When the fires broke out across Moscow, Napoleon himself was nearly killed. He was in shock and disbelief that the Russians would rather destroy one of their largest and most important cities than to negotiate with him.
I would also like to praise Kutuzov here in the comments. He does not often receive positive comments outside of Russia. Napoleon's main strength is his speed and determination. He is constantly striving for a decisive battle, where he will be able to win a complete victory and, thus, impose his will on the enemy. You yourself have said many times that France could not afford long campaigns. And Kutuzov did absolutely the right thing. He decided not to play by Napoleon's rules. He did not give Napoleon a major battle throughout his retreat from Moscow, although he undoubtedly could have. He used, as I think, the "Fabian Strategy". Fabius fought Hannibal without engaging him in major battles. Instead, he kept a respectful distance from Hannibal, constantly chasing him, not giving rest. He didn't give him room to maneuver and was constantly looking for the perfect moment to attack. So, several times Fabius almost managed to lure Hannibal into a trap. His strategy has shown its effectiveness. Kutuzov did the same thing. He knew that he could not risk a major battle against Napoleon. Even though Napoleon's army was tired and frozen (the Russians were not much better) it was still a threat. If Kutuzov had entered into a major battle with him, he risked losing the entire army. This could have led to the fact that Napoleon would have received a respite or worse, to the defeat of Russia in the war. Therefore, he pursued Napoleon, did not give him rest, did not allow him to replenish supplies and constantly disturbed him in smaller engegments. If everything had gone according to plan, Napoleon would have been completely destroyed at the Berezina. But, as we all know, nothing ever goes exactly according to plan.
His campaign is almost perfect if you look closely. Finally, when an opponent leaves with barely 20% of his forces, how can you blame him? Maybe it could have been even more radical, but war isn't a video game.
I watched a long podcast about Mikhail Kutuzov, and according to the historian who studied him, apparently Kutuzov had a much more sound mind for long-term strategy and politics than many give him credit for: Kutuzov apparently did NOT want to kill or capture Napoleon, and wanted him to be able to return to France with at least something of an army. Part of this motivation was that he feared that if France were to be completely crushed in Russia then and there, that Britain would become too powerful and too much of a possible future threat to Russia. With that in mind, his actions of holding back his troops and not trying to destroy Napoleon completely suddenly make more sense. And it only makes it all the more horrifying to think that the only reason Napoleon made it out of Russia was because Kutuzov allowed him to.
It's a nice idea which has been generally propagated. However, the reality was different. It was Barclay who oversaw the steady retreats and gradual scorched earth/denial of resources to the Grande Armee. When Kutuzov first got command, we all know what he did - he stood and fought at Borodino. He later tried to seek the destruction of the French army at Maloyaroslavets, but Napoleon outmanoeuvred him, extricated Davout, and Kutuzov grew too timid to press on despite the French having been strung out. All throughout the campaign since he took over, he had been trying to give battle to Napoleon at every point, including Krasnoi and Berezina. Sure, the Russians caught tens of thousands of stragglers, but Napoleon was still able to slip away every time. Furthermore, it is often thought that the Russians closed the pincer on him with the armies of Wittgenstein and Chichagov, but this is clearly not true. Wittgenstein was slow to arrive, delayed as he was by St-Cyr. Kutuzov lagged behind greatly in his marches (understandable, though, as disease and the cold also wreaked havoc on the Russians), and Chichagov was supposed to be blocked by Schwarzenberg, who had the larger army. However, by late November, Schwarzenberg struck a deal with the Russians to winter at Bialystok. Not to mention that Chichagov leaving a rearguard to contain Reynier's Saxon Corps meant that Napoleon's southern flank was completely exposed. In short, the Austrian commander's treachery (not surprising, though, considering how the Austrians had been routinely treacherous throughout the Wars of the Coalition) or poor generalship, either or, allowed Chichagov to slip by to seize Minsk, and from there, try to block Napoleon at Borisov... only for Napoleon to outmanoeuvre him and escape as well. Also, if Kutuzov had wanted to avoid battle so bad, then how come he spent so many Russian lives at Borodino, Maloyaroslavets, Krasnoi, and Berezina? Fabius NEVER gave battle to Hannibal, nor risked the lives of his men in four separate engagements. Furthermore, as aforementioned, while Kutuzov did carry on the pursuit, the retreat was initially handled by Barclay. The roles were split, unlike with Fabius, who handled avoiding battle with Hannibal, conducting scorched earth, and herding him into possible encirclements all under his own command. The only reason Kutuzov is remembered so well was because he happened to be a true Russian, unlike Barclay, who was a foreigner. Tolstoy has overexaggerated his legacy.
19:30 Kutuzov was not only a general, but also a political thinker. He didn't want to finish off Napoleon and France, he was strongly against the foreign campaign 1813-1814. He wanted to keep weakened France as a counterbalance for England.
@@ToonStory-fh4gn and here is a history twist - in October 1941 the French met the Russians on the Borodino field again. Légion des volontaires français contre le bolchévisme faced the 32nd division of the Soviet army.
The Dutch engineers who built the two pontoon bridges across the Berezina. There were about 400-500 of them when they started. Less than 100 of them were alive by the time the bridges were finished.
“I drew a parallel in my head of this with the French Revolution” That is brilliant. Heck, Napoleon might even have had horrific flashbacks of his experiences of the Revolution in France.
37:30 interestingly enough in Russia we dont really know either. Don't get me wrong, Napoleon's invasion left a deep mark on our culture. Every Russian child literally knows from birth about Napoleon's invasion of Russia. The Battle of Borodino has a symbolic meaning in our culture, as an example of bravery and perseverance in the face of a terrible enemy. This battle was reflected in our poetry and visual art. Tolstoy mentioned it in his work War and Peace. However, only professional historians who study this event may know about the consequences of this invasion for ordinary people. At school, we study that the invasion had severe consequences for the population, but we do not study which ones specifically. We quickly switch to a "Foreign campaign" (this corresponds to the war of the 6th coalition, and I absolutely do not like this name), and then we quickly move on to the further reign of Alexander I. Napoleon appears for the last time in the context of the Decembrist uprising. We are told how Russian generals and officers during the "Foreign campaign" saw life in Europe and "wanted to live in Russia in the same way." And that's it.
Watching videos of the Congress of Vienna and Alexander's behavior, I understand that the cost of this war was incredibly high for Russia, and that he risked civil war if he ever left without at least a large part of Poland. Which led me to ask myself this question
On dirait que vous portez un verston de hussard ;) Beau raisonnement concernant la garde et la décision à Borodino. Il avait pas tort quand on y réfléchit ! Ensuite en terme de vidéo, la grande c'est "Leipzig" et la petit "road to Leipzig" (en bonus avant la bataille) puis on attaque la campagne de France, Endgame... j'ai presque envie de dire que vous n'avez pas le choix que de la visionner celle-la. :p
Merci ! Je me suis équipé pour accompagner notre ami corse jusqu'au bout :) J'ai compté : il me reste au moins 2 bonnes heures de Downfall à revoir, ça en fait héhé
I saw "Desiree" yesterday, with Marlon Brando's great portrayal of Napoleon. The scene was great when he returns from his Russian campaign and then leans in his armchair, darkened, and talks about how his soldiers crawled under their dead comrades to protect themselves from the cold. 4:03 Napoleon still looking better than Phoenix at Toulon.
@@ToonStory-fh4gn At first you think it's a bit of a shame that you didn't get to see Brando as Napoleon on the battlefield, but in the end you're happy to have at least seen him in the role. There is also a moment when he enters a hall with the hat. Something like that alone would have been enough to convince the audience that he is Napoleon. It's also interesting because in the film he mainly represents Napoleon as a force of nature. This is what Bernadotte says in a great moment in the film when it comes to his appointment as King of Sweden. "Sweden may not have the wealth of Spain, nor the beauty of Naples, but it has a free parliament that elected me." This was actually an effective moment to expose Napoleon as an autocrat. Once again, the theme of Napoleon has been dealt with for a long time, and often much better than Scott currently does, and it may well be that the Spielberg series will thunder Scott's little trash film into the orcus of oblivion.
Catherine Pavlovna dissuaded Alexander from making peace with Napoleon in her first letter after the fall of Moscow. In the second, she wrote coldly that the capture of Moscow had caused deep irritation, that he was being blamed for the misfortunes of the empire, for the ruin, for the loss of the country's honor and his own. She says that everything looks as if he had betrayed Moscow, that the leader is despised in the country. These words could not but cause Alexander serious anxiety. It should be noted that Catherine Pavlovna was considered by many as the first among the candidates for the throne in a possible coup. He was deciding how to react. After a while he sent Catherine a long letter. Most of it was excuses, but actually that was secondary. The point was the conclusion. The Tsar told his sister that back in the spring he had received information from a reliable source that Napoleon's agents were making every effort to stir up discontent in the country against the government. Alexander in passing asks her if she would be surprised if he told her that 8-10 days before his departure (to Vilna) he had been informed that the operation would begin with her. He also indifferently says that this operation should be timed to coincide with the fall of one of the capitals. This was a very good move by Alexander. He was giving his detractors that any criticism of him would be considered as fulfillment of a plan prepared by foreign enemies. Naturally, after this Catherine began to justify herself and assure her brother of endless support. In the crisis of the tsarist regime, Alexander was able to tame the opposition and retain power.
@@RussianEagles Oh good luck with that! It's really interesting, because the way this campaign is told, we (= us as Westerners) focus on Napoleon's version of the story, and forget to think about the incredibly stressful situation Alexander had to deal with, and how his authority must have been severely tested. Thanks for all these clarifications!
Thanks for sharing this! I did not know about it. Now I want to learn about the rest of this generation of the Romanov family (from what I’ve read of him, Grand Duke Konstantin, Tsar Alex’s brother, was a complete idiot)
Winter as a factor in Napoleon's defeat can be reflected in the following analogy. Imagine that you have cancer, asthma of the last degree, and then on top of that you get pneumonia. On the one hand, it doesn't make you feel any better, but compared to the rest, it's not so important. Plus the Russian generals also got "pneumonia". 19:50 thanks, man ❤
Yes, I think winter here is the eye-catchy stuff and the perfect scapegoat. Napoleon lost most of its army before entering Moscow, and as you said Russian Russians feel cold too!
I’m also annoyed by the over-emphasis of winter as a factor in the failures of the three major invasions of Russia (by Sweden, Napoleon and the European Axis of Germany, Italy, Hungary and Romania) The Axis lost over half of all the tanks in their entire invasion force within the first few months of Barbarossa, mostly due to mechanical failure and engine overheating (tanks are monsters that need constant maintenance and refuelling to remain effective in combat) It’s important to remember that the German generals lied about the scale of impact of the weather (as well as Soviet troop numbers) to cover up their own errors and failings. I also dislike when pro-Ukrainians keep saying that Russia/the USSR has always relied on overwhelming numbers to win its battles and wars (and I support Ukraine!) I keep telling them no, the Russian army in 1812 and the Soviets in 1941 were actually outnumbered by the enemy force at the start of the invasions (it also didn’t help that the Soviets in the early phase of the Eastern Front kept failing to properly coordinate their troops, and thus they kept doing things like sending only 3000 men to face an Axis division of 5000 men)
21:50 - Napoleon saying something to the effect of "we got them" at Rivoli when the situation seemed very serious to my untrained eye says something about how serious the situation is when Napoleon says "This is begnning to be very serious"... 😅😅
This campaign is just horrible beyond words. I was thinking of the poems from the first world war soldiers when watching this. Do you know if there are any such similar poems from this campaign? Also, have you thought about this strategic mistake on an historical scale? How would you rate it? It must be up there among the biggest errors in history.
In front of all his marshals, after several days of reflection without speaking to anyone: "Gentlemen, here are the results of my reflections: this is beginning to be very serious".
@@StoriesFromHistory-rv4oi I am sure you can find letters about it in the series by Real Time History. Victor Hugo wrote this poem: gallica.bnf.fr/essentiels/victor-hugo/chatiments/expiation if you want to translate it. For the alt-history aspect: of course we have plenty of people who have done "what if Napoleon had won in Russia" scenarios: in any case his regime remains precarious and the economic situation in continental Europe is not good. His succession would have caused great difficulties, and we can imagine Europe fragmenting. In any case, I imagine a slower spread of the industrial revolution.
"They were no longer living hearts, people of war; It was a wandering dream in the mist, a mystery, A procession of shadows against the black sky." That was a haunting poem. Love these types of art left behind by the people qho were there. They speak volumes about he it really were and felt. @@ToonStory-fh4gn
"Leaders, soldiers, all were dying. Each had their turn. While surrounding his tent with love, Seeing his shadow move on the canvas, Those who remained, always believing in his star, Accused destiny of lese-majesty, He suddenly felt terrified in his soul. Stunned by the disaster and not knowing what to believe, The emperor turned to God; the man of glory Trembled; Napoleon understood that he was atoning Perhaps for something, and, pale, uneasy, Before his legions scattered on the snow: Is this the punishment? he said, God of armies? - Then he heard himself called by his name And someone speaking in the shadows said to him: No."@@ToonStory-fh4gn
If Napoleon choose taken St Petersburg than distance Moscow, this war would got a different ending for French Empire and the Europa. What a blunder by Napoleon Bonaparte?!
One period I haven't yet covered on my channel is the Hundred Years' War, and the Middle Ages in general. In fact, I've had a series on Joan of Arc ready to go for weeks, and if you have a suggestion on the Plantagenets, don't hesitate!
I’ve always had an unorthodox view that invading Russia (as sovereign of Europe with satellite powers and allies you have to keep happy like Napoleon) is politically fatal to you because the already declining military situation (that every schoolboy knows about for WW2!) exacerbates your unraveling empire. Curious to see what contemporary French attitudes are to Napoleon’s second greatest blunder after Spain.
It's seen as the excess of hybris that marks the end of Napoleon. But because the whole story has been so romanticized, the narrative that has dominated is the Russian winter that befell Napoleon like a twist of fate. A bit like at Waterloo, where Napoleon was defeated by events and not really of his own making.
@@ToonStory-fh4gn I was very pleased reading your response. When I have more time, I will watch more of your content. Bon chance, monsieur. Best wishes from So Cal.
Quand on voit ce qui s'est passé à la Berezina, j'ai presque envis de dire que c'est un "succès" & que l'expression qu'elle a consacrée est surfaite... Aller, je parlerais plutôt d'une "retraite semi-controlée"
J'ai lu "défaite tactique et victoire stratégique" et personnellement je dirai "méga maxi bordel mais ça aurait pu être pire donc tant qu'à faire on prend"
Squadron leader Eugène Labaume: "Some had lost their hearing, others their speech, and many, due to the excess cold, were reduced to a state of frenzied stupidity which made them roast corpses to devour them, or which drove them to gnaw their hands and arms ".
It's a bit chilly out here, isn't it?
What a perfect Russian trap for the French Emperor and the Master of the Battlefront?! ( "Peace lies in Moscow." - by Napoleon, 8th September, 1812 )
When the fires broke out across Moscow, Napoleon himself was nearly killed.
He was in shock and disbelief that the Russians would rather destroy one of their largest and most important cities than to negotiate with him.
He had to be evacuated for first the fire was seen as a direct attempt to its life
I would also like to praise Kutuzov here in the comments. He does not often receive positive comments outside of Russia.
Napoleon's main strength is his speed and determination. He is constantly striving for a decisive battle, where he will be able to win a complete victory and, thus, impose his will on the enemy. You yourself have said many times that France could not afford long campaigns. And Kutuzov did absolutely the right thing. He decided not to play by Napoleon's rules. He did not give Napoleon a major battle throughout his retreat from Moscow, although he undoubtedly could have. He used, as I think, the "Fabian Strategy". Fabius fought Hannibal without engaging him in major battles. Instead, he kept a respectful distance from Hannibal, constantly chasing him, not giving rest. He didn't give him room to maneuver and was constantly looking for the perfect moment to attack. So, several times Fabius almost managed to lure Hannibal into a trap. His strategy has shown its effectiveness. Kutuzov did the same thing. He knew that he could not risk a major battle against Napoleon. Even though Napoleon's army was tired and frozen (the Russians were not much better) it was still a threat. If Kutuzov had entered into a major battle with him, he risked losing the entire army. This could have led to the fact that Napoleon would have received a respite or worse, to the defeat of Russia in the war. Therefore, he pursued Napoleon, did not give him rest, did not allow him to replenish supplies and constantly disturbed him in smaller engegments. If everything had gone according to plan, Napoleon would have been completely destroyed at the Berezina. But, as we all know, nothing ever goes exactly according to plan.
His campaign is almost perfect if you look closely. Finally, when an opponent leaves with barely 20% of his forces, how can you blame him? Maybe it could have been even more radical, but war isn't a video game.
I watched a long podcast about Mikhail Kutuzov, and according to the historian who studied him, apparently Kutuzov had a much more sound mind for long-term strategy and politics than many give him credit for:
Kutuzov apparently did NOT want to kill or capture Napoleon, and wanted him to be able to return to France with at least something of an army.
Part of this motivation was that he feared that if France were to be completely crushed in Russia then and there, that Britain would become too powerful and too much of a possible future threat to Russia.
With that in mind, his actions of holding back his troops and not trying to destroy Napoleon completely suddenly make more sense.
And it only makes it all the more horrifying to think that the only reason Napoleon made it out of Russia was because Kutuzov allowed him to.
It's a nice idea which has been generally propagated. However, the reality was different. It was Barclay who oversaw the steady retreats and gradual scorched earth/denial of resources to the Grande Armee. When Kutuzov first got command, we all know what he did - he stood and fought at Borodino. He later tried to seek the destruction of the French army at Maloyaroslavets, but Napoleon outmanoeuvred him, extricated Davout, and Kutuzov grew too timid to press on despite the French having been strung out. All throughout the campaign since he took over, he had been trying to give battle to Napoleon at every point, including Krasnoi and Berezina.
Sure, the Russians caught tens of thousands of stragglers, but Napoleon was still able to slip away every time. Furthermore, it is often thought that the Russians closed the pincer on him with the armies of Wittgenstein and Chichagov, but this is clearly not true. Wittgenstein was slow to arrive, delayed as he was by St-Cyr. Kutuzov lagged behind greatly in his marches (understandable, though, as disease and the cold also wreaked havoc on the Russians), and Chichagov was supposed to be blocked by Schwarzenberg, who had the larger army. However, by late November, Schwarzenberg struck a deal with the Russians to winter at Bialystok. Not to mention that Chichagov leaving a rearguard to contain Reynier's Saxon Corps meant that Napoleon's southern flank was completely exposed.
In short, the Austrian commander's treachery (not surprising, though, considering how the Austrians had been routinely treacherous throughout the Wars of the Coalition) or poor generalship, either or, allowed Chichagov to slip by to seize Minsk, and from there, try to block Napoleon at Borisov... only for Napoleon to outmanoeuvre him and escape as well. Also, if Kutuzov had wanted to avoid battle so bad, then how come he spent so many Russian lives at Borodino, Maloyaroslavets, Krasnoi, and Berezina? Fabius NEVER gave battle to Hannibal, nor risked the lives of his men in four separate engagements.
Furthermore, as aforementioned, while Kutuzov did carry on the pursuit, the retreat was initially handled by Barclay. The roles were split, unlike with Fabius, who handled avoiding battle with Hannibal, conducting scorched earth, and herding him into possible encirclements all under his own command. The only reason Kutuzov is remembered so well was because he happened to be a true Russian, unlike Barclay, who was a foreigner. Tolstoy has overexaggerated his legacy.
@@CMY187 yes, I saw that point of view. It is interesting to think about
@@doritofeesh I see your point.
“This story is so Shakespearean”
I agree. Like you said; it’s a horror movie in real life.
With fate's implacable fangs closing in on you...
"A horse, a horse, my kingdom for a horse."
Henry V
"Ay, there's the rub."
Hamlet
19:30 Kutuzov was not only a general, but also a political thinker. He didn't want to finish off Napoleon and France, he was strongly against the foreign campaign 1813-1814. He wanted to keep weakened France as a counterbalance for England.
Thanks for this insight, I actually did not know that !
@@ToonStory-fh4gn and here is a history twist - in October 1941 the French met the Russians on the Borodino field again. Légion des volontaires français contre le bolchévisme faced the 32nd division of the Soviet army.
@@alexbort3082 Oh not the most glorious page of our History 🤕 But yes you are absolutely right... Strange development!
@@ToonStory-fh4gn looks like we will see another page of this history, thanks to Macron
The Dutch engineers who built the two pontoon bridges across the Berezina.
There were about 400-500 of them when they started.
Less than 100 of them were alive by the time the bridges were finished.
I read somewhere it was 400 engineers and only 7 survived. 7.
@@bigmikem1578 I read 6... But at this point it makes no difference I guess
@@ToonStory-fh4gnit’s still way less than 100 that’s Insane what brave men and unbelievable devotion to duty.
“I drew a parallel in my head of this with the French Revolution”
That is brilliant. Heck, Napoleon might even have had horrific flashbacks of his experiences of the Revolution in France.
The revolution came back to devour him
37:30 interestingly enough in Russia we dont really know either. Don't get me wrong, Napoleon's invasion left a deep mark on our culture. Every Russian child literally knows from birth about Napoleon's invasion of Russia. The Battle of Borodino has a symbolic meaning in our culture, as an example of bravery and perseverance in the face of a terrible enemy. This battle was reflected in our poetry and visual art. Tolstoy mentioned it in his work War and Peace. However, only professional historians who study this event may know about the consequences of this invasion for ordinary people. At school, we study that the invasion had severe consequences for the population, but we do not study which ones specifically. We quickly switch to a "Foreign campaign" (this corresponds to the war of the 6th coalition, and I absolutely do not like this name), and then we quickly move on to the further reign of Alexander I. Napoleon appears for the last time in the context of the Decembrist uprising. We are told how Russian generals and officers during the "Foreign campaign" saw life in Europe and "wanted to live in Russia in the same way." And that's it.
Watching videos of the Congress of Vienna and Alexander's behavior, I understand that the cost of this war was incredibly high for Russia, and that he risked civil war if he ever left without at least a large part of Poland. Which led me to ask myself this question
@@ToonStory-fh4gn perhaps. I never saw this information
19:03 This goes so hard. Napoleon is a goldmine of memorable quotes.
All of them are incredible indeed!
On dirait que vous portez un verston de hussard ;)
Beau raisonnement concernant la garde et la décision à Borodino. Il avait pas tort quand on y réfléchit !
Ensuite en terme de vidéo, la grande c'est "Leipzig" et la petit "road to Leipzig" (en bonus avant la bataille) puis on attaque la campagne de France, Endgame... j'ai presque envie de dire que vous n'avez pas le choix que de la visionner celle-la. :p
Merci ! Je me suis équipé pour accompagner notre ami corse jusqu'au bout :)
J'ai compté : il me reste au moins 2 bonnes heures de Downfall à revoir, ça en fait héhé
I saw "Desiree" yesterday, with Marlon Brando's great portrayal of Napoleon. The scene was great when he returns from his Russian campaign and then leans in his armchair, darkened, and talks about how his soldiers crawled under their dead comrades to protect themselves from the cold. 4:03 Napoleon still looking better than Phoenix at Toulon.
I'll have to see that one too, and Waterloo too, to remind me what a totally mastered film is.
@@ToonStory-fh4gn At first you think it's a bit of a shame that you didn't get to see Brando as Napoleon on the battlefield, but in the end you're happy to have at least seen him in the role. There is also a moment when he enters a hall with the hat. Something like that alone would have been enough to convince the audience that he is Napoleon. It's also interesting because in the film he mainly represents Napoleon as a force of nature. This is what Bernadotte says in a great moment in the film when it comes to his appointment as King of Sweden. "Sweden may not have the wealth of Spain, nor the beauty of Naples, but it has a free parliament that elected me." This was actually an effective moment to expose Napoleon as an autocrat. Once again, the theme of Napoleon has been dealt with for a long time, and often much better than Scott currently does, and it may well be that the Spielberg series will thunder Scott's little trash film into the orcus of oblivion.
@@currentofthesnake8486 Dude every time you delight me with demolishing Scott in each of your comments, please keep sending him buckets of vomit 🤣🤣🤣
@@ToonStory-fh4gn Somehow I have to process what I saw.
Catherine Pavlovna dissuaded Alexander from making peace with Napoleon in her first letter after the fall of Moscow. In the second, she wrote coldly that the capture of Moscow had caused deep irritation, that he was being blamed for the misfortunes of the empire, for the ruin, for the loss of the country's honor and his own. She says that everything looks as if he had betrayed Moscow, that the leader is despised in the country.
These words could not but cause Alexander serious anxiety. It should be noted that Catherine Pavlovna was considered by many as the first among the candidates for the throne in a possible coup. He was deciding how to react. After a while he sent Catherine a long letter. Most of it was excuses, but actually that was secondary. The point was the conclusion. The Tsar told his sister that back in the spring he had received information from a reliable source that Napoleon's agents were making every effort to stir up discontent in the country against the government. Alexander in passing asks her if she would be surprised if he told her that 8-10 days before his departure (to Vilna) he had been informed that the operation would begin with her. He also indifferently says that this operation should be timed to coincide with the fall of one of the capitals. This was a very good move by Alexander. He was giving his detractors that any criticism of him would be considered as fulfillment of a plan prepared by foreign enemies. Naturally, after this Catherine began to justify herself and assure her brother of endless support.
In the crisis of the tsarist regime, Alexander was able to tame the opposition and retain power.
Eh, their correspondence is in French. Well, I'll learn it for sure one day)
@@RussianEagles Oh good luck with that! It's really interesting, because the way this campaign is told, we (= us as Westerners) focus on Napoleon's version of the story, and forget to think about the incredibly stressful situation Alexander had to deal with, and how his authority must have been severely tested. Thanks for all these clarifications!
Thanks for sharing this! I did not know about it. Now I want to learn about the rest of this generation of the Romanov family (from what I’ve read of him, Grand Duke Konstantin, Tsar Alex’s brother, was a complete idiot)
Winter as a factor in Napoleon's defeat can be reflected in the following analogy. Imagine that you have cancer, asthma of the last degree, and then on top of that you get pneumonia. On the one hand, it doesn't make you feel any better, but compared to the rest, it's not so important. Plus the Russian generals also got "pneumonia".
19:50 thanks, man ❤
Yes, I think winter here is the eye-catchy stuff and the perfect scapegoat. Napoleon lost most of its army before entering Moscow, and as you said Russian Russians feel cold too!
I’m also annoyed by the over-emphasis of winter as a factor in the failures of the three major invasions of Russia (by Sweden, Napoleon and the European Axis of Germany, Italy, Hungary and Romania)
The Axis lost over half of all the tanks in their entire invasion force within the first few months of Barbarossa, mostly due to mechanical failure and engine overheating (tanks are monsters that need constant maintenance and refuelling to remain effective in combat)
It’s important to remember that the German generals lied about the scale of impact of the weather (as well as Soviet troop numbers) to cover up their own errors and failings.
I also dislike when pro-Ukrainians keep saying that Russia/the USSR has always relied on overwhelming numbers to win its battles and wars (and I support Ukraine!)
I keep telling them no, the Russian army in 1812 and the Soviets in 1941 were actually outnumbered by the enemy force at the start of the invasions (it also didn’t help that the Soviets in the early phase of the Eastern Front kept failing to properly coordinate their troops, and thus they kept doing things like sending only 3000 men to face an Axis division of 5000 men)
21:50 - Napoleon saying something to the effect of "we got them" at Rivoli when the situation seemed very serious to my untrained eye says something about how serious the situation is when Napoleon says "This is begnning to be very serious"... 😅😅
This campaign is just horrible beyond words. I was thinking of the poems from the first world war soldiers when watching this. Do you know if there are any such similar poems from this campaign?
Also, have you thought about this strategic mistake on an historical scale? How would you rate it? It must be up there among the biggest errors in history.
In front of all his marshals, after several days of reflection without speaking to anyone: "Gentlemen, here are the results of my reflections: this is beginning to be very serious".
@@StoriesFromHistory-rv4oi I am sure you can find letters about it in the series by Real Time History. Victor Hugo wrote this poem: gallica.bnf.fr/essentiels/victor-hugo/chatiments/expiation if you want to translate it.
For the alt-history aspect: of course we have plenty of people who have done "what if Napoleon had won in Russia" scenarios: in any case his regime remains precarious and the economic situation in continental Europe is not good. His succession would have caused great difficulties, and we can imagine Europe fragmenting. In any case, I imagine a slower spread of the industrial revolution.
"They were no longer living hearts, people of war;
It was a wandering dream in the mist, a mystery,
A procession of shadows against the black sky."
That was a haunting poem. Love these types of art left behind by the people qho were there. They speak volumes about he it really were and felt. @@ToonStory-fh4gn
"Leaders, soldiers, all were dying. Each had their turn.
While surrounding his tent with love,
Seeing his shadow move on the canvas,
Those who remained, always believing in his star,
Accused destiny of lese-majesty,
He suddenly felt terrified in his soul.
Stunned by the disaster and not knowing what to believe,
The emperor turned to God; the man of glory
Trembled; Napoleon understood that he was atoning
Perhaps for something, and, pale, uneasy,
Before his legions scattered on the snow:
Is this the punishment? he said, God of armies? -
Then he heard himself called by his name
And someone speaking in the shadows said to him: No."@@ToonStory-fh4gn
If Napoleon choose taken St Petersburg than distance Moscow, this war would got a different ending for French Empire and the Europa. What a blunder by Napoleon Bonaparte?!
I read somewhere of a noble woman killing her baby before taking her own life.
Yes I would not be surprized by this kind of event...
The Berisina could be crossed sans pontons , mais etre dans l'eau gelee est la mort , meme si quelqun traverse , mouille sur l'autre rive
Would you consider maybe looking into the Plantagenet dynasty?
One period I haven't yet covered on my channel is the Hundred Years' War, and the Middle Ages in general. In fact, I've had a series on Joan of Arc ready to go for weeks, and if you have a suggestion on the Plantagenets, don't hesitate!
The Anarchy 1138-1153.
I’ve always had an unorthodox view that invading Russia (as sovereign of Europe with satellite powers and allies you have to keep happy like Napoleon) is politically fatal to you because the already declining military situation (that every schoolboy knows about for WW2!) exacerbates your unraveling empire. Curious to see what contemporary French attitudes are to Napoleon’s second greatest blunder after Spain.
It's seen as the excess of hybris that marks the end of Napoleon. But because the whole story has been so romanticized, the narrative that has dominated is the Russian winter that befell Napoleon like a twist of fate. A bit like at Waterloo, where Napoleon was defeated by events and not really of his own making.
@@ToonStory-fh4gn I was very pleased reading your response. When I have more time, I will watch more of your content. Bon chance, monsieur. Best wishes from So Cal.
@@schuylercrilley3963 Thank you, greetings from BaguetteLand 😃
there is nothing we can do bro
Quand on voit ce qui s'est passé à la Berezina, j'ai presque envis de dire que c'est un "succès" & que l'expression qu'elle a consacrée est surfaite...
Aller, je parlerais plutôt d'une "retraite semi-controlée"
J'ai lu "défaite tactique et victoire stratégique" et personnellement je dirai "méga maxi bordel mais ça aurait pu être pire donc tant qu'à faire on prend"
Ahah Je n'aurais pas dit mieux ! Je prends aussi !
lol what? someone ate themselves in this campaign?
Squadron leader Eugène Labaume: "Some had lost their hearing, others their speech, and many, due to the excess cold, were reduced to a state of frenzied stupidity which made them roast corpses to devour them, or which drove them to gnaw their hands and arms ".
@@ToonStory-fh4gn omg, at least it was not the will of the able soldiers.
@@mnemonicpie Ah no, the French are a bit crazy but not that crazy haha
I fall asleep to this documentary.
Thank you for this comment 😀