Hey Gregory, currently studying a course about philosophy from the renaissance to the enlightenment, what would you say is the most groundbreaking philosophers during this long era? Descartes, Rousseau, Kant?
Is it in line with Kant to think of the forms of space and time as a mental apparatus, similar to how neuroscience claims the visual processing parts of our brain process and condition the visual stimuli we receive? Or is it wrong to think of the forms of understanding as merely part of ourselves?
If you're following Kant, they're not "parts". And they would be for all human beings, not just ourselves. I'd avoid trying to mix in the sometimes pseudoscience of "neuroscience' here
@@GregoryBSadlerthank you for your response. I’m having a hard time understanding Kant’s concept of mind, and so I’m looking forward to hearing you break down Kant’s “Psychological Ideas” in §46.
Maybe you're now clear on his conception of space and time but the fact that he arrives at the idea that space and time are forms of intuition by way of transcendentalism is key. Transcendental arguments in the Kantian terminology attempt to establish conditions of the possibility of some given reality. So transcendental aesthetic seeks to provide an explanation of how sensibility (roughly perception, but it's usually understood to be pre-conceptual, so it's a mere seeing, not seeing _as)_ is possible given the human mode of sensing/representation. But also key to understanding is that the experience of external stimuli isn't the _source_ of our representatives of space and time, which would be a Lockean conception, rather, it's the forms of intuition of space and time that determine the human mode of experience. Section 46 basically says the _I_ as a thinking thing as derived in the cogito seems convincing and plausible but because that's outside the purview of experience and thus of knowledge it is a mere speculation that cannot be knowledge by his reckoning. According to him the _I_ is only an indexical that points at our sense of the self, the nature of which can't be known.
If all objects come to our perception in this form of space and time, as we can't imagine objects that don't take space in our mind, why does it actually precede experience? This assumes the existence of objects outside our perception that don't have this form, which i understand is what Kant mean by the thing-in-itself. But it makes more sense to me that the content can't exist without form and vise versa. How can it be otherwise?
I do know I would say a foolish thing but I can't figure out space without objects or points. For Euclid , in my shallow interpretation, point and space are correlatives, if I have a point it would be in a space and I would have space if there is a point, more or less as the relationship between continent and content. So the condition of a space is a point and vice versa. But I feel that assertion that objects and space, so time, are correlatives brings to the hypotheses that the kosmos or the universe are eternal, somehow, but I must study it deeper, maybe in Proclus or some Neoplatonic philosopher. BTW, amazing classes about Kant, Professor Sadler, thank you so much for them.
Kant has a somewhat different view on space and empirical content. He's not saying they're correlatives in the sense you're using it there. Glad you enjoy the videos
Hey Gregory, currently studying a course about philosophy from the renaissance to the enlightenment, what would you say is the most groundbreaking philosophers during this long era? Descartes, Rousseau, Kant?
I don't really use those sorts of vague categories like "most groundbreaking"
Love from yemen ❤
Thanks!
Is it in line with Kant to think of the forms of space and time as a mental apparatus, similar to how neuroscience claims the visual processing parts of our brain process and condition the visual stimuli we receive? Or is it wrong to think of the forms of understanding as merely part of ourselves?
If you're following Kant, they're not "parts". And they would be for all human beings, not just ourselves. I'd avoid trying to mix in the sometimes pseudoscience of "neuroscience' here
@@GregoryBSadlerthank you for your response. I’m having a hard time understanding Kant’s concept of mind, and so I’m looking forward to hearing you break down Kant’s “Psychological Ideas” in §46.
Maybe you're now clear on his conception of space and time but the fact that he arrives at the idea that space and time are forms of intuition by way of transcendentalism is key. Transcendental arguments in the Kantian terminology attempt to establish conditions of the possibility of some given reality. So transcendental aesthetic seeks to provide an explanation of how sensibility (roughly perception, but it's usually understood to be pre-conceptual, so it's a mere seeing, not seeing _as)_ is possible given the human mode of sensing/representation. But also key to understanding is that the experience of external stimuli isn't the _source_ of our representatives of space and time, which would be a Lockean conception, rather, it's the forms of intuition of space and time that determine the human mode of experience.
Section 46 basically says the _I_ as a thinking thing as derived in the cogito seems convincing and plausible but because that's outside the purview of experience and thus of knowledge it is a mere speculation that cannot be knowledge by his reckoning. According to him the _I_ is only an indexical that points at our sense of the self, the nature of which can't be known.
Can we expect diagrams like Half Hour Hegel videos, here?
You see what you get, I’m pretty sure
If all objects come to our perception in this form of space and time, as we can't imagine objects that don't take space in our mind, why does it actually precede experience? This assumes the existence of objects outside our perception that don't have this form, which i understand is what Kant mean by the thing-in-itself. But it makes more sense to me that the content can't exist without form and vise versa. How can it be otherwise?
I think you need to go back over the text. Space and time for Kant logically precede any experience of objects in space and time.
I do know I would say a foolish thing but I can't figure out space without objects or points. For Euclid , in my shallow interpretation, point and space are correlatives, if I have a point it would be in a space and I would have space if there is a point, more or less as the relationship between continent and content. So the condition of a space is a point and vice versa. But I feel that assertion that objects and space, so time, are correlatives brings to the hypotheses that the kosmos or the universe are eternal, somehow, but I must study it deeper, maybe in Proclus or some Neoplatonic philosopher.
BTW, amazing classes about Kant, Professor Sadler, thank you so much for them.
Kant has a somewhat different view on space and empirical content. He's not saying they're correlatives in the sense you're using it there. Glad you enjoy the videos
@@GregoryBSadler Thank you!
ARE time and space substance?
No