I think its just outright wrong to say German offensive in 1918 'almost worked'. That is just German military propaganda from the Inter-War years, literally written by the German generals who came up with that dumb 'strategy'. They basically took all their best men, and threw them into incredibly costly attacks against weak targets. The Germans attacked where the allies weren't, and they attacked there because they knew they couldn't attack where the allies were strong. But there was good reason not to defend those regions very much, the German conquered stuff that didn't matter. As soon as they came into areas that were strategically more important, they were stopped. They simply were at the end of effective supply. Even if it had been incredibly, unbelievable, absurdly successful, more successful then the wildest dreams of German generals, it wouldn't have won them the war. Not even the generals who launched it believed it could work, the basically just send people into battle because the didn't have a clue what else to do, they had no strategic path to victory, and they didn't want peace, so a big offensive was somehow gone do something. This is clear from their own writing and planning. They basically just planned a big battle and hoped that somehow some opportunity would present itself. Its was literally delusional born out of a complete powerlessness. Lets say it was incredibly successful, Germany breaks threw, and divides the allies with Britain North and France South. Again this was basically impossible, but lets assume. Congratulations, you have now widened the Front by a huge margin. Britain had no reason to withdraw, they had plenty of men and material in France and control over the ports. Germany wasn't capable of another offensive for a while. And France would also not give up either. And Americans were still streaming in. Both France and Britain were preparing for offensives. After Michael Germany had very little left in the tank, their next attack at Marne was absolutely crushed. Ukraine will certainty no do anything that stupid. And the context is also very different. Germany was isolated. Ukraine is being supplied by NATO. Ukrainians quality can increase, Germany quality was decreasing only. You seem to assume the difference between Ukraine and Russia is comparable as that of Germany against the allies. This isn't the case. Ukraine population is between 1/4-1/3 of Russia. The British, French and US empires plus lots of other allies had a much bigger superiority. And Germany in 1918 never achieved close to a 3:1 or 4:1 attrition rate, but that is what Ukraine is doing. And Ukraine did this before they had all the new weapons. Russia isn't this overwhelmingly powerful machine. Their industrial capacity isn't great, its nothing compared to US, France, Britain in WW1. They have been living of 50+ years of Soviet equipment and drawing that down fast. That's the only reason they have been able to fight the way they do. The quality of their equipment is decreasing and new equipment isn't coming in fast. And they are offering an ever increased amount of money to get people into the army, they simply can't recruit like Stalin did. Ukraine on the other hand is increasingly getting much more modern equipment, there is an increasing quality difference. And its a real question if Russia can continue its quantity dominance for much longer. So I think your analysis is wrong. Germany was cut off by blockade. Ukraine is literally getting deliveries of modern fighter planes. And after F-16, other planes like Gripen might show up. The NATO economies are only now slowly increasing their output, but they will be increasing it faster then Russia can. As long as Ukraine can get decently modern equipment they are in a far better situation then you suggest. So Ukraine isn't gone do a single glorious offensive, they are gone to just continue to defend, let Russia attack and lost 4x as much and plan for the war to continue. Train their pilots, build up their more modern Airforce. And then start a number of offensive to continuously push the Russians out of their territory, and negotiate some kind of settlement at some point. I don't think a single decisive battle and nuclear weapons play much of a role. This is a grind. Washington is to hesitant, essentially buying into Russian propaganda. The need to give Ukraine weapons, even with those Ukraine will not reenact Cannee. Once Ukraine can show it can hold its own and push back, a negotiated settlement is much more likely.
The issue you don't address is "what if we don't", though; and I believe it needs to be addressed. For Russia, there are 3 possible results: First, a victory that enables them to reach their objectives - well, at least some of them, they have shown to be flexible in what their objectives are and have rethought the whole strategy after the failure of the initial phase of the war, they will still need to get at least something to consider it a victory. Second, a minor defeat that sees them not reaching any objective, ending up the same or even worse than they were but Putin and the ruling people still being strong enough to contain threats. It would be mostly internal threats - primarily parts of the ruling class turning on Putin. Any decentralization movements on the periphery will have a hard time unless Putin is distracted, as he really built the police to suppress primarily those, and external threats, while they may be encouraged by Russia's weakness, will also be discouraged by the loss of the aggressor and worried about potential West support for Russia as they defend themselves this time. This is a safety net for Russia, as no matter how hard they lose, the ultimate major loss, losing their territory and sovereignty, will be avoided. So Putin's strategy needed (and IMO did) adopt a two-pronged approach: First, they are attempting to win in Ukraine. Second, they are trying to create a cushion that will enable them to only suffer a minor loss when they lose. They need to split their resources between these two things, and definitely, the chances of a victory do play into deciding how much energy to put into securing one and the other. What is happening now, the victory is being dangled in front of Putin. As you say, Ukraine is dependent on western resources and risks losing should the help be stopped. Of course, they may keep resisting on conquered territories but Russia will just torture them to submission - this will be drain on the economy as the torturers need to be paid (it's a hard physical work after all) and do not produce anything, but will not affect the mood of people who are not opposed to it like Westerners would be. And as Putin feels the victory being close, he may divert more energy into securing it over avoiding a major loss. If he then is faced with a chance of a loss, he will be willing to risk more to avoid it, because it would mean a fair chance of a major loss. Consequently, if he doesn't and the victory starts to appear unobtainable, he may feel forced into more drastic measures (such as nuclear weapons) to ensure it. Nuclear weapons in particular carry a huge risk: They have an aura of an ultimate weapon. If you use them, you are expected to win, unless your opponent does the same. Failing to do so means you are immeasurably weak, and appearing to be so will increase risks of someone else trying to take something from you while you are weak. So they will have to keep bombing Ukraine until they're beaten - which means better have enough missiles to achieve that. Ultimately, while attempting to deescalate on Ukraine is a reasonable thing to do, the strategy West has chosen to try to achieve this goal is not guaranteed to do so, and in fact may very well achieve an opposite effect instead.
I think the question is whether the war - waged to the size and brutality that we see - just in it self, in it's internal 'workings' is escalatory. It will radicalize the parties, and worse will get worse, if possible at all: More and more is at stake. So trying to 'manage' the war, like america apparently tries to, will risc either end in Ukr. defeat or Russia, not being able to win, will end up use nuclear weapons. A looming Ukr. defeat can easely mean that certain European countries will involve themselves in the war, and we are back to escalation. If Ru is insane enough - or thinks america weak enough - to use nuclear weapons, well then we'll probably see it, if not in Ukr. then in Poland, Finland or the Baltics - so why wait? is that prudent?. So I'm quite sure, the better strategy is to arm Ukr. to win (that'll ultimately be liberate Crimea and much/all of Donbas). Victory will not come by a grand offensive, it will, I think, come by a Russian (political-military) collapse. And I believe that's the WW1 reference to note: Germany collapsed, it's army was not beaten in a 'grand offensive', but it collapsed under the combined weight of the war and its effects on Germany.
Well I think time is required for sanctions and the reality of Vladolf's opportunistic strategic blunder to have effect in Russia. A dictator appears strong, but blusters, while democracies are slow to mobilize military potential. Fundamentally the RF would best rationally be a link between the European, N. American and Chinese economies, providing resources, but Vladolf chose to be hostile. The fact is the war started long ago but at a subliminal level, cyber attacks, assassinations and their "active measures" which is psychological warfare. But now they're exposed as weak with a dominant China, burnt bridges to the west, the younger generation fear becoming a vassal of China. Put yourself in the position of the UK in WW1, the distant naval blockade caused Imperial Germany to sink the Lusitania, while US troops took away hope, the allies withstood the German offensive and gained the initiative. But the Germans had already endured "Turnip Winters" where they had to eat vegetables grown for animal fodder. This 3 day special operation to install a puppet government in Kyiv and kill Zelenskyy has not exactly gone to plan. How is the gains worth the horrendous costs? There is definitely a menu of responses to use of some Russian nuke, I believe they would most likely deploy one in event of a collapse of the Russian front out of panic. Giving orders to nuke is not risk free for Putin. Do you remember all those tense frightened looking faces in the Kremlin when Vladolf announced the invasion? That was not just FSB worried their false reports would be exposed or the army concerned about their capabilities. The RF simply cannot occupy Ukraine, it takes 3mi troops, but they already have manpower shortages, Gazprom has booked huge losses and yet again their offensive is indecisive with large losses. The US appropriation to support Ukraine in addition to the European efforts, is just unlikely to create the conditions for the kind of offensive to "win". Basically European countries are realising it's far better to support Ukraine than prepare for an attack ceding the RF the strategic initiative. But they were slow to ramp production.
@@RobBCactive Of course I can't know, but I think it's likely that the combined costs of the war on Russia will make it's will and/or logistic ability to continue the war collapse at some point. It can be a political 'palace coup', it can be mutiny/disobedience in the army, rebellion/civil war (e.g. in the Caucassus) Civil disobedience (strikes etc). The decisive terrain is Crimea, if, which I believe is very possible, Ukraine can isolate and besiege Crimea, it will look to the russian public as if they are loosing the war. The cost is of course the absolutely huge loss of life, economical cost (leading to worsening living conditions) and political cost in a Regime that started a war that it looks like it is loosing. I don't believe in the 'grand offensive' to end the war, since I think the other will happen faster. Though I believe that a renewed attempt on cutting the 'land bridge' could well be made next year, but it will not be decisive in it self.
Very delicately making the case that Ukraine is done I must say that for a TTV (Think Tank Vermin) this guy is a couple of cuts above the rest And a French speaker to boot... , wonders never cease However subtract a point or two for prominent display of diplomas(?) on the shelves C'est d'un commun mon cher
This looks realistically at the risks of Russian escalation if they are forced to contemplate being fully kicked out of Ukraine, but fails to at all balance that against the medium and long term risks from a victorious Russia, that then possesses Ukraine and is euphoric in victory. All of the discussed risks then continue to apply to the next war(s) that Russia would be very likely to undertake. I find the presented thinking to good, but tragically incomplete and therefore the conclusion to lack larger validity.
The Russian people have a high threshold, but bigger I think, is that the masses don't really have a clear idea of what is going on and no easy way to find out. Nor do they want to, like the 50% of Americans who are content to watch only Fox. The younger tech people who know how to find the truth have left the country for the most part. Also, don't underestimate Putin. He seems to be slow in acting, but the ax does fall. I can think of several situations such as how long it took him to act on Prigozhin, but it happened.
Regarding the Russian's ability to endure high losses which is a poignant contrast with the West's ability to absorb losses. That said, we need to realize that the Ukrainians are absorbing proportionally more losses and that of the average Russian citizen who is not nearly as affected by the conflict as the average Ukrainian one. That just comes down to shear population size differences. I do wonder if the Russian civil population will at some point reach a Afghanistan war moment (1988-89) and want to pull out. Some estimates suggest 180k KIA for the Russians. That's a lot of families, friends, associates in Russia that have lost someone or know someone who has been lost. Plus another 500k or so injured Russians who surely will be wondering "what was it all for?" type questions. As I see it, despite Putin's ironclad hold on Russia, the longer this war goes on, the more losses Russian families suffer, we might reach a turning point. While Putin wants Ukraine, and while Putin needs to end the war with some sort of victory, he will also need to end the war, or at least hostilities, sooner then later to preserve his hold on power. Its not just Ukraine who is desperate to win this war, but surely Putin will become desperate to win or end the conflict too. Sadly, I see a ceasefire with a Ukrainian victory AND Putin remaining in power equating to a never ending war being only a temporary ceasefire and time to recover that could then continue the war at a later date. Its a Korean situation. Either Ukraine must win AND Putin loses power, or Putin wins and Ukraine looses its freedom as the only real solutions to the conflict. Hopefully the latter for Ukraine's sake. Just my 2 cents.
1. If Russia is (visibly) losing, then they will use nuclear weapons. So the conclusion is: Russia can only win or get stuck. But then Ukraine cannot afford having russians stuck in Ukraine, so Russia can only win. We can only prepare white flags for all the countries of Central Europe and be ready to bend knees before our overlords in Moscow. 2. Let's revisit the "getting stuck" a bit, because this is what's going on right now. It's not true sanctions don't work. They work very well: the cost is considerable fo Russia (their statistics are doctored if published at all) and every month less and less business with outside world is possible for Russia. But it only means: common people will suffer and proportionally more and more resources will be redirected towards war effort. Was there ever any (bigger) country forced into peace by sanctions? On the other hand Ukraine has manpower shortage, the Western support seems shaky and in the years to come political landscape in the West can shift a lot in favor of Russia. Time can be on the Russian side if they play their cards well. 3. Let's get back to your reasoning, because this is crucial. What would Russia achieve by using nukes? Tactical nuke would result in a tactical victory here and there and in irradiated battlegroud. Nuking cities would have effect similar to carpet bombings of WW2. They destroyed a lot, killed a lot of civillians, achieved nothing of strategic importance. And crucially they didn't knock Germany out of the war. 4. Wars have goals. Assuming Russia wanted to capture Ukrainian resources and most of all it's population. Nuking cities and turning Ukrainian fields into wastelands would be completely counterproductive. 4. What's more, war is not a computer game. You don't just win and it's over. Or in terms of game theory: international politics (were war is a tool) is not a finite game. Even if half the Ukraine was turned into nuclear wasteland, Russia remains in place and US remain in place, China and India also aren't going anywhere. Even if Russia wins a local war, it loses it's position in the world, becoming a pariah and having all major forces, especially other nuclear powers as her enemies. 5. Wars are won on the battlefield. Unfortunately, if decisive battle was even possible, the timing is already lost. The window closed when Russians dug in. And it was this constant nuclear fearmongering that prevented us from taking a decisive approach. We allowed Russians to gain territory, we gave them time to set and to learn from their mistakes and to regain initiative. We have lost room for manoeuvre and nobody knows what is the strategy of the West for this war anymore.
“Russia has inexhaustible resources” and Russia has “greater tolerance for losses”….a lot of dog whistles. You make no distinctions between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, saying only that an unknown Russian nuclear weapon will magically go into full operational mode w/out the US noticing and destroy a Ukrainian division that has somehow clustered in 1 location despite the Ukrainians operating at brigade level throughout the war. You don’t ask the most important question: “Ru uses a tactical(?) nuclear weapon on ?, then what?” China has deterred Russia from the nuclear rhetoric for a reason. The U.S. has threatened conventional retaliation even if Russia tests a nuclear weapon (like on Snake Island).
You are wrong about the Russian command structure. The war plans are indeed centralized, as are the strategic and operational goals, but operational and tactical control are in the hands of the officers on the ground. Read Jacques Bauds: The Russian Art of War, in which he gives, among other things, an in-depth analyses of the Russian command structure.
Shurkin, you say that Russians have a tremendous capacity for pain, and obviously you are right. It's astonishing. But Russia of today is not Stalin's Russia. For a long time they have had a low birthrate and 20-30 years ago they more or less stopped having children for some years. So the young generations are very small and most of the dead and dying soldiers on the battlefield statistically is someone's only son and likely only child. It's not like 80 years ago with a high birthrate coupled with a low expectation of child survival. IF the cassualty estimates from European intelligence services are somewhat accurate, Russia will quickly run out of deplorables, That nobody apparently cares about. So I'm pretty sure, the loss of soldiers will bite as it settles in. Btw one sees the same in Ukraine, which likely explains the oddity that draft age is/was 27 years (as I understand it, only now going down to 25 y.o.) - There is little more than 100k ukraine males in each year in their 20ties. compared to almost 350k 40 year olds! So I guess, they are sparing these very few young men.
Lets suppose the permission to strike Russian territory is given. I then ask ok, what is behind those attacks? Does Ukraine have the ground forces and sustainment necessary to follow up those attacks? They will certainly need that in order to coerce a Russian surrender. The Russians will have to surrender in order for Ukraine to declare victory. From what we know of the Russians do we perceive this will happen? Considering all of the rhetoric and support coming from the west I believe the Russians see this war as between the west as a whole not a war merely against Ukraine. Since there is an argument that can be made that Ukraine and its war are being manipulated if not completely controlled by the west can the Russians come to any other conclusion? So that leads me to the conclusion that we had better be prepared for a nuclear world war 111.
I think its just outright wrong to say German offensive in 1918 'almost worked'. That is just German military propaganda from the Inter-War years, literally written by the German generals who came up with that dumb 'strategy'. They basically took all their best men, and threw them into incredibly costly attacks against weak targets. The Germans attacked where the allies weren't, and they attacked there because they knew they couldn't attack where the allies were strong. But there was good reason not to defend those regions very much, the German conquered stuff that didn't matter. As soon as they came into areas that were strategically more important, they were stopped. They simply were at the end of effective supply. Even if it had been incredibly, unbelievable, absurdly successful, more successful then the wildest dreams of German generals, it wouldn't have won them the war. Not even the generals who launched it believed it could work, the basically just send people into battle because the didn't have a clue what else to do, they had no strategic path to victory, and they didn't want peace, so a big offensive was somehow gone do something. This is clear from their own writing and planning. They basically just planned a big battle and hoped that somehow some opportunity would present itself. Its was literally delusional born out of a complete powerlessness.
Lets say it was incredibly successful, Germany breaks threw, and divides the allies with Britain North and France South. Again this was basically impossible, but lets assume. Congratulations, you have now widened the Front by a huge margin. Britain had no reason to withdraw, they had plenty of men and material in France and control over the ports. Germany wasn't capable of another offensive for a while. And France would also not give up either. And Americans were still streaming in. Both France and Britain were preparing for offensives. After Michael Germany had very little left in the tank, their next attack at Marne was absolutely crushed. Ukraine will certainty no do anything that stupid.
And the context is also very different. Germany was isolated. Ukraine is being supplied by NATO. Ukrainians quality can increase, Germany quality was decreasing only.
You seem to assume the difference between Ukraine and Russia is comparable as that of Germany against the allies. This isn't the case. Ukraine population is between 1/4-1/3 of Russia. The British, French and US empires plus lots of other allies had a much bigger superiority. And Germany in 1918 never achieved close to a 3:1 or 4:1 attrition rate, but that is what Ukraine is doing. And Ukraine did this before they had all the new weapons.
Russia isn't this overwhelmingly powerful machine. Their industrial capacity isn't great, its nothing compared to US, France, Britain in WW1. They have been living of 50+ years of Soviet equipment and drawing that down fast. That's the only reason they have been able to fight the way they do. The quality of their equipment is decreasing and new equipment isn't coming in fast. And they are offering an ever increased amount of money to get people into the army, they simply can't recruit like Stalin did.
Ukraine on the other hand is increasingly getting much more modern equipment, there is an increasing quality difference. And its a real question if Russia can continue its quantity dominance for much longer.
So I think your analysis is wrong. Germany was cut off by blockade. Ukraine is literally getting deliveries of modern fighter planes. And after F-16, other planes like Gripen might show up. The NATO economies are only now slowly increasing their output, but they will be increasing it faster then Russia can. As long as Ukraine can get decently modern equipment they are in a far better situation then you suggest.
So Ukraine isn't gone do a single glorious offensive, they are gone to just continue to defend, let Russia attack and lost 4x as much and plan for the war to continue. Train their pilots, build up their more modern Airforce. And then start a number of offensive to continuously push the Russians out of their territory, and negotiate some kind of settlement at some point.
I don't think a single decisive battle and nuclear weapons play much of a role. This is a grind. Washington is to hesitant, essentially buying into Russian propaganda. The need to give Ukraine weapons, even with those Ukraine will not reenact Cannee. Once Ukraine can show it can hold its own and push back, a negotiated settlement is much more likely.
Very sobering and clear analysis. Thank you.
The issue you don't address is "what if we don't", though; and I believe it needs to be addressed.
For Russia, there are 3 possible results: First, a victory that enables them to reach their objectives - well, at least some of them, they have shown to be flexible in what their objectives are and have rethought the whole strategy after the failure of the initial phase of the war, they will still need to get at least something to consider it a victory. Second, a minor defeat that sees them not reaching any objective, ending up the same or even worse than they were but Putin and the ruling people still being strong enough to contain threats. It would be mostly internal threats - primarily parts of the ruling class turning on Putin. Any decentralization movements on the periphery will have a hard time unless Putin is distracted, as he really built the police to suppress primarily those, and external threats, while they may be encouraged by Russia's weakness, will also be discouraged by the loss of the aggressor and worried about potential West support for Russia as they defend themselves this time. This is a safety net for Russia, as no matter how hard they lose, the ultimate major loss, losing their territory and sovereignty, will be avoided.
So Putin's strategy needed (and IMO did) adopt a two-pronged approach: First, they are attempting to win in Ukraine. Second, they are trying to create a cushion that will enable them to only suffer a minor loss when they lose. They need to split their resources between these two things, and definitely, the chances of a victory do play into deciding how much energy to put into securing one and the other. What is happening now, the victory is being dangled in front of Putin. As you say, Ukraine is dependent on western resources and risks losing should the help be stopped. Of course, they may keep resisting on conquered territories but Russia will just torture them to submission - this will be drain on the economy as the torturers need to be paid (it's a hard physical work after all) and do not produce anything, but will not affect the mood of people who are not opposed to it like Westerners would be.
And as Putin feels the victory being close, he may divert more energy into securing it over avoiding a major loss. If he then is faced with a chance of a loss, he will be willing to risk more to avoid it, because it would mean a fair chance of a major loss. Consequently, if he doesn't and the victory starts to appear unobtainable, he may feel forced into more drastic measures (such as nuclear weapons) to ensure it. Nuclear weapons in particular carry a huge risk: They have an aura of an ultimate weapon. If you use them, you are expected to win, unless your opponent does the same. Failing to do so means you are immeasurably weak, and appearing to be so will increase risks of someone else trying to take something from you while you are weak. So they will have to keep bombing Ukraine until they're beaten - which means better have enough missiles to achieve that.
Ultimately, while attempting to deescalate on Ukraine is a reasonable thing to do, the strategy West has chosen to try to achieve this goal is not guaranteed to do so, and in fact may very well achieve an opposite effect instead.
I think the question is whether the war - waged to the size and brutality that we see - just in it self, in it's internal 'workings' is escalatory. It will radicalize the parties, and worse will get worse, if possible at all: More and more is at stake.
So trying to 'manage' the war, like america apparently tries to, will risc either end in Ukr. defeat or Russia, not being able to win, will end up use nuclear weapons.
A looming Ukr. defeat can easely mean that certain European countries will involve themselves in the war, and we are back to escalation.
If Ru is insane enough - or thinks america weak enough - to use nuclear weapons, well then we'll probably see it, if not in Ukr. then in Poland, Finland or the Baltics - so why wait? is that prudent?.
So I'm quite sure, the better strategy is to arm Ukr. to win (that'll ultimately be liberate Crimea and much/all of Donbas). Victory will not come by a grand offensive, it will, I think, come by a Russian (political-military) collapse.
And I believe that's the WW1 reference to note: Germany collapsed, it's army was not beaten in a 'grand offensive', but it collapsed under the combined weight of the war and its effects on Germany.
Totally agree on all point.
Well I think time is required for sanctions and the reality of Vladolf's opportunistic strategic blunder to have effect in Russia. A dictator appears strong, but blusters, while democracies are slow to mobilize military potential.
Fundamentally the RF would best rationally be a link between the European, N. American and Chinese economies, providing resources, but Vladolf chose to be hostile. The fact is the war started long ago but at a subliminal level, cyber attacks, assassinations and their "active measures" which is psychological warfare.
But now they're exposed as weak with a dominant China, burnt bridges to the west, the younger generation fear becoming a vassal of China.
Put yourself in the position of the UK in WW1, the distant naval blockade caused Imperial Germany to sink the Lusitania, while US troops took away hope, the allies withstood the German offensive and gained the initiative. But the Germans had already endured "Turnip Winters" where they had to eat vegetables grown for animal fodder.
This 3 day special operation to install a puppet government in Kyiv and kill Zelenskyy has not exactly gone to plan. How is the gains worth the horrendous costs?
There is definitely a menu of responses to use of some Russian nuke, I believe they would most likely deploy one in event of a collapse of the Russian front out of panic. Giving orders to nuke is not risk free for Putin. Do you remember all those tense frightened looking faces in the Kremlin when Vladolf announced the invasion? That was not just FSB worried their false reports would be exposed or the army concerned about their capabilities.
The RF simply cannot occupy Ukraine, it takes 3mi troops, but they already have manpower shortages, Gazprom has booked huge losses and yet again their offensive is indecisive with large losses.
The US appropriation to support Ukraine in addition to the European efforts, is just unlikely to create the conditions for the kind of offensive to "win".
Basically European countries are realising it's far better to support Ukraine than prepare for an attack ceding the RF the strategic initiative. But they were slow to ramp production.
Yeah, I dont think Ukraine is the Germans in this scenario...
@@RobBCactive
Of course I can't know, but I think it's likely that the combined costs of the war on Russia will make it's will and/or logistic ability to continue the war collapse at some point. It can be a political 'palace coup', it can be mutiny/disobedience in the army, rebellion/civil war (e.g. in the Caucassus) Civil disobedience (strikes etc).
The decisive terrain is Crimea, if, which I believe is very possible, Ukraine can isolate and besiege Crimea, it will look to the russian public as if they are loosing the war.
The cost is of course the absolutely huge loss of life, economical cost (leading to worsening living conditions) and political cost in a Regime that started a war that it looks like it is loosing.
I don't believe in the 'grand offensive' to end the war, since I think the other will happen faster. Though I believe that a renewed attempt on cutting the 'land bridge' could well be made next year, but it will not be decisive in it self.
@@henrikkrogh6524 well put!! I think everyone wants things to happen faster, they become frustrated, but it's not realistic.
Very delicately making the case that Ukraine is done
I must say that for a TTV (Think Tank Vermin) this guy is a couple of cuts above the rest
And a French speaker to boot... , wonders never cease
However subtract a point or two for prominent display of diplomas(?) on the shelves
C'est d'un commun mon cher
You didn't consider the implicit promotion of nuclear proliferation by yielding to Russian nuclear blackmail.
This looks realistically at the risks of Russian escalation if they are forced to contemplate being fully kicked out of Ukraine, but fails to at all balance that against the medium and long term risks from a victorious Russia, that then possesses Ukraine and is euphoric in victory. All of the discussed risks then continue to apply to the next war(s) that Russia would be very likely to undertake.
I find the presented thinking to good, but tragically incomplete and therefore the conclusion to lack larger validity.
The Russian people have a high threshold, but bigger I think, is that the masses don't really have a clear idea of what is going on and no easy way to find out. Nor do they want to, like the 50% of Americans who are content to watch only Fox. The younger tech people who know how to find the truth have left the country for the most part. Also, don't underestimate Putin. He seems to be slow in acting, but the ax does fall. I can think of several situations such as how long it took him to act on Prigozhin, but it happened.
Regarding the Russian's ability to endure high losses which is a poignant contrast with the West's ability to absorb losses. That said, we need to realize that the Ukrainians are absorbing proportionally more losses and that of the average Russian citizen who is not nearly as affected by the conflict as the average Ukrainian one. That just comes down to shear population size differences. I do wonder if the Russian civil population will at some point reach a Afghanistan war moment (1988-89) and want to pull out. Some estimates suggest 180k KIA for the Russians. That's a lot of families, friends, associates in Russia that have lost someone or know someone who has been lost. Plus another 500k or so injured Russians who surely will be wondering "what was it all for?" type questions. As I see it, despite Putin's ironclad hold on Russia, the longer this war goes on, the more losses Russian families suffer, we might reach a turning point. While Putin wants Ukraine, and while Putin needs to end the war with some sort of victory, he will also need to end the war, or at least hostilities, sooner then later to preserve his hold on power. Its not just Ukraine who is desperate to win this war, but surely Putin will become desperate to win or end the conflict too. Sadly, I see a ceasefire with a Ukrainian victory AND Putin remaining in power equating to a never ending war being only a temporary ceasefire and time to recover that could then continue the war at a later date. Its a Korean situation. Either Ukraine must win AND Putin loses power, or Putin wins and Ukraine looses its freedom as the only real solutions to the conflict. Hopefully the latter for Ukraine's sake. Just my 2 cents.
1. If Russia is (visibly) losing, then they will use nuclear weapons. So the conclusion is: Russia can only win or get stuck. But then Ukraine cannot afford having russians stuck in Ukraine, so Russia can only win. We can only prepare white flags for all the countries of Central Europe and be ready to bend knees before our overlords in Moscow.
2. Let's revisit the "getting stuck" a bit, because this is what's going on right now. It's not true sanctions don't work. They work very well: the cost is considerable fo Russia (their statistics are doctored if published at all) and every month less and less business with outside world is possible for Russia. But it only means: common people will suffer and proportionally more and more resources will be redirected towards war effort. Was there ever any (bigger) country forced into peace by sanctions?
On the other hand Ukraine has manpower shortage, the Western support seems shaky and in the years to come political landscape in the West can shift a lot in favor of Russia. Time can be on the Russian side if they play their cards well.
3. Let's get back to your reasoning, because this is crucial. What would Russia achieve by using nukes? Tactical nuke would result in a tactical victory here and there and in irradiated battlegroud. Nuking cities would have effect similar to carpet bombings of WW2. They destroyed a lot, killed a lot of civillians, achieved nothing of strategic importance. And crucially they didn't knock Germany out of the war.
4. Wars have goals. Assuming Russia wanted to capture Ukrainian resources and most of all it's population. Nuking cities and turning Ukrainian fields into wastelands would be completely counterproductive.
4. What's more, war is not a computer game. You don't just win and it's over. Or in terms of game theory: international politics (were war is a tool) is not a finite game. Even if half the Ukraine was turned into nuclear wasteland, Russia remains in place and US remain in place, China and India also aren't going anywhere. Even if Russia wins a local war, it loses it's position in the world, becoming a pariah and having all major forces, especially other nuclear powers as her enemies.
5. Wars are won on the battlefield. Unfortunately, if decisive battle was even possible, the timing is already lost. The window closed when Russians dug in. And it was this constant nuclear fearmongering that prevented us from taking a decisive approach. We allowed Russians to gain territory, we gave them time to set and to learn from their mistakes and to regain initiative. We have lost room for manoeuvre and nobody knows what is the strategy of the West for this war anymore.
“Russia has inexhaustible resources” and Russia has “greater tolerance for losses”….a lot of dog whistles. You make no distinctions between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, saying only that an unknown Russian nuclear weapon will magically go into full operational mode w/out the US noticing and destroy a Ukrainian division that has somehow clustered in 1 location despite the Ukrainians operating at brigade level throughout the war.
You don’t ask the most important question: “Ru uses a tactical(?) nuclear weapon on ?, then what?”
China has deterred Russia from the nuclear rhetoric for a reason. The U.S. has threatened conventional retaliation even if Russia tests a nuclear weapon (like on Snake Island).
You are wrong about the Russian command structure. The war plans are indeed centralized, as are the strategic and operational goals, but operational and tactical control are in the hands of the officers on the ground. Read Jacques Bauds: The Russian Art of War, in which he gives, among other things, an in-depth analyses of the Russian command structure.
Shurkin, you say that Russians have a tremendous capacity for pain, and obviously you are right. It's astonishing.
But Russia of today is not Stalin's Russia. For a long time they have had a low birthrate and 20-30 years ago they more or less stopped having children for some years. So the young generations are very small and most of the dead and dying soldiers on the battlefield statistically is someone's only son and likely only child. It's not like 80 years ago with a high birthrate coupled with a low expectation of child survival.
IF the cassualty estimates from European intelligence services are somewhat accurate, Russia will quickly run out of deplorables, That nobody apparently cares about.
So I'm pretty sure, the loss of soldiers will bite as it settles in.
Btw one sees the same in Ukraine, which likely explains the oddity that draft age is/was 27 years (as I understand it, only now going down to 25 y.o.) - There is little more than 100k ukraine males in each year in their 20ties. compared to almost 350k 40 year olds!
So I guess, they are sparing these very few young men.
You have the wrong thumbnail for the video.
Well this didn't age well
Lets suppose the permission to strike Russian territory is given. I then ask ok, what is behind those attacks? Does Ukraine have the ground forces and sustainment necessary to follow up those attacks? They will certainly need that in order to coerce a Russian surrender. The Russians will have to surrender in order for Ukraine to declare victory. From what we know of the Russians do we perceive this will happen? Considering all of the rhetoric and support coming from the west I believe the Russians see this war as between the west as a whole not a war merely against Ukraine. Since there is an argument that can be made that Ukraine and its war are being manipulated if not completely controlled by the west can the Russians come to any other conclusion? So that leads me to the conclusion that we had better be prepared for a nuclear world war 111.
After Kursk, I’m wondering if you’ve changed any of your thinking.
Very softly spoken rubbish. At one point he says “I don’t know” and I kinda wish he’d stop at that
Nothing new. You only talk about what the weather should not do..