Agrippa vs Presuppositionalism
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- Опубликовано: 30 янв 2025
- An objection to the presuppositionalist position using Agrippa's Five Modes, the inspiration for Munchhausen's Trilemma.
Information for this video gathered from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy and more!
Information for this video gathered from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy and more!
At 6:28, Agrippa just justified the claim that "no claim can be justified", hence he justified that knowledge is not possible. Therefore "i do not know anything to be true" is justified and true. Self-contradictory.
I like the separation between truth and knowledge. Having seen the recent debate Sye was in where his opponent distinguished between beliefs and knowledge, this seems to be a somewhat similar but a stronger argument since it also makes it possible to make the point that even if Sye is right he still doesn't have knowledge since his justification (god) is no different from the leprechaun.
Just as an aside, I find your manner of speech interesting, your pauses and inflections/emphases gives your videos, to me anyway, a kind of hook to draw one in. I was just wondering whether or not this was a conscious, stylistic choice?
Totally a stylistic choice.
Carneades.org I like it. =)
Did the 5 modes justifies that no claim is justified?
@Jacob B then the skeptics cannot claim that knowledge doesn't exist
You really should continue with this series whenever you can. It's awesome witnessing presuppositionalism being destroyed all over.
I 'm struggling to understand how this one applies. If my assertion that I don't have access to ultimate knowledge is not justified than doesn't that make Sye right?
No. Imagine that metaphysically it is true that you do not have knowledge. You do not need to make an assertion one way or the other. It could be the case that you don't know anything, and in fact you could believe that you don't know anything and as long as it is not justified it is true. Sye puts the epistemic cart before the metaphysical horse in his chart. Things can be epistemically obscure, but metaphysically true. You can believe that you don't have knowledge and not be self contradictory. Your believe would be unjustified, but absent some Cliffordian ethical "you must only have justified beliefs" there's no way Sye can claim that your position leads to a contradiction.
Carneades.org I think I get it. I've always had trouble with philosophy. Science is more intuitive to me. :) Thanks.
Philosophical debates are not about "psychological states" such as whether you believe a claim to be true. They're about conflicting truth claims about objective reality.
So, you can't object with the argument that you just believe you can't know anything but don't know it. That's a psychological state. The debate is only about whether you can know it or not, not subjective psychological states such as whether you believe thing or are convinced of them.
Fascinating that this has been explained to you at length, on several occasions yet you persist in mischaracterizing your interlocutor's position.
The presuppositional apologist is making an argument. His interlocutor IS NOT REQUIRED to assume the negation to the conclusion of the prsuppositionalist argument. It's POSSIBLE that they assume that position and a debate over that specific claim can ensue, but it IS NOT NECESSARY. I can remain neutral regarding the conclusion of your argument... or even be completely unaware of the conclusion to your argument, and still point out variaous failings contained within the argument.
This notion that, because you have a _desire_ to engage in a worldview debate, carries zero obligation with it. That you immidiately assume that any interaction with your argument, short of 100% accceptance of every premise and conclusion in totality, is necessarily an attempt to engage in a worldview debate is simply profound ignorance, or gross dishonesty on your part.
As already demonstrated numerosu times in the past, someone can even agree with your conclusion (as many Christians do) and find fault with yor argumentation (as many Christians do) because pointing out flaws in your arugmentation IS NOT THE SAME THING as arguing against the conclusion. Though if your interlocutor does identify unsound premises, invalid structure or any other sort of fallacious reasoning, then it does follow from that identification that your conclusion does not necessarily follow from your premises.
This is a very interesting thought, "Agripa's obj." I think it would basically end up in saying that you cannot doubt my claim that God is real because I can just say that it is an unjustified belief. I'm not too hurt to say that because as I said in another post Michael Polanyi basically says you have to have belief for any "knowledge" or as Agripa may call it "true belief." I have a question: Is there any consequences I may not be willing to bite if I were to say my belief is unjustified? Because that's baiscally what Polanyi says everyone already has. And, ah yes. elementsoflife.quora.com/God-el-alone-knows-how-much-you-can-know-Part-2 I think what this article basically says is Godel showed that things can be known but are not provable. Perhaps I understand it wrong, but I would say Godel showed that things can be known but are not provable. Which I have asserted before in another comment. Perhaps you would like to look at Kurt Godel's things or you already have. I became interesting in it when Through The Wormhole with Morgan Freeman basically thought Godel had a good argument against God. It was very complex and hard to wrap my brain around which I enjoyed. I think I now have a basic understanding of it and can say it is not against theism. Anyways, let me know about that question please!
*"Is there any consequences I may not be willing to bite if I were to say my belief is unjustified?"*
You can have such a belief, but it will not be knowledge by the standard definition. If you claim that it is warranted then you will have externalist knowledge, but you'll need to deny closure. But unless you subscribe to a Cliffordian Doxastic imperative (statement about what you should believe) you do not suffer otherwise.
*"I think what this article basically says is Godel showed that things can be known but are not provable."*
Nope. The article claims that Godel showed that there are statements that are true that cannot be proven, not things that can be known (remember that true belief is insufficient for knowledge). Here's my video on Godel: Godel's Incompleteness Theorem (Doubting Math)
I have not heard of an argument by Godel against God (send me a link if you can find it), but he does have an ontological argument for God's existence that you should check out. I haven't done a video on it yet, but I should make one. For now, check out section 6 of the SEP on Ontological arguments.
excellent,thanks!
+Ed Thoreum No problem, thanks for watching!
Yeah Agrippa! Now I look forward to Groucho Marx.
I want to know your preferred response to the argument.
It's all coming in the last video in the series (along with many new objections).