Why didn't the Germans encircle Stalingrad?
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- Опубликовано: 8 фев 2025
- Why didn't the Germans encircle Stalingrad? A question by an Oberst (Supporter) “The Wehrmacht in the first couple years of the war as all about massive encirclements and 'bewegungskrieg'. I cant seem to find anywhere a reason why it was decided to attack Stalingrad directly and not cut it off like other cities (Kiev, Leningrad) or the 'cauldrons' during Barbarossa. The OKW and Hitler must have been aware about large cities being so difficult to take directly by force.”
For this we look at various misconceptions, original directives, the development of the campaign and geography.
Cover design by vonKickass.
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» SOURCES «
Hubatsch, Walther: Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung 1939 - 1945: Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht. Karl Müller Verlag: Erlangen, Germany, 1999.
Wettstein, Adrian E.: Die Wehrmacht im Stadtkampf 1939-1942. Ferdinand Schöningh: Paderborn, Germany, 2014.
Boog, Horst et al: Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 6: Der Globale Krieg. Bd. 6. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt: Stuttgart, Germany, 1990.
Mawdsley, Evan: Thunder in the East. The Nazi-Soviet War 1941-1945. Second Edition. Bloomsbury: London, 2016.
Citino, Robert M.: Death of the Wehrmacht. The German Campaigns of 1942. University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, Kansas, 2007.
Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan M.: To the Gates of Stalingrad. The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 1: April-August 1942. University Press of Kansas: United States, 2009.
en.wikipedia.o...
#Stalingrad,#WhyStalingrad,#BattleOfStalingrad
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I think that as the battle developed, Stalingrad gained in focus of attraction as the fighting there was obviously tying down large numbers of Soviet troops, and from what I have read, the Germans were certainly ahead of the game in terms of the numbers of casualties. Soviet troops tied down there could not be used elsewhere to threaten the flanks of the German advances further south. Of course, in reality just the opposite was taking place, but this was unknown to the Germans at the time. Then too, there was always the logistical problems that made it easier to think that fighting the Soviets where they were could be more practical than traveling longer distances to get to them. Also, the idea of massing troops that had to be supplied over a single connection, either a road, rail or especially a bridge, was always a bad idea, and encircling Stalingrad definitely presented such a bad idea, with the width of the Volga being entirely helpful. should such a connecting link be destroyed.
The river, just a damn big river
Love your work
"One does not just "cross" the Volga" - [ancient Sean Bean Boromir memes activated]
Well, the Soviets managed it quite well ;)
Stalin: Why won't the Allies invade France in 1942?
Churchill: One does not just "cross" the Channel.
@@franciscosaez7953 I read "allies" as "aliens" lol
@@franciscosaez7953
'When Napoleon lay at Boulogne for a year with his flat-bottomed boats and his Grand Army, he was told by someone, "there are bitter weeds in England."'
Sadly there were many bitter weeds in Normandy's hedgerows as well.
Hi! My home city is Volgograd, former Stalingrad. Just want to add some precise details.
There were no bridges across Volga in 1940s for hundreds of kilometers up or downstream.
The hydroelectric dam near Volgograd was build in 1950s and opened in 1961, and that was the first crossing point. The actual bridge was opened in 2004.
I am not even sure bridges existed in Saratov and Astrakhan in 1942, both being the closest cities, both about 350km from Stalindgrad.
And big thanks for your great videos!
Dear Mikhail: I went to Volgograd in 2012 and I enjoyed the very nice people of your Hero city.
I understood that the Volga River was too wide for the Germans try to cross and envelope the 62 Army. And more, the Soviet artillery emplaced on the esstern bank, increasing the fire support week by week, the same the Air Force, caused the ralentisation and further stop of the Germans.
Greetings from Uruguay!
How did the Russians manage to encircle it then?
@Fascista Mexican ok yea that does make sense, and I guess the don bridgehead that the soviets held didn’t exactly help the situation for the Germans either
@@prodcross they encircled the German army that was there not stalingrad
@@prodcross they broke through Romanian and Hungarian units behind away from Stalin grad and encircled the German 6th army at Stalingrad watch eaststory to get a oversimplified version
Stalingrad is being covered by Indy Nidell's World War 2 in Real Time, and in brilliant, massive detail by @TIK in Battlestorm Stalingrad. Recommend both. WW2 is great for global perspective.
love that channel as well
I really wish they had waited a year
Talking about 194 *2* in 202 *1* is stupid
@@NoNameAtAll2 but gotta pay bills they're team of around 8 people who needs to earn for everyone
I was going to suggest Tik as well. His latest video in the series spends a lot of time discussing the acute logistic problems the 6th Army was having.
Be wary of TIK. While his videos showing military campaigns are fine he has some... Ehhr... Unique political views.
Basically he's a hardline American style Libertarian with a pretty poor grasp on political theory. He thinks the NSDAP was left wing, that fascism in general is a left wing ideology and seems to see the world in a really reductive "big state vs small state" dichotomy.
Of course calling fascism left wing completely ignores the history of these political movements and makes me strongly question his intentions.
1. about one km wide river in that area
2. enemy on the other side will counterattack with all forces and will have better logistics
3. looks like Germans were really good at underestimating their opponents
While Germany was typically very good at the tactical and partly the operational level, their grand strategy was always a complete disaster.
@@michaelkovacic2608 People always say this but really I can't think of major improvements to Germany's grand strategy in WW2. They were a small country that had to fight empires that spanned most of Earth with only a handful of allies. Their strategic position was horrendous but they did fairly well despite that. To me, it seems like their strategy was pretty solid given a bad situation.
@@JakeTheOnion the planning of barbarossa is a prime example of the complete disaster that German strategic planning was. Sure they did "well" considering their disposition, but one could argue it was due to more luck and equal incompetence of opponents than it was good strategy.
@@JakeTheOnion Lol, German strategic position was horrendous? :D
France was passive, Great Britain allowed almost everything, Soviet Union helped rebuild German army and there was a Polish buffer in case Soviet attack.
Germany also had a powerful propaganda machine that convinced most that Versailles treaty was unfair and a strong industry eager to get back to mass production. Their strategy to starve Great Britain into surrendering or to conquer Soviet Union by defeating their armies at the border was complete non-sense. Nazi strategy fell apart as soon as other countries stopped being pushovers.
@@Paciat Are you just being contrarian for the sake of it? How was Germany not in a terrible position strategically? Sure, France and Britain didn't want to take the political initiative in declaring war on Germany early, but the sheer numbers weighed against them can't be ignored. Germany's plans were a long shot but so would any plan under those circumstances. Even then, they didn't need to starve Britain into surrendering, only into an even peace in a war that did Britain no good. And why wouldn't a country's war effort collapse after losing millions of men in the field after a season of fighting? A country that barely won against Finland? It's not an unreasonable thought, only in retrospect does it seem stupid. If their strategy was "complete nonsense", surely you can think of something better. Can you?
To the north, the Volga looks to be about 3 miles wide; to the south, the east bank is a huge marshland.
Right up until WINTER. Then everything freezes -- every year. Stavka counted on that for Uranus.
@@davidhimmelsbach557 Stavka also counted on the soviets already having bridgegeads. And the Volga doesn't freeze entirely. Especially not enough to launch an offensive across it, if you don't have any bridge head and the enemy artillery can just mass bombard the ice and break it.
@@projectpitchfork860 But during Uranus the Reds DID come directly across the ice. Yes, the leading fighters were all infantry. It actually took days for the heavy stuff to cross, as Stavka built up the ice thickness and dealt with karst ridges to the point that even Studebaker trucks could cross.
@@davidhimmelsbach557 I'm sorry? Exactly how did Stavka build up the ice thickness?? Not sure that is possible?
But in the end , for Uranus, very little needed to come quickly and directly across the Volga. The Northern pincer was 75km to the west and the southern already had established positions. Zhukov delibrately delayed the start due to logistics involved and the complicated terrain for launch.
@@68Boca One merely needed to pump up very cold Volga water -- through holes in the ice -- and to let it freeze atop the existing ice. If it's to hand, a 'snow machine' could be used, too. This was done in stages, of course. Using this simple trick, combat engineers can build up ice thick enough for the requirements.
( Ski resorts use teams of 'snow machines' to gun fresh powder where their clients want to ski. This gambit extends the skiing season quite a bit.)
BTW, the southern wing of Uranus did NOT come easily across the Volga, It was led by Red infantry -- on the sly. Once across the river -- and with all Kraut eyes looking elsewhere -- the infantry pushed the Kraut screen off the river's edge.
Then the German 29th Motorized Division began its rehearsed counter-attack. It had been built up to be a full panzer division -- on the sly, by Paulus & Coy.
Uranus was now days old -- and by now the Red Army had captured the Enigma machine placed up with the Hungarian Army. (Against Adolf's explicit orders, I should add.) It was at this point that Stavka used that machine to spoof Paulus with fake Hitler directives. The critical order specified that the 29th MD was to stop counter-attacking. (!) It worked.
Every German account of Uranus pounds on this one order as being the doom of 6th Army. The southern wing cut the rail & truck connection that 6th Army had to the rear.
After the 29th MD stopped doing its thing, the Reds consolidated their bridgehead -- by finally bringing over plenty of heavy weapons.
The other big gambit was the Red cavalry. An entire corps crossed the Volga. It went deep. The Krauts were not at all prepared for cavalry. They were too fast and too quiet.
Finally, absolute confirmation on the subject. Ever since I'd heard it wasnt mentioned in the original Case Blue battle plan I have been wondering about this. Thankyou so much Bernhard.
The army that reached Stalingrad had been bled very badly and was far from full strength. I cannot imagine it had enough men, much less logistics, to support encircling an area that large. Even if you secure a bridge over the Volga what do you drive across that bridge? You require enough strength to turn towards the city and still defend towards the east. Paulus had already been asking for reinforcements and been told no significant amounts were available.
I completely agree, but I think lack of petrol was an even bigger problem.
@@michaelkovacic2608 Food, fuel, and ammunition were all issues. In general the logistics for Case Blue were a disaster and this restricted the amount of men that could be sent.
It is also worth adding that if the Germans crossed the Volga, it would be that much harder to supply those forces and would leave them horribly exposed to Soviet counterattacks.
Yeah, the besiegers would have starved faster then the besieged. All the while being counter-attacked while Germans were tied down.
@@88porpoise Fall Blau was destined to fail from the beginning. Only chance for success, in my opinion, would have been the capture of Moscow in 1941. Perhaps this would have sufficiently weakened Soviet logistics to allow Germany a quick victory.
@@michaelkovacic2608 It may just delay the war. German at that time is already stretch logistically.
And attempt to surround Moscow fails
Meaning they need to brute force into Moscow.
German army logistic and condition was at the edge and can probably don't have the full strength to even brute force Moscow.
Even if the capture it somehow, they wouldn't be able to hold back any counter attack given the strength/logistic, the Germans would be pushed back quickly
Also maybe if the Germans could snap their fingers and teleport 50 S-boots into the Volga river, because the Soviet Volga river flotilla is going to have something to say about building bridges across the Volga
I think Luftflotte 4 would have had the answer to that particular conundrum
@@juliantheapostate8295 not at night
I'm not an expert, but it seems very hazardous to me to sail a river flotilla by enemy land forces, where they would have plenty of artillery to sink the vessels.
Hernan Cortez had the initiative to multiply his scant Spanish forces by many times over by making local allies, and Hernan Cortez, with only one surviving ship builder, had his local allies construct sectional-prefabricated brigantines, and carry them many miles over the American countryside, to battle the Aztecs at the great lake of the city of the Mehicas. Germany needed to transport sectional E-boats over rail and land and dominate the Volga all the way down to Astrakhan and Baku, with the oil, oil, oil.
@@Cyberspine The soviets had artillery as well. And more of it.
It's difficult to encircle and to just power through a city. Plus hindsight is 20/20.
Can't wait for the Stuka book, going to look sweet with my Stuka aircraft.
Hearts of Iron does give you great insight into the challenges of a large military campaign. For example, in my latest playthrough as Russia, in a war with China, the Yangtze river became a near impenetrable barrier, and I only broke through by deploying 18 T-54 divisions, 2 IS-7 divisions, 4 motorized divisions, 8 infantry divisions, and all the CAS I could find, on a single point in the Chinese line. The Chinese had been smart and built a bunker complex all along the river long before I reached it. Just rationing out the fuel for the operation was a headache
Who cares
Volga
Yep, a couple of years ago a visited Russia and actually went to Volgograd, I saw the might Volga river, can confirm, it seem to me more like a stretched out, never ending lake than a river itself, if you're going to cross it, you need a lot of planning, it would be almost like a full on amphibious operation than a land one.
Or you just wait for the winter and drive on ice :D
@@blorblor5438 Absolutely no ice would withstand that amount of firepower from the Eastern bank, so no, I wouldn't recommend that.
@@mr.monhon5179 yeah apart from that the wehrmacht wasn't capable of winter offensives, Ardennes 1944 being the desperate outlier.
@@blorblor5438 Maybe for troops, light transport vehicles and light artillery, but I wouldn't trust that the ice would hold up a 30+ ton tank.
megatherium100 I wouldn't trust ice as an infantryman on foot whilst stalins organs are being let loose and landing all around you FYI the Soviet army was great in prepared defence look at Kursk and the documented Germans view in the after action reports
Havent watched the video yet but Stalingrad was no typical city, it was basically a 30 kilometer long strip along the Volga, only a few kilometers deep. Lack of petrol and other supplies would have prevented even a normal encirclement, let alone crossing the Volga.
Supply issues isn’t a valid reason since the 6th army succeeded in capturing the whole city on the West Bank of the river, so the bloodiest battle in human history was easier than encircling it? Unlikely
Why not encircle the city? Imagine trying to cross the Volga (one of the biggest rivers in the world) while being shot at with everything the Soviets had on the eastern bank. Oh, and your forces are practically running on empty aready.
two other options , shelling or flatten the city with bomber's A H advised avoiding Stalingrad but the M brass wanted to achieve something of there own following a h ideas that lead to the capitulation of the polish authoritarian government and french gov
@@creatorsfreedom6734 the Germans DID flatten the city and it just made the battle worse for them.
@@creatorsfreedom6734
That seems unlikely because AH wanted to go all the way to Astrakahn and you have to take the railway to do that--right through Stalingrad.
@@fazole A H wanted to en circle Moscow but then the M brass change the plan while A H was recovering from a Cold , other information can be found on this
@@Waldemarvonanhalt There wasn't a need to take the city and as history shows the price was too high. 20/20 hindsight and a God's eye view of the battlefield has it's benefits.
Thank you for an interesting video. You mention how difficult it would have been to seize bridges over the Volga. Well, since there are only two bridges over the Volga near Volgograd/Stalingrad today, and both of them are in Volgograd, they would have been useless for encirclement purposes. And I don't think those two bridges existed back then, I've only heard about the Soviets shipping in reinforcements across the Volga on ferries and barges. The other closest bridges today are in Saratov, 200 miles/320 kilometers to the north, and in Astrachan, 200 miles/320 km to the south down by the Caspian Sea. Totally useless for encircling Stalingrad, if those bridges even existed back then. Also, the terrain to the south of Volgograd would be difficult if you wanted to cross the river there, as there the Volga flows through wetlands, at least 10 miles/16 km wide, but sometimes twice that. To the north, the terrain would be better, but there the river itself is at least 2 miles/3.2 km wide at its narrowest point, and often more than twice that. Not easy to get an army across that kind of river. Crossing the Don was nothing compared to crossing the Volga. That river is big, seriously big.
The Germans could of built there own bridges
Thx that's spot on to the time ghost WW2 coverage ! Much appreciated :)
Asking this question in that way gets at some of the major misconceptions around Stalingrad, or we could say the falsehoods spread by traditional historiography on the topic (starting with the German Generals).
Which includes the idea that attacking directly was unsound and the 6th Army was defeated because they took unsustainable losses during the urban combat. This is not the case.
The real reason is that the losses taken were not adequately replaced even though the German Army still had the resources to do so, and the reason for this is that the OKW was funneling the vast majority of replacements to Army Groups Mitte and Nord, even though it was Army Group B in the South which was taking the most losses by far. This is what cost them the battle of Stalingrad.
6th Army lost most of their troops between July and September, of which only the latter month was fought within the city, the rest of the losses were taken during the Don campaign. These losses were significant, and probably unsustainable strategically, but they were replaceable and if they had been adequately replaced the city likely would have fallen very quickly.
As it was, the 6th Army was down by the equivalent of at least a couple of entire divisions when they reached the city, with their formations increasingly depleted, which only got worse as the battle went on in the city. In spite of this, they got extremely close to taking it several times, and were only stopped because Chuikov‘s 62nd Army received vital reinforcements at exactly the right moment. Unlike the Germans, the Red Army was funneling significant reinforcements into the city at a steady rate.
All Paulus got was a couple of extra formations that were moved around operationally but cut holes in the front in other sectors of the Stalingrad Area. But no actual replacements for the overall losses of the entire Army Group, of which 6th Army suffered the brunt.
So it wasn‘t that an intact army at full strength was destroyed at Stalingrad, or that the Germans lost countless additional reserves in the city: instead it was a depleted army receiving too few reinforcements very nearly succeeded in taking the city with its last reserves of strength, but once they were used up, it became impossible to take further ground despite a number of piecemeal attempts.
But of course, even if they had enough reinforcements and took the city, there‘s a good chance the Soviet Counteroffensive would still have been devastating, the German Army still lost its capacity for strategic offensives and taking Astrakhan or Baku would still have been an impossible objective.
Any ideas of a Germany victory by 1942 hinged on the idea that the Red Army might break if pushed just a little further and this was not going to happen in any case.
As for any attempts to encircle the city: that was even more of an impossible task given the lack of troops and would have been unnecessary with enough replacements. The idea was to remove an enemy bridgehead and crucially to shorten the front. Attempting to cross the Volga would just make things worse.
Good perspective.
the Germans also couldn’t get enough ammo and food to the area to supply Army Group B. No point in sending replacements when you don’t have logistics to even feed the heavily reduced units that are already there.
Would have, could have, should have. The Red Army was on the other side of the Volga and in Stalingrad. The Wehrmacht could not conquer Stalingrad. Conquering the eastern side of the Volga too would have been harder.
Maybe you should make videos then???
@@williedesmond8201 if I made videos, they would not be about history.
I mean the simple answer to why there wasn‘t a big encirclement is that they had lost the strategic capacity to do that. The last bigger encirclements happened during the Don campaign, but it was clearly the death of „Bewegungskrieg“. And even in 1941 when it was working they were taking staggering, unsustainable losses. Same during Fall Blau.
The simple answer is completely wrong
But yeah that makes total sense, why encircle a city, when you could conduct urban fighting and turn the battle into the bloodiest battle in human history, so definitely done for losses
No
@@looinrims see, this is the reason it‘s a good idea not to learn our knowledge of battles like this from the History Channel.
1. no, the answer is not wrong. Paulus had no way to encircle Stalingrad any more than he did. A complete encirclement would have meant going across the Volga in two places and then holding the other side against superior Red Army forces. After the Don campaign Paulus did not have the troops for that.
2. It‘s simply not true that urban warfare is what killed the 6th Army. The 6th Army had already taken massive losses, easily a couple of divisions or an army corps worth of troops in the Don campaign before entering the city. A campaign during which they did exactly what you think they should have been doing: fighting the Red Army in the field and trying to surround parts of the opposing army. This was moderately successful but the losses taking in doing so were already completely unsustainable.
3. contrary to popular belief (and the after-the-fact claims of the German generals) the losses taken during the fighting in the city were not heavier than the losses taken during the Don campaign. In fact given that the 6th Army was already massively understrength and got very few reinforcements, the battle went much better than could have been expected: Chuikov‘s forces were nearly crushed on several different occasions and it was in fact the Soviets who kept feeding huge numbers of reinforcements into the battle to keep that from happening. Paulus got very few. Had his army been at full strength, it‘s not unlikely he would have taken the city.
4. what really destroyed the 6th Army was obviously getting surrounded and starved out. But there was no way to stop that. Even without attempting to take he city, Paulus did not have enough divisions (at enough strength) to adequately protect his flanks. And he certainly wouldn‘t have had them if he tried to cross the Volga and hold the other side as well, assuming this was even possible.
And to expand the point that was made elsewhere about the fact that surrounding a city is just not always the best approach: this is even more true where Stalingrad is concerned because of the Volga. Cutting it off from the West which Paulus did was actually pretty effective: all land supply lines were cut and supplying the 62nd Army by boat always carried severe limitations.
Surrounding the city completely, however, would have been a totally different matter; not only would that mean crossing the Volga in at least one place, but now YOUR army is the one that has to be partially supplied by boat and the part on the other side is trapped there with superior enemy forces. Not a great move, if it was even possible to cross. Either way it would have required reserves that the Germans operationally no longer had.
In trying to take Stalingrad, Army Group B was for the most part trying to shorten it‘s line and shore up it‘s ability to defend while taking a base of attack from the enemy. Trying to cross the Volga would have done the opposite of that.
@@raylast3873 1. You missed the point
2. No shit, again you miss the point, it wasn’t ‘strategic capacity’ considering the alternative they chose was literally the worst strategic decision possible
3. I didn’t say so, it doesn’t really matter either
4. Again no shit, I’m not saying they should’ve, I’m saying your explanation for why they didn’t was wrong, what’s with the rise of strawmen the last two decades? It’s like people can’t talk without shoving words in people’s mouths
Also no none of this comes from the history channel it’s logic 101
@@looinrims no, I did not miss the point. Going into the city was not „the worst choice“ (what alternative would you propose, exactly?). You just agreed that Urban warfare wasn‘t the problem yet somehow trying to take the city was still the worst choice sOmEhOw (why, exactly?). It was reasonable, the city was not strongly defended when they went in and they needed to shorten their lines. The alternative would have been (1) leaving an enemy strongpoint in place to be strengthened or (2) retreating which was inaceptable to the high command.
And again, your original claim makes zero sense: the battle in the city was costly for the Red Army, but only with pretty „normal“ losses for the Germans. Until they got surrounded themselves which they could not prevent in any case.
@@raylast3873 “no I did not miss the point”
Saying you didn’t doesn’t change the fact you did, fucking yikes
I had this question since too long! Thank you for covering it.
A friend of mine told me one of the things that went wrong at Stalingrad was that after Paulus made it to the Volga in late August, 1942, he was supposed to chase the Russians into Stalingrad where the Luftwaffe was supposed to bomb them to death. But the Luftwaffe bombed Stalingrad before the Soviets retreated, which is to say that most of them survived, and then fortified the ruins (which made excellent cover). I am just trying to find out from anyone else if this description is accurate.
Stalingrad buildings had reinforced concrete, unlike every other city flattened by the Germans before it. The first bombs blew out the windows and some walls, but the next bomb did no further damage. The buildings became sniper nests.
Imagine losing half a million men trying to take a secondary objective...
Wasnt that like a normal practice during WW1?
that's hitler for you!
@Fascista Mexikaner hey look another false narrative traditionalist going over the same myths since the 1930's that Nazis are hapless victims of everything.
@Fascista Mexikaner Aww is the little Nazi mad that his side got dicked in WW2?
I do not believe Stalingrad was a secondary objective. It was necessary for the Volga guard-line to prevent Soviet advances while Army Group A pushed into the Caucasus to take the oil fields. The fact that its failure resulted in the collapse of the entire operation just indicates to me the reality that it was the lynchpin of the offensive. That's the problem with Blau, the Germans tried to do 2 things at once, attack southwards but also hold the eastern volga line. The reality however was that they just weren't logistically capable of more than one thing at a time by that point.
As with all military operations easier said than done...Thank you for your detailed analysis..much appreciated
I just finished "Death of Wehrmacht", noted in the sources for this video. Excellent read, and gives insight on the German tactics used in 1942.
This is an example of what Indy Neidell meant by history does not occur in a vacuum.
Very well done! A good explanation as to why the Germans didn't try to surround Stalingrad. The final and most critical point being the SIZE/width of the Volga River. It would require an undertaking similar to crossing the Northern Rhine or the Mississippi at St. Louis. The Germans didn't have the bridging materials and engineering manpower in that location at that time.
One thing is certain: the Soviets encircled the city.
"in soviet russia, city encircle you"
Operation Rings around Uranus. Not my anus.
They had developed enough first hand experience by then to know how devastating it could be
It's a lot easier to encircle when the river is part of the encirclement instead of the hole in it.
Lol Romanians, if the krauts send their forces on the flanks the outcome would been different
A stream can be large or small. A river is large. A creek is fairly small - maybe knee or chest deep, and a brook is very small - can often be jumped over at places.
The German military was concerned with capturing cities. Hitler, however, needed oil so his military machine could function. He was targeting the Caspian oil fields and Stalingrad was just in his way. He'd be fine with just pulling the cat's claws so to speak rather than wasting time trying to kill it. Stalin's the one who decided to make an major issue out of Stalingrad probably because it bore his name.
I totally agree with you, referencing TiK
Also, and more likely, because losing a bridgehead on the steeper bank looked like a disastrous option.
Stalingrad was far from just a symbolic objective, it had immense strategic value for the Red Army in particular and was crucial as a supply network for their forces around the Volga River and the Caucasus. The Caucasus oil fields were the target of Case Blue, but if they were going to actually hold it they needed to secure the Volga. The Germans were already extremely overstretched and had no natural obstacles to rely on to counter any major Soviet counter-offensive that would inevitably be done to prevent the Caucasus from falling into German hands.
If Case Blue was going to have any chance of success then Stalingrad needed to be taken, had the Soviets lost it their offensive capabilities would have been severely hindered. It also would have bought the Germans much needed time to reinforce the Volga and finish operations further South.
It takes both sides to wage a battle this large, long, and vicious. One German general (I forget who), thought that Hitler became obsessed with capturing Stalingrad because it was named after Stalin.
I think it’s a plausible factor in the campaign. H made many irrational decisions, and was extremely stubborn. It probably was a prestige issue.
@@gerardlabelle9626 no. Hitler was only interested in Stalingrad as a way of anchoring Army Group B. Army Group A was the one Hitler was obsessed with and made himself the commander of. If what you say is right, Hitler would have made himself commander of Army Group B and not Von Weichs
Excellent Video as always! I've often thought that part of the German thinking was that by not attempting to encircle the city the Germans not only avoided the enormous problem of crossing the Volga, but could count on it being a problem that the RUSSIANS had to deal with, given the location of the city. As I recall the city garrison was at its most vulnerable when the ice on the river was thick enough to prevent boats, but too thin to cross. Imagine the fate of large German force stuck on the Eastern side of the Volga suddenly cut off because of the ice floes. Anyway, very interesting, keep up the great work.
Complete encirclement (even if achieved) was not making sure the taking would follow shortly after, as is seen at the example of Leningrad (but there, too, was sometimes too incomplete/with exit/replenishment road/path)...
Nice video. Seem like poor planning, Stalingrad was a huge communication nexus for the whole region. Taking it should have been part of the plan from the start.
There was a plan to take it on the march. But AGS couldn't prevent 62nd Army from slipping away and reinforcing it. The encirclements didn't work because the motorised divisions kept having to stop to wait for fuel
OMG )) You pronounce Stalingrad sooo german! ) Love it!
Great vid ) Love your channel!
I just had the same question during the coverage on the ww2 channel. So thank you 😀
Outstanding video and presentation.
Maps would really have added a lot to this presentation. I continually had pause your video and open another webpage to find the places you refer to on a map.
The main objective of Operation Fall Blau, was for Friedrich Paulus' 6th Army Group to capture the oil rich Caucuses. The original plan had 6th Army split into Groups A & B. Group B would take Stalingrad, then advance to take Astrakhan. Doing this would block oil from reaching Moscow and guard Group A's flank. Group A would enter the Caucuses, and capture all oil production facilities. Group A's goal was to ultimately capture Baku. The goal of Germany's 1942 offensive was to obtain desperately needed oil resources.
Thank you for the most clear and concise explanation of why the German Army couldn't just encircle Stalingrad and let it wither on the vine. I had not considered the size of the Volga. That would be like trying to take Memphis by crossing the Mississippi above and below. You might be able to get temporary bridges across, but then you would use up so many precious resources just trying to defend that. And a river of that size has a will of its own and will not obey your wishes for very long. (When Heisenberg was on his death bed, Einstein came to visit him. They agreed that when Heisenberg got to Heaven he should ask God to explain relativity and turbulence. Heisenberg figured that God would agree with him that relativity was a crock. On the other hand, he did not think that even God could explain turbulence.) And Stalingrad was more of a long, defended line of fortifications than a city. What a trap that was.
Well that answers one of my big questions. A follow up video on the MHV channel would be great.
Cool, I was actually wondering this just the other day.
The Germans were bleeding heavily and stretched the hell out of their already overstretched supply lines just to GET TO Stalingrad. To the north you had the heavy fighting around Rhzev. To the south you had the Caucasus. All had heavy fighting.
Even on the approach to Stalingrad, Paulus was already complaining about his casualties and supply situation due to heavy fighting.
So the idea of the Wehrmacht having the luxury of encircling Stalingrad just doesn't fly if one looks at what happened before the battle itself, how bad it was for the Germans.
While the German army was fighting for its survival in Stalingrad, hundreds of thousands of Axis soldiers with lots of equipment were stuck defending Tunesia. This Tunesia army required an overseas supply line that was under constant threat, requiring the attention of a significant part of the Luftwaffe for defense. Eventually, the Axis army in Tunesia could not be supplied enough and had to surrender. If the Axis had given up on North Africa quicker and withdrawn the armies in time then hundreds of thousands of Axis troops with equipment and lots of Luftwaffe would have been available to support the battle of Stalingrad, perhaps enough to turn that battle. It wouldn't have won the war (it would even have quickened the Allied Sicily invasion) but it certainly would have given the Axis army at Stalingrad a better chance to break the encirclement there..
I doubt the air supply would have been sufficient even if North Africa had been abandoned. The problem was not only the scale of the operation, but the distance they had to cover in contested airspace. The Germans lost way too many transport planes to enemy fighters, a factor that was amplified when Manstein's counterattack failed and the Soviet forces took the forward airfields. Of course abandoning the North Africa campaign might free up air units too, but these would most likely be put on the Western Front as that was where the Germans suffered the most from enemy air supremacy.
Of course we'll never know for certain, and I agree that after El Alamein North Africa served absolutely no strategic purpose anymore for the Reich, but I doubt abandoning North Africa would have saved the men at Stalingrad for much longer.
Great video, thanks!!
Well, also, if you go across the Volga, then the forces you have on the other side of the Volga are going to be more difficult to reinforce and could easily get cut off by attacking Soviet armies. You're better off launching an offensive through the city on the coast of the Volga and using the Volga as natural barrier to Soviet reinforcements.
Here's some fun trivia activity: which moderately large city that doesn't have a river running through the middle? There are a few, but you can count them across the whole world, on one hand.
So if you want to encircle any city on earth, you will need to do one or two assault river crossings and maintain a bridge over the river to supply the forces you are using to encircle the city.
Edinburgh is one I can think of
Because they couldn't, the river could supply them indifferently, also Stalingrad was a massive straight city run up the the rail line instead of a city that bloom out like most older city
Wrong question somehow. Why was the strategy chosen at all? Why did the German high command continue the campaign up to this point? Why on either side no one considered to draw a plan for exiting the conflict?
> Why on either side no one considered to draw a plan for exiting the conflict
even nowadays most countries don't do this. Let alone nowadays very few fight a total war that comes even close in intensity, scale, ideology, etc.
watching TIKs battlestorm stalingrad series its pretty evident they didnt have the recources or logistical capabilities to even try with for a long time were not getting the reinforcements to maintain their preexisting offensive (thank halder and co), for an encirclement would have taken atleast 1/2 the total preexisting force extra if not double or more, been at far greater risk etc while for a fairly signifigant part of the time, german forces were pushing forward albeit in a slow pace with high attrition..
I think at the point they reached Volga they were already outnumbered 1:2 or so in density on the front, and with greatly stretched logistics.
@@AlexanderSeven no, the germans were still more but the panzer were nearly all knok out and the city fighting was harder than expected
I really like TIK, but I think too much is blamed on Halder here. Arguably, supply shortages were the Germans' biggest problem. The Russian infrastructure in this area was a complete mess, and there was little that Halder could do about it. He certainly was no mastermind, but he wasn't completely incompetent either. Germany's campaigns before 1942 had been well executed on the operational level.
@@jacopofolin6400 i lean more towards this but im not a bean counter and it may depend on how hes counting it, id honestly have to look into it before commenting on that..
@@michaelkovacic2608 halder was in charge of allocating reinforcements, its only when he finaly gets fired that paulus gets meaningful reinforcements to balance out the losses while halder was actively reinforcing other areas.. sure halder gets allot of hate, but more often then not its fairly well deserved, especialy here..
as for the bad logistics in the area, that would of been a major problem for reinforcing army group B with extra recources needed for an encirclement on a riverbank, thats something you have a point on, but, that wasnt a major factor in the summer/autumn to prevent the army group from being *maintained* at a reasonable enough fighting strength, instead of the downwards trend it was while halder was controling the flow of replacement troops
I found it particularly interesting how the wehrmacht initial plans only intended to put the city under artillery fire. Is there a book that analyzes the wehrmacht's orders and objectives in a compare/contrast with hitlers final directives? I'm really curious to get a view of how the wehrmacht may have fought the war without hitlers interventions.
Should have taken Astrakhan first : would have cut off Caspian + oil deliveries to Russia and then gone for oil fields to the South . Would have rendered Stalingrad strategically unimportant to be taken later.
In such a move, Stalingrad would have been a fortress at an interior angle to the German advance with a railroad leading right into it. A push to Astrakhan without taking Stalingrad would have made their flank very vulnerable.
Except Stalingrad was 1 of 3 places that the T-34 was continuously built during the war (ie* unlike all the other plants that was rooted up and moved east of the Urals to become Tankograd the super manufacturing plant that made I think close to 60% of all armored vehicles the Soviets made during the war years) And I think Stalingrad Tractor made almost 30% of capacity for that tank, then the October steel factory was another very important installation as I think it was 1 of only 5 steel works that could make armor plate in the length, thickness, and shape to be used in tank manufacturing. So Stalingrad was far from being unimportant
That may be true. That was the plan. But the distance from Stalingrad/Volgagrad is 265 miles downriver and the logistics were stretched to its limits.
One must also leave multiple divisions behind in defensive positions in order to defend their flank along the Volga.
I think Fall Blau was very optimistic. Even if Stalingrad fell on the march, I do not think the Axis forces had the troops, equipment or logistics to accomplish the main objectives.
@@charlietipton8502 Yes , not easy but better than losing an entire army and failing to cut off oil supplies or take and hold the Caucasus
Von Manstein in his book Lost Victories stated that Stalingrad wasn't even in Operation Blue when it was formulated in Early 42. Paulus was a dubious General who was assigned to command Stalingrad because he was A favorite of Hitler. He was promoted to Field Marshall because he was expected to die there. Von Manstein was assigned to command the relief effort only after Stalingrad had already started.
Bridging the lower course of the Volga? - Are you dreaming?! The railway bridge of Saratov (upriver from Stalingrad) is more than one mile (1.7 km) long (construction period 1930-35). The Soviets even considered building sub-Volga tunnels in the 1920s.
And nothing guarantee that the bridge will remain intact...
Excellent question Excellent answer
TLDR: Stalingrad was just an area in the left flank of operation fall blau which needed to be kept checked. The main thrust was towards Groznyi but the fall blau lost it's momentum.
the volga river is the separating line between european russia and asia, so
for 1) hitler had no intention of going into asia,
for 2) stalingrad, or Tsaritsyn or Volgograd, was just a bunch of houses laying on the bank of the volga river. the ultimate objective for army group B was to reach the volga river and block it from enemy use, so it doesnt make any sense to "go around" your current finish line, "go beyond" your current objective, one that also offers excellent use for future defensives operations at that. going around wouldve been far risker and troublesome, especially since the early stages of the city suburb fight was going very well, before the 62th receiving reinforcement divisions.
thirdly, 6th army or at least the portion available for the city fight, simply does not have the strength or the size to cross and fight the soviet forces beyond, as well as having to contend with the 62nd and 64th army. going into stalingrad might have turned the momentum of the offensive into a "rat-war", but crossing it with the few units available was simply an invitation for disaster. Ultimately it wasnt the 6th army that couldnt get the job done. it took 95% of the city and repelled all 3 of zhukov's suicidal charge at kotluban. it was the don flank held by romianian troops that was penetrated. so in a alternate scenario where Army group B had an reserve army, (winking at the 11th) and operation uranus was halted, then it wouldve only been a matter of time before the 6th army completely erased all resistance in stalingrad, if dont outright taken it within the first month if they had received reinforcements.
From the diaries and books I have read I am convinced it is pretty straightforward. Hitler was in charge and he deemed the Russians on their last men. He also wanted to thrust south to the caucuses for oil. I don't understand the logic when both Leningrad and Moscow where not captured but he, he was a corporal! Any plan to encircle Stalingrad would be massive in scale, I am sure there where staffers that proposed this, but it would not fit Hitlers ambition and plans and would be dismissed instantly.
A map would be useful when you talk about movement of trups as part of Case Blue.
Have you watched what TIK has done with his ongoing Stalingrad series of videos? Just remarkable and amazing 20+ hours so far and ongoing
Have anybody else watched TIK:s stalingrad series and went: Yes, i knew of this, im surely enlightened xD
Nope never heard of it JUST STICK TO TANKS!
Tik is king
Definitely
Never, love TIK’s videos, but every time I watch this channel I am reminded of how little I actually know.
is that guy still embarrassing himself by claiming the nazis were leftwing socialists? Because I kinda stopped watching after that trainwreck of a video
The pinned them to the Volga, which cut them off from most supplies and reinforcement
That answer has been repeated so many times, but here is the short answer. 1.) the general leading the attack was ordered to completely take the city due to its name. 2.) The said general was very well known for liking long range attacks and fighting with their superior guns, the soviets however knew this, and decided to force the close range fight, which threw the German command off a bit. 3.) The soviets only put just enough men in the city to make it seem as though they were fighting for it, so in the Germans minds they were definitely able to take the city. Once they would, they had no idea the soviets were massing a giant counter to circle them, which is how everything went wrong in the first place. The end.
> 1.) the general leading the attack was ordered to completely take the city due to its name.
which is absolute hogwash and not supported by any historical document.
there was this huge river called the Volga that have to be crossed :)
One of the biggest issues I saw was that the flanks of Stalingrad were manned by lesser equipped and poorly trained Romanian, Hungarian, and Italian divisions. Rather than Veteran German Wehrmact Troops and panzer divisions.
Isn’t Stalingrad a city like Kiev? Where the river cuts through it and it’s on both sides?
Most of the city was on the western bank at the time.
@@cracklingvoice more like all of it.
Volga river is huge.
By the time of Stalingrad battle the Red Army mostly recovered from initial shock and grew in size.
Wehrmacht had previous little reserve to cross Volga in any place, not to mention, in 2 places - at Stalingrad and at the point or encircling at the same time.
There is a lot of discussion on the subject but in my opinion Stalingrad had not military significance and it was destroyed. The troops should then have moved on to the oil wells which were indeed of military significance.
Good question
Good reply
Really great video. Excellent analysis. You and TIK should get together. I think combined you guys might be just the best ever.
In a word: Halder.
For Halder, Moscow was everything, Stalingrad was a distraction.
He consequently did NOT supply AGS-B with the umph required to super-encircle Stalingrad.
That would entail pulling panzers in a major way out of AGC.
AGS-A could not be a panzer source because of Adolf's priority.
It's fortunate for the world: AGS-B needed the panzers and 17th Army; AGS-A needed more motorized divisions -- less panzers and no 17th Army.
The mountain campaign was a distraction... actually the wrong way to advance.
Just gotta look at a map of the city. With how battered and undersupplied 6th army was by the time they got to the city encirclement was out of the question. Given that they could barely get half of 6th Army's daily supplies across the Don there was no way they could cross the Volga.
I read that one German regiment or battalion did cross the Volga and was never heard from again. I differ this to other historians who might have greater insight to this story--fact or fictional.
What I always wondered was why the Luftwaffe didn't make the Islands and the East shore of the Volga (rail lines, artillery batteries, staging points) more of a strategic priority? They notably set ablaze Stalingrad in August with their fire bombing raids killing 40,000 civilians, but it didn't deter the Red Army. You can also ask a similar question for the Don River theater where a great bulk of the 6th Army had to keep the Russians at bey especially around Kletskaya and Serafimovich area that became built up staging points. Those dark forests were prime targets for the Luftwaffe to exploit and burn down. Not much information is written about the Luftwaffe objectives. Richthofen pressed the army for greater gains in the street fighting. But I'm surprised that Paulus didn't press Richthofen to destroy the Red Army threat where they were on the Islands Main land. Possibly TIK did bring to light the supply issue and noted that the Luftwaffe were dropping metal particles and farming equipment on the Soviets. Perhaps we will never know the thinking of Richthofen and his subordinates. If someone does have an insight to the reasons why those areas weren't thought of as strategic targets to hit and to continue to bomb please let me know. Thank you.
One thing I think would be important (note: I am not a historian) would be the same problem of the Battle of Britain: pilot losses. During the Battle of Britain, effectively, all downed German pilots were lost, downed in enemy territory with no hope of returning to friendly territory, whereas the defenders were downed in friendly territory and could return to combat with the experience they gained if they survived without serious injury. The eastern side of the Volga is quite similar in this respect: there's no realistic chance that they're going to get back if they get shot down over there, whereas in an active warzone, or even somewhere that doesn't have major natural barriers to movement, there's some chance that they'll make it out, whether on their own or being found by friendlies.
After watching this video I looked at the Volga at potential crossing points north and south of the city. Quite frankly it may be a bridge too far. The river is way to wide for float bridging to work consistently. This means that the Soviets can let mother nature do their job for them.
That being said, the southern side of Stalingrad offers the best crossing areas. You could leap frog across the river using the islands as way points. When you look at the river today their are two very large concrete and steel bridges that cross the river. These bridges use the islands as way points. It's not one continous bridge. They were not there during the war.
Given what I have said above I believe that it was too much for the Germans to come to the waters edge, stop, organize for a opposed river crossing and then execute it. Possible yes, any river can be crossed. Given the state of German logistics then crossing the Volga to encircle Stalingrad is not practical.
Why didn't they use gas to attack fortifying building or a steel plants?
What about the other question of just bypassing Stalingrad altogether?
Thank you for this video. My father always said, that Hitler wanted to take Stalingrad because of the name "Stalin". I thought it would be strange. But watching this video there is more that meets the eyes - as always. :)
havent watched the video so ignorant comment:
i think a very simple answer is just that the volga is a very wide river thats really hard to get around to fully encircle the city. For most of september october and november the germans had the city completely cut off from land communications, but entire infantry regiments and divisions were being crossed by ferries during night time over the volga to constantly resupply the city. To stop that they'd have to cross the Volga themselves, and theyd face very fierce soviet resistance that'd make the attempt almost certainly a failure
Was AH really determined to get to Astrakahn? If so, you need the railway to supply the drive and that passes right through Stalingrad.
Crossing of a major river is never easy. Neither is holding any bridge. People assume those to be trivial, but such operation was very likely to fail due to Soviet counter offensives.
There was alternative to establish frontline just south of Stalingrad, at least until whole Volga bank to Astrakhan is taken and secured. Why wasn't taken that approach?
Screening the city and interdicting/cutting the Volga while severing soviet oil supply. 2 Army group sized tasks, on divergent axes, with one army group (south) split into 2 (A and B). Moving Von Manstein's 11th Armee- the conquerors of Crimea- from there to Leningrad instead of across Kerch Straits didn't help either. The oil was more important than a driving an army into a city, where its advantages are nullified by its incorrect use. The fixation on Stalingrad: like a moth to a flame.
Who knew leaving the porch light on could be such a brilliant stratagem?!
@3:44 - misprint here, must be "Artemovsk" - now Bakhmut.
Hey mate, I couldn't find the link to support your Stuka work you're doing with Chris. Is it because I'm already late? And if so, does it mean the book has already been published? Where could I find it, if this were the case? Thanks a lot and keep up the great work! :-D
Hey, thanks, you can still join late: www.indiegogo.com/projects/stuka-the-doctrine-of-the-german-dive-bomber/x/22448592#/
I will be published in Q1 2022.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized Woohoo! Just ordered my copy, thank you for replying so fast! :-D
thank you!
Yeah, I'd figured the Volga's sheer width made crossing it not a trivial exercise, and it's not as if the Germans had brought up enough equipment and material to construct TWO massive bridges across it, even IF somehow they got enough forces across to establish and hold the necessary bridgeheads. Never mind that said bridgeheads would be subjected to whatever the Soviets could throw at them, and even if somehow the Germans had crossed the Volga in two locations, linked up, and cleared the area astride Stalingrad, that'd still leave a pocket to reduce, itself also not a trivial matter. Plus, the bridges themselves would be subject to Soviet VVS attacks, as well as their predecessors to Spetsnaz units, including FROGMEN to set explosive charges. And if the bridgeheads weren't extensive enough, Soviet ARTILLERY. It can be said that such an encirclement would have ended up being as large an operation as the battle to assault the city itself.
I can see investing Stalingrad by taking positions near it, and setting up heavy artillery to bombard it, as they'd done at Leningrad. That also would have reduced its effectiveness as a river/road junction and supply route. Put the effort, especially the Fourth Panzer Army, to take the Caucasus and Baku. Still leaves one hell of a flank to protect.
I've asked myself more if it would have been an option to "encicle" the city only from the west and then dig in along the outside of Stalingrad and the Volga and focus more on Army Group B (AGB was at the Volga and at Stalingrad), espacially in replacements, reinforcements and supply and more heavy weapons for the romanian and hungarian troops. Then repell the soviet offensive and then continue the offensive in the caucasus in 1943 and take Astrakhan, Baku and the caucasus passes and then eliminate the rest of the soviet foeces in the caucasus during 1943/44. Although even if you managed to hold the Volga and clear the caucasus of soviet troops, you would still need to repair the oil fields (as the soviets made sure to only leave them behind completely useless) and transport the (enormous masdes of) oil all the way back to Germany to refine them and make fuel out of it and then get that fuel to the front lines. Since railways wouldn't be an option, as there were not enough for the sheer amount of oil and they were already clumped up with trains delivering supply, best option would be to transport the oil to ports in the black sea and use bulgarian and romanian ships to transport it to the balkan and from there to Germany. Alternativly you could also force Turky to open the Bosperus for Italy and then use their ships. Of course the soviets had their black sea fleet but that would desintigrate, if you took and held all soviet ports in the black sea.
I think this illustrates the German high command’s naive, unrealistic economic hopes. Had they captured the Caucasus oilfield intact, the oil was not going to magically appear in Germany. No infrastructure existed for transporting the Caucasus oil westwards to central Europe, which did have an extensive rail and river transport network. Maybe the Germans just assumed that the USSR had a similar network that could be used…an assumption which Barbarossa had disastrously shown to be false.
You sketched some arrangements that the Germans might have made, had they planned for it, and had the major resources and time to implement them. They had neither of the latter. Strategically, then, the Caucasus campaign was a poor choice: seizing an unusable resource at tremendous cost
@@gerardlabelle9626 The caucasus campaign was still a good idea. Even if the Wehrmacht couldn't get much oil to Germany, they could still deny the soviets their oil supply. But of course with all my ideas I also have the benefit of hindsight.
@@projectpitchfork860 In any case, even if the Nazis captured Baku, Allied LL would take care of any Soviet industrial shortcomings. More than half of the total Soviet aviation fuel in the war came from the United States in the first place, and since Iran came under joint Soviet-British occupation during WW2, steady oil supplies could easily get there from the Middle East and beyond.
@@modest_spice6083 Lend Lease didn't reach any serious dimensions until late 1943, where it impacted soviet economy a lot. They espacially couldn't compemsate for the soviets losing 80% of their oil production and 50% of their fuel reserves, which were in the caucasus. And holding the Volga would have already been enough to deny the soviets meaningfull access to their oil.
@@modest_spice6083 And that "half of the aviation fuel" only applied from 44 onwards as far as I know. And tge main fuel consumption was from the army.
Simply because they couldn't; As a matter of a fact they were encircled, to encircled you got to have the means for it; Stalingrad is far away , the Germasn were like wise far from the pristine condition , they were worn out , much supplies were lacking the extension of the supply lines were enormous, besides that the germans logistics wwere mostly by train, very little transport trucks. They do not bother to evaluate right what the Russians could bring into the fight, numbers and the quality of the machines, the pz t34 and the KV's and others, while their main tanks were the pz 3 and 2. The Germans, till they were pushed back into Germany, they never defended, always attacked that is what they did in Sgrad, they resume going house to house, after that point in the war it was like a fight or flight response, they choose, or were forced to , to fight.
Crossing the Volga is very hard but then you have to supply the army that crosses the river.
The city stretches 40 kms long, thats why its difficult to encircle. Also, backed up by the Volga river, transport cannot be stopped
As I've usually heard it encirclement was the original plan but hitler ordered the forces needed to be diverted south to secure the Caucasus oil fields. In the end they achieved neither and were soon beaten back and ended up in full retreat.
Again , history made to be fun and easy …… thank you.
Glad you enjoyed it
Did cross one flank but every thing got sucked in to stopping the Northern Jaw .No encirclement .
I think there's a key point not mentioned clearly enough here. The Germans don't have enough resources to supply and defend a big pincers on the other side of the Volga. They are at the end of a very long logistics trail, and they are already thinning out their flanks unacceptably. They need to stay on this side of the Volga to impose some logistical issues on the Russians. If they go to the other side, their logistics get worse and the Russians get better. These are all really good signs that they are actually past their offensive terminal point.
Looking at the map and "strategic" objective(s) in the caucuses one cannot imagine a successful campaign without dealing with the threat Stalingrad can pose. As correctly mentioned it was a major supply centre - major here being an understatement - as T34 tank factories were there along with refineries and other important strategic assets. I would imagine, and I maybe wrong, that the Nazis, for operational security, could not put such a major objective in writing and in official communications, but I would imagine Stalingrad as an objective of the summer offensive would be discussed thoroughly right from the start at higher levels.
They didn't control both sides of the Don that well.
Yes, they still have pockets of soviets in the rear.
Could they have backed off and waited until the following spring to capture Stalingrad?
Nope they would have frozen in the steppes plus having to defend against russian winter offensive.
There was no need to take the city. It was already a pile of rubble. Ongoing bombing could continue to hit the factories.
Waiting was not really feasible. The mission was to take the oil fields and infrastructure, because Germany was suffering a huge oil crisis and things were only getting worse. The choice was to get the Caucasus oil fields producing for Germany or suffer defeat. Keeping most of your forces sitting around outside Stalingrad through the winter only siphons away their resources.
@@simplicius11 they would transport it the same way the Soviets would, presumably
The Germans reaching Stalingrad and the Volga was like that scene from My Way when the Japanese commander saw all the Soviet tanks cresting the hill after he lost 60% of his troops and his face was essentially 😫
Same vibes
Personally I would of understood this much more clearly if animated maps were used to illustrate the various actual and intended operations.
of course, but this is the not visualized channel, maps etc. take a few hours more.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized thanks for getting back to me, it would be a pleasure to meet you and the other guys sometime. Are there any seminars planned soon? Btw for what it's worth, I still believe in both the world was the German army was still generally the finest fighting force.👍
Never heard someone pronounce it Shtalingrad before lol
seems at least Stalin was concerned about the germans surrounding stalinegrad, and ordered his generals to do something about it; even though the germans by that point they could not, and the russians were also not in a position to do much about it if they tried.
The whole mess was a case study in mission creep by both armies.
5:32 the Reich's idea to capture resources (Case Blue) was clearly flawed thinking by 1942. They falsely believed they could capture caucuses oil fields and oil storage; to then use it to continue to fuel the German war machines (primarily the luftwaffe and the armaments production - which was already starting to curtail it's air operations and civil production due to fuel shortages by mid-1942).
However this was flawed because the Soviets already denied this as an option by adopting a scorched Earth policy, so had the Germans come to being able to take the facilities they would have been sabotaged and destroyed before capture. Some evidence of this is where the Germans did indeed capture some oil facilities but these were destroyed so badly by the retreating soviets that they were put of operation and were non-functional for several years.
I think I know the answer already but I will watch anyway.
The bigger question is not why they didn't encircle but why did they attack the long way through town instead of the narrow way through town? Or to put it in another way why did they attack from the south to the north instead of from the East to the West?
Stalingrad Battle Data goes into interesting depth.