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I think the counter-argument misunderstood the original argument. My son has a Lego set of a flower. If you describe every piece and how they all fit together, you have described the flower. There is no new information required. That shows that "flower" and "all Lego pieces arranged in a certain way" are the same two pieces of information and are probably ontologically equivalent. You can play the game where you say that on one level it's Lego pieces and on another level it's flower, but you don't need to have some spooky external extra ontology to make the flower exist. You don't have that with consciousness. I can have the knowledge of all the identities of all the neurons and their connections and that tells me nothing about the conscious experience (if any) that this particular collection of connected neurons has. Therefore, there is something else needed to know about the system besides the identities and connectome of the neurons. I don't know how saying that "maybe you can't know what that experience is unless you ARE that collection of neurons" disputes that. Yes, and that's because the two facts - collection of neurons and their experience - are two different facts.
The problem with the Mary's Room question is that the conclusion one draws depends primarily on the assumption that one brings into it. If physicalism is true, and Mary knows everything physical about the color red, then she would necessarily know what it is like to see red. So, if she knows all about red because it was magically fed into her brain, then she knows what it's like to see red by way of hallucination. If she knows about red because she studied it and tested it, then that would imply that she must have seen red, as a necessary part of her studies on red. In that case, given the premise of the thought experiment, she both knows red and does not know red. If one assumes substance dualism, then Mary's Room confirms substance dualism, for the reasons that are commonly discussed.
I don’t think that’s quite right. Jackson doesn’t assume physicalism or dualism. The argument doesn’t require it. For Jackson, physicalism can be stated in terms of information. If all is physical then all information must also be physical since it’s grounded in the physical. And the idea is that we can imagine Mary knowing all the physical facts, and yet when she sees color for the first time she learns a new fact (the what it’s like fact). And if there was a fact that she learned, it couldn’t have been physical because she already knew all the physical facts. Even if she had already hallucinated, the experience of seeing an apple for real would cause her to learn what it’s like to see an apple for real and not hallucinating. It is after all a new fact. The argument doesn’t imply dualism or any particular kind of dualism per se. It just implies physicalism is not the case.
The point with the Mary's room issue is some could could just Moore shift. P1. If Mary knows all the physical facts but experiences redness, then qualia is not physical P2. Mary knows all the physical facts but experiences redness C. Therefore, qualia is not physical Vs P1. If Mary knows all the physical facts but experiences redness, then qualia is not physical P2. It's not the case that qualia is not physical P2. Therefore, it's not the case that Mary knows all the physical facts. It still is the thought experiment, it's just pointing out that it begs the question against the physicalist. I'm agnostic on Phil of mind but I've never found this thought experiment/argument compelling at all. It just stipulates she knows all the physical facts and trys to assume qualia goes out the door on the physicalists account. But I see no reason why the physicalist would be compelled to accept this, it's parasitic on the conclusion. Ive asked people who aren't into philosophy at all and they almost always feel that it sneaks it what it's trying to prove without any real work.
They way I like to put it is that as soon as the thought experiment uses words like knowledge and experience we have to ask how these things exist. To a physicalist, knowledge is the building of neural pathways in the brain. They also distinguish between the ventral (temporal) pathway from the dorsal (parietal) pathway when talking about the building of knowledge for color. Therefore to say that Mary has never experienced red and doesn't know what red looks like is to say that her brain hasn't actually been stimulated in all ways concerning color (ruclips.net/video/h0nTeDWvpj4/видео.html Patricia Churchland distinguishes between pathways involving language and pathways involving sensory systems that are not language mediated in the brain about this). Therefore Mary doesn't have all the physical facts because sensory system pathways about color are just as much part of Mary's scientific knowledge as language system pathways . To a non-physicalist, knowledge from experience is non-physical. That is, there is something about knowledge from experience that can't be reduced to just the building of neural pathways. However, to state that these things are non-physical from the get go of the thought experiment in order for the thought experiment to lead to the non-physicalist conclusion that the dualist believes is the case is begging the question. The thought experiment either makes a false claim of complete scientific knowledge about color for Mary or it begs the question, therefore it is simply a bad thought experiment.
There was a long discussion about Mary's Room in the video and I think there is one central problem. Identity theorists say, that mental states are equivalent to brain states, they do not say that mental states are equivalent to knowledge about brain states. So Mary's Room might be a sound argument in some sense, yes, I would say she gains new knowledge, but it doesn't really address the identity theorist's view, so it seems irrelevant. As Oppy briefly mentioned, if she were able to manipulate her own brain and would still be unable to see the colour red, that might disprove identity theory but most identity theorists would reject that premise.
@@peterchristeas5519Yes, but that brain state is not itself the sensation of redness. The knowledge about the 'redness brain state' and the brain state that constitutes the sensation of redness are distinct states. (I'm guessing, with my very limited knowledge, what an identity theorist would say)
@@TeoTura But what is the nature of that brain state then? The brain state which constitutes the sensation of redness? Constitutes is also a term that the identity theorist would have to use cautiously, as if constitution is sufficient for identity, then this is the exact problem which arises. If the brain states which constitute the experience of redness aren't wholly sufficient, then doesn't this imply there is something that possesses ontological status that is not a brain state which is required for such a qualitative experience?
@@peterchristeas5519 I consider myself a sort of physicalist, though not an identity theorist. I was attempting to anticipate a possible response from an identity theorist. I lean more towards viewing qualitative experiences as emergent properties. I don't believe that a brain state is the same as the experience (constitutes it), but rather that the experience arises from a specific brain state. In this sense, a particular brain state isn't identical to the experience of redness; rather, it's what the experience of redness arises from. Concerning your last question, the idea that the brain state is not wholly sufficient is something that would need to be demonstrated, and I'm not aware of any experiment that supports that position. Perhaps a perspective like mine, 'non-reductive physicalism,' or a dualist position, is on par with an identity theorist's opinion in terms of explanatory power. However, I think Dr. Oppy tends toward the latter because it implies fewer assumptions. I'm a novice in these topics, so I'm doing my best to explain what I've understood so far.
@@TeoTura Like he said, Oppy's an identity theorist in a sense, but he's not sure whether or not his version commits him to something that would be categorised under physicalism. Perhaps you're inclined towards a property dualist flavoured physicalism. With respect to your point about lack of experimentation, no experiment needs to be conducted to believe this two be the case. As Leibniz' law of indiscernables affirms, we can know that a and b are not identical if there is something which is true of a and not true of b (excluding cambridge properties of course). So, if mental states are identical to brain states, then there can't be anything which is true of one that is not true of the other. However, this clearly isn't the case. When I think of a tree, its form is present in my intellect, however, its form isn't present in my brain. If mental states were synonymous with brain states, this could not be.
I feel like, if I’m understanding him correctly, that Oppy refers to his idea in terms of scales rather than levels; and his dislike of the word emergence, to remove any hierarchy. Whether that’s the seniority of the scale, the observability, or being an extreme of the scale. It’s more rhizomatic in thought. Rather than giving preference to the small scale for being well…the smallest-or for being the earliest scale of matter in the universe, it accepts all matter exists all the time, and just categorizes them in terms of scale. IMO this kind of view would seem to reject hierarchical notions that might seem efficient and natural to us as humans (small things to big things, old things to new things) Those same notions of course also play into predilections for god type beliefs and adjacent ideas like platonism.
If qualia is apparently independent from brain states, then can someone please explain how people having a stroke can smell burnt toast when no burnt toast is present. If the qualitative experience of smelling burnt toast can be achieved solely by altering a brain’s neurological functioning, how can it not be directly related to neurological functioning?
could the same be said in the other direction though? I guess shouldn't we be agnostic as to whether or not qualia are physical states? Edit: I think what I'm trying to say is that it often seems as though the default position is that qualia aren't physical states and the burden is on the physicalist/ identity theorist to show that they are where it's never been clear to me why that is.
@queerdo I suppose it's possible I'm not aware of the arguments you're referring to, but I just don't find that the arguments against the physicality of qualia establish what they aim to, by my lights. I think the physicalists also have simplicity on their side and avoid the interaction problem, so I don't know if it's accurate to say they simply "repeat their position over and over."
I don't understand how consciousness can be material. I think that there is an obvious correlation, maybe even causation by the brain but consciousness itself seems to be a different thing. For instance, consciousness has no mass, no width or height. I feel like I might be missing something.
@@haydenwalton2766 Alright, density, the mind has no density. And I would evidence that by saying it is our experience that thoughts don't weigh anything.
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I think the counter-argument misunderstood the original argument.
My son has a Lego set of a flower. If you describe every piece and how they all fit together, you have described the flower. There is no new information required. That shows that "flower" and "all Lego pieces arranged in a certain way" are the same two pieces of information and are probably ontologically equivalent. You can play the game where you say that on one level it's Lego pieces and on another level it's flower, but you don't need to have some spooky external extra ontology to make the flower exist.
You don't have that with consciousness. I can have the knowledge of all the identities of all the neurons and their connections and that tells me nothing about the conscious experience (if any) that this particular collection of connected neurons has.
Therefore, there is something else needed to know about the system besides the identities and connectome of the neurons.
I don't know how saying that "maybe you can't know what that experience is unless you ARE that collection of neurons" disputes that. Yes, and that's because the two facts - collection of neurons and their experience - are two different facts.
The problem with the Mary's Room question is that the conclusion one draws depends primarily on the assumption that one brings into it. If physicalism is true, and Mary knows everything physical about the color red, then she would necessarily know what it is like to see red. So, if she knows all about red because it was magically fed into her brain, then she knows what it's like to see red by way of hallucination. If she knows about red because she studied it and tested it, then that would imply that she must have seen red, as a necessary part of her studies on red. In that case, given the premise of the thought experiment, she both knows red and does not know red.
If one assumes substance dualism, then Mary's Room confirms substance dualism, for the reasons that are commonly discussed.
I don’t think that’s quite right. Jackson doesn’t assume physicalism or dualism. The argument doesn’t require it. For Jackson, physicalism can be stated in terms of information. If all is physical then all information must also be physical since it’s grounded in the physical. And the idea is that we can imagine Mary knowing all the physical facts, and yet when she sees color for the first time she learns a new fact (the what it’s like fact). And if there was a fact that she learned, it couldn’t have been physical because she already knew all the physical facts. Even if she had already hallucinated, the experience of seeing an apple for real would cause her to learn what it’s like to see an apple for real and not hallucinating. It is after all a new fact. The argument doesn’t imply dualism or any particular kind of dualism per se. It just implies physicalism is not the case.
The point with the Mary's room issue is some could could just Moore shift.
P1. If Mary knows all the physical facts but experiences redness, then qualia is not physical
P2. Mary knows all the physical facts but experiences redness
C. Therefore, qualia is not physical
Vs
P1. If Mary knows all the physical facts but experiences redness, then qualia is not physical
P2. It's not the case that qualia is not physical
P2. Therefore, it's not the case that Mary knows all the physical facts.
It still is the thought experiment, it's just pointing out that it begs the question against the physicalist.
I'm agnostic on Phil of mind but I've never found this thought experiment/argument compelling at all. It just stipulates she knows all the physical facts and trys to assume qualia goes out the door on the physicalists account. But I see no reason why the physicalist would be compelled to accept this, it's parasitic on the conclusion. Ive asked people who aren't into philosophy at all and they almost always feel that it sneaks it what it's trying to prove without any real work.
They way I like to put it is that as soon as the thought experiment uses words like knowledge and experience we have to ask how these things exist. To a physicalist, knowledge is the building of neural pathways in the brain. They also distinguish between the ventral (temporal) pathway from the dorsal (parietal) pathway when talking about the building of knowledge for color. Therefore to say that Mary has never experienced red and doesn't know what red looks like is to say that her brain hasn't actually been stimulated in all ways concerning color (ruclips.net/video/h0nTeDWvpj4/видео.html Patricia Churchland distinguishes between pathways involving language and pathways involving sensory systems that are not language mediated in the brain about this). Therefore Mary doesn't have all the physical facts because sensory system pathways about color are just as much part of Mary's scientific knowledge as language system pathways . To a non-physicalist, knowledge from experience is non-physical. That is, there is something about knowledge from experience that can't be reduced to just the building of neural pathways. However, to state that these things are non-physical from the get go of the thought experiment in order for the thought experiment to lead to the non-physicalist conclusion that the dualist believes is the case is begging the question.
The thought experiment either makes a false claim of complete scientific knowledge about color for Mary or it begs the question, therefore it is simply a bad thought experiment.
There was a long discussion about Mary's Room in the video and I think there is one central problem. Identity theorists say, that mental states are equivalent to brain states, they do not say that mental states are equivalent to knowledge about brain states. So Mary's Room might be a sound argument in some sense, yes, I would say she gains new knowledge, but it doesn't really address the identity theorist's view, so it seems irrelevant.
As Oppy briefly mentioned, if she were able to manipulate her own brain and would still be unable to see the colour red, that might disprove identity theory but most identity theorists would reject that premise.
But isn't knowledge whether it be about brain states or not, a brain state itself according to the identity theorist?
@@peterchristeas5519Yes, but that brain state is not itself the sensation of redness. The knowledge about the 'redness brain state' and the brain state that constitutes the sensation of redness are distinct states. (I'm guessing, with my very limited knowledge, what an identity theorist would say)
@@TeoTura But what is the nature of that brain state then? The brain state which constitutes the sensation of redness? Constitutes is also a term that the identity theorist would have to use cautiously, as if constitution is sufficient for identity, then this is the exact problem which arises. If the brain states which constitute the experience of redness aren't wholly sufficient, then doesn't this imply there is something that possesses ontological status that is not a brain state which is required for such a qualitative experience?
@@peterchristeas5519 I consider myself a sort of physicalist, though not an identity theorist. I was attempting to anticipate a possible response from an identity theorist. I lean more towards viewing qualitative experiences as emergent properties. I don't believe that a brain state is the same as the experience (constitutes it), but rather that the experience arises from a specific brain state. In this sense, a particular brain state isn't identical to the experience of redness; rather, it's what the experience of redness arises from. Concerning your last question, the idea that the brain state is not wholly sufficient is something that would need to be demonstrated, and I'm not aware of any experiment that supports that position. Perhaps a perspective like mine, 'non-reductive physicalism,' or a dualist position, is on par with an identity theorist's opinion in terms of explanatory power. However, I think Dr. Oppy tends toward the latter because it implies fewer assumptions. I'm a novice in these topics, so I'm doing my best to explain what I've understood so far.
@@TeoTura Like he said, Oppy's an identity theorist in a sense, but he's not sure whether or not his version commits him to something that would be categorised under physicalism. Perhaps you're inclined towards a property dualist flavoured physicalism. With respect to your point about lack of experimentation, no experiment needs to be conducted to believe this two be the case. As Leibniz' law of indiscernables affirms, we can know that a and b are not identical if there is something which is true of a and not true of b (excluding cambridge properties of course). So, if mental states are identical to brain states, then there can't be anything which is true of one that is not true of the other. However, this clearly isn't the case. When I think of a tree, its form is present in my intellect, however, its form isn't present in my brain. If mental states were synonymous with brain states, this could not be.
I feel like, if I’m understanding him correctly, that Oppy refers to his idea in terms of scales rather than levels; and his dislike of the word emergence, to remove any hierarchy. Whether that’s the seniority of the scale, the observability, or being an extreme of the scale. It’s more rhizomatic in thought. Rather than giving preference to the small scale for being well…the smallest-or for being the earliest scale of matter in the universe, it accepts all matter exists all the time, and just categorizes them in terms of scale.
IMO this kind of view would seem to reject hierarchical notions that might seem efficient and natural to us as humans (small things to big things, old things to new things) Those same notions of course also play into predilections for god type beliefs and adjacent ideas like platonism.
Yeah something about Oppy's view seems a bit off. I wanted to see Mike hit Oppy more on his view in this video.
If qualia is apparently independent from brain states, then can someone please explain how people having a stroke can smell burnt toast when no burnt toast is present. If the qualitative experience of smelling burnt toast can be achieved solely by altering a brain’s neurological functioning, how can it not be directly related to neurological functioning?
It is directly related isn’t it? It’s just that doesn’t solve the problem
You're conflating the content of consciousness and consciousness itself.
It looked to me like Oppy was just calling qualia a physical state, which just sidesteps the question.
could the same be said in the other direction though? I guess shouldn't we be agnostic as to whether or not qualia are physical states?
Edit: I think what I'm trying to say is that it often seems as though the default position is that qualia aren't physical states and the burden is on the physicalist/ identity theorist to show that they are where it's never been clear to me why that is.
@queerdo I suppose it's possible I'm not aware of the arguments you're referring to, but I just don't find that the arguments against the physicality of qualia establish what they aim to, by my lights. I think the physicalists also have simplicity on their side and avoid the interaction problem, so I don't know if it's accurate to say they simply "repeat their position over and over."
Well Frankish and some of them just say quaila is an illusion
I don't understand how consciousness can be material. I think that there is an obvious correlation, maybe even causation by the brain but consciousness itself seems to be a different thing. For instance, consciousness has no mass, no width or height. I feel like I might be missing something.
@Jon What did Oppy say that made him sound like a dualist?
consciousness is an emergent property of a brain
(btw, oppy is generally right and humer is generally wrong)
So what physical properties does the mind have?
@@OlofBerkesköld what properties of the mind are not physical ?
the burdon of proof doesn't lie with my position
@@OlofBerkesköld what properties of the mind aren't physical ?
the burden of proof doesn't lie with my position
@@haydenwalton2766 Alright, density, the mind has no density. And I would evidence that by saying it is our experience that thoughts don't weigh anything.
@@haydenwalton2766 Spacelessness, our conscience doesn't take any space in the physical world.
Seems that Oppy has Parkinson. He has?
no