Algorithmic Game Theory (Lecture 5: Revenue-Maximizing Auctions)
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- Опубликовано: 16 сен 2024
- The challenge of revenue maximization. Bayesian optimal auctions.
Full course playlist: • Algorithmic Game Theor...
Book: www.amazon.com...
Lecture notes: timroughgarden....
very good lecture ! thank you
wonderful info, but board is not visible properly
I didn't understand why being DSIC is not a barrier to optimality. Isn't it possible that another auction without being DSIC leads to a higher revenue?
A priori, that's a possibility. But the full version of Myerson's analysis --- which is similar to the one in this lecture, with deviations from a dominant strategy replaced by deviations from a Bayes-Nash equilibrium --- shows that, in single-parameter settings, even if you optimize over the space of all (not necessarily DSIC) auctions, there is always a revenue-maximizing one that is DSIC.
Loving the lectures but writing down notes is a serious nightmare
You don't need to. Just download the pdf's from here theory.stanford.edu/~tim/f13/f13.html
@@nitishsandhu4462 very thanks for sharing the link..
A good understanding of "capitalist pouring milk" XDDD
What are you talking about
The boy who raise hand frequently is really distracting.
There should be some specific times for asking questions.
There is always a boy in a classroom doing this.
He is (presumably) paying to be in this class. You are watching it for free on RUclips. Ergo, you are really not in a position to complain :)
@@vidursingh2749 well said