I've been having similar thoughts recently. The hard determinist arguments seem a priori. They don't frame them that way. Pereboom and Caruso pretend there is wiggle room for agent causation. That is doubtful, or doubtful that agent causation will help. You can run a version of the manipulation argument for the case of indeterminism (Kristin Mickelson) so that argument, which is a priori, extends to free will skepticism. Yet it seems that we have empirical evidence which suggests that some of us have more freedom than others. There is a disconnect, an ambiguity. Two senses of freedom, which is essentially a compatibilist view.
Maybe there are other ways of spelling out the compatiblist view, but it seems that it relies on counterfactual analysis of the scenario in question which can only be done by isolating and fixing a causal base while leaving the rest of the facts in a state of affairs variable. My main problem is that this process can seem arbitrary from a metaphysical standpoint. How does one choose which facts are included in the causal base and which ones aren't? It can be a practical guide to action if done sufficiently well, but I'm not sure how one is supposed to choose what is included in the causal base and what is excluded without any reference to future directed practical concerns. Perhaps I could still adopt compatiblist analyses of these cases in a pragmatic way, but then I'm not sure if that counts as actually being a compatiblist. Any thoughts?
I think hard determinism is intuitively wrong. There are arguments for hard determinism that make sense, and arguments against that make sense. But the tiebreaker is that we have choice within a very small framework of soft determinism. Free will for sure doesn't exist, but everything isn't already determined. Each one of our small choices within the world of soft determism affects the environment which influences everyone else. That choice changes the outcome. It COULD be another way, but our choices culminate into a small amount of variation. The argument that punishment isn't right because of determinism is so dumb IMO. Someone being a product of their environment is irrelevent to the consequences of their impact on their environment.
I think Jim should be treated, exactly the same 8n both cases, the only difference is that there is 1 more step preceding Jim's actions. We need to evaluate what caused Jim's actions and find a way to correct it so Jim doesn't perform that action again. Once we are confident Jim won't repeat the action then he can be rejoined with society.
I mostly agree. From a consequentialist POV, what's important is whether Jim is so likely to keep committing serious crimes that we should separate him from society until he won't. If the parasite couldn't be removed or influenced, we might need to lock him up forever, even though he isn't "free" on the compatibilist view and thus less blameworthy. The only other reason to punish him despite us being sure he won't recommit might be to deter future potential offenders. Here, it wouldn't make sense to punish him because of that in the parasite case, because nobody would be deterred.
Perceptions of freedom are ineffable - seemingly IMPOSSIBLE to define - because that which we count as our freedom is sneakily multifaceted. An analogous half-philosophical, half-neuroscientific error would come from trying to pinpoint consciousness within a particular characteristic, or region in the brain. That sounds absurd, because by all accounts, consciousness is comprised of many overlapping behaviours and neurological processes. I reckon freedom is the same (and is even contained within the analogy); it's a gestalt we ascribe to a monolithic faculty, even though there are innumerable exclusive and theoretically definable elements at play under the hood. Day-to-day, our common sense interpretation of freewill is a useful heuristic: Classical freewill lets us make reliable estimations of an individual's character and set expectations for the future. However, in the pursuit of evermore knowledge, we shouldn't contort our interpretations of the facts to meet our longstanding heuristics, or intuitions; we should revise our heuristics to meet emerging facts, all the while coming up with definitions that a regular Joe can understand. Compatibilism is likewise both an admirable attempt at reclassifying freewill, but is at times leveraged to twist the facts in a bid to preserve the longstanding heuristic. An honest compatibilism will seek to speak the language of intuition while conveying the facts yielded by empirical corollaries and hard analyses. Freewill might be said to appear when we behave both regularly and our momentary neurology is consistent with our typical neurology. Therefore, a crime of passion committed by an otherwise sane individual must be prosecuted not because of some metaphysical transgression, but because it reveals a critical failing in that person's normal state. If further investigation elucidates no such failure in the criminal's normalcy, then the primary function of punishment is deterrence. Deterrence nudges edge-case deviants more in-line with our preferred normal range, and fosters enfranchisement by appeasing the aggrieved. That's not retribution; soundness of mind is ultimately rational and can be located in far-flung proclivities, just like consciousness and freewill. This brand of compatibilism doesn't attempt mental gymnastics that invoke muddled libertarian freewill and alternate universes. Rather, it appeals to universally understandable, macroscopic processes, and hitches them on to the omnibus idea that is freewill.
In both cases Jim has killed, the causes are different. In both cases the action resulted from Jim's body. In both cases there were causes external to Jim's body. I don't know what you mean by "free". Yes, what's different is the causes are different. So the consequences need to deal with the event need to be different. And it's importantly different but the difference isn't the existence of "freedom". Not sure what you mean by "punishment", I don't think punishment is ever moral on Determinism or Compatabalism.
I don't quite agree with the last statement. Given our shared values (human/societal well-being, reduction of suffering etc.), punishment can make sense when: 1. it furthest the goal of preventing future crimes by the same person (this might be prison, or (forced) therapy, or whatever seems to be empirically effective). Or 2. it deters future potential offenders. In that case, we punish the person committing the crime so that hopefully, many more future crimes would be prevented, which would result in the least amount of suffering overall.
Interesting. Fair warning, I am extremely green on philosophy and self-teaching, so I may make some massive and obvious errors here. I really thought for a second I had a good objection from determinism (and I still suspect one exists, though weaker than I first thought), but things get really complicated the closer one gets to the concept of "agency". The only thing I have left that objects, still from the side of determinism, is that our judgements would be deterministic as well, derived from external factors (like our upbringing, evolution of humanity and the Darwinian need for law&order for the species to propagate). That would color them as not necessarily viable for use in a defense of compatibilism (obviously, if you're already a compatibilist, you wouldn't accept that) I'd also like to add a side-note that agency and responsibility are a tenuous relationship in our nature. Consider Bob again, and the Nuremburg trials. Would your same judgement hold the Nazi officers responsible even though they were overwhelmingly influenced by powerful leadership? Most people's (and I would wager most philosophers) would. Perhaps, instead, the mind control scenario is (pun intended) so alien to us we cannot make a valid judgement. But my alternate objection comes from libertarianism now. The closest real-world scenario to match the alien is someone holding a gun against your head to make you do something wrong. Thing is, there are libertarian answers to this, though they vary widely depending on the moral framework (something libertarians have more free choice in than determinists). ...and that's where my head closes in. Your scenario of judgement seems completely defensible under libertarianism and determinism. Or am I missing something? It would certainly reinforce compatibilism to a compatibilist, but that's not usually enough for an argument. Please let me know which points I missed or dropped if you take the time to read through it.
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I've been having similar thoughts recently. The hard determinist arguments seem a priori. They don't frame them that way. Pereboom and Caruso pretend there is wiggle room for agent causation. That is doubtful, or doubtful that agent causation will help. You can run a version of the manipulation argument for the case of indeterminism (Kristin Mickelson) so that argument, which is a priori, extends to free will skepticism. Yet it seems that we have empirical evidence which suggests that some of us have more freedom than others. There is a disconnect, an ambiguity. Two senses of freedom, which is essentially a compatibilist view.
Maybe there are other ways of spelling out the compatiblist view, but it seems that it relies on counterfactual analysis of the scenario in question which can only be done by isolating and fixing a causal base while leaving the rest of the facts in a state of affairs variable. My main problem is that this process can seem arbitrary from a metaphysical standpoint. How does one choose which facts are included in the causal base and which ones aren't? It can be a practical guide to action if done sufficiently well, but I'm not sure how one is supposed to choose what is included in the causal base and what is excluded without any reference to future directed practical concerns. Perhaps I could still adopt compatiblist analyses of these cases in a pragmatic way, but then I'm not sure if that counts as actually being a compatiblist. Any thoughts?
I think hard determinism is intuitively wrong. There are arguments for hard determinism that make sense, and arguments against that make sense. But the tiebreaker is that we have choice within a very small framework of soft determinism. Free will for sure doesn't exist, but everything isn't already determined. Each one of our small choices within the world of soft determism affects the environment which influences everyone else. That choice changes the outcome. It COULD be another way, but our choices culminate into a small amount of variation.
The argument that punishment isn't right because of determinism is so dumb IMO. Someone being a product of their environment is irrelevent to the consequences of their impact on their environment.
I think Jim should be treated, exactly the same 8n both cases, the only difference is that there is 1 more step preceding Jim's actions. We need to evaluate what caused Jim's actions and find a way to correct it so Jim doesn't perform that action again. Once we are confident Jim won't repeat the action then he can be rejoined with society.
I mostly agree. From a consequentialist POV, what's important is whether Jim is so likely to keep committing serious crimes that we should separate him from society until he won't. If the parasite couldn't be removed or influenced, we might need to lock him up forever, even though he isn't "free" on the compatibilist view and thus less blameworthy. The only other reason to punish him despite us being sure he won't recommit might be to deter future potential offenders. Here, it wouldn't make sense to punish him because of that in the parasite case, because nobody would be deterred.
Perceptions of freedom are ineffable - seemingly IMPOSSIBLE to define - because that which we count as our freedom is sneakily multifaceted. An analogous half-philosophical, half-neuroscientific error would come from trying to pinpoint consciousness within a particular characteristic, or region in the brain. That sounds absurd, because by all accounts, consciousness is comprised of many overlapping behaviours and neurological processes. I reckon freedom is the same (and is even contained within the analogy); it's a gestalt we ascribe to a monolithic faculty, even though there are innumerable exclusive and theoretically definable elements at play under the hood.
Day-to-day, our common sense interpretation of freewill is a useful heuristic: Classical freewill lets us make reliable estimations of an individual's character and set expectations for the future. However, in the pursuit of evermore knowledge, we shouldn't contort our interpretations of the facts to meet our longstanding heuristics, or intuitions; we should revise our heuristics to meet emerging facts, all the while coming up with definitions that a regular Joe can understand. Compatibilism is likewise both an admirable attempt at reclassifying freewill, but is at times leveraged to twist the facts in a bid to preserve the longstanding heuristic.
An honest compatibilism will seek to speak the language of intuition while conveying the facts yielded by empirical corollaries and hard analyses. Freewill might be said to appear when we behave both regularly and our momentary neurology is consistent with our typical neurology. Therefore, a crime of passion committed by an otherwise sane individual must be prosecuted not because of some metaphysical transgression, but because it reveals a critical failing in that person's normal state. If further investigation elucidates no such failure in the criminal's normalcy, then the primary function of punishment is deterrence. Deterrence nudges edge-case deviants more in-line with our preferred normal range, and fosters enfranchisement by appeasing the aggrieved. That's not retribution; soundness of mind is ultimately rational and can be located in far-flung proclivities, just like consciousness and freewill.
This brand of compatibilism doesn't attempt mental gymnastics that invoke muddled libertarian freewill and alternate universes. Rather, it appeals to universally understandable, macroscopic processes, and hitches them on to the omnibus idea that is freewill.
In both cases Jim has killed, the causes are different. In both cases the action resulted from Jim's body. In both cases there were causes external to Jim's body. I don't know what you mean by "free". Yes, what's different is the causes are different. So the consequences need to deal with the event need to be different. And it's importantly different but the difference isn't the existence of "freedom". Not sure what you mean by "punishment", I don't think punishment is ever moral on Determinism or Compatabalism.
I don't quite agree with the last statement. Given our shared values (human/societal well-being, reduction of suffering etc.), punishment can make sense when: 1. it furthest the goal of preventing future crimes by the same person (this might be prison, or (forced) therapy, or whatever seems to be empirically effective). Or 2. it deters future potential offenders. In that case, we punish the person committing the crime so that hopefully, many more future crimes would be prevented, which would result in the least amount of suffering overall.
Interesting. Fair warning, I am extremely green on philosophy and self-teaching, so I may make some massive and obvious errors here.
I really thought for a second I had a good objection from determinism (and I still suspect one exists, though weaker than I first thought), but things get really complicated the closer one gets to the concept of "agency".
The only thing I have left that objects, still from the side of determinism, is that our judgements would be deterministic as well, derived from external factors (like our upbringing, evolution of humanity and the Darwinian need for law&order for the species to propagate). That would color them as not necessarily viable for use in a defense of compatibilism (obviously, if you're already a compatibilist, you wouldn't accept that)
I'd also like to add a side-note that agency and responsibility are a tenuous relationship in our nature. Consider Bob again, and the Nuremburg trials. Would your same judgement hold the Nazi officers responsible even though they were overwhelmingly influenced by powerful leadership? Most people's (and I would wager most philosophers) would. Perhaps, instead, the mind control scenario is (pun intended) so alien to us we cannot make a valid judgement.
But my alternate objection comes from libertarianism now. The closest real-world scenario to match the alien is someone holding a gun against your head to make you do something wrong. Thing is, there are libertarian answers to this, though they vary widely depending on the moral framework (something libertarians have more free choice in than determinists).
...and that's where my head closes in. Your scenario of judgement seems completely defensible under libertarianism and determinism. Or am I missing something? It would certainly reinforce compatibilism to a compatibilist, but that's not usually enough for an argument.
Please let me know which points I missed or dropped if you take the time to read through it.
I love this. Thanks. :)
Get some sleep! Love your content though!
I disagree