To clarify the point I was making about Montgomery. Anyone can have their say on any leader from any nation. I'm looking forward to the day that I can turn around and say "I've done my research and can conclude that Monty wasn't a great general" because I'll have no shame in saying that (if it is indeed true). I'm reserving my judgement of Monty until I've read up on him more, but the point stands that just because I'm British doesn't mean that I love every British leader and criticise leaders from other nations. There were good and bad leaders from every nation, and I think it's good practice for everyone to think critical of the leaders of our own nations - especially those we admire the most.
I really don't understand you.You defend Monty,you say how his plan for operation was good and to cut-everything was good but then you stat with excuses for defeat!?First-history is science based on facts!History is not novel where you can debate do you like what is wrote or not or something in the novel could be wrote different or better.History is strict science based on facts.And fact is that whole plan for operation Market-Garden was bad coz battle was lost and whole 1st para brigade was almost totally destroyed!You can maybe debate that Monty wasn't such a bad commander.I think that Monty was such a bad commander that you couldn't found worst from him!My opinion is based on several mistakes done from Monty during war and the biggest one when he showed that his military knowledge is in the rank of captain and maybe(but just maybe) in rank of major is his conquest of Antwerp when Monty(some general!)"forget" to take port!So Germans established such a strong defence in port with bunkers,heavy artillery,muchine gun nests that port was taken more then months after!So military objective was Antwerp coz that port but for Monty-port wasn't so important!But about Market-Garden.When some general going in strategic battle then he must look everything-from terrain to intelligence infomations.Terrain was very hard for any strategic operation when there are too many rivers with many bridges that core with help from American airborne divisions must cross over.Then there were very narrow roads for such a big force like core.And then there were intelligence informations!I don't understand how Monty didn't ask himself first-where is that SS panzer core with 2 SS panzer divisions-Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg!?Where is gruppenfuhrer Bietrich!?He was in Normandy but where is he now!And then Dutch resistance send you msgs that there are large tank formations nearArnhem.And as I know-every SS panzer division had their own insignias.And Monty didn't asked just-what are the insignias on those tanks in Arnhem!?I don't think that was hard at all!Anyway-history is exact science with facts.And fact is that Monty pushed so hard for one operation who was complete disaster!It was strange for everyone why Monty push so hard in one very risky operation when he was known as "old fart"general who always done everything by the 1st World war book(from el-Alamein onward!)-when you attack you must have 2 times more troops from defender,then 2 hrs artillery barrage,then mine cleaners and then tanks with infantry..So old,so boring without any inventions,creativity..I think Monty was just a careerist who got his position coz he belonged to ruling class in England(same old Normans who ruled in England from 1066!)just like that alcoholic Churchill.But their time was running out coz Americans didn't cared for those old farts.So Monty wanted to show how he can be just like Heinz Guderian or Patton.He didn't knew nothing about modern warfare,he didn't even tried to learn about modern warfare like Russian generals-Chuikov or Rokosovski!He just wanted to do something balled but he made big blonder!Thats Monty!Sorry if I made mistakes while I wrote this-English is not my languege
Your argument that 30 corps and more importantly guard armor got there on time doesn’t work because even when they got there only the armor was ready to cross for supporting infantry was not ready to cross the were not going to advance between nine Nijmegen and Arnhem him and supported the matter how you slice it. Even though 30 Corps was able to reach there they were not able to reach their hold everythingAnd then push to 43 division was fighting off the German counter attacks and guards armor was not gonna fight on its own up roads that weren’t really roads they were are you know what the calm elevator roads and have the tanks picked up one by one if you completely ignore that even though 30/core reach there they were in no way or shape ready to fight in between my Megan and I are in him in the face of the two pans are divisions and to say that the Germans didn’t control the bridge is also incorrect the braided the Germans did control the bridge in control if you houses around one end of it for four days but they control the other end and everything else across the river market garden was not gonna work because of the multi dimensional ability of the Germans to react and control the last bridge and the far Bank of the Neiefer Rhine.
If anything, your descriptions have upped my opinion of Monty. Like I commented on your Ike v. Monty Explaining Market-Garden comparison, ( ruclips.net/video/f79KgQVL3MM/видео.html ), "It's kinda sad that Monty's own ex-post-facto description of [the operation's] goals is what made me think him a fool."
I feel that in recent years Montgomery has gotten a lot of slander. The usual things like he was 'overrated', 'too-cautious/timid/unimaginative', 'egocentric', or in this case, a 'poor planner'. However its my thoughts that this has been an opinion gathered out of lots of rhetoric and not enough thought and nuanced. History is extraordinarily nuanced in many areas, and it is far easier to make a sweeping generalization such as the popular 'Montgomery was to blame for Allied setbacks from D-day onward period.' It is simpler to hold that belief than deal with the uncertainty that comes from closer examination. A lot of these opinions are formed on a level of national bias. This is unfortunate as it clouds the reality of the situation. TIK is doing a great job in trying to prevent a nationalistic bias concerning historical discussion. As that kind of lopsidedness seems to beget more of the same bias. To defend some of the criticism of Montgomery, it's useful to look at what some of his contemporaries have said of him: * "Monty was not such a dashing, romantic figure as his opponent; nor would you find him leading a forlorn hope in person, for the simple reason that if he was in command forlorn hopes did not occur. He had an extraordinary capacity for putting his finger straight on the essentials of any problem, and of being able to explain them simply and clearly. He planned all his battles most carefully." Brian Horrocks -- A Full Life (1960), * "General Montgomery is a very able, dynamic type of army commander. I personally think that the only thing he needs is a strong immediate commander. He loves the limelight but in seeking it, it is possible that he does so only because of the effect upon his own soldiers, who are certainly devoted to him. I have great confidence in him as a combat commander. He is intelligent, a good talker, and has a flair for showmanship." General Dwight D. Eisenhower, diary entry (11 June 1943) * "Nevertheless, again there cropped up criticisms of Montgomery's "caution," which I had first heard among pressmen and airmen when he was conducting his long pursuit of Rommel across the desert. Criticism is easy- an unsuccessful attack brings cries of "butcher" just as every pause brings wails of "timidity." Such charges are unanswerable because proof or refutation is impossible. In war about the only criterion that can be applied to a commander is his accumulated record of victory and defeat. If regularly successful, he gets credit for his skill, his judgement as to the possible and impossible, and his leadership. Those critics of Montgomery who assert that he sometimes failed to attain the maximum must at least admit that he never once sustained a major defeat. In this particular instance I went over all details carefully, both with Montgomery and with Alexander. I believed then, and believe now, that a headlong attack against the Mount Etna position, with the resources available in the middle of July, would have been defeated. And it is well to remember that caution and timidity are not synonymous, just as boldness and rashness are not!" Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (1948), p. 179 * "Montgomery is a first-class trainer and leader of troops on the battlefield, with a fine tactical sense. He knows how to win the loyalty of his men and has a great flair for raising morale. He rightly boasted that, after the battle of Alamein, he never suffered a defeat; and the truth is that he never intended to run the risk of a defeat; that is one reason why he was cautious and reluctant to take chances. There is, however, much to be said for his attitude when we consider that, up to October 1942, we had not won a single major battle since the start of the war - except Archie Wavell's operations against the Italians and some local victories against the Axis forces in the Western Desert. Yet I can't disguise that he was not an easy man to deal with; for example, administrative orders issued by my staff were sometimes objected to - in other words Monty wanted to have complete independence of command and to do what he liked. Still, no serious difficulties arose over these very minor disturbances, he was always reasonable when tackled." General Harold Alexander in Memoirs: 1940-1945 I will admit that the quotes are selected to challenge the popular opinion of Montgomery. However I do feel that upon closer inspection, for the 21st Army group commander for the initial D-Day landing, to command the ground forces you couldn't get a much better commander than Montgomery in that field. Contenders can range to Perhaps Wavell who was sacked unfairly by Churchill, Truscott who was sidelined constantly in Italy by first Patton and then Clarke. Bradly may have though I suspect he would not have been as good as the other choices. Or William Slim, who is my personal favorite.
As an American and veteran of the 82nd airborne division. (First Gulf War) I found your video and conclusions fascinating and informative. Gavin made a decision based on the information he had. It was a bad decision. I would have still gladly followed him into battle. Because he usually made the right decision. Great commander's from Alexander on have made bad decisions. Love your channel.
First, my credentials: I am a military veteran of 27 years service with some experience of tactical and operational planning and proud possessor of a bachelor's degree in history with considerable emphasis on military history. Additionally, I have also had an intense continuing lifelong (now 59 years) personal and professional interest and study of military affairs and military history. I have the following comments: I concur with the conclusion that Operation Market-Garden was badly planned and rushed in preparation. A key element of a good military plan is flexibility. The "fog of war," "friction," (whatever you want to call it) always happens and there was no flexibility in the plan. It had to succeed at every point, take every single objective at or about the scheduled time for it to succeed. There was no flexibility to account for possible setbacks or alternative courses should achieving one or more objectives prove problematic. As was expressed in the movie at several points they could not suffer mischance at any point and this characteristic is a major mark of a bad military plan. The choice of ground for the offensive dictated this lack of flexibility, but the assumption was made that the enemy would be incapable of effectively using the extremely favorable defensive terrain they possessed. This assumption was based on the belief the enemy was already broken. The intelligence assessments completely discounted this assumption but were disregarded. The neglect of sound intelligence preparation of the operational environment is another hallmark of a flawed planning and preparation process. Additionally, having heard General Urqhart discuss the matter in a live interview, I am keenly aware that he strongly criticized the placement of 1 Para drop-zones. He himself expressed the conclusion that this was a catastrophic decision that violated what he concluded was an overriding requirement for airborne operations: drop as close as humanly possible to the objective to maximize the element of surprise and seize the initiative while the enemy is most vulnerable. Other examples of how this was a bad plan can be adduced, but I believe I have made my point. Concerning General Gavin: as was portrayed in the movie he did indeed suffer a back injury which plagued him for the rest of his life. Those (including myself) who have had to operate under conditions of severe physical distress, including severe pain and still make sound military judgement in situations of intense stress and/or urgency will know this is not easy. I would accept that he did in fact misjudge the situation and make a faulty military assessment. These situations are one reason why we have orders. Having priorities at least to some degree predetermined for you in the relative calm of the planning sessions is a good thing. Intelligence among other factors can be reasonably assessed in the absence of battlefield stress and the guidance of a soundly prepared plan expressed in well-written orders can make decisions easier when the battlefield stress is on. One is not blind to changing conditions on the battlefield (a point at which flexibility in the plan is vital) but the maintenance of the objective is an important military principle and Gavin did not do this. His primary objective was to open the bridge to 30 Corps' passage. He failed to do this. If in fact there had been a substantial armored force in the Reichswald his full division would have been unlikely to hold the Groesbeek Heights. The Groesbeek Heights offer relatively little in the way of terrain advantage. In fact, as 1 Para proved, one of the best hopes for light infantry to hold against a combined arms assault is urban terrain. He would have had to depend on possession of Nijmegen itself and expeditious relief by 30 Corps to hope to hold indefinitely against a well-executed combined arms assault. In that context his best choice was to act as Major Frost did and seize and prepare to defend the bridge (objective) utilizing the urban terrain surrounding it. Thus, though counter arguments can be made, I believe your assessment of the situation to be be essentially correct. Other points can be made. This discussion is by no means a comprehensive assessment of all relevant factors. Nevertheless the conclusions you reached have considerable merit. I eagerly await any rejoinder anyone may wish to make as long as it is polite and soundly thought through. Discussion such as this is one important means of advancing our understanding of historical events. Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this forum.
As a veteran of military planning you must know how difficult it is to judge a retreating enemy. When are they ripe for more pressure? What will crack them for good? When will they turn and fight? When are you most extended? Making that call is very difficult because everything on both sides of the shifting lines, is in flux. We focus too much attention on offensive action, not enough on retreats. Gen O'Connor is reputed to have said he wasn't a complete general because he had never commanded a retreat (he was soon to be captured in a retreat so go figure) The story of Market Garden has to start with the Battle of Falaise. If you don't add the heady rush across Northern France and Belgium into the planning mix you cannot describe what is/was/could have been too hasty in Holland. Military planners make judgements - consolidate or strike? Where is the threat, when to apply pressure and what would make the best investment of force. The German Border and the Rhine were obvious defensive and psychological features for the retreating germans. The Siegfried line was there for that reason. Any map appreciation, German or Allied, shows the land between the Rhine and Maas looked good for resistance. A boggy, low lying, riverine stopping ground covering your flank to the sea. If the Germans were going to stop anywhere it would be along that line. The Maas, Waal and Scheldt delta however had to be taken, it was the obvious consolidation ground for the Allies. It covered Antwerp like a claw over their logistic plans. Somewhere between the Maas and the Rhine is where the allies had to end up. It was also exactly where a map appreciation said the Germans where most likely to resist. The Delta was going to take a lot of minor missions to secure, it's been a sponge of British soldiery since medieval times. So In September 1944, for SHAEF, what was more important - cracking open the German Rhine/Siegfried line, by snapping on the heels of a rout - or using what momentum you still had to push as far as Nijmegen and clear the approaches to Antwerp? It was Eisenhower's, Tedder's and Ramsay's judgement that Antwerp was the prize. I can't fault their logic. Let the German line solidify at the Rhine, break it down later when you've massively reduced your logistic chain and can take your time to plan a multi-army breakthrough. Montgomery's judgement was the Germans only needed one last push to crack open the northern flank. Why send an army to capture Arnhem next month when you might get it with a division now? If Monty could have got to the Inland Sea coast, he would have Rotterdam and Antwerp, and instead of fighting through the hilly woody bits further South, you had open lands into Northern Germany and the Ruhr. Thats tasty. Don't say you wouldn't have considered it. Everything had to be taken up to Nijmegen for either plan to work so 2/3rds of Market Garden HAD to take place. Arnhem was a cherry on an already hasty plan. Is this the root of Brownings supposed remark "going a bridge too far"? Stopping at Nijmegen, you might have got moving again as early October, although most likely in the midst of Winter. And you'd have to plan an assault across some of the worst ground in Europe - two rivers back to back with a soggy island between - difficult proposition. Both questions may have hurried the decision to go for Arnhem straight away? What harm was there expending a single light division to try for that last bridge across the Rhine? Bigger things than 1st Airborne had been sacrificed getting to that point. 14,000 sacrificed at Hong Kong just to show the flag. 23,000 at Crete to hide ULTRA. 3,500 at Dieppe just to test the waters and show willing. There was more to the British Army in 1944 than 1st Airborne, however brave. There was a major division in philosophy in Allied high command - was Arnhem the compromise? It has the feel of a half pregnant kinda plan? "Its just a quick right turn from Arnhem to the Ruhr!" then isn't it also just a 'quick left turn from the Ruhr to Arnhem'. And the Ruhr has to house reserves, its where the reserves are produced! You can take three days to assemble your 'surprise' by airborne division? No two lifts on day 1? Drop them far away? Thats feeling your way into a fight - not a commando job. Is this why the Groesbeek held such fascination for Browning and Gavin. If you were only planning to hold along Waal, maybe even blow the bridges at Nijmegen to secure that flank, then the Groesbeek is the vital ground not the spans. For what its worth, I would have gone with Comet two weeks earlier. Only I would have cancelled Arnhem, blown the Nijmegen bridges and spent September clearing Antwerp. In the Autumn, something bigger. I bet if that had been done and the allies spent the Winter getting miserable under a dyke; if the assault across the Rhine required massive investment further south and a costly crossing of the Waal and Rhine. Historians would be saying 'if only' SHAEF had added Arnhem to Comet, they could have ended the war by Christmas. I can hear them saying 'the two SS divisions at Arnhem were shattered, poorly equipped and had no real tanks, they wouldn't have put up much resistance' Murphy's Judgement - everything that can go wrong, will go wrong. So plow in and hope the other guy suffers more mistakes than you.
My only problem with all of this question is that there is now overwhelming evidence that Gavin didn't decide not to go for the Nijmegen bridge. The evidence supports his own claim he instructed Colonel Lindquist of the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment to send his 1st Battalion directly to the bridge immediately after landing, and Lindquist failed to interpret the instruction properly. 1) In chronological order, the first piece of evidence is Gavin's 17 July 1945 letter to US Army Historical Officer Captain Westover: "About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping up well, I personally directed Colonel Lindquist, commanding the 508th Parachute Infantry, to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen bridge without delay after landing, but to keep a very close watch on it in the event he needed it to protect himself against the Reichswald. So I personally directed him to commit his first battalion to this task. He was cautioned to send the battalion via the flat ground east of the city." (p.11, Lost at Nijmegen, RG Poulussen, 2011) 2) The second is Cornelius Ryan's 20 January 1967 interview with Gavin for his book A Bridge Too Far: Gavin and Lindquist had been together in Sicily and Normandy and neither Gavin nor Ridgway, the old commander of the 82nd, trusted him in a fight. He did not have a “killer instinct.” In Gavin’s words, “He wouldn’t go for the juggler [jugular].” As an administrative officer he was excellent; his troopers were sharp and snappy and, according to Gavin, “Made great palace guards after the war.” Gavin confirms he ordered Lindquist to commit a battalion to the capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the jump. He also confirms he told Lindquist not to go to the bridge by way of the town but to approach it along some mud flats to the east. We discussed also objectives. Gavin’s main objectives were the heights at Groesbeek and the Grave bridge; he expected and intelligence confirmed “a helluva reaction from the Reichswald area.” Therefore he had to control the Groesbeek heights. The Grave bridge was essential to the link up with the British 2nd Army. He had three days to capture the Nijmegen bridge and, although he was concerned about it, he felt certain he could get it within three days. The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized. (James Maurice Gavin, Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University) 3) The third is the first of two books using first hand witness accounts published in 2012, the year after Dutch researcher RG Poulussen first drew my attention to the issue, and this is American historian John C McManus' September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far (2012), chapter 3: As Gavin finished his briefing, the British General [Browning] cautioned him: “Although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen bridges, it is essential that you capture the Groesbeek ridge and hold it.” General Browning’s order, of course, made perfect sense. It was of paramount importance to hold the high ground. Any commander worth his salt understood that. Even so, the purpose of Market Garden was to seize the bridges in order to speedily unleash a major armored thrust into northern Germany, toward Berlin. High ground notwithstanding, the only way for the Allies to accomplish this ambitious objective was to take the bridges, and these were, after all, perishable assets, because the Germans could destroy them (and might well be likely to do so the longer it took the Allies to take the bridges). By contrast, the Groesbeek ridge spur wasn’t going anywhere. If the 82nd had trouble holding it, and German artillery or counterattacks became a problem, the Allies could always employ air strikes and artillery of their own to parry such enemy harassment. Also, ground troops from Dempsey’s Second Army could join with the paratroopers to retake Groesbeek from the Germans. So, in other words, given the unpleasant choice between the bridges and the hills, the bridges had to come first. General Gavin did have some appreciation of this. At an earlier meeting with his regimental commanders, he [Gavin] had told Colonel Roy Lindquist of the 508th Parachute Infantry that even though his primary mission was to hold the high ground at Berg en Dal near Groesbeek, he was also to send his 1st Battalion into Nijmegen to take the key road bridge. Gavin told Lindquist to push for the bridge via "the flatland to the east of the city and approach it over the farms without going through the built-up area." Gavin considered this so important that he stood with Lindquist over a map and showed him this route of advance. At the same time, Colonel Lindquist had trouble reconciling Gavin's priorities for the two ambitious objectives of holding Berg en Dal and grabbing the bridge. He believed that Gavin wanted him to push for the bridge only when he had secured the critical glider landing zones and other high ground. According to Lindquist, his impression was that "we must first accomplish our main mission before sending any sizeable force to the bridge." Actually, General Gavin wanted the 508th to do both at the same time, but somehow this did not sink into the 508th's leadership. "If General Gavin wanted Col Lindquist to send a battalion for the bridge immediately after the drop, he certainly did not make that clear to him," Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Shanley, the executive officer of the 508th, later wrote. Perhaps this was a miscommunication on Gavin's part, probably not. Lieutenant Colonel Norton, the G-3, was present for the conversation (Shanley was not) and recorded Gavin's clear instructions to Lindquist: "Seize the high ground in the vicinity of Berg en Dal as his primary mission and ... attempt to seize the Nijmegen bridge with a small force, not to exceed a battalion." 4) The fourth is 82nd Airborne historian Phil Nordyke's Put Us Down In Hell - The Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2 (2012), chapter 9: Captain Chet Graham was assigned as the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters. "I sat in on a high level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation." ... and in chapter 10: Captain Chet Graham, the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters, decided to obtain a status of the progress toward the capture of the Nijmegen highway bridge. "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' " 5) In addition, by the time Gavin's intervention finally got the 1st Battalion moving at 8 pm, it was the same time that Gräbner's SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 (attached to 10.SS-Panzer) arrived at the Nijmegen bridge, followed by SS-Sturmbannführer Leo-Hermann Reinhold (II./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10) and his adjutant SS-Untersturmführer Gernot Traupel in a car - probably the last German vehicle and the only one of 10.SS-Panzer-Division to get to Nijmegen via the Arnhem bridge, before Frost started stopping traffic at 9 pm. An account of the Nijmegen defence from the German point of view based on Traupel's diary is in Retake Arnhem Bridge - An Illustrated History of the Kampfgruppe Knaust September to October 1944 by Bob Gerritsen and Scott Revell (2014) Chapter 4. Contrary to the Hollywood film, it was Traupel who ordered the Nijmegen bridge blown on his own initiative, because Reinhold was not at the command post when British tanks crossed over, and division commander Harmel was constantly shuttling back and forth between Arnrhem and Nijmegen in a Volkswagen and was not there either.
I'm late to this. I didn't take your argument as some jingoistic slant. But I would point out that in your original documentary that you did make what could be considered a personal attack on Gavin's character. You highlighted his comment about not firing officers who lose one battle as some sort of inference by him to assuage Gavin's guilt. As to the battle itself, I found the conclusion that the plan wasn't bad and that it was "lost" at Nijmegen as overly simplistic. The plan relied on the capture of multiple bridges with an attack on a narrow front with seven days planning. There were no sand table scenarios, no real walk throughs that were and are part and parcel of any complex military operation. Of course, any delay in an enforced timetable would hamper success. Lastly, you had to know that the perception of bias would be raised. Market-Garden was too complex to be distilled into a single error or decision. Montgomery put 3 divisions of light troops into an armored cauldron. He took a risk, and he failed. Trying to find a single person or event in a plan this rigid on timetable and with so many moving parts tends to offer itself up to questions about bias. I enjoyed your documentary. As I stated at the beginning, I don't think you were being biased. I look forward to further content from you.
Okay, ignoring the jingoistic rubbish, which as you point out takes us nowhere, why did Market Garden fail? In the film "A Bridge Too Far" Browning mentions that "It took six months to organise the D-day drop. And that was only half as big as this." I think that that one comment gives the real reason for the failure. The whole operation was planned in seven days. Decisions made on day one were set in stone because to change them on day six would have led to the operation being scrubbed. For example, the Poles on day three were to drop into terrain unsuitable for a British drop on day one. We're the Poles superman who could drop in places that the British couldn't? If so why not drop the Poles on day one instead of the British? Of course the Poles weren't supermen. It was just a mistake caused by rushed planning. Again with the Nijmegen drop. Gavin was told that there were Germans in the Reichswald. He said at the time that he needed two divisions to do his job properly. He had to choose to either take the Grosbeek Heights or to take Nijmegen. He didn't have the men to do both. This was a day one decision that once taken had to be set in stone. Personally I think that you are right. Market Garden failed because of Gavin making an incorrect decision. But I can't wholly blame Gavin. Historians often say "Why didn't X do Y?", "This information was known so why do that?", "Why not do Z because W was doing this?". What historians often forget is that they might study a battle for years, yet the participants whom they criticise may have only been involved for a matter of hours. I'm a distinctly amateur historian, yet I know more about Operation Market Garden that any of the participants did on 26th September 1944. Is it fair to judge them based on 20/20 hindsight?
Dean Stuart Were there intelligence reports on German forces in the Reichswald? All I’ve ever heard was that it was Browning/Gavin’s “opinion”. This alway struck me as odd given that Browning ignore Maj. Brian Urquhart’s intel on the SS Panzer divisions. (I’ve only read a few online things, none of which clarified this for me) The other thing I’m not yet clear on is Gavin’s orders to Lindquist that the 508th should “move without delay” to take the bridge but did not do so between assembling at 3pm after their drop, and 6pm when Gavin asked. (According to Wikipedia). I might have missed this in TIK’s original, excellent, video, but I don’t remember it. My two-cents on this video: I thought it was very good. There’s no place for any more national pride in writing history. There is already more than enough in the history books that we have to try to avoid.
Market was based on former operations, all repeatedly cancelled, some at the very last moment, because of the speed of the allies' advance through France and Belgium. I read that paratroopers were eager to go in action (especially the 1st ABD, since they didn't have see action during D-Day, let's say since North Africa and Sicily) . Urquhart was an infantry commander, maybe poorly aware of specifics about "paratropeers warfare" and requirements. As for the Polish Independent Para Brigade, it's landing zones (on the third day) were supposed to have been cleared by the 1st ABD, and most important, the Deelen airfield AA positions (and those around), dealt with. IMHO, itsn't the seven days short time that poised the entire plan, but : - The decision for ONE flight/drop a day for the transports - Browning "stealing" more needed elsewhere Dakotas and Horsas for his own HQ transportation - The absence of fighter-bomber support to make the area between Arnhem and Nijmegen a forbidden zone for german armour - Of course the distance between the landing zones and the Arnhem road bridge for the 1st ABD - The One WAY road for the XXX corps And in the course of events : - the radio problems of the 1st ABD (to be linked with the former cancelled drops, I read somewhere that those problems came not from the terrain features but from the lack of consistency in the maintainance of these radios) - the failure of the recce jeeps to get to the bridge at Arnhem - the germans finding the overall plans of Market-Garden on the late body of an (american) officer... About Gavin, wasn't Browning with him ? He could have pressd him on the taking of the Nijmegen bridge, as his superior officer, I guess. Beside that, your comment sounds sound to me ;)
TIK, I'm sincerely surprised someone felt you were biased. I'm very sensitive to bias as it's all around us especially on RUclips. I have watched several of your videos and have only seen criticism towards action and decisions made during the time of the battle based upon your research not on your nationality. Please keep it up. It's refreshing and informative...and friggin' fun to watch! Cheers mate.
So Gavin's decision (if he made it, and wasn't ordered to) to defend the Groosebeck heights with too many troops was the problem, but landing 8 miles from Arnhem bridge, when there WERE alternatives to that, wasn't an issue? Why not just drop closer to the bridge and on the south side and take both ends, then attack OUT of those areas to seize landing zones for followup gliders and supplies? Much easier and more varied choices than an attack to the bridge.
The person responsible for the failure was Brereton. He was in charge of the 1st Allied Airborne Army and the buck stops with him. It was he who signed off the plan with explicit instructions to capture the bridges with 'thunderclap surprise'. So why did he allow Browning and Gavin to relegate the Nijmegen to the lowest priority ?
TIK has RG Poulussen's Lost At Nijmegen (2011), but to drill down on Gavin's decision he needs to investigate 82nd Airborne historian Phil Nordyke's combat history of the 508th PIR in WW2 - Put Us Down In Hell (2012), and also John C McManus' September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far (2012). Gavin's decision not to prioritise the Nijmegen highway bridge over the Groesbeek heights was a post-war decision after things had gone wrong on the operation, and he wanted to take responsibility for the error instead of throwing one of his regimental commanders under the bus. These authors quote eye witnesses at the divisional briefing held before the operation in which Gavin instructed 508th Regiment commander Colonel Roy Lindquist to go for the bridge as soon as possible after landing. Nordyke's witness was Captain Chester 'Chet' Graham, the CO of the 508th PIR's HQ Company and the regiment's Liaison Officer to Division HQ. McManus' witness was Lieutenant Colonel Jack Norton, the Division G-3 (Operations Officer). According to Nordyke, chapter 9: Captain Chet Graham was assigned as the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters. "I sat in on a high level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation." In McManus, chapter 3: At an earlier meeting with his regimental commanders, he [Gavin] had told Colonel Roy Lindquist of the 508th Parachute Infantry that even though his primary mission was to hold the high ground at Berg en Dal near Groesbeek, he was also to send his 1st Battalion into Nijmegen to take the key road bridge. Gavin told Lindquist to push for the bridge via "the flatland to the east of the city and approach it over the farms without going through the built-up area." Gavin considered this so important that he stood with Lindquist over a map and showed him this route of advance. At the same time, Colonel Lindquist had trouble reconciling Gavin's priorities for the two ambitious objectives of holding Berg en Dal and grabbing the bridge. He believed that Gavin wanted him to push for the bridge only when he had secured the critical glider landing zones and other high ground. According to Lindquist, his impression was that "we must first accomplish our main mission before sending any sizeable force to the bridge." Actually, General Gavin wanted the 508th to do both at the same time, but somehow this did not sink into the 508th's leadership. "If General Gavin wanted Col Lindquist to send a battalion for the bridge immediately after the drop, he certainly did not make that clear to him," Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Shanley, the executive officer of the 508th, later wrote. Perhaps this was a miscommunication on Gavin's part, probably not. Lieutenant Colonel Norton, the G-3, was present for the conversation (Shanley was not) and recorded Gavin's clear instructions to Lindquist: "Seize the high ground in the vicinity of Berg en Dal as his primary mission and ... attempt to seize the Nijmegen bridge with a small force, not to exceed a battalion." Cont...
Nordyke, Chapter 10 continues on the ground after the drop: Receiving information from the patrols that no enemy was between them and their objective at De Ploeg, Captain Adams and Company A increased the pace of the advance. “The march to the objective was (almost) uneventful… Everyone started digging in. Everyone had the idea that the rest of the job would be as easy as it had been up to that point. That was somewhat my own impression and I still believe if we had marched straight to the [highway] bridge [in Nijmegen] we would have had it without a fight.” Lieutenant Colonel Warren’s 1st Battalion arrived at De Ploeg at around 6:30 p.m., about five hours after landing, without encountering any significant resistance. Warren ordered his troopers to dig in and strengthen the roadblock on the Nijmegen-Groesbeek highway to prevent German movement south from Nijmegen. Meanwhile, Captain Ben Delamater, the battalion’s executive officer, got the command post organised. "The regimental commanding officer [Colonel Roy Lindquist], with his radio operator and two Dutch interpreters from the British army soon followed us onto our first objective. The planned defenses were being set up when several civilians wearing arm bands and carrying Underground credentials of some sort told the colonel that the Germans had deserted Nijmegen, that the town and the highway bridge were lightly held. The regimental CO had been instructed that if the initial mission were accomplished to 'go ahead and take the highway bridge if you can.' This division order was perfectly understood in relation to the primary missions and was not a weak, conditional order as might be supposed offhand.” “The regimental and battalion COs then planned to send one platoon of C Company [led by Lieutenant Bob Weaver], plus the S-2 section, plus two light machine gun squads on a reconnaissance patrol to approach the bridge from the south." Zig Borough's The 508th Connection (2013), chapter 6: Holland, Operation Market Garden - Nijmegen Bridge - A battalion S-2 patrol led the way and reached the Nijmegen bridge during the daylight hours. Trooper Joe Atkins, HQ 1st, told that story: "I was called on to take the point going into Nijmegen. As we entered the city, a crowd of people gathered around us, and we had to push our way through. Three of us in the lead became separated from the other troopers behind us by the crowds of Dutch people. We three continued to make our way into the city until we came to the bridge. At the bridge, only a few German soldiers were standing around a small artillery weapon. I had a Thompson sub and a .45 pistol. The other two were armed with M1 rifles. They covered me as I jumped up and yelled, ‘Hände hock’ (‘Hands up!’) The Germans were so surprised; the six or seven defenders of the bridge gave up without resisting. We held the prisoners at the entrance to the bridge for about an hour. It began to get dark, and none of our other troopers showed up. We decided to pull back away from the bridge, knowing we could not hold off a German attack. The German prisoners asked to come with us, but we refused, having no way to guard them. As we were leaving, we could hear heavy equipment approaching the bridge." Nordyke, chapter 10 continues: Captain Chet Graham, the regimental liasion officer with division headquarters, decided to obtain a status of the progress toward the capture of the Nijmegen highway bridge. "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' " At about 8:00 P.M., Colonel Lindquist ordered Lieutenant Colonel Warren, the commander of the 1st Battalion, to seize the Nijmegen highway bridge. It was an order that Warren wasn’t expecting. “This was the first time the battalion was told it was to secure this bridge. By the time the battalion minus [Company C, one section of 81mm mortars, and one section of machine guns] was assembled from its rather wide defensive positions, it was well after dark.” “A Dutch Underground worker [Geert van Hees] who had contacted regimental headquarters had stated that the highway bridge over the Waal River was defended by a noncommissioned officer and seventeen men. This Dutch patriot also volunteered to guide the battalion into town.” - It is clear to me from these accounts that have only come to light after the key players had passed (Chet Graham passed a short time later in 2015) that Gavin (and Browning according to McManus) realised that both the Groesbeek heights and the Nijmegen bridge both needed to be secured, but while the heights were not going anywhere and could be recovered if lost, the bridge was a perishable asset (as McManus puts it) because the Germans could destroy it. It's clear that the confusion over priorites was only confusing at the time to Lindquist, who was not a gifted combat officer in Nordyke's earlier chapters on Normandy, and Gavin himself sought to muddy the waters after the war in order to take on the responsibility himself rather than throw a subordinate under the historical bus. It also explains why Gavin insisted that his own troopers of the 504th PIR undertake the assault river crossing, when the default contingency plan for the Nijmegen bridges being strongly held by the enemy was an assault crossing to be made by the British 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division, with either one or two Brigades up (according to John Sliz in Special Bridging Force - Engineers Under XXX Corps During Operation Market Garden, 2021). Cornelius Ryan failed to pick up on this, or didn't include it in his book, so A Bridge Too Far (1974) established the conventional narrative after both Montgomery and Browning had passed, and has persisted until the more recent researches carried out about 10-12 years ago has filled in the missing story of the 508th and the failure at Nijmegen.
As a High School History teacher I loved this video. I try and get this point across to students all the time. History is not static, it's dynamic and fluid. Every generation interprets and reinterprets events from the past through a new lens. This is evident when studying the historiography of an event. Nearly all assessment in senior history classes is based on discussion of the past. Students need to argue their case using evidence and justify their arguments with facts and evidence from a variety of sources. Great video TIK, keep up the awesome work, ill be showing this to my senior students. Nationalism and Political hijackings of History is nothing new, but through scholarship these misrepresentations can be exposed for what they are. Bakes
Feel free to show them! I hope they find it useful :) knowing what happened is only half the battle, with the historiography being the juicy other half. It's all about being able to think critically, scrutinizing every written word and presenting arguments. But I don't think you can't do any of that unless you can take a step back and look at a topic from as politically neutral a viewpoint as possible.
remember to tell your students to all ways capture the main objective above all else. and don't ever fly in your HQ in the first wave and waste precious space on useless non combat power.
History is not fluid. the entire problem with high school history teachers is exemplified by your statement. It started by the college professors teaching you that. History is etched in stone. We may uncover more of the stone, but it's there. We should not view history with today's eyes and today's societal views. What we see as "wrong" today likely was "normal" and "right" at the time. A decision made in June of 1944 is only "dumb" in hindsight. At the time it was the best decision that could be made by the guy there at the time.
Perhaps you have the moral fortitude and courage to explain the holocaust then, maybe split the tattooed skin/human soap from the vile systematic deaths? The world has had enough demonization, fictionalization and sadly dishonest fraud . Over to you, teacher of our future.... Dave
There are a thousand different reasons Market Garden failed. The plan was badly flawed. 1st Division was dropped too far from Arnhem bridge. It's objectives included the Arnhem rail and road bridges, the high ground and future supply zone north of Arnhem, all while half the strength of the division had to spread out for miles west of Arnhem to guard the drop zones for the day-two drops. Even if the SS panzer divisions had not been there, it would have difficult for 1st Division to succeed. If the bridges were the key to the whole operation, they should have been targeted by glider assaults like the one at Pegasus bridge on D-Day, quickly reinforced by paratroopers landing as near as possible. If the Arnhem bridges had been seized quickly, the SS troops that historically drove south to secure the Nijmegen bridge would have been blocked, perhaps allowing th 82nd Division to capture Nijmegen. Even if the Nijmegen bridge had been captured by the time 30th Corp arrived, the British still would have to fight their way north to Arnhem on a single elevated road surrounded by open countryside. The pocket held by Frost at the north end of the Arnhem road bridge was so small, held by the battered remnants of 2nd Battalion and a few other troops, that it would hardly have made a suitable 'beachhead' across the Rhine. By day four of the battle, likely the earliest 30th Corp might have made it to Arnhem if Nijmegen had been captured on day one, the Germans had already amassed considerable forces in the area and more were on the way from nearby Germany. Where would the British get the forces to feed across the Arnhem bridge and fight their way forward. At best they would have gained a small precariously held bridgehead over the Rhine, which would have been of great benefit in the spring. This is the basic scenario in one of the 'alternative history' books(can't think of which one at the moment) edited by Paul Tsonga.
Facts are facts. Opinions and interpretations that are not based on facts are just beliefs. In my opinion the Market Garden Operation was doomed from the beginning due to poor communications and poor planning and unbridled optimism. Of course I never cared much for Monty or Churchill. If I have the advantage of knowing what cards the opponent is holding and I have numerical/demographic superiority and I have productive/material and logistical superiority then winning is a no brainer and attrition will be winning in time. Couple all that with the fact that some of the Nazis failed to heed Sun Tzu's and Clausewitz's advice and WW II was lost from the get go but in Market Garden ol' Monty showed us how to lose by not following Sun Tzu's advice. Thanks for the post. Always educational.
His argument is valid but, the motorized unit of Graebner had crossed the bridge and only came back because 10th SS Panzer had things under control in Nijmegen, so it is safe to say that if the Allies take the Nijmegen bridge, it would be quickly counter attacked by 10th SS Panzer and Graebner, I believe that the north side would fall, if not both sides of the bridge. To me, even if the germans don't have time to fortify the newly acquired bridge on the counter attack, the delay would be enough to kill any chances to get to Arnhem. Maybe there is a chance, if all forces of the 1st battalion had actually got to Arnhem bridge, but I am not confident about that argument, seeing that most of the forces of the Germans were in Arnhem, to me Frost held because the main force of the British were being held in another flank, if the Germans had to use all their firepower solely on the bridge, the defense would fall. Greetings from Brazil!!!! Brazil actually fought in the war :D "A cobra vai fumar"
I see your point . Yes t German forces were scattered due to having to contend w t scattered Brit forces in Arnham. But still Frost's relatively small Brit force took t (north end of) bridge by surprise and held against t superior forces attacking it for quite a long time. So I am lead to think that Gavin's much greater force could have done t same if they had taken their bridge quickly enuf, befor t Germans reinforced it.
The final nail in the Market Garden coffin was the failure to take the Waal bridge at Nijmegen BUT, the ultimate reason was the Allies underestimated the fight remaining in the Germans. Lets face it, would any rational commander undertake such a risky venture unless he thought they were just going to blow through some weak units with poor morale? I’m not convinced 30 corps could have crossed into Arnhem even if they had been able to link up with the feeble remnants of Frost’s command.
Given that Frost's men were at the Northern end of Arnhem Bridge, XXX Corps most certainly would have crossed into Arnhem, but for the issue of not having a bridge over the Waal to actually cross to get to them......
Sean O'Sullivan I should have phrased that better. They would not have been able to exploit any link with Frost. Frost may have held the north end of the bridge, but only in terms of a front measured in yards, and the entire bridge could have been swept by German fire. The plan was a poor one at best and no amount of Hollywood movies are going to change that.
@@briancoleman971 we can certainly agree about the last bit (Hollywood!). However, given that 10th SS were nowhere near at full strength and nor were the 9th, I can't see that a fully committed 82nd wouldn't have been able to give the Germans a hiding. The German units would have been cut off between the two paratroop units. There was nothing of note in Arnhem to have inflicted any significant damage on Frost's men (and wouldn't be until day 3) and the 10th didn't have any tanks and nor did 9th SS recon (Graebner's unit, which is the one that Frost's men smashed back at Arnhem Bridge when they returned from Nijmegen).
Sean O'Sullivan Yeah I am not sure about the dates but there are plenty of photos of surrendering Brit paratroopers alongside Stug IIIs in Arnhem, which were capable of handling any Brit tanks that tried to cross. Of course if they were not there yet I suppose XXX corps could have crossed. I have not taken a serious look at this battle in over a year so no up on the timelines.
@@briancoleman971 most of those photos of the captured 1AB near the Stugs are valid but were mostly kept away from the bridge. The tanks that turned the tide of battle were all brought in on D+2
I think it was the delay in regards to Sosobowski and his men with the weather and all that on commencement. But it was no way Sosobowski's fault. If they were dropped around Elst very shortly after British First Airborne you could force these Panzer divisions to choose between Wolfheze and Elst diluting their strength in addition to blocking the way to the Nijmegen Bridge. People always conjure up images of tanks when it comes to Panzer Divisions dismissing the shutzen and panzer grenadier regiments that are just basically fancy words for infantry even before getting to the pioneer battalions, recce battalions, nebelwefer battalions and in addition to these the anti-aircraft battalions that are sometimes attached to them. This almost full circle of roads surrounding Elst ironically marks a suggested drop zone.
9:00 personally I think it wouldn't be too much of a problem for XXX Corps since the 9th SS would have to split its forces to combat Frost's battalion and since there would be no urban combat for XXX Corps to deal with in Nijmagen they could concentrate their full force against the 9th. XXX Corps probably wouldn't have gotten to Arnhem on the 19th but I believe they would've on the 20th and relieved Frost.
@@johnlucas8479 had the 82nd taken their primary objective, being Nijmegen Bridge, then 10th SS would have been stuck between Frost's men & 82nd AB until XXX arrived. Given what Frost's men did to 9th SS Panzer recon (Graebner's team), it's reasonable to assume that the 82nd would have been able to cause mayhem to 10th SS Panzer, too - remembering that neither 9th nor 10th SS Panzer were at anything better than 30% strength and 10th didn't have any tanks of their own. The ONLY unit that was close to full strength was the one that Frost's men smashed.
@@sean640307 If the 82nd had captured the bridge on the 17th. Yes the 10th was between the 82nd and Frost at Arnhem, question would the 10th attempt to recapture the bridge or simplify set up defensive position on the island and that would have had all of the 18th and morning of the 19th. Also the terrain between Nijmegen and Arnhem was impossible tank country , complete flat, crisis-crossed by a grid-iron of waterways and densely planted with fruit orchards that obstructed vision. Historically when XXX Corp start north on the 21st they were stop at Ressen by A/Tank guns almost immediately, and did not reach Village of Elst until 23rd. They also did not link up with the Poles at Driel until the evening of the 22nd at 1950.
@@johnlucas8479 of course you raise a very interesting question. We'll never know, but what we do know for certain is that if the 82nd had taken the bridge, then an under-strength 10th would be trapped and would have to do one of either of those options. Had they returned to Arnhem, then they would have met the same ferocity as 9th SS recon, and possibly the same fate. If they had attempted to push through 82nd assuming that there were more than the 2 companies initially dispatched, of course, then the same country that is supposed to have impeded XXX Corps would have had the same effect on 10th SS and THEY would have been stuck on the road with little cover. This would have made them sitting ducks for the heavy guns of XXX Corps which ended up shelling the Germans in Oosterbeck. People seem to forget that neither 9th nor 10th SS were at anything like full strength and 10th had no tanks, but did have SPGs. A trackless SPG becomes a sitting duck AND stops anything getting past it easily so all it would have taken is a couple of well placed bazooka teams and it's Villers Bocage in reverse
@@sean640307 The only German Unit that reach Nijmegen via the Arnhem Bridge was the 9SS Recon Bn at cross at 1800. The rest of the 10th SS Reach Nijmegen by cross the ferry at Pannerden. Unlike Frost at Arnhem the 82nd at the Bridge would not have any A/Tank Guns. You are assuming that 10th would have attempted to cross the Nijmegen Bridge. With the Bridge in 82nd hands the logical decision for 10th would be to dig in north of the bridge which they did historically after loss the bridge on the 20th. If you are saying that 10th would have been sitting duck why did XXX Corp fail to reach Arnhem after cross the Nijmegen Bridge on the 21st.
I was thinking, In Nijmegen they basicly had to cope with the same issue as in Arnhem . They had to hold the dropzones for future drops and take their key objectives, the bridges on the first day. This means that Urquhart or Gavin had to hold back at least one bataljon back to do this. This meant that the already weakened division, due to the fact that could not land in one go are even more depleted in their available combatpower, making it more difficult to capture the bridges on the first day. The fact that the dropzones had to be defended longer than anticipated even worsened this problemIn NIjmegen this lead Gavin to decide not to attack the bridge on day one. In Arnhem this lead to division that was practicly overstreched. What I don't understand is that the attack had to be made so soon. They could easily take some more time prepare it and easy out the kinks in the plan or in equipment, for example that the radio's were used to communicate across distances far outstretching the recommmended maximum operating distance the could reliable operate on. Something that in my opinion would have been totally preventable with proper rehearsal. Within the allied strategic situation waiting a few weeks would not have been a problem. They were reaching the maximum of their supply lines and could not advance any further. The biggest thing that could happen is that the 15th German army would leave Zeeland and negate the use for operation Market Garden. They probably wouldn't have done that because that would mean the would hand the Allies operational use of Antwerp on a silver platter.
It was known that the German defences were getting stronger each day. Also, weather was critical for airborne operations - the longer the delay, the worse the weather would get.
The reason I love TIK's documentaries is he uses facts and solid sources to explain events. He leaves emotions out of it. I find no fault with the original Market Garden documentary, and having read the sources TIK used, his presentation is spot on. Highly recommend "It Never Snows in September" by Robert Kershaw (one of TIK's recommendations) as it is a real eye opener to how the battle unfolded through the German view. The key to the entire operation was the capture of all the bridges. The Allies knew this at Normandy, and they knew this in Market Garden. It was very unfortunate it wasn't done at Nijmegan. Regardless of who was in command, it was a bad decision to change the orders and not take the bridge.
1st Airborne did most of its fighting in woods and towns - not ideal for close air support. Also, the weather was very poor - fog, fain and low cloud. Air support was available for 30 Corps though, and there were enough Allied planes that the Germans resorted to troop movements at night to as to cut down on the air attacks they were suffering.
Very interesting but in analyzing Market Garden you need to take into account the nationalities and the personalities of the commanders involved and to delve into why this was given the go ahead by Eisenhower in the first place. In my opinion it was doomed from the start because it relied on a narrow two lane road that was could be and was easily blocked for hours at a time and could not handle the required traffic For example when the British tanks got to Nijmegen and crossed the bridge they had to pause while the infantry was brought up on the heavily congested road In reality the USA was calling the shots and Eisenhower more of a diplomat and politician than a General had to manage the perception that it was an allied effort with Britain being a equal partner which it wasn't while the higher echelons (Churchill, Montgomery etc) knew it wasn't One thing Eisenhower did to manage the perception was to have the commanders immediately below him to be all British with Montgomery initially nominally Commander of ground forces in Europe but this had proved unworkable and Montgomery had been relieved with Eisenhower himself taking on the role, right before Market Garden - Churchill and Montgomery's noses were out of joint over this - there is a PHD thesis in exploring the ramifications of this change and the disaster of Market Garden that followed Can't do it justice in this forum but can point you to what to explore next but issues of National pride and personality played a big part
As in any military operation, and even at the lowest levels...by definition, failure at any level, "technically" belongs in the hands at the top. This is throughout history, whether it is justified or not. A simple example, if a lieutenant loses a firefight, which loses a battle, which loses a campaign, which loses a war...technically...the buck stops at the top. Because, that lieutenant was led by a colonel, that was led by a general, that was led by a field commander...etc/etc/etc. Eventually, who chose the failed field commander....I know it's not necessarily fair, but it is what it is.
Anybody who wants to read a truly professional historian's summary of why Market-Garden failed should buy Martin Middlebrook's really excellent book "Arnhem 1944". Middlebrook's book is the last of a brilliantly researched series of books on WW2, all highly recommendable. He names every important factor leading up to the defeat bar one - that the Germans won a brilliant victory by showing Initiative and flexibility, i.e. such characteristics that were definitely not found to great extent in British generals.
Some of your conclusions make sense but others ignore basic tactical principals.1. You fail to address the decision to ignore intel that said that heavy armor was present. You cannot simply ignore intel. They have been teaching officers in most armies in the world that intel is the greatest weapon long before WWII.2. You also ignore that there was no backup plan for the British airborne if something went wrong. Everything had to go exactly right and it, as we know, didn't.It doesn't matter what part of the plan failed. Was matters is that it did fail because the only plan, if a bridge wasn't taken dealt with taking it intact. Yea they had bridging equipment to cover a blown bridge. They had collapsible boats. But they didn't have a plan if ANYONE of the units failed to at least establish a bridgehead. It was Monty's plan. He was the overall commander. All of these things were directly his responsibility.Yes you can say that the plan collapsed because the 82nd failed to take the Nijmegen bridge. But from a tactical point attacking on a very narrow front is always ill advised. Many problems have to be addressed especially if there are obstacles like rivers. River crossings are never easy. Trying to capture bridges can be very iffy at best. The plan was overly optimistic. Had it worked they still would have had the issue of the Germans cutting the line with a counterattack. Everything hinged on crossing those bridges in a timely manner. Gavin's actions would lead me to believe that he was overly worried about a counter attack. One thing a senior commander has to do is convince junior commanders that the plan is sound. Looks like Gavin wasn't convinced. Brown too is a fault for not forcing the issue. That failure on his part leads to the conclusion that he wasn't convinced the plan was sound or was too weak to stand up to Gavin. Perhaps worried that if the plan failed that the responsibility of that failure would be laid on his shoulders? Monty, Brown and Gavin were all in "cover your ass" mode after the plan failed trying to make sure that they didn't take the blame. So no one is going to uncover the whole story.
1. I agree, and Browning has his part to play in that, although so do others. Frost says in his memoirs that if he'd been told there was going to be armour, they could have swapped some of their mortar rounds for extra PIAT ammunition, but nobody told them. Browning is a very tempting target for blame for this and for the failure of the whole operation, especially since he had a part to play in the 82nd area with the whole - let's not go to the Nijmegen road bridge thing. 2. Agreed. Perhaps Gavin wasn't convinced. The fact that they took all the southern bridges (the closest to XXX Corps and relief), took artillery to pound the Reichswald (instead of say extra infantry units to take the last bridge) and then didn't send anyone towards the Nijmegen bridge until they were certain there wasn't going to be any counter attacks, speaks volumes in itself. Probably Browning had his part to play in that too. There is a definite "cover your arse" zone going on, which I fully understand. However, I do wish one or more of them had come out after the war at some point and said "ok, this is what really happened" and told the truth. The truth is there somewhere in the facts. But it's been left down to us to figure out what the reasoning was because these three Generals especially didn't want a stain their reputation.
+oldtanker2 _Some of your conclusions make sense but others ignore basic tactical principals.1. You fail to address the decision to ignore intel that said that heavy armor was present._ *There was no proof heavy armour was present*. None was there in the Arnhem, area. Read on... _"the composition of the German forces at Arnhem was far more complex than most published histories of Market Garden had tended to suggest. The two SS panzer divisions had been operating far below their full strength on the eve of the operation and, while 1st Airborne was ultimately confronted by armour in considerable strength, _*_hardly any tanks were actually present in the Arnhem area on 17 September. The vast majority deployed from Germany or other battle fronts after the airborne landings_*_"_ - ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the Royal Air Force Some low level pictures of a few Panzer IIIs and IVs were taken in early September for operation Comet. Ryan on speaking to Urquhart got it wrong. _"Urquhart’s account is therefore somewhat perplexing. Further problems arise if we seek to document the events he described. Several extensive searches for the photographs have failed to locate them. Ostensibly, this might not seem surprising, as most tactical reconnaissance material was destroyed after the war, but Urquhart insisted that the Arnhem sortie was flown by a Spitfire squadron based at Benson; this would almost certainly mean 541 Squadron. Far more imagery from the Benson squadrons survived within the UK archives, _*_but no oblique photographs showing tanks at Arnhem_*_. In addition, although the Benson missions were systematically recorded at squadron and group level, not one record matches the sortie Urquhart described."_ _"The low-level missions targeting the bridges on 6 September were scrupulously noted down, but all other recorded reconnaissance sorties over Arnhem were flown at higher altitudes and captured vertical imagery. _*_Equally, it has proved impossible as yet to locate an interpretation report derived from a low-level mission that photographed German armour near Arnhem before Market Garden_*_."_ _"As for Brian Urquhart’s famous account of how a low-level Spitfire sortie took photographs of tanks assumed to belong to II SS Panzer Corps, the reality was rather different. In all probability, the low-level mission that Urquhart recalled photographed the bridges and not the tanks"_ - ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the Royal Air Force
+oldtanker2 The British paras at Arnhem did have the Poles coming in later. *They also took their prime objective - the bridge.* They were not the reason for failure - that is obvious. The overall commander was Eisenhower. Market Garden was a _strategic plan_ that evolved. From drops on the the Scheldt, to Comet then MG. Montgomery had no involvement in the planning of the operation - none. He left that to the others having confidence in them. The First Airborne Army was _heavily_ involved in the planning. Attacking on a very narrow front is not always ill advised. It worked wonderfully for the Germans in 1940. There is the problem of German counter-attacks all along the front, so taking a part of Holland is not that much different. Everything did hinge on taking of the bridges in a timely manner - that was the whole idea. A bold plan to leapfrog. It was feasible and high probability of success if all did their jobs professionally. Gavin's actions? Plain incompetence. His near 2,000 men were assembled and ready to move by 3 pm with only 12 Germans on the bridge. The 508th were sitting around in fields for 2 hours drinking coffee before Gavin found out and directed them to the bridge. By then it was too late. The 10th SS panzer infantry had poured men south over into Nijmegen town. The 508th moved on the bridge and were beaten back. Gavin never bothered to gain information on the location and movements of his men. A basic mistake. He assumed Linquist was moving on the bridge. There is nothing stated that Gavin did not like the plan.
Burns you polluted rube Alan brooke,Adml Ramsey,Air marshall Tedder all pointed at Monty.Along with IKE they insisted Antwerp be open,logistically that makes perfect sense so We understand why you don't get it.Guards Armor didn't get to Nijmegan on time then they would wait for 43rd Wessex.Shitty plan by a small minded man
It's a very hard lesson indeed to accept that every knowledge except for dogma, which does not admit rational opposition, is fallible. Much of the difficulty of trying not to see things as black and white, once and for all certainties arises from the fact that thinking requires immense sums of energy, therefore, it's inanely tiresome. The other element that makes it difficult is the intense feeling of insecurity that revisions may cause, which can be really overwhelming to many. Then we have the case of identity definition. If I associate my identity too closely to a belief, changing it is equaled to the threat of losing it, and this in turn can be perceived as death threat, even if only psychologically so. Then comes the requirements of fame, making money that can be at risk if one's propositions are proved incorrect etc. Lots of deeply rooted things at play...
It would be interesting to test his theory about 30 corps fighting the 10th over the Nijmegen bridge (and still not making it to Arnhem) rather than before and through the town which to my understanding is much harder than in “relatively” more open terrain. Yes it would take some speculation but it might be worth a short video. As to his other comments. I’ve not seen anyone who tries as hard as you to assess historical events as fairly as possible given the variety of sources you use.
Concentration on tactical issues lead often to overlook the grander scale. The whole point of Arnhem was the idea that they could quickly exploit the bridgehead to invade Germany. I think it was not the right timescale. Arnhem was not the only autumn offensive of the western allies that went poorly and far behind the goals; it was the same with the taking of the Scheldt estuary, the battles for Huertgen forest and Alsatia, and even in Italy they did not manage to really exploit the breakthrough of the Gustav line. So, hypothetically, if they had taken Arnhem and the Rhine bridge: 1. Still overextended lines. 2. Antwerp as the major port in this area would have been still not open for shipping because the germans held the Scheldt estuary. 3. Ardennes offensive, which kind of played in the hands of the Allies, would likely not have happened. German reserves would have been used against Arnhem bridgehead. 4. It was kind of late in the year for the major scale offensive the Allies hoped to start off with Arnhem. One of the 2 US armies nearby had to be shifted around which would take some time. The area north and northeast of Arnhem was not the worst for the German defenders with its many rivers and other waterways. I believe even with succesful Arnhem the war would not have been that much shorter. It probably would have helped many of the Dutch people, though, who suffered a huge famine in the last war winter.
Honestly, looking at the strategic picture, it makes a lot more sense to go for the Scheldt estuary, because without logistics your armies can't march forwards. I do think Market Garden shouldn't have aimed at crossing the bridges of the Rhine, but instead should have concentrated on securing Allied logistics. One thing I would point out though is that people often say that Market Garden was "a rotten plan, poorly executed", which is what I disputed in the documentary. The tactical plan could have worked in my humble opinion. But yes, strategically there were other objectives that should have been prioritized.
Monty wanted three Channel ports for all supply to all allied armies. Antwerp was 35 miles up a narrow, winding, dredged river. One or two ships sunk by German planes will block the port. Antwerp was last on the list. Ostend was secured with half the port destroyed. Bolougne was secured with destroyed port, and operational at the same time as Antwerp. The Canadians, Poles and Czechs tried to take Dunkirk but failed leaving the port in German hands until surrender. Montgomery knew the Germans had destroyed the port of Dunkirk. The failure to get three Channel ports operational quickly meant focus had to be shifted be on unfavourable Antwerp and clearing all the river approaches - The Scheldt.
Burns you pathetic lump,now Dunkirk is the fault of the Canadians,Czechs and Poles.The very men who covered Monty's retreat as the Burns ample backsides ran up the gang palnks - you make me larf.Then you blather on Bernard didn't plan Monty Garden - you've done enough drugs to send sniffer dogs into early retirement
The Allies had air superiority, as proven in Normandy (battering the Wehrmacht). It was a bad decision not to send in the 2nd Tactical Airforce. The lightly armed paratroopers along Hell's Highway, at Nijmegen and at Arnhem needed that air artillery. Only 30the Corps did get that air support south of Valkenswaard on the 17th of September. Market Garden was lost "in the air".
The problem with Market Garden is that its objective, like its direction was obvious and predictable with insufficient movement in its application to take advantage of the initial element of surprise. Concentration, supply and fortification of the holding forces to achieve all of the objectives on day 1 against the occupying forces used against them lacked the vital intelligence and communications necessary to surprise and pin down the enemy to prevent their movement and interdiction in any subsequent battle for those vital objectives. Ground communications to call in air strikes from aircraft patrolling the skies with bombs, rockets and cannon, machine gun strafing was non existent for both Market and Garden operational forces to break up defensive positions and offensive armored formations preventing and intervening with the operational link up required for success.
Let me first reiterate what a fine job you did on the documentary. Take heart in the fact that the views of all historians have been disbuted ........... sometimes for completely unexpected reasons. Don't be discouraged. By asking 'why' something occurred we necessarily have to ask 'what if' and this requires each of us to pull out his/her crystal ball. That's what historians are for.
Gotta say, the idea that a young junior (37) brigadier general would be given serious planning ability affecting the entire general plan, when there was a corps planning staff (Browning) seems doubtful to me.
Could you look into the ground between Nijmegen and Arnhem. The reason I thought the battle was lost before your videos was that the "open ground" there was not not good for British tanks. The ground was not great tank country because the grass has a mud under current which would bog down tanks. This forced the tanks to remain on raised roads which made them perfect targets for anti tank weapons. Even if all the bridges were taken, the choke point there would have decimated. 30th corps. This would not necessarily mean bad planning but like in Normandy with bocage the defender will get the advantage of the terrain.
You're correct that the ground was poor and the roads were raised in the area that became known as "the Island". The road going straight to Arnhem from Nijmegen was particularly bad, with the road going west first and then back round through Driel being the easier route overall. If memory serves me correctly, I read that the Dutch military had analysed the area before the war and concluded that the best way to Arnhem was the left route. Could be wrong with that so don't quote me. However, it's worth bearing in mind that by the time this area became a factor, XXX Corps were already 36 hours behind schedule. Frost's battalion had collapsed, and the Germans were over the Arnhem bridge and forming a blocking line to the south. Realistically at this point the operation was lost, and the only thing left to do was rescue the remnants of 1st Airborne Division.
You are both right. It was terrible terrain for tanks, which is why the Guards Armoured Division advance stalled until 43rd Infantry Division could be bought up to the front line to attack Oosterhaut and then Elst. But by then all momentum had been lost and it became a battle of attrition.
I enjoyed all of you vid on this TIK.... much info was given, I am learning more of what happened in Netherlands because I have a good friend there now.... I am not a historian by any means, but actuating a plan with full knowledge tanks existed, and was failed to plan for... is in itself a HUGE flaw. Many other things, decisions made, affected the outcome of success... failure to take the bridge early at Nijmegen, drop zones.... German response has to receive some credit.... I really have enjoyed your comments and arguments, and those of viewers.... I understand the Patriot thing that happens, all to often it does. Again I will say, to dismiss aerial photo's of German tanks as being nonoperation is quite surprising to me.... given German tanks were far superior in many ways. I guess my question is, If the German's didn't have tanks in the area, would they still have been able to stop Market Garden??? From all I have seen, I think they wouldn't have been able to keep the Allies from taking the bridges at Nijmegen and Arnhem .... While many decisions influenced the failure of Market Garden once it began, including German response, planning an operation with 2 divisions of panzer tanks in the area is.... at lack of better words, Questionable. Thanks again for all your work, I did watch the first vid's in their entirety .... War is just sad for everyone that is involved.... Easy to watch and make decisions one way or another when you know all the facts, after the facts... the planners didn't have this..... presenting arguments as you do, is much appreciated :)
The tanks really weren't a big deal. 9SS and 10SS had only a few tanks left and they were not committed to the battle for several days. The Germans bought in several other tank units from further afield but they were quite weak and had mostly older tanks. 1st Airborne was equipped with about a hundred anti-tank guns which were capable of knocking out any German tank which was actually committed to the battle before 24th September, at which point it was pretty much all over.
Highly recommend reading "It Never Snows in September" by Robert Kershaw. It gives the German view of Market Garden. It certainly opens the eyes to the condition of the German units in the area at the time, as well as how the German command responded. It was one of TIK's sources and there was a good reason he used it.
Until what is known what Gavin told Browning, Gavin has to take the blame. In Normandy General Patton asked Bradley if he could go south into Brittany to see if he could seize some port(s). Bradley said OK. Patton took one third of his force. Bradley was shocked at how much of his force his took to wander into open country with no enemy. Bradley assumed Patton would take a small force to peel off from the prime objectives in Normandy. Bradley never asked Patton how many troops he would take. When Gavin said he was taking a force top Goesbeek did Browning know how many and that he would neglect his prime task?
Browning went for a more important task: pissing on the Reichswaldborder and have a photo taken from that occasion. (talking about neglecting tasks...tssk)
The problem was delivery - you singled out Gavin, hitting him over and over again for a decision that made sense given the intel he had, making light of his reasons for that decision, and basically accusing him of lying about the XXX Corps timetable all while glossing over the multiple British superiors who accepted that decision. While there may not have been any intentional nationalism on your part, it was hard not to see an anti-American sentiment in that - especially since the 1st Division basically got a pass for making the same choice to defend their drop zones, with only Frost's battalion reaching the Arnhem bridge and never actually controlling it.
Its not just a case of reading. You pour over the details/footnotes/sources, test them again the evidence offered, and then compare the viability of the different arguments and evidence offered. Nothing else will do.
With the benifit of hindsight it seems obvious that this plan was doomed to failure. Even without hindsight I think someone in the chain of command should have made some alterations. If it was impossible to land gliders any nearer to Arnhem then they should have settled for a cut down 1st airborne division. Forget the idea of holding the landing zones, just land as much of the division as possible and head straight for the bridges. One para battalion should also have risked dropping just South of Arnhem. Any follow up para drops would have to be made on the island (not suitable for gliders though). Clearly one of the 82nd battalions should have been tasked with taking and holding Nijmegen bridge, this was an unbelievable error which definitely should have been picked up by one of the senior commanders. Generally it's obvious that this plan was rushed through.
Hindsight 20/20? Didn’t Gavin secure his right flank, since they expected the Germans to attack from the hights east of Nijmegen? If he hadn’t taken time to secure the Groesbeek hights, the Germans could have cut them off and thát would have been an even bigger desaster.
Thank you for your totally informative and enlightening presentation. In consideration of comments over whose blame lead to the failure of Market Garden I do view Gen. Gavin's performance as inadequate. It's totally understandable that he would have needed to secure the woods from an approach by an enemy of unknown strength before moving to his objective, but had he sent out a unit to reconnoiter the area, he would have realized it would be his for the taking on the first day, and in the worst case of a successful German counter attack, he might have retreated into the city as a redoubt. I surmise he may already have considered the option and rejected it as untenable for reasons unknown, but holding out at least for until relief arrived was all that was expected. I say he acted upon his fears instead of looking to determine the true nature of the situation on the ground that might have lead to success. Those who maintain that political biases motivate the the accusation of blame on Gavin seem themselves to be political, and a refusal to consider this view is a refusal to consider a proper lesson from history. There is a saying: "neither wars nor women can ever be won without courage". Probing his objective would have settled the matter and I trust he would thus have acted accordingly with that information.
The problem with moving into the city is that the height was also the location of Landing and Drop zones for the 2nd and 3rd Lifts as well as resupply drops.
I am a Kiwi and as such have a special interest in the Battle for Egypt and Lybia. I have gone out of my way to get the books written by the veterans of all ranks and published from 1945-1980s as well as those written by military historians. One feature of the British Desert Army after Gen. O'Connor and before Montgomery is how for 18 months it repeated the same mistakes over and over (with the same results) and so a smaller, badly supplied army ran rings around the much larger and better supplied but badly led Desert Army, later 8th Army. This should be a SUPREME embarrassment to the British High Command of the time. It was a case of "lions led by [incompetent] sheep." The German Africa Korp only had 3 Divisions for most of the campaign, 4 at Alamein, with at best 4 useful Italian Divisions. The Brits had a minimum of 15 Divs. I will refrain from arguing the cause except to say before Montgomery the 8th Army never operated as a unified team with the same goals, which led to terrible moral and in-fighting within 8th Army. There are many stories of Allied units watching, sometimes for 1-2hrs while another near-by Allied unit was overrun and captured and not help when they easily could, should and may have been ordered to support the lost unit in their battle orders. HOWEVER Montgomery mostly fixed this in just a few months and gave the Allies their first major victory over the Germans of WW2. I think after Alamein Montgomery never did as well again but this was probably due to political interference and the American's desire to be in charge. And don't forget the major part Montgomery played commanding one of the Divisions in the rear guard at Dunkirk under Alexander, all unsung heroes. I know from my reading what the veterans thought before and after 2nd Alamein (October), that what Monty achieved from taking command in August to the end of 2nd Alamein at the start of November 1942 was phenomenal. At First Alamein(July) Rommel attacked, with most of his useful units at 25-30% of establishment, and almost beat an Army of about 250,000 with an Army with few supplies and only about 35,000-45,000 reliable troops. That is fairly underwhelming and a crying shame.
By the time Monty took over, the Afrika Corps was down to 150 tanks or less. Rommel wasted material too and made some bad decisions at Operation BattleAxe.
I totally agree with you that history is a debate and it is not easy to get rid of all our bias to grasp the reality of what hapened in the past. After watching your video, I had the idea of making an argument blaming it all on the americans but since it would simply put oil on the fire, I've restrained myself lol As for the battle plan of Operation Market Garden, I would say that the basic idea is not bad at all but might have been a bit optimistic and like all optimistic plans, it's brillant or audacious when it succeed and flawed and horrible when it fails. I think tho that one of the bigest shortcomming of the plan is that logistics couldn't keep up with it or wasn't taken into account as it should have. All the paratroopers should have been on the ground on day 1, especially for the 1st division since their landing zone was so far away from their objective. I think that guarding the landing zone has been a costly distraction. Maybe even Gavin might have focus his attention on the bridge he was supposed to take. With that said, with all those ifs and maybes, it doesn't mean the operation would have been a success . If the allied troups had behaved differently, the german would have too and the situation could have been better or worst
I guess this guy has not hear the recording of the commanders at Nijmegen . You know you can down load them but they do not go with you say about Nijmegen
The entire marketgarden plan was overly complicated and failed. Therefore it was a bad plan. The plan was based on Churchill wanted to have a say in post war europe. By getting the British more German territories, the larger voice they would have. Eisenhower relented and let monty and Churchill have their plan. It failed and cost lives and resources for a purely British political end. It is possible if those men and resources were given to the American army, the Americans could have smashed the Siegfried line and taken more of Germany before the Soviets did. Everyone knew the war was over and every nation was positioning for post war negotiations.
Fair points. But could you explain 'overcomplicated' for me? I've heard this phrase said a lot about Market Garden but not heard people explain why they think it's overcomplicated. You could sum in up in one sentence - "Capture bridges and cross the Rhine." Try doing that for other battles!
Coordinating a single bridge capture between paratroopers and an armored column is difficult enough. Monty wanted to drop 4 airborne divisions to take seven bridges needed to take Arnhem. There are too many variables there to go wrong. If one single bridge is not held, the operation fails. Keep it simple and allow for flexibility in the plan because the plan will go wrong eventually.
William Smith for me M.G. is a copy of what the Germans did with airborne troops going the other way in 1940. They had as series of co-ordinated forts and established defenses like Eben Emael to overcome which the Allies didn't in 1944. I think the issues revolved around inter-service rivalries. Airborne proving it's value etc.
The Belgium/Dutch defenses in 1940 were formidable, Eben Emael was considered the best, most modern fort in the world. But the defenses had 4 flaws. First they were a generation out of date being the best of defense against 19th century tactics ie. pre-motorisation of armies (tanks, trucks, apc's, planes, paras etc.) Second the Germans had huge siege mortars in 1914 which could destroy these type of forts and better ones in 1940. Third the forts thru the Low Countries were part of a combined defense plan involving mutually supporting Belgium and Dutch forts along rivers and canals to be assisted by British and French troops, however Belgium declared neutrality in late 1939 which stuffed up the cooperation and Holland fell if a few days, not the few weeks expected to be enough to move Brit and French troops up to fight the expected WW1 type campaign with the support of the forts. And last all the Allies were scared of the Germans and there was no real will to fight militarily or politically among the Europeans, except maybe the British. In 1944 MG would go up against motivated German forces with plenty of defensive experience. And of course 2 SS Panzer Divs refitting on the final and furthest bridge should have beaten MG on day 1, paras are not equipped to fight more than a handful of tanks, def not 2 Panzer Divs. Well done Col Frost and Co. outstanding effort. Not withstanding all TIK's theories which appear very sound.
The cause is not the decision of Gavin. He made a crucial error but it is noteworthy why he did , and that is imo the real reason: scattered commands and responsibilities. It seems Gavin was not aware of the precarious situation of 1st airborne. I think if a regiment of his division was holding the bridge he would have taken a different decision. So it’s a lack of information and urgency which goes up all the way in chain of conmand
Have to disagree. There was a telephone link used by the Dutch resistance between Arnhem and a phone in the 505th area of Groesbeek, so some worrying news about the situation at Arnhem was getting through and was passed to Browning's Corps HQ. I think Gavin had a clear grasp of the overall operation's objectives and there's witness evidence he tried to make that clear in his final divisional briefing when he instructed Colonel Lindquist of the 508th on his mission at Nijmegen [quote]: Captain Chet Graham was assigned as the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters. "I sat in on a high level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation." (Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke 2012) - That last sentence ending - "as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation" is a perfect summary. Clearly Lindquist was at fault for not moving on the bridge as quickly as he should and Gavin had to intervene to get him moving, by which time it was too late and 10.SS-Panzer-Division was already feeding some units into the city. In his interview with Cornelius Ryan for Ryan's book A Bridge Too Far (1974), Gavin made some revealing comments about Colonel Lindquist as well as some comments about objectives. Ryan I think made some incorrect after-the-fact commentary about Gavin having three days to get the bridge, which is ridiculous because Gavin had no way of knowing if the British tanks would reach him in three days or one day when his division landed, but that aside, Ryan's interview notes make interesting reading [my square brackets]: Gavin and Lindquist had been together in Sicily[?] and Normandy and neither Gavin nor Ridgway, the old commander of the 82nd, trusted him in a fight. He did not have a “killer instinct.” In Gavin’s words, “He wouldn’t go for the juggler [jugular].” As an administrative officer he was excellent; his troopers were sharp and snappy and, according to Gavin, “Made great palace guards after the war.” Gavin confirms he ordered Lindquist to commit a battalion to the capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the jump. He also confirms he told Lindquist not to go to the bridge by way of the town but to approach it along some mud flats to the east. We discussed also objectives. Gavin’s main objectives were the heights at Groesbeek and the Grave bridge; he expected and intelligence confirmed “a helluva reaction from the Reichswald area.” Therefore he had to control the Groesbeek heights. The Grave bridge was essential to the link up with the British 2nd Army. He had three days to capture the Nijmegen bridge and, although he was concerned about it, he felt certain he could get it within three days. The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized. (Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967 - James Maurice Gavin, Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University) So Gavin's responsibility for what happened originated in his planning decisions. The 'British request' to drop a battalion north of the bridge probably came from Browning, because General Brereton of 1st Allied Airborne Army had removed the double airlift and dawn glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave bridges that were in Browning's original operation COMET plan, and the fallout of the operation LINNET II affair meant that Browning could not protest the changes - he knew he would be replaced by Matthew Ridgway and his US XVIII Airborne Corps if he threatened to resign a second time. Gavin's decision to assign the critical Nijmegen mission to Lindquist's 508th is controversial, given that Lindquist had not performed well in Normandy (Nordyke's earlier chapters refer). He decided to assign the more aggressive and experienced 505th to the purely defensive role of holding the Reichswald sector of his perimeter, and he had arguably the best battalion in the whole division, Ben Vandervoort's 2nd/505th, in division reserve sitting on Hill 81.8 behind Groesbeek for the first couple of days. I think Gavin put his own division before the mission, and that ultimately led to the failure of the operation and the destruction of the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem. Lindquist's story is no less interesting, but you have to do a deep dive into Nordyke's regimental history to get into that.
Gavin did make the wrong decision, but he made it in good faith based on the intelligence he was given. That fact it has been proved wrong in hindsight shouldn't be held against him too much. Many other decisions were wrong also. The decision to put Urchart in charge of an airborne division, for one. But he was an experienced, hard as nails infantryman, so you can kind of see why that choice was made. Downing could have overridden Gavin's decision, but decided to allow the very capable young man to command his own division, which is fair enough I suppose. Even the decision to drop 1st Airborne so far away (although sometimes dressed up as a 'your men can die but ours can't' from the airforce guys) was actually justifiable, as the loss of too many planes could have meant they then lacked the capacity to resupply the airborne units, which would have meant the same outcome anyway. I'm not a huge fan of picking out individuals to blame, everyone did the best they could under the circumstances they faced and had things gone slightly different the operation could have been a huge success.
It's my observation - and I may be misinterpreting the relationship here - that a senior officer in one Army (British or American) does not have the authority to order a junior officer in another Army (American or British) to put his men in potential harm's way. I have a couple of examples of how this worked between Browning and Gavin: 1) There was a British "request" (I think probably came from Browning or conceivably Dempsey or even Montgomery) for Gavin to drop a battalion at the north end of the Nijmegen bridge. He told Cornelius Ryan he toyed with the idea and eventually dismissed it because of his experience in Sicily (where troops were widely scattered and disorganised for days). 2) On D+1, Gavin proposed a second attempt to take the bridge after the previous night's late attempt had failed, but Browning rejected the plan, preferring to wait until the tanks of XXX Corps arrived so that they had armoured support (this is the source of the de-prioritising of the bridge as a pre-flight order myth). Browning also rejected Gavin's first suggestion of putting his own troops (the 504th PIR) across the river in assault boats on 19 September, when XXX Corps first arrived, but then accepted the proposal made a second time after a frontal assault with the 505th and Guards' tanks had failed. There was a prepared British fallback plan to put 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division across in boats for this type of scenario with one or two brigades (operations BESSIE or BASIL respectively), but Gavin's proposal was accepted as more expedient than bringing the 43rd up the corridor. So Browning was able to overrule Gavin in rejecting a proposed operation involving American troops in harm's way, but he could only "request" a battalion be dropped on the bridge and Gavin was able to dismiss it. It would probably take an American senior officer such as Brereton or Eisenhower to intervene to make this an order. I see a lot of people in RUclips video comments trying to absolve Gavin of any responsibility by saying that Browning or Montgomery should have intervened because it was a British operation, but when it suits them they don't like the idea of American troops being under British command at all. You can't have it both ways.
Afaik 10th SS only consisted of a few experienced but depleted battalions and recon units. I don't see how they could've managed to counterattack the 82nd if they took the bridge yet alone annihilating the entire division. If my memory serves me right there 10th SS was in 2 battalions strength in Nijmegen. Let's speculate that 82nd took the bridges before Germans themselves were able to dig in inside the city and delay the XXX Corps in urban combat, how could they even counter attack the 82nd? 10th was not equipped with Tigers or anything at Nijmegen, not even any tanks to my knowledge; contrary to what people believe I guess. It was in the upcoming days that Panzer regiments, Panthers and Tigers started to arrive near the vicinity of Arnhem. So taking the bridges first was the vital point, Germans were in no position to dislodge the 82nd if they took the bridge.
Here's the plan that works. 1. 1st Para at Arnhem, 1 brigade dropped north, one south, with followup glider borne forces mirroring that. Seize the bridge on both sides. pre-dawn drop to NE if AAA is such a concern. 2. 82nd airborne 1 regiment dropped each bank at Nijmegen, close to the bridge in first drop. 3. 101st - drop closer to bridges but generally the same plan 4. Second drop, remainder of 1st and 82nd, with 82nd forces moving to groosebeck and 1st moving south to clear "the island" as much as possible 5. Polish Brigade held as flying reserve to either reinforce groosebeck if needed or Arnhem. Piece of cake.
Bruno TaTa I would add, take the smaller bridges near the jump off with commandos and SAS, smaller forces, but more quickly received. failure to capture the smaller bridges can be fixed by Bailey bridges. massing the airborne in the eight miles between the two key bridges means they are able to support each other, hold drop zones and road. prevent Germans from moving in the same area. the area on the German side would be free of allies except in the area of the bridge, here ground attack aircraft could be given free reign without fear of friendly fire. artillery could be landed at whatever drop zone between the bridges was open... light flanking forces running up either side of the main force would speed up the advance.
Let me explain why you are wrong. North of Arnhem is woods. And Deelen military Airfield. And the closest open ground is several miles away from Arnhem Bridge, and much closer the 9SS and 10SS division rest areas than the drop zones used. This means the landing zones would have come under attack sooner. Paras could have dropped South of Arnhem Bridge, but the division would have been split by the Rhine if the bridges are destroyed or could not be captured. Not good. Gliders couldn't land to the South as to ground is too soft, so any troops landing there have no jeeps and no anti-tank guns. And only the supplies the men can carry. Also, there was a lot of German Flak in Arnhem and to the South of it, so expect far more casualties during the drop. There were good reasons for choosing the drop zones which were actually used.
This is litteraly the same reason why no one can argue and discuss todays problems aswell. If you start talking about subjects as minority religions in European countries, different cultures not assimilating into countries, talking about behaviours of others instantly you would be called a racist, nationalist and even a nazi. Same situation is with history as you mentioned. This is really annoying that people are calling names instead of providing a proper argument that supports or objects a claim..
Exactly. Regardless of the subject or the side of the fence you sit on, there should be two things - 1) a civilised open discussion, and 2) lots of facts and figures that you've gathered from extensive reading to provide evidence for whatever point you're trying to put across. Reading one book and calling yourself an expert doesn't cut it. Statements without evidence or chest-pounding opinions designed to strike an emotional response have no place in these discussions.
TIK ...and even if you are an expert you are not relived from the duty of making a good argument based on facts and propper logic. Being an expert simply means to have knowledge about necessary facts and being able to put them into perspective, not that one is always right.
people please remember that all nations in world war two had great leaders but also terrible leaders as well. what im saying is don't judge a country just based on the first terrible leader you encounter wait instead for a wider and broader scope of leaders before judging any country's leaders capacity really though you shouldn't judge on how it performs warfare's but as how it operates as a whole. also remember all who fought in this war were brave please do not disrespect three memories with nationalism fuelled rants.
I agree. But even where a country doesn't perform well, that's not a bad reflection of the country or the people, but usually circumstance (Luxembourg had no chance in WW2, let's be honest) or poor decisions made by leadership (Mussolini sending his country to war when it simply wasn't prepared).
***** so true so true TIK so really to judge a country you have to visit it join in the culture for a while eat the food and see how it treats its people.
I have watched your Market-Garden vid and found it superb, particularly your contention that the battle was more a German victory than another (yawn) Allied noble defeat. What you said about Gavin and the American participation in the battle was in no way detrimental to Gavin's memory. Why you are responding to the criticism of your presentation puzzles me, you are at times perilously close to apologizing . . . which isn't called for in any way shape or form. You Tube is rife with adolescents who 'learn' their history from whatever Spielberg film or series they're in love with, or whatever other rubbish disguised as history Hollywood unloads on us. And then there's Stephen Ambose, a plagerist and pompous windbag for American exceptionalism who liked to pretend he was an historian; or Max Hastings who has spent decades apologizing for his book Overlord . . . Your video was fine mate, don't diminish yourself by apologizing for it. Cheers!
10th SS were in Nijmegen because they poured south over the uncaptured bridge. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen slightly ahead of schedule ready to speed over the bridge only to see it still in German hands and 10th SS fighting the 82nd in Nijmegen. If XXX Corps had been delayed and not reached Nijmegen on time it is possible the 82nd would have been annihilated by the 10th SS.
and if the 508th had taken the bridge on 17th 15.hrs (muhahaha), how would this have changed the fact that 10th SS is capable of annihilating the 82nd ? Then 10thSS can always annihilate the 82nd ?! until the time has come that XXXcrps arrives....soooo...the speed of XXXcrps is the essence..
When I watched the original video I just knew somebody would think TIK would base his thoughts on this b/c of a conscious or subconscious Brit vs Yank thing. Was hoping he would not defend himself b/c it is obvious if the British commanded the Nijmegan area and did the same thing TIK would have blamed that Brit commander...Anyways great series of videos and a new subscriber.
I ask myself whether you should put so much energy into a counter-opinion that is largely based on national sentiment. I thought this was the least video on your channel, TIK, and I love it because I've seen over 30 of them to date.
I disagree that Gavin was at fault. I agree that this is not a nationalistic thing because they are/were allies. They accepted the military chain of command and operated within it. A commander is responsible for the unit does a fails to do and that responsibility cannot be delegated. Other authors have suggested that Gen. Smith, Ike's Chief of Staff, had warned Montgomery about the intelligence concerning the armor in the area. Ike supposedly said that he was not going to tell Montgomery how to run his operation. Ultimately, the decision to go rests with Montgomery supported by Ike. Montgomery should have done his homework and he really didn't or if he did, he ignored the lessons that it provided. If I recall correctly, Gavin was a one star although he was a division commander and Browning was a core command which made him at least three-star. The three-star out ranks the one star and the fact that the three-star is on site and therefore is the senior commander. A one star, does not flaunt the wishes of the three-star. The idea of chain of command does include partnership but if you remember from the battle of the bulge, I took command of the situation when Bradley could not and transferred troops to Montgomery in order to save the situation in spite of Bradley's objections. The situation is the same here in that Browning could have ordered Gavin to take the bridge but he did not and instead concentrated on setting up his headquarters.
Good points! Tbh, it's almost too close to call. When I was working on my documentary, I debated whether I should blame both Gavin AND Browning, as Browning made a lot of really crucial mistakes. In the end I chose to single out Gavin because I do think his decision at Nijmegen was huge. A lot of people say the operation was doomed from the start, but this argument actually suggests it wasn't, which is a nice alternative argument to the traditional one. Also it presents a "what if" because if they had taken the bridge, would XXX Corps have gotten to Arnhem, and would people still say the plan was "rotten"? So that's my reasoning for backing it. But like you pointed out, there were lots of mistakes made by everyone. From Ike and Montgomery, all the way down to Browning and Gavin. Browning's mistakes especially are so numerous that it's hard to list them all. But I would say (again, my opinion) that Nijmegen was a bit more decisive. Sort of like an umbrella. Browning's umbrella has a lot of holes in it, but it was Gavin that snapped the stem. Which is worse? In the end it doesn't matter because either way you're definitely getting wet. Obviously, this is all up for debate. But you're right in saying that Browning is at fault here, and I certainly won't try to persuade you otherwise :)
Mike Quinton It's a possibility :) after I've finished my next one on Fort Eben Emael, I'm going to try doing a big battle. Haven't chosen which one yet so anything's possible
A military commander who has a key objective in a major military operation, who simply neglects pursuing that objective in favor of hiding back by the drop zone, is clearly at fault. Responsible, at fault and to blame.
On the subject of the Germans, I understand they were prepared for the Allied, was because they had captured plans of the invasion from a dead allied officer.
I share the view of several historians which I listed in the description of my documentary on Market Garden. Did you see my documentary? ruclips.net/video/vTUC79o4Kmc/видео.html
Let's take your logic back a few steps. Instead of saying Gavin's decision not to take the bridge lost the battle let us say that after dismissing intel reports and even actual photos of tanks in the area Monty's decision to go ahead with the operation lost the battle. The battle still might have been lost had the bridge at Nijmegen been taken. But it would Certainly Would Not have been lost had Monty called it off. I know the paras were getting jerked around a lot and were itching to go but would they have been as gung ho after being shown the tank photos? Taken I believe by a Mosquito spy plane... Is asserting that tanks that are hidden in the woods and camouflaged are probably inoperable a rational idea? What was the Objective of market garden?... Well it seems obvious the objective was to see if everything goes right and then to figure out what to do next.
HAVE YOU READ THE 96 PAGE "ARNHEM 1944" BOOK FROM OSPREY BY STEPHEN BADSEY? IT'S INCREDIBLY CONCISE, SUCCINCT & DARING IN IT'S FINGER POINTING - PRINCIPALLY AT LT GEN LEWIS BRERETON. I COULDN'T AGREE MORE WITH YOU ON YOUR ATTITUDE TO BRITAIN (MY COUNTRY, WHICH I ALSO LIVE IN). IT MAKES MY TEETH GRIND TO SEE NATO DOING WHATEVER IT CAN TO EXPAND EAST & RATTLING SABRES ON LANDS WHERE MOST OF THE TOUGHEST, PROFESSIONAL ARMIES IN HISTORY HAVE FOUGHT. I LAUGH WHEN I SEE BRITAIN'S & AMERICA'S FAT SOLDIERS (THERE ARE PLENTY OF THEM) IN THE FREEZING BALTIC REPUBLICS "INTIMIDATING" RUSSIA. BRITAIN HAS LOST 2 WARS (IN IRAQ & AFGHANISTAN), CONTRIBUTED MIGHTILY TO DESTROYING LIBYA, DESTABILISING SYRIA & POLITICALLY SURRENDERED TO THE IRA. YOU'VE GOT TO GO BACK TO THE 1620'S - 1630'S TO SEE A SORRIER RECORD FOR THE BRITISH MILITARY. I HATE SEEING MY COUNTRY VISIBLY DESTROYING ITSELF & MAKING ITSELF INTO AN ADJUNCT OF AMERICA. TOO MANY AMERICANS & BRITISH DON'T REALISE THAT OUR 2 COUNTRIES HAVE SPENT NEARLY ALL OF OUR EXISTENCE AS NON-ALLIES. IN WW1 WE WERE CO-BELLIGERENTS, NOT ALLIES. AFTER THAT WAR WE WERE LEFT CARRYING THE FINANCIAL CAN FOR ALL OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES. WE'D ALREADY SPENT 300 YEARS WORTH OF THE PROFITS OF EMPIRE & COMMERCIALISM IN WW1. BY THE EARLY 1920'S, BRITAIN COULDN'T PAY AMERICA. AS A RESULT OF THIS BRITAIN COULDN'T AFFORD A NAVY LIKE IT HAD BEFORE, AND SO IT SURRENDERED THE PREMIER NAVAL POWER STATUS TO AMERICA & JAPAN IN 1922 AT THE WASHINGTON NAVAL TREATY. AMERICA DIDN'T FORGET THAT IT WAS STIFFED BY BRITAIN (WHO'D BEEN STIFFED BY OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES - SOME OF WHOM, LIKE RUSSIA, DIDN'T EXIST BY THE END OF WW1). SO WITH WW2, THEIR ATTITUDE WAS THEY WOULD ENSURE THEY GOT THEIR MONEY, FIRST IN GOLD, CURRENCY & BONDS, THEN VIA LEND-LEASE. BRITAIN DIDN'T RECOVER FROM WW2 UNTIL THE LATE 1980'S VIA THE ICE COLD SHOWER OF THATCHERNOMICS. WE DIDN'T PAY OFF AMERICA EVERY PENNY OF OUR WAR DEBT (TO AMERICA & CANADA) UNTIL 2006 - INCLUDING INTEREST. "AMERICA SAVED OUR ASSES" BECAUSE WE PAID FOR IT. INTO THE SLIP STREAM OF BRITAIN'S DEMISE AS A GREAT POWER WAS AMERICA. MY POINT ABOUT ALL OF THIS IS THAT EVERY TIME BRITAIN HAS GOT INVOLVED WITH AMERICA IN SHOOTING WARS IT'S BEEN INCREDIBLY DAMAGING FOR BRITAIN. THIS GOES RIGHT BACK TO THE 7 YEARS' WAR. BRITAIN SAVED IT'S AMERICAN COLONIES AT VAST EXPENSE IN GOLD & BLOOD. ITS THANKS WAS TO BE SCREAMED AT FOR DARING THE AMERICAN COLONISTS TO BE EXPECTED TO CONTRIBUTE 6 PENCE PER YEAR IN TAX REVENUE COMPARED TO 25 SHILLINGS PER YEAR IN TAX REVENUE FOR THE BRITISH (THESE FIGURES ARE AVERAGES). BRITAIN BENT OVER BACKWARDS IN TRYING NOT TO WIN TOO MUCH IN ORDER TO BE PLACATORY TO THE LITTLE COLONIAL DARLINGS (I.E. HOWE PULLED HIS PUNCHES IN 1776 & THIS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE WAR - WHICH WAS ESSENTIALLY LOST AFTER SARATOGA). IT WAS AMERICA'S OUTRAGEOUS BEHAVIOUR TOWARD BRITAIN IN THE LATE 19TH CENTURY THAT SHOULD HAVE RESULTED IN WAR. BRITAIN, AGAIN, BENT OVER BACKWARDS TO ACCOMMODATE AMERICA. WHEN GERMANY BEHAVED IN A FAR MORE REASONABLE WAY, BRITAIN WENT TO WAR WITH IT. SEE THE AMERICAN STRATEGIST EDWARD LUTTWAK'S OPINIONS ON THIS (SEE ruclips.net/video/GYCHXQ4zFcA/видео.html 14:40 MINUTES IN). IT'S VERY NOTICEABLE (TO ME) THAT THE IRA COLLAPSED FINANCIALLY AFTER THE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 ATTACKS, DUE TO THE INSTANT HALT IN AMERICAN FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM. WHAT WOULD AMERICA'S STANCE BE IF GERMANY OR BRITAIN HAD A BIG WAR IN SOUTH AMERICA & VAST SWATHES OF PEOPLE POURED OVER THE BORDERS INTO AMERICA. AMERICA WOULD HAVE DIRECTED SUCH "CULTURAL ENRICHMENT" STRAIGHT TO GERMANY &/OR BRITAIN. NO BRITISH PERSON I'VE MET HAS EVER SAID TO A WEST EUROPEAN "WE SAVED YOUR ARSES". CANADIANS DON'T HAVE THIS ATTITUDE. AMERICANS MOST DEFINITELY DO. THIS COMES FROM THE MANIFEST DESTINY OUTLOOK OF AMERICA - A SECULAR VERSION OF GOD'S CHOSEN PEOPLE. WHEN I LOOK AT BRITAIN'S HISTORY WITH AMERICA I THINK OF THE AMERICAN SHOWMAN, P.T. BARNUM'S ATTITUDE TO ENTERTAINMENT - "THERE'S A SUCKER BORN EVERY MINUTE".
This one just popped up so probably way behind the posting curve here. First off, love your enthusiasm and the obvious effort you put into your work. History is fascinating and it's a real joy to see someone put so much effort into illuminating it in compelling ways. A bit of a pet peeve of mine though is the introduction of controversy for controversy's sake. And there is a fine line between being purposefully controversial and just generating some buzz. Generating buzz is one of those necessary evils. I definitely want to give you the benefit of the doubt on this one but the controversy meter is pegged off scale high. And while you do present a good case for your argument, it's a little nit picky at the tactical scale where there are gigantic issues going on at the strategic scale that perhaps may have predetermined the outcome. George Herring said about the study of history (paraphrasing) "We study history not to be more clever the next time. Instead, we study history to be wise for the rest of our lives". Gavin lost Market Garden because he didn't storm the bridge in the first hours is a "clever" interpretation of the outcome of the operation. A "wiser" viewpoint might be that Market Garden was overly complicated. Relied on too many objectives being taken all at once and held until relieved by a 100 miles of two lane dirt road through swamp land where any single point of failure could result in the ultimate failure of the operation. Another piece of wisdom that I think relates here. "No battle plan survives contact with the enemy." Market Garden had absolutely zero accommodation for that wisdom. In fact, it goes directly against that well known axiom. It was a bad plan. And most definitely a bridge too far.
Historians are often notoriously bad at the analysis. You may be falling into that category with all the hard work you've done. You get lost in the weeds, as they say. You give Browning a pass, when he also put a non-para into the single most important position in the entire operation. An Airborne general would have had the confidence and understanding of that form of warfare to INSIST on a better drop zone.
Love all your videos TiK. War is a nasty activity and no plan lasts past first contact with the enemy. There were no contingency for the entire thing. If one thing failed, the whole thing would fail. Nijmegen is a start, but the whole thing was badly planned.
I am American and I came away from your Marketgarden video thinking its failure was based largely on Gavin's failure to take t Nimagan bridge. Also, I am so provincially American that I just assumed you were American. You dont sound like t Queen, Michael Cain, or Richard Dawkins. So Idt I even noticed your Brit accent. Tho now that you bring it up , you do clearly have some sort of Brit accent. My wife guessed that you are from Manchester . Tho Idt you sound like Ian Curtis either. So Idk
This discussion is old-hat I am aware but in retrospect I believe a lot of the debate over the Gavin issue stemmed from a bit of dissonance between the tone of the first half or so of the video and that of the end. To be succinct, miscommunications and logistical foibles, doubts from participants, and and the progressive build-up of mishaps as the Operation progressed could be interpreted by viewers as indicative of poor planning or umbrella-blame. On the other hand, the end points to Gavin - one man - as the catalyst for cataclysm. While I believe this was meant in a "straw that broke the camel's back" sort of way, I can see why a good amount of viewers - myself included, originally - could interpret this as disingenuous when it isn't the case.
for want of a horse shoe nail, planning,, intel, DZ's, blown bridge, bridge not taken, radio's, air support, do I need to go on, had that bridge and town been taken on day one it would have been ready for the arrival of 30 corps
Yes, my friend. Our civil war was anything but.... I believe that is why we Americans continue to fight and refight that war. "Lost Cause" and all that. My great-grandmother was a child of a Confederate veteran and she was very much alive when I was a little boy. I'm 62 and I clearly remember her trying to explain the whole thing. At 5 years old, playing with toy civil war soldiers (blue and gray) when the blue was winning my floor battles, she informed me that the blue were the "bad" guys and the grey were the "good" guys. All from the color of the toys. Upon growing up, I discovered that this was not always the case. My ancestors did not own slaves, but yet they fought for pro-slavery agenda. The whole thing was about as black and white as a rainbow. Oh by the way, her father's 2 brothers out of 5 went North. So I heard about the fratricidal nature of that war. Being from Missouri, she told me how neighbors would attack and kill neighbors only because of pro Union or Confederate politics. About as transparent as mud.
Did Gen Gavin set the drop zones for his division? Did he make the choice to land away from the town and not on the north bank at all? the freaking south would be taken by XXX corps eventually! Not dropping on both sides of both of the difficult to bridge rivers was the reason it failed. Plain and simple. A contributing factor was the failure to use airpower to interdict german reinforcements to the Nijmegen area, most easily by simply attacking the ferry location. All their planning was to avoid this or that minor problem(soft ground or flak here or there), and they forgot to secure the main objectives!
+TIK Na minha opnião foi pelo grande problema de logística, e na hora da operação os paraquedistas aliados saltaram em pontos errados longe dos seus objetivos
I agree to some extent. The loss of the drop zones at Arnhem was a major error. One thing the people say is that Monty should have concentrated on the port of Antwerp by taking the islands on the coast, whilst trapping the 15th Army. But if he'd gotten to the Zuiderzee, he would have done the same thing, but also be across the Rhine. So I see both sides of the argument.
TIK, I am soo happy to have found you. Propaganda is a huge part of war, but you finds a logical perspective to it all. Best historian youtuber this day!
Your argument makes no tactical sense for several reasons, We are talking about paratroopers, that have nothing with which to take on armour. The whole idea behind this venture is for thirty corps to make it up the road quickly, which could not be done on this road. Without thirty corps, the paras have nothing to take on armour but small arms. monty's plan was the flaw as there were not enough fail safes, not enough intel, not enough period.If the plan was well designed, the taking of one bridge would not have stopped it. This plan was ill concieved, and based on the ego of it's designer, To blame one small commander in the plan is irrelevant, as the plans maker is ultimately to blame. Poor Planning.
I don't understand your point about the paratroopers having nothing to take on armour. Their PIATs and Bazookas can take out tanks. Plus they landed with AT guns like the 6-pounders the British carried into Arnhem. Tactically, if the 82nd had taken the Nijmegen Bridge on the first day, XXX Corps would have been over the Nijmegen Bridge at around 10am on the third day. They may have been at Arnhem later that day, or may have been at Arnhem the next day. Certainly, they wouldn't have suffered the 36 hour delay at Nijmegen fighting an urban house-to-house battle to take the city. I'm not saying that the play couldn't have been better - it absolutely could have been. The 1st Airborne landing closer to Arnhem could have prevented the SS from driving down to Nijmegen, for example. What I'm saying is, with the plan as it was, it could have worked. It didn't work because Nijmegen Bridge fell into German hands on the first day of battle, and this could have been avoided if a unit of the 82nd had been ordered to go to the bridge right from the start. A lot of people say the plan was doomed from the start when in reality, it was only doomed when Nijmegen Bridge fell into German hands.
Have you actually shot a piat? a Bazooka? I have, they would not take out a tank, they may damage one, but that is about it. And they didn't have many to begin with. I got my information from some guys that were there on the ground, not officers that wrote books. Sorry, the buck stops at Monty's plan.
1st Airborne had sixteen 17-pdr A/T guns and about eighty 6-pdr A/T guns with APDS ammo, which could knock out just about ant German tank (at close range, at least). And a lot of PIATs, which knocked out tanks just fine. I know the American paratroops had fewer anti-tank weapons, but the 82nd at least met almost no German tanks at all and the 101st had the support of 30 Corps by the time significant German tanks arrived.
Wait, I've seen your video on why Market Garden failed. And you provide a lot of situational background prior to saying Gavin made a bad call. BUT you then ignore the "known" situation at the time, to judge Gavin's decision. You judge it based on the what is NOW known to be true. Gavin makes the decision, Boy accepts it. You ignore the bad choice Boy makes, to judge Gavin as wrong. They thought there what 1 or 2 thousand tanks in his flank? We NOW KNOW that was more tanks than the whole German army had on the front at the time. BUT THEY DIDN'T. So if the German hordes do appear, it was the right call (well sort of, it just ends in disaster closer rather than farther). But now we can say, "if only.." You answer your own debate, you just ignore it. It was Boy's shoulders. Or Monty's, or Ike's. The buck stops somewhere ABOVE Gavin. Otherwise, you need to go lower and blame a company commander for no initiative. The German Propaganda was just so effective and the Allies too quick to believe it.
My information (from the film), 30 Corps stopped for tea. I believe it. The Brits never relished confronting Germans, without their American friends. Where was the American Air Force, pounding the Panzer divisions.
XXX Corps never stopped for tea - that old chestnut needs to be put to bed permanently. After crossing the bridge, the lead elements did have to stop but specifically because they had no ammunition left (and 180 dead German soldiers in the girders of the bridge are testimony to the amount of ammunition expended), plus they were without their accompanying infantry and a handful of 82nd AB were not going to be enough. Finally, it was actually dark when they made the decision to stop. As Villa is implying, it might be much more prudent to not learn your information from a film that was financed by US money so was never going to show the real reason MG failed.
@@sean640307 So, you're claiming that 30 Corps was hell bent for leather. "Cause, history. I served in the 101st Airborne. We needed Patton to succeed. This was a political campaign. History shows the Brits getting their asses kicked by the Germans over and over again. So, go back to your history books, written by the winners.
@@arrowrod history shows no such thing. I didn't say XXX Corps were going hell for leather, either, I'm pointing out the facts that they could NOT have been the claimed 36 hours slow given that they left their staring point at 14:35 on the 17th Sept and met with the 82nd at 08:20 on the 19th Sept. The loss of the Son bridge when the 101st was there only to see it blown up in their faces was inconvenient, and it's true that the building of the Bailey bridge cost about 12-14 hours BUT most of that time was made up between Eindhoven and Grave. I am NOT critical of ANY of the paras - 101st took their objectives, 82nd took most of theirs, 1st AB were thwarted but at least had the northern part of the bridge at Arnhem, which denied the Germans access to it. However, Gavin made a decision which ultimately proved fatal to the operation. If he'd been given more transports, I'm sure he would have made different decisions. If we're going to blame anyone higher in the food chain, Monty isn't the one to blame as he had NO control or influence over anything with regards to Operation Market - that was First Allied Airborne specifically Brereton, Browning, and input from Williams (USAAF) as they were the planners of the airborne assault. As for Patton succeeding, nothing that happened at Market Garden would have helped Patton to succeed any better than he did. Your own military analysis after the war has been particularly critical of Patton's performance in the Lorraine campaign in general, and Metz specifically. Patton's antics also deprived Hodges of much needed fuel, so if anything, Patton caused the US 1st Army more harm.
No the tanks stopped twice the irish guards said it,the Germans and GIs saw and recorded it,Monty didn't show up - no field marshall.Carrington stopped in lent - certainly no Lord - there are your cuplrits.Are you Monty's little swiss boy?
But that is the trouble nowadays - as soon as a video is shown that goes against some viewers' national pride, regardless of nationality, a sheer barrage of "Sh.t Storm" is the result. Just watch any British documentary on WW2 - the socalled "Wehraboos" are out in battalion strength calling it propaganda etc. regardless how fair it really is. American documentaries often overlook the British part in the war - out come the British protesters! Lately TIK had the audacity to criticise the actions of a South African general - from the reactions one thought a third Boer War had been declared. I myself have criticised a TIK video, but everybody has the right to have their own opinion and it is wrong to bash the jingoistic drum and start insulting one another just because their opinion doesn't match yours. Calm down everybody - always look on the bright side of life, dee dum, dee dum...!
Tik, I love what you do. I think that this is a mistake. I don't think one can defend one's self on line. Just continue making good documentarys. the chips will fall where they fall.
Everybody remember that they never served in the military and do know squat about what it's really like in the military and combat. Everybody in this debate thinks that they are great generals but none of them every commanded troops. All the historians who write the books never served in the military, never commanded troops but they all think that they're great generals. They all need to get over themselves. Everybody talks about what happened like the troops are chess pieces. The troops were real living human beings who didn't want to die and this is true on both side. If all you great generals want to debate war, then why don't you actually enlist in the military and see what you experience in combat? Quite frankly, I don't give two hoots and a holler,TIK, about what a civilian likes says about anything military. You all engage in this historical debate about something which has happened and is completed like you're all-knowing generals. In the US, you are doing what is called "Monday Morning Quarterbacking." It is easy to sit on your duff at home and watch a US football game and then criticize the quarterback the following morning. Actually being on the field is quite a different experience. I never played anything other than sandlot ball but it gave me a small taste of what is happening and, I hope, the insight to understand what happens on the field in college and pro ball games when supposedly well-trained and experienced players are playing the game. As I said, all you "Monday Morning Quarterbacking Generals" from the safety to 70 years and books and books which are limited in scope, like the knowledge all the commanders had on the ground at that time, and may unintentionally ignoring important Info because the civilian didn't know or think it was important. Bridges could've been taken and roads cut and everything else and the battle could've still been lost and like when an inferior team upsets a superior team. The difference is that in sports people go home only disappointed but in war troops die and never see their families again and families never see their loved one again. To me, it's all vain speculation. Agree there is rhyme and reason for critically studying what happened but it happened and it's over. Let us honor the men who fought and died. One sight I want to share is about the training of US military officers to all the civilian historians. The US officer's job is: 1. to complete the mission and 2. the welfare of his men. When all this was going down, do any of the "sideline generals" know what the conditions were and what the chances for success were? Is that ever mentioned in any of the history books by the "civilian" historians? Were they there assessing the situation like the other, on-the-spot officers? There is a saying in the US that, "he who fights and runs away lives to fight another day." May be the withdrawing of battle experienced troops or the non-engaging with superior force could've saved many lives for another battle with a much better chance of victory. Yes, all this is subjective which is why second guessing is ridiculous. As I said, let us simply honor the men.
Who never served? Please clarify. These are the sources cited for TIK:s documentary: John Frost, A Drop Too Many. 2009. Max Hastings, Armageddon. London, 2004. Robert J. Kershaw, It Never Snows in September. Surry, 2007. Martin Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle, 17-29 September. 2009. Robert Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944. UK, 2014. Poulussen, R.G. Lost at Nijmegen. 2011. Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far. USA, 1974 Major General R E Urquhart, Arnhem. 1958. Major General S Sosabowski, Freely I Served. Great Britain, 1982. As I'm sure you are aware since you make such specific claims about Market Garden historians military service record, 5 out of the 9 have military careers behind them, and if I'm not mistaken all but one of them reached general officer rank in their respective services. Oh and yes, I too have served in the military, which is irrelevant, so please don't even try.
To clarify the point I was making about Montgomery. Anyone can have their say on any leader from any nation. I'm looking forward to the day that I can turn around and say "I've done my research and can conclude that Monty wasn't a great general" because I'll have no shame in saying that (if it is indeed true). I'm reserving my judgement of Monty until I've read up on him more, but the point stands that just because I'm British doesn't mean that I love every British leader and criticise leaders from other nations. There were good and bad leaders from every nation, and I think it's good practice for everyone to think critical of the leaders of our own nations - especially those we admire the most.
I really don't understand you.You defend Monty,you say how his plan for operation was good and to cut-everything was good but then you stat with excuses for defeat!?First-history is science based on facts!History is not novel where you can debate do you like what is wrote or not or something in the novel could be wrote different or better.History is strict science based on facts.And fact is that whole plan for operation Market-Garden was bad coz battle was lost and whole 1st para brigade was almost totally destroyed!You can maybe debate that Monty wasn't such a bad commander.I think that Monty was such a bad commander that you couldn't found worst from him!My opinion is based on several mistakes done from Monty during war and the biggest one when he showed that his military knowledge is in the rank of captain and maybe(but just maybe) in rank of major is his conquest of Antwerp when Monty(some general!)"forget" to take port!So Germans established such a strong defence in port with bunkers,heavy artillery,muchine gun nests that port was taken more then months after!So military objective was Antwerp coz that port but for Monty-port wasn't so important!But about Market-Garden.When some general going in strategic battle then he must look everything-from terrain to intelligence infomations.Terrain was very hard for any strategic operation when there are too many rivers with many bridges that core with help from American airborne divisions must cross over.Then there were very narrow roads for such a big force like core.And then there were intelligence informations!I don't understand how Monty didn't ask himself first-where is that SS panzer core with 2 SS panzer divisions-Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg!?Where is gruppenfuhrer Bietrich!?He was in Normandy but where is he now!And then Dutch resistance send you msgs that there are large tank formations nearArnhem.And as I know-every SS panzer division had their own insignias.And Monty didn't asked just-what are the insignias on those tanks in Arnhem!?I don't think that was hard at all!Anyway-history is exact science with facts.And fact is that Monty pushed so hard for one operation who was complete disaster!It was strange for everyone why Monty push so hard in one very risky operation when he was known as "old fart"general who always done everything by the 1st World war book(from el-Alamein onward!)-when you attack you must have 2 times more troops from defender,then 2 hrs artillery barrage,then mine cleaners and then tanks with infantry..So old,so boring without any inventions,creativity..I think Monty was just a careerist who got his position coz he belonged to ruling class in England(same old Normans who ruled in England from 1066!)just like that alcoholic Churchill.But their time was running out coz Americans didn't cared for those old farts.So Monty wanted to show how he can be just like Heinz Guderian or Patton.He didn't knew nothing about modern warfare,he didn't even tried to learn about modern warfare like Russian generals-Chuikov or Rokosovski!He just wanted to do something balled but he made big blonder!Thats Monty!Sorry if I made mistakes while I wrote this-English is not my languege
Are you okay?
Your argument that 30 corps and more importantly guard armor got there on time doesn’t work because even when they got there only the armor was ready to cross for supporting infantry was not ready to cross the were not going to advance between nine Nijmegen and Arnhem him and supported the matter how you slice it. Even though 30 Corps was able to reach there they were not able to reach their hold everythingAnd then push to 43 division was fighting off the German counter attacks and guards armor was not gonna fight on its own up roads that weren’t really roads they were are you know what the calm elevator roads and have the tanks picked up one by one if you completely ignore that even though 30/core reach there they were in no way or shape ready to fight in between my Megan and I are in him in the face of the two pans are divisions and to say that the Germans didn’t control the bridge is also incorrect the braided the Germans did control the bridge in control if you houses around one end of it for four days but they control the other end and everything else across the river market garden was not gonna work because of the multi dimensional ability of the Germans to react and control the last bridge and the far Bank of the Neiefer Rhine.
If anything, your descriptions have upped my opinion of Monty. Like I commented on your Ike v. Monty Explaining Market-Garden comparison, ( ruclips.net/video/f79KgQVL3MM/видео.html ), "It's kinda sad that Monty's own ex-post-facto description of [the operation's] goals is what made me think him a fool."
I feel that in recent years Montgomery has gotten a lot of slander. The usual things like he was 'overrated', 'too-cautious/timid/unimaginative', 'egocentric', or in this case, a 'poor planner'. However its my thoughts that this has been an opinion gathered out of lots of rhetoric and not enough thought and nuanced. History is extraordinarily nuanced in many areas, and it is far easier to make a sweeping generalization such as the popular 'Montgomery was to blame for Allied setbacks from D-day onward period.' It is simpler to hold that belief than deal with the uncertainty that comes from closer examination.
A lot of these opinions are formed on a level of national bias. This is unfortunate as it clouds the reality of the situation. TIK is doing a great job in trying to prevent a nationalistic bias concerning historical discussion. As that kind of lopsidedness seems to beget more of the same bias.
To defend some of the criticism of Montgomery, it's useful to look at what some of his contemporaries have said of him:
* "Monty was not such a dashing, romantic figure as his opponent; nor would you find him leading a forlorn hope in person, for the simple reason that if he was in command forlorn hopes did not occur. He had an extraordinary capacity for putting his finger straight on the essentials of any problem, and of being able to explain them simply and clearly. He planned all his battles most carefully."
Brian Horrocks -- A Full Life (1960),
* "General Montgomery is a very able, dynamic type of army commander. I personally think that the only thing he needs is a strong immediate commander. He loves the limelight but in seeking it, it is possible that he does so only because of the effect upon his own soldiers, who are certainly devoted to him. I have great confidence in him as a combat commander. He is intelligent, a good talker, and has a flair for showmanship."
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, diary entry (11 June 1943)
* "Nevertheless, again there cropped up criticisms of Montgomery's "caution," which I had first heard among pressmen and airmen when he was conducting his long pursuit of Rommel across the desert. Criticism is easy- an unsuccessful attack brings cries of "butcher" just as every pause brings wails of "timidity." Such charges are unanswerable because proof or refutation is impossible. In war about the only criterion that can be applied to a commander is his accumulated record of victory and defeat. If regularly successful, he gets credit for his skill, his judgement as to the possible and impossible, and his leadership. Those critics of Montgomery who assert that he sometimes failed to attain the maximum must at least admit that he never once sustained a major defeat. In this particular instance I went over all details carefully, both with Montgomery and with Alexander. I believed then, and believe now, that a headlong attack against the Mount Etna position, with the resources available in the middle of July, would have been defeated. And it is well to remember that caution and timidity are not synonymous, just as boldness and rashness are not!"
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (1948), p. 179
* "Montgomery is a first-class trainer and leader of troops on the battlefield, with a fine tactical sense. He knows how to win the loyalty of his men and has a great flair for raising morale. He rightly boasted that, after the battle of Alamein, he never suffered a defeat; and the truth is that he never intended to run the risk of a defeat; that is one reason why he was cautious and reluctant to take chances. There is, however, much to be said for his attitude when we consider that, up to October 1942, we had not won a single major battle since the start of the war - except Archie Wavell's operations against the Italians and some local victories against the Axis forces in the Western Desert. Yet I can't disguise that he was not an easy man to deal with; for example, administrative orders issued by my staff were sometimes objected to - in other words Monty wanted to have complete independence of command and to do what he liked. Still, no serious difficulties arose over these very minor disturbances, he was always reasonable when tackled."
General Harold Alexander in Memoirs: 1940-1945
I will admit that the quotes are selected to challenge the popular opinion of Montgomery. However I do feel that upon closer inspection, for the 21st Army group commander for the initial D-Day landing, to command the ground forces you couldn't get a much better commander than Montgomery in that field. Contenders can range to Perhaps Wavell who was sacked unfairly by Churchill, Truscott who was sidelined constantly in Italy by first Patton and then Clarke. Bradly may have though I suspect he would not have been as good as the other choices. Or William Slim, who is my personal favorite.
As an American and veteran of the 82nd airborne division. (First Gulf War) I found your video and conclusions fascinating and informative. Gavin made a decision based on the information he had. It was a bad decision. I would have still gladly followed him into battle. Because he usually made the right decision. Great commander's from Alexander on have made bad decisions. Love your channel.
I quite like this post.
Never should have been a mixed
Operation
The 82 and 101 did better in bulge battle no brit interference!
@@angloaust1575 *sigh
The British also did just fine in the Ardennes.
First, my credentials: I am a military veteran of 27 years service with some experience of tactical and operational planning and proud possessor of a bachelor's degree in history with considerable emphasis on military history. Additionally, I have also had an intense continuing lifelong (now 59 years) personal and professional interest and study of military affairs and military history.
I have the following comments:
I concur with the conclusion that Operation Market-Garden was badly planned and rushed in preparation. A key element of a good military plan is flexibility. The "fog of war," "friction," (whatever you want to call it) always happens and there was no flexibility in the plan. It had to succeed at every point, take every single objective at or about the scheduled time for it to succeed. There was no flexibility to account for possible setbacks or alternative courses should achieving one or more objectives prove problematic. As was expressed in the movie at several points they could not suffer mischance at any point and this characteristic is a major mark of a bad military plan.
The choice of ground for the offensive dictated this lack of flexibility, but the assumption was made that the enemy would be incapable of effectively using the extremely favorable defensive terrain they possessed. This assumption was based on the belief the enemy was already broken. The intelligence assessments completely discounted this assumption but were disregarded. The neglect of sound intelligence preparation of the operational environment is another hallmark of a flawed planning and preparation process.
Additionally, having heard General Urqhart discuss the matter in a live interview, I am keenly aware that he strongly criticized the placement of 1 Para drop-zones. He himself expressed the conclusion that this was a catastrophic decision that violated what he concluded was an overriding requirement for airborne operations: drop as close as humanly possible to the objective to maximize the element of surprise and seize the initiative while the enemy is most vulnerable. Other examples of how this was a bad plan can be adduced, but I believe I have made my point.
Concerning General Gavin: as was portrayed in the movie he did indeed suffer a back injury which plagued him for the rest of his life. Those (including myself) who have had to operate under conditions of severe physical distress, including severe pain and still make sound military judgement in situations of intense stress and/or urgency will know this is not easy. I would accept that he did in fact misjudge the situation and make a faulty military assessment. These situations are one reason why we have orders. Having priorities at least to some degree predetermined for you in the relative calm of the planning sessions is a good thing. Intelligence among other factors can be reasonably assessed in the absence of battlefield stress and the guidance of a soundly prepared plan expressed in well-written orders can make decisions easier when the battlefield stress is on. One is not blind to changing conditions on the battlefield (a point at which flexibility in the plan is vital) but the maintenance of the objective is an important military principle and Gavin did not do this. His primary objective was to open the bridge to 30 Corps' passage. He failed to do this. If in fact there had been a substantial armored force in the Reichswald his full division would have been unlikely to hold the Groesbeek Heights. The Groesbeek Heights offer relatively little in the way of terrain advantage. In fact, as 1 Para proved, one of the best hopes for light infantry to hold against a combined arms assault is urban terrain. He would have had to depend on possession of Nijmegen itself and expeditious relief by 30 Corps to hope to hold indefinitely against a well-executed combined arms assault. In that context his best choice was to act as Major Frost did and seize and prepare to defend the bridge (objective) utilizing the urban terrain surrounding it.
Thus, though counter arguments can be made, I believe your assessment of the situation to be be essentially correct.
Other points can be made. This discussion is by no means a comprehensive assessment of all relevant factors. Nevertheless the conclusions you reached have considerable merit.
I eagerly await any rejoinder anyone may wish to make as long as it is polite and soundly thought through. Discussion such as this is one important means of advancing our understanding of historical events. Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this forum.
As a veteran of military planning you must know how difficult it is to judge a retreating enemy. When are they ripe for more pressure? What will crack them for good? When will they turn and fight? When are you most extended? Making that call is very difficult because everything on both sides of the shifting lines, is in flux.
We focus too much attention on offensive action, not enough on retreats. Gen O'Connor is reputed to have said he wasn't a complete general because he had never commanded a retreat (he was soon to be captured in a retreat so go figure)
The story of Market Garden has to start with the Battle of Falaise. If you don't add the heady rush across Northern France and Belgium into the planning mix you cannot describe what is/was/could have been too hasty in Holland. Military planners make judgements - consolidate or strike? Where is the threat, when to apply pressure and what would make the best investment of force.
The German Border and the Rhine were obvious defensive and psychological features for the retreating germans. The Siegfried line was there for that reason. Any map appreciation, German or Allied, shows the land between the Rhine and Maas looked good for resistance. A boggy, low lying, riverine stopping ground covering your flank to the sea. If the Germans were going to stop anywhere it would be along that line.
The Maas, Waal and Scheldt delta however had to be taken, it was the obvious consolidation ground for the Allies. It covered Antwerp like a claw over their logistic plans. Somewhere between the Maas and the Rhine is where the allies had to end up. It was also exactly where a map appreciation said the Germans where most likely to resist. The Delta was going to take a lot of minor missions to secure, it's been a sponge of British soldiery since medieval times.
So In September 1944, for SHAEF, what was more important - cracking open the German Rhine/Siegfried line, by snapping on the heels of a rout - or using what momentum you still had to push as far as Nijmegen and clear the approaches to Antwerp?
It was Eisenhower's, Tedder's and Ramsay's judgement that Antwerp was the prize. I can't fault their logic. Let the German line solidify at the Rhine, break it down later when you've massively reduced your logistic chain and can take your time to plan a multi-army breakthrough.
Montgomery's judgement was the Germans only needed one last push to crack open the northern flank. Why send an army to capture Arnhem next month when you might get it with a division now? If Monty could have got to the Inland Sea coast, he would have Rotterdam and Antwerp, and instead of fighting through the hilly woody bits further South, you had open lands into Northern Germany and the Ruhr. Thats tasty. Don't say you wouldn't have considered it.
Everything had to be taken up to Nijmegen for either plan to work so 2/3rds of Market Garden HAD to take place. Arnhem was a cherry on an already hasty plan. Is this the root of Brownings supposed remark "going a bridge too far"?
Stopping at Nijmegen, you might have got moving again as early October, although most likely in the midst of Winter. And you'd have to plan an assault across some of the worst ground in Europe - two rivers back to back with a soggy island between - difficult proposition. Both questions may have hurried the decision to go for Arnhem straight away?
What harm was there expending a single light division to try for that last bridge across the Rhine? Bigger things than 1st Airborne had been sacrificed getting to that point. 14,000 sacrificed at Hong Kong just to show the flag. 23,000 at Crete to hide ULTRA. 3,500 at Dieppe just to test the waters and show willing. There was more to the British Army in 1944 than 1st Airborne, however brave.
There was a major division in philosophy in Allied high command - was Arnhem the compromise? It has the feel of a half pregnant kinda plan? "Its just a quick right turn from Arnhem to the Ruhr!" then isn't it also just a 'quick left turn from the Ruhr to Arnhem'. And the Ruhr has to house reserves, its where the reserves are produced!
You can take three days to assemble your 'surprise' by airborne division? No two lifts on day 1? Drop them far away? Thats feeling your way into a fight - not a commando job. Is this why the Groesbeek held such fascination for Browning and Gavin. If you were only planning to hold along Waal, maybe even blow the bridges at Nijmegen to secure that flank, then the Groesbeek is the vital ground not the spans.
For what its worth, I would have gone with Comet two weeks earlier. Only I would have cancelled Arnhem, blown the Nijmegen bridges and spent September clearing Antwerp. In the Autumn, something bigger.
I bet if that had been done and the allies spent the Winter getting miserable under a dyke; if the assault across the Rhine required massive investment further south and a costly crossing of the Waal and Rhine. Historians would be saying 'if only' SHAEF had added Arnhem to Comet, they could have ended the war by Christmas. I can hear them saying 'the two SS divisions at Arnhem were shattered, poorly equipped and had no real tanks, they wouldn't have put up much resistance'
Murphy's Judgement - everything that can go wrong, will go wrong. So plow in and hope the other guy suffers more mistakes than you.
@@davidrendall2461 good post
My only problem with all of this question is that there is now overwhelming evidence that Gavin didn't decide not to go for the Nijmegen bridge. The evidence supports his own claim he instructed Colonel Lindquist of the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment to send his 1st Battalion directly to the bridge immediately after landing, and Lindquist failed to interpret the instruction properly.
1) In chronological order, the first piece of evidence is Gavin's 17 July 1945 letter to US Army Historical Officer Captain Westover:
"About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping up well, I personally directed Colonel Lindquist, commanding the 508th Parachute Infantry, to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen bridge without delay after landing, but to keep a very close watch on it in the event he needed it to protect himself against the Reichswald. So I personally directed him to commit his first battalion to this task. He was cautioned to send the battalion via the flat ground east of the city." (p.11, Lost at Nijmegen, RG Poulussen, 2011)
2) The second is Cornelius Ryan's 20 January 1967 interview with Gavin for his book A Bridge Too Far:
Gavin and Lindquist had been together in Sicily and Normandy and neither Gavin nor Ridgway, the old commander of the 82nd, trusted him in a fight.
He did not have a “killer instinct.” In Gavin’s words, “He wouldn’t go for the juggler [jugular].” As an administrative officer he was excellent; his troopers were sharp and snappy and, according to Gavin, “Made great palace guards after the war.”
Gavin confirms he ordered Lindquist to commit a battalion to the capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the jump. He also confirms he told Lindquist not to go to the bridge by way of the town but to approach it along some mud flats to the east.
We discussed also objectives. Gavin’s main objectives were the heights at Groesbeek and the Grave bridge; he expected and intelligence confirmed “a helluva reaction from the Reichswald area.” Therefore he had to control the Groesbeek heights. The Grave bridge was essential to the link up with the British 2nd Army. He had three days to capture the Nijmegen bridge and, although he was concerned about it, he felt certain he could get it within three days.
The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized. (James Maurice Gavin, Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University)
3) The third is the first of two books using first hand witness accounts published in 2012, the year after Dutch researcher RG Poulussen first drew my attention to the issue, and this is American historian John C McManus' September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far (2012), chapter 3:
As Gavin finished his briefing, the British General [Browning] cautioned him: “Although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen bridges, it is essential that you capture the Groesbeek ridge and hold it.”
General Browning’s order, of course, made perfect sense. It was of paramount importance to hold the high ground. Any commander worth his salt understood that. Even so, the purpose of Market Garden was to seize the bridges in order to speedily unleash a major armored thrust into northern Germany, toward Berlin. High ground notwithstanding, the only way for the Allies to accomplish this ambitious objective was to take the bridges, and these were, after all, perishable assets, because the Germans could destroy them (and might well be likely to do so the longer it took the Allies to take the bridges). By contrast, the Groesbeek ridge spur wasn’t going anywhere. If the 82nd had trouble holding it, and German artillery or counterattacks became a problem, the Allies could always employ air strikes and artillery of their own to parry such enemy harassment. Also, ground troops from Dempsey’s Second Army could join with the paratroopers to retake Groesbeek from the Germans. So, in other words, given the unpleasant choice between the bridges and the hills, the bridges had to come first.
General Gavin did have some appreciation of this. At an earlier meeting with his regimental commanders, he [Gavin] had told Colonel Roy Lindquist of the 508th Parachute Infantry that even though his primary mission was to hold the high ground at Berg en Dal near Groesbeek, he was also to send his 1st Battalion into Nijmegen to take the key road bridge. Gavin told Lindquist to push for the bridge via "the flatland to the east of the city and approach it over the farms without going through the built-up area." Gavin considered this so important that he stood with Lindquist over a map and showed him this route of advance.
At the same time, Colonel Lindquist had trouble reconciling Gavin's priorities for the two ambitious objectives of holding Berg en Dal and grabbing the bridge. He believed that Gavin wanted him to push for the bridge only when he had secured the critical glider landing zones and other high ground. According to Lindquist, his impression was that "we must first accomplish our main mission before sending any sizeable force to the bridge." Actually, General Gavin wanted the 508th to do both at the same time, but somehow this did not sink into the 508th's leadership. "If General Gavin wanted Col Lindquist to send a battalion for the bridge immediately after the drop, he certainly did not make that clear to him," Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Shanley, the executive officer of the 508th, later wrote.
Perhaps this was a miscommunication on Gavin's part, probably not. Lieutenant Colonel Norton, the G-3, was present for the conversation (Shanley was not) and recorded Gavin's clear instructions to Lindquist: "Seize the high ground in the vicinity of Berg en Dal as his primary mission and ... attempt to seize the Nijmegen bridge with a small force, not to exceed a battalion."
4) The fourth is 82nd Airborne historian Phil Nordyke's Put Us Down In Hell - The Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2 (2012), chapter 9:
Captain Chet Graham was assigned as the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters. "I sat in on a high level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation."
... and in chapter 10:
Captain Chet Graham, the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters, decided to obtain a status of the progress toward the capture of the Nijmegen highway bridge. "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' "
5) In addition, by the time Gavin's intervention finally got the 1st Battalion moving at 8 pm, it was the same time that Gräbner's SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 (attached to 10.SS-Panzer) arrived at the Nijmegen bridge, followed by SS-Sturmbannführer Leo-Hermann Reinhold (II./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10) and his adjutant SS-Untersturmführer Gernot Traupel in a car - probably the last German vehicle and the only one of 10.SS-Panzer-Division to get to Nijmegen via the Arnhem bridge, before Frost started stopping traffic at 9 pm.
An account of the Nijmegen defence from the German point of view based on Traupel's diary is in Retake Arnhem Bridge - An Illustrated History of the Kampfgruppe Knaust September to October 1944 by Bob Gerritsen and Scott Revell (2014) Chapter 4. Contrary to the Hollywood film, it was Traupel who ordered the Nijmegen bridge blown on his own initiative, because Reinhold was not at the command post when British tanks crossed over, and division commander Harmel was constantly shuttling back and forth between Arnrhem and Nijmegen in a Volkswagen and was not there either.
I'm late to this. I didn't take your argument as some jingoistic slant. But I would point out that in your original documentary that you did make what could be considered a personal attack on Gavin's character. You highlighted his comment about not firing officers who lose one battle as some sort of inference by him to assuage Gavin's guilt.
As to the battle itself, I found the conclusion that the plan wasn't bad and that it was "lost" at Nijmegen as overly simplistic. The plan relied on the capture of multiple bridges with an attack on a narrow front with seven days planning. There were no sand table scenarios, no real walk throughs that were and are part and parcel of any complex military operation. Of course, any delay in an enforced timetable would hamper success.
Lastly, you had to know that the perception of bias would be raised. Market-Garden was too complex to be distilled into a single error or decision. Montgomery put 3 divisions of light troops into an armored cauldron. He took a risk, and he failed. Trying to find a single person or event in a plan this rigid on timetable and with so many moving parts tends to offer itself up to questions about bias.
I enjoyed your documentary. As I stated at the beginning, I don't think you were being biased. I look forward to further content from you.
Okay, ignoring the jingoistic rubbish, which as you point out takes us nowhere, why did Market Garden fail? In the film "A Bridge Too Far" Browning mentions that "It took six months to organise the D-day drop. And that was only half as big as this." I think that that one comment gives the real reason for the failure. The whole operation was planned in seven days. Decisions made on day one were set in stone because to change them on day six would have led to the operation being scrubbed.
For example, the Poles on day three were to drop into terrain unsuitable for a British drop on day one. We're the Poles superman who could drop in places that the British couldn't? If so why not drop the Poles on day one instead of the British? Of course the Poles weren't supermen. It was just a mistake caused by rushed planning.
Again with the Nijmegen drop. Gavin was told that there were Germans in the Reichswald. He said at the time that he needed two divisions to do his job properly. He had to choose to either take the Grosbeek Heights or to take Nijmegen. He didn't have the men to do both. This was a day one decision that once taken had to be set in stone.
Personally I think that you are right. Market Garden failed because of Gavin making an incorrect decision. But I can't wholly blame Gavin. Historians often say "Why didn't X do Y?", "This information was known so why do that?", "Why not do Z because W was doing this?". What historians often forget is that they might study a battle for years, yet the participants whom they criticise may have only been involved for a matter of hours. I'm a distinctly amateur historian, yet I know more about Operation Market Garden that any of the participants did on 26th September 1944. Is it fair to judge them based on 20/20 hindsight?
Dean Stuart Were there intelligence reports on German forces in the Reichswald? All I’ve ever heard was that it was Browning/Gavin’s “opinion”.
This alway struck me as odd given that Browning ignore Maj. Brian Urquhart’s intel on the SS Panzer divisions.
(I’ve only read a few online things, none of which clarified this for me)
The other thing I’m not yet clear on is Gavin’s orders to Lindquist that the 508th should “move without delay” to take the bridge but did not do so between assembling at 3pm after their drop, and 6pm when Gavin asked. (According to Wikipedia). I might have missed this in TIK’s original, excellent, video, but I don’t remember it.
My two-cents on this video: I thought it was very good. There’s no place for any more national pride in writing history. There is already more than enough in the history books that we have to try to avoid.
Market was based on former operations, all repeatedly cancelled, some at the very last moment, because of the speed of the allies' advance through France and Belgium. I read that paratroopers were eager to go in action (especially the 1st ABD, since they didn't have see action during D-Day, let's say since North Africa and Sicily) . Urquhart was an infantry commander, maybe poorly aware of specifics about "paratropeers warfare" and requirements.
As for the Polish Independent Para Brigade, it's landing zones (on the third day) were supposed to have been cleared by the 1st ABD, and most important, the Deelen airfield AA positions (and those around), dealt with.
IMHO, itsn't the seven days short time that poised the entire plan, but :
- The decision for ONE flight/drop a day for the transports
- Browning "stealing" more needed elsewhere Dakotas and Horsas for his own HQ transportation
- The absence of fighter-bomber support to make the area between Arnhem and Nijmegen a forbidden zone for german armour
- Of course the distance between the landing zones and the Arnhem road bridge for the 1st ABD
- The One WAY road for the XXX corps
And in the course of events :
- the radio problems of the 1st ABD (to be linked with the former cancelled drops, I read somewhere that those problems came not from the terrain features but from the lack of consistency in the maintainance of these radios)
- the failure of the recce jeeps to get to the bridge at Arnhem
- the germans finding the overall plans of Market-Garden on the late body of an (american) officer...
About Gavin, wasn't Browning with him ? He could have pressd him on the taking of the Nijmegen bridge, as his superior officer, I guess.
Beside that, your comment sounds sound to me ;)
Would not the bridge have been blown at Nijmegen if wired correctly, without an initial drop coup de main?
TIK, I'm sincerely surprised someone felt you were biased. I'm very sensitive to bias as it's all around us especially on RUclips. I have watched several of your videos and have only seen criticism towards action and decisions made during the time of the battle based upon your research not on your nationality. Please keep it up. It's refreshing and informative...and friggin' fun to watch! Cheers mate.
So Gavin's decision (if he made it, and wasn't ordered to) to defend the Groosebeck heights with too many troops was the problem, but landing 8 miles from Arnhem bridge, when there WERE alternatives to that, wasn't an issue? Why not just drop closer to the bridge and on the south side and take both ends, then attack OUT of those areas to seize landing zones for followup gliders and supplies? Much easier and more varied choices than an attack to the bridge.
The person responsible for the failure was Brereton. He was in charge of the 1st Allied Airborne Army and the buck stops with him. It was he who signed off the plan with explicit instructions to capture the bridges with 'thunderclap surprise'. So why did he allow Browning and Gavin to relegate the Nijmegen to the lowest priority ?
TIK has RG Poulussen's Lost At Nijmegen (2011), but to drill down on Gavin's decision he needs to investigate 82nd Airborne historian Phil Nordyke's combat history of the 508th PIR in WW2 - Put Us Down In Hell (2012), and also John C McManus' September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far (2012).
Gavin's decision not to prioritise the Nijmegen highway bridge over the Groesbeek heights was a post-war decision after things had gone wrong on the operation, and he wanted to take responsibility for the error instead of throwing one of his regimental commanders under the bus. These authors quote eye witnesses at the divisional briefing held before the operation in which Gavin instructed 508th Regiment commander Colonel Roy Lindquist to go for the bridge as soon as possible after landing.
Nordyke's witness was Captain Chester 'Chet' Graham, the CO of the 508th PIR's HQ Company and the regiment's Liaison Officer to Division HQ. McManus' witness was Lieutenant Colonel Jack Norton, the Division G-3 (Operations Officer).
According to Nordyke, chapter 9:
Captain Chet Graham was assigned as the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters. "I sat in on a high level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation."
In McManus, chapter 3:
At an earlier meeting with his regimental commanders, he [Gavin] had told Colonel Roy Lindquist of the 508th Parachute Infantry that even though his primary mission was to hold the high ground at Berg en Dal near Groesbeek, he was also to send his 1st Battalion into Nijmegen to take the key road bridge. Gavin told Lindquist to push for the bridge via "the flatland to the east of the city and approach it over the farms without going through the built-up area." Gavin considered this so important that he stood with Lindquist over a map and showed him this route of advance.
At the same time, Colonel Lindquist had trouble reconciling Gavin's priorities for the two ambitious objectives of holding Berg en Dal and grabbing the bridge. He believed that Gavin wanted him to push for the bridge only when he had secured the critical glider landing zones and other high ground. According to Lindquist, his impression was that "we must first accomplish our main mission before sending any sizeable force to the bridge." Actually, General Gavin wanted the 508th to do both at the same time, but somehow this did not sink into the 508th's leadership. "If General Gavin wanted Col Lindquist to send a battalion for the bridge immediately after the drop, he certainly did not make that clear to him," Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Shanley, the executive officer of the 508th, later wrote.
Perhaps this was a miscommunication on Gavin's part, probably not. Lieutenant Colonel Norton, the G-3, was present for the conversation (Shanley was not) and recorded Gavin's clear instructions to Lindquist: "Seize the high ground in the vicinity of Berg en Dal as his primary mission and ... attempt to seize the Nijmegen bridge with a small force, not to exceed a battalion."
Cont...
Nordyke, Chapter 10 continues on the ground after the drop:
Receiving information from the patrols that no enemy was between them and their objective at De Ploeg, Captain Adams and Company A increased the pace of the advance. “The march to the objective was (almost) uneventful… Everyone started digging in. Everyone had the idea that the rest of the job would be as easy as it had been up to that point. That was somewhat my own impression and I still believe if we had marched straight to the [highway] bridge [in Nijmegen] we would have had it without a fight.”
Lieutenant Colonel Warren’s 1st Battalion arrived at De Ploeg at around 6:30 p.m., about five hours after landing, without encountering any significant resistance. Warren ordered his troopers to dig in and strengthen the roadblock on the Nijmegen-Groesbeek highway to prevent German movement south from Nijmegen. Meanwhile, Captain Ben Delamater, the battalion’s executive officer, got the command post organised. "The regimental commanding officer [Colonel Roy Lindquist], with his radio operator and two Dutch interpreters from the British army soon followed us onto our first objective. The planned defenses were being set up when several civilians wearing arm bands and carrying Underground credentials of some sort told the colonel that the Germans had deserted Nijmegen, that the town and the highway bridge were lightly held. The regimental CO had been instructed that if the initial mission were accomplished to 'go ahead and take the highway bridge if you can.' This division order was perfectly understood in relation to the primary missions and was not a weak, conditional order as might be supposed offhand.”
“The regimental and battalion COs then planned to send one platoon of C Company [led by Lieutenant Bob Weaver], plus the S-2 section, plus two light machine gun squads on a reconnaissance patrol to approach the bridge from the south."
Zig Borough's The 508th Connection (2013), chapter 6: Holland, Operation Market Garden - Nijmegen Bridge -
A battalion S-2 patrol led the way and reached the Nijmegen bridge during the daylight hours. Trooper Joe Atkins, HQ 1st, told that story: "I was called on to take the point going into Nijmegen. As we entered the city, a crowd of people gathered around us, and we had to push our way through. Three of us in the lead became separated from the other troopers behind us by the crowds of Dutch people. We three continued to make our way into the city until we came to the bridge. At the bridge, only a few German soldiers were standing around a small artillery weapon. I had a Thompson sub and a .45 pistol. The other two were armed with M1 rifles. They covered me as I jumped up and yelled, ‘Hände hock’ (‘Hands up!’)
The Germans were so surprised; the six or seven defenders of the bridge gave up without resisting. We held the prisoners at the entrance to the bridge for about an hour. It began to get dark, and none of our other troopers showed up. We decided to pull back away from the bridge, knowing we could not hold off a German attack. The German prisoners asked to come with us, but we refused, having no way to guard them. As we were leaving, we could hear heavy equipment approaching the bridge."
Nordyke, chapter 10 continues:
Captain Chet Graham, the regimental liasion officer with division headquarters, decided to obtain a status of the progress toward the capture of the Nijmegen highway bridge. "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' "
At about 8:00 P.M., Colonel Lindquist ordered Lieutenant Colonel Warren, the commander of the 1st Battalion, to seize the Nijmegen highway bridge. It was an order that Warren wasn’t expecting. “This was the first time the battalion was told it was to secure this bridge. By the time the battalion minus [Company C, one section of 81mm mortars, and one section of machine guns] was assembled from its rather wide defensive positions, it was well after dark.”
“A Dutch Underground worker [Geert van Hees] who had contacted regimental headquarters had stated that the highway bridge over the Waal River was defended by a noncommissioned officer and seventeen men. This Dutch patriot also volunteered to guide the battalion into town.”
- It is clear to me from these accounts that have only come to light after the key players had passed (Chet Graham passed a short time later in 2015) that Gavin (and Browning according to McManus) realised that both the Groesbeek heights and the Nijmegen bridge both needed to be secured, but while the heights were not going anywhere and could be recovered if lost, the bridge was a perishable asset (as McManus puts it) because the Germans could destroy it. It's clear that the confusion over priorites was only confusing at the time to Lindquist, who was not a gifted combat officer in Nordyke's earlier chapters on Normandy, and Gavin himself sought to muddy the waters after the war in order to take on the responsibility himself rather than throw a subordinate under the historical bus.
It also explains why Gavin insisted that his own troopers of the 504th PIR undertake the assault river crossing, when the default contingency plan for the Nijmegen bridges being strongly held by the enemy was an assault crossing to be made by the British 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division, with either one or two Brigades up (according to John Sliz in Special Bridging Force - Engineers Under XXX Corps During Operation Market Garden, 2021).
Cornelius Ryan failed to pick up on this, or didn't include it in his book, so A Bridge Too Far (1974) established the conventional narrative after both Montgomery and Browning had passed, and has persisted until the more recent researches carried out about 10-12 years ago has filled in the missing story of the 508th and the failure at Nijmegen.
As a High School History teacher I loved this video. I try and get this point across to students all the time. History is not static, it's dynamic and fluid. Every generation interprets and reinterprets events from the past through a new lens. This is evident when studying the historiography of an event. Nearly all assessment in senior history classes is based on discussion of the past. Students need to argue their case using evidence and justify their arguments with facts and evidence from a variety of sources. Great video TIK, keep up the awesome work, ill be showing this to my senior students. Nationalism and Political hijackings of History is nothing new, but through scholarship these misrepresentations can be exposed for what they are. Bakes
Feel free to show them! I hope they find it useful :) knowing what happened is only half the battle, with the historiography being the juicy other half. It's all about being able to think critically, scrutinizing every written word and presenting arguments. But I don't think you can't do any of that unless you can take a step back and look at a topic from as politically neutral a viewpoint as possible.
remember to tell your students to all ways capture the main objective above all else. and don't ever fly in your HQ in the first wave and waste precious space on useless non combat power.
never fly in on the first wave with the plans of the whole operation
History is not fluid. the entire problem with high school history teachers is exemplified by your statement. It started by the college professors teaching you that. History is etched in stone. We may uncover more of the stone, but it's there. We should not view history with today's eyes and today's societal views. What we see as "wrong" today likely was "normal" and "right" at the time. A decision made in June of 1944 is only "dumb" in hindsight. At the time it was the best decision that could be made by the guy there at the time.
Perhaps you have the moral fortitude and courage to explain the holocaust then, maybe split the tattooed skin/human soap from the vile systematic deaths? The world has had enough demonization, fictionalization and sadly dishonest fraud . Over to you, teacher of our future.... Dave
There are a thousand different reasons Market Garden failed. The plan was badly flawed. 1st Division was dropped too far from Arnhem bridge. It's objectives included the Arnhem rail and road bridges, the high ground and future supply zone north of Arnhem, all while half the strength of the division had to spread out for miles west of Arnhem to guard the drop zones for the day-two drops. Even if the SS panzer divisions had not been there, it would have difficult for 1st Division to succeed. If the bridges were the key to the whole operation, they should have been targeted by glider assaults like the one at Pegasus bridge on D-Day, quickly reinforced by paratroopers landing as near as possible. If the Arnhem bridges had been seized quickly, the SS troops that historically drove south to secure the Nijmegen bridge would have been blocked, perhaps allowing th 82nd Division to capture Nijmegen. Even if the Nijmegen bridge had been captured by the time 30th Corp arrived, the British still would have to fight their way north to Arnhem on a single elevated road surrounded by open countryside. The pocket held by Frost at the north end of the Arnhem road bridge was so small, held by the battered remnants of 2nd Battalion and a few other troops, that it would hardly have made a suitable 'beachhead' across the Rhine. By day four of the battle, likely the earliest 30th Corp might have made it to Arnhem if Nijmegen had been captured on day one, the Germans had already amassed considerable forces in the area and more were on the way from nearby Germany. Where would the British get the forces to feed across the Arnhem bridge and fight their way forward. At best they would have gained a small precariously held bridgehead over the Rhine, which would have been of great benefit in the spring. This is the basic scenario in one of the 'alternative history' books(can't think of which one at the moment) edited by Paul Tsonga.
Facts are facts. Opinions and interpretations that are not based on facts are just beliefs. In my opinion the Market Garden Operation was doomed from the beginning due to poor communications and poor planning and unbridled optimism. Of course I never cared much for Monty or Churchill. If I have the advantage of knowing what cards the opponent is holding and I have numerical/demographic superiority and I have productive/material and logistical superiority then winning is a no brainer and attrition will be winning in time. Couple all that with the fact that some of the Nazis failed to heed Sun Tzu's and Clausewitz's advice and WW II was lost from the get go but in Market Garden ol' Monty showed us how to lose by not following Sun Tzu's advice. Thanks for the post. Always educational.
tiny correction: NederRijn means Lower Rhine, like Nederland translates to the Low Countries
His argument is valid but, the motorized unit of Graebner had crossed the bridge and only came back because 10th SS Panzer had things under control in Nijmegen, so it is safe to say that if the Allies take the Nijmegen bridge, it would be quickly counter attacked by 10th SS Panzer and Graebner, I believe that the north side would fall, if not both sides of the bridge. To me, even if the germans don't have time to fortify the newly acquired bridge on the counter attack, the delay would be enough to kill any chances to get to Arnhem.
Maybe there is a chance, if all forces of the 1st battalion had actually got to Arnhem bridge, but I am not confident about that argument, seeing that most of the forces of the Germans were in Arnhem, to me Frost held because the main force of the British were being held in another flank, if the Germans had to use all their firepower solely on the bridge, the defense would fall.
Greetings from Brazil!!!! Brazil actually fought in the war :D "A cobra vai fumar"
exactly! Another good brain in this debate vs the likes of TIK and John Burns.
And that comes all the way from Brazil !
I see your point . Yes t German forces were scattered due to having to contend w t scattered Brit forces in Arnham.
But still Frost's relatively small Brit force took t (north end of) bridge by surprise and held against t superior forces attacking it for quite a long time. So I am lead to think that Gavin's much greater force could have done t same if they had taken their bridge quickly enuf, befor t Germans reinforced it.
The final nail in the Market Garden coffin was the failure to take the Waal bridge at Nijmegen BUT, the ultimate reason was the Allies underestimated the fight remaining in the Germans. Lets face it, would any rational commander undertake such a risky venture unless he thought they were just going to blow through some weak units with poor morale? I’m not convinced 30 corps could have crossed into Arnhem even if they had been able to link up with the feeble remnants of Frost’s command.
Given that Frost's men were at the Northern end of Arnhem Bridge, XXX Corps most certainly would have crossed into Arnhem, but for the issue of not having a bridge over the Waal to actually cross to get to them......
Sean O'Sullivan I should have phrased that better. They would not have been able to exploit any link with Frost. Frost may have held the north end of the bridge, but only in terms of a front measured in yards, and the entire bridge could have been swept by German fire. The plan was a poor one at best and no amount of Hollywood movies are going to change that.
@@briancoleman971 we can certainly agree about the last bit (Hollywood!). However, given that 10th SS were nowhere near at full strength and nor were the 9th, I can't see that a fully committed 82nd wouldn't have been able to give the Germans a hiding. The German units would have been cut off between the two paratroop units. There was nothing of note in Arnhem to have inflicted any significant damage on Frost's men (and wouldn't be until day 3) and the 10th didn't have any tanks and nor did 9th SS recon (Graebner's unit, which is the one that Frost's men smashed back at Arnhem Bridge when they returned from Nijmegen).
Sean O'Sullivan Yeah I am not sure about the dates but there are plenty of photos of surrendering Brit paratroopers alongside Stug IIIs in Arnhem, which were capable of handling any Brit tanks that tried to cross. Of course if they were not there yet I suppose XXX corps could have crossed. I have not taken a serious look at this battle in over a year so no up on the timelines.
@@briancoleman971 most of those photos of the captured 1AB near the Stugs are valid but were mostly kept away from the bridge. The tanks that turned the tide of battle were all brought in on D+2
When someone does a 30 minute long video as a rebuttal to internet comments, you know it's a quality presenter.
I think it was the delay in regards to Sosobowski and his men with the weather and all that on commencement. But it was no way Sosobowski's fault. If they were dropped around Elst very shortly after British First Airborne you could force these Panzer divisions to choose between Wolfheze and Elst diluting their strength in addition to blocking the way to the Nijmegen Bridge. People always conjure up images of tanks when it comes to Panzer Divisions dismissing the shutzen and panzer grenadier regiments that are just basically fancy words for infantry even before getting to the pioneer battalions, recce battalions, nebelwefer battalions and in addition to these the anti-aircraft battalions that are sometimes attached to them. This almost full circle of roads surrounding Elst ironically marks a suggested drop zone.
And all along there was me thinking that Sosobowski and the Poles were at fault !!! (I'm certain I read that somewhere ?).
I think we can agree that it was not the fault of the Polish Airborne. Nijmegen is key.
9:00 personally I think it wouldn't be too much of a problem for XXX Corps since the 9th SS would have to split its forces to combat Frost's battalion and since there would be no urban combat for XXX Corps to deal with in Nijmagen they could concentrate their full force against the 9th. XXX Corps probably wouldn't have gotten to Arnhem on the 19th but I believe they would've on the 20th and relieved Frost.
There is also 10th SS Panzer Division which was sent to Nijmegen on the 17th.
@@johnlucas8479 had the 82nd taken their primary objective, being Nijmegen Bridge, then 10th SS would have been stuck between Frost's men & 82nd AB until XXX arrived. Given what Frost's men did to 9th SS Panzer recon (Graebner's team), it's reasonable to assume that the 82nd would have been able to cause mayhem to 10th SS Panzer, too - remembering that neither 9th nor 10th SS Panzer were at anything better than 30% strength and 10th didn't have any tanks of their own. The ONLY unit that was close to full strength was the one that Frost's men smashed.
@@sean640307 If the 82nd had captured the bridge on the 17th. Yes the 10th was between the 82nd and Frost at Arnhem, question would the 10th attempt to recapture the bridge or simplify set up defensive position on the island and that would have had all of the 18th and morning of the 19th. Also the terrain between Nijmegen and Arnhem was impossible tank country , complete flat, crisis-crossed by a grid-iron of waterways and densely planted with fruit orchards that obstructed vision. Historically when XXX Corp start north on the 21st they were stop at Ressen by A/Tank guns almost immediately, and did not reach Village of Elst until 23rd. They also did not link up with the Poles at Driel until the evening of the 22nd at 1950.
@@johnlucas8479 of course you raise a very interesting question. We'll never know, but what we do know for certain is that if the 82nd had taken the bridge, then an under-strength 10th would be trapped and would have to do one of either of those options. Had they returned to Arnhem, then they would have met the same ferocity as 9th SS recon, and possibly the same fate. If they had attempted to push through 82nd assuming that there were more than the 2 companies initially dispatched, of course, then the same country that is supposed to have impeded XXX Corps would have had the same effect on 10th SS and THEY would have been stuck on the road with little cover. This would have made them sitting ducks for the heavy guns of XXX Corps which ended up shelling the Germans in Oosterbeck. People seem to forget that neither 9th nor 10th SS were at anything like full strength and 10th had no tanks, but did have SPGs. A trackless SPG becomes a sitting duck AND stops anything getting past it easily so all it would have taken is a couple of well placed bazooka teams and it's Villers Bocage in reverse
@@sean640307 The only German Unit that reach Nijmegen via the Arnhem Bridge was the 9SS Recon Bn at cross at 1800. The rest of the 10th SS Reach Nijmegen by cross the ferry at Pannerden. Unlike Frost at Arnhem the 82nd at the Bridge would not have any A/Tank Guns. You are assuming that 10th would have attempted to cross the Nijmegen Bridge. With the Bridge in 82nd hands the logical decision for 10th would be to dig in north of the bridge which they did historically after loss the bridge on the 20th. If you are saying that 10th would have been sitting duck why did XXX Corp fail to reach Arnhem after cross the Nijmegen Bridge on the 21st.
I was thinking, In Nijmegen they basicly had to cope with the same issue as in Arnhem . They had to hold the dropzones for future drops and take their key objectives, the bridges on the first day. This means that Urquhart or Gavin had to hold back at least one bataljon back to do this. This meant that the already weakened division, due to the fact that could not land in one go are even more depleted in their available combatpower, making it more difficult to capture the bridges on the first day. The fact that the dropzones had to be defended longer than anticipated even worsened this problemIn NIjmegen this lead Gavin to decide not to attack the bridge on day one. In Arnhem this lead to division that was practicly overstreched.
What I don't understand is that the attack had to be made so soon. They could easily take some more time prepare it and easy out the kinks in the plan or in equipment, for example that the radio's were used to communicate across distances far outstretching the recommmended maximum operating distance the could reliable operate on. Something that in my opinion would have been totally preventable with proper rehearsal.
Within the allied strategic situation waiting a few weeks would not have been a problem. They were reaching the maximum of their supply lines and could not advance any further. The biggest thing that could happen is that the 15th German army would leave Zeeland and negate the use for operation Market Garden. They probably wouldn't have done that because that would mean the would hand the Allies operational use of Antwerp on a silver platter.
It was known that the German defences were getting stronger each day. Also, weather was critical for airborne operations - the longer the delay, the worse the weather would get.
The reason I love TIK's documentaries is he uses facts and solid sources to explain events. He leaves emotions out of it. I find no fault with the original Market Garden documentary, and having read the sources TIK used, his presentation is spot on. Highly recommend "It Never Snows in September" by Robert Kershaw (one of TIK's recommendations) as it is a real eye opener to how the battle unfolded through the German view.
The key to the entire operation was the capture of all the bridges. The Allies knew this at Normandy, and they knew this in Market Garden. It was very unfortunate it wasn't done at Nijmegan. Regardless of who was in command, it was a bad decision to change the orders and not take the bridge.
About the name Poulussen. It's dutch and its pronounced like Paulus (the german general) but with -en.
ou and au sound the same in dutch.
I will always question the Air Forces decision not support the ground troops fully. Typhoons would have made mincemeat outta the panzers.
1st Airborne did most of its fighting in woods and towns - not ideal for close air support. Also, the weather was very poor - fog, fain and low cloud. Air support was available for 30 Corps though, and there were enough Allied planes that the Germans resorted to troop movements at night to as to cut down on the air attacks they were suffering.
Very interesting but in analyzing Market Garden you need to take into account the nationalities and the personalities of the commanders involved and to delve into why this was given the go ahead by Eisenhower in the first place.
In my opinion it was doomed from the start because it relied on a narrow two lane road that was could be and was easily blocked for hours at a time and could not handle the required traffic
For example when the British tanks got to Nijmegen and crossed the bridge they had to pause while the infantry was brought up on the heavily congested road
In reality the USA was calling the shots and Eisenhower more of a diplomat and politician than a General had to manage the perception that it was an allied effort with Britain being a equal partner which it wasn't while the higher echelons (Churchill, Montgomery etc) knew it wasn't
One thing Eisenhower did to manage the perception was to have the commanders immediately below him to be all British with Montgomery initially nominally Commander of ground forces in Europe but this had proved unworkable and Montgomery had been relieved with Eisenhower himself taking on the role, right before Market Garden -
Churchill and Montgomery's noses were out of joint over this - there is a PHD thesis in exploring the ramifications of this change and the disaster of Market Garden that followed
Can't do it justice in this forum but can point you to what to explore next but issues of National pride and personality played a big part
As in any military operation, and even at the lowest levels...by definition, failure at any level, "technically" belongs in the hands at the top. This is throughout history, whether it is justified or not. A simple example, if a lieutenant loses a firefight, which loses a battle, which loses a campaign, which loses a war...technically...the buck stops at the top. Because, that lieutenant was led by a colonel, that was led by a general, that was led by a field commander...etc/etc/etc. Eventually, who chose the failed field commander....I know it's not necessarily fair, but it is what it is.
Anybody who wants to read a truly professional historian's summary of why Market-Garden failed should buy Martin Middlebrook's really excellent book "Arnhem 1944". Middlebrook's book is the last of a brilliantly researched series of books on WW2, all highly recommendable. He names every important factor leading up to the defeat bar one - that the Germans won a brilliant victory by showing Initiative and flexibility, i.e. such characteristics that were definitely not found to great extent in British generals.
So basically the REICHSWALD with it's 1000 PANZERS won the Battle hahahahaa
Eemci just won the youtube comment of the year. :D
Market Garden failed because of poor Intel or the criminally decision to ignore the intel with 2 Pz Div situated in the area.
Some of your conclusions make sense but others ignore basic tactical principals.1. You fail to address the decision to ignore intel that said that heavy armor was present. You cannot simply ignore intel. They have been teaching officers in most armies in the world that intel is the greatest weapon long before WWII.2. You also ignore that there was no backup plan for the British airborne if something went wrong. Everything had to go exactly right and it, as we know, didn't.It doesn't matter what part of the plan failed. Was matters is that it did fail because the only plan, if a bridge wasn't taken dealt with taking it intact. Yea they had bridging equipment to cover a blown bridge. They had collapsible boats. But they didn't have a plan if ANYONE of the units failed to at least establish a bridgehead. It was Monty's plan. He was the overall commander. All of these things were directly his responsibility.Yes you can say that the plan collapsed because the 82nd failed to take the Nijmegen bridge. But from a tactical point attacking on a very narrow front is always ill advised. Many problems have to be addressed especially if there are obstacles like rivers. River crossings are never easy. Trying to capture bridges can be very iffy at best. The plan was overly optimistic. Had it worked they still would have had the issue of the Germans cutting the line with a counterattack. Everything hinged on crossing those bridges in a timely manner. Gavin's actions would lead me to believe that he was overly worried about a counter attack. One thing a senior commander has to do is convince junior commanders that the plan is sound. Looks like Gavin wasn't convinced. Brown too is a fault for not forcing the issue. That failure on his part leads to the conclusion that he wasn't convinced the plan was sound or was too weak to stand up to Gavin. Perhaps worried that if the plan failed that the responsibility of that failure would be laid on his shoulders? Monty, Brown and Gavin were all in "cover your ass" mode after the plan failed trying to make sure that they didn't take the blame. So no one is going to uncover the whole story.
1. I agree, and Browning has his part to play in that, although so do others. Frost says in his memoirs that if he'd been told there was going to be armour, they could have swapped some of their mortar rounds for extra PIAT ammunition, but nobody told them. Browning is a very tempting target for blame for this and for the failure of the whole operation, especially since he had a part to play in the 82nd area with the whole - let's not go to the Nijmegen road bridge thing.
2. Agreed. Perhaps Gavin wasn't convinced. The fact that they took all the southern bridges (the closest to XXX Corps and relief), took artillery to pound the Reichswald (instead of say extra infantry units to take the last bridge) and then didn't send anyone towards the Nijmegen bridge until they were certain there wasn't going to be any counter attacks, speaks volumes in itself. Probably Browning had his part to play in that too.
There is a definite "cover your arse" zone going on, which I fully understand. However, I do wish one or more of them had come out after the war at some point and said "ok, this is what really happened" and told the truth. The truth is there somewhere in the facts. But it's been left down to us to figure out what the reasoning was because these three Generals especially didn't want a stain their reputation.
+oldtanker2
_Some of your conclusions make sense but others ignore basic tactical principals.1. You fail to address the decision to ignore intel that said that heavy armor was present._
*There was no proof heavy armour was present*. None was there in the Arnhem, area. Read on...
_"the composition of the German forces at Arnhem was far more complex than most published histories of Market Garden had tended to suggest. The two SS panzer divisions had been operating far below their full strength on the eve of the operation and, while 1st Airborne was ultimately confronted by armour in considerable strength, _*_hardly any tanks were actually present in the Arnhem area on 17 September. The vast majority deployed from Germany or other battle fronts after the airborne landings_*_"_
- ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the Royal Air Force
Some low level pictures of a few Panzer IIIs and IVs were taken in early September for operation Comet. Ryan on speaking to Urquhart got it wrong.
_"Urquhart’s account is therefore somewhat perplexing. Further problems arise if we seek to document the events he described. Several extensive searches for the photographs have failed to locate them. Ostensibly, this might not seem surprising, as most tactical reconnaissance material was destroyed after the war, but Urquhart insisted that the Arnhem sortie was flown by a Spitfire squadron based at Benson; this would almost certainly mean 541 Squadron. Far more imagery from the Benson squadrons survived within the UK archives, _*_but no oblique photographs showing tanks at Arnhem_*_. In addition, although the Benson missions were systematically recorded at squadron and group level, not one record matches the sortie Urquhart described."_
_"The low-level missions targeting the bridges on 6 September were scrupulously noted down, but all other recorded reconnaissance sorties over Arnhem were flown at higher altitudes and captured vertical imagery. _*_Equally, it has proved impossible as yet to locate an interpretation report derived from a low-level mission that photographed German armour near Arnhem before Market Garden_*_."_
_"As for Brian Urquhart’s famous account of how a low-level Spitfire sortie took photographs of tanks assumed to belong to II SS Panzer Corps, the reality was rather different. In all probability, the low-level mission that Urquhart recalled photographed the bridges and not the tanks"_
- ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the Royal Air Force
+oldtanker2
The British paras at Arnhem did have the Poles coming in later. *They also took their prime objective - the bridge.* They were not the reason for failure - that is obvious.
The overall commander was Eisenhower. Market Garden was a _strategic plan_ that evolved. From drops on the the Scheldt, to Comet then MG. Montgomery had no involvement in the planning of the operation - none. He left that to the others having confidence in them. The First Airborne Army was _heavily_ involved in the planning.
Attacking on a very narrow front is not always ill advised. It worked wonderfully for the Germans in 1940.
There is the problem of German counter-attacks all along the front, so taking a part of Holland is not that much different.
Everything did hinge on taking of the bridges in a timely manner - that was the whole idea. A bold plan to leapfrog. It was feasible and high probability of success if all did their jobs professionally.
Gavin's actions? Plain incompetence. His near 2,000 men were assembled and ready to move by 3 pm with only 12 Germans on the bridge. The 508th were sitting around in fields for 2 hours drinking coffee before Gavin found out and directed them to the bridge. By then it was too late. The 10th SS panzer infantry had poured men south over into Nijmegen town. The 508th moved on the bridge and were beaten back. Gavin never bothered to gain information on the location and movements of his men. A basic mistake. He assumed Linquist was moving on the bridge.
There is nothing stated that Gavin did not like the plan.
Burns you polluted rube Alan brooke,Adml Ramsey,Air marshall Tedder all pointed at Monty.Along with IKE they insisted Antwerp be open,logistically that makes perfect sense so We understand why you don't get it.Guards Armor didn't get to Nijmegan on time then they would wait for 43rd Wessex.Shitty plan by a small minded man
It's a very hard lesson indeed to accept that every knowledge except for dogma, which does not admit rational opposition, is fallible. Much of the difficulty of trying not to see things as black and white, once and for all certainties arises from the fact that thinking requires immense sums of energy, therefore, it's inanely tiresome. The other element that makes it difficult is the intense feeling of insecurity that revisions may cause, which can be really overwhelming to many. Then we have the case of identity definition. If I associate my identity too closely to a belief, changing it is equaled to the threat of losing it, and this in turn can be perceived as death threat, even if only psychologically so. Then comes the requirements of fame, making money that can be at risk if one's propositions are proved incorrect etc. Lots of deeply rooted things at play...
It would be interesting to test his theory about 30 corps fighting the 10th over the Nijmegen bridge (and still not making it to Arnhem) rather than before and through the town which to my understanding is much harder than in “relatively” more open terrain.
Yes it would take some speculation but it might be worth a short video.
As to his other comments. I’ve not seen anyone who tries as hard as you to assess historical events as fairly as possible given the variety of sources you use.
It is a billion times easier to cross a bridge when you have both sides.
I would advise not getting bogged down with publicly debating people of no reputation.
Concentration on tactical issues lead often to overlook the grander scale. The whole point of Arnhem was the idea that they could quickly exploit the bridgehead to invade Germany. I think it was not the right timescale. Arnhem was not the only autumn offensive of the western allies that went poorly and far behind the goals; it was the same with the taking of the Scheldt estuary, the battles for Huertgen forest and Alsatia, and even in Italy they did not manage to really exploit the breakthrough of the Gustav line. So, hypothetically, if they had taken Arnhem and the Rhine bridge: 1. Still overextended lines. 2. Antwerp as the major port in this area would have been still not open for shipping because the germans held the Scheldt estuary. 3. Ardennes offensive, which kind of played in the hands of the Allies, would likely not have happened. German reserves would have been used against Arnhem bridgehead. 4. It was kind of late in the year for the major scale offensive the Allies hoped to start off with Arnhem. One of the 2 US armies nearby had to be shifted around which would take some time. The area north and northeast of Arnhem was not the worst for the German defenders with its many rivers and other waterways. I believe even with succesful Arnhem the war would not have been that much shorter. It probably would have helped many of the Dutch people, though, who suffered a huge famine in the last war winter.
Honestly, looking at the strategic picture, it makes a lot more sense to go for the Scheldt estuary, because without logistics your armies can't march forwards. I do think Market Garden shouldn't have aimed at crossing the bridges of the Rhine, but instead should have concentrated on securing Allied logistics.
One thing I would point out though is that people often say that Market Garden was "a rotten plan, poorly executed", which is what I disputed in the documentary. The tactical plan could have worked in my humble opinion. But yes, strategically there were other objectives that should have been prioritized.
Monty wanted three Channel ports for all supply to all allied armies. Antwerp was 35 miles up a narrow, winding, dredged river. One or two ships sunk by German planes will block the port. Antwerp was last on the list. Ostend was secured with half the port destroyed. Bolougne was secured with destroyed port, and operational at the same time as Antwerp. The Canadians, Poles and Czechs tried to take Dunkirk but failed leaving the port in German hands until surrender. Montgomery knew the Germans had destroyed the port of Dunkirk.
The failure to get three Channel ports operational quickly meant focus had to be shifted be on unfavourable Antwerp and clearing all the river approaches - The Scheldt.
Burns you pathetic lump,now Dunkirk is the fault of the Canadians,Czechs and Poles.The very men who covered Monty's retreat as the Burns ample backsides ran up the gang palnks - you make me larf.Then you blather on Bernard didn't plan Monty Garden - you've done enough drugs to send sniffer dogs into early retirement
@@TheImperatorKnight Yes yes, a poor plan could have succeeded if, if nothing went wrong and all dices fall on SIX. The Gamble didn't pay off.
The Allies had air superiority, as proven in Normandy (battering the Wehrmacht). It was a bad decision not to send in the 2nd Tactical Airforce. The lightly armed paratroopers along Hell's Highway, at Nijmegen and at Arnhem needed that air artillery. Only 30the Corps did get that air support south of Valkenswaard on the 17th of September. Market Garden was lost "in the air".
The problem with Market Garden is that its objective, like its direction was obvious and predictable with insufficient movement in its application to take advantage of the initial element of surprise. Concentration, supply and fortification of the holding forces to achieve all of the objectives on day 1 against the occupying forces used against them lacked the vital intelligence and communications necessary to surprise and pin down the enemy to prevent their movement and interdiction in any subsequent battle for those vital objectives. Ground communications to call in air strikes from aircraft patrolling the skies with bombs, rockets and cannon, machine gun strafing was non existent for both Market and Garden operational forces to break up defensive positions and offensive armored formations preventing and intervening with the operational link up required for success.
"It doesn't matter who has the best idea, but what idea is the best." - J. Krishnamurti.
Let me first reiterate what a fine job you did on the documentary. Take heart in the fact that the views of all historians have been disbuted ........... sometimes for completely unexpected reasons. Don't be discouraged. By asking 'why' something occurred we necessarily have to ask 'what if' and this requires each of us to pull out his/her crystal ball. That's what historians are for.
Try your theory and substitute holocaust for Mkt Garden. Best of luck asking even kindergarten level questions....
Gotta say, the idea that a young junior (37) brigadier general would be given serious planning ability affecting the entire general plan, when there was a corps planning staff (Browning) seems doubtful to me.
Could you look into the ground between Nijmegen and Arnhem. The reason I thought the battle was lost before your videos was that the "open ground" there was not not good for British tanks. The ground was not great tank country because the grass has a mud under current which would bog down tanks.
This forced the tanks to remain on raised roads which made them perfect targets for anti tank weapons. Even if all the bridges were taken, the choke point there would have decimated. 30th corps.
This would not necessarily mean bad planning but like in Normandy with bocage the defender will get the advantage of the terrain.
You're correct that the ground was poor and the roads were raised in the area that became known as "the Island". The road going straight to Arnhem from Nijmegen was particularly bad, with the road going west first and then back round through Driel being the easier route overall. If memory serves me correctly, I read that the Dutch military had analysed the area before the war and concluded that the best way to Arnhem was the left route. Could be wrong with that so don't quote me.
However, it's worth bearing in mind that by the time this area became a factor, XXX Corps were already 36 hours behind schedule. Frost's battalion had collapsed, and the Germans were over the Arnhem bridge and forming a blocking line to the south. Realistically at this point the operation was lost, and the only thing left to do was rescue the remnants of 1st Airborne Division.
You are both right. It was terrible terrain for tanks, which is why the Guards Armoured Division advance stalled until 43rd Infantry Division could be bought up to the front line to attack Oosterhaut and then Elst. But by then all momentum had been lost and it became a battle of attrition.
I enjoyed all of you vid on this TIK.... much info was given, I am learning more of what happened in Netherlands because I have a good friend there now.... I am not a historian by any means, but actuating a plan with full knowledge tanks existed, and was failed to plan for... is in itself a HUGE flaw. Many other things, decisions made, affected the outcome of success... failure to take the bridge early at Nijmegen, drop zones.... German response has to receive some credit....
I really have enjoyed your comments and arguments, and those of viewers.... I understand the Patriot thing that happens, all to often it does. Again I will say, to dismiss aerial photo's of German tanks as being nonoperation is quite surprising to me.... given German tanks were far superior in many ways.
I guess my question is, If the German's didn't have tanks in the area, would they still have been able to stop Market Garden??? From all I have seen, I think they wouldn't have been able to keep the Allies from taking the bridges at Nijmegen and Arnhem .... While many decisions influenced the failure of Market Garden once it began, including German response, planning an operation with 2 divisions of panzer tanks in the area is.... at lack of better words, Questionable.
Thanks again for all your work, I did watch the first vid's in their entirety .... War is just sad for everyone that is involved.... Easy to watch and make decisions one way or another when you know all the facts, after the facts... the planners didn't have this..... presenting arguments as you do, is much appreciated :)
The tanks really weren't a big deal. 9SS and 10SS had only a few tanks left and they were not committed to the battle for several days. The Germans bought in several other tank units from further afield but they were quite weak and had mostly older tanks. 1st Airborne was equipped with about a hundred anti-tank guns which were capable of knocking out any German tank which was actually committed to the battle before 24th September, at which point it was pretty much all over.
Highly recommend reading "It Never Snows in September" by Robert Kershaw. It gives the German view of Market Garden. It certainly opens the eyes to the condition of the German units in the area at the time, as well as how the German command responded. It was one of TIK's sources and there was a good reason he used it.
Until what is known what Gavin told Browning, Gavin has to take the blame. In Normandy General Patton asked Bradley if he could go south into Brittany to see if he could seize some port(s). Bradley said OK. Patton took one third of his force. Bradley was shocked at how much of his force his took to wander into open country with no enemy. Bradley assumed Patton would take a small force to peel off from the prime objectives in Normandy. Bradley never asked Patton how many troops he would take.
When Gavin said he was taking a force top Goesbeek did Browning know how many and that he would neglect his prime task?
Browning went for a more important task: pissing on the Reichswaldborder and have a photo taken from that occasion.
(talking about neglecting tasks...tssk)
The problem was delivery - you singled out Gavin, hitting him over and over again for a decision that made sense given the intel he had, making light of his reasons for that decision, and basically accusing him of lying about the XXX Corps timetable all while glossing over the multiple British superiors who accepted that decision. While there may not have been any intentional nationalism on your part, it was hard not to see an anti-American sentiment in that - especially since the 1st Division basically got a pass for making the same choice to defend their drop zones, with only Frost's battalion reaching the Arnhem bridge and never actually controlling it.
Its not just a case of reading. You pour over the details/footnotes/sources, test them again the evidence offered, and then compare the viability of the different arguments and evidence offered. Nothing else will do.
Moot not mute.
With the benifit of hindsight it seems obvious that this plan was doomed to failure. Even without hindsight I think someone in the chain of command should have made some alterations. If it was impossible to land gliders any nearer to Arnhem then they should have settled for a cut down 1st airborne division. Forget the idea of holding the landing zones, just land as much of the division as possible and head straight for the bridges. One para battalion should also have risked dropping just South of Arnhem. Any follow up para drops would have to be made on the island (not suitable for gliders though). Clearly one of the 82nd battalions should have been tasked with taking and holding Nijmegen bridge, this was an unbelievable error which definitely should have been picked up by one of the senior commanders. Generally it's obvious that this plan was rushed through.
Hindsight 20/20? Didn’t Gavin secure his right flank, since they expected the Germans to attack from the hights east of Nijmegen? If he hadn’t taken time to secure the Groesbeek hights, the Germans could have cut them off and thát would have been an even bigger desaster.
Thank you for your totally informative and enlightening presentation. In consideration of comments over whose blame lead to the failure of Market Garden I do view Gen. Gavin's performance as inadequate. It's totally understandable that he would have needed to secure the woods from an approach by an enemy of unknown strength before moving to his objective, but had he sent out a unit to reconnoiter the area, he would have realized it would be his for the taking on the first day, and in the worst case of a successful German counter attack, he might have retreated into the city as a redoubt. I surmise he may already have considered the option and rejected it as untenable for reasons unknown, but holding out at least for until relief arrived was all that was expected. I say he acted upon his fears instead of looking to determine the true nature of the situation on the ground that might have lead to success. Those who maintain that political biases motivate the the accusation of blame on Gavin seem themselves to be political, and a refusal to consider this view is a refusal to consider a proper lesson from history. There is a saying: "neither wars nor women can ever be won without courage". Probing his objective would have settled the matter and I trust he would thus have acted accordingly with that information.
The problem with moving into the city is that the height was also the location of Landing and Drop zones for the 2nd and 3rd Lifts as well as resupply drops.
what did bittirich say?
I am a Kiwi and as such have a special interest in the Battle for Egypt and Lybia. I have gone out of my way to get the books written by the veterans of all ranks and published from 1945-1980s as well as those written by military historians. One feature of the British Desert Army after Gen. O'Connor and before Montgomery is how for 18 months it repeated the same mistakes over and over (with the same results) and so a smaller, badly supplied army ran rings around the much larger and better supplied but badly led Desert Army, later 8th Army.
This should be a SUPREME embarrassment to the British High Command of the time. It was a case of "lions led by [incompetent] sheep." The German Africa Korp only had 3 Divisions for most of the campaign, 4 at Alamein, with at best 4 useful Italian Divisions. The Brits had a minimum of 15 Divs.
I will refrain from arguing the cause except to say before Montgomery the 8th Army never operated as a unified team with the same goals, which led to terrible moral and in-fighting within 8th Army. There are many stories of Allied units watching, sometimes for 1-2hrs while another near-by Allied unit was overrun and captured and not help when they easily could, should and may have been ordered to support the lost unit in their battle orders. HOWEVER Montgomery mostly fixed this in just a few months and gave the Allies their first major victory over the Germans of WW2. I think after Alamein Montgomery never did as well again but this was probably due to political interference and the American's desire to be in charge. And don't forget the major part Montgomery played commanding one of the Divisions in the rear guard at Dunkirk under Alexander, all unsung heroes.
I know from my reading what the veterans thought before and after 2nd Alamein (October), that what Monty achieved from taking command in August to the end of 2nd Alamein at the start of November 1942 was phenomenal. At First Alamein(July) Rommel attacked, with most of his useful units at 25-30% of establishment, and almost beat an Army of about 250,000 with an Army with few supplies and only about 35,000-45,000 reliable troops. That is fairly underwhelming and a crying shame.
Prof_Kaos
Nothing to do with Rommel having access to a wealth of intelligence information telling him where the British were going to be?
By the time Monty took over, the Afrika Corps was down to 150 tanks or less. Rommel wasted material too and made some bad decisions at Operation BattleAxe.
I totally agree with you that history is a debate and it is not easy to get rid of all our bias to grasp the reality of what hapened in the past. After watching your video, I had the idea of making an argument blaming it all on the americans but since it would simply put oil on the fire, I've restrained myself lol
As for the battle plan of Operation Market Garden, I would say that the basic idea is not bad at all but might have been a bit optimistic and like all optimistic plans, it's brillant or audacious when it succeed and flawed and horrible when it fails. I think tho that one of the bigest shortcomming of the plan is that logistics couldn't keep up with it or wasn't taken into account as it should have. All the paratroopers should have been on the ground on day 1, especially for the 1st division since their landing zone was so far away from their objective. I think that guarding the landing zone has been a costly distraction. Maybe even Gavin might have focus his attention on the bridge he was supposed to take.
With that said, with all those ifs and maybes, it doesn't mean the operation would have been a success . If the allied troups had behaved differently, the german would have too and the situation could have been better or worst
I guess this guy has not hear the recording of the commanders at Nijmegen . You know you can down load them but they do not go with you say about Nijmegen
The entire marketgarden plan was overly complicated and failed. Therefore it was a bad plan. The plan was based on Churchill wanted to have a say in post war europe. By getting the British more German territories, the larger voice they would have. Eisenhower relented and let monty and Churchill have their plan. It failed and cost lives and resources for a purely British political end. It is possible if those men and resources were given to the American army, the Americans could have smashed the Siegfried line and taken more of Germany before the Soviets did. Everyone knew the war was over and every nation was positioning for post war negotiations.
Fair points. But could you explain 'overcomplicated' for me? I've heard this phrase said a lot about Market Garden but not heard people explain why they think it's overcomplicated.
You could sum in up in one sentence - "Capture bridges and cross the Rhine." Try doing that for other battles!
Coordinating a single bridge capture between paratroopers and an armored column is difficult enough. Monty wanted to drop 4 airborne divisions to take seven bridges needed to take Arnhem. There are too many variables there to go wrong. If one single bridge is not held, the operation fails. Keep it simple and allow for flexibility in the plan because the plan will go wrong eventually.
William Smith for me M.G. is a copy of what the Germans did with airborne troops going the other way in 1940. They had as series of co-ordinated forts and established defenses like Eben Emael to overcome which the Allies didn't in 1944. I think the issues revolved around inter-service rivalries. Airborne proving it's value etc.
The Belgian defensive resources during the invasion, and the German military that fought in Market Garden - were they comparable?
The Belgium/Dutch defenses in 1940 were formidable, Eben Emael was considered the best, most modern fort in the world. But the defenses had 4 flaws. First they were a generation out of date being the best of defense against 19th century tactics ie. pre-motorisation of armies (tanks, trucks, apc's, planes, paras etc.) Second the Germans had huge siege mortars in 1914 which could destroy these type of forts and better ones in 1940. Third the forts thru the Low Countries were part of a combined defense plan involving mutually supporting Belgium and Dutch forts along rivers and canals to be assisted by British and French troops, however Belgium declared neutrality in late 1939 which stuffed up the cooperation and Holland fell if a few days, not the few weeks expected to be enough to move Brit and French troops up to fight the expected WW1 type campaign with the support of the forts. And last all the Allies were scared of the Germans and there was no real will to fight militarily or politically among the Europeans, except maybe the British.
In 1944 MG would go up against motivated German forces with plenty of defensive experience. And of course 2 SS Panzer Divs refitting on the final and furthest bridge should have beaten MG on day 1, paras are not equipped to fight more than a handful of tanks, def not 2 Panzer Divs. Well done Col Frost and Co. outstanding effort. Not withstanding all TIK's theories which appear very sound.
The cause is not the decision of Gavin. He made a crucial error but it is noteworthy why he did , and that is imo the real reason: scattered commands and responsibilities. It seems Gavin was not aware of the precarious situation of 1st airborne.
I think if a regiment of his division was holding the bridge he would have taken a different decision.
So it’s a lack of information and urgency which goes up all the way in chain of conmand
Have to disagree. There was a telephone link used by the Dutch resistance between Arnhem and a phone in the 505th area of Groesbeek, so some worrying news about the situation at Arnhem was getting through and was passed to Browning's Corps HQ.
I think Gavin had a clear grasp of the overall operation's objectives and there's witness evidence he tried to make that clear in his final divisional briefing when he instructed Colonel Lindquist of the 508th on his mission at Nijmegen [quote]:
Captain Chet Graham was assigned as the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters. "I sat in on a high level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation."
(Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke 2012)
- That last sentence ending - "as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation" is a perfect summary. Clearly Lindquist was at fault for not moving on the bridge as quickly as he should and Gavin had to intervene to get him moving, by which time it was too late and 10.SS-Panzer-Division was already feeding some units into the city.
In his interview with Cornelius Ryan for Ryan's book A Bridge Too Far (1974), Gavin made some revealing comments about Colonel Lindquist as well as some comments about objectives. Ryan I think made some incorrect after-the-fact commentary about Gavin having three days to get the bridge, which is ridiculous because Gavin had no way of knowing if the British tanks would reach him in three days or one day when his division landed, but that aside, Ryan's interview notes make interesting reading [my square brackets]:
Gavin and Lindquist had been together in Sicily[?] and Normandy and neither Gavin nor Ridgway, the old commander of the 82nd, trusted him in a fight.
He did not have a “killer instinct.” In Gavin’s words, “He wouldn’t go for the juggler [jugular].” As an administrative officer he was excellent; his troopers were sharp and snappy and, according to Gavin, “Made great palace guards after the war.”
Gavin confirms he ordered Lindquist to commit a battalion to the capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the jump. He also confirms he told Lindquist not to go to the bridge by way of the town but to approach it along some mud flats to the east.
We discussed also objectives. Gavin’s main objectives were the heights at Groesbeek and the Grave bridge; he expected and intelligence confirmed “a helluva reaction from the Reichswald area.” Therefore he had to control the Groesbeek heights. The Grave bridge was essential to the link up with the British 2nd Army. He had three days to capture the Nijmegen bridge and, although he was concerned about it, he felt certain he could get it within three days.
The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized.
(Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967 - James Maurice Gavin, Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University)
So Gavin's responsibility for what happened originated in his planning decisions.
The 'British request' to drop a battalion north of the bridge probably came from Browning, because General Brereton of 1st Allied Airborne Army had removed the double airlift and dawn glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave bridges that were in Browning's original operation COMET plan, and the fallout of the operation LINNET II affair meant that Browning could not protest the changes - he knew he would be replaced by Matthew Ridgway and his US XVIII Airborne Corps if he threatened to resign a second time.
Gavin's decision to assign the critical Nijmegen mission to Lindquist's 508th is controversial, given that Lindquist had not performed well in Normandy (Nordyke's earlier chapters refer). He decided to assign the more aggressive and experienced 505th to the purely defensive role of holding the Reichswald sector of his perimeter, and he had arguably the best battalion in the whole division, Ben Vandervoort's 2nd/505th, in division reserve sitting on Hill 81.8 behind Groesbeek for the first couple of days.
I think Gavin put his own division before the mission, and that ultimately led to the failure of the operation and the destruction of the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem. Lindquist's story is no less interesting, but you have to do a deep dive into Nordyke's regimental history to get into that.
Gavin did make the wrong decision, but he made it in good faith based on the intelligence he was given. That fact it has been proved wrong in hindsight shouldn't be held against him too much.
Many other decisions were wrong also. The decision to put Urchart in charge of an airborne division, for one. But he was an experienced, hard as nails infantryman, so you can kind of see why that choice was made.
Downing could have overridden Gavin's decision, but decided to allow the very capable young man to command his own division, which is fair enough I suppose.
Even the decision to drop 1st Airborne so far away (although sometimes dressed up as a 'your men can die but ours can't' from the airforce guys) was actually justifiable, as the loss of too many planes could have meant they then lacked the capacity to resupply the airborne units, which would have meant the same outcome anyway.
I'm not a huge fan of picking out individuals to blame, everyone did the best they could under the circumstances they faced and had things gone slightly different the operation could have been a huge success.
It's my observation - and I may be misinterpreting the relationship here - that a senior officer in one Army (British or American) does not have the authority to order a junior officer in another Army (American or British) to put his men in potential harm's way. I have a couple of examples of how this worked between Browning and Gavin:
1) There was a British "request" (I think probably came from Browning or conceivably Dempsey or even Montgomery) for Gavin to drop a battalion at the north end of the Nijmegen bridge. He told Cornelius Ryan he toyed with the idea and eventually dismissed it because of his experience in Sicily (where troops were widely scattered and disorganised for days).
2) On D+1, Gavin proposed a second attempt to take the bridge after the previous night's late attempt had failed, but Browning rejected the plan, preferring to wait until the tanks of XXX Corps arrived so that they had armoured support (this is the source of the de-prioritising of the bridge as a pre-flight order myth). Browning also rejected Gavin's first suggestion of putting his own troops (the 504th PIR) across the river in assault boats on 19 September, when XXX Corps first arrived, but then accepted the proposal made a second time after a frontal assault with the 505th and Guards' tanks had failed. There was a prepared British fallback plan to put 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division across in boats for this type of scenario with one or two brigades (operations BESSIE or BASIL respectively), but Gavin's proposal was accepted as more expedient than bringing the 43rd up the corridor.
So Browning was able to overrule Gavin in rejecting a proposed operation involving American troops in harm's way, but he could only "request" a battalion be dropped on the bridge and Gavin was able to dismiss it. It would probably take an American senior officer such as Brereton or Eisenhower to intervene to make this an order. I see a lot of people in RUclips video comments trying to absolve Gavin of any responsibility by saying that Browning or Montgomery should have intervened because it was a British operation, but when it suits them they don't like the idea of American troops being under British command at all. You can't have it both ways.
Nice presentation. I guess the debate on some items will continue. Fascinating topic and geography.
Afaik 10th SS only consisted of a few experienced but depleted battalions and recon units. I don't see how they could've managed to counterattack the 82nd if they took the bridge yet alone annihilating the entire division. If my memory serves me right there 10th SS was in 2 battalions strength in Nijmegen. Let's speculate that 82nd took the bridges before Germans themselves were able to dig in inside the city and delay the XXX Corps in urban combat, how could they even counter attack the 82nd? 10th was not equipped with Tigers or anything at Nijmegen, not even any tanks to my knowledge; contrary to what people believe I guess. It was in the upcoming days that Panzer regiments, Panthers and Tigers started to arrive near the vicinity of Arnhem. So taking the bridges first was the vital point, Germans were in no position to dislodge the 82nd if they took the bridge.
Here's the plan that works.
1. 1st Para at Arnhem, 1 brigade dropped north, one south, with followup glider borne forces mirroring that. Seize the bridge on both sides. pre-dawn drop to NE if AAA is such a concern.
2. 82nd airborne 1 regiment dropped each bank at Nijmegen, close to the bridge in first drop.
3. 101st - drop closer to bridges but generally the same plan
4. Second drop, remainder of 1st and 82nd, with 82nd forces moving to groosebeck and 1st moving south to clear "the island" as much as possible
5. Polish Brigade held as flying reserve to either reinforce groosebeck if needed or Arnhem.
Piece of cake.
Bruno TaTa
I would add, take the smaller bridges near the jump off with commandos and SAS, smaller forces, but more quickly received. failure to capture the smaller bridges can be fixed by Bailey bridges. massing the airborne in the eight miles between the two key bridges means they are able to support each other, hold drop zones and road. prevent Germans from moving in the same area.
the area on the German side would be free of allies except in the area of the bridge, here ground attack aircraft could be given free reign without fear of friendly fire.
artillery could be landed at whatever drop zone between the bridges was open...
light flanking forces running up either side of the main force would speed up the advance.
Let me explain why you are wrong.
North of Arnhem is woods. And Deelen military Airfield. And the closest open ground is several miles away from Arnhem Bridge, and much closer the 9SS and 10SS division rest areas than the drop zones used. This means the landing zones would have come under attack sooner.
Paras could have dropped South of Arnhem Bridge, but the division would have been split by the Rhine if the bridges are destroyed or could not be captured. Not good. Gliders couldn't land to the South as to ground is too soft, so any troops landing there have no jeeps and no anti-tank guns. And only the supplies the men can carry. Also, there was a lot of German Flak in Arnhem and to the South of it, so expect far more casualties during the drop.
There were good reasons for choosing the drop zones which were actually used.
Spoken like a true Armchair general, or TIK!
This is litteraly the same reason why no one can argue and discuss todays problems aswell. If you start talking about subjects as minority religions in European countries, different cultures not assimilating into countries, talking about behaviours of others instantly you would be called a racist, nationalist and even a nazi. Same situation is with history as you mentioned. This is really annoying that people are calling names instead of providing a proper argument that supports or objects a claim..
Exactly. Regardless of the subject or the side of the fence you sit on, there should be two things - 1) a civilised open discussion, and 2) lots of facts and figures that you've gathered from extensive reading to provide evidence for whatever point you're trying to put across. Reading one book and calling yourself an expert doesn't cut it. Statements without evidence or chest-pounding opinions designed to strike an emotional response have no place in these discussions.
TIK ...and even if you are an expert you are not relived from the duty of making a good argument based on facts and propper logic. Being an expert simply means to have knowledge about necessary facts and being able to put them into perspective, not that one is always right.
people please remember that all nations in world war two had great leaders but also terrible leaders as well. what im saying is don't judge a country just based on the first terrible leader you encounter wait instead for a wider and broader scope of leaders before judging any country's leaders capacity really though you shouldn't judge on how it performs warfare's but as how it operates as a whole. also remember all who fought in this war were brave please do not disrespect three memories with nationalism fuelled rants.
I agree. But even where a country doesn't perform well, that's not a bad reflection of the country or the people, but usually circumstance (Luxembourg had no chance in WW2, let's be honest) or poor decisions made by leadership (Mussolini sending his country to war when it simply wasn't prepared).
***** so true so true TIK so really to judge a country you have to visit it join in the culture for a while eat the food and see how it treats its people.
I have watched your Market-Garden vid and found it superb, particularly your contention that the battle was more a German victory than another (yawn) Allied noble defeat. What you said about Gavin and the American participation in the battle was in no way detrimental to Gavin's memory. Why you are responding to the criticism of your presentation puzzles me, you are at times perilously close to apologizing . . . which isn't called for in any way shape or form. You Tube is rife with adolescents who 'learn' their history from whatever Spielberg film or series they're in love with, or whatever other rubbish disguised as history Hollywood unloads on us. And then there's Stephen Ambose, a plagerist and pompous windbag for American exceptionalism who liked to pretend he was an historian; or Max Hastings who has spent decades apologizing for his book Overlord . . . Your video was fine mate, don't diminish yourself by apologizing for it. Cheers!
10th SS were in Nijmegen because they poured south over the uncaptured bridge. XXX Corps reached Nijmegen slightly ahead of schedule ready to speed over the bridge only to see it still in German hands and 10th SS fighting the 82nd in Nijmegen. If XXX Corps had been delayed and not reached Nijmegen on time it is possible the 82nd would have been annihilated by the 10th SS.
and if the 508th had taken the bridge on 17th 15.hrs (muhahaha), how would this have changed the fact that 10th SS is capable of annihilating the 82nd ?
Then 10thSS can always annihilate the 82nd ?! until the time has come that XXXcrps arrives....soooo...the speed of XXXcrps is the essence..
ODDBALL SOK It is like talking to a child. How old are you?
is that your educated answer ?
ODDBALL SOK
How old are you?
is it important ?
is your age important ?
When I watched the original video I just knew somebody would think TIK would base his thoughts on this b/c of a conscious or subconscious Brit vs Yank thing. Was hoping he would not defend himself b/c it is obvious if the British commanded the Nijmegan area and did the same thing TIK would have blamed that Brit commander...Anyways great series of videos and a new subscriber.
I ask myself whether you should put so much energy into a counter-opinion that is largely based on national sentiment. I thought this was the least video on your channel, TIK, and I love it because I've seen over 30 of them to date.
Psssh... Sorry I have to say this: it's not "Neither Rhine." It's "Lower Rhine" or possibly "Nether Rhine."
I disagree that Gavin was at fault. I agree that this is not a nationalistic thing because they are/were allies. They accepted the military chain of command and operated within it. A commander is responsible for the unit does a fails to do and that responsibility cannot be delegated. Other authors have suggested that Gen. Smith, Ike's Chief of Staff, had warned Montgomery about the intelligence concerning the armor in the area. Ike supposedly said that he was not going to tell Montgomery how to run his operation. Ultimately, the decision to go rests with Montgomery supported by Ike. Montgomery should have done his homework and he really didn't or if he did, he ignored the lessons that it provided. If I recall correctly, Gavin was a one star although he was a division commander and Browning was a core command which made him at least three-star. The three-star out ranks the one star and the fact that the three-star is on site and therefore is the senior commander. A one star, does not flaunt the wishes of the three-star. The idea of chain of command does include partnership but if you remember from the battle of the bulge, I took command of the situation when Bradley could not and transferred troops to Montgomery in order to save the situation in spite of Bradley's objections. The situation is the same here in that Browning could have ordered Gavin to take the bridge but he did not and instead concentrated on setting up his headquarters.
Good points! Tbh, it's almost too close to call. When I was working on my documentary, I debated whether I should blame both Gavin AND Browning, as Browning made a lot of really crucial mistakes. In the end I chose to single out Gavin because I do think his decision at Nijmegen was huge. A lot of people say the operation was doomed from the start, but this argument actually suggests it wasn't, which is a nice alternative argument to the traditional one. Also it presents a "what if" because if they had taken the bridge, would XXX Corps have gotten to Arnhem, and would people still say the plan was "rotten"? So that's my reasoning for backing it.
But like you pointed out, there were lots of mistakes made by everyone. From Ike and Montgomery, all the way down to Browning and Gavin. Browning's mistakes especially are so numerous that it's hard to list them all. But I would say (again, my opinion) that Nijmegen was a bit more decisive. Sort of like an umbrella. Browning's umbrella has a lot of holes in it, but it was Gavin that snapped the stem. Which is worse? In the end it doesn't matter because either way you're definitely getting wet.
Obviously, this is all up for debate. But you're right in saying that Browning is at fault here, and I certainly won't try to persuade you otherwise :)
now.... do battle of the bulge?
Mike Quinton It's a possibility :) after I've finished my next one on Fort Eben Emael, I'm going to try doing a big battle. Haven't chosen which one yet so anything's possible
A military commander who has a key objective in a major military operation, who simply neglects pursuing that objective in favor of hiding back by the drop zone, is clearly at fault. Responsible, at fault and to blame.
Air cover,close ground support.End of in my book....
On the subject of the Germans, I understand they were prepared for the Allied, was because they had captured plans of the invasion from a dead allied officer.
Yep, a dead US soldier in a crashed US glider, in a US drop zone.
General Bittrich's men captured the British pathfinders during their pre-drop and took their radios and listened in on EVERYTHING
I have just seen a tube by your own solders and ours, that refute your point, and they were there
I share the view of several historians which I listed in the description of my documentary on Market Garden. Did you see my documentary? ruclips.net/video/vTUC79o4Kmc/видео.html
Let's take your logic back a few steps. Instead of saying Gavin's decision not to take the bridge lost the battle let us say that after dismissing intel reports and even actual photos of tanks in the area Monty's decision to go ahead with the operation lost the battle. The battle still might have been lost had the bridge at Nijmegen been taken. But it would Certainly Would Not have been lost had Monty called it off.
I know the paras were getting jerked around a lot and were itching to go but would they have been as gung ho after being shown the tank photos? Taken I believe by a Mosquito spy plane... Is asserting that tanks that are hidden in the woods and camouflaged are probably inoperable a rational idea?
What was the Objective of market garden?... Well it seems obvious the objective was to see if everything goes right and then to figure out what to do next.
You have to remember the British have a reputation for altering history.
Every nation alters history.
Point Shoot every country does
USA with the reasons for the war of independence is one example
No they don't Hollywood does.
HAVE YOU READ THE 96 PAGE "ARNHEM 1944" BOOK FROM OSPREY BY STEPHEN BADSEY? IT'S INCREDIBLY CONCISE, SUCCINCT & DARING IN IT'S FINGER POINTING - PRINCIPALLY AT LT GEN LEWIS BRERETON.
I COULDN'T AGREE MORE WITH YOU ON YOUR ATTITUDE TO BRITAIN (MY COUNTRY, WHICH I ALSO LIVE IN). IT MAKES MY TEETH GRIND TO SEE NATO DOING WHATEVER IT CAN TO EXPAND EAST & RATTLING SABRES ON LANDS WHERE MOST OF THE TOUGHEST, PROFESSIONAL ARMIES IN HISTORY HAVE FOUGHT. I LAUGH WHEN I SEE BRITAIN'S & AMERICA'S FAT SOLDIERS (THERE ARE PLENTY OF THEM) IN THE FREEZING BALTIC REPUBLICS "INTIMIDATING" RUSSIA. BRITAIN HAS LOST 2 WARS (IN IRAQ & AFGHANISTAN), CONTRIBUTED MIGHTILY TO DESTROYING LIBYA, DESTABILISING SYRIA & POLITICALLY SURRENDERED TO THE IRA. YOU'VE GOT TO GO BACK TO THE 1620'S - 1630'S TO SEE A SORRIER RECORD FOR THE BRITISH MILITARY. I HATE SEEING MY COUNTRY VISIBLY DESTROYING ITSELF & MAKING ITSELF INTO AN ADJUNCT OF AMERICA.
TOO MANY AMERICANS & BRITISH DON'T REALISE THAT OUR 2 COUNTRIES HAVE SPENT NEARLY ALL OF OUR EXISTENCE AS NON-ALLIES. IN WW1 WE WERE CO-BELLIGERENTS, NOT ALLIES. AFTER THAT WAR WE WERE LEFT CARRYING THE FINANCIAL CAN FOR ALL OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES. WE'D ALREADY SPENT 300 YEARS WORTH OF THE PROFITS OF EMPIRE & COMMERCIALISM IN WW1. BY THE EARLY 1920'S, BRITAIN COULDN'T PAY AMERICA. AS A RESULT OF THIS BRITAIN COULDN'T AFFORD A NAVY LIKE IT HAD BEFORE, AND SO IT SURRENDERED THE PREMIER NAVAL POWER STATUS TO AMERICA & JAPAN IN 1922 AT THE WASHINGTON NAVAL TREATY.
AMERICA DIDN'T FORGET THAT IT WAS STIFFED BY BRITAIN (WHO'D BEEN STIFFED BY OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES - SOME OF WHOM, LIKE RUSSIA, DIDN'T EXIST BY THE END OF WW1). SO WITH WW2, THEIR ATTITUDE WAS THEY WOULD ENSURE THEY GOT THEIR MONEY, FIRST IN GOLD, CURRENCY & BONDS, THEN VIA LEND-LEASE. BRITAIN DIDN'T RECOVER FROM WW2 UNTIL THE LATE 1980'S VIA THE ICE COLD SHOWER OF THATCHERNOMICS. WE DIDN'T PAY OFF AMERICA EVERY PENNY OF OUR WAR DEBT (TO AMERICA & CANADA) UNTIL 2006 - INCLUDING INTEREST. "AMERICA SAVED OUR ASSES" BECAUSE WE PAID FOR IT. INTO THE SLIP STREAM OF BRITAIN'S DEMISE AS A GREAT POWER WAS AMERICA.
MY POINT ABOUT ALL OF THIS IS THAT EVERY TIME BRITAIN HAS GOT INVOLVED WITH AMERICA IN SHOOTING WARS IT'S BEEN INCREDIBLY DAMAGING FOR BRITAIN. THIS GOES RIGHT BACK TO THE 7 YEARS' WAR. BRITAIN SAVED IT'S AMERICAN COLONIES AT VAST EXPENSE IN GOLD & BLOOD. ITS THANKS WAS TO BE SCREAMED AT FOR DARING THE AMERICAN COLONISTS TO BE EXPECTED TO CONTRIBUTE 6 PENCE PER YEAR IN TAX REVENUE COMPARED TO 25 SHILLINGS PER YEAR IN TAX REVENUE FOR THE BRITISH (THESE FIGURES ARE AVERAGES). BRITAIN BENT OVER BACKWARDS IN TRYING NOT TO WIN TOO MUCH IN ORDER TO BE PLACATORY TO THE LITTLE COLONIAL DARLINGS (I.E. HOWE PULLED HIS PUNCHES IN 1776 & THIS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE WAR - WHICH WAS ESSENTIALLY LOST AFTER SARATOGA).
IT WAS AMERICA'S OUTRAGEOUS BEHAVIOUR TOWARD BRITAIN IN THE LATE 19TH CENTURY THAT SHOULD HAVE RESULTED IN WAR. BRITAIN, AGAIN, BENT OVER BACKWARDS TO ACCOMMODATE AMERICA. WHEN GERMANY BEHAVED IN A FAR MORE REASONABLE WAY, BRITAIN WENT TO WAR WITH IT. SEE THE AMERICAN STRATEGIST EDWARD LUTTWAK'S OPINIONS ON THIS (SEE ruclips.net/video/GYCHXQ4zFcA/видео.html 14:40 MINUTES IN).
IT'S VERY NOTICEABLE (TO ME) THAT THE IRA COLLAPSED FINANCIALLY AFTER THE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 ATTACKS, DUE TO THE INSTANT HALT IN AMERICAN FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM. WHAT WOULD AMERICA'S STANCE BE IF GERMANY OR BRITAIN HAD A BIG WAR IN SOUTH AMERICA & VAST SWATHES OF PEOPLE POURED OVER THE BORDERS INTO AMERICA. AMERICA WOULD HAVE DIRECTED SUCH "CULTURAL ENRICHMENT" STRAIGHT TO GERMANY &/OR BRITAIN.
NO BRITISH PERSON I'VE MET HAS EVER SAID TO A WEST EUROPEAN "WE SAVED YOUR ARSES". CANADIANS DON'T HAVE THIS ATTITUDE. AMERICANS MOST DEFINITELY DO. THIS COMES FROM THE MANIFEST DESTINY OUTLOOK OF AMERICA - A SECULAR VERSION OF GOD'S CHOSEN PEOPLE.
WHEN I LOOK AT BRITAIN'S HISTORY WITH AMERICA I THINK OF THE AMERICAN SHOWMAN, P.T. BARNUM'S ATTITUDE TO ENTERTAINMENT - "THERE'S A SUCKER BORN EVERY MINUTE".
This one just popped up so probably way behind the posting curve here.
First off, love your enthusiasm and the obvious effort you put into your work. History is fascinating and it's a real joy to see someone put so much effort into illuminating it in compelling ways. A bit of a pet peeve of mine though is the introduction of controversy for controversy's sake. And there is a fine line between being purposefully controversial and just generating some buzz. Generating buzz is one of those necessary evils. I definitely want to give you the benefit of the doubt on this one but the controversy meter is pegged off scale high. And while you do present a good case for your argument, it's a little nit picky at the tactical scale where there are gigantic issues going on at the strategic scale that perhaps may have predetermined the outcome.
George Herring said about the study of history (paraphrasing) "We study history not to be more clever the next time. Instead, we study history to be wise for the rest of our lives".
Gavin lost Market Garden because he didn't storm the bridge in the first hours is a "clever" interpretation of the outcome of the operation.
A "wiser" viewpoint might be that Market Garden was overly complicated. Relied on too many objectives being taken all at once and held until relieved by a 100 miles of two lane dirt road through swamp land where any single point of failure could result in the ultimate failure of the operation.
Another piece of wisdom that I think relates here. "No battle plan survives contact with the enemy." Market Garden had absolutely zero accommodation for that wisdom. In fact, it goes directly against that well known axiom.
It was a bad plan. And most definitely a bridge too far.
Historians are often notoriously bad at the analysis. You may be falling into that category with all the hard work you've done. You get lost in the weeds, as they say.
You give Browning a pass, when he also put a non-para into the single most important position in the entire operation. An Airborne general would have had the confidence and understanding of that form of warfare to INSIST on a better drop zone.
Love all your videos TiK. War is a nasty activity and no plan lasts past first contact with the enemy. There were no contingency for the entire thing. If one thing failed, the whole thing would fail. Nijmegen is a start, but the whole thing was badly planned.
Red White and Blue ×2 Brothers Always
ok... your point is valid, and I agree, but... 30minutes? :-) come on! 7 should be enough.
don't you know TIK by now? (watch some more vids of him).
I am American and I came away from your Marketgarden video thinking its failure was based largely on Gavin's failure to take t Nimagan bridge.
Also, I am so provincially American that I just assumed you were American. You dont sound like t Queen, Michael Cain, or Richard Dawkins. So Idt I even noticed your Brit accent. Tho now that you bring it up , you do clearly have some sort of Brit accent.
My wife guessed that you are from Manchester . Tho Idt you sound like Ian Curtis either. So Idk
Arguing hypothetical situations, more specifically, situations that did not occur is not history.
What hypothetical situations?
This discussion is old-hat I am aware but in retrospect I believe a lot of the debate over the Gavin issue stemmed from a bit of dissonance between the tone of the first half or so of the video and that of the end. To be succinct, miscommunications and logistical foibles, doubts from participants, and and the progressive build-up of mishaps as the Operation progressed could be interpreted by viewers as indicative of poor planning or umbrella-blame. On the other hand, the end points to Gavin - one man - as the catalyst for cataclysm. While I believe this was meant in a "straw that broke the camel's back" sort of way, I can see why a good amount of viewers - myself included, originally - could interpret this as disingenuous when it isn't the case.
for want of a horse shoe nail, planning,, intel, DZ's, blown bridge, bridge not taken, radio's, air support, do I need to go on, had that bridge and town been taken on day one it would have been ready for the arrival of 30 corps
Max Hastings says a lot of BS in the books that he wrote.
Perhaps, however on balance he offers far more factual information than I ever have and I'd suggest yourself also. Join a library.
Hastings writes a good book and has the sources & research to back it up
The American civil war is a fun one it's being painted as black and white
Yes, my friend. Our civil war was anything but.... I believe that is why we Americans continue to fight and refight that war. "Lost Cause" and all that. My great-grandmother was a child of a Confederate veteran and she was very much alive when I was a little boy. I'm 62 and I clearly remember her trying to explain the whole thing. At 5 years old, playing with toy civil war soldiers (blue and gray) when the blue was winning my floor battles, she informed me that the blue were the "bad" guys and the grey were the "good" guys. All from the color of the toys. Upon growing up, I discovered that this was not always the case. My ancestors did not own slaves, but yet they fought for pro-slavery agenda. The whole thing was about as black and white as a rainbow. Oh by the way, her father's 2 brothers out of 5 went North. So I heard about the fratricidal nature of that war. Being from Missouri, she told me how neighbors would attack and kill neighbors only because of pro Union or Confederate politics. About as transparent as mud.
lol you will never guess where I learned that.
Did Gen Gavin set the drop zones for his division? Did he make the choice to land away from the town and not on the north bank at all? the freaking south would be taken by XXX corps eventually!
Not dropping on both sides of both of the difficult to bridge rivers was the reason it failed. Plain and simple. A contributing factor was the failure to use airpower to interdict german reinforcements to the Nijmegen area, most easily by simply attacking the ferry location.
All their planning was to avoid this or that minor problem(soft ground or flak here or there), and they forgot to secure the main objectives!
A operação market garden foi totalmente mal planejada. 👍.
In what ways?
+TIK Na minha opnião foi pelo grande problema de logística, e na hora da operação os paraquedistas aliados saltaram em pontos errados longe dos seus objetivos
I agree to some extent. The loss of the drop zones at Arnhem was a major error. One thing the people say is that Monty should have concentrated on the port of Antwerp by taking the islands on the coast, whilst trapping the 15th Army. But if he'd gotten to the Zuiderzee, he would have done the same thing, but also be across the Rhine. So I see both sides of the argument.
+TIK ah Ok, thank you👍.
TIK, I am soo happy to have found you. Propaganda is a huge part of war, but you finds a logical perspective to it all. Best historian youtuber this day!
Man this plan as whole is so fucked I have a hard time blaming any one party other than the Allies as a whole.
Your argument makes no tactical sense for several reasons, We are talking about paratroopers, that have nothing with which to take on armour. The whole idea behind this venture is for thirty corps to make it up the road quickly, which could not be done on this road. Without thirty corps, the paras have nothing to take on armour but small arms. monty's plan was the flaw as there were not enough fail safes, not enough intel, not enough period.If the plan was well designed, the taking of one bridge would not have stopped it. This plan was ill concieved, and based on the ego of it's designer, To blame one small commander in the plan is irrelevant, as the plans maker is ultimately to blame. Poor Planning.
I don't understand your point about the paratroopers having nothing to take on armour. Their PIATs and Bazookas can take out tanks. Plus they landed with AT guns like the 6-pounders the British carried into Arnhem.
Tactically, if the 82nd had taken the Nijmegen Bridge on the first day, XXX Corps would have been over the Nijmegen Bridge at around 10am on the third day. They may have been at Arnhem later that day, or may have been at Arnhem the next day. Certainly, they wouldn't have suffered the 36 hour delay at Nijmegen fighting an urban house-to-house battle to take the city.
I'm not saying that the play couldn't have been better - it absolutely could have been. The 1st Airborne landing closer to Arnhem could have prevented the SS from driving down to Nijmegen, for example. What I'm saying is, with the plan as it was, it could have worked. It didn't work because Nijmegen Bridge fell into German hands on the first day of battle, and this could have been avoided if a unit of the 82nd had been ordered to go to the bridge right from the start. A lot of people say the plan was doomed from the start when in reality, it was only doomed when Nijmegen Bridge fell into German hands.
Have you actually shot a piat? a Bazooka? I have, they would not take out a tank, they may damage one, but that is about it. And they didn't have many to begin with. I got my information from some guys that were there on the ground, not officers that wrote books. Sorry, the buck stops at Monty's plan.
1st Airborne had sixteen 17-pdr A/T guns and about eighty 6-pdr A/T guns with APDS ammo, which could knock out just about ant German tank (at close range, at least). And a lot of PIATs, which knocked out tanks just fine. I know the American paratroops had fewer anti-tank weapons, but the 82nd at least met almost no German tanks at all and the 101st had the support of 30 Corps by the time significant German tanks arrived.
tim schlotter a PIAT is still an anti-tank weapon; it bad but better than nothing
@@MrToymaster1 it was good enough to take out a Royal Tiger in Arnhem......
An argument too far
Wait, I've seen your video on why Market Garden failed. And you provide a lot of situational background prior to saying Gavin made a bad call. BUT you then ignore the "known" situation at the time, to judge Gavin's decision. You judge it based on the what is NOW known to be true. Gavin makes the decision, Boy accepts it. You ignore the bad choice Boy makes, to judge Gavin as wrong. They thought there what 1 or 2 thousand tanks in his flank? We NOW KNOW that was more tanks than the whole German army had on the front at the time. BUT THEY DIDN'T. So if the German hordes do appear, it was the right call (well sort of, it just ends in disaster closer rather than farther). But now we can say, "if only.." You answer your own debate, you just ignore it. It was Boy's shoulders. Or Monty's, or Ike's. The buck stops somewhere ABOVE Gavin. Otherwise, you need to go lower and blame a company commander for no initiative. The German Propaganda was just so effective and the Allies too quick to believe it.
that will a good one
i didn't sense any nationlism in Tik dokumentary! Nonsense!!!
like this video.
I'm thinking of doing a few more "talking about history" videos similar to this style
My information (from the film), 30 Corps stopped for tea. I believe it. The Brits never relished confronting Germans, without their American friends. Where was the American Air Force, pounding the Panzer divisions.
You might do well to study history before posting on here.
XXX Corps never stopped for tea - that old chestnut needs to be put to bed permanently. After crossing the bridge, the lead elements did have to stop but specifically because they had no ammunition left (and 180 dead German soldiers in the girders of the bridge are testimony to the amount of ammunition expended), plus they were without their accompanying infantry and a handful of 82nd AB were not going to be enough. Finally, it was actually dark when they made the decision to stop. As Villa is implying, it might be much more prudent to not learn your information from a film that was financed by US money so was never going to show the real reason MG failed.
@@sean640307 So, you're claiming that 30 Corps was hell bent for leather. "Cause, history. I served in the 101st Airborne. We needed Patton to succeed. This was a political campaign. History shows the Brits getting their asses kicked by the Germans over and over again. So, go back to your history books, written by the winners.
@@arrowrod history shows no such thing. I didn't say XXX Corps were going hell for leather, either, I'm pointing out the facts that they could NOT have been the claimed 36 hours slow given that they left their staring point at 14:35 on the 17th Sept and met with the 82nd at 08:20 on the 19th Sept. The loss of the Son bridge when the 101st was there only to see it blown up in their faces was inconvenient, and it's true that the building of the Bailey bridge cost about 12-14 hours BUT most of that time was made up between Eindhoven and Grave. I am NOT critical of ANY of the paras - 101st took their objectives, 82nd took most of theirs, 1st AB were thwarted but at least had the northern part of the bridge at Arnhem, which denied the Germans access to it. However, Gavin made a decision which ultimately proved fatal to the operation. If he'd been given more transports, I'm sure he would have made different decisions. If we're going to blame anyone higher in the food chain, Monty isn't the one to blame as he had NO control or influence over anything with regards to Operation Market - that was First Allied Airborne specifically Brereton, Browning, and input from Williams (USAAF) as they were the planners of the airborne assault. As for Patton succeeding, nothing that happened at Market Garden would have helped Patton to succeed any better than he did. Your own military analysis after the war has been particularly critical of Patton's performance in the Lorraine campaign in general, and Metz specifically. Patton's antics also deprived Hodges of much needed fuel, so if anything, Patton caused the US 1st Army more harm.
No the tanks stopped twice the irish guards said it,the Germans and GIs saw and recorded it,Monty didn't show up - no field marshall.Carrington stopped in lent - certainly no Lord - there are your cuplrits.Are you Monty's little swiss boy?
But that is the trouble nowadays - as soon as a video is shown that goes against some viewers' national pride, regardless of nationality, a sheer barrage of "Sh.t Storm" is the result. Just watch any British documentary on WW2 - the socalled "Wehraboos" are out in battalion strength calling it propaganda etc. regardless how fair it really is. American documentaries often overlook the British part in the war - out come the British protesters! Lately TIK had the audacity to criticise the actions of a South African general - from the reactions one thought a third Boer War had been declared. I myself have criticised a TIK video, but everybody has the right to have their own opinion and it is wrong to bash the jingoistic drum and start insulting one another just because their opinion doesn't match yours. Calm down everybody - always look on the bright side of life, dee dum, dee dum...!
Tik, I love what you do. I think that this is a mistake. I don't think one can defend one's self on line. Just continue making good documentarys. the chips will fall where they fall.
Everybody remember that they never served in the military and do know squat about what it's really like in the military and combat. Everybody in this debate thinks that they are great generals but none of them every commanded troops. All the historians who write the books never served in the military, never commanded troops but they all think that they're great generals. They all need to get over themselves. Everybody talks about what happened like the troops are chess pieces. The troops were real living human beings who didn't want to die and this is true on both side. If all you great generals want to debate war, then why don't you actually enlist in the military and see what you experience in combat?
Quite frankly, I don't give two hoots and a holler,TIK, about what a civilian likes says about anything military. You all engage in this historical debate about something which has happened and is completed like you're all-knowing generals. In the US, you are doing what is called "Monday Morning Quarterbacking." It is easy to sit on your duff at home and watch a US football game and then criticize the quarterback the following morning. Actually being on the field is quite a different experience. I never played anything other than sandlot ball but it gave me a small taste of what is happening and, I hope, the insight to understand what happens on the field in college and pro ball games when supposedly well-trained and experienced players are playing the game. As I said, all you "Monday Morning Quarterbacking Generals" from the safety to 70 years and books and books which are limited in scope, like the knowledge all the commanders had on the ground at that time, and may unintentionally ignoring important Info because the civilian didn't know or think it was important. Bridges could've been taken and roads cut and everything else and the battle could've still been lost and like when an inferior team upsets a superior team. The difference is that in sports people go home only disappointed but in war troops die and never see their families again and families never see their loved one again. To me, it's all vain speculation. Agree there is rhyme and reason for critically studying what happened but it happened and it's over. Let us honor the men who fought and died.
One sight I want to share is about the training of US military officers to all the civilian historians. The US officer's job is: 1. to complete the mission and 2. the welfare of his men. When all this was going down, do any of the "sideline generals" know what the conditions were and what the chances for success were? Is that ever mentioned in any of the history books by the "civilian" historians? Were they there assessing the situation like the other, on-the-spot officers? There is a saying in the US that, "he who fights and runs away lives to fight another day." May be the withdrawing of battle experienced troops or the non-engaging with superior force could've saved many lives for another battle with a much better chance of victory. Yes, all this is subjective which is why second guessing is ridiculous. As I said, let us simply honor the men.
Who never served? Please clarify.
These are the sources cited for TIK:s documentary:
John Frost, A Drop Too Many. 2009.
Max Hastings, Armageddon. London, 2004.
Robert J. Kershaw, It Never Snows in September. Surry, 2007.
Martin Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle, 17-29 September. 2009.
Robert Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944. UK, 2014.
Poulussen, R.G. Lost at Nijmegen. 2011.
Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far. USA, 1974
Major General R E Urquhart, Arnhem. 1958.
Major General S Sosabowski, Freely I Served. Great Britain, 1982.
As I'm sure you are aware since you make such specific claims about Market Garden historians military service record, 5 out of the 9 have military careers behind them, and if I'm not mistaken all but one of them reached general officer rank in their respective services. Oh and yes, I too have served in the military, which is irrelevant, so please don't even try.