The difference is that Hendrix did things on a guitar that had never been done before. He influenced many other guitarists and created new sounds and methods of playing. Jackson didn't really do anything new, he was "just" a competent commander with a great deal of faith and courage.
@@bludfyrehis ability to lead tactical marches and find the enemy flank, and push his troops beyond normal infantry capability is what he brought to the table that was novel, other commanders haven't duplicated it
@@robertsmith6188you should visit the part of Pennsylvania where Jackson thought to march to burn and cripple the Union. It's swamps and mountains, with robust canal connecting it to Lake Erie and Buffalo. Pretty sure any army that marched into that area wouldn't march back out again. Confederates also didn't have the logistics to actually manage an offensive war, as was seen in the battle of Gettysburg.
I have to vote for Jackson as superior in both boldness and control of a corp, A.P. Hill never had that vision but was very competent. I have skin in this game. My great great grandfather was the brother of Jackson's chief engineer. Kieth Boswell, who died on the field when Jackson was shot. Great grandpa was in the va cavalry and survived, I knew his son well as he lived to 100 in Burbank and told stories of his father in the war. Great video as always -
Thank you for your comment. I too believe in Jackson. I really feel it's unfair to compare Jackson and Hill AFTER Jackson was killed. Compare same for same. Who knows Jackson may have saved the Confederacy and become president! LOL, I've stood at Jacksons grave and the Cracker Box counsel on the Chancellorsville battlefield. Very moving both places.
Well, the assessment of both men was sound. Hill tries his best as Corps commander, but Jackson was a great tactician especially in his Valley campaign. This was something. Impressive.
Yes but A.P. Hill was obviously overwhelmed to lead a Corps. He proved determination, aggresion and presence on the battlefield of 1862/63 with his division but lacked all this qualities in commanding a third of the AoNV succesfully. This became already clear at Gettysburg when Lee and Longstreet bypassed Hill and all three days. In the Crisis of the Second Day at the Wilderness in 1864 Lee had to rode to the front to rally Hills Troops in person and also for the rest of the war Hill was ill very often or did just the defensive minimum he was required. I totally agree with Gary Gallaghers verdict that Hills promotion as a Corps Commander was one step about his level of competence but Hill was popular with the troops and Lee lacked a adequate replacement. He could replsce Ewell with Early but had no other seasoned and able division commander at hand to replace Hill
Interesting how the Stonewall Jackson narrative took hold, so most remember the legend best, but lost in all that is that Hill was actually the superior General. Excellent work as always.
That makes me SICK!!! There is a faction in the U.S. that wants to WIPE OUT HISTORY! I HATE IT!!! They have renamed many of the schools, too, like the one named for JEB Stuart. WELL...guess what? I grew up in a small south GA town and our high school mascot is the REBEL(as in Confederate Rebels)...colors and all!
Jackson was erratic but had flashes of brilliance as an independent commander that Hill did not. The Valley campaign’s use of speed and deception to concentrate superior local numbers and defeat an outnumbering enemy in detail was a unique achievement that no one else ever matched. My take is that the best Civil War generals were the ones who were somewhat more cautious and defensive because they fully understood the changes the rifle brought to the field while still being capable of effective offensive leadership; Sherman, Thomas and Meade with the Union, Longstreet and DH Hill with the Confederacy.
Should probably have said unique in the Civil War. Napoleon did it in 1796 in Italy then again in 1814. Other similar comparables like Paul Von Lettow Vorbeck or the Marquess of Montrose.
The Valley campaign was masterful, but Jackson was literally on his home turf. His intimate knowledge of the geography and the road network was an invaluable advantage against enemy forces maneuvering on unfamiliar ground.
I have always thought Jackson drove his troops too hard in the Valley, but his inaction during the Seven Days battles was inexcusable. That tore it with me. Jackson was held as a hero because of his death.
First I ever heard this. It's been observed that as a corps commander, Hill was often on the sick list. It's like the fire went out of him, or so I've heard. When Jackson died, Lee said "I know not how to replace him". If I'm not mistaken, Jackson's valley campaign is considered a masterpiece, still studied at military schools around the world. However, I consider his treatment of Garnett and his habit of shooting his own soldiers unforgivable.
From the Hill video on this channel, Hill was in constant groin pain with a prostrate issue. He would have high fevers and have to go to the battles in an ambulance. Why not call Centra-Care? Puts a different perspective on his just giving up.
None were perfect, but many were great. Jackson and Hill had a tempestuous relationship, not always because of ego, but personalities. Jackson didn't communicate well, and Hill expected to be informed promptly. Great video!
Why is crazy Stonewall Jackson held up as some brilliant military mind? The guy was 4 tacos short of a combo meal and acted like a 16 year old girl when angry.
I agree wholeheartedly, I've thought Jackson was vastly over rated once I began to actually look at his career. However I have thought Lee, while an excellent tactician, was poor at strategic thinking and actually made the South's chances worse. The South's best and only chance was to drag out the war until the North got tired of it. Every battle where the casualties were even close were an actual defeat for the South.
@@johnfleet235 I don't see the relevance to my comment. I said nothing about his alliance to the cause I merely made a point about his inability to grasp the overall necessity of the conduct of the war. Jefferson Davis had the same blind spot. In the Atlanta campaign Johnson led Sherman a merry chase for months so he was replaced with Hood, a more aggressive commander. We all know how that worked out. Why does it matter if Lee was in it for Virginia or for the Confederacy as a whole, it wouldn't have changed his behavior either way.
@@jamesnelson1968 Perhaps what johnfleet means is that Lee's devotion to Virginia - not the Confederacy as a whole - crippled his capacity for strategic thinking. That does make some sense. Johnston's campaign against Sherman was exactly what the rebels ought to have been doing all along. But Lee loved the blood baths.
@@aaronfleming9426 perhaps it is what he meant, but not being psychic, I can olny go by what was written. Since Lee's army was know as the Army of Northern Virginia, maybe Lee already thought of the army as Virginia's defense. At any rate Virginia needed a different strategic as much as the entire Confederacy. Whether he was think provincially or not, Lee's actions were a mistake. The war only lasted as long as it did because he faced such poor generalship on the Union side. A mediocrity like Mead beat him at Gettysburg. No matter what had happened on he third day the Confederate force were out of gas logistically and would have had to retreat anyway.
@@jamesnelson1968 Oh, I think it's pretty clear that he thought provincially. I think the other main reason the war lasted so long is that the U.S. had to form an army from scratch and then use that absolutely green army to conquer an enormous swathe of land. The poor generalship certainly didn't help.
TJ and Master Robert both called for Hill on their deathbed, which says the most I think. The biggest "what if" for me is if Jackson had been present at Gettysburg, and able to develop the Union defeat on day one faster and farther including a night attack "if practicable." As far as the "legend of Stonewall" goes, once Lee calls you his Right Arm you would have to commit a serious offense or blunder to be labeled as a mediocre general. On that note I suppose anyone arguing against TJ is arguing against Lee also, which I am certainly not prepared to do. Neither one of them wanted to live through the loss of the war.
Fair, and correct according to GGGF who was member of light division entire war except 3 months wounded and four months captured. He wrote Jackson, showed promise, Hill worked beyond exhaustion.
@@michaelbarnett2527 Antietam was no draw. Lee's plan of campaign was ruined, he lost a large number of men, and he was forced to abandon the battlefield and withdraw back to Virginia. Antietam was a tactical victory for the Union, but a barren one- because McClellan refused to take advantage of it and pursue Lee.
I've read in several places where fatigue was given as a probable reason for Jackson's inaction. One take away I always think about when studying the Confederate high command is how petty they're squabbles seem to be, especially when looking at the big picture.
@@stevewixom9311 Jackson had just executed a rapid transfer of his whole force across the state and across geographical regions of the state, The Mountain Boys used to the clean, cool weather of the Valley were now thrust into the dense swampy, mosquito infested lowlands southeast of Richmond. Jackson did not have time to study the area and all the routes and approaches to the enemy positions. Never mind the fact that Jackson by all accounts got very little sleep over a period of 2 weeks fighting his way out of the Valley and then moving rapidly per Lees orders to Richmond, Jackson was very dependent on Sleep. When he arrived, he found a haphazard command structure, Lee has not yet even formed a staff capable of transferring orders free of confusion. He had to trust Lee's maps and Lees' aides and Lee's maps were inaccurate and his staff work was grossly inadequate making communication between commands separated by thick forest and swamps a nightmare. If you read any unbiases accounting of the Seven Days battles. Jackson was actually never late; he simply follows his orders to the letter. the Blame therefore must be Lee's who blindly fed the largest command he would have during the war into a piecemeal, Division by Division Blind assault into the Teeth of Prepared Federal Defenses. Lee suffered over 20.000 losses in 7 days of fighting. foreshadowing the terrible and immense cost it would be for the South to have Robert E Lee as its Principal Commander! These men lost in the Seven Days would be desperately needed in the years to come because they could not be replaced. Hill also bares a lot of blame for rushing into Battle totally blind even when the circumstances on the field did not match what his orders stated. Hill was incapable of changing tactics in the mist of Battle. He simply charged headlong directly to the front and whipped the enemy or got whipped himself, and at Mechanicsville, he took a terrible and inglorious whipping, then like a coward with the bodies of Men shrewd all over the field, he tried to Blame Jackson instead of taking responsibility himself.
I agree with you Jackson also get himself in hot water at second Manassas and Fredricksburg. Longstreet saves him at second Manassas by placing artillery on the high ground and firing into the deep cut followed by an attack. AP Hill basically saves Lee at sharpsburg with his late arrival and attack pushing the federals all the way back to the lower bridge. Also Toombs men for holding the bridge for serval hours. Hills attack is so overlooked here.
Didn’t Lee once reprimand Hill, saying something to the effect of: “why didn’t you do as Jackson would have done, and thrown your entire force upon the enemy?” Perhaps Lee had an opinion on this topic.
@@stevevicory9623 More specifically, the Battle of Jericho Mills. But Lee's mood was being affected by his illness at least as much as Hill's supposed failing (Lee would be forced into bed soon). Like I said, Jackson didn't always take the time to get his 'whole force into action either' but threw whatever he had at-hand piecemeal at a foe, just like Hill had done. Sometimes it worked, sometimes not. It's the age-old question of launching an attack--is it better to 'strike with what you have now?' or "is it better to wait to organize everyone and launch an attack with more punch" later? There is no one right answer, the correct response depends on the specific situation.
@@stewartmillen7708 there is a great book (and easy read about that battle) called "A Southern Yarn". Basically had Lee not been incapacitated and been able to go on the offensive there what could have happened. The AOTP was split all over the place. I recommend anyone to check it out.
@@marinewillis1202 Sounds interesting, and I was aware of the situation--Lee had held onto the river at Ox Ford, but ceded ground past the river on both flanks, with his army behind strong entrenchments. This meant that Lee could strip forces from one flank and make use of interior lines to reinforce the other to attack, while Grant's forces would have had to cross the North Anna twice to respond. It took about a day for Grant to realize he had stepped into a potential trap. However, even if Lee hadn't been sick, I have my doubts about the ability of the Army of Northern Virginia in offensive action. There had been too many losses in both raw manpower and commanders at every level. A lot of Confederate units had been really beat up, particularly in Ewell's corps. at Spotsylvania--Johnson's division had lost both their commander and there were only enough survivors to form a single understrength brigade. Maybe if Lee had been able to lure Grant into a similar situation at the Wilderness, when his army was as fresh as it was going to get, such an offensive might have worked. But increasingly Confederate units were having problems coordinating and staging attacks (Jericho Mills, Bethesda Church, and the first day at Cold Harbor).
Stonewall was the best in the business. If he were in charge, the south would have easily won the war. Only a couple of weeks , at most. When the Confederates didn't immediately march on Washington after Fitst Bull Run, he was "very disappointed". P.S. Stonewall used to fall asleep in church, and sometimes he would fall asleep on his horse, when they were on the march.
I don't know how I feel about the assessment for one - probably forever unknowable - reason: how much of Hill's eventual successes were because of what he learned from Stonewall. Speed and tactics for fighting a numerically superior army were obviously Stonewall's legacy and Stonewall's failures of aggression during the 7 Days, communication silence throughout his career, and other issues big and small were certainly observable to fellow officers. It seems that Hill used Stonewall's strengths and improved on the weaknesses but that's also true in any walk. Remember new tactics and strategies had to be invented because of the development of weaponry. Balancing greatness of the student and teacher in this way is not as clear cut.
Jackson’s brilliance far overshadowed any flaws he might have had, which flaws you magnified substantially. I’ve never in my life heard anyone be so critical of Jackson’s actions at Chancellorsville. And you don’t give a lot of weight to the Lee-Jackson dynamic. I enjoy your site, but on this question, I’m dissenting.
Jackson got extraordinarily lucky at Chancellorsville. His "sneaky" flank attack was easily spotted, and Howard was ordered to prepare for Jackson's attack. Howard ignored the order. Then Howard's pickets began reporting enemy movement, and Howard still refused to prepare for the imminent attack. If Howard had taken precautions, Jackson would have had brutal fighting until darkness fell instead of routing the XI Corps.
@@SkylersRants Oh, you're right, there's a big "if" there. But what it demonstrates is that Jackson's attack wasn't some piece of glorious genius. His movement, which was supposed to be stealthy, was not. He got lucky.
Thank you for your research. Jackson is always held up as invisible but he was either very bold & aggressive or stationary & ineffective. Confederate supporters always say ”what if Stonewall was at Gettysburg” I say that all depends on whether he was having a good day or a bad day. One thing missing from this excellent presentation is just how invisible AP Hill is on July 2nd & 3rd at Gettysburg. Longstreet had operational control of 2 of his divisions for the final attack.
You nailed it. I believe this channel did a biography of Hill and if I recall correctly his prostate problem was caused by an STD and the recurring symptoms could be debilitating.
This is a thorough comparison. An interesting topic as well. Any slight study of the campaigns will show Jackson's mis management of battles and campaigns. We here all know the 7 days, kernstown and cedar mountain could be thrown in there. However, what studies i know of hill point out errors in corps command also. I would excuse all but Longstreet and lee at Gettysburg, due to newness in position. You pointed out the mine run campaign, hill created issues in a few actions there. Also, i believe at north anna during the overland campaign. It might have been before they got there but it was between Spotsylvania and there. While i wont entertain who was better, i will say that hill did not have the effect that jackson did on the union generals or cabinent. It was said his name was worth 2 divisions i believe. Something to that effect. An interesting topic for sure, one that will definitely bring about debate! Great job Dr!
These are really interesting, please do more! Ideas Hardee vs Polk Forrest vs Sheridan Early vs Johnston Or compare generals from different wars John Mosby vs Francis Marion Jackson vs Patton McClellan vs Pershing Lee vs Washington F Lee vs Stuart
I wish you would say roughly what size of men these " Brgades, Divisions, and Corps " were Ive heard so many differing variations, so many times, it gets confusing.
I think you are spot on. I've come to the conclusion that Jackson was over rated, however; it's imposable to argue the legacy of a dead martyr. People only believe the myths surrounding the legend...
Whole Jackson did have some great qualities,ive always thought he was blown out of proportion. Anyone interested in reading a completely biased book about Jackson should check out the biography written about him by,i think the mans name wasGFR Henderson. I have the book and have never seen anyone brag someone up like that before. That book is a must have for all tou Jacksonites.
Stonewall has never been one of my favorites so admittedly I'm probably biased. I absolutely agree with your arguments. I fail to see how anyone could disagree with you. The one thing I don't understand & haven't for a long time is how the apotheosis of Jackson took place. Probably because I am not a native southerner I find the worship of Jackson odd. Also why does Hill not get the attention he deserves. Very good video. I really enjoyed it.
Kind of hard to take that opinion, as Jackson’s line ended up being the key to the afternoon and the victory. Jackson set his troops up strategically, and Beauregard reinforced his position, and used it as the fulcrum for the rest of the attacks.
Couldn’t agree more with your conclusion. Hill was grossly underrated, then and today. Love to see you compare Jubal Early, Richard Anderson and John Gordon.
Should do one on Maxcy Gregg and James Archer, a Comparison between those 2 would be emaculate. Some of the Hardest Fighters in Hills Division aside from Pender. ( Obviously Pender was Great )
Thank you for an interesting take. There is one issue I have - have you possibly made a category mistake? You talk about division vs corps command. There is another category - small army independent command. Jackson appears to have made his greatest impact in this area. He was able to act independently and effectively. Relatively few Civil War generals could do this. I will give Burnside as an example. He was a failure at major army command. However, from 1861 till early 1864 he was one of the few Union commanders able to function with a small independent army. North Carolina in the early war. Relatively capable as a corps commander. Even the Knoxville campaign showed his ability to get an army somewhere and then to fight. I wonder if Grant should have given him command of the Valley or Petersburg portions of the 1864 campaign. He could not have done worse and could have done much better. As for his reputation with the soldiers - he maintained the loyalty of the IX Corps from 1861 on. That is an important factor on its own.
how about federal cavalry commanders- Buford vs Custer-the long serving regular and the fresh out of west point revolutionary. both brigadiers at gettysburg both fighting very differnet battles. one to hold the early ground, one on the 3rd day ignoring his orders and beating stuart.
Jackson is one of the most overestimated commanding generals in all military history. He conducted an outstanding Valley campaign but then completely failed Lee during the Seven Days' Battles. In his remaining campaigns, he displayed rock- solid competence, but hardly brilliance. His flank attack at Chancellorsville succeeded primarily due to surprise but ground to a halt when it encountered organized resistance. The primary reason for this is that Jackson was a religious fanatic- and not altogether sane. His own wife said that he refused to mail letters on Sundays or even mail them so that they encumbered the Confederate mail system on Sundays. He once said that he never ate pepper with his food because it made his left leg weak. This extremism filtered right through to his command of his troops. He made great efforts to give his troops rest on Sundays and made up for missed Sundays with another day of the week. After the AotP had been repulsed at Fredericksburg, Jackson suggested a night assault. To distinguish between Union and Confederate forces at night, Jackson suggested- in the dead of winter- that the attacking Confederates strip completely naked. With this in mind, it takes little imagination to see why Lee ensured that Longstreet had one days' seniority over Jackson when the two were promoted to Lieutenant General in October of 1862. Lastly, he was an overly secretive commanding court martial prone general who was excessively intolerant of what he perceived as errors on the part of his subordinates. A solid case can be made that Jackson's historical reputation stems from the fact that he was killed in action (by friendly fire and not enemy action) in one of the most startling (but indecisive) victories of the Civil War. That this took place just prior to the imagined decline of Confederate fortunes (they were losing the war in May of 1863) can only add to his luster. Hill was largely MIA on 2 and 3 July at Gettysburg (possibly because of his venereal disease) and had neither flashes of brilliance nor actions of abject failure afterwards.
Wow, that's some daring stuff! The analysis is fair and accurate - as we knew it would be - but I've never heard a comparison like that and the conclusion was stunning! I'd love to see a comparison of William T. Sherman and George H. Thomas!
Stonewalls 'Foot Calvary' says it all, in a lot of ways. Think the 'Truscott Trot' yrs later. Those guys really knew what it took at times in need. Good post. Rather surprising that Hill was a bit better.
I agree with your assessment. Jackson’s high water point was the Valley Campaign. Was his success in that situation his brilliance or just incompetence on the Union side?
I agree with your assessment the way you put it. When Jackson and Hill were corps and division commanders respectively, there were times where Hill carried a lot of the weight. As for Chancellorsville, Rhodes I learned was a brigade commander and didn't command a division until Gettysburg. As for Gettysburg and the Bristoe Campaign, Hill was new to corps command so people shouldn't be hard on him for his mistakes. Once he completely transitioned he did better. Hill truly was a warrior. As for the more competent fighting men among the Union and Confederate commanders, if today's generation of military leaders studied their campaigns and fighting styles, it would do them a lot of good.
@@tasmanianwalrus583 I was watching a video about the first day of Gettysburg and a historian there said the battle was Rhode:s debut as a division commander though I remember Rhodes being labeled a division commander at Chancellorsville in God's and Generals so I stand corrected. What I said before was what I got from another RUclips video.
A very brave endeavor on your part to take this on, considering the passionate fans of either general. 😊 I loved the video, and I'm going to agree with you. An idea for the next one: Grant vs. Sherman. Great job, Sir.
Hill is like hood, damn good division commanders. Hill saves the day at Antietam, and has his ups and downs as a corp com. Gettysburg performance is baffling ( from Lee down tbh). Jackson has the valley and Chancellorsville but overall I agree with your video, great job!
@@DutchUnion Oh, really? How many instances can you show me of Jackson defending where he didn't either lose more men than he should (Fredericksburg) or barely held out against piecemeal attacks (2nd Bull Run, Antietam). This was observed at the time, and the natural question of 'why didn't you entrench?" was asked. A. P. Hill served under Jackson, and two examples of him being slipshod on the derfensive are Fredericksburg (where his line had a hole in it) and the first night a the Wilderness (where he did not allow his subordinate commanders to adjust/fortify their positions for the Union attack they knew was coming the next day).
1864 Jackson if alive would have been the logical choice to defend Atlanta instead of Hood. Hill was never considered by Lee for that command. Jackson and Stuart confounded the Potomac commanders. Hill's fame is Antietam. Jackson just scared Stanton when on loose.
@@patrickrooney971 No, Atlanta had to be defended. Grant, read the map the railroad from Richmond to Memphis ran through Atlanta. Taking Atlanta doomed Richmond. A valley campaign,which happened under Early, Just pulled scattered units together and Wallace stopped the advance at Monocacy. Jackson at Atlanta would have given Sherman fits. Hood was not up to the task.
First, this was a spot-on assessment. Jackson was idealized by the South, first for his stand at 1st Manassas / 1st Bull Run, and then for his death following his exceptional maneuvering at Chancellorsville. However, a dispassionate comparison to Hill shows that while he was undoubtedly competent, he was far from perfect and not even the best Corp commander on-hand. It was nice to see it laid out as you have, with receipts, as it were. :-) As for future head-to-heads... What about Grant vs Meade? Or maybe Thomas vs Sherman?
Thomas vs. Sherman is my vote....I think it would be about as controversial as this video, because when you look at the facts, Sherman doesn't come out of that comparison looking very good.
@@aaronfleming9426 Thomas was exceedingly fortunate that Hood elected to remain in the area of Nashville. Had Hood left the area and begun making his way northwards, Thomas would have been relieved of his command- and for good reason. While weather was a factor, Thomas utterly failed to consider the fact that Hood's army had been repeatedly defeated and needed to be engaged and finished off. Instead, he insisted on mounting his cavalry, when his infantry forces- a large proportion of whom were veterans- were well capable of dealing with Hood's demoralized forces. This is almost exactly what happened, since Thomas' cavalry played little part in the Union victory at Nashville. Lastly, he consciously deceived Grant, by telling him that he would move when he had no intention of doing so. Thomas was a champion at defense but had no business as an army commander.
@@manilajohn0182That's the sort of nonsense that Sherman and Grant would have us believe, but if you think Thomas "utterly failed to consider" something, you don't know that man you're talking about. Thomas was one of the most thorough and far-thinking generals in either army, which is why - quite unlike Sherman and Grant - he doesn't have any colossal blunders on his record. Hood wasn't going anywhere, and if he had tried we have no reason to think he wouldn't have been detected and that Thomas wouldn't have moved to counter him. Thomas did have some veterans, but he also had a lot of green troops, and the whole force had been pulled together from across a massive region. Considering the weather, and the fact that Hood was in no shape to move - let alone attempt a crossing of the Tennessee River - Thomas was exactly right to take his time and do a thorough job at a low cost. The most outrageous thing about Grant's meddling with Thomas is that Grant, having been disgusted and disheartened by Halleck's micromanaging earlier in the war, should have known better. He didn't treat any other commander the way he treated Thomas, and the most valid explanation is simply that Grant was jealous. It is a sad stain on his record. Grant overlooked all sorts of flops and failures from Sherman, a general with a combat record as putrid as Thomas' was stellar. It's also worth noting that Thomas was an army commander early in the war as well. It was a small army to be sure, but his victory at Mill Springs was strategically significant, politically significant, and one of the most decisive actions of the war...and it occurred while Sherman was having a nervous breakdown because he thought he needed another 60,000 men to safeguard Kentucky. When Thomas is in command, he prepares thoroughly and then absolutely crushes his enemy.
@@aaronfleming9426 That's simply not true, and on every count. There was nothing locking Hood in place and preventing him from marching away at any time, and you can't state anything which would have forced him to remain there. This is what Grant repeatedly attempted to make clear to Thomas- that Hood's sheer stupidity in seeking battle with a demoralized and exhausted army was presenting Thomas with a golden opportunity that he risked letting slip away. Instead of acting promptly, Thomas did the same thing which he did throughout his career; he waited until he was completely ready. In doing that, he demonstrated that he lacked a proper appreciation for the factor of time. If Thomas had properly considered the true state of Hood's army, he would have at once appreciated the fact that Thomas' difficulties were a proverbial drop in the ocean compared to those of Hood. As long as Hood remained where he was, Thomas didn't need cavalry to pulverize Hood; all that he needed to do was to engage an army demoralized by defeat after defeat and expecting impending defeat. If, on the other hand, Hood had not repeatedly detached forces and had instead marched away, Thomas would have been placed in the position of attempting to bring him to battle. With poorly mounted cavalry up against Forrest, Thomas' chances of bringing Hood to battle would have been poor at best. Not that he would have had the opportunity to pursue Hood. For repeatedly delaying in engaging Hood and for deceiving Grant by informing him that he would move at once (while not doing so), Thomas would have been immediately relieved of his command. The actual historical result confirms exactly what I said. Thomas did crush Hood because Hood waited around to be crushed- and Thomas' cavalry played no more than an ordinary role in the victory. Neither Grant nor Sherman ever made "colossal blunders". Their biggest error was not expecting a Confederate attack at Shiloh, and Shiloh proved to be a Union victory. They simply made mistakes- like most generals do, including Thomas. Mill Springs was a small affair by any standard. The only thing significant about it was that it was the first real Union victory of the war. It had no significant political or strategic results whatsoever. Grant's taking of Fort's Henry and Donelson eclipsed Mill Springs immediately- and the capture of those forts were eclipsed soon enough as well.
@@manilajohn0182I think you're wrong on every count. The same ice storm that kept Thomas in place kept Hood in place. Hood's exhaustion kept him in place. Hood's lack of options kept him in place. In the end, Thomas judged that Hood would stay in place, and the ensuing events vindicate Thomas. What Thomas understood was that thorough preparation led to decisive results. As another example, at Chattanooga Grant continually pushed to attack prematurely. Thomas continually talked him out of premature assaults and into skillful maneuvering. When the moment finally did come, Thomas' corps - which appreciated his care with their lives, by the way - swept over Missionary Ridge in one of the most startlingly successful attacks of the war (while Sherman failed to make progress, of course). Grant and Sherman blundered badly at Shiloh. Yes, they rallied and won. They also came a whisker away from losing the war. You want to ignore that, I'm sure, though you love to criticize Thomas because what *might* have happened if he *had* misjudged at Nashville, which he didn't. Grant also has the second assault at Vicksburg on his record, and of course Cold Harbor. Sherman had Kennesaw Mountain - undertaken for no discernable reason and against Thomas' advice. Sherman himself admitted that at Snake Creek Gap he missed "a once in a career opportunity" to destroy Johnston. Why? Because he ignored Thomas' advice and sent McPherson - his and Grant's pet - to do a job that Thomas was well prepared to do. McPherson choked. That's what happens when you play favorites. Sherman took so long to capture Atlanta that Lincoln despaired of winning re-election. When he did capture it, he took his foot of Hood's neck and let him run away. You want to denigrate Thomas for taking a couple of extra days to destroy Hood and totally ignore the fact that Hood wouldn't have been at Nashville if Sherman had finished him at Jonesboro like he should have. Come on, man. Mill Springs was a small affair by later standards, but it was comparable to several early battles like Wilson's Creek and larger than some morale-affecting battles like Balls Bluff. The fact that it was the first real Union victory of the war was exactly what gave it political significance; strategically it unhinged the Confederate defense of eastern Kentucky. And the two most salient features are this: though the scale was small, Thomas was in command; the utter destruction of the enemy army was unique for a field battle in the Civil War. Who cares if it was eclipsed by the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson a couple of weeks later? Thomas had 4,000 men. Grant had 20,000 and a fleet of ironclad gunboats. They both did great work with what they had (Grant's battle was a little shakier, but he won in the end). And as you rightly note, other battles would soon eclipse both of those accomplishments. The end result of the two general's excellent work was to unhinge both ends of the line in Kentucky and force the Confederate army all the way back to Corinth. Sorry man, I like Grant as much as the next guy, but he had a serious blind spot in regards to Thomas.
Stonewall is one of those people that we know through history that maybe without we don't know through fact because I didn't know that he performed so Portland and a lot of his engagements
Hill made some really dumb attacks during the 7 Days, and Jackson's incompetence can be explained by unfamiliarity with the terrain and sheer exhaustion. Hill was utterly useless as a corps commander; most historians aren't even sure where he was on Day 2 and 3 at Gettysburg. He was a good division and brigade commander; Jackson was competent at all his levels of command. Lee didn't call Ol' Jack his "right arm" for nothing.
A good survey. Jackson had some truly outstanding days as a commander. Also some pathetic. A correction. Chancellorsville was a bigger battle than Gettysburg. More troops engaged.
Jackson was a very mixed bag. He whooped the yanks on some occasions. But froze and behaved passively when on defense. I didn't realize how overrated he was until I learned a lot more about the war. A great commander by all means. But not God tier as many think. I think Longstreet was better.
Kernstown was not a corps. Helps if you are consistent in your analysis. Also dealing with relatively raw troops The Light division was very experienced by peninsula campaign I am not a fan of Jackson but his troope bore the brunt of two full corps at Antietam. Hill did well by marching quickly but he was also facing the worst corps commander on the union side If Franklin committed more than one division during Frederiskburg the result may have been very different. Chancelersville Jackson was magnificent. If anyone has been to the wilderness they would understand. This assessment is weak
This assessment is a mile wide and an inch deep and it doesn’t really hold water. AP Hill was an exceptional Division Commander, but he was always out of his depth as a Corps Commander. And he got that position because there was really nobody else. For Jackson this ignores, First Bull Run, the overall strategic objective of the valley campaign the fact that Jackson was sick and exhausted at Seven Days, the brilliant victory at Harper’s Ferry among others. For AP Hill it ignores his performance at Gettysburg which played a major part in dooming that campaign and numerous other instances where Lee had to babysit him. And doesn’t even mention AP Hill giving the order to murder surrendered African American troops at Petersburg. The Valley Campaign was Jackson’s first opportunity at independent command. Kernstown was literally the earliest engagement. The overall strategic objective for Jackson was to occupy Federal forces and keep those forces from uniting or reinforcing with McClellan coming up the peninsula. Jackson and his forced marches were the perfect tool to achieve that because being outnumbered, Jackson had no choice but to bounce his force around to strike as often as possible to make up for the lack of numbers, this was also an ingenious use of interior lines. Overall the Valley Campaign can only be looked as a resounding success in light of the fact that it achieved its overall objective. There might have been a bad engagement or two but you have to look at overall result. Even more egregious is the omission of Harper’s Ferry, which took place immediately before Antietam and explains why Jackson didn’t have all of his forces in place for that battle. At Harper’s Ferry Jackson struck and took nearly 13,000 Union prisoners, about the same number in small arms and 50 pieces of artillery. Totally incompetent right? What really hampers the credibility of this piece is that it repeats the bad history of Harry Heth’s Division going to Gettysburg for “supplies”. This myth has been confirmed as bad history for quite some time. Hill’s lack of control on 1 July 1863 resulted in exactly what Lee did not want, which was general engagement before the Army was consolidated. Hill may been sick with the chronic gonorrhea that he acquire as a Cadet that day but who knows. What we do know is on that day he didn’t have positive control over his Corps. Thanks for the video.
@@HistoryGoneWilder Dr. Wilder: Please consider Sherman against Thomas. Thomas never lost a battle. Sheman went on to command the entire U.S. Army. Respectfully, W.S.
I agree with your assessment. Never had a high opinion of Jackson in many ways because of his petty behavior towards Hill. For someone who fought the entire conflict Hill's record is much more impressive. Thanks!
Let's leave out every battle that made Jackson famous and then pretend Powell Hill was better. Come on man. First Manassas, First Winchester, Front Royal, on and on. "Stonewall is a hard road to travel," says the song, because the people of the time knew that Jackson had struck fear into the heart of Lincoln like nobody else had. Can you imagine the Gentle Giant singing that "Uncle Remus would put me to bed with a picture of A.P. Hill above my head?" Stonewall will be remembered in a 1000 years alongside Julius Caesar.
The video did leave out a few of Jackson's victories. It also left out some of his other flops, like the Romney campaign, Cedar Mountain, and Brawner's Farm.
13,000 casualties at Chancellorsville may have had something to do with that. And the next battle after Jackson died was Gettysburg, where the Army of the Potomac finally had a competent commander, and got to fight on the defensive for the first time since Malvern Hill. With some 28,000 casualties added to the 13k at Chancellorsville, it's no wonder the ANV wasn't the same again...whether or not Jackson had died.
Hill was not a better corps commander than Jackson. Jackson was very good in independent or semi-independent operations such as Chancellorsville and The Valley campaign. Jackson was assaulted heavily at Antietam and held. His line was broken at Fredericksburg because the ground there (and I have been there) is relatively flat and not as easily defended as Marye's Heights( something this narrator left out). A.P. Hill was one of the best division commanders of the war, but as a corps commander, he was a disappointment. His performance at Gettysburg is criticized for bringing on an unwanted engagement before the army was fully concentrated. Hill was also an impetuous and hasty commander who attacked without orders, causing many men to die needlessly, like at Mechanicsburg and Bristoe Station. He also had a haphazard defensive line at The Wilderness, which caused his troops to break and the army nearly broken until Longstreet arrived to counter attack. This along with his STD, which caused him to be out sick constantly. I simply do not agree that Hill was a better corps commander than Jackson. It's kind of like a great defensive coordinator in football who becomes a head coach and then fails. Hill was very much like that progression.
Both were good at their jobs, but who could say which one comes out on top. I don’t think either would’ve been successful in Lee’s position however, particularly Jackson, with his aggressive style and strange personality, might’ve ended up as another John Bell Hood. Perhaps Hill’s judgement was a bit better, so giving him the nod is plausible.
@@aaronfleming9426 He was a religious fanatic who drove his men mercilessly, and was very pugnacious. That type of fighting means lots of casualties that the Confederacy couldn’t afford. I think he was good as a subordinate to someone who knew how, and when to utilize his skills, like Lee.
I am disappointed in this video, not as a result of your conclusion, but in the presentation. In your previous comparison videos there was a clear effort to portray the strengths and failings of both officers, but here it comes across as Jackson’s actions being shown in the most critical light possible while showing Hill’s in the most charitable. I would have sooner seen AP Hill compared to Richard Ewell, as both were capable division commanders under Jackson, who were tasked with corps command following his death. I admit my bias is towards Jackson, and I still greatly respect your knowledge and insight. In this, however, the argument came across very slanted. This made it seem like the conclusion shaped the narrative of the information, rather than the information shaping the narrative of the conclusion.
I love A.P. Hill but this is not even close. Stonewall was the best General the war produced and one of the best in history. Kernstown was early and he didn’t perform well during the 7 Days, but was flawless otherwise. Again, I love Hill but he struggled at Gettysburg and then Bristol. As you note he left a gap at Fredericksburg that Jackson patched with Early. Hill was incredible at Antietam and Second Manassas…among others. I believe Stonewall was the best and Hill was third. I think John Bell Hood was second until he went West. I think Hood should’ve been kept as a Division Commander, but it’s all hindsight. It’s impossible to compare really because they had different roles in every battle.
the biggest detriment to Hill was his repeated bouts with illness. I agree, he was a better corps commander than Jackson because he saw the overall battlefield better outside of Bristoe, while Jackson would get to focused in on one spot at the wrong time. Also, Jackson's Valley campaign was against political hacks for Union generals in high command which had it been a Hooker, Meade, or Reynolds he might well have been defeated. The Union forces in the Valley eventually made up what became a large part of the XI and XII Corps who after some growing pains became one of the best Corps after they were merged together under Hooker around the Chattanooga campaign. Hill even while ill managed to get the most out his men and like the video said always seemed to have his men at the right spot. Had he not been killed, I don't think Five Forks goes as bad as it did, and it is possible he could have convinced Lee of how untenable his position was and they could have left a day or two earlier. If they could have gotten even half that force to North Carolina, they could have put up a pretty good fight, though in the end. They would have just bought themselve a few months.
Stonewall Jackson had the Jimi Hendrix effect. They died at the height of their powers thus their legend grew
Exactly so. As the cynical talent manager observes: “It’s sad, but a great career move.”
The difference is that Hendrix did things on a guitar that had never been done before. He influenced many other guitarists and created new sounds and methods of playing. Jackson didn't really do anything new, he was "just" a competent commander with a great deal of faith and courage.
i love Stonewall but i’m more of a Longstreet fan…. like his idea at Gettysburg made more since in my opinion than Lees plan
@@bludfyrehis ability to lead tactical marches and find the enemy flank, and push his troops beyond normal infantry capability is what he brought to the table that was novel, other commanders haven't duplicated it
@@robertsmith6188you should visit the part of Pennsylvania where Jackson thought to march to burn and cripple the Union. It's swamps and mountains, with robust canal connecting it to Lake Erie and Buffalo. Pretty sure any army that marched into that area wouldn't march back out again. Confederates also didn't have the logistics to actually manage an offensive war, as was seen in the battle of Gettysburg.
I have to vote for Jackson as superior in both boldness and control of a corp, A.P. Hill never had that vision but was very competent.
I have skin in this game. My great great grandfather was the brother of Jackson's chief engineer. Kieth Boswell, who died on the field when Jackson was shot. Great grandpa was in the va cavalry and survived, I knew his son well as he lived to 100 in Burbank and told stories of his father in the war. Great video as always -
Thank you for your comment. I too believe in Jackson. I really feel it's unfair to compare Jackson and Hill AFTER Jackson was killed. Compare same for same. Who knows Jackson may have saved the Confederacy and become president! LOL, I've stood at Jacksons grave and the Cracker Box counsel on the Chancellorsville battlefield. Very moving both places.
I think Jackson was way better than Hill also and I do not think this video does a good job of portraying Jackson.
WOW! I tip my hat to your family!
Well, the assessment of both men was sound. Hill tries his best as Corps commander, but Jackson was a great tactician especially in his Valley campaign. This was something. Impressive.
Stonewall at Gettysburg. A different battle!
Yes but A.P. Hill was obviously overwhelmed to lead a Corps. He proved determination, aggresion and presence on the battlefield of 1862/63 with his division but lacked all this qualities in commanding a third of the AoNV succesfully. This became already clear at Gettysburg when Lee and Longstreet bypassed Hill and all three days. In the Crisis of the Second Day at the Wilderness in 1864 Lee had to rode to the front to rally Hills Troops in person and also for the rest of the war Hill was ill very often or did just the defensive minimum he was required. I totally agree with Gary Gallaghers verdict that Hills promotion as a Corps Commander was one step about his level of competence but Hill was popular with the troops and Lee lacked a adequate replacement. He could replsce Ewell with Early but had no other seasoned and able division commander at hand to replace Hill
Jackson was the most feared general in the south. Lee called hill 'his right arm"
My best friend always argued that A.P. Hill was Lee's most under-rated general. I so wish he was still here so I could share this with him. 💔
He may be right!
Interesting how the Stonewall Jackson narrative took hold, so most remember the legend best, but lost in all that is that Hill was actually the superior General. Excellent work as always.
Thank you. Jackson's legend makes people think he is better.
Sometimes dying tragically young propels a man's legend beyond his true capacity.
I have one for you. What about Lee against Longstreet? Lee was obsessed with Virginia and Longstreet thought about the confederacy as a whole.
Right
Like comparing apples and oranges
@@marksandor2830 It is a difficult comparison, isn't it.
Every move Longstreet made was dictated by Lee
In that regard, Longstreet wins, it was better to think about the entire Confederacy than about just one state.
Remember that both Jackson and Lee had A. P. Hill on their minds as they passed. Hill was in their last words.
Up came Hill!
Drove by Ft AP Hill today. All the signs with his name have either been removed or are covered over now. Pretty sad.
Yeah names and statues offend people these days. truly sad.
Sad, they took down the confederate monument in bowling green a couple of years ago, now this. Let’s just erase the civil war.
Sad.
That makes me SICK!!! There is a faction in the U.S. that wants to WIPE OUT HISTORY! I HATE IT!!! They have renamed many of the schools, too, like the one named for JEB Stuart. WELL...guess what? I grew up in a small south GA town and our high school mascot is the REBEL(as in Confederate Rebels)...colors and all!
Jackson was erratic but had flashes of brilliance as an independent commander that Hill did not. The Valley campaign’s use of speed and deception to concentrate superior local numbers and defeat an outnumbering enemy in detail was a unique achievement that no one else ever matched. My take is that the best Civil War generals were the ones who were somewhat more cautious and defensive because they fully understood the changes the rifle brought to the field while still being capable of effective offensive leadership; Sherman, Thomas and Meade with the Union, Longstreet and DH Hill with the Confederacy.
D.H. Hill would be a good breakdown.
Should probably have said unique in the Civil War. Napoleon did it in 1796 in Italy then again in 1814. Other similar comparables like Paul Von Lettow Vorbeck or the Marquess of Montrose.
Robert Bruce going way back
The Valley campaign was masterful, but Jackson was literally on his home turf. His intimate knowledge of the geography and the road network was an invaluable advantage against enemy forces maneuvering on unfamiliar ground.
You left out Patrick Cleburne,,, not just me saying that but Shelby Foote as well.
General A.P. Hill has always been my favorite commander.
Hill was one of the best corp commanders in both armies north or south. To me he was better than Jackson or Longstreet
I like Hill and Jubal Early.
He has really grown on me, too, after watching all of the videos about him.
I have always felt that AP Hill deserves way more credit
Mine too
I have always thought Jackson drove his troops too hard in the Valley, but his inaction during the Seven Days battles was inexcusable. That tore it with me. Jackson was held as a hero because of his death.
Oh boy what a treat!! We haven’t had one of these in a while!!
I would put my best on Hill. In fact, if I recall correctly both Jackson and Lee called for Hill on their death beds.
First I ever heard this. It's been observed that as a corps commander, Hill was often on the sick list. It's like the fire went out of him, or so I've heard. When Jackson died, Lee said "I know not how to replace him". If I'm not mistaken, Jackson's valley campaign is considered a masterpiece, still studied at military schools around the world. However, I consider his treatment of Garnett and his habit of shooting his own soldiers unforgivable.
From the Hill video on this channel, Hill was in constant groin pain with a prostrate issue. He would have high fevers and have to go to the battles in an ambulance. Why not call Centra-Care? Puts a different perspective on his just giving up.
Stonewall is lionized. There are movies about him. Whenever I suck on a lemon, I am thinking, this is what Stonewall would be doing.
This video is such an honor to my ancestor, and I can't thank you enough!! You gave General Hill the credit that he truly deserves!
My ancestor Augusta Evans wrote of her personal admiration for and confidence and trust in Hill in her letters.
I salute General Hill. And all those men who gave their all to either side.. I don't think we can come close to filling their shoes , or boots! :)
You hail from Culpeper? Or have family ties there, I guess?
None were perfect, but many were great. Jackson and Hill had a tempestuous relationship, not always because of ego, but personalities. Jackson didn't communicate well, and Hill expected to be informed promptly. Great video!
Thank you so much!
Why is crazy Stonewall Jackson held up as some brilliant military mind? The guy was 4 tacos short of a combo meal and acted like a 16 year old girl when angry.
I agree wholeheartedly, I've thought Jackson was vastly over rated once I began to actually look at his career. However I have thought Lee, while an excellent tactician, was poor at strategic thinking and actually made the South's chances worse. The South's best and only chance was to drag out the war until the North got tired of it. Every battle where the casualties were even close were an actual defeat for the South.
James-Lee was not really a Confederate. He went South for Virginia and he fought for Virginia.
@@johnfleet235 I don't see the relevance to my comment. I said nothing about his alliance to the cause I merely made a point about his inability to grasp the overall necessity of the conduct of the war. Jefferson Davis had the same blind spot. In the Atlanta campaign Johnson led Sherman a merry chase for months so he was replaced with Hood, a more aggressive commander. We all know how that worked out.
Why does it matter if Lee was in it for Virginia or for the Confederacy as a whole, it wouldn't have changed his behavior either way.
@@jamesnelson1968 Perhaps what johnfleet means is that Lee's devotion to Virginia - not the Confederacy as a whole - crippled his capacity for strategic thinking. That does make some sense.
Johnston's campaign against Sherman was exactly what the rebels ought to have been doing all along. But Lee loved the blood baths.
@@aaronfleming9426 perhaps it is what he meant, but not being psychic, I can olny go by what was written. Since Lee's army was know as the Army of Northern Virginia, maybe Lee already thought of the army as Virginia's defense. At any rate Virginia needed a different strategic as much as the entire Confederacy. Whether he was think provincially or not, Lee's actions were a mistake. The war only lasted as long as it did because he faced such poor generalship on the Union side. A mediocrity like Mead beat him at Gettysburg. No matter what had happened on he third day the Confederate force were out of gas logistically and would have had to retreat anyway.
@@jamesnelson1968 Oh, I think it's pretty clear that he thought provincially. I think the other main reason the war lasted so long is that the U.S. had to form an army from scratch and then use that absolutely green army to conquer an enormous swathe of land. The poor generalship certainly didn't help.
TJ and Master Robert both called for Hill on their deathbed, which says the most I think. The biggest "what if" for me is if Jackson had been present at Gettysburg, and able to develop the Union defeat on day one faster and farther including a night attack "if practicable."
As far as the "legend of Stonewall" goes, once Lee calls you his Right Arm you would have to commit a serious offense or blunder to be labeled as a mediocre general. On that note I suppose anyone arguing against TJ is arguing against Lee also, which I am certainly not prepared to do.
Neither one of them wanted to live through the loss of the war.
Fair, and correct according to GGGF who was member of light division entire war except 3 months wounded and four months captured. He wrote Jackson, showed promise, Hill worked beyond exhaustion.
I had never really thought about it but I believe your assessment is correct all things given.
While Jackson was alive Lee never lost a battle, after he died Lee could only at best get a stalemate and eventually lost
Lee lost at Antietam, my friend. After the battle, Lee ended his campaign and withdrew back to Virginia.
@@manilajohn0182 Antietam was a tactical draw. But a strategic victory for the North.
@@michaelbarnett2527 Antietam was no draw. Lee's plan of campaign was ruined, he lost a large number of men, and he was forced to abandon the battlefield and withdraw back to Virginia.
Antietam was a tactical victory for the Union, but a barren one- because McClellan refused to take advantage of it and pursue Lee.
I think you just threw a rock at a hornet's nest. But I, for one, agree with you. Jackson's failures during the Seven Days are inexcusable.
Given Jacksons speed of movements during the Valley campaign, why do you think he was so slow during the Seven days?
@@stevewixom9311 My guess is that fatigue or PTSD had something to do with it. But, I'n not sure, and anyone can correct me if I'm wrong.
I've read in several places where fatigue was given as a probable reason for Jackson's inaction.
One take away I always think about when studying the Confederate high command is how petty they're squabbles seem to be, especially when looking at the big picture.
@@stevewixom9311 Jackson had just executed a rapid transfer of his whole force across the state and across geographical regions of the state, The Mountain Boys used to the clean, cool weather of the Valley were now thrust into the dense swampy, mosquito infested lowlands southeast of Richmond. Jackson did not have time to study the area and all the routes and approaches to the enemy positions. Never mind the fact that Jackson by all accounts got very little sleep over a period of 2 weeks fighting his way out of the Valley and then moving rapidly per Lees orders to Richmond, Jackson was very dependent on Sleep. When he arrived, he found a haphazard command structure, Lee has not yet even formed a staff capable of transferring orders free of confusion. He had to trust Lee's maps and Lees' aides and Lee's maps were inaccurate and his staff work was grossly inadequate making communication between commands separated by thick forest and swamps a nightmare. If you read any unbiases accounting of the Seven Days battles. Jackson was actually never late; he simply follows his orders to the letter. the Blame therefore must be Lee's who blindly fed the largest command he would have during the war into a piecemeal, Division by Division Blind assault into the Teeth of Prepared Federal Defenses. Lee suffered over 20.000 losses in 7 days of fighting. foreshadowing the terrible and immense cost it would be for the South to have Robert E Lee as its Principal Commander! These men lost in the Seven Days would be desperately needed in the years to come because they could not be replaced. Hill also bares a lot of blame for rushing into Battle totally blind even when the circumstances on the field did not match what his orders stated. Hill was incapable of changing tactics in the mist of Battle. He simply charged headlong directly to the front and whipped the enemy or got whipped himself, and at Mechanicsville, he took a terrible and inglorious whipping, then like a coward with the bodies of Men shrewd all over the field, he tried to Blame Jackson instead of taking responsibility himself.
I agree with you Jackson also get himself in hot water at second Manassas and Fredricksburg. Longstreet saves him at second Manassas by placing artillery on the high ground and firing into the deep cut followed by an attack. AP Hill basically saves Lee at sharpsburg with his late arrival and attack pushing the federals all the way back to the lower bridge. Also Toombs men for holding the bridge for serval hours. Hills attack is so overlooked here.
Didn’t Lee once reprimand Hill, saying something to the effect of: “why didn’t you do as Jackson would have done, and thrown your entire force upon the enemy?”
Perhaps Lee had an opinion on this topic.
Lee just let his anger get the better of him, as Jackson didn't always get 'his whole force' into action.
North Anna.
@@stevevicory9623 More specifically, the Battle of Jericho Mills. But Lee's mood was being affected by his illness at least as much as Hill's supposed failing (Lee would be forced into bed soon). Like I said, Jackson didn't always take the time to get his 'whole force into action either' but threw whatever he had at-hand piecemeal at a foe, just like Hill had done. Sometimes it worked, sometimes not.
It's the age-old question of launching an attack--is it better to 'strike with what you have now?' or "is it better to wait to organize everyone and launch an attack with more punch" later? There is no one right answer, the correct response depends on the specific situation.
@@stewartmillen7708 there is a great book (and easy read about that battle) called "A Southern Yarn". Basically had Lee not been incapacitated and been able to go on the offensive there what could have happened. The AOTP was split all over the place. I recommend anyone to check it out.
@@marinewillis1202 Sounds interesting, and I was aware of the situation--Lee had held onto the river at Ox Ford, but ceded ground past the river on both flanks, with his army behind strong entrenchments. This meant that Lee could strip forces from one flank and make use of interior lines to reinforce the other to attack, while Grant's forces would have had to cross the North Anna twice to respond. It took about a day for Grant to realize he had stepped into a potential trap.
However, even if Lee hadn't been sick, I have my doubts about the ability of the Army of Northern Virginia in offensive action. There had been too many losses in both raw manpower and commanders at every level. A lot of Confederate units had been really beat up, particularly in Ewell's corps. at Spotsylvania--Johnson's division had lost both their commander and there were only enough survivors to form a single understrength brigade.
Maybe if Lee had been able to lure Grant into a similar situation at the Wilderness, when his army was as fresh as it was going to get, such an offensive might have worked. But increasingly Confederate units were having problems coordinating and staging attacks (Jericho Mills, Bethesda Church, and the first day at Cold Harbor).
Stonewall was the best in the business. If he were in charge, the south would have easily won the war. Only a couple of weeks , at most. When the Confederates didn't immediately march on Washington after Fitst Bull Run, he was "very disappointed". P.S. Stonewall used to fall asleep in church, and sometimes he would fall asleep on his horse, when they were on the march.
I don't know how I feel about the assessment for one - probably forever unknowable - reason: how much of Hill's eventual successes were because of what he learned from Stonewall. Speed and tactics for fighting a numerically superior army were obviously Stonewall's legacy and Stonewall's failures of aggression during the 7 Days, communication silence throughout his career, and other issues big and small were certainly observable to fellow officers. It seems that Hill used Stonewall's strengths and improved on the weaknesses but that's also true in any walk. Remember new tactics and strategies had to be invented because of the development of weaponry. Balancing greatness of the student and teacher in this way is not as clear cut.
Hill vs Ewell, they both were promoted at the same time.
Jackson’s brilliance far overshadowed any flaws he might have had, which flaws you magnified substantially. I’ve never in my life heard anyone be so critical of Jackson’s actions at Chancellorsville. And you don’t give a lot of weight to the Lee-Jackson dynamic.
I enjoy your site, but on this question, I’m dissenting.
Jackson got extraordinarily lucky at Chancellorsville. His "sneaky" flank attack was easily spotted, and Howard was ordered to prepare for Jackson's attack. Howard ignored the order. Then Howard's pickets began reporting enemy movement, and Howard still refused to prepare for the imminent attack. If Howard had taken precautions, Jackson would have had brutal fighting until darkness fell instead of routing the XI Corps.
@@aaronfleming9426
As the Spartan said, "If."
@@SkylersRants Oh, you're right, there's a big "if" there. But what it demonstrates is that Jackson's attack wasn't some piece of glorious genius. His movement, which was supposed to be stealthy, was not. He got lucky.
@@aaronfleming9426
And yet, it was.
@@SkylersRantsAs the Spartan said, "Meh."
Thank you for your research. Jackson is always held up as invisible but he was either very bold & aggressive or stationary & ineffective. Confederate supporters always say ”what if Stonewall was at Gettysburg” I say that all depends on whether he was having a good day or a bad day. One thing missing from this excellent presentation is just how invisible AP Hill is on July 2nd & 3rd at Gettysburg. Longstreet had operational control of 2 of his divisions for the final attack.
You nailed it.
I believe this channel did a biography of Hill and if I recall correctly his prostate problem was caused by an STD and the recurring symptoms could be debilitating.
Stonewall would have taken Cemetery and Culp's Hill. Different battle.
To win the 'who was better' contest, you've got to have a cool nickname. 'Little Powell' vs 'Stonewall Jackson'? No comparison. Jackson wins.
This is a thorough comparison. An interesting topic as well. Any slight study of the campaigns will show Jackson's mis management of battles and campaigns. We here all know the 7 days, kernstown and cedar mountain could be thrown in there. However, what studies i know of hill point out errors in corps command also. I would excuse all but Longstreet and lee at Gettysburg, due to newness in position. You pointed out the mine run campaign, hill created issues in a few actions there. Also, i believe at north anna during the overland campaign. It might have been before they got there but it was between Spotsylvania and there. While i wont entertain who was better, i will say that hill did not have the effect that jackson did on the union generals or cabinent. It was said his name was worth 2 divisions i believe. Something to that effect. An interesting topic for sure, one that will definitely bring about debate! Great job Dr!
Thank you so much!
These are really interesting, please do more!
Ideas
Hardee vs Polk
Forrest vs Sheridan
Early vs Johnston
Or compare generals from different wars
John Mosby vs Francis Marion
Jackson vs Patton
McClellan vs Pershing
Lee vs Washington
F Lee vs Stuart
I'm glad you like them. I hope to more in the future and I like the suggestions.
I wish you would say roughly what size of men these " Brgades, Divisions, and Corps " were Ive heard so many differing variations, so many times, it gets confusing.
Fantastic work and love ❤️ your History lessons
Thank you so much!
Have you considered working with the American Battlefield Trust?
I think you are spot on. I've come to the conclusion that Jackson was over rated, however; it's imposable to argue the legacy of a dead martyr. People only believe the myths surrounding the legend...
Not at all, His reputation is well founded like Forrest's
The obvious next step would be a comparison with Longstreet.
Whole Jackson did have some great qualities,ive always thought he was blown out of proportion. Anyone interested in reading a completely biased book about Jackson should check out the biography written about him by,i think the mans name wasGFR Henderson. I have the book and have never seen anyone brag someone up like that before. That book is a must have for all tou Jacksonites.
Stonewall has never been one of my favorites so admittedly I'm probably biased. I absolutely agree with your arguments. I fail to see how anyone could disagree with you. The one thing I don't understand & haven't for a long time is how the apotheosis of Jackson took place. Probably because I am not a native southerner I find the worship of Jackson odd. Also why does Hill not get the attention he deserves. Very good video. I really enjoyed it.
I partially cover that in a video I did right before my Valley Campaign videos. Thank you so much!
@@HistoryGoneWilder I will go back & watch that. Thank you
Makes me wonder if Stonewall was actually he's just standing there like a stone wall
Kind of hard to take that opinion, as Jackson’s line ended up being the key to the afternoon and the victory. Jackson set his troops up strategically, and Beauregard reinforced his position, and used it as the fulcrum for the rest of the attacks.
Couldn’t agree more with your conclusion. Hill was grossly underrated, then and today.
Love to see you compare Jubal Early, Richard Anderson and John Gordon.
@@gaspipe7548 I'm so glad to hear that. Keep watching the channel for great videos.
My three Ancestors fought in the Light Division of which I am very proud of. Your narrative tells why!
Should do one on Maxcy Gregg and James Archer, a Comparison between those 2 would be emaculate. Some of the Hardest Fighters in Hills Division aside from Pender. ( Obviously Pender was Great )
Thank you for an interesting take. There is one issue I have - have you possibly made a category mistake? You talk about division vs corps command. There is another category - small army independent command. Jackson appears to have made his greatest impact in this area. He was able to act independently and effectively. Relatively few Civil War generals could do this.
I will give Burnside as an example. He was a failure at major army command. However, from 1861 till early 1864 he was one of the few Union commanders able to function with a small independent army. North Carolina in the early war. Relatively capable as a corps commander. Even the Knoxville campaign showed his ability to get an army somewhere and then to fight.
I wonder if Grant should have given him command of the Valley or Petersburg portions of the 1864 campaign. He could not have done worse and could have done much better.
As for his reputation with the soldiers - he maintained the loyalty of the IX Corps from 1861 on. That is an important factor on its own.
Interesting observation on Burnside.
how about federal cavalry commanders- Buford vs Custer-the long serving regular and the fresh out of west point revolutionary. both brigadiers at gettysburg both fighting very differnet battles. one to hold the early ground, one on the 3rd day ignoring his orders and beating stuart.
Jackson is one of the most overestimated commanding generals in all military history. He conducted an outstanding Valley campaign but then completely failed Lee during the Seven Days' Battles. In his remaining campaigns, he displayed rock- solid competence, but hardly brilliance. His flank attack at Chancellorsville succeeded primarily due to surprise but ground to a halt when it encountered organized resistance.
The primary reason for this is that Jackson was a religious fanatic- and not altogether sane. His own wife said that he refused to mail letters on Sundays or even mail them so that they encumbered the Confederate mail system on Sundays. He once said that he never ate pepper with his food because it made his left leg weak. This extremism filtered right through to his command of his troops. He made great efforts to give his troops rest on Sundays and made up for missed Sundays with another day of the week. After the AotP had been repulsed at Fredericksburg, Jackson suggested a night assault. To distinguish between Union and Confederate forces at night, Jackson suggested- in the dead of winter- that the attacking Confederates strip completely naked. With this in mind, it takes little imagination to see why Lee ensured that Longstreet had one days' seniority over Jackson when the two were promoted to Lieutenant General in October of 1862. Lastly, he was an overly secretive commanding court martial prone general who was excessively intolerant of what he perceived as errors on the part of his subordinates.
A solid case can be made that Jackson's historical reputation stems from the fact that he was killed in action (by friendly fire and not enemy action) in one of the most startling (but indecisive) victories of the Civil War. That this took place just prior to the imagined decline of Confederate fortunes (they were losing the war in May of 1863) can only add to his luster.
Hill was largely MIA on 2 and 3 July at Gettysburg (possibly because of his venereal disease) and had neither flashes of brilliance nor actions of abject failure afterwards.
Wow, that's some daring stuff! The analysis is fair and accurate - as we knew it would be - but I've never heard a comparison like that and the conclusion was stunning! I'd love to see a comparison of William T. Sherman and George H. Thomas!
Stonewalls 'Foot Calvary' says it all, in a lot of ways. Think the 'Truscott Trot' yrs later. Those guys really knew what it took at times in need. Good post. Rather surprising that Hill was a bit better.
I agree with your assessment.
Jackson’s high water point was the Valley Campaign. Was his success in that situation his brilliance or just incompetence on the Union side?
Also Chancellorville.
I agree with your assessment the way you put it. When Jackson and Hill were corps and division commanders respectively, there were times where Hill carried a lot of the weight. As for Chancellorsville, Rhodes I learned was a brigade commander and didn't command a division until Gettysburg. As for Gettysburg and the Bristoe Campaign, Hill was new to corps command so people shouldn't be hard on him for his mistakes. Once he completely transitioned he did better. Hill truly was a warrior. As for the more competent fighting men among the Union and Confederate commanders, if today's generation of military leaders studied their campaigns and fighting styles, it would do them a lot of good.
Rodes commanded a division at Chancellorsville
@@tasmanianwalrus583 I was watching a video about the first day of Gettysburg and a historian there said the battle was Rhode:s debut as a division commander though I remember Rhodes being labeled a division commander at Chancellorsville in God's and Generals so I stand corrected. What I said before was what I got from another RUclips video.
@@nathanappleby5342 all good
A very brave endeavor on your part to take this on, considering the passionate fans of either general. 😊 I loved the video, and I'm going to agree with you. An idea for the next one: Grant vs. Sherman. Great job, Sir.
Thank you so much!
Hill is like hood, damn good division commanders. Hill saves the day at Antietam, and has his ups and downs as a corp com. Gettysburg performance is baffling ( from Lee down tbh). Jackson has the valley and Chancellorsville but overall I agree with your video, great job!
Thank you so much! I've got more who was better videos and my animation series for Chickamauga starts next tuesday.
Both great!😮
Where do you find the music for these videos?
As someone who feels Jackson is moderately overrated, He is still a far superior Corp commander than Hill, no question
I enjoyed it! It would be great to see a comparison of Nathan Bedford Forrest and Phil Sheridan!
Jackson was better in independent commands, while Hil was better as division and corps command. However, both could be slipshod in defense.
Nope
@@DutchUnion Oh, really?
How many instances can you show me of Jackson defending where he didn't either lose more men than he should (Fredericksburg) or barely held out against piecemeal attacks (2nd Bull Run, Antietam). This was observed at the time, and the natural question of 'why didn't you entrench?" was asked.
A. P. Hill served under Jackson, and two examples of him being slipshod on the derfensive are Fredericksburg (where his line had a hole in it) and the first night a the Wilderness (where he did not allow his subordinate commanders to adjust/fortify their positions for the Union attack they knew was coming the next day).
Dang autocorrect- INVINCIBLE
James Longstreet vs George Thomas
Oooo good one.
1864 Jackson if alive would have been the logical choice to defend Atlanta instead of Hood. Hill was never considered by Lee for that command. Jackson and Stuart confounded the Potomac commanders. Hill's fame is Antietam. Jackson just scared Stanton when on loose.
Wouldn't a 2nd valley Campaign be More likely, If Lee decided to detatch him at All?
@@patrickrooney971 No, Atlanta had to be defended. Grant, read the map the railroad from Richmond to Memphis ran through Atlanta. Taking Atlanta doomed Richmond. A valley campaign,which happened under Early, Just pulled scattered units together and Wallace stopped the advance at Monocacy. Jackson at Atlanta would have given Sherman fits. Hood was not up to the task.
Very interesting video. Thank you.
You're welcome. Thank you for watching.
First, this was a spot-on assessment. Jackson was idealized by the South, first for his stand at 1st Manassas / 1st Bull Run, and then for his death following his exceptional maneuvering at Chancellorsville. However, a dispassionate comparison to Hill shows that while he was undoubtedly competent, he was far from perfect and not even the best Corp commander on-hand. It was nice to see it laid out as you have, with receipts, as it were. :-) As for future head-to-heads... What about Grant vs Meade? Or maybe Thomas vs Sherman?
Thomas vs. Sherman is my vote....I think it would be about as controversial as this video, because when you look at the facts, Sherman doesn't come out of that comparison looking very good.
@@aaronfleming9426 Thomas was exceedingly fortunate that Hood elected to remain in the area of Nashville. Had Hood left the area and begun making his way northwards, Thomas would have been relieved of his command- and for good reason.
While weather was a factor, Thomas utterly failed to consider the fact that Hood's army had been repeatedly defeated and needed to be engaged and finished off. Instead, he insisted on mounting his cavalry, when his infantry forces- a large proportion of whom were veterans- were well capable of dealing with Hood's demoralized forces. This is almost exactly what happened, since Thomas' cavalry played little part in the Union victory at Nashville. Lastly, he consciously deceived Grant, by telling him that he would move when he had no intention of doing so. Thomas was a champion at defense but had no business as an army commander.
@@manilajohn0182That's the sort of nonsense that Sherman and Grant would have us believe, but if you think Thomas "utterly failed to consider" something, you don't know that man you're talking about. Thomas was one of the most thorough and far-thinking generals in either army, which is why - quite unlike Sherman and Grant - he doesn't have any colossal blunders on his record.
Hood wasn't going anywhere, and if he had tried we have no reason to think he wouldn't have been detected and that Thomas wouldn't have moved to counter him.
Thomas did have some veterans, but he also had a lot of green troops, and the whole force had been pulled together from across a massive region. Considering the weather, and the fact that Hood was in no shape to move - let alone attempt a crossing of the Tennessee River - Thomas was exactly right to take his time and do a thorough job at a low cost.
The most outrageous thing about Grant's meddling with Thomas is that Grant, having been disgusted and disheartened by Halleck's micromanaging earlier in the war, should have known better. He didn't treat any other commander the way he treated Thomas, and the most valid explanation is simply that Grant was jealous. It is a sad stain on his record.
Grant overlooked all sorts of flops and failures from Sherman, a general with a combat record as putrid as Thomas' was stellar.
It's also worth noting that Thomas was an army commander early in the war as well. It was a small army to be sure, but his victory at Mill Springs was strategically significant, politically significant, and one of the most decisive actions of the war...and it occurred while Sherman was having a nervous breakdown because he thought he needed another 60,000 men to safeguard Kentucky.
When Thomas is in command, he prepares thoroughly and then absolutely crushes his enemy.
@@aaronfleming9426 That's simply not true, and on every count.
There was nothing locking Hood in place and preventing him from marching away at any time, and you can't state anything which would have forced him to remain there. This is what Grant repeatedly attempted to make clear to Thomas- that Hood's sheer stupidity in seeking battle with a demoralized and exhausted army was presenting Thomas with a golden opportunity that he risked letting slip away. Instead of acting promptly, Thomas did the same thing which he did throughout his career; he waited until he was completely ready. In doing that, he demonstrated that he lacked a proper appreciation for the factor of time.
If Thomas had properly considered the true state of Hood's army, he would have at once appreciated the fact that Thomas' difficulties were a proverbial drop in the ocean compared to those of Hood. As long as Hood remained where he was, Thomas didn't need cavalry to pulverize Hood; all that he needed to do was to engage an army demoralized by defeat after defeat and expecting impending defeat. If, on the other hand, Hood had not repeatedly detached forces and had instead marched away, Thomas would have been placed in the position of attempting to bring him to battle. With poorly mounted cavalry up against Forrest, Thomas' chances of bringing Hood to battle would have been poor at best.
Not that he would have had the opportunity to pursue Hood. For repeatedly delaying in engaging Hood and for deceiving Grant by informing him that he would move at once (while not doing so), Thomas would have been immediately relieved of his command. The actual historical result confirms exactly what I said. Thomas did crush Hood because Hood waited around to be crushed- and Thomas' cavalry played no more than an ordinary role in the victory.
Neither Grant nor Sherman ever made "colossal blunders". Their biggest error was not expecting a Confederate attack at Shiloh, and Shiloh proved to be a Union victory. They simply made mistakes- like most generals do, including Thomas.
Mill Springs was a small affair by any standard. The only thing significant about it was that it was the first real Union victory of the war. It had no significant political or strategic results whatsoever. Grant's taking of Fort's Henry and Donelson eclipsed Mill Springs immediately- and the capture of those forts were eclipsed soon enough as well.
@@manilajohn0182I think you're wrong on every count.
The same ice storm that kept Thomas in place kept Hood in place. Hood's exhaustion kept him in place. Hood's lack of options kept him in place.
In the end, Thomas judged that Hood would stay in place, and the ensuing events vindicate Thomas.
What Thomas understood was that thorough preparation led to decisive results. As another example, at Chattanooga Grant continually pushed to attack prematurely. Thomas continually talked him out of premature assaults and into skillful maneuvering. When the moment finally did come, Thomas' corps - which appreciated his care with their lives, by the way - swept over Missionary Ridge in one of the most startlingly successful attacks of the war (while Sherman failed to make progress, of course).
Grant and Sherman blundered badly at Shiloh. Yes, they rallied and won. They also came a whisker away from losing the war. You want to ignore that, I'm sure, though you love to criticize Thomas because what *might* have happened if he *had* misjudged at Nashville, which he didn't. Grant also has the second assault at Vicksburg on his record, and of course Cold Harbor. Sherman had Kennesaw Mountain - undertaken for no discernable reason and against Thomas' advice.
Sherman himself admitted that at Snake Creek Gap he missed "a once in a career opportunity" to destroy Johnston. Why? Because he ignored Thomas' advice and sent McPherson - his and Grant's pet - to do a job that Thomas was well prepared to do. McPherson choked. That's what happens when you play favorites.
Sherman took so long to capture Atlanta that Lincoln despaired of winning re-election. When he did capture it, he took his foot of Hood's neck and let him run away. You want to denigrate Thomas for taking a couple of extra days to destroy Hood and totally ignore the fact that Hood wouldn't have been at Nashville if Sherman had finished him at Jonesboro like he should have. Come on, man.
Mill Springs was a small affair by later standards, but it was comparable to several early battles like Wilson's Creek and larger than some morale-affecting battles like Balls Bluff. The fact that it was the first real Union victory of the war was exactly what gave it political significance; strategically it unhinged the Confederate defense of eastern Kentucky. And the two most salient features are this: though the scale was small, Thomas was in command; the utter destruction of the enemy army was unique for a field battle in the Civil War.
Who cares if it was eclipsed by the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson a couple of weeks later? Thomas had 4,000 men. Grant had 20,000 and a fleet of ironclad gunboats. They both did great work with what they had (Grant's battle was a little shakier, but he won in the end). And as you rightly note, other battles would soon eclipse both of those accomplishments. The end result of the two general's excellent work was to unhinge both ends of the line in Kentucky and force the Confederate army all the way back to Corinth.
Sorry man, I like Grant as much as the next guy, but he had a serious blind spot in regards to Thomas.
“When The Legend Becomes Fact, Print The Legend:'
That said, and as a fan of both Generals, “I would not presume to debate you.”
Wow! Starting to look like the good(bad) old times...circa 2020/21. LOTS of comments. But do they hold up to the old days??
Stonewall is one of those people that we know through history that maybe without we don't know through fact because I didn't know that he performed so Portland and a lot of his engagements
I dont think Jackson was ever in Portland... tell me if im wrong though.
who was better? that's easy...that would be the guy who didn't pair a great reputation for tactics with getting killed in the dark by friendly fire
excellent objective assessment
Thank you very much!
My father was a huge fan of A P Hill, thanks a great video highlighting both mens strengths and weaknesses
Thank you so much! Please check out my other videos and consider subscribing if you have not done so already.
Hill made some really dumb attacks during the 7 Days, and Jackson's incompetence can be explained by unfamiliarity with the terrain and sheer exhaustion. Hill was utterly useless as a corps commander; most historians aren't even sure where he was on Day 2 and 3 at Gettysburg. He was a good division and brigade commander; Jackson was competent at all his levels of command. Lee didn't call Ol' Jack his "right arm" for nothing.
A good survey. Jackson had some truly outstanding days as a commander. Also some pathetic. A correction. Chancellorsville was a bigger battle than Gettysburg. More troops engaged.
pathetic? for nothing and his reputation transcends him
@@DutchUnion His performance during the Seven Days was pathetic.
@@stephennewton2223Even so, it cannot be considered a defeat under his belt.
@@DutchUnion I'm not sure of the relevance.
Jackson was a very mixed bag. He whooped the yanks on some occasions. But froze and behaved passively when on defense. I didn't realize how overrated he was until I learned a lot more about the war. A great commander by all means. But not God tier as many think. I think Longstreet was better.
Great Analysis!
Mr. Hill looks like Daniel Brian the wrestler
Kernstown was not a corps. Helps if you are consistent in your analysis. Also dealing with relatively raw troops
The Light division was very experienced by peninsula campaign
I am not a fan of Jackson but his troope bore the brunt of two full corps at Antietam. Hill did well by marching quickly but he was also facing the worst corps commander on the union side
If Franklin committed more than one division during Frederiskburg the result may have been very different.
Chancelersville Jackson was magnificent. If anyone has been to the wilderness they would understand.
This assessment is weak
This assessment is a mile wide and an inch deep and it doesn’t really hold water. AP Hill was an exceptional Division Commander, but he was always out of his depth as a Corps Commander. And he got that position because there was really nobody else.
For Jackson this ignores, First Bull Run, the overall strategic objective of the valley campaign the fact that Jackson was sick and exhausted at Seven Days, the brilliant victory at Harper’s Ferry among others.
For AP Hill it ignores his performance at Gettysburg which played a major part in dooming that campaign and numerous other instances where Lee had to babysit him. And doesn’t even mention AP Hill giving the order to murder surrendered African American troops at Petersburg.
The Valley Campaign was Jackson’s first opportunity at independent command. Kernstown was literally the earliest engagement.
The overall strategic objective for Jackson was to occupy Federal forces and keep those forces from uniting or reinforcing with McClellan coming up the peninsula.
Jackson and his forced marches were the perfect tool to achieve that because being outnumbered, Jackson had no choice but to bounce his force around to strike as often as possible to make up for the lack of numbers, this was also an ingenious use of interior lines.
Overall the Valley Campaign can only be looked as a resounding success in light of the fact that it achieved its overall objective. There might have been a bad engagement or two but you have to look at overall result.
Even more egregious is the omission of Harper’s Ferry, which took place immediately before Antietam and explains why Jackson didn’t have all of his forces in place for that battle. At Harper’s Ferry Jackson struck and took nearly 13,000 Union prisoners, about the same number in small arms and 50 pieces of artillery.
Totally incompetent right?
What really hampers the credibility of this piece is that it repeats the bad history of Harry Heth’s Division going to Gettysburg for “supplies”.
This myth has been confirmed as bad history for quite some time. Hill’s lack of control on 1 July 1863 resulted in exactly what Lee did not want, which was general engagement before the Army was consolidated. Hill may been sick with the chronic gonorrhea that he acquire as a Cadet that day but who knows. What we do know is on that day he didn’t have positive control over his Corps.
Thanks for the video.
Thank you. I respectfully disagree but that's what makes History fun, is these little debates.
You make a strong case, backed by facts and data. Getting the popcorn for reading the comments. ;-)
I find Abner Doubleday an interesting character he got railroaded at Gettysburg could you do something with Doubleday versus I have no idea
That's a great idea. I want to pit two Union commanders against one another.
@@HistoryGoneWilder Dr. Wilder: Please consider Sherman against Thomas. Thomas never lost a battle. Sheman went on to command the entire U.S. Army. Respectfully, W.S.
@@wmschooley1234 I would also love to see Sherman vs. Thomas!
You really have to ask the question then, why was John bell hood given command over A.P . Hill in the west.
Because Lee thought a lot of Hill and wouldn't have wanted him sent West.
Hood spent a lot of energy currying favor with Davis.
I agree with your assessment. Never had a high opinion of Jackson in many ways because of his petty behavior towards Hill. For someone who fought the entire conflict Hill's record is much more impressive. Thanks!
Thank you!
A.P. Hill is my favorite Civil War General.
I believe he would have been more popular had he never been placed under Jackson. A mistake by General Lee
Have you checked out my A. P. Hill biography?
Let's leave out every battle that made Jackson famous and then pretend Powell Hill was better. Come on man. First Manassas, First Winchester, Front Royal, on and on. "Stonewall is a hard road to travel," says the song, because the people of the time knew that Jackson had struck fear into the heart of Lincoln like nobody else had. Can you imagine the Gentle Giant singing that "Uncle Remus would put me to bed with a picture of A.P. Hill above my head?" Stonewall will be remembered in a 1000 years alongside Julius Caesar.
The video did leave out a few of Jackson's victories. It also left out some of his other flops, like the Romney campaign, Cedar Mountain, and Brawner's Farm.
In the end, the Army of Northern Virginia was not the same after Jackson died.
The army was the same going into gettysburg, I would say it was lee who was not the same after Jackson's death
@@Falcone3717 Jackson would have taken Culp's Hill.
13,000 casualties at Chancellorsville may have had something to do with that. And the next battle after Jackson died was Gettysburg, where the Army of the Potomac finally had a competent commander, and got to fight on the defensive for the first time since Malvern Hill. With some 28,000 casualties added to the 13k at Chancellorsville, it's no wonder the ANV wasn't the same again...whether or not Jackson had died.
Too bad Stonewall wasn't at Gettysburg.
Or after JEB Stuart died...big loss.
A.P. Hill is clearly superior because he counts for college credits, while Jackson only helps you graduate highschool.
How bout Grant vs Stonewall Jackson
Hill was not a better corps commander than Jackson. Jackson was very good in independent or semi-independent operations such as Chancellorsville and The Valley campaign. Jackson was assaulted heavily at Antietam and held. His line was broken at Fredericksburg because the ground there (and I have been there) is relatively flat and not as easily defended as Marye's Heights( something this narrator left out). A.P. Hill was one of the best division commanders of the war, but as a corps commander, he was a disappointment. His performance at Gettysburg is criticized for bringing on an unwanted engagement before the army was fully concentrated. Hill was also an impetuous and hasty commander who attacked without orders, causing many men to die needlessly, like at Mechanicsburg and Bristoe Station. He also had a haphazard defensive line at The Wilderness, which caused his troops to break and the army nearly broken until Longstreet arrived to counter attack. This along with his STD, which caused him to be out sick constantly. I simply do not agree that Hill was a better corps commander than Jackson. It's kind of like a great defensive coordinator in football who becomes a head coach and then fails. Hill was very much like that progression.
Both were good at their jobs, but who could say which one comes out on top. I don’t think either would’ve been successful in Lee’s position however, particularly Jackson, with his aggressive style and strange personality, might’ve ended up as another John Bell Hood. Perhaps Hill’s judgement was a bit better, so giving him the nod is plausible.
I like your take on the possibility of Jackson ending up like Hood if he had survived Chancellorsville.
@@aaronfleming9426 He was a religious fanatic who drove his men mercilessly, and was very pugnacious. That type of fighting means lots of casualties that the Confederacy couldn’t afford. I think he was good as a subordinate to someone who knew how, and when to utilize his skills, like Lee.
@@marshabonforte6963Lee wasn't any better at conserving manpower, do you think? Personally I think Lee and Jackson fed each other's reckless side.
Id hate it, if I was under eithers command. Welp, been nice knowing ya…
Could you compare J.E.B Stuart and Nathan Bedford Forrest
I already have. Search for it on the channel. I think you will enjoy it.
I think…. You do a terrific job! That’s what I think. Thank you.
Thank you so much!
I'll second that 100% Respectfully, W.S.
Hill might be one of the best division commanders they had, but performed poorly as corps commander. Jackson was better
Interesting. Thank you!
Jubal Early vs Longstreet...
I agree with your argument.
Stonewall Jackson and James Longstreet.
Stonewall hands down
I am disappointed in this video, not as a result of your conclusion, but in the presentation. In your previous comparison videos there was a clear effort to portray the strengths and failings of both officers, but here it comes across as Jackson’s actions being shown in the most critical light possible while showing Hill’s in the most charitable. I would have sooner seen AP Hill compared to Richard Ewell, as both were capable division commanders under Jackson, who were tasked with corps command following his death. I admit my bias is towards Jackson, and I still greatly respect your knowledge and insight. In this, however, the argument came across very slanted. This made it seem like the conclusion shaped the narrative of the information, rather than the information shaping the narrative of the conclusion.
I agree with your assessment
Thank you.
I love A.P. Hill but this is not even close. Stonewall was the best General the war produced and one of the best in history. Kernstown was early and he didn’t perform well during the 7 Days, but was flawless otherwise. Again, I love Hill but he struggled at Gettysburg and then Bristol. As you note he left a gap at Fredericksburg that Jackson patched with Early. Hill was incredible at Antietam and Second Manassas…among others. I believe Stonewall was the best and Hill was third. I think John Bell Hood was second until he went West. I think Hood should’ve been kept as a Division Commander, but it’s all hindsight. It’s impossible to compare really because they had different roles in every battle.
Jackson flubbed badly in the Romney campaign, was mediocre at Cedar Mountain, and was caught napping at Brawner's Farm. Far from flawless.
the biggest detriment to Hill was his repeated bouts with illness. I agree, he was a better corps commander than Jackson because he saw the overall battlefield better outside of Bristoe, while Jackson would get to focused in on one spot at the wrong time. Also, Jackson's Valley campaign was against political hacks for Union generals in high command which had it been a Hooker, Meade, or Reynolds he might well have been defeated. The Union forces in the Valley eventually made up what became a large part of the XI and XII Corps who after some growing pains became one of the best Corps after they were merged together under Hooker around the Chattanooga campaign. Hill even while ill managed to get the most out his men and like the video said always seemed to have his men at the right spot. Had he not been killed, I don't think Five Forks goes as bad as it did, and it is possible he could have convinced Lee of how untenable his position was and they could have left a day or two earlier. If they could have gotten even half that force to North Carolina, they could have put up a pretty good fight, though in the end. They would have just bought themselve a few months.