similar force a century before over the same terrain.
Muddling is a typical British strategy that’s true. Same as counting on the colonials to serve as some of that cannon fodder.
But I contrast the research of NAM Rodger’s and his stories of how Britain built its naval power and how it sometimes was effective and sometimes not.
Good video. Good food for thought.
The British (read as English) way of war is all about sowing discord amongst the enemy, espionage and counter espionage, assassination, blackmail, etc.
That is the most consistent way they have waged war since the 1400s. It is the one ares where they are still arguably on par or better than even the Americans, particularly in the realm of human intelligence.
yes the English are really good at the sneaky stuff, the actual fighting is done by the Scots Irish and Welsh
@@drno4837well that’s ridiculous as there are a lot more english than irish scottish and welsh, and the irish are too busy being nazi sympathisers to actually fight
Excellent! I think you missed out the contribution of Royal Marines and Special Forces. We are very good at raiding and working with friendly forces in different cultures and countries. Ireland has also taught us how to work militarily alongside an evolving political process. "Hearts and Minds" is too simplistic a term for this.
I think that Britain has been adaptable in terms of its strategy purely in response to the threat to the homeland from the continent. In Napoleonic warfare, Britain maintained a naval strategy because that was what was necessary to prevent a French invasion of the mainland. The same is seen in WW2 after the collapse of the British expeditionary force. But in scenarios where the threat to the homeland is limited Britain can dabble more heavily in continental affairs such as in WW1, the latter stages of WW2 and the Cold War. Nuclear weapons meant that there was no real possibility of an invasion of the homeland and therefore it was acceptable to adopt a continental approach. This thesis really depends upon the fact that Britains strategic focus lies in Europe, but Britain is still so connected to it economically and societally that I believe it still holds.
Interesting and balanced analysis. Resources will now and in the future constrain and determine our military forces and our war-fighting strategy. As we no longer have the wealth or power that could be wielded in the 18th to 20th centuries the strategies available then are no longer applicable except in alliance. We have to determine where and how we can best apply our resources and expertise within the alliance structure we are committed to. Our geographic position makes us well suited to maritime operations in the Atlantic, North Sea and the Greenland/Iceland/Norway gap. Our overseas possessions are useful bases for force projection of a limited expeditionary nature across the globe ergo amphibious strike and raiding is an area well suited to both our resources and traditions.
Perhaps we need to look further in to our past for inspiration, to the pre imperial age where we were a small island off the coast of larger powers yet still contrived to punch above our weight?
I am only a 1/3 through, but the discussion on economic warfare to defeat Germany in WWI reminded me that Britain did have a realistic, possibly workable(?), early war plan to break Germany financially.
I’m being lazy here and I’m not looking anything up, but again it is my recollection that they started to implement it, and it was effective, but the problem was is the plan would’ve broken the allies economies too. I don’t know if Michael mentioned this. I hope he does but I would be interested to see how this plays into the British way of war thesis.
But in closing, this is an interesting academic discussion but not currently relevant. In their own words, the British have said that they will never go to war without America. Now that would be an interesting addition to this talk.
By 1916 Britain was broke, Treasury reserves were at zero. If it hadn’t been for American money and their seizure of German assets in 1917 Britain couldn’t afford to pay to continue the war. The 1918 August advance, planned and led by the Australians, was crucial because all the allied governments were heading to a fiscal cliff in 1919 that would have meant withdrawing financial support for France and being unable to continue to fund a stalemate or the blockade. It was a very near thing, as they used to say.
@@seanlander9321 All powers fighting in the war were broke including Germany and France.
A huge change in Britain's strategic position over time that you didn't mention is Britain's wealth relative to other countries. Prior to the second world war, Britain was a very wealthy country relative to those on the continent. Since the second world war, Britain has ended up being in the middle of the pack. Wealth is good for adaptability. Navies are relatively capital intensive and manpower light. From a strategic planning perspective, it needs to be asked whether britain will continue to be in the middle of the western pack, or whether britain will return to its pre-war, modern norm. I lean towards the latter, I think that changes in the global economy will benefit britain more than the continental countries, i think that the relatively strong performance of e.g. france and italy is built on unsustainable levels of public spending, and the british labour force is probably higher quality than those of france and italy, but there are obviously counterarguments and exogenous factors.
I absolutely agree with the first part of your comment, but I don’t really understand the bases for your opinions/conclusions in the second part. The UK has run a larger deficit (albeit pre-debt servicing costs, which for Italy and France derive from much older borrowing sprees, which the UK has instead embarked on more recently) than Italy and France for much of the last decade, and labour productivity has largely been aligned to, if not lower than, those two countries’.
Britain’s pre-war wealth was largely driven by two key factors unlikely to come back: coal as primary energy source, and empire. Britain’s economy is now disproportionately reliant on financial services and internal consumption compared to the Continent’s high-quality and innovative manufacturing, which to me does not really show a fundamental resilience to any sort of shock like the ones we are likely to experience more and more. On a more anecdotal side, being a dual national I’ve also had the pleasure of working both in the UK and (albeit briefly) in Italy and, insofar as professional services are concerned, I’d argue that British workers make for excellent specialists, but very poor generalists compared to Italian ones.
I don’t think Britain will be able to ever detach itself again from the “middle of the pack” purely on economic grounds, but it can do so if we start making more decisive prioritisation decisions on what we really want our armed forces to do and not simply throw money left right and centre in the hope of being able to do a bit of everything, poorly.
The problem is Britian isn't really a international trading power, most of its trade is with European countries with the big exception of the United States, but that makes sense because Britain and the US are part of the North Atlantic region. Along with big trading wars between China and the US, international trade is increasingly getting deprioritised in favour of domestic tarrifs and other protectionist policies, so for Britain to persue internationalism now probably won't be very positive for the economy like it was in the 90's and early 2000's.
Personanly I think the best thing Britain needs to do is bolster domestic manufacturing, reduce reliance on foreign powers for energy and materials and focus on exporting goods to generate wealth while cutting imports.
@@edbucci5216 I don't think it makes any sense to remove debt servicing from government spending. Britain does have a productivity problem, although the productivity gap is exaggerated by unsustainable public spending on the continent. Britain also has a much brighter demographic future than countries on the continent, with the exception of France, but France struggles with integration a lot more than the UK. The UK would be well served by more manufacturing, as it is it does as much as Italy, less than France and Germany, but European manufacturing doesn't look like it has a positive future in general. In general it doesn't have as good an environment as East Asian manufacturing, and it has totally failed to transition to next generation products like chips and EVs.
"Coal and empire" is very reductive. Britain did not become rich because of empire, it got empire because it was rich. Empire then made it richer. During the 19th and 20th centuries, the UK had a really strong service sector, providing the capital and engineering expertise for a huge amount of overseas infrastructure, both within and outside of the empire.
@JumboGaming001 most of everyone's trade is with the EU, US or China. Those are the world's largest economies. Nowadays, for the first time in the post industrial era, we seem to be in a world where developing countries will outgrow developed ones. The UK is in a strong position to capitalise on that, with its strong courts and financial sector. We're yet to see whether increased trade with the rest of the developed world will outstrip decreased trade with the EU post-brexit. Potentially following the US too closely regarding china is one of the big exogenous events that could really screw over the British economy.
Increased protectionism is in goods, not services, so that benefits the UK if anything. Increased protectionism is as a result of discontent in "left behind" segments of western societies.
@@wiliam74984 There is no doubt Britain needs to capitalise on trade deals with South America and Africa to gain access to cheap resources to make Britains manufacturing more competitive internationally.
But will UK trade with europe be outstripped with trade from South America, Africa and Asia? I say no, because its cheaper for a cargo vessel to run from a port in England to a port in Germany than it is to run a ship all the way from Britain to Japan. Plus British military assets will be incredibly vulnerable trying to protect British Far-east Asian trade in a war where as its much cheaper and easier for Britain to protect trade in the Atlantic and Western Europe.
When I think of the British way of war, I think of overwhelming firepower- the arrow storm at Agincourt, the broadsides at Trafalgar, the firestorms at Hamburg and Dresden.
It goes beyond that. it's having the best soldiers, airmen and sailors lead by the best generals and admirals and fighting with courage, determination and humor.
@@bengoacher4455True. But also not wanting a "fair fight" if you can avoid it
The British way of war is actually about being subtle. Overwhelming firepower is US doctrine
That firepower depended on logistics, and the ability to fund it. Henry V planned his campaign superbly and had massive credit amongst merchants, Trafalgar was possible because of the foundation of the Bank of England (and growth of empire & economy), Dresden (as a symbol of WWII) was an extension of that system.
During WW2 the conventional wisdom was that the British were partial to set piece engagements that utilized significant bombardment artillery & air followed by armoured and infantry assault. In contrast the Americans were more adept at maneuver and exploitation though they were also rich in artillery/air assets.
Yes indeed keep the fighting far away from Britain itself. No ground warfare since 1746 in Scotland and 1688 in England
The British way of war - every campaign begins with a disaster. Primary examples include The Battle of France/Dunkirk and the destruction of the main column before the Battle of Rourke's Drift.
Just from a person who reads history for fun I’ve gathered the overall strategy is:
A large navy to protect the island and a professional marine force to tip the scales of continental wars to ensure nobody else has a large enough navy to attack the island.
Obviously today the strategy is to cling to NATO and use diplomacy. Since the navy is no longer large enough to defend the island by itself.
I would argue that the modern British strategy is a combo of naval power and quality ground/marine forces over quantity, leaving NATO to bring the numbers for a continental war. Of course, decades of peacetime underfunding and complacency means that the UK can develop new next-gen ships, aircraft, weapons, and strategies, but can no longer afford to produce them in sufficient quantities or in a timely fashion. Meanwhile, cultural and political changes mean that each branch of the military struggles to recruit for even their relatively small forces.
@@Roman_Eagle The British population has been exponentially smaller and the British navy exponentially larger in the past. Battleships have always been just as expensive (i do agree, ruinously expensive) relative to the budgets of the time. The issue is only political will. Don't let them fool you.
@@casey203 Oh, I agree that political will is lacking when it comes to inadequate funding for the UK military and Navy. For instance, HMS Victory (a quite standard 1st-rate ship of the line) cost 6% of the GDP for the year she was built, and we can only spare 2.3% in 2025.
However, costs have also changed, for comparison, HMS Queen Elizabeth cost an estimated £6B whereas the UK GDP is estimated at £2.54T, I can't be bothered to calculate the GDP % but it sure isn't 6%, But think what the UK defence would be capable of if we spent what both NATO and several previous defence secretaries have advised and requested of Chancalors, 5%. A matter of extreme pertinence with WW3 within sight, the Theusideties trap set between the great powers, and the UK involved in conflicts around the world, such as in arming Ukraine.
Ultimately the 'British Way of War' will have changed drastically in a post-1945 world. And pursuing a maritime strategy needs to come with asterisks attached.
For much of our history, we have been one of the worlds major global powers (or occasionally, the global power). We always had a seat at the top table and had vast colonial possessions & trade lanes to protect from hostile incursions. Come round to 1945, and the entire global power dynamic began to really change and Britain's role in the world with it. Today, our Armed Forces need to be a lot more expeditionary in nature.
Today, the role of our navy will change massively. Whilst historically it was concerned with protecting the isles, colonial possessions & trade lanes, we don't need to worry as much about any of those today since we will have the United States protecting free flow of trade (even if they are flirting with more isolationist & protectionist ideals). When we look at our threats, our Navy requires something else entirely. It's much more likely we'll be needed to protect and secure the Baltic Sea in the European theatre. Look to the Indo-Pacific region, we're much more likely to be part of a much larger multinational task force to assist the United States Navy in a war with China. When looking at these 2 key threats, we don't need as much of a large naval focus since we'll either be fighting second-rate naval powers (i.e. Russia) or assisting the major global navy (USN) in their fight against China.
At that point the consideration is do we want a 'dual-theatre navy' (i.e. A navy that could deploy to both the Indo-Pacific & Europe and sustain both) or do we want a single-theatre navy. At which point, I'm more inclined to side with the latter. Since I am very doubtful the USN will require our help in the pacific. If the USN won't require our help, we could very well stick with a navy which focuses on locking down the Baltic Sea against a second-rate naval power. At which point, our 'maritime strategy' seems a lot more affordable, and could allow us to additionally sustain a significant Army.
I am conscious of the fact this sounds dangerously close to the Armed Forces specialising in the Baltics, which is where N.Drummonds idea of a dual-division Army with a focus on both light & heavy warfare comes into play. Allowing the UK to still engage in Counter-Insurgency operations comparable to that in Iraq or Afghanistan, which I have no doubt we'll need to at some point in the future. Or indeed other various roles a light force would need to fulfil.
Do not forget about the Russian northern fleet with all its submarines, I think Britain should focus a lot on patrolling between Greenland an Norway so the Atlantic does not become terribly infested
The measure of Britain’s insignificance at the end of WWII is the occupation of Japan, where Britain cannot afford to participate unless Australia pays for it. Britain then finds itself under Australian command, its judiciary in the war crime trials subservient to the Australians who also prevent the British embassy from reopening until 1952.
@chillithegerman870 Russian submarines don't have a good track record of functioning well beyond their territorial waters, mostly due to corruption eating the budget and corners getting cut that leave the vessel far worse off than it should be.
As an aside here, FRANCE'S NAVY could likely fight and win against Russia's entire fleet without other nations' intervention, and France has likely the third or maybe the fourth best navy in NATO which should say something.
Basically Russia as a naval power is insignificant with the only scary ship they have in service being the Kuznetzov, or however you spelt that cursed ships name, and that's only scary because of the ecological disaster it'll leave behind when sunk with every other ship falling into one of three catagories:
corruption damaged (corruption has sapped the money needed for modernisation and/or repairs leaving the ship unusable)
ignored (lack of money being dedicated in the first place leaves these ships unmaintained)
'acceptable' (technically seaworthy / somehow actually seaworthy for an example of an 'acceptable' vessel see the Ukrainian cultural heritage site the sunken Moskova, which was the FLAGSHIP OF *THEIR MOST INTERNATIONALLY NOTED FLEET,* and if the degree of maintenance done on that poor ship is any indication than none of Russia's ships are being adequately maintained).
(Unless you were talking about the hidden ability of Russian ships to magically transform themselves into submarines then you can disregard this comment _sarcasm_ ).
@@chillithegerman870 Well see that too deeply concerns the United States since they require the free ability to both trade, and to transport troops. So the GIUK gap is something else entirely and not something the UK would be solely responsible for.
Personally, I am of the opinion that Canada should take up far more responsibility for protecting the arctic.
There used to be
Yes, drift into economic free fall and then allow your armed forces to shrink to the point you can’t defend yoursel
And bang on about blitz spirit and other jingoism. After all the straits of Dover where the British Army escaped from France in 1940 defeat was one thing capture would have been another. Yet an army of young men comes over and we can't see how we have fallen
Britain was normally a small country on an island with limited natural resources of its own. It therefore needed a good fleet, larger allies for continental warfare and a means of paying for both.
Britain's natural resources aren't limited, even if we fail to make use of them these days. A good example that comes to mind is the wool industry which exported cloth (often in exchange for wine etc) to the continent for centuries, nowadays it costs more to shear the sheep than the value of the wool; the Romans established tin mining in Cornwall I believe. However the current political milieu demands that we wring our hands about climate change rather than extract gas via fracking for instance.
Britain was sitting on a massive amount of coal that powered industry from the Industrial Revolution until recent decades.
One of the reasons the industrial revolution happened in the north of England was its abundance of coal and iron
The UK is the only place on earth that has an abundance of natural resources located in such a small geographic space. It resulted on being first off the block to the Industrial Revolution before most Countries even existed and whilst many of them are still dealing with Revolutions. On a side note Coutts Bank is the second oldest bank in the world and it has a few ££££ in its coffers.
...and limestone... @@seanoconnor8843
Corbett at a time of Empiric power. UK exports what now? What is the size of the merchant fleet? The largest vessels, QE class and LPD, we can only set one each to sea at the same time. But American F-15's are flying over the house right now at low level in the dark, @$5000 an hour each. We don't even have a small arms factory any more it was closed down, and we sold H&K back to Germany. We aren't buying any more Typhoons either. One tranche has been retired, not even replacing them. Taiwanese sea cables just been cut as well. Will the Pax Americana hold in 2025? South China sea lanes must be kept open. Japanese fleet will get bigger. So Corbett is still right, about maritime strategy. Did you watch the Bridge Colby interview with Tucker? He has been appointed Undersecretary for policy. Expect focus on China, and Europe will have to deal with Ukraine.
Its a question if the british way of war would look now, during a period when they are no longer the most powerful and well connected economy on earth. A lot of the economic warfare that Britain used to wield is now firmly out of Britains hand and today (honestly for 70 years already) a tool of the US. So what does Britain do if it can no longer do these things?
Like the bad guy in 300 said I will erase all history that you’ve ever existed…..
The problem with these theories re WWI is that Germany probably would have beaten France without a major British commitment to Flanders, maybe not in 1914 but surely by 1916. Further, Churchill’s indirect approach led to the fiasco at Gallipoli in WWI (and in WWII would have led to dithering in the Balkans in 1944 if the US and Soviets hadn’t insisted on a landing in NW Europe). Fast forward to today - Britain no longer has the economic/industrial or naval power to pull off a maritime approach to war and needs something g new for the 21st century.
Still a focus on the Royal Navy and Air Force (with a small expeditionary force) today might make more sense. But all of this is trumped by having a decent economic and industrial policy - the UK is pretty rapidly slipping from genteel poverty to straight out poverty. Fixing (or eliminating) the NHS and re-industrializing the north would do more for Britain’s power than fiddling with army recruiting or procurement.
If you eliminate the NHS you will fundamentally weaken the economy. It is the most cost effective health system in the developed world. £/population/GDP.
With more expensive or less healthcare you weaken both your capacity to spend on war and your availability of, and willingness, of the people to fight.
Peninsula?
Illuminating but dry. Could have benefited from more examples and maps.
Hart is just wrong. Sometimes that hardened position needs taking. Some defenses cant be bypassed.
Finnish opinion: army is too small if its size (total active force and trained reserves) is less than about a fifth of the total population of the country.
If we applied this to the UK today, that would require an army of around 13.5 million people. That would be almost three times the size of the combined armed forces (Army, Navy, RAF) of the UK at their highest strengths during WW2 (5.1 million).
You must realise that Finland and the UK are just different in this respect. Finland has a land mass 50% larger than the UK, with a population 1/12 of the UK, and shares an enormous land border with Russia.
@@julius9055 Sure, but this was a comment on a video about the UK. I understand why Finland has a large body of reservists, but its silly to apply the same criteria to other countries with much larger populations and different circumstances.
There may be a huge reserve, but to make the most out of it we could also use a lot more spending on equipment and armament.
I fear that most of the western militaries are glass cannons. They may be hard hitting once, but they cannot take a hit without shattering. In any real near pear conflict they will be overran quickly as they have no way of rebuilding their power in any meaningful time.
Are the netherlands and belgium independant because of british wishes to keep france and germany away from the rhine and schelde
Might be, Britain did guarantee Belgium in case of a German invasion in WW1, and Britain during the Glourious Revolution saw the replacement of the Catholic Stuart Dynasty with a Protestant Dutch born Orange Dynasty, so perhaps that played an important role in keeping Britian interested in Dutch affairs and vice versa?
I think that's how Corbett saw it. Not saying I agree.
Arguably so.
Englishmen went to fight alongside the Dutch for their independence against Habsburg rule.
@JumboGaming001 Worth noting that James II was the only Stuart Catholic monarch during his reign (although Charles II did convert on his deathbed). While religious turmoil was part of the Civil War, Charles I was Anglican and the main dissenters of his rule were Reformists (rather than Protestants) such as Scottish Covenanters and English Puritans. James I, while baptised a Catholic by his mother, Mary - Queen of Scots, was raised from an early age as a member of the Protestant Church of Scotland, following the forced abdication of his mother. Mary II was also Anglican.
Religion absolutely played its part in the strife of 17th century in Britain and Ireland, but more important was the supremacy of the crown vs parliament.
Navy, Navy, Navy
British way of war? Sure it does exist.
British way of war always was a strategic approach, therefore the focus never was on the military by itself but on politics, with the result that the British armed forces (especially the land forces) always were very mediocre and never on par with their continental adversaries such as the French, not to mention the Germans. The real strength of the Brits always was politics. The British always mastered the field of politics, there is no country with better politicians than Britain. The key factor of the British way of war is, only (no matter what) go to war with very strong allies and even when you already have strong allies on your side look for even more in order to let them do the heavy lifitng of land warfare.
This concept always was highly succesful. With the view on the Brits it becomes clear that for winning wars constantly you need two things: strong allies which you only can get by making good politics and furthermore you need a good geography.
The Royal Navy were superior to the next two powers combined.
So how do explain Splendid Isolation and Pax Britannica? As for mediocre forces, what nonsense.
@@AndrewTeale-cy3dw Splendid Isolation was possible because of the outstanding geograpghy England, as an island nation, has.
The performance of the English armed forces always was (and still is) very mediocre, no wonder, because (as I wrote above) the English approach to war always was a strategic one, never one on tactical level. The masters in the art of warfare, i.e. tactics are the Germans, in this particular field the Brits were not just mediocre they even were very bad. The Brits never were a soldierly people, this is true for the Germans. The strength of the Brits always were politics.
@@kodor1146 Repeating the same nonsense doesn't make it any better. You obviously have no understanding of splendid isolation. You have conveniently ignored Pax Britannica.
Your level of understanding would make You an excellent candidate for Imperial domination by the British. As for the German masters of War, their strategic goals were at best stupid and at worst horrific. Tactically they failed again and again and again.
Thanks for the video, Michael. Corbett's book and Lambert's book are both in my reading pile, not sure which of the two to tackle first. On the British Army, Nick Drummond has a nice video that you may already have seen that looks at how to reorganise it and where to invest to get the most bang for your buck: ruclips.net/video/nGLwEnkGgCE/видео.html
Nukes …
Hew Strachan's name is pronounced 'Strawn' - not 'Strakken'.
The weird thing is footballer Gordon Strachan's name is pronounced 'Strakken' and he was also born in Edinburgh so go figure
@@eddhardy1054I'm only going by what his bio says: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hew_Strachan
@@CliSwe The only thing that draws me towards Gordon's version is that in Gaelic 'ch' is pronounced kinda like k as in loch. Also the Gaelic surname MacLachlan is I believe pronounced like 'MagLoklan'
Thanks for this! Very useful framing.
I recently listened to an interview with Andrew Lambert on the School of War podcast.
ruclips.net/video/zAS-5O9Eqc8/видео.html is the link to the YT version.
Also, the US Naval War College just posted and award to, and a lecture by Prof Lambert. I haven't listened to it yet but look forward to it. Here is the link I hope:
ruclips.net/video/N4Iyts41Kf4/видео.html
Keep up the good work and fresh perspectives.
British way of war:
1. rely exclusively on haphazard improvisation and dumb luck
2. only go to war against people who are even more incompetent than you.
3. if (or rather when) you fail, get a greater power than you (USA) to fight your enemy for you
The British way of war is to lose most of the battles before finally somehow winning the war. They do this to by letting the sons of the landed gentry run the war badly and impotently for the first two years until finally talented people would be put in charge who will win it- barely. England lost the American Revolution because they never really had capable leadership eithor in power in England or in leading their armies in the colonies.
Do believe you've been watching too much Blackadder.
🙄 Mel Gibson movies are fiction, not documentaries.
Our best regiments and commanders were busy in a proper war 🤷🏻♂️
@@wiretom Ah, yes ... those pesky French!!! Took 500 years for England not to win against the French just across the channel.
If UK Germany and Russia teamed up...holy mother
British training and professionalism combined with their strong airforce and navy in the hands of Russia's psudo-militia style of army combined with German quality manufacturing.
Yup, combined these three basically cover the weaknesses of each other:
the UK struggles with production of vast quantities of equipment whilst Russia struggles with the quality of it's equipment this gets covered by the German's implementing their own manufacturing practices for Russia, allowing Russia to supply all three with masses of high quality equipment.
the Germans and Russians both struggle with naval forces and airforces, which get largely covered by the UK prioritising those aspects of warfare.
Russia struggles with corruption and discipline within its armed forces that British instructors and drill Sargents could aid with rooting out.
Overall I give such an alliance less than a decade before they could fight any other alliance and likely come out on top, only exclusions being over large alliances I.e 'the whole of Europe' or 'all other NATO countries' and alliances between a strong arms producer and China and/or India simply down to the sheer quantity of people those nations could mobilise and then equip.
That smacks of Hitler’s wet dream of allying with the British Empire.