NTSB Animation: Runway Incursion and Overflight, Southwest Airlines 708 Federal Express 1432
HTML-код
- Опубликовано: 27 сен 2024
- This animated reconstruction depicts the sequence of events in a runway incursion that occurred at Austin-Bergstrom International Airport (AUS), Austin, Texas on February 4, 2023, about 6:40 a.m. central standard time. Southwest Airlines (SWA) flight 708, a Boeing 737-700, and Federal Express (FedEx) flight 1432, a Boeing 767-300 were involved.
The sequence of events was reconstructed based on Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data, Air Traffic Control (ATC) radio communications, flight data recorder (FDR) data from both airplanes, and aircraft performance data.
A map and still images are used to provide an overview of the incident, followed by a three-dimensional animation. The animation does not depict the weather or visibility conditions. The animation includes narration, and the script is attached. The animation of the close approach of the two airplanes is shown twice, the first time with a narrative description of the events, and the second time with recorded ATC communications along with a transcript in the right upper corner of the screen.
The animation begins with a map showing Texas and the surrounding states with the location of Austin-Bergstrom International Airport indicated by a symbol and a label. The map is overlayed with a photograph of the airplane that served as Southwest Airlines (SWA) flight 708, and a photograph of the airplane that served as Federal Express (FedEx) flight 1432. Text boxes indicate the flight numbers and the occupants of each airplane. Text boxes indicate that ten airplanes had departed before SWA flight 708, but FedEx 1432 was the first arrival. A Google Earth image shows the north end of runway 18L, overlayed with the photograph of SWA flight 708
indicating its departure on runway 18L, then overlayed with the photograph of FedEx flight 1432 indicating its arrival on runway 18L. A graphic then indicates the location of the control tower, which is about 3,700 feet from the north end of the runway.
The weather at the airport at the time of incident is discussed; night conditions prevailed, and dense fog obscured the controller’s view of the airport surface. The effect of the weather on visibility is highlighted in a text box. The lack of surface detection equipment at the airport is highlighted in a text box. Then, the Google Earth image is shifted to the area where taxiway Bravo intersects runway 18L. Text boxes indicate the FedEx crew reported being established on the Category III instrument landing system approach for 18L, meaning that the autopilot was flying the approach while the crew monitored. Another text box indicates the controller reported runway visibility to the FedEx crew and cleared them to land.
A still image introduces the SWA on taxiway Bravo with an oval around the airplane and a label SWA, and an animated arrow shows the path of SWA to runway 18L. At the bottom of the screen, the local time, separation of the two airplanes and altitude above ground level of the FedEx airplane are displayed. A disclaimer is shown in a text box that the animation does not depict the weather, which prevented the controller from seeing the airplanes.
The still image is followed by a three-dimensional real time animation. When the SWA crew reports they are short of runway 18L and ready to depart, the animation shows arrows with dimensions indicating that SWA 708 was 550 feet from the hold-short line, which is 200 feet from the edge of the runway 18L. SWA 708 turns to the right from taxiway Bravo onto runway 18L and stops to perform an engine runup. FedEx 1432 is shown on approach in the upper left of the screen; initially, the location of FedEx 1432 is highlighted by a circle and FedEx label; the circle and label are removed when the separation between airplanes is about 2 miles. As SWA 708 begins to move down the runway, the camera view pans left to right to follow it, showing FedEx 1432 descending behind it. Shortly after crossing the threshold, the
FedEx airplane begins to climb, and the crew announces they are going around. FedEx 1432 descends to an altitude of 60 feet above the runway about 400 feet behind SWA 708. FedEx 1432 passes about 200 feet over SWA 708 and begins to turn left, while SWA 708 continues the takeoff.
The animation is played again with ATC audio and its transcript. At the end of the repeated animation, a text box indicates that the FedEx crew reported seeing SWA 708 through the dense fog. The animation is followed by an image of two orange cockpit voice recorders and a text box indicating that the cockpit voice recorders on both airplanes were overwritten. The final still image shows the minimum separation between the two airplanes, which is indicated on the screen to be 170 feet.
I think the only one here with situational awareness was FedEx. They called out their concern when they asked if they were still cleared for landing. Even without the engine run up, the separation would have been too close for comfort IMHO. I guess that controller had a different opinion. And did Southwest not put two and two together about FedEx being on the approach and needing 20s on the runway before they could roll?
That's all on Southwest. Heard Fedex on final and did want to wait and hold short so he lied about holding short.
It would seem that the tower had no visual contact with SWA at their hold-short/ready call, so they had to assume (there's that word) that holding short of the runway means holding short of the runway. FedEx did well to call in the sanity check.
I'd say the lion's share of this near-miss is on SWA for portraying themselves as 20-30 sec farther forward than they actually were. FDX closed a lot of distance in that time, and SWA had to know they were on the clock. They were all sure lucky that night.
ATC should've told Southwest to expedite / no delay. 3NM final and Southwest took their sweet little time to initiate their takeoff roll. Unacceptable.
@@jamesmurray3948 When Southwest said "Rolling Now" the ATC should have immediately told FedEx to go around.
southwest is busy with checklists, fx completed their checklists they only has to land the plane and monitor the channels. either way disasters are systemic failures and fortunately the system (alert fx pilots) worked
What is also scary is the fact that 737 was even allowed to enter ILS critical area while there is a heavy 767 inside of FAF on a Cat III approach. Just mind blowing. What was the rush that morning?
Yeah, I always thought that Cat III ops required some pretty large clear areas on and around the runway when a plane is on approach. I was surprised they cleared Southwest onto the runway at all in those conditions.
@@whitelobster1ify correct
but Fedex did not formally request cat lll in which case the controller would not have let SW through the critical hold line
@@mijo3642 Fdx announced “on Cat III Rwy xx”. Regardless, Swa had no business of being allowed into the ILS critical area with traffic inside of FAF. ILS critical area is being taught to every private pilot. S#|t, it’s even a question on our airport’s movement area annual written test. If this was allowed in a case like than what is even the point of having it?
@@igorzitnan6626 No, 1) visibility was not conducive to require Cat 3. 2) ATC did not acknowledge nor clear them for CAT 3 approach therefore, southwest are perfectly entitled to be at the CAT 1 hold line if an official CAT 3 is NOT in progress. Having said that; SW did not let ATC know they need to run up for 20 seconds even though anyone with half a brain would know there is no ground radar and if you can't see the tower they cannot see you (SW Pilots).
Therefore again, ATC was correct with the clearances based on the weather, the poor communication from both aircraft and LVP's were not in force as far as I can summize despite what you flight-sim wannabe's think you know.
When I want to practice a CAT 2 or 3 approach I TELL ATC I want to be cleared for a practice CAT 3 which I at least do once a week ( I also practice a flap 3 landing which, is classed as a normal procedure for us ) but, only when it is not busy therefore, no holding in the critical area AND no intersecting runway take off's will be authorized. Seems a little knowledge is way more dangerous than complete ignorance
Excerpted from the NTSB report - Interview of controller:
NTSB investigator(question condensed as it was asked twice and not understood the first time): "Are there standard operating procedures that talk about how to handle situations with low visibility on the runway?"
Controller: "Yeah"
NTSB Investigator: What are they?
Controller: "I couldn't recall them for you"
NTSB Investigator(question asked twice differently as not understood the first time): Can you describe the purpose of SMGCS(Surface Movement Guidance Control System)/Can you describe it at a high level, what it is?
Controller: I could not, I know it is a system we use here. And this is the first facility I've been to with SMGCS(note: he had been there almost five years).
Is this an atypical Controller, or is this typical of the newer Controllers?
I didn’t realize this was a Cat III. FedEx had excellent situational awareness. It sucks we don’t have the CVR. They were concerned about the separation and were probably discussing it and were very prepared for that go around. They were anticipating seeing WN on the runway. Someone give those pilots a medal and a bonus for excellent airmanship.
I wonder what the WN pax were thinking when they heard that TOGA thrust 150 feet over their heads?
Tenerife is coming to the US. It’s not a matter of if. It’s when.
Even if you don't consider the separation issues, I don't understand why ATC cleared an aircraft to enter the ILS critical area when another aircraft is on the instrument approach. I thought that was strictly disallowed because the presence of a large metal aircraft in the path of the ILS signal will negatively affect the ILS signal for the landing aircraft? If you draw a line from the glidescope antenna east of runway 18L to the ILS critical boundary line on taxiway E and then draw a line at the same angle on the west side of the antenna, it would definitely include an aircraft lined up on the end of runway 18L.
@@pilotcritic Are you claiming the runway is not inside the Localizer Critical Area?
@@mikkotuomi7884I misread the post I was replying to. You are correct to point out the runway would logically be considered part of the critical area. I retract my earlier statement.
Yes, in most countries, at a minimum the departing aircraft has to pass the localizer before the landing aircraft reaches 200FT above the runway.
@@pilotcritic
Your assumption was correct.
For an aircraft on a runway (lined up and waiting), it is NOT in the critical area for the LOC or Glideslope, provided it is more than 7000ft away from the LOC antenna.
See figures 1-2, 1-3, 1-4 from this FAA publication: www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/FINAL_SIGNED_Order_6750_16E_ILS_Siting_Criteria_06-09-2014_for_Web_posting%5B1%5D.pdf#page16
The main issue here was the controller’s failure to apply applicable separation standards to departing and arriving aircraft on a single runway.
"we're ready" - not quite. We need a runup on the active runway with a 767 on 3 mile CAT III Autoland final, and Tower can't see me. What could go wrong? Kudos to Fedex crew. When they asked "confirm we are cleared to land" they were already spring-loaded to go around.
I had not really visualized what happened here, seeing the animation is really scary
I can't believe SWA heard "Landing Traffic 3 miles out" and thought "additional" taxi + 19 sec run-up would be safe.
When it landed, was "Cancun or Bust" written on any of the windows?
lol! With Southwest, I surely wouldn’t be surprised
that was on ted cruz window.
Having worked with Southwest those pilots want to get air born as fast as possible.
@@FishFind3000
Uder the banner of "fuel savings & on-time service" what pilot doesn't? Holding short would have added ~ 2 mins, so get-there-itus seems a weaker element here. Was the Tower duped by exploiting the fog? Also seems unlikely given they were number One & still needed a Run-up. IMO, the early call ("holding short & ready") began this event. They were neither Short, nor Ready but when your cleared for T/O . . .
Amazing work like always
If your animation is correct, the tower controller probably thought the SWA flight was at the hold line, not much further from the runway. Only the FedEx pilots seemed concerned or aware of the situation. The tower controller didn't take the hint and FedEx probably should have missed even before seeing the SWA AC since they appeared to be the only ones understanding the situation.
Well they may have been, couldn’t find the CAT III line on the chart, but the line is way back. They were holding short, at CAT III, and there’s no obligation to mention which line they’re on.
@@jaysmith1408 Don't disagree but if the hold bars for the ILS critical area is a significant distance from the end of the runway, I would expect a little more common sense and conversation with an aircraft clearly on a short final in CAT III conditions. The airport wasn't busy, he would have been on the runway two minutes later. Fortunately the FedEx pilots were on the ball.
Not really an incursion though because SW was cleared to takeoff. So this is totally on the ATC. If you can't see what is going on you err on the side of caution, you don't clear a plane you can't see to takeoff in front of a plane you cleared to land that you also cannot see onto a runway that is socked in by weather. ATC screwed this pooch.
Truly astonishing. Wow.
Just wow, only guys who were fully conscious were the FedEx crew. Good for ATC that they don`t keep the LVP procedures, also good for Southwest, radio is something that you don`t need to listen all the time especially when you are departing in dense fog.
*On an editorial note, "Federal Express" was formally changed to FedEx in January 2000.
The paychecks still say "Federal Express Corporation" on them.
No, Federal Express is correct
Loss of CVR data is a missed opportunity to learn more from a close call.
Technology is not a barrier: 3 mics with separate streams, mp3 encoded at 1 MB / min, for a 15 hour flight would be 2700 MB. A 330 GB hard drive from 13 years ago could store over 100 of those long flights.
Going by the requirements of the CVR, which hard drive from 13 years ago is designed to survive a 310 MPH impact?
I agree. At this stage and age one would think airliners would be equipped with some sort of secondary (backup/alternate) digital CVR, recording audio and data for hundreds of hours onto solid state media whose files get uploaded to the cloud automatically. There are lots of red tape, legal and privacy concerns before something like this could become mandatory on commercial aircraft, if ever. The time-limited black box will always remain as the primary (and maybe only) CVR device for incident/accident analysis.
@@davidb4113 It's like how many swimming pools full, or football fields long. A hard drive would fail in turbulence.
I heard that there could be pushback from the pilot's unions over recording and storing CVR data indefinitely. If there wasn't an incident to trigger saving the data, they don't want cockpit conversations to be kept around at all. That's one of the reasons why pilots erase the data after an uneventful flight.
@@whitelobster1ify that's it. As a pilot, I'd concerned about that too.
In Europe or indeed anywhere else in the world aircraft are not cleared to land until they are number one and no other traffic is on the runway. Regardless if CAT I, II og III
This could have been so bad.
Reading through the docket, I wonder if the controller forgot to take the engine run-up into account when clearing Southwest for takeoff. Southwest is (in?)famous for taxiing at relatively high speeds and rolling immediately once cleared. The controller likely assumed Southwest would be well off the runway by the time FedEx landed. That said, obviously a delay of a few minutes to allow FedEx to land before clearing Southwest would have been the correct call, and the controller's colleagues and supervisors, in their interviews, indicate they were very surprised he didn't hold Southwest, and that they would have.
Now NTSB just needs to figure out the commonalities between this incident and the dozens of other incursions experienced across the country in the last few years.
The controller did not "forget", the PIC or PM of the Southwest plane did not notify them of the need for extra time to complete the run-up, unless that happened prior to the recording presented here. If the controller knew he had traffic on final and needed Southwest to move it he should have included the words "immediate" or "no delay" in his take-off clearance. That would have given the Southwest pilots the ability to reject the clearance if they knew they needed extra time. Most of these issue, not all, but most seem to include controllers making mistakes in anticipating separation. It has been a while since I looked, but I could have sworn ATC guidelines will not allow controllers to anticipate separation in low visibility situations at airports, but for the life of me I cannot remember the rules. I guess I will have to look them up when I have time. Not sure why Southwest reported they were ready to depart while still taxiing on bravo. Assuming the controller could not see the plane, I would bet he assumed the Southwest plane was at the hold short line when he made that call. When that controller cleared Southwest, they still had 20.000 feet+ of separation. I have not seen the docket, but if the other controllers are saying they would not clear Southwest in that circumstance (assuming they believed they were at the hold short line and actually ready to go) I don't believe them. I see/hear clearances like this all the time.
@@KuostA You should be careful about trying to fit your pet "cause" into every problem. No idea when this controller or pilot were hired, no idea if they are qualified or not. A controller hired in the past two years, for example, would likely still be in training, meaning someone would be sitting with him/her. After completing training at OKC, they will sit with someone for an extended period of time before they are certified.
Out of curiosity, which other situations involved DEI? I can't recall any.
@@KuostA Something more interesting than DEI (IMO) is the AUS tower is currently at 78% staffing level and 20% of their staff are trainees. On average for the current staff it takes 1.81 years to get certified (after OKC training). Staffing levels across the country are like this.
@@KuostA Its really amazing how you were able to isolate DEI as a cause. Tell me, do you know when this controller was hired? What their work experience is? How long they've worked Austin tower? Educational background? Age/race/nationality/sexual orientation? I mean you'd probably need all that information to point to DEI so I'm just super curious how you figured all of that out
@@overhead18 Excerpted from the NTSB report. I suggest you read it in full before trying to assert otherwise. Interview of controller:
NTSB investigator(question condensed as it was asked twice and not understood the first time): "Are there standard operating procedures that talk about how to handle situations with low visibility on the runway?"
Controller: "Yeah"
NTSB Investigator: What are they?
Controller: "I couldn't recall them for you"
NTSB Investigator(question asked twice differently as not understood the first time): Can you describe the purpose of SMGCS(Surface Movement Guidance Control System)/Can you describe it at a high level, what it is?
Controller: I could not, I know it is a system we use here. And this is the first facility I've been to with SMGCS(note: he had been there almost five years).
They have to fix those voice recorder issues
What do you believe might have been on the CVR that would have made a difference to the investigation of this incident?
Well done FedEx; the other two not so much...
It is surprising to hear that some International airpots in the US still don't have ground radar in 2023 - interesting and sounds like a very high risk
2 miles of separation is 10,000+ft.
If the visibility was that bad shouldn’t the SWA aircraft been told to hold at the ILS critical hold line before holding short so as not to interfere with the ILS signal?
Likely where they were when they called holding short.
3 mile final is too late for takeoff clearance
Pretty tired of hearing the CVR was overwritten
SOP says save it after an incident, does it not?
how many times did we have near misses and accidents because of no ground-detection radar.. how many times did they recommend it's installations?
this is a major airport right? because, whilst I can see small airports having real difficulty in purchasing and installing such a system, that really should not be an issue for any major airport having multiple jumbo flights a day... in such a case, it should really be a requirement,
This whole incident was ridiculous just listening to the audio and now watching the animation makes it even more ridiculous that this even happened. The low visibility considered is even more of a reason why this should not have happened.
Will the board meeting for this report be posted here?
It’s long past time to greatly extend the duration of flight recorders and the preservation interval as well. Even a simple USB stick could back up data, which would be useful in all but the worst scenarios.
It's not a technical issue. The Air Line Pilots Association has been lobbying against any increase in recording time. They also opposed the increase from 30 minutes to the current requirement of 2 hours.
@@ignorance72 obviously there must be some groups opposed but this is objectively the right thing to do. The flying public has a right to expect factual analysis of errors, and the trade off is that they don’t get sued. This safety model has worked well (compare and contrast with the litigation in the medical sector that has never worked well because it incentivizes staying silent). Time to get this done.
Someday there will be something possibly hockey puck shaped that you could put on an object such as an airplane and track its movements on the ground. Since it's at an airport, they could call it an air tag or something.
They already have the ADSB system for tracking, not sure why Austin doesn’t have it.
Uh, you are not holding short with a right turn and a taxi to go. The Southwest pilot caused this incident and ATC thinking that Southwest will put petal to the metal because that's what they do. Not that that's a bad thing. The bad thing is the lie.
LOL. "Petal"... makes it sound all flowery. 😛
I said this to a family member: ATC probably had an expectation bias when it comes to SWA because they quite often taxi as if they are trying to get to a store before it closes. That’s their normal operation. So ATC likely believed, even in reduced visibility, that the SWA flight was closer to the runway than it was and would be airborne soon after the takeoff clearance. Repetitive exposure had the controller’s thought process in the normal ops mode when it came to the SWA flight.
The controller seems to me very tired or bored
Total insanity to allow a take off and land at the same time on the same runway.
Literally happens every day. The insane part is doing it in CAT3 conditions.
Quick question, does the run-up have to be done on the runway or could it have been done on the taxiway prior to reporting they're at the hold short point?
The procedure varies by engine model but you need to push the engines to a high power setting so doing that on a taxiway perpendicular to a runway you shouldn't enter would be a bad idea.
I believe SW requires a static takeoff when engine anti icing is being used, so it would have to be on the runway.
Is "no delay" in the takeoff clearance standardized at all? I was surprised the ATC didn't say that
ATC shouldnt have cleared them for takeoff. I dont see the point. You have no visual of the runway and you are trying to squeeze SWA out with traffic on a 3 mile final for what? Its not like the airport was busy. I swear some of these controllers just make their lives harder and stressful for no reason. Just let the FDX land and exit first. SWA is delayed what 3 min? And will still reach its destination ontime....The system is broken and begging for an accident
No delay could have been issues here for SW but it wasn't, however, the ATC should not have cleared and airplane he couldn't see, to take off on a runway he couldn't see in front of an airplane he couldn't see that he'd already cleared to land. ATC screwed the pooch hard here but, SW is known for their no delay takeoffs so the controller probably was expecting the same this time as well. ATC's assumption almost ended in tragedy.
Of course it would be better to not clear SWA at all, but given that the controller knew it would be a squeeze and cleared anyway, it would have helped SWA's situational awareness to explicitly remind them of the squeeze
CVR overwritten. If only I could buy something at walmart the size of my fingernail that could store hours and hours of CVR audio.
It's not a technical issue. The Air Line Pilots Association has been lobbying against any increase in recording time. They also opposed the increase from 30 minutes to the current requirement of 2 hours.
@@ignorance72 Oh it can't be technical issue..pilots want to record over. The recent AA 777 incursion at JFK-the plane departed for Europe-so no records available. Terrible for the investigation, the pilots want it that way.
How long before a cockpit voice recorder overwrites ?
@@sncy5303 In this day and age that seems unnecessarily limited.
www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/ASR1804.pdf
@@jameschristiansson3137 It's not a technical issue. The Air Line Pilots Association has been lobbying against any increase in recording time. They also opposed the increase from 30 minutes to the current requirement of 2 hours.
@@sncy5303 The FAA is actively trying to increase the recording time as we speak, but they're getting strong pushback from the ALPA. See my previous comment.
Quick question. Why the eff can't the controller see the planes on his display... you would think something like that would be important. It's almost as if ATC is a 100 year old garbage system that should have been automated 40 years ago
Southwest pilots should have been fired. Simple math tells you an aircraft doing 120 mph is covering 2 miles a minute. FedEx was only 3 miles out and doing at least 120 mph. They should have known they would be cutting it close and waited for FedEx to land. The fact that SW sat there for 19 seconds running up their engines tells you these two pilots had absolutely no situational awareness as to what was going on. They even failed to abort their takeoff when instructed by the tower. Factor in the weather conditions makes it even worse.
FedEx was the one calling for the abort, not the controller. By that time Southwest had passed V1 and was unable to abort. This was 100% on the controller for ever clearing Southwest to enter the runway with the FedEx was on short final.
@@stephenj4937 correct. Fedex did Tower's job for a second there. Tower seemed clueless, didn't react to go around and approved SWA right turnout like nothing had happened.
The anti-ice run up protocol will need some tweaking sounds like. Can it be done at the hold short position?
naw. the ATC shouldn't have planes taking off while an approaching aircraft is doing a CATIII ILS
Just an observation, the animation cuts off some of the most important aspects.
Who cleared SWA 708 to taxi to 18L, where is the instruction to hold short of the critical area?
What is the weather, visibility/ ceiling at which critical area has to be protected?
CATIII autoland approach in progress and SWA 708 enters not only the critical area but gets cleared to occupy the runway 18L?
Just some of these silly questions…
SWA 708 never queries the controller about critical area….
The ILS critical area is on the east side of 18L, where the glideslope antennas are.
Ok, since most of you don’t seem to understand ATC procedures allow me to explain a few things! I edited this as I’m not rated in a B737, so I didn’t know about the anti ice requirements! Thanks for that info.
Most importantly, the controller never should have allowed SWA to depart because FEDEX was inside the outer marker. This is a blatant violation of the 7110.65 sec 3-7-5!
Finally, the ils critical area is on the other side of where SWA was. And yes, the runway is part of that critical area! My experience, 30 years ATC terminal, tower and radar!
Except, my aircraft & company require a standing takeoff (I.e. engine run up) when visibility is low and/or engine anti ice is required.
It did need an engine run up in this case due to anti-ice.
Thanks for that, I did not know that.
You really do need ground radar!
Gonna say, I suspect this is going to be one of the recommendations made, particularly if the fog is frequent.
That was a bawhair from a Tenerife Mk II
What I dont understand is what is the infatuation from controllers of lining planes up or clearing them to take off when the airport isnt busy. It literally looks like little traffic at KAUS at this time of morning. If a plane is on a 5 mile final just let them land. What is the reason for trying to squeeze one more plane in before a landing A/C? Also why are are still clearing planes to land when the runway isnt actually clear? I guess people have to die before we finally make a change? ridiculous
Armchair hindsight takes like these are always funny to me. Why did he clear him for takeoff? Because he claimed he was holding short ready to go. If that were actually the case, he would have had plenty of time to depart before the landing traffic. Use your brain
@@marsthedude1 how about you use your brain. I was clearly implying this happens all the time. Also it doesn't matter if he thought SWA was holding short. Did you even watch the video? The controller cleared the SWA for TO with traffic on a 3 mile final thus my original point "squeezing" a departure in for no reason at all.
Didint the controller say to SW abort? (The takeoff)
Why then wasn't he called out for pilot deviation?
FedEx 767 told SW to Abort as they almost landed on the 737. FedEx TOGA and saved everyone's lives
No, it was FedEx who called for Southwest to abort, not the tower.
No, it was the FDX pilot telling SWA to abort since they (Fedex) were right above them (SWA).
@@jonathankleinow2073 are you sure? Maybe listen to it again.
@@mendel5106 It is written in the NTSB's preliminary report (DCA23FA149)
Dayum NTSBgov, still only 720p in 2024? D:
That's not a runway incursion. That's a controller screw up 100%!
Feds covering for the controller here. Assumptions must be made by ATC in such conditions. The instrument critical area exists for a reason. The controller's faint plea, "Southwest 708 are you on the roll?" says it all. The garbage about radar coverage not extending below 800 feet being a cause is weak. Pilots did as directed. Controller should wake up and observe the situation more carefully. It is not practical for ground radar to be installed at every airport. Operations in dense fog can operate without it but someone needs to see the big picture.
🦁🦁🦁🦁🦁 THE LION WAS HERE 🦁🦁🦁🦁🦁 No. 74
When is FAA going to mandate longer recycle times on the FDR’s?
CVR I think you mean?
@@TheDanieltoye Exactly, my mind is not clear these days! Thanks!
They need to extend CVR recordings, possible uplink to cloud storage. Furthermore upgrade the sonar pings. 30 days is just not long enough.
Yeas, exactly. There have been so many incidents for which preserved CVR recordings would have been helpful. The AC nearly landing on top of a line of aircraft on a taxiway at SFO comes to mind.
No technological reason there can't be a minimum 24-hour loop for the CVR; I'm guessing it might be a pilot union issue?
Industry safety enhancement trumps individual disciplinary concerns, sorry.
The process was recommended December of last year by the FAA, currently going through the Review process. Just needed to type your question into google.
Controller should’ve never cleared the southwest plane on the runway with a cat three approach in progress so close to the runway
Wow! So many things went wrong here. Kudos to FedEx.
Thank god for the Fedex crew.
Too bad the controller had not given SWA an **immediate takeoff** directive.
Well then SWA would have had to answer they were unable to do so.
@@aesma2522 That is correct. They were part of the problem (SWA cockpit crew). They were told FedEx was 4-miles final. IMC conditions prevailed from what I believe. They needed to do spool-up for bleed air to anti-ice, when on RW. They could have declined takeoff clearance whether one we heard or an **immediate takeoff** directive. SWA problem is they are always in too big a hurry.
(1) FAA & USG should have installed ground proximity radar; (2) controller should have cleared SWA for “ immediate “ takeoff; (3) SWA knew or should have known that the FedEx on a CAT 3 approach was closing in and that they didn’t have time for a 20-30 second run up and that they couldn’t been seen by the FEDEX flight. SAW lost situational awareness.
To me, both the controller and the Southwest pilots were at fault. 1) The controller should never have cleared SWA to take-off in such low visibility conditions with another plane on final. 2) The SWA pilots should NOT have stopped on the runway. They should've known that if FDX was on a 3 mile final, and they needed time for a run-up, they should have rejected the takeoff clearance and waited for FDX to land. If the controller was determined to depart the SWA first, he should've cleared them for "immediate take-off" with no delay. Unacceptable.
Thank you NTSB. This could have been very bad.
my videogame was in that plane!
A couple of issues: The controller sounds like he is fatigued and does not have a firm grasp of the SA on either aircraft. The fog and weather played a factor. The SWA flight reported they were ready and holding short of 18L way before they were actually at that location which was not in S.O.P. and gave the impression to ATC that they had more time in the sequencing then they actually did. FedEx should not have called for the abort of SWA as this caused confusion. Only ATC can issue deviations or aborts to a flight. FedEx should have said "Aircraft on the runway, unable to land, going around. SWA should have never reported they were ready on the hold short point for 18L when they were still 200 feet from that point and should have done a better job at monitoring the radio. What was going on in the cockpit of SWA that this didnt take place? We will never know because the data recorder was over written. My guess is that it was not a sterile cockpit as required by SOP. We are in for a Tehnerife style catastrophe in this country, especially at an airport with NO surface detection radar or equipment with poor or no visibility, just as in the accident at Tenerife that killed over 500 people.
It's coming NTSB and you better act before then. We have a ton of new pilots and new ATC personnel in the system right now which is not a good combination. The inexperience level is going to bite us and the unprofessional activities going on in ATC centers and towers across this country is adding fuel to the crisis. We have allowed distractions of every kind to infiltrate our control towers and ATC centers from public tours, to cell phones at the work stations, to radios and T.V.'s being on. The FAA and NTSB needs to investigate and get control of this before we end up putting two planes together on a runway and killing hundreds of people. It's coming if we dont act swiftly and effectively.
Controller fatigue was not a factor according to NTSB. ATC had incorrect mental model of SWA and made incorrect assumptions. The chair of the NTSB shares your concerns and said in her statement today that incursions were trending in the wrong direction. NTSB can only make recommendations though. Hopefully this close call and this NTSB report pushes folks that can act, to act.
All accurate. You also forgot the implementation of DEI within ATC and it's impact on their caliber. Thiis is a prime example of that, in addition to countless others recently.
@@KuostA That's funny, I heard the ATC guy as a middle-aged, heterosexual, married, white male. You must be really skilled at determining someone's skin color, racial background, sexual orientation and religious preferences just from listening to their radio voice /s
@@jaywung7616 lawl u blatantly heard wrong.
@@KuostA How does this incident show failures in DEI?
Oh okay cool well you’re going to have a long list of fun animations to make of all these runway incursions and crap going on these days, it’s kind of becoming a weekly event. It’d be nice if someone could look into that maybe
Hope the controller was drug tested.