Anti-landing, not anti-glider

Time for another quick vid, or a longer than usual quick vid.
Everyone know about the use of glider during the Second World War. But do we really know what the function of these obstacles was? Let's take a look and do some mythbusting.
#history #historyfacts #homeguard #homefront #ww2 #secondworldwar #remembertheregulars

[@philipbellew9645]

Just a few thoughts on the possible thinking behind the documentation.
The initial airborne threat of the 1930s could be of planes flying from Germany. These aircraft would have a limited range if they are also tugging gliders. Generally transport planes cannot tug gliders and have a full load on board themselves due to the power required to initially take off and the amount of fuel required for all that extra drag etc. They also go slower and are vulnerable to air attack. Gliders are generally single use aircraft in an invasion (they don't glide but they are controlled decent from the moment of release) and you need a lot of them to be effective.
Given that the document shown is only a month after Dunkirk and the air invasion threat was now so much closer to the UK that range issue has gone away but as you point out gliders are still mentioned in passing but I am sure its the powered aircraft, landing and taking off again for further flights and resupply was still the main threat.
Rommels version Luftlandehindernis ("air-landing obstacle”) also has also no mention of gliders specifically.

[@RememberTheRegs]

@@philipbellew9645 absolutely brilliant comments and insight as always Phil. And very much appreciated.
The range of the aircraft flying from Germany in 1939 was something mentioned in the Julius Caesar plan, but I personally hadn't considered the effect of range and need for capturing an airfield in the UK to facilitate their use. So that's an excellent point.
As with the closing of the air gap. Again that's something mentioned in the assessments which didn't draw more attention from me but a vital change in the air threat as you rightly say.
Although not expressed in the documents you can infer that the fear is resupply via air bridge, and knocking that route of supply out as soon as possible was key. I think using obstacles to do that as a knock out blow during the initial phase of invasion is extremely clever. Also means that an invading force could be landed but not supplied by the enemy, and although they would need to be countered by the defenders the enemy would soon run out of supply and soon become combat ineffective 😀

[@lonewolfhamradio]

Very interesting, new subscriber

[@RememberTheRegs]

@@lonewolfhamradio thank you and thank you for subscribing 😀

[@mwatney9775]

Many thanks for this: I too was fooled by the wrong interpretation. And thank you for making the effort to go to primary sources: irritatingly rare these days.

[@RememberTheRegs]

Thanks and no worries :) Glad you liked the video.