A slightly different take on the notion of extended mind is one I find interesting, but not talked about. For example, in phil. of lang. there is a strain of thought which says language needs a bootstrapping operator for naming and reference and language communication generally to get started. And the problem of relating private states seems still to be a mystery. Many make vague or not-so-vague use of the idea of ostension as the starting point for language, but I know of no accounts given as to how ostension is supposed to work absent some prior buttressing from language. If we imagine a race of space aliens who know nothing of us, and we want to get started communicating with them by teaching them simple words with pointing gestures, how would that work? Suppose that all my pointing, grunting, hand-waving, and other ostension type gesticulating is to these aliens a perfect nullity. Assuming intelligence on their part and ability to communicate, I still see no way for this process to get started with mere physical pointing. It seems that if we want to believe ostension works for us, we must assume some sort of actual touching of minds on some higher level (in spite of the apparent mystical sound of that). Ostension apparently must rest on some innate knowledge or higher level communication of thoughts.
this would have to be explored through ontology and metaphysics, maybe even science. Are we Tabula Rasas? Do this extend to all self conscious beings? Is this evolutionary?
Suppose that alexis is a moral philosopher and the entire legal system is her philosophical theory. Now suppose that alexis wrote a paper about her legal system and all philosophers and politicians and all individuals of the community are convinced,and then through a legislative act alexis's legal system is implemented. It seems that individuals thought about alexis's legal system and are convinced by it and then they started following it,therefore it seems that individuals are just acting according to their intentions and believed thoughts and no extended mind is there at all. It might be the case an individual i,let's call him smith, smith finds himself in a society which implements alexis's legal system and smith doesn't like alexis's legal system but it's in his best interest not to anger the authorites,so he goes with the system to carry his life's business. It seems that smith is making his decisions in his head and the rules of alexis's legal system are to him just the acts he expects other individuals to do in certain circumstances and to him acts he ought to carry otherwise he will be in trouble.
The Tetris example (Kirsch and Maglio) is a tad bogus. If I were constructing a mosaic tile table top I would engage the same kind of rotational practices using my hand and the next bit of tile floating slightly above the table to see how to get the best fit (as per the Tetris example). The task is not holy and solely 'cognitive'; let's be honest- its ecological. So one is not manipulating the environment to solve a 'strictly cognitive' task. One is manipulating the environment to facilitate a decision about a task which is ultimately ecological. One's cognitive processes are no more distributed out into the 'world' than is one's sensory motor activity is retracting back into “skin and scull”. The internal/external divide is too binary a distinction. And regarding "cognitive niche construction"; why not just "niche construction"?
The modvs1 comment about moussaka (whatever that is) is interesting. It appears that if Otto had only copied the cookbook section into his notebook, it would have counted as extended mind, but if he just uses the original cookbook, it doesn't. That seems like a serious flaw. I understand the bloating concern, but it seems the endorsement of information actually absorbed (when he read the cookbook) rather than merely sitting by on call, as with the kindle encyclopedia sets, is what matters - not the physical act of writing. Further, suppose Otto and Inga both make entries into one notebook together by giving speech input to a computer which prints out the pages for them. They may share one copy of the book or maybe each has a copy. This poses the interesting possibility of extended shared mind, which I think is a more interesting issue, and which I hope to develop into another comment later.
The extended affect section about music and emotion seems more appropriately applied in a discussion of the philosophy of signs, representation, language, etc. That is not to say a sign cannot be an extension of the signified, but this example does not seem to argue for extended affect any more than a discussion of obscene language, which research apparently shows is something whose use can actually diminish perceived pain, as when you stub your toe and swear. Anyway, it seems you might just as well use an example of how telling a sad tale (or anecdote) can make you feel more sad. The simple fact that, e.g., sadness begets sadness is not that compelling as an example of extended mind.
The Otto and Inga parable is overly contrived. If you've baked moussaka a hand full of time, chances are you won't need a recipe. If you're familiar with the terrain, you won't need the map, etc...
Please take a look at here: Instancology (by search the youtube.com). I feel that you are a very smart professor, but, with all respects, you might need a "qualitative upgrade" .
Hey dude just wanted to say this vid came through studying for my philosophy test at 4am stoned off my skull
Sameee but 8yrs after you :)
This is just so great material! Thanks a lot. You have a great talent in explaining
A slightly different take on the notion of extended mind is one I find interesting, but not talked about. For example, in phil. of lang. there is a strain of thought which says language needs a bootstrapping operator for naming and reference and language communication generally to get started. And the problem of relating private states seems still to be a mystery. Many make vague or not-so-vague use of the idea of ostension as the starting point for language, but I know of no accounts given as to how ostension is supposed to work absent some prior buttressing from language. If we imagine a race of space aliens who know nothing of us, and we want to get started communicating with them by teaching them simple words with pointing gestures, how would that work? Suppose that all my pointing, grunting, hand-waving, and other ostension type gesticulating is to these aliens a perfect nullity. Assuming intelligence on their part and ability to communicate, I still see no way for this process to get started with mere physical pointing. It seems that if we want to believe ostension works for us, we must assume some sort of actual touching of minds on some higher level (in spite of the apparent mystical sound of that). Ostension apparently must rest on some innate knowledge or higher level communication of thoughts.
this would have to be explored through ontology and metaphysics, maybe even science. Are we Tabula Rasas? Do this extend to all self conscious beings? Is this evolutionary?
THANK YOU!!!!! :D This theory confused me SOOOOO much before I watched your video THANKS SO MUCH
excellent point about reasoning-gesture, brings the understanding of absolute mechanics even closer :P nice work
Suppose that alexis is a moral philosopher and the entire legal system is her philosophical theory.
Now suppose that alexis wrote a paper about her legal system and all philosophers and politicians and all individuals of the community are convinced,and then through a legislative act alexis's legal system is implemented.
It seems that individuals thought about alexis's legal system and are convinced by it and then they started following it,therefore it seems that individuals are just acting according to their intentions and believed thoughts and no extended mind is there at all.
It might be the case an individual i,let's call him smith, smith finds himself in a society which implements alexis's legal system and smith doesn't like alexis's legal system but it's in his best interest not to anger the authorites,so he goes with the system to carry his life's business.
It seems that smith is making his decisions in his head and the rules of alexis's legal system are to him just the acts he expects other individuals to do in certain circumstances and to him acts he ought to carry otherwise he will be in trouble.
The Tetris example (Kirsch and Maglio) is a tad bogus. If I were constructing a mosaic tile table top I would engage the same kind of rotational practices using my hand and the next bit of tile floating slightly above the table to see how to get the best fit (as per the Tetris example). The task is not holy and solely 'cognitive'; let's be honest- its ecological. So one is not manipulating the environment to solve a 'strictly cognitive' task. One is manipulating the environment to facilitate a decision about a task which is ultimately ecological. One's cognitive processes are no more distributed out into the 'world' than is one's sensory motor activity is retracting back into “skin and scull”. The internal/external divide is too binary a distinction. And regarding "cognitive niche construction"; why not just "niche construction"?
The modvs1 comment about moussaka (whatever that is) is interesting. It appears that if Otto had only copied the cookbook section into his notebook, it would have counted as extended mind, but if he just uses the original cookbook, it doesn't. That seems like a serious flaw. I understand the bloating concern, but it seems the endorsement of information actually absorbed (when he read the cookbook) rather than merely sitting by on call, as with the kindle encyclopedia sets, is what matters - not the physical act of writing. Further, suppose Otto and Inga both make entries into one notebook together by giving speech input to a computer which prints out the pages for them. They may share one copy of the book or maybe each has a copy. This poses the interesting possibility of extended shared mind, which I think is a more interesting issue, and which I hope to develop into another comment later.
The extended affect section about music and emotion seems more appropriately applied in a discussion of the philosophy of signs, representation, language, etc. That is not to say a sign cannot be an extension of the signified, but this example does not seem to argue for extended affect any more than a discussion of obscene language, which research apparently shows is something whose use can actually diminish perceived pain, as when you stub your toe and swear. Anyway, it seems you might just as well use an example of how telling a sad tale (or anecdote) can make you feel more sad. The simple fact that, e.g., sadness begets sadness is not that compelling as an example of extended mind.
Great lectures. Do you have a module on consciousness?
Excellent videos. Could you go on to discuss supervenience?
The Otto and Inga parable is overly contrived. If you've baked moussaka a hand full of time, chances are you won't need a recipe. If you're familiar with the terrain, you won't need the map, etc...
Please take a look at here: Instancology (by search the youtube.com). I feel that you are a very smart professor, but, with all respects, you might need a "qualitative upgrade" .