Yes, but neither is Drachinifel, nor any other Naval Historian. Drach's Drydock yesterday has a quote that ends with "...and every politician, even after a Treaty that shutters most Naval Ship Producrion for over a decade... seems to somehow believe that in 10, 15, or 20 years, that Infrastructure at the Dockyards will simply still be there, ready to go at moment's notice..." Pretty much the same concept.
Anything involving the IJN and more resources to do anything. Would also require Order 66-ing the IJA. As the interservice rivalry would mean that the IJA would protest heavily against it. Up to and including the junior officer corps on both sides starting their own mini war.
With respect, I would disagree on some of the points with the RM, particularly keeping in mind the date of January 1939. With respect to fuel and ammunition, the relevant choices had already been made. The increased tolerances on ammunition manufacture allowed in the 1930s was ended in 1937. It is rather telling the the investigations just prior to Italy's entry into the war didn't find ammunition to be an issue, but rather issues with the FTP systems on older ships. With regards to fuel, the decision to stockpile had already been made, and through 1939 and 1940 most of the limited amount of material the navy could still import into the country was petroleum products for fuel and lubricants - explicitly at the expense of steel and other raw material needed for building programs. This is why the RM was able to mass two million tons of fuel by June 1940, while construction programs like those of the Capitani Romani foundered. At that point, it is hard to do much to change the navy's fortunes in the war, as many of the key decisions that come down to the navy's choices along have already been made in the period from 1935 through 1938. Perhaps the only unilateral decision they could make that would have impact would be to throw more resources at the radar program and expanding the navy's electronics department - though really that also is something that should have been done in 1936. The fundamental move that could have been made in January 1939 needs to come from the top, because it has to break the back of the air force's arguments against the RM having aircraft, the air force seriously investing in operations over the open water, and the adoption of torpedo bombers over high level bombing. That last point *did* happen in 1939 historically, but only in September 1939. As such the first torpedo bomber unit was only formed in July 1940, and became operational in August 1940 - with just five aircraft, reduced to four after the first mission. The second was only formed at the end of the year, so for almost all of the second half of 1940 Italy had just four torpedo-bombers to throw at the Royal Navy, and lacked them in appreciable numbers until the late spring/summer of 1941. If that decision had been made in January of 1939 rather than September, such a force would have existed nine months sooner and much about the summer of 1940 would likely have been very different for the British. Beyond that, I wholeheartedly agree on the point of improving reconnaissance capabilities by the air force. That, and aircraft-to-ship links for air force reconnaissance aircraft (allowing them to communicate directly with admirals at sea rather than having to go through both chains of command), would have greatly improved the effectiveness of Italian reconnaissance and likely would have helped them make contact on many opportunities where they were unable to, due to reconnaissance issues. I would go so far as to say that would the most important thing, bar none, to fix, prior to the war. No matter how effective a fighting force, a force that cannot find the enemy reliable cannot fight the enemy.
I'm sensing a pattern about nations and their infrastructure hmmm... Also the idea of Japan announcing the Yamatos like the second coming of HMS Dreadnought is pretty funny but at he same time cool, until it gets sink by a carrier.
Why did Russia invade Ukraine? Yep, you’ve got it. Infrastructure. There’s a whole history of economic decisions made by the Soviets after WW2 that I intend to deal with on my channel, when I figure out why my mic usb interface will talk to GarageBand but not Filmora or Photo Booth.
To quote a Danish minister of finance “There are two kinds of European nations. There are small nations and there are countries that have not yet realized they are small nations.”
About the IJN announcing Yamato and Musashi in 1939, I don't think the KGVs are cancelled because besides being mostly done, they're the only modern fast battleships the RN has. Germany still have S&G, B&T. Italy has the Littorios. Take in the time to draft a design, get the guns build, get the armour forged, get it laid down, built, launched, fitted out and commissioned, you're looking at 1944 at the earliest. 5 years minimum before there's a "super-Lion" to match Yamato.
I love the IJN, but the madness and lack of foresight are shocking. Some of the most innovative vessels. Italy almost had it, just some little fast DDs. The German fleet with the Stromtinger’s mortar and sonar! That’s a scary thought.
IJN: 1) train a reserve of carrier pilots (including getting combat experience in China). 2) build up a proper WMR of carrier aircraft (including not shutting down production of a strike aircraft, before the replacement machine was ready to go into production -perhaps that was 1941, not 1939).
IJN carrier pilots did in fact perform sorties from CVs / CVLs against Chinese land targets. IJN pilots were the best trained in the world in 1939. Thankfully Japan's disposable soldier mentality meant lots of them drowned instead of getting rescued. You see, Japanese floatplanes were dedicated to reconnaissance, not air sea rescue. US floatplans (not flying boats!) were exclusively for air sea rescue with armed SBDs for scouting. US doctrine here was correct though IJN doctrine of running carriers in groups was better than the U.S. doctrine. Once the US learned to group up all their carriers in task forces there was no stopping them.
@@QuizmasterLaw Yes, I am aware of that - I am suggesting that it was within the IJN's (economically limited) capacity to train up a reserve of pilots, so that losses of their highly trained aircrew in 1942 (particularly at Midway) did not progressively turn their carrier air arm into the bumbling novices of the 1944 Mariana's turkey shoot. Had they at least built up a reserve of skilled aircrew, and WAR aircraft, equivalent to the say 120-140 aircraft of one fleet carrier division (2 ships), they would have had some capacity to swap carrier air groups in and out of combat, allowing some rest, and also allowing the experienced aircrew to train replacements up to an acceptable level. They would have had an alternative to putting their last experienced carrier air group ashore on Rabaul in 1943, where it was wasted away over the Solomons. These were things which, in general terms, were foreseeable in 1939 (and '40-41), buit they didn't do it. As it was, a number of their smaller carriers went to war carrying A5M Claudes instead of A6M Reisen.
@@ianwalter62 The Japanese war machine was stretched to the limit literally fighting from the Indo Tibetan frontier all the way through Manchuria then out to the Aleutians and down sweeping in an arc to Guadalcanal and back up through New Guinea. There were no personnel avaliable or frankly materiel with which to train them. What you imagine to have been possible wasn't, at least not in the war waged.
@@ianwalter62 Thanks, though, even in 1940 the Japanese empire was stretched to the breaking point. The navy was the last uncommitted force and had in fact been active in the war against China.
If Japan revealed the Yamato's to the world in a "Don't screw with us" message, how viable would it have been for the RN simply pulled the G3 and N3 designs off the shelf and do a crash build response with those existing designs? Particularly with the G3, the design is complete and sat on the shelf (Literally). The guns have even been built for the Nelson's and presumably the engine design was complete, perhaps even use a newer design that's previously been built. The secondary 6" guns are in use on Leander/Arethusa, the AA guns are typical fit. Sure the Yamato's still wander around for several years without equal, but at least the RN could crash build a couple of G3's then pull in Nelson/Rodney to have an engine swap to boost their speed closer to 28 knots to make them a 3/4 G3. The logistics of ammo exist etc, and that then gives the RN something to at least offer a threat. I'm not sure if the N3 design was as mature as the G3 and the guns are new build (Unless Furious' gun design could be used?), but throw a couple of those in to give a 2 x N3, 2 x G3, 2 x fast Nel/Rods. Add in an emergency program to upgrade the KGVs to 15"/45, plus Hood and 1. it simplifies the RN shell logistics from three shell types to two, and 2. has the advantage of not having to design/redesign a new ship in response to the Yamato's being revealed so would be a faster response and 3. that sounds like a scary fleet even without considering the QE's, R's and Renown/Repulse. Is that a practical option or are there other factors such as infrastructure (Ie yard space/slipway to handle them)?
Did the German destroyer guns make sense if they were looking to fight the contre torpilleurs? They were big enough that you actually might want the big punch to fight them on even terms
Aren't the Kageros a bit slender for an ASW type? I always feel a beamier design would be better as, while not as fast it would be more manoeuvrable and have more volume for equipment.
they're a start, yes they're not perfect, but in the time taken to design, tool and start that, you could have built several adapted Kageros, so on balance that was where I chose to go.
I suppose the £1m question is what is the role of the KM supposed to be in 1939? They can't outbuild the British so their best case is preventing a WWI style blockade. They can't do that with the battle fleet so Die Junge Schule (German for Jeune École)? On the other hand if they're only going to fight the French then having a large surface force in the Atlanticto attack trade makes sense..
One more thing for all the axis powers develop an effective dual purpose antiaircraft gun. Like let’s say A 5’38. They could have just licensed them from the US. The Japanese could have licensed the aa from Sweden. 20 and 40 mm.
Japan's under an embargo and Germany winds up embargoed too. That just leaves furtive sales to Spain and Italy until the Italians foolishly join the war effort. Sorry, the USA isn't That stupid!
Sythetic fuel from coal only works for petrol. That's one factor why the Wehrmacht went for petrol engines in their tanks, although they literally invented Diesel. I'm pretty sure you can't produce diesel fuel or fuel oil from coal, but I stand to be corrected.
I can't help seeing the irony of describing Italian industry as bespoke with what they are producing as high quality then saying the biggest issue as quality control in ammunition
strange but true, with the mass production they had issues with not enough quality control, with the line production they had issues with almost a quality to the point of being unique... so buy your fighter or vehicle from the Italians, but your amunition from the Germans, or perferably the Swedes, would be good advice for small nations prior to WWII.
"We COULD build infrastructure . . . but that would mean taxing the rich and respectable . . . and they'd rather not, thank you very much." Ad infinitum. And so today's Rossiyan navy-"all show and no go", as we used to say in the states.
Japan also did not have enough shipping. The evidence is they did know that shipping that they had gotten pre embarargo was not showing up, but they aparently they did not realise that shipping was transferring to the Atlantic, or just did not care, because they aparently expected to capture more shipping than actualy existed in Hong Kong and Singapore and DEI add that capacity in there initial estimates.
Not sure the KGVs would have been stopped if Japan announces the Yamatos as, while they would have been outclassed in the Pacific the RN needed the KGVs for the Med, North Sea & Atlantic.
If the Italians know that they are going to end up fighting the RN then in 1939 probably their best bet would be expanding the small/special forces units as they ultimately did a lot of damage in WWII but were limited by the size of the units involved.
I specifically chose January 1939 as by that date war looked to be close. The wording however wasn’t the best. Unfortunately Patreon has a junky text editor. My personal take is that all of the major navies were short on minor combatants in 1939, so all could have started building earlier. All were also short of critical intelligence. An investment in Naval Intelligence early could have huge paybacks. R&D is an issue especially for the Axis navies. Hire a couple of dozen scientists and engineers above and beyond. Run the as a checksum team, give them the same data and see if they reach the same answer. I’m really looking forward to your coverage of the minor Allied and Axis navies. The minor navies have to get mucho creative, and some of their stuff like the Terrible Twins was incredible, even if there was too little of it.
Well when the Germans stopped production on the two H39s, and in particular the more complete of the two to focus on Graf Zeppelin, if you abuse future knowledge that Hermann Göring is never going to give you the aircrafts necessary for it even if you complete Graf Zeppelin scrapping Graf Zeppelin and completing at least the more complete of the H39s possibly makes more sense than getting Graf Zeppelin basically finished but not having aircraft or pilots for it because Göring insists everything that flies is his. As much as the Royal Navy got it's knickers in a wad over Bismarck and Tirpitz how do they react to H 39 out there rocking 16" guns? If H39 is completed I don't know that the Royal Navy is going to be happy about taking a KGV against it and the Nelrods are too slow
If I was in the Italian navy. I think I would negotiate the purchase of some German tactical medium bombers. Then negotiate with local affairs to replace them. Why? Because you have identified a need. A need to locate hostile task forces and lone shipping vessels. To thus grant your own navy the ability to use aerial recon with planes. However loitering time will be limited, so clearly when finding lone transports, instead of waiting the few hours for a Destroyer to show up, clearly the recon should transport a few bombs on board to blow up weak transports. And I would train the air group at exactly that role. It's not like we need to scout the entire Med either, just the bit south of Italy. And the ability to send out patrols from a planned point central to the bottom of the nation would allow you to go out and hunt Royal Navy task forces to vector neighborhood assets to engage. Thus with one single air group trained in a specialist role, we get navy strike against poorly defended targets, recon elements to plan offensives, and recon potential to locate threats specific to the task. And while weather can preclude some choices, it wouldn't be hard to do the whole directional radio trick the British used for vectoring into a good landing position and finding your way home with just two static emplacements. And you can send out 4 or 5 scout aircraft into a region to locate every ship by each flying at a suitable distance. And given the small size of such a unit, the Naval admirals in charge would fight tooth and nail to not lose the utility back into a 'generic Italian air force' role. Of course the Admirals would need to learn not to cripple the 30 or so aircraft unit trying to bomb out Malta. Which I doubt will work. But if I scream loudly enough and paint big enough words on the commanding officers wall saying 'for use against undefended targets of opportunity, not fortified positions or protected task forces, leave that to the other Idiots' maybe they will remember occasionally.
I can't help wondering whether the japanese shouldn't have really gone overboard into the code breaking - at the end of the day whether you go for Kentai Kessen or you are looking to defend your resource area then the best way to do it is know where the enemy is going to strike and if you know their force composition you can best work out how to counter it. The other thing that they could have got from Germany would be radar.....
they did work on code breaking chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com/2012/07/japanese-codebreakers-of-wwii.html & had radar www.ozatwar.com/sigint/section22.htm ... we just don't hear that much about them
@DrClarke for the Germans I would have gone more rapid firing DDs , stuck the 9.2s on the panzerschif & mass built the scharnhorst with both the 11s & 15s utilizing the extra mass for AA on the 11s. Completely agree with Japan should have just laid them out on table & said oh btw were building these have fun. My older brother would agree with you on the Regina Marine. Keep up the great work, take care & best wishes as always doctor
Not only more rapid firing DDs but smaller ones thus more of them. Also a simpler engine layout would have benefitted them since they simply lacked the material to produce reliable high-end high pressure steam turbines.
9:14 this is literally the first time I've seen Dr. Clarke angry. Wow! Let's hope current NATO+ naval decision making is better than that of the IJN in 1937-1941.
"Frigatting Fudgesicle" Expletive indicating mild disbelief with an underlying tone of "schools have obviously failed you". Usage: "Frigatting Fudgesicles, Tovey! It's a bow-pronounced 'ow' as in 'owie' not 'oh' as in 'Boat'!"
The head of the Japanese Air Force in China when asked after the war when he knew he was going to loose the war said that he knew the war was over when the new generation of fighter that was going to be high enough to go after B29s was delivered to him on ox drawn cart.
Was there any argument in the IJN in 1937 that they would have been better off building let's say, four 45,000 ton aircraft carriers rather than four Yamatos given their dockyard situation? After all, both the IJN and U.S. navy had years of experience with very large aircraft carriers.
no, aircraft in 1937 were not what they were in 1941 and certainly not what they were in 1945 - there is a vast development in technological use, doctrine, capability and numbers which really change the scenario. Although I do get what you are saying and it certainly would have been interesting.
The Japanese didn’t lay down four Yamatos in 1937-1938: they laid down two Yamatos (Musashi in 1938) and the two Shokakus. Shinano and the other never-complete Yamato were laid down in 1940, in Shinano’s case in the same dock Shokaku had just vacated.
2:30 oh yeh still a new viewer of this channel , couldn't agree more if a history book gives a warm fuzzy sensation it wasn't a serious history book , a proper history book should enrage your modern sensibilities and logic based assumptions . I remember reading a book about Sandakan it was horrific .
I do have a problem with your insistence in crash building and stockpiling of things in January 1939, It only make sence if you KNOW a war will start in September 1939 which you shouldn't. Announcing the existence of the Yamato's could easily blow up in the Japanese's faces. It could very easily panic the US government in opening the money taps and crash build a similar response in greater numbers or if the air minded Admirals get there way, begin the Essex swarm production earlier and quicker. The British response would be to quickly dust off the excellent N3 designs and upgrade the engines for more speed with perhaps a longer 18inch gun. Building a Scharnhorst swarm cannot be done in January1939 as the Anglo-German naval Treaty fixed the Germans to 35% of the RN's numbers and Hitler didn't denounce the Treaty till 28/4/1939, so building a large number of BB ships earlier and in violation of the Treaty would spur the British and French programs. One of the German's biggest flaws was over engineering everything to get the most out of the displacement at the expense of reliability while the Japanese approach was to build so lightly the ships couldn't withstand combat or even weather damage. I feel a huge weakness in the Japanese is strategic incompetence. They thought of themselves as Warriors!!!!! and not as professional Naval Officers, Their objective was more in line with winning a battle, not a long term war which requires a degree of cold blooded logic, not just warrior fighting spirit which they thought only they possessed.
John the started the Build Program for the Flowers & Hunts in June 1939, Henderson had proposed similar programs based around sloop construction in 1938, 1936 & 1934... honestly considering they were planning on being ready for war in 1942 and even small ships taking a year to two to build + equal time to work out, suggesting starting the build 5 months early is probably the least controversial thing I'm making the case for. 😉 although I can see why you say that considering the traditional history on those things being war emergency builds, rather than starting months before war began.
I disagree about publishing the Yamatos. The us would just have switched to the 16” 50 cal on all the new ships. The British would just have planned pack tactics because that’s what the RN does. The RN takes down superior ships with a pack of inferior ships. The RN would also have started building 19 inch battle ships. The biggest thing the Japanese needed to do was ditch the Kansas Kessen theory. If your plan is one big battle the you don’t need infrastructure or anti submarine capability, or the ability to replace airmen losses. The Japanese were racist about the western powers. They Thought one punch and the western nations would quit like the Russians did. They needed to triple their aircrew training capability. Bigger pool for losses, more trained aircrew coming on line. Make plans for anti submarine warfare and convoys. Make peace between battleship, carrier admirals and the army.
The only way Japan would ditch the Kantai Kassen doctrine is for it to lose in Tsushima, practicality impossible considering the shenanigans of the Baltic Fleet, it's so ingrained to them that the IJN wouldn't be the IJN without it, imagine the Royal Navy but without Trafalgar. It's 1930s everyone racist to one another so I doubt the mentality has anything to do with it. But I do agree that the most realistic approach they could do is follow Yamamoto plan of expanding the kido butai and his planned giant submarines. But it still won't be enough to defeat the US, there are many problems to Japan carrier training program, namely it's not flexible, not even Yamamoto is immune to that. It would however make the war in the Pacific bloodier and, to a ship enthusiast, pretty amazing.
@@leogazebo5290 I agree it would have been incredibly hard to ditch Kantai Kassen . But that would be the only way to get the other necessary changes done. So long as you believe in one decisive battle you are not going to invest in infrastructure.
They also should've moved/built more refineries in the south instead of shipping all the oil to japan to then be refined. That way they wouldn't be so low on fuel and have training be done closer to their source of fuel giving them enough to properly train their pilots without risking their cargo ships as much. They just focused too much industry on their home islands which barley had any of the resources they needed.
2-3 kgv's would probably beat the yamato 14 inch guns higher rate of fire carries more shells less barrel wear kgv got excellent protection plus carries torps plus you could build 2-3 kgv's for every one yamato.
It seems to me[imo?] That the underdog navies trying to come from behind like the Confederate, the germans and the japaneese, is the think we're unable to match numbers so we goo for super ships. Mallory on March 1 had 5 ironclads building and nearly ready to go. In the next 90 days the Virginia had fought a battal lost it port and destroyed to prevent captured two launched three if you count the Richmond and 2 towed to be completed elsewhere and missippi destroyed to prevent capture cause not enough big ships could be found to tow it to safety. And Louisiana used as floating battery with portholes to small to train its guns. Ps forgot the Eastport captured on the tennesee River after fort Henry fell along with 215,000 board feet of lu ber ready to help complete her.. later in the war the small dimond class exemplified by the Albemarle was developed. Had that been the first design at New Orleans instead of unfinished missippie they might of had 20 two gun diamonds in service and 5 building. Instead of lousiana they might have 8bmore dimonds in service and 4 building. Would frigate have even dared to attack? At Memphis instead of one barely launched and one burned on the stocks what if they had 3 in service and two more building would that not have made a huge difference? Instead of the georga used as floating battery bight not two dima do have saved fort polaski?
Hit send button too soon . Imagine if Weehawken and Nahant had faced 5 diamonds? First of all the southern iron class would not have gone aground and been unable to even aim a cannon at the Yankees monitors. Finally at norfork had the virgina not been converted likely the first diamond could have been ready oct 1 a second dec one and a third one march 1 finished not the virgina barely ready to go. Remember the Richmond was launched and towed upriver by may 11 ,what if that had been one finished and a third started, maybe the army generals might have been less likely to surender Gosport. Further had places like Gosport, Island number 10 fort Pulaski and New Orleans held, would not the confederacy gun inventory stayed higher
Please everyones thoughts. Did not meen to get so specific. But what if germany had started the war with 300 subs what if h Japan had started the war with 4 more of their latest fleet carriers. Would ten carriers been enough to knock out perle harbor, maybe emboldened nagoumo to stay for third strike? Or affected the Ceylon raid with 4 extra carriers or out some of midway with 8 japaneese flattops to make the CAP heayer?
And there is ego: of keiretsu; of army vs navy, ... No long term ideas. If admiral A proposes good long term idea than admiral B - or general B :) will kill it. Why should navy take all the credit? And this problem goes all the way back. I agree with the stated, by the way. Point of history is: it rimes so one can take some lessons from it.
With the 8 months of notice (1/1/39-9/1/39), could the Kriegsmarine have accelerated the production and deployment of armed merchant cruisers (like Atlantis, Komet, Thor et al.) over what they ultimately had? Along with more U-boats (and getting Donitz his promotion to Konteradmiral early as well) that would seem to buy the biggest additional punch for a short war (and also if the USN gets to actually test its torpedoes in combat conditions, the Kriegsmarine should get the same benefit).
Could have but to little effect. Basically the earlier successes of the Hilfskreuzer were due to being already at sea or able to break the not yet established blockade. Already by 1942 the blockade was in effect. We can see this in the declining performnace of the Hilfskreuzer over time. Easy to build, and of deadly effect with surprise but once blockaded and no longer surprising were not worth investing further resources in.
They could have, but building/converting merchant cruisers screams 'we're planning to go to war soon' to everyone with the most rudimentary level of intelligence on your naval industry. It would probably have hurt more than helped overall.
@@DERP_Squad thanks I misread his question; KM could not have e.g. built many more or better boats, partly because no one was entirely sure what the optimal boat was. Everyone expected the Type IX/XIV to do much better than it did, no one expected the Einbaum Type I and II to be other than training boats, yet they were in fact effective coastal boats. Regarding the Hilfskreuzer DERP's right, they already were moving as quickly and quietly as possible to convert the half dozen or so auxiliary cruisers, doing more would have attracted foreign eyes. I've really studied the U-Boat war in great detail Germany does NOT have a path to victory. Doenitz wanted to start the war with At Least 300 boats. He got just about 30 because the others were coastal. Basically 20+20 Type VIIs and IXs some of which still fitting out. Hitler didn't expect the war to start in 1939 nor did the KM so plan. The war plans were looking at 1942 as the start date. German war planning when not brilliant and insightful was a complete cock-up. Doenitz did masterfully with about nil resources and Raeder was just bad, Canaris "worse" i.e. a literal spy but it's VERY tough to argue that racists who want to enslave slavs and exterminate jews are somehow other than the bad guys. So that's why the well compartmentalized portions (Doenitz had NO IDEA about the mass murders) do well whereas the leakier parts are Oh. Look. A repeated code group. Let me do that again and again and again Just Following Orders! So yeah, Bletchley had LOT of cribs all right...
@@DERP_Squad My thought was that when the Z-Plan was adopted (predicated on no major war before 1944-45 or even later), the alternative considered was to concentrate on the merchant cruisers, U-boats and the Deutschland-class as preparation for war in the near future, as opposed to battleships et al.
German carriers? Japan would have needed to teach them everything quick or they be sunk. And the 3rd Reich would never allow Japan to teach carrier warfare.
Your idiocy is extremely outclassed by your ego and arrogance. There are so many flaws in your arguments it's astounding, and your incredulity is nauseating. Also your knowledge of naval history I find lacking. For example: The Yamato Classes 18.1" main guns weren't the big threat that you seem to think they were. The US Navy's 16"/50 cal on the Iowa Class were more than a match. They even looked at going with an 18'/47 cal in the mid 30's when they knew Japan wasn't going to be in the next treaty negotiation. They chose the 16" for the Iowa's and the Montana's. Also, your claim that the Graf Zeppelin should have been completed so it could be used to scout for convoy's for the U-Boats is hysterical. No German Capital Ship made more than ONE successful sortie into the Atlantic during the ENTIRE war. And by successful I mean made it back to Germany without being sunk. No German Destroyer had the range to do that kind of escort, so Zeppelin would have to have gone with no ASW defenses. It would have been sunk faster than Bismarck. I think that Doctorate of yours should be returned.
A lot to unpack... The Yamato's are a big threat in the mindset of the 1930s, aviation as a whole, carrier aviation in particular was not yet even in 1939 percieved as what it would become - the battleships were still the big thing and whilst the USN had chosen to go with 16in guns, that is the background of a Treaty system which theoretically limited them to them; and which had resulted in an industrial base which could turn out very good ones. Battleships are still the big queens of the sea in this period, a perception that really won't change till after Midway really, far more than the sinking of Prince of Wales & Repulse did. As you will have heard my point about the Graf Zepplin was about it's aggregate in a task force scenario and it's utility as such, although in the case of this I was also suggesting that it should be completed to a Japanese inspired deck design; the fact is ships even if they didn't make successful forays still tied up an awful lot of allied resources to counter their potential impact and when they did carry out operations they would cause a huge amount of disruption. On the Anti-Submarine Warfare front, the major threat posed by allied submarines would have been on the way in and out, which would have been within range of coverage of the 2,600nmi operating circle of the Type 1936s - although again, as put forward, they would need to buy more, which would be difficult. But perhaps the cheap/cheerful adapted ASW escort I suggest would have been the saving grace if they had pursued such a project - they certainly had the potential.
![Megan Thee Stallion - Roc Steady (feat. Flo Milli) [Official Video]](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/HozPPyqW0dY/mqdefault.jpg)
I feel that Dr. Clarke is not satisfied by any nations infrastructure.
You probably can never be truely satisfied, no matter how much infrastructure you have.
Yes, but neither is Drachinifel, nor any other Naval Historian.
Drach's Drydock yesterday has a quote that ends with "...and every politician, even after a Treaty that shutters most Naval Ship Producrion for over a decade... seems to somehow believe that in 10, 15, or 20 years, that Infrastructure at the Dockyards will simply still be there, ready to go at moment's notice..."
Pretty much the same concept.
The Italians definitely had the most realistic appraisal of their needs and limitations among the Axis powers
Anything involving the IJN and more resources to do anything. Would also require Order 66-ing the IJA. As the interservice rivalry would mean that the IJA would protest heavily against it. Up to and including the junior officer corps on both sides starting their own mini war.
With respect, I would disagree on some of the points with the RM, particularly keeping in mind the date of January 1939.
With respect to fuel and ammunition, the relevant choices had already been made. The increased tolerances on ammunition manufacture allowed in the 1930s was ended in 1937. It is rather telling the the investigations just prior to Italy's entry into the war didn't find ammunition to be an issue, but rather issues with the FTP systems on older ships. With regards to fuel, the decision to stockpile had already been made, and through 1939 and 1940 most of the limited amount of material the navy could still import into the country was petroleum products for fuel and lubricants - explicitly at the expense of steel and other raw material needed for building programs. This is why the RM was able to mass two million tons of fuel by June 1940, while construction programs like those of the Capitani Romani foundered.
At that point, it is hard to do much to change the navy's fortunes in the war, as many of the key decisions that come down to the navy's choices along have already been made in the period from 1935 through 1938. Perhaps the only unilateral decision they could make that would have impact would be to throw more resources at the radar program and expanding the navy's electronics department - though really that also is something that should have been done in 1936.
The fundamental move that could have been made in January 1939 needs to come from the top, because it has to break the back of the air force's arguments against the RM having aircraft, the air force seriously investing in operations over the open water, and the adoption of torpedo bombers over high level bombing. That last point *did* happen in 1939 historically, but only in September 1939. As such the first torpedo bomber unit was only formed in July 1940, and became operational in August 1940 - with just five aircraft, reduced to four after the first mission. The second was only formed at the end of the year, so for almost all of the second half of 1940 Italy had just four torpedo-bombers to throw at the Royal Navy, and lacked them in appreciable numbers until the late spring/summer of 1941. If that decision had been made in January of 1939 rather than September, such a force would have existed nine months sooner and much about the summer of 1940 would likely have been very different for the British.
Beyond that, I wholeheartedly agree on the point of improving reconnaissance capabilities by the air force. That, and aircraft-to-ship links for air force reconnaissance aircraft (allowing them to communicate directly with admirals at sea rather than having to go through both chains of command), would have greatly improved the effectiveness of Italian reconnaissance and likely would have helped them make contact on many opportunities where they were unable to, due to reconnaissance issues. I would go so far as to say that would the most important thing, bar none, to fix, prior to the war. No matter how effective a fighting force, a force that cannot find the enemy reliable cannot fight the enemy.
I'm sensing a pattern about nations and their infrastructure hmmm...
Also the idea of Japan announcing the Yamatos like the second coming of HMS Dreadnought is pretty funny but at he same time cool, until it gets sink by a carrier.
but no one would think that until it actually happened...
Why did Russia invade Ukraine? Yep, you’ve got it. Infrastructure. There’s a whole history of economic decisions made by the Soviets after WW2 that I intend to deal with on my channel, when I figure out why my mic usb interface will talk to GarageBand but not Filmora or Photo Booth.
And now it is working. Luckily Hong Kong support is open when I’m most awake.
To quote a Danish minister of finance “There are two kinds of European nations. There are small nations and there are countries that have not yet realized they are small nations.”
I love how -angry- Alex is at the idiocy of the parties involved here.
About the IJN announcing Yamato and Musashi in 1939, I don't think the KGVs are cancelled because besides being mostly done, they're the only modern fast battleships the RN has. Germany still have S&G, B&T. Italy has the Littorios.
Take in the time to draft a design, get the guns build, get the armour forged, get it laid down, built, launched, fitted out and commissioned, you're looking at 1944 at the earliest. 5 years minimum before there's a "super-Lion" to match Yamato.
I love the IJN, but the madness and lack of foresight are shocking. Some of the most innovative vessels.
Italy almost had it, just some little fast DDs.
The German fleet with the Stromtinger’s mortar and sonar! That’s a scary thought.
Man, this channel is such a refreshing take on history. I have been so tired of the narrative that the axis powers were just some sort of geniuses
IJN:
1) train a reserve of carrier pilots (including getting combat experience in China).
2) build up a proper WMR of carrier aircraft (including not shutting down production of a strike aircraft, before the replacement machine was ready to go into production -perhaps that was 1941, not 1939).
IJN carrier pilots did in fact perform sorties from CVs / CVLs against Chinese land targets.
IJN pilots were the best trained in the world in 1939. Thankfully Japan's disposable soldier mentality meant lots of them drowned instead of getting rescued. You see, Japanese floatplanes were dedicated to reconnaissance, not air sea rescue. US floatplans (not flying boats!) were exclusively for air sea rescue with armed SBDs for scouting. US doctrine here was correct though IJN doctrine of running carriers in groups was better than the U.S. doctrine. Once the US learned to group up all their carriers in task forces there was no stopping them.
@@QuizmasterLaw Yes, I am aware of that - I am suggesting that it was within the IJN's (economically limited) capacity to train up a reserve of pilots, so that losses of their highly trained aircrew in 1942 (particularly at Midway) did not progressively turn their carrier air arm into the bumbling novices of the 1944 Mariana's turkey shoot.
Had they at least built up a reserve of skilled aircrew, and WAR aircraft, equivalent to the say 120-140 aircraft of one fleet carrier division (2 ships), they would have had some capacity to swap carrier air groups in and out of combat, allowing some rest, and also allowing the experienced aircrew to train replacements up to an acceptable level. They would have had an alternative to putting their last experienced carrier air group ashore on Rabaul in 1943, where it was wasted away over the Solomons.
These were things which, in general terms, were foreseeable in 1939 (and '40-41), buit they didn't do it. As it was, a number of their smaller carriers went to war carrying A5M Claudes instead of A6M Reisen.
@@ianwalter62 The Japanese war machine was stretched to the limit literally fighting from the Indo Tibetan frontier all the way through Manchuria then out to the Aleutians and down sweeping in an arc to Guadalcanal and back up through New Guinea. There were no personnel avaliable or frankly materiel with which to train them. What you imagine to have been possible wasn't, at least not in the war waged.
@@QuizmasterLaw We are talking about what steps could have been taken in 1939-41, not 42-3.
@@ianwalter62 Thanks, though, even in 1940 the Japanese empire was stretched to the breaking point. The navy was the last uncommitted force and had in fact been active in the war against China.
If Japan revealed the Yamato's to the world in a "Don't screw with us" message, how viable would it have been for the RN simply pulled the G3 and N3 designs off the shelf and do a crash build response with those existing designs?
Particularly with the G3, the design is complete and sat on the shelf (Literally). The guns have even been built for the Nelson's and presumably the engine design was complete, perhaps even use a newer design that's previously been built. The secondary 6" guns are in use on Leander/Arethusa, the AA guns are typical fit.
Sure the Yamato's still wander around for several years without equal, but at least the RN could crash build a couple of G3's then pull in Nelson/Rodney to have an engine swap to boost their speed closer to 28 knots to make them a 3/4 G3.
The logistics of ammo exist etc, and that then gives the RN something to at least offer a threat.
I'm not sure if the N3 design was as mature as the G3 and the guns are new build (Unless Furious' gun design could be used?), but throw a couple of those in to give a 2 x N3, 2 x G3, 2 x fast Nel/Rods. Add in an emergency program to upgrade the KGVs to 15"/45, plus Hood and 1. it simplifies the RN shell logistics from three shell types to two, and 2. has the advantage of not having to design/redesign a new ship in response to the Yamato's being revealed so would be a faster response and 3. that sounds like a scary fleet even without considering the QE's, R's and Renown/Repulse.
Is that a practical option or are there other factors such as infrastructure (Ie yard space/slipway to handle them)?
Did the German destroyer guns make sense if they were looking to fight the contre torpilleurs? They were big enough that you actually might want the big punch to fight them on even terms
16:00 If Japan had announced the Yamato I think the Iowas would have ended up as what we would call the Montana class Battleships in our timeline
How many slipways did the Germans have for capital ships? I thought it was 3 so struggling to understand where they were building 11
Aren't the Kageros a bit slender for an ASW type? I always feel a beamier design would be better as, while not as fast it would be more manoeuvrable and have more volume for equipment.
they're a start, yes they're not perfect, but in the time taken to design, tool and start that, you could have built several adapted Kageros, so on balance that was where I chose to go.
I suppose the £1m question is what is the role of the KM supposed to be in 1939? They can't outbuild the British so their best case is preventing a WWI style blockade. They can't do that with the battle fleet so Die Junge Schule (German for Jeune École)?
On the other hand if they're only going to fight the French then having a large surface force in the Atlanticto attack trade makes sense..
One more thing for all the axis powers develop an effective dual purpose antiaircraft gun. Like let’s say A 5’38. They could have just licensed them from the US. The Japanese could have licensed the aa from Sweden. 20 and 40 mm.
Japan's under an embargo and Germany winds up embargoed too. That just leaves furtive sales to Spain and Italy until the Italians foolishly join the war effort. Sorry, the USA isn't That stupid!
Sythetic fuel from coal only works for petrol. That's one factor why the Wehrmacht went for petrol engines in their tanks, although they literally invented Diesel. I'm pretty sure you can't produce diesel fuel or fuel oil from coal, but I stand to be corrected.
The German navy could have deleted the scuttling training from their flag officer curriculum
I can't help seeing the irony of describing Italian industry as bespoke with what they are producing as high quality then saying the biggest issue as quality control in ammunition
strange but true, with the mass production they had issues with not enough quality control, with the line production they had issues with almost a quality to the point of being unique... so buy your fighter or vehicle from the Italians, but your amunition from the Germans, or perferably the Swedes, would be good advice for small nations prior to WWII.
"We COULD build infrastructure . . . but that would mean taxing the rich and respectable . . . and they'd rather not, thank you very much."
Ad infinitum. And so today's Rossiyan navy-"all show and no go", as we used to say in the states.
Japan also did not have enough shipping. The evidence is they did know that shipping that they had gotten pre embarargo was not showing up, but they aparently they did not realise that shipping was transferring to the Atlantic, or just did not care, because they aparently expected to capture more shipping than actualy existed in Hong Kong and Singapore and DEI add that capacity in there initial estimates.
Not sure the KGVs would have been stopped if Japan announces the Yamatos as, while they would have been outclassed in the Pacific the RN needed the KGVs for the Med, North Sea & Atlantic.
If the Italians know that they are going to end up fighting the RN then in 1939 probably their best bet would be expanding the small/special forces units as they ultimately did a lot of damage in WWII but were limited by the size of the units involved.
I specifically chose January 1939 as by that date war looked to be close. The wording however wasn’t the best. Unfortunately Patreon has a junky text editor.
My personal take is that all of the major navies were short on minor combatants in 1939, so all could have started building earlier.
All were also short of critical intelligence. An investment in Naval Intelligence early could have huge paybacks.
R&D is an issue especially for the Axis navies. Hire a couple of dozen scientists and engineers above and beyond. Run the as a checksum team, give them the same data and see if they reach the same answer.
I’m really looking forward to your coverage of the minor Allied and Axis navies. The minor navies have to get mucho creative, and some of their stuff like the Terrible Twins was incredible, even if there was too little of it.
Time to open a fresh bottle of Irn bru....... .
Well when the Germans stopped production on the two H39s, and in particular the more complete of the two to focus on Graf Zeppelin, if you abuse future knowledge that Hermann Göring is never going to give you the aircrafts necessary for it even if you complete Graf Zeppelin scrapping Graf Zeppelin and completing at least the more complete of the H39s possibly makes more sense than getting Graf Zeppelin basically finished but not having aircraft or pilots for it because Göring insists everything that flies is his.
As much as the Royal Navy got it's knickers in a wad over Bismarck and Tirpitz how do they react to H 39 out there rocking 16" guns? If H39 is completed I don't know that the Royal Navy is going to be happy about taking a KGV against it and the Nelrods are too slow
If I was in the Italian navy. I think I would negotiate the purchase of some German tactical medium bombers.
Then negotiate with local affairs to replace them.
Why? Because you have identified a need. A need to locate hostile task forces and lone shipping vessels. To thus grant your own navy the ability to use aerial recon with planes.
However loitering time will be limited, so clearly when finding lone transports, instead of waiting the few hours for a Destroyer to show up, clearly the recon should transport a few bombs on board to blow up weak transports. And I would train the air group at exactly that role.
It's not like we need to scout the entire Med either, just the bit south of Italy. And the ability to send out patrols from a planned point central to the bottom of the nation would allow you to go out and hunt Royal Navy task forces to vector neighborhood assets to engage.
Thus with one single air group trained in a specialist role, we get navy strike against poorly defended targets, recon elements to plan offensives, and recon potential to locate threats specific to the task.
And while weather can preclude some choices, it wouldn't be hard to do the whole directional radio trick the British used for vectoring into a good landing position and finding your way home with just two static emplacements. And you can send out 4 or 5 scout aircraft into a region to locate every ship by each flying at a suitable distance.
And given the small size of such a unit, the Naval admirals in charge would fight tooth and nail to not lose the utility back into a 'generic Italian air force' role.
Of course the Admirals would need to learn not to cripple the 30 or so aircraft unit trying to bomb out Malta. Which I doubt will work. But if I scream loudly enough and paint big enough words on the commanding officers wall saying 'for use against undefended targets of opportunity, not fortified positions or protected task forces, leave that to the other Idiots' maybe they will remember occasionally.
"What's the point of having a doomsday bomb IF YOU DON'T TELL ANYONE ABOUT IT?!?!?!"
I can't help wondering whether the japanese shouldn't have really gone overboard into the code breaking - at the end of the day whether you go for Kentai Kessen or you are looking to defend your resource area then the best way to do it is know where the enemy is going to strike and if you know their force composition you can best work out how to counter it.
The other thing that they could have got from Germany would be radar.....
they did work on code breaking chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com/2012/07/japanese-codebreakers-of-wwii.html & had radar www.ozatwar.com/sigint/section22.htm ... we just don't hear that much about them
@DrClarke for the Germans I would have gone more rapid firing DDs , stuck the 9.2s on the panzerschif & mass built the scharnhorst with both the 11s & 15s utilizing the extra mass for AA on the 11s. Completely agree with Japan should have just laid them out on table & said oh btw were building these have fun. My older brother would agree with you on the Regina Marine. Keep up the great work, take care & best wishes as always doctor
Not only more rapid firing DDs but smaller ones thus more of them. Also a simpler engine layout would have benefitted them since they simply lacked the material to produce reliable high-end high pressure steam turbines.
Superb.
Interesting lecture.
9:14 this is literally the first time I've seen Dr. Clarke angry.
Wow!
Let's hope current NATO+ naval decision making is better than that of the IJN in 1937-1941.
"Frigatting Fudgesicle" Expletive indicating mild disbelief with an underlying tone of "schools have obviously failed you".
Usage:
"Frigatting Fudgesicles, Tovey! It's a bow-pronounced 'ow' as in 'owie' not 'oh' as in 'Boat'!"
The head of the Japanese Air Force in China when asked after the war when he knew he was going to loose the war said that he knew the war was over when the new generation of fighter that was going to be high enough to go after B29s was delivered to him on ox drawn cart.
Was there any argument in the IJN in 1937 that they would have been better off building let's say, four 45,000 ton aircraft carriers rather than four Yamatos given their dockyard situation? After all, both the IJN and U.S. navy had years of experience with very large aircraft carriers.
no, aircraft in 1937 were not what they were in 1941 and certainly not what they were in 1945 - there is a vast development in technological use, doctrine, capability and numbers which really change the scenario. Although I do get what you are saying and it certainly would have been interesting.
The Japanese didn’t lay down four Yamatos in 1937-1938: they laid down two Yamatos (Musashi in 1938) and the two Shokakus.
Shinano and the other never-complete Yamato were laid down in 1940, in Shinano’s case in the same dock Shokaku had just vacated.
@@bkjeong4302 I was not saying four BBs were laid down in 1937, I was referring to discussions of battleship plans at that time.
35:00 To be fair infrastructure-wise, a great part of the Autobahn system is the work of that failed Austrian painter.
2:30 oh yeh still a new viewer of this channel , couldn't agree more if a history book gives a warm fuzzy sensation it wasn't a serious history book , a proper history book should enrage your modern sensibilities and logic based assumptions .
I remember reading a book about Sandakan it was horrific .
I do have a problem with your insistence in crash building and stockpiling of things in January 1939, It only make sence if you KNOW a war will start in September 1939 which you shouldn't.
Announcing the existence of the Yamato's could easily blow up in the Japanese's faces. It could very easily panic the US government in opening the money taps and crash build a similar response in greater numbers or if the air minded Admirals get there way, begin the Essex swarm production earlier and quicker.
The British response would be to quickly dust off the excellent N3 designs and upgrade the engines for more speed with perhaps a longer 18inch gun.
Building a Scharnhorst swarm cannot be done in January1939 as the Anglo-German naval Treaty fixed the Germans to 35% of the RN's numbers and Hitler didn't denounce the Treaty till 28/4/1939, so building a large number of BB ships earlier and in violation of the Treaty would spur the British and French programs.
One of the German's biggest flaws was over engineering everything to get the most out of the displacement at the expense of reliability while the Japanese approach was to build so lightly the ships couldn't withstand combat or even weather damage.
I feel a huge weakness in the Japanese is strategic incompetence. They thought of themselves as Warriors!!!!! and not as professional Naval Officers,
Their objective was more in line with winning a battle, not a long term war which requires a degree of cold blooded logic, not just warrior fighting spirit which they thought only they possessed.
John the started the Build Program for the Flowers & Hunts in June 1939, Henderson had proposed similar programs based around sloop construction in 1938, 1936 & 1934... honestly considering they were planning on being ready for war in 1942 and even small ships taking a year to two to build + equal time to work out, suggesting starting the build 5 months early is probably the least controversial thing I'm making the case for. 😉 although I can see why you say that considering the traditional history on those things being war emergency builds, rather than starting months before war began.
I disagree about publishing the Yamatos. The us would just have switched to the 16” 50 cal on all the new ships. The British would just have planned pack tactics because that’s what the RN does. The RN takes down superior ships with a pack of inferior ships. The RN would also have started building 19 inch battle ships.
The biggest thing the Japanese needed to do was ditch the Kansas Kessen theory. If your plan is one big battle the you don’t need infrastructure or anti submarine capability, or the ability to replace airmen losses. The Japanese were racist about the western powers. They Thought one punch and the western nations would quit like the Russians did.
They needed to triple their aircrew training capability. Bigger pool for losses, more trained aircrew coming on line.
Make plans for anti submarine warfare and convoys.
Make peace between battleship, carrier admirals and the army.
The only way Japan would ditch the Kantai Kassen doctrine is for it to lose in Tsushima, practicality impossible considering the shenanigans of the Baltic Fleet, it's so ingrained to them that the IJN wouldn't be the IJN without it, imagine the Royal Navy but without Trafalgar. It's 1930s everyone racist to one another so I doubt the mentality has anything to do with it.
But I do agree that the most realistic approach they could do is follow Yamamoto plan of expanding the kido butai and his planned giant submarines.
But it still won't be enough to defeat the US, there are many problems to Japan carrier training program, namely it's not flexible, not even Yamamoto is immune to that. It would however make the war in the Pacific bloodier and, to a ship enthusiast, pretty amazing.
@@leogazebo5290 I agree it would have been incredibly hard to ditch Kantai Kassen . But that would be the only way to get the other necessary changes done. So long as you believe in one decisive battle you are not going to invest in infrastructure.
They also should've moved/built more refineries in the south instead of shipping all the oil to japan to then be refined. That way they wouldn't be so low on fuel and have training be done closer to their source of fuel giving them enough to properly train their pilots without risking their cargo ships as much. They just focused too much industry on their home islands which barley had any of the resources they needed.
Japan announces the existence of the Yamatos what does that do to the German and Italian navys
probably causes a minor panic attack
2-3 kgv's would probably beat the yamato 14 inch guns higher rate of fire carries more shells less barrel wear kgv got excellent protection plus carries torps plus you could build 2-3 kgv's for every one yamato.
It seems to me[imo?] That the underdog navies trying to come from behind like the Confederate, the germans and the japaneese, is the think we're unable to match numbers so we goo for super ships. Mallory on March 1 had 5 ironclads building and nearly ready to go. In the next 90 days the Virginia had fought a battal lost it port and destroyed to prevent captured two launched three if you count the Richmond and 2 towed to be completed elsewhere and missippi destroyed to prevent capture cause not enough big ships could be found to tow it to safety. And Louisiana used as floating battery with portholes to small to train its guns. Ps forgot the Eastport captured on the tennesee River after fort Henry fell along with 215,000 board feet of lu ber ready to help complete her.. later in the war the small dimond class exemplified by the Albemarle was developed. Had that been the first design at New Orleans instead of unfinished missippie they might of had 20 two gun diamonds in service and 5 building. Instead of lousiana they might have 8bmore dimonds in service and 4 building. Would frigate have even dared to attack? At Memphis instead of one barely launched and one burned on the stocks what if they had 3 in service and two more building would that not have made a huge difference? Instead of the georga used as floating battery bight not two dima do have saved fort polaski?
Hit send button too soon . Imagine if Weehawken and Nahant had faced 5 diamonds? First of all the southern iron class would not have gone aground and been unable to even aim a cannon at the Yankees monitors. Finally at norfork had the virgina not been converted likely the first diamond could have been ready oct 1 a second dec one and a third one march 1 finished not the virgina barely ready to go. Remember the Richmond was launched and towed upriver by may 11 ,what if that had been one finished and a third started, maybe the army generals might have been less likely to surender Gosport. Further had places like Gosport, Island number 10 fort Pulaski and New Orleans held, would not the confederacy gun inventory stayed higher
Please everyones thoughts. Did not meen to get so specific. But what if germany had started the war with 300 subs what if h
Japan had started the war with 4 more of their latest fleet carriers. Would ten carriers been enough to knock out perle harbor, maybe emboldened nagoumo to stay for third strike? Or affected the Ceylon raid with 4 extra carriers or out some of midway with 8 japaneese flattops to make the CAP heayer?
And there is ego: of keiretsu; of army vs navy, ... No long term ideas. If admiral A proposes good long term idea than admiral B - or general B :) will kill it. Why should navy take all the credit? And this problem goes all the way back. I agree with the stated, by the way. Point of history is: it rimes so one can take some lessons from it.
With the 8 months of notice (1/1/39-9/1/39), could the Kriegsmarine have accelerated the production and deployment of armed merchant cruisers (like Atlantis, Komet, Thor et al.) over what they ultimately had? Along with more U-boats (and getting Donitz his promotion to Konteradmiral early as well) that would seem to buy the biggest additional punch for a short war (and also if the USN gets to actually test its torpedoes in combat conditions, the Kriegsmarine should get the same benefit).
Could have but to little effect. Basically the earlier successes of the Hilfskreuzer were due to being already at sea or able to break the not yet established blockade. Already by 1942 the blockade was in effect. We can see this in the declining performnace of the Hilfskreuzer over time. Easy to build, and of deadly effect with surprise but once blockaded and no longer surprising were not worth investing further resources in.
They could have, but building/converting merchant cruisers screams 'we're planning to go to war soon' to everyone with the most rudimentary level of intelligence on your naval industry. It would probably have hurt more than helped overall.
@@DERP_Squad thanks I misread his question; KM could not have e.g. built many more or better boats, partly because no one was entirely sure what the optimal boat was. Everyone expected the Type IX/XIV to do much better than it did, no one expected the Einbaum Type I and II to be other than training boats, yet they were in fact effective coastal boats. Regarding the Hilfskreuzer DERP's right, they already were moving as quickly and quietly as possible to convert the half dozen or so auxiliary cruisers, doing more would have attracted foreign eyes.
I've really studied the U-Boat war in great detail Germany does NOT have a path to victory. Doenitz wanted to start the war with At Least 300 boats.
He got just about 30 because the others were coastal. Basically 20+20 Type VIIs and IXs some of which still fitting out. Hitler didn't expect the war to start in 1939 nor did the KM so plan. The war plans were looking at 1942 as the start date.
German war planning when not brilliant and insightful was a complete cock-up. Doenitz did masterfully with about nil resources and Raeder was just bad, Canaris "worse" i.e. a literal spy but it's VERY tough to argue that racists who want to enslave slavs and exterminate jews are somehow other than the bad guys. So that's why the well compartmentalized portions (Doenitz had NO IDEA about the mass murders) do well whereas the leakier parts are
Oh. Look. A repeated code group. Let me do that again and again and again Just Following Orders!
So yeah, Bletchley had LOT of cribs all right...
@@DERP_Squad My thought was that when the Z-Plan was adopted (predicated on no major war before 1944-45 or even later), the alternative considered was to concentrate on the merchant cruisers, U-boats and the Deutschland-class as preparation for war in the near future, as opposed to battleships et al.
In house fighting with the Japanese army didn't help
I enjoy discussions. It’s the stupid heuristic arguments that I can’t be bothered with.
German carriers? Japan would have needed to teach them everything quick or they be sunk. And the 3rd Reich would never allow Japan to teach carrier warfare.
The economy stupid.
Speak Loud mate
Your idiocy is extremely outclassed by your ego and arrogance. There are so many flaws in your arguments it's astounding, and your incredulity is nauseating.
Also your knowledge of naval history I find lacking. For example: The Yamato Classes 18.1" main guns weren't the big threat that you seem to think they were. The US Navy's 16"/50 cal on the Iowa Class were more than a match. They even looked at going with an 18'/47 cal in the mid 30's when they knew Japan wasn't going to be in the next treaty negotiation. They chose the 16" for the Iowa's and the Montana's. Also, your claim that the Graf Zeppelin should have been completed so it could be used to scout for convoy's for the U-Boats is hysterical. No German Capital Ship made more than ONE successful sortie into the Atlantic during the ENTIRE war. And by successful I mean made it back to Germany without being sunk. No German Destroyer had the range to do that kind of escort, so Zeppelin would have to have gone with no ASW defenses. It would have been sunk faster than Bismarck.
I think that Doctorate of yours should be returned.
A lot to unpack...
The Yamato's are a big threat in the mindset of the 1930s, aviation as a whole, carrier aviation in particular was not yet even in 1939 percieved as what it would become - the battleships were still the big thing and whilst the USN had chosen to go with 16in guns, that is the background of a Treaty system which theoretically limited them to them; and which had resulted in an industrial base which could turn out very good ones. Battleships are still the big queens of the sea in this period, a perception that really won't change till after Midway really, far more than the sinking of Prince of Wales & Repulse did.
As you will have heard my point about the Graf Zepplin was about it's aggregate in a task force scenario and it's utility as such, although in the case of this I was also suggesting that it should be completed to a Japanese inspired deck design; the fact is ships even if they didn't make successful forays still tied up an awful lot of allied resources to counter their potential impact and when they did carry out operations they would cause a huge amount of disruption.
On the Anti-Submarine Warfare front, the major threat posed by allied submarines would have been on the way in and out, which would have been within range of coverage of the 2,600nmi operating circle of the Type 1936s - although again, as put forward, they would need to buy more, which would be difficult. But perhaps the cheap/cheerful adapted ASW escort I suggest would have been the saving grace if they had pursued such a project - they certainly had the potential.
Think you need to read upon the Hipper!