Exxon Valdez: Why Didn't She Turn?
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- Опубликовано: 23 фев 2023
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View the official accident report: www.ntsb.gov/investigations/A...
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In this video, we investigate what happened to the Exxon Valdez.
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@Casual Navigation One small correction for the beginning of the video. The ballast discharge ashore was not due to invasive species issue but oil contamination. The older single hull tankers loaded ballast water directly into the cargo tanks to reduce hull stress and get to proper drafts for rough weather. This "dirty ballast" would be contaminated with oil from the previous cargo and it was discharged ashore so the oil could be recovered and the water drained away. Modern double hull tankers usually don't need this extra ballast but there are still plans and provisions for it. The regulations around segregated "clean" ballast water exchange and treatment were still years away at this point.
Yes, I was just about to say the same, but you phrased it much better than would have been able to.
I thought it was too early for that level of ballast water management. Thanks for the info
@@benmac940 Sadly, given the damage invasive species have already caused, it is also way to late...
Why not both?
@@CristiNeagu The oil separation process might have killed invasive species, but at the time it was more of a side effect rather than an intent. Keep in mind this was nearly 35 years ago.
What you have described so well is what the Airline Industry call an "Error Chain". In other words, it is very rarely that a single error will cause a catastrophe, but a number of errors, each impacting on the next.
Shipping industry also call it error chain , the main problem is that oil companies especially today must realise that 23 people with only 4 officers working on the navigation of the ship , loading ,discharging mooring, unmooring, fire safety, inspection of critical equipment and many others like tons of paperwork, are not robots dealing with human made superstructures and mother nature.
Like if the maintenance crew says they have 628k fuel instead of 728k fuel, and then the pilots aren't able to find out that they are too heavy in time. All due to a simple number mistake
swiss cheese models :) the holes all lined up
Most if not all industries have that or a similar name its an internationally recognized model used in risk analysis and incident investigation etc
The titanic had a big error chain
The most amazing thing to me is that ship sailed the Seas for 23 years after that disaster everybody I know always thought that was scrapped immediately after the disaster but they changed the name and it transported oil for another 23 years
Reminded me of MS Stockholm, it crashed into an Italian Cruise Ship in 1958 sinking it, and it got repaired and still in service today.
It’s not the ship that was at fault.
eh, people only care about impending disasters, and if course immediate rubber-necking.
@@jamescollier3 of*
It was a state of the art U.S. built ship only a few years old. Relatively new. There was no reason to scrap it. The ship didnt do anything wrong. It was the begining of major moves by oilcos to reduce their pollution liability by selling tankers and getting them off their books, and either setting up separately owned shipping companies and/or increased chartering in ships from independent shipowners.
that final sentence has to be the most efficient summary of a report i've ever seen.
In conclusion, every one fucked up, except the tugs; and here is how
I remember this from my younger days. IIRC, the news basically reported it all happened because the captain was drunk.
That's what Futurama told me.
The news does disastrously oversimplify these things, but I think they also didn't have the full breakdown of what happened and a drunk captain was an easy thing to latch onto.
That's exactly what I remember. I guess it makes a better news story than explaining the whole truth.
What do you do with a drunken sailor?
What do you do with a drunken sailor?
What do you do with a drunken sailor early in the morning?
Make him skipper of the Exxon Valdez. Make him skipper of the Exxon Valdez. Make him skipper of the Exxon Valdez early in the mornin'.
@@MedCodingGoddess The Capitol Steps (fantastic political parody and satire group) popularized a different version.
What do you do with a drunken sailor?
What do you do with a drunken sailor?
What do you do with a drunken sailor .... oily in the morning?
One of the reasons why the spill got to be as disastrous as it was is that the spill response (which was supposed to be in place) wasn't. For the first few days after the grounding the weather was unusually calm for Alaska in March; however, the containment systems needed to be ferried in. By the time everything was in place, the wind and waves had gone back to normal condition, causing the slick to expand.
As an OOW in training, I can't help but feel that the most significant factor was the junior officer's lack of confirming the rudder angle during the turn, in combination with them starting the turn over a mile late.
This video is a great lesson for any junior officers in training.
Exactly right when conducting any turn particularly in confined waters you should always monitor the turn closely
I'm sure that something like this is being trained for these days on those simulators modern officer schools have.
@Koen ven one of the simulator exercises I did for my watchkeeper deck was vlcc in this area. I'm in nz
Because the captain being drunk and passed out below is SOP?
It happened in a different era. Nowadays with ships fitted with GPS, ECDIS etc as OOW you have a much better real time picture of where you are and what is going on, ie real time position monitoring. Even radar technology was not as advanced yet as it is now, with possibilities like PI tracking etc. Notice that the 3rd mate was taking fixes, he would have been doing that outside on the bridge wing using the gyro repeater and plotting them on the chart. Frequency of fixes is normally determined by how close you are to land / objects etc, so he would be taking a lot of them. He could not possibly have been monitoring rudder angle 100% of the time. Size of the vessel comes into play here as well. Ie on a smaller chemicals / product tanker you would have been on auto pilot already especially in this age. You can work your way out of mistakes like this a lot easier. But maneuvering a vessel that size requires a more forward looking approach.
The ultimate cause here is a loss of situational awareness.
The big mistake here is that the 3rd mate should not have been by himself, but the captain should have been there especially if you are planning awkward routes through the VTS as there is more potential issues like possible oncoming traffic. He should have known from experience that a 3rd mate would have been overwhelmed by himself.
Funny story, when I did my simulator exercises for OOW (2 decades ago), we did an exercise where I was the helmsman, and a co student was playing the role of captain. We entered New York and they put in a steering gear failure. Told the student playing master multiple times, and he continuously missed it. In the end I was leaning against the side of the steering console because nothing was working and he still didn't click on to the fact that the steering commands he was issuing where literally doing nothing. He was that busy in his head that he absolutely missed everything around him. These simulator exercises are used to teach situational awareness and this was a prime example of total loss, I will never forget this exercise haha.
Absolutely devastated the wild salmon population to this day. The fisherman lost there way of life. A court case went all the way to the Supreme Court to get the fisherman some kind of compensation but ultimately ruled in favor of the oil company. What a disappointing court case.
C'mon man in America, companies are people too!
A court ruling that damaging the ecosystem is grounds for compensation would be a hilarious precedent to set 🤣
The big shipping mishaps that I recall from my youth are the Exxon Valdez, Torrey Canyon, Amoco Cadiz and Daeyang Family.
Others I recall from the news were Achille Lauro, Oceanos, Deepwater Horizon, Herald of Free Enterprise and the burning of the Queen Elizabeth in Hong Kong.
Wouldn't be the only time Elizabeth is burned
I also remember the Estonia.
My uncle worked on the tankers out of Alaska around that time. He left the industry because of the very casual attitude of the crews and owners in regards to safety. When the Valdez ran aground, he told me that he was pretty much expecting something like that happening.
I know who the forward lookout was. She graduated with me from Cal Maritime Academy. Good on her for noticing the discrepancy in the light interval. The third mate on watch was also not qualified for standing the watch in those waters. He did not meet the pilotage requirements. That was Capitan Hazelwood's responsibility to see to that. Accidents like this almost always happen because of a series of failures and not just one failure. It is the responsibility of the Mate on watch to monitor the rudder angle indicator, turn rate, the heading and the course over ground, therefore the helmsman cannot be blamed. I am a retired merchant marine officer, unlimited tonnage, any oceans.
I worked on the old CMA Golden Bear steam turbines in the 1980's. What an antique! DC electrical board, Frankenstein knife switches. I am glad they replaced the ship with a more modern one.
Wasn’t the captain at the time drunk. Because from what I heard that’s why standards on booze at sea is so hard now
What did the light interval discrepancy mean? Was it actually a different buoy? Which one?
@@Norsilca take what I'm about to say with a couple dozen grains of salt because I'm not a mariner, I just wish I was one.
iirc, the light blinks faster the closer you get to the source
Nice flex m8
The helmsman was not qualified to be steering in the coastal waters, he was only certified to steer the ship at sea (more than 50 miles from land), the 3rd officer left the bridge unsupervised, and the captain was drunk. He blew a .37 on a breathalyzer 3 hours after the grounding. Company rules forbid alcohol on board so he was either drunk when returned to the ship 1 hour before departure or he had brought alcohol on board in violation of Company rules. Either way he was convicted of operating a vessel while intoxicated and acquitted on appeal because they could not prove that he was drunk at the time of the grounding of the ship. He was also not on the bridge as required at the time. As a result of this grounding the captain is required to be on the bridge until the ship is 100 miles off shore when leaving Valdez and it is a criminal offense for him to leave the bridge punishable by jail time. I worked on the cleanup of the spill and 30 years later you can dig down on some of the beaches and find crude oil that couldn't be recovered.
Utter tripe, there is no such restrictions for an AB.
You are so full of bull. Who did you work for on the cleanup?
Read the court documents and NTSB reports before making outlandish claims about Hazelwood. He was never convicted of being drunk, he never "blew" a 0.37. There was no appeal as he was only convicted of a negligent oil discharge which could not be disputed.
@@denali9449 Even his negligent discharge conviction was overturned.
@@TexasBarnRats But he did pay his fine and served the community service picking up trash in Anchorage and working in a soup kitchen. Too bad he did not get to work on the clean up crews after he crapped on PWS.
This channel is such a gem, I love just relaxing and learning about shipping and navigation here.
it really starts with bean counters deciding on the number of crew including officers. It takes years to learn to drive a ship through constricted water, and people don't come out of school with 10 years of experience.
Deepwater Horizon was about bean counters wanting to save $100M, which is a lot of money, but its pocket change compared to doing a job right
DW Horizon is reported on a lot but even in those reports a number of things are overlooked. The stuff they did over there would not be allowed anywhere I have ever worked in any case. If you are a industry insider, displacing to seawater with only one barrier in place is a absolute no go as you are removing your primary barrier against wellbore flow, leaving only the second, which they also failed to verify properly. There should have been a secondary verified barrier in place, ie a mechanical plug. Huge failure on BP's part but also huge failure on the part of the US government having proper legislation & oversight in place. That is IMHO the most important one, there is a cascade of other issues that ultimately led to the disaster.
And considering the fossil fuel industry wipes their collective asses with $100 million every day. It’s literally nothing to them.
With the Valdez, it wasn't bean counters...it came from the top, Exxon Shipping President Frank Iarossi. Everywhere that man went, disasters happened. Amazing how tanker disasters practically ceased when he finally retired.
Why did the buoy start flashing once every 4 seconds instead of 5??
I wonder too
These boats are intirely too damn big for "accidents" to even be possible.
Probably some automation to display if you are getting too close, like the pedestrian traffic lights audio signal that speeds up before it turns red.
It was probably a different buoy!
I wonder if it's like an airplane landing System we're the tone/light changes as to the source direction of the beacon.
I was Chief Officer of a VLCC that sailed prior to the Exxon Valdez sailing/grounding. In fact ,at the time in that particular trade, there was a industry wide culture of efficiency that lead to crews too small and worked too hard for the tasks at hand.
Any risk that such a culture could return to the oil shipping business? I've heard of such a culture being pervasive in the cargo shipping industry (and being partly to blame for Ever Given getting stuck in the Suez).
@@jeffbenton6183 Probably not, the downside to accidents particularly for the major oil companies is too high. I was active in the Tanker business until fairly recently and the safety requirements and culture world has changed dramatically in a very positive direction over the last 30 years.
@@northerncaptain855 That's reassuring. Thanks for that! It's always comforting to know when there's an incentive system in place that helps prevent bad behavior. I was concerned though since - decades after a tragedy - old lessons start to get ignored, and they have to be re-learned the hard way all over again. Glad to hear that this hasn't happened in this case (at least, not yet, but hopefully never)
That last summary was basically a roll call for everyone tertially related to the accident; they'd all played a part in setting up the accident. Bad choices, followed by errors and mistakes all compounded together. I hope the company didn't just blame the crew, as it clearly wasn't all on them.
Always a good day when he posts
You really explain how important CRM is. This video reminds me of Dr. Reason Swiss Cheese model that's really implemented in world of aviation. This is why I subscribed to you, you're like Mentour Pilot channel but for maritime transport industry.
If only the Exxon Valdez had the Kramerica Industries Bladder System installed…
Giddyup 👍
It wasn't actually scrapped. It was later commanded by Dennis Hopper when he was pursuing Kevin Costner.
@@earthwormscrawl not Dennis Castro?
Great video! I really appreciate that you include the report.
This happened in 1989 and two major improvements in shipping has been made since then. First GPS has evolved and is now much more precise and showing up direct on the electronic navigational chart. The other is AIS, giving VTC (and other vessels), a much clearer view of what's happening. These two improvements also gives predictions within the near future and better surveillance capabilities.
I heard about this! I also saw pictures of it, and I always wondered how it somehow managed to do a small mistake...
I live in Alaska and love that you did a video on this accident.
I did a month long sea kayak expedition in PWS. You can still find oil if you dig a little
You can also still find Exxon acting totally irresponsibly, if you dig a little. Exxon goes full cartoon villain evil - ruclips.net/video/Evy2EgoveuE/видео.html
Old oil just sinks...
So much more than just a drunk ship's master! Thank you.
Actually had this as a topic in a accounting class. Found it interesting to learn about the actual events. Nice video!
Hey, it would be cool if you investigate the Amoco Cadiz case, with the chain of event that led to the disaster and the consequences. It happened right in front of my grandma’s house, it would be interesting to see your opinion on such a tragedy
Commenting in the hopes your gets traction.
It is an interesting story. And changed the industry, initial problem was a steering issue, failed hydraulics, unfortunately weather was very bad, combination of oil on deck, ship rollin and rudder movement ships crew found repair was not possible.
The real controversy.
The Master did put out a call for assistance, a tug did come to stand by.
The Master contacted the owners.
The Master declined to accept Lloyds open form, (A complete misunderstanding of how it works) and attempted to hire tug for some kind of daily rate.
It’s is assumed after but never confirmed the owners influence was involved.
The tug eventually did try and tow the ship clear after several hours of pointless negotiations. But it was to late.
Odd considering engine was still functioning. A theory expressed at the time.
If she had simply gone astern, the stern would theoretically have sought the wind and she would have gone into the wind away from the shore.
At the time of grounding I believe it was f 11 around 55 knots on shore wind at the edge of the Atlantic which is pretty severe.
I had the opportunity to repair this ship twice at JSL,Singapore.
The 3/mate didn't have the required federal pilotage for that area, the master knew that, yet left him up there conning the ship.
And this Valdez is pronounced Val-deez.
It's the sister ship to the Exxon Sugondez.
It's pronounced val-DEEZ. I got yelled at my someone from the Valdez (like you said it) family for daring to pronounce it like their name.
Though its a spanish surname, why wouldnt It be pronounced like that?
@@enalche2 That's what I assumed. But I was corrected, and then I started noticing that radio and TV news people were all saying val-DEEZ. And Exxon says val-DEEZ. It's weird.
@@enalche2 it's an American town. Lots of old world names are pronounced differently once people get here. I might not even recognize my own surname if someone were to try to get my attention in Norway.
Very interesting. Thanks for sharing this with us.
That last paragraph can be summed up as "Corporations just gonna corporation."
Reducing staff to barebones is par for the course. "Barebones" in and of itself is a term levied from the outside and from a position with elevated safety concerns. On the business side, it's rather seem as efficient staffing levels, with the motivating factor being mo' money, mo' money, always. Essentially, transmuting business fiduciaries into employee stress level capacity.
Heightened cortisol levels shorten lifespan, therefore it's an inevitable conclusion that besides neoliberal globalism bringing workers compensation down by competing against a labor pool encompassing the entire planet (bringing cost 🔻🔻🔻), adequate staffing, as determined by safety regulators, is given as a spread with a minimum (barebones) and maximum number of staff. Capitalism demands operating costs as minimal as possible, and short-term profit seeking shareholders, mean safety factor considerations, are "red tape."
When people bemoan deregulation, they mean this. In the absence of outside oversight, a company can shirk responsibility by claiming they didn't know any better or scapegoat an employee and not the environment or culture that they're forced to work in.
You'll see that thought underhandedly manifest in many different ways throughout the Neoliberal world. 'Never question the system'. The system that is set up to transfer wealth away from those who actually produce it and funnel it to those who's only attribute necessary was having money to lend. The REAL lazy parasites in society sit at the top, not at the bottom. Neoliberalism has a welfare issue alright, it's just an elaborate shell game of one that benefits, insulates, protects and perpetuates the rich.
Disaster capitalism, or, ahem, simply Capitalism (with a capital C), is working exactly as they intend it too, make no mistake.
We will continue to see disaster after disaster. The fed will continue low interest rates to get people entrenched in debt. And then it'll raise them to get people to default. Effectively robbing everyone of their output but those at the top who can rode it out, and buy up failed competition for pennies at auction.
If you aren't pissed off, you aren't paying attention.
Accidents and disasters happen no matter what the system is, not just capitalism. At the end of the day, the Exxon Valdez disaster was a human error, not the result of a corrupt corporation. The most direct and damming cause was the third mate that screwed up by not effectively utilizing the bridge resources, not maintaining an effective watch, and not acting as required by the "ordinary practice of seamen." Essentially all companies involved in shipping nowadays have effective safety and pollution plans that are designed to prevent events like this from happening by training personnel how to act safely and responsibly during operations that involve risk, and by training them on how to effectively respond when a pollution-causing event happens. They do this not just because they are forced to by law, but because it is cheaper for them in the long run to prevent loss of life and material. It is true that the shipping industry is reactive, not proactive. The laws and regulations that protect mariners, ships, and the environment are written in blood. But remember that regulation and capitalism are not enemies, they can (and must) exist together in harmony.
@Gsithgg well, i dont need to single Exxon out but corruption is endemic to the oil industry, and thats been proven time and time again.
I think we'd both agree that the most effective safety protocols are the ones that remove humans from it. Ideally, automation and eventually AI or automata doing it for us. That's the single constant social trend of technology.
But I think it's obvious and clearly reasonable to expect nothing from corruption than more corruption. You cant grow an orange in an apple orchard. And putting faith in institutions that just continue to abuse it is Einsteinian Insanity. So I question if technology will bring us deliverance. Looking at the tech bro billionaires, I expect not.
The phrase "why you hitting yourself" comes to mind. Or Radioheads Just.
My conclusions aren't against capitalism as much as they're against corporatism.
I held a presentation where this was a small part of, it's interesting to see this explained more
I’m new to this channel so the first few “anyway”s caught me off guard haha great piece of writing here mate
Babe wake up, new Casual Navigation video.
I was up there after the spill working with NMFS on damage assessment. The assumption a lot of people made at the time was that the ship was trying to shave some time off the journey by cutting on the inside of Bligh Reef.
Imho, there was A LOT of misinformation AND disinformation that was disseminated unchecked
One thing to keep in mind with major disasters like this (in sailing or any other domain) is that there's never just one cause. There's usually a combination of macro-scale risky behavior (such as cheaping out on safety measures or running workers to exhaustion), engineering mistakes or poorly-communicated assumptions, individual mistakes, miscommunications and/or negligence, and a measure of simple bad luck. And, depressingly often, the people limiting resources and pressuring rank and file employees to overwork themselves or ignore safety concerns are the last ones to get blamed when they had the most power to solve problems.
Nice summary of an event long ago that to this day has very specific consequences for Mariners, both in terms of Civil & Criminal Liabilities and the cost & time of Specialized Training only available in a few locations around the country.
- - - Completely agree with the one page summary starting at 7:23
3:20 Good to see that your simulation shows the vessel banking to port on a starboard turn. A small vessel would bank into the turn. That's the difference between a ship and a boat.
Great video!
Much more information here than the news ever gave.
Oh and don't forget how Exxon tried to blame the Coast Guard for it
Actually, the Coast Guard played a HUGE role in it. VTS personnel failed drug tests, and popped for sky-high BAC. RADM Robbins & Nelson knew this but stayed silent as the media was dog-piling Hazelwood. Don't forget that the CG's crappy new radar system blanked out half the time for the 20+ mile area that Bligh Reef was located...and it was on the blink that night while VTS personnel stepped outside to smoke a cigarette when the grounding occurred. VTS also failed to follow-up by radio to ensure that the maneuver had been completed.
Agreed. I'm retired from the USCG and spent time up there before and after the grounding. The VTS radars were replaced before the grounding with less capable equipment. They couldn't "see" the ships that far out. I was the aide to the Pacific Area Commander and we made a few trips to Valdez. In every visit there was a lot of discussion about terrorist attacks on the terminal but no talk about what do we do if there is a major oil spill. So what happened to Hazlewood? Nothing. The USCG officers up there botched the paperwork and chain of custody and the charges got dropped. He kept his license.@@TexasBarnRats
@@vanceb1 Very interesting. Sounds like you were privy to the EarthFirst! briefings (you're the first person I've ever heard allude to that). Very few folks were in that loop. It's likely we crossed paths.
There was a pre-EV plan for a PWS oil spill: Dispersants. They were being successfully applied, but on the 2nd morning of application, ADEC asked "are these 'dispersants' toxic?"
"Well, duh. Of course, but the net gain is drastic."
ADEC:: "No more toxins in the environment!!! Stop applying dispersants!"
...and the originally-confined oil spill subsequently spread.
Now at Hazelwood's trial, Prosecutors were caught red-handed replaying reel-to-reel tapes of VTS radio traffic at different speeds: regular speed for CG transmissions, but at a reduced speed during Hazelwood's transmission to make him sound drunk. That didn't go over well.
After the 3rd Mate grounded the vessel, Hazelwood's actions were top shelf, e.g. when he couldn't back off the reef, he opted to run it fully aground before the tide began to slack. Though this punctured additional tanks, it prevented the vessel from breaking in half when the tide dropped 18 feet, and having a TOTAL loss of the hull and ALL cargo. Of course, he was charged for that logical action.
In fact, his quick thinking was so impressive that the Royal Institute of Marine Engineers recognized Hazelwood for his awareness and creative brilliance under pressure. He was also granted a teaching position at SUNY Maritime that was heavily attended. His creative remedial quick thinking in '89 is still lauded and studied by young maritime professionals today.
Things really turned around when "The Chang" took over D-17 CG leadership...he skipped CG senior and middle "management" and talked directly to junior and even enlisted field personnel to get the real scoop, and acted on it. Hell, in Oct/Nov '89, he began secret direct telephone communications with 2 particular enlisted personnel (an E-5 and an E-4) who had 7+ months of E/V field assessment and operation experience, using that info to challenge his staff. He even brought one of them to Anchorage to help plan for Spring '90 Ops.
After departing the CG, I was with Marine Casualty Response Centers of major Classification Societies, working with the old E/V FOSC senior staff (all of us then civilians) responding to every major tanker casualty world-wide throughout the 90's. It was in my role of a QI that I personally came across the former E/V 3rd Mate in 1995 involved in ANOTHER collision! He was Captain of a shuttle tanker....made a reckless "Cowboy Turn" and plowed straight into a ULCC (larger than the E/V)!!! Luckily he missed the cargo tanks and instead punctured the #1 Port Bunker tank, releasing 858 bbl of Bunker-C. Could have been ANOTHER E/V. That guy was an incompetent menace.
I then went on to found a Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering firm and operated it for 18 years, applying OPA-90 and MARPOL standards to new vessel design and construction. Helped write a published paper on the E/V incident.
I respect that you presented this topic clearly and without judgement. It would be all too easy to fall to virtue-signalling and reflexive hatred, as the many refrains of "drunken sailor" in the comments show. Keeping with your "just the known facts" as best as you are able keeps the material interesting and informative. Good work!
It was blamed on the captain by the press. Had that been the sole reason he would have had his licence revoked. Good video with a concise and well written script.
So memorable that any spill, even at home thought of as large is known as a Valdez. Even the keyboard offered me Valdez as I was typing it.
Fun Fact:
Th Exxon Valdez was named after the city of Valdez, Alaska (which is pronounced: val-DEEZ).
I cringed every time he said the name! Yes, everywhere _else_ that word is pronounced as it would be in Spanish, but this isn't everywhere else.
@@OgreKev I was not personally offended by the incorrect pronunciation. I just remember wondering why all the reporters back in 1989 were saying it val-DEEZ.
@@guardrailbiter I grew up in Alaska and we have several family friends from Valdez or otherwise connected to the oil industry. It wasn't until the town, ship, and narrows made national news that I learned that the name is pronounced differently pretty much everywhere else it exists.
@@OgreKev the police chief is an old family friend, he came down to the boat the first day on the job!
Deez nuts
So at first I thought Valdes Narrows was somehow Named after the ship/accident but turns out it was originally named "Valdes Narrows" in 1898 by Captain W. R. Abercrombie, USA. He also called the passage "Stanton Narrows."
Good video. Sad story.
Wow! This channel is so good that I literally didn’t realize this was a maritime channel until after watching like 6 videos lol just subscribed, keep up the good work 💯
Joe was a regular at that Valdez bar on every trip. He had his drivers license revoked 3 times for DWIs in NY prior all this. It was suspended at the time of the Valdez accident. He never had his maritime license revoked even after this. He was our neighbor we went to teh saem high school and unfortunately he was a a lifelong alcoholic ( Valencia Tavern). People would throw opened cans of motor oil on his lawn aftrerward and he had to move out. We found reporters going threw our trash cans at night looking for stuff, thinking they were his trash cans.
The funny thing is that in the case of the accident he did what he should have, he handed control over to the third mate and went down to his quarters to sleep it off. While it was his boat, he was not at the helm and it wasn't functionally his responsibility to make the turn back into the lane. Him not being on the bridge was fine, as obviously you need people to work shifts so they can rest.
I have aquintances that are intimately familiar with him and the criminal case against him. We even have a signed navigation map of Prince William Sound from him hanging on one of our walls that he gave to his attorney.
@@Noubers Mindnumbingly crazy analysis. Next time your Delta airline pilot comes aboard drunk and leaves the cockpit to sleep and gives complete ontrol to someone junior for the most difficult part of a voyage, I suppose you would call that 'fine'. I'm happy you have a signed chart ( not 'map') from him. He ws an A-hole when drubnk and also the few times he was sober. Do you have a wall of fame at home for other drunks?
@@cliffcrowley3756 I'd never fly Delta.
@@cliffcrowley3756 On longer flights it is routine for the pilots to work in shifts. A ship isn't a plane anyway.
@@bradarmstrong3952 Of course. But not during takeoffs and landings, The E Valdez was the equivalent of on takeoff. And not to sleep off a drunk. . The Master is responsible for everything especially regarding the safety of the ship. . The first responsibility is to make sure the Master is not drunk.
I remember reading about this incident
If you think about it from the point of view of who could have prevented it from happening, then you see that the officer was the point of failure and the Master shares responsibility for not supervising him because he was sleeping off a few nightcaps. Not too difficult.
Could you do a video on the MS Star Clipper or the MV Summit Venture and the two bridge disasters they caused, both in 1980?
Your channel is very nice
Most people have no frame of reference for just how fast the situation can turn to sh*t on the bridge of even a well run ship.
The sea is particularly unforgiving of any incapacity, inattention, or neglect.
Due to managements labor reorganization, the watch had an inexperienced mate who was just promoted and a helmsman who didn't know how to operate the auto pilot. The mate gave the order to turn but the helmsman didn't know how to get it out of auto pilot to make the turn. The mate failed to follow up on his command and was doing paperwork. The lookout was the most experienced on the watch and she watched Blige Reef get closer and closer on the wrong side of the ship while calling the bridge in panic. Things can go from perfect to disaster in seconds.
Your video does not really focus on the cause. The Master, Joe Hazelwood was not exhausted, he was drunk as he often was on his many runs to Valdez and its bars. A male and female officer and crew were also drinking, oh,... and also having sex while the Master was sleeping. Leaving the helm to a junior officer. Joe was the most experienced Master in the Exxon fleet and as such was given command of their newest vessel in their most sensitive trading area. Afterward, the Exxon Drug and Alcohol clause and policy was established for their own seamen and even office persionnel, as well as chartered in ships
He was “tired and emotional”.
Once found guilty and fined they then appealed saying how they'd only made a few mill profit that year. To which they were given a much smaller fine.
They continue to profit each year.
Disgusting
The 1978 Amoco Cadiz oil spill on Brittany coast was about 7 times the one in Prince William Sound. The larger Amoco Cadiz broke into pieces in bad weather before any oil pumping could be performed. This disaster came as a bargain for Amoco which settled for a laughable US$230 million in 1992.
Reminds me of how the CSB and NTSB operate: the point isn't to assign blame, but to determine what changes are needed to ensure it never happens again.
"Human error? Okay, what systemic changes are needed to mitigate it?"
that last accident summary read out like Batman's Rogue's Gallery. What could go wrong, DID go wrong. Unfortunately, the only time we get change is when SO MANY things go wrong at the same time, AND it results in an accident. Makes me wonder just how frequent these "perfect storms" of problems occur, for us to see bad luck step in and take advantage of it in a big way?
Hazelwood was a good ship handler and sailor, he was a below average manager of people. He assumed that because he could easily carry out the this maneuver, any of his mates could. Not taking into account the fatigue and inexperience of the 3/M (he had mostly worked on small research vessels prior). The third mate was doing the second mate a solid and carrying over past his normal watch end to let him get some sleep. He also may have zoned out for a time while looking at the radar due to the fatigue. I will also say that I doubt the alcohol played a material roll in the accident.
Finally, while not known for sure due to the lack of telemetry recorders back then, it is believed the helmsman may have never taken the helm out of auto pilot. He was just as tired, and possibly under the influence of drugs also. As such, all US flagged tankers have a "Kagen Alarm." When you turn the wheel with the A/P on, you get a loud buzzer, and it is a required item on the gear check (at least where I worked.)
Reasonable comments based on my understanding of the event. One very little known piece of the puzzle is that the USCG Boarding team were short a person when they arrived, that is, the only team member qualified to administer a breathalyzer.
So, a clever devise the team came up with was to call for a State Trooper, as they were around in State Waters, thus jurisdiction was valid.
The State Trooper arrived, the 'angle' was explained to the Trooper. The Trooper then spoke with Capt H at length and returned to report to the team that he (the Trooper) had no probable cause to conduct a breathalyzer. And departed the vessel.
Later, when the Coastie who was qualified did get aboard and perform the test, the reading was so high that the only explanation was consumption post incident.
@@rs2352 I did a term paper at the maritime academy on the NTSB report. It was my junior year, so around the 10th anniversary.
@@rs2352 Joe Hazelwood could handle his alcohol. It took a 12-pack just to get him buzzed. That man could pound it and still walk a straight line.
This incident was the inspiration for the story of the movie Free Willy 2. Of course that was fiction, but in the movie, the tanker had multiple malfunctions causing it to run aground, and significantly worse decision making afterward, causing a worse disaster.
It's interesting for me to watch this and not picture that movie because of knowing the connection, but it also makes me wonder about how many things like that were part of the public reaction.
As odd as it is, this video makes me homesick. I lived in Valdez for a decade, it's a beautiful town. My roommates job was to give the captains a breathalyzer test and run security. Almost the entire town works at the terminal, or if your local "Across the Bay".
At least the front didnt fall off
It's very unusual, I'd like to make that clear.
That wasn’t supposed to happen.
Oh yes! Great reference to
ruclips.net/video/3m5qxZm_JqM/видео.html
Can you do a video on the rms Olympic crashing into the Nantucket light ship
My dad worked for Exxon and was a supervisor or “beach master” on cleanup of this. He said they’d physically clean all rocks on beaches.
Not a bad video, but you left out a lot of detail, particularly the entire situation with the VTC & their lack of working radar coverage. This particular incident is also directly responsible for the adoption & implementation of STCW 95.
Few people seem to know about that aspect. Very true.
@Rufus Jones Which is weird to me. I would think the whole story would be important enough to get widely talked about. I guess people like having one person to blame when things go wrong.
Thanx
Aha, right at the end alcohol is mentioned.....but fatigue is still endemic: It's quite standard to travel halfway round the globe and arrive on board to be told you're on night shift/watch.
I remember seeing a picture of an Exxon ad by the roadside with 'SHIT HAPPENS' graffittied on it.
No one expected all 9000 hulls to be breached!
Exactly - not mentioned is the oil industry fight against the requirement of double hulled tankers. Only after this disaster was it made a requirement.
Could the vessel have navigated between Bligh Reef and Bligh Island as shown at 3:01?
I had an idea this was about the Exxon Veldez. I remember when that happened. I was going to say that this wreck cause double hulls to he mandatory. I heard something recently from a Valdez Alaska resident that all people born and live there get paid still. That's on top of the State of Alaska oil dividends it pays to all residents.
Shortly after the disaster I was at the monthly chantey sing and we added a verse to What Do You Do With a Drunken Sailor. At that time the scuttlebutt was that drinking may have been involved so the new verse was Put him at the helm of an Exxon tanker, put him at the helm of an Exxon tanker, put him at the helm of an Exxon tanker, early in the morning. It's just one of those songs where we would add lib. That verse stuck around for quite a while. Thanks for an in depth on this disaster.
ב''ה, "keep him away from the oil tanker" was the New England version.
Did the helmsman somehow think he was ordered to come right ten degrees (i.e. from 180 to 190) instead of just put your rudder at ten degrees right and hold it?? It does seem clear that the helmsman did not understand what the officer wanted to do. Groggy minds from exhausting day leads to confusion. :(
I 100% place the blame on Exxon and their negligent penny pinching.
Over a couple years they had cut the crew from about 40 down to under 20.
The crew had been busting their asses all day loading the ship and then set sail right away and none of the crew had gotten the required amount of time off to rest because they were running on a skeleton screw.
I think by law they were supposed to get 6 hours rest and instead only got an hour or so at most.
The specially trained response team that was supposed to be ready 24/7 had been layed off a couple years earlier, replaced with some regular dock workers who didn't have nearly the same training and experience.
Plus the response ship that was supposed to be ready at all times had all its gear unloaded and scattered all over the dock.
What was originally suppose to take 90 minutes from first call to having a response team on site instead took over a day and by then the damaged oil tanks were pretty much empty.
"...it remained the largest spill in US hustory until..."
FILL IN THE FUGGIN BLANK.
"These pretzels are making me thirsty!"
Interesting. I never had really any idea how large ocean vessels steered.
I took a kayak trip there in the early 2000s- amazingly beautiful. So cool to kayak through the ice flows coming off the glacier beached at low tide. No evidence of oil to be seen, though I was told that if you dug a hole on the beach, you'd find oil. The animals had returned though not in the same abundance as prior to the accident according to the locals. The oil didn't reduce the numbers of biting insects ; )
I’d say, VTC for not monitoring the ship, the ship owner for not making sure all parts work before having the ship leave, and the ship captain for not checking on the junior officer and the progress of the ship
3:06 What’s the significance of the buoy flashing every 5 vs every 4 seconds?
Maybe it's a different bouye and they failed to realise
If it is the same bouy then it might be related to distance or direction depending on how the bouys flash. (Spinning flood light vs strobes)
@@jasonreed7522 that's also possible yes
Marine Aids To Navigation have very specific flash patterns, timing and colors so that we can located them on a chart or if we look at the chart, we can determine our location by the lights we see. In that area there was no light flashing at 5 seconds. The Bligh Reef light flashes at 4 seconds and one across the shipping lanes flashes at 6 seconds. The light where they should have started their turn was a continuous flashing light. All of these are white lights.
My overwhelming takeaway from this video, is that pilotage was removed far too quickly. Perhaps I'm naive to the subject, but I would have assumed pilotage until open water.
i'd like to see the ship my mum was on that ran aground, it was a dredger called Arco Axe, it ran aground in 2005, 2006 or 2007 and not sure what happened after that.
Surely it's on the OOW. You should know your position and heading before and after a turn
What do we do with a drunken sailor?
What do we do with a drunken sailor?
What do we do with a drunken sailor
Ear-ly in the mornin'?
Stick 'im at the helm of an Exxon tanker!
Stick 'im at the helm of an Exxon tanker!
Stick 'im at the helm of an Exxon tanker
Ear-ly in the mornin'!
I can hear that in my head😂
@@JoshuaC923 me too
@@JoshuaC923 Try this one sung to the Johnny Cash tune.....
I seen a train a comin
It blew up on the tracks
The flames went up to heaven
And the smoke smelled just like crack.
I know I got the cancer
and I'll due real soon.
The best that I could wish for
is to live till Sunday afternoon.
Such a trip to know it continued until 2012
Do ships currently have the equivalent of auto-pilot? Using GPS to navigate?
Yes, for thirty years.
That last passage was a fairly hefty boot.
Report précis: everyone was to blame so no-one got jailed
Can someone please explain to me the lighting situation with the light house and buoy. I understand what was meant when the captain said “continue on until Busby island is a beam to port” meaning go on until the light is on the left of the ship. What I don’t understand is the beam part. My understanding is that the light house emits a continuous “flash” per se. How could it be seen as a beam from a certain point? Also Bligh buoy, it was said after they turned the ship 20 degrees starboard, the buoy was still on the starboard side and flashing every 4 seconds instead of 5. How is that possible? Somebody please explain to a dummy like me. Thanks
It's a subtle difference in terminology. Rather than "a beam of light on the port side" it's "the light is abeam on the port side" meaning exactly 90 degrees off the bow on the left side of the boat. It's a very precise instruction if you know the terms of art.
I'm unclear on the change in flash that they mentioned as well. Perhaps they timed it wrong the first time? Maybe they confused 2 different lights? Hard to tell without looking at a chart and even then there's no guarantee that the light scheme would be the same as it was 35 years ago.
The Great Lakes ore carrier Roger Blough went hard-aground on a rocky reef in broad daylight and ideal conditions. Supposedly the whole bridge crew were down below for coffee when it happened
So, in other words, just about everyone who could've done something wrong, didn't skip the opportunity that day.
The captain was filing out paperwork in his cabin…when the bean counters run operations.
how was it then with instruments on the bridge back then? Since screens are so cheap these days the designers should provide you with a map and predicted path maybe? Then he who steared could easily have seen he needed to turn more ....
Its sounds simple but it isnt these days you indeed have the ecdis (electronic chart display and information centre)
But it can get errors cause its coupled to your instruments gyro gps the vlog (ship speedometer) and yoy can indeed track your route on it so its more obvious but its not your primary nav instrument
The reasoning "...screens are so cheap these days...." really has nothing to do with prices _then._ This was 1989. The internet wasn't even a thing for the public. In the early 90's, hard drive space used to cost roughly $1 per megabyte of storage.
Here's a link to a luxury superyacht from 1984. (Essentially the same tech as the big ships.) Look at the bridge. In the early 80's, "screens" were green dots of text on a dark background, although home computers closer to the 1990 had 16 bit graphics.
@@grondhero that is how it was, had color monitors at work in 1986 but the resolution was not that great, bought my private computer in 1992 when price performance met.
In this time it would have been radars and paper charts. Loran and sat nav for positions
I was an AB unlimited for 8 years and the worst officer I ever stood watch with had been an AB with Exxon on the Alaska to west coast run which is part of the Jones Act protected domestic routes. He would make ridiculous demands on the helmsman such as asking him to explain concepts such as set and drift to the relieving helmsman which are properly the concern of the mate, or in the navy the concern of the quartermaster, but merchant helmsmen are boatswains mates with no training in navigation so they are supposed to concentrate only on steering, and not the result on the charted route of their steering since they are expected to only do as they are told, and not to overthink anything. Helmsmen are frequently not given rudder angles but are merely given a new heading leaving it to them to gauge how fast the turn is to be accomplished and when to ease off on the rudder or even to counter steer to halt the swing. A third mate is not really the guy you want maneuvering in restricted piloting waters. Most accidents occur on the third mate’s watch which is one reason why the 2nd mate, or navigator, has the mid watch from 12-4 twice each day, since the captain would normally be sleeping on the mid watch 0000-0400 as opposed to 1200-1600 hours. But I stood watch with that mate years later after he’d worked for Exxon doing a run from Bayonne, NJ to the Persian Gulf and back for the military sealift command on a RO/RO hauling US army vehicles and captured enemy tanks after the Gulf War. Most deep sea ABs are not very good at steering because they are on automatic pilot or the Iron Mike 99.9% of the time. I had been a submarine quartermaster so I knew how to navigate and learned how to steer as a relief wheelsman on the Great Lakes where you get lots of practice on hand steering. Another problem with inexperienced ABs on the wheel is remembering to dial in the new heading after a turn prior to turning the auto-pilot on again. Bad officers become over involved in paperwork failing to properly monitor the helmsman, who again, in the merchants is really only a boatswains mate and not a real quartermaster.
Could have sworn I subscribed to you a few weeks ago
I don't understand the information a navigator gets from the buoy changing the speed that it's flashing at, and why did the buoy start to flash quicker, does it have some kind of radar and flashes quicker when it detects ships as a warning? This seems pretty farfetched but I don't understand why the buoy which I assumed was passive started flashing quicker and what information that gave to the bridge?
Maybe they confused it with a different buoy or light? Like you, I don't see a sensor influenced light being the case and unfortunately the video did not elaborate on this point
Marine lights (ATONs) do not change their flash times. There is a 4 second light at the south end of Bligh Reef and a 6 second light across the shipping lane about 5 - 6 miles west northwest of the Bligh Reef light. This second light could have caused some confusion BUT, the prudent mariner would be able to recognize the difference in timing and location. Transited this area hundreds of times back then and never had n issue.