诶，没想到袁老师的信息没有更新，也难怪会偏了。承诺是确实存在的，只不过不是签了字的协议，是一系列的会谈保证。 U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous “not one inch eastward” assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by Western leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University The documents show that multiple national leaders were considering and rejecting Central and Eastern European membership in NATO as of early 1990 and through 1991, that discussions of NATO in the context of German unification negotiations in 1990 were not at all narrowly limited to the status of East German territory, and that subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels. The documents reinforce former CIA Director Robert Gates’s criticism of “pressing ahead with expansion of NATO eastward [in the 1990s], when Gorbachev and others were led to believe that wouldn’t happen.”[1] The key phrase, buttressed by the documents, is “led to believe.” President George H.W. Bush had assured Gorbachev during the Malta summit in December 1989 that the U.S. would not take advantage (“I have not jumped up and down on the Berlin Wall”) of the revolutions in Eastern Europe to harm Soviet interests; but neither Bush nor Gorbachev at that point (or for that matter, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl) expected so soon the collapse of East Germany or the speed of German unification.[2] The first concrete assurances by Western leaders on NATO began on January 31, 1990, when West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher opened the bidding with a major public speech at Tutzing, in Bavaria, on German unification. The U.S. Embassy in Bonn (see Document 1) informed Washington that Genscher made clear “that the changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an ‘impairment of Soviet security interests.’ Therefore, NATO should rule out an ‘expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.'” The Bonn cable also noted Genscher’s proposal to leave the East German territory out of NATO military structures even in a unified Germany in NATO.[3] This latter idea of special status for the GDR territory was codified in the final German unification treaty signed on September 12, 1990, by the Two-Plus-Four foreign ministers (see Document 25). The former idea about “closer to the Soviet borders” is written down not in treaties but in multiple memoranda of conversation between the Soviets and the highest-level Western interlocutors (Genscher, Kohl, Baker, Gates, Bush, Mitterrand, Thatcher, Major, Woerner, and others) offering assurances throughout 1990 and into 1991 about protecting Soviet security interests and including the USSR in new European security structures. The two issues were related but not the same. Subsequent analysis sometimes conflated the two and argued that the discussion did not involve all of Europe. The documents published below show clearly that it did. The “Tutzing formula” immediately became the center of a flurry of important diplomatic discussions over the next 10 days in 1990, leading to the crucial February 10, 1990, meeting in Moscow between Kohl and Gorbachev when the West German leader achieved Soviet assent in principle to German unification in NATO, as long as NATO did not expand to the east. The Soviets would need much more time to work with their domestic opinion (and financial aid from the West Germans) before formally signing the deal in September 1990. The conversations before Kohl’s assurance involved explicit discussion of NATO expansion, the Central and East European countries, and how to convince the Soviets to accept unification. For example, on February 6, 1990, when Genscher met with British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, the British record showed Genscher saying, “The Russians must have some assurance that if, for example, the Polish Government left the Warsaw Pact one day, they would not join NATO the next.” (See Document 2) Having met with Genscher on his way into discussions with the Soviets, Baker repeated exactly the Genscher formulation in his meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on February 9, 1990, (see Document 4); and even more importantly, face to face with Gorbachev. Not once, but three times, Baker tried out the “not one inch eastward” formula with Gorbachev in the February 9, 1990, meeting. He agreed with Gorbachev’s statement in response to the assurances that “NATO expansion is unacceptable.” Baker assured Gorbachev that “neither the President nor I intend to extract any unilateral advantages from the processes that are taking place,” and that the Americans understood that “not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.” (See Document 6)
但Gorbachev本人不是這樣說. 2014年, Gorbachev接受Russia Beyond的訪問. 當年談的只是在東德地區駐軍問題, 根本沒談過北約擴張問題, 也沒有人提出過. RBTH(Russia Beyond): One of the key issues that has arisen in connection with the events in Ukraine is NATO expansion into the East. Do you get the feeling that your Western partners lied to you when they were developing their future plans in Eastern Europe? Why didn’t you insist that the promises made to you - particularly U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s promise that NATO would not expand into the East - be legally encoded? I will quote Baker: “NATO will not move one inch further east.” M.G(Mikhail Gorbachev): The topic of “NATO expansion” was not discussed at all, and it wasn’t brought up in those years. I say this with full responsibility. Not a singe Eastern European country raised the issue, not even after the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in 1991. Western leaders didn’t bring it up, either. Another issue we brought up was discussed: making sure that NATO’s military structures would not advance and that additional armed forces from the alliance would not be deployed on the territory of the then-GDR after German reunification. Baker’s statement, mentioned in your question, was made in that context. Kohl and [German Vice Chancellor Hans-Dietrich] Genscher talked about it. Everything that could have been and needed to be done to solidify that political obligation was done. And fulfilled. The agreement on a final settlement with Germany said that no new military structures would be created in the eastern part of the country; no additional troops would be deployed; no weapons of mass destruction would be placed there. It has been observed all these years. So don’t portray Gorbachev and the then-Soviet authorities as naïve people who were wrapped around the West’s finger. If there was naïveté, it was later, when the issue arose. Russia at first did not object. The decision for the U.S. and its allies to expand NATO into the east was decisively made in 1993. I called this a big mistake from the very beginning. It was definitely a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made to us in 1990. With regards to Germany, they were legally enshrined and are being observed.
@@brucel7430 嘿，“戈尔巴乔夫2014的访谈回忆” vs “美、苏、德、英、法等多国1990-1991当年的诸多文件”。有趣不！ 续上文： Afterwards, Baker wrote to Helmut Kohl who would meet with the Soviet leader on the next day, with much of the very same language. Baker reported: “And then I put the following question to him [Gorbachev]. Would you prefer to see a united Germany outside of NATO, independent and with no U.S. forces or would you prefer a unified Germany to be tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO’s jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position? He answered that the Soviet leadership was giving real thought to all such options [….] He then added, ‘Certainly any extension of the zone of NATO would be unacceptable.’” Baker added in parentheses, for Kohl’s benefit, “By implication, NATO in its current zone might be acceptable.” (See Document 8) Well-briefed by the American secretary of state, the West German chancellor understood a key Soviet bottom line, and assured Gorbachev on February 10, 1990: “We believe that NATO should not expand the sphere of its activity.” (See Document 9) After this meeting, Kohl could hardly contain his excitement at Gorbachev’s agreement in principle for German unification and, as part of the Helsinki formula that states choose their own alliances, so Germany could choose NATO. Kohl described in his memoirs walking all night around Moscow - but still understanding there was a price still to pay. All the Western foreign ministers were on board with Genscher, Kohl, and Baker. Next came the British foreign minister, Douglas Hurd, on April 11, 1990. At this point, the East Germans had voted overwhelmingly for the deutschmark and for rapid unification, in the March 18 elections in which Kohl had surprised almost all observers with a real victory. Kohl’s analyses (first explained to Bush on December 3, 1989) that the GDR’s collapse would open all possibilities, that he had to run to get to the head of the train, that he needed U.S. backing, that unification could happen faster than anyone thought possible - all turned out to be correct. Monetary union would proceed as early as July and the assurances about security kept coming. Hurd reinforced the Baker-Genscher-Kohl message in his meeting with Gorbachev in Moscow, April 11, 1990, saying that Britain clearly “recognized the importance of doing nothing to prejudice Soviet interests and dignity.” (See Document 15) The Baker conversation with Shevardnadze on May 4, 1990, as Baker described it in his own report to President Bush, most eloquently described what Western leaders were telling Gorbachev exactly at the moment: “I used your speech and our recognition of the need to adapt NATO, politically and militarily, and to develop CSCE to reassure Shevardnadze that the process would not yield winners and losers. Instead, it would produce a new legitimate European structure - one that would be inclusive, not exclusive.” (See Document 17) Baker said it again, directly to Gorbachev on May 18, 1990 in Moscow, giving Gorbachev his “nine points,” which included the transformation of NATO, strengthening European structures, keeping Germany non-nuclear, and taking Soviet security interests into account. Baker started off his remarks, “Before saying a few words about the German issue, I wanted to emphasize that our policies are not aimed at separating Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union. We had that policy before. But today we are interested in building a stable Europe, and doing it together with you.” (See Document 18) The French leader Francois Mitterrand was not in a mind-meld with the Americans, quite the contrary, as evidenced by his telling Gorbachev in Moscow on May 25, 1990, that he was “personally in favor of gradually dismantling the military blocs”; but Mitterrand continued the cascade of assurances by saying the West must “create security conditions for you, as well as European security as a whole.” (See Document 19) Mitterrand immediately wrote Bush in a “cher George” letter about his conversation with the Soviet leader, that “we would certainly not refuse to detail the guarantees that he would have a right to expect for his country’s security.” (See Document 20) At the Washington summit on May 31, 1990, Bush went out of his way to assure Gorbachev that Germany in NATO would never be directed at the USSR: “Believe me, we are not pushing Germany towards unification, and it is not us who determines the pace of this process. And of course, we have no intention, even in our thoughts, to harm the Soviet Union in any fashion. That is why we are speaking in favor of German unification in NATO without ignoring the wider context of the CSCE, taking the traditional economic ties between the two German states into consideration. Such a model, in our view, corresponds to the Soviet interests as well.” (See Document 21) The “Iron Lady” also pitched in, after the Washington summit, in her meeting with Gorbachev in London on June 8, 1990. Thatcher anticipated the moves the Americans (with her support) would take in the early July NATO conference to support Gorbachev with descriptions of the transformation of NATO towards a more political, less militarily threatening, alliance. She said to Gorbachev: “We must find ways to give the Soviet Union confidence that its security would be assured…. CSCE could be an umbrella for all this, as well as being the forum which brought the Soviet Union fully into discussion about the future of Europe.” (See Document 22)
There was, he said, no promise not to enlarge the alliance, though in the same interview Gorbachev also stated that he thinks that enlargement was a “big mistake” and “a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made” in 1990.
@@petershen6924 Oral statements have no meaning in any diplomatic setting thus no side is able to use them as the bases to demand further action from the other. so in this case, the Russians hold no high ground just because they think "someone promised us something." but the threat of war is, in its essence, an ultimatum. at that point, the diplomatic setting is already ended.
搜标题： The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia （2009年4月发表） 大概时间线是： 1. 90年代末北约自82年吸纳西班牙加入以来第一次打算吸纳新的成员几个原华约国进入，俄国政客批评这违背了90年北约和美国许下的北约不东扩承诺，戈尔巴乔夫同样表态，甚至当时的驻俄美官员也有部分表示赞同俄的这一说法。 2. 之后美国官方包括小布什等说北约或者美国未曾有过这种允诺，倒是承认有过关于东西德的一些约定，但从未约定过北约未来的路线图。 3. 虽然当时东西德会谈资料详实，很多东西都有笔录，但是还未解密，谁撒谎说不清楚。但双方继续扯皮，大众只能看罗生门。 4. 幸亏我们又活了几年能等到资料解密，多方资料显示谁在撒谎一目了然。 本人比较懒，关于论文后面的具体资料分析就没有兴趣再看了，希望不服气的朋友继续看完告诉大家这论文还是有问题。 至于为什么早就真相大白了还一直扯，那这个技巧大家都很熟悉了。
刚才在做核酸排队时听这期节目，前面排队的一位长者立马听出了你得声音说到，袁腾飞的节目在哪看的，他怎么找都找不着了，夸赞你的节目做的好风格也很有意思，我说在youtube他听成优酷，我说这个你找不找他说回去让孩子找，我说这个是外网，他说哦难怪再听不见袁腾飞的节目了。
'统一的时间还没有我看袁老师节目时间长的'网友，我喜欢这种修辞
谢谢袁老师，也谢谢会员们的慷慨分享！
别光谢谢 支持下袁老师
那么多历史学者，老师，面对大是大非的问题，就只有袁老师敢说真话。这就是袁老师着谜的地方。
蘇聯統治下的東歐國家過的什麼日子，好不容易擺脫了蘇聯，現在又被俄羅斯時刻覬覦。它們現在尋求加入北約不足為奇。
@@berlinismydearhome9556 你演绎了什么叫吹毛求疵。
苏联解体后，乌克兰成欧洲子宫，生活也好不到哪去
@@berlinismydearhome9556
罗马尼亚：？
波兰：？
波罗的海三国：？
@@berlinismydearhome9556 都加入，懂？
@@berlinismydearhome9556 加入北约抵抗俄罗斯侵略有啥问题？自己看不懂中文还搁这吹
11:55（關於鎖子甲）
想跟袁老師分享 ，漢朝普及的應該是玄鐵甲
鎖子甲最早記載於（晉書）的《先帝賜臣鎧甲表》中，但現今尚未發現魏晉以前的（鎖子甲）實物和記載，推測當代只有少數貴族能裝備，而（鎖子甲）直到明／清才普及於軍隊
看了袁sir 讲中国历史的视频 这个系列绝对会在往后每个时代传播 大家会记住您为时代做出的贡献
当传家宝⑧
给袁Sir点赞，谢谢。俄罗斯说的北约东扩，让人想到是欲加之罪 何患无辞。
袁sir根本没有仔细讲，有一本书叫《关于苏联解体》（作者是美国人）提到过这个事，北约不东扩到前苏联加盟共和国，是老布什给戈尔巴乔夫的口头承诺。
@@李明-k8h 口头就说不清了，这种作者自己也是道听途说的
@@李明-k8h 我去，没有史实条约根据的东西，是不是小说都不好说。这也拿出来做证据的话，咱们这是讲野史呢？
@@李明-k8h 没有实质性文件，而且俄罗斯当年也多次申请加入北约。
@@李明-k8h 口头说的也算？郭德纲还说过买中南海呢，怎么没给抓起来枪毙五分钟？
从来就没有北约东扩 只有俄国西扩 南扩 几百年来向来如此
黄俄从来不说俄爹东扩，占了整个西伯利亚甚至库页岛和大清东北
俄羅斯也東擴，突厥人、蒙古人、和中國人的土地都被它佔領了不少。
黄俄们的祖宗都越过白令海峡东扩到美洲了，后来觉得没用才把那片土地卖给美国。
俄罗斯有扩张领土的传统，某大国被占了300多万平方公里的土地，那个地方的一些神经病，还认为占领的是应该的，还为俄爹洗地，真不知道他们怎么想的。
@@Hanyao8敵國？哪個國家是中國的敵國？請明示。
對袁老師和公司的團隊同仁們，我只能說感謝再感謝！
您們辛苦了，讓這麼多人受惠！
很好，很客观，不以自己的喜好歪曲历史。谢谢袁老师。
不允许东扩是不同意北约往东边扩张，新成员国可以来自南北。袁老师这个解释未必精确！
@@RobinClock 这个没什么解释不解释，想确认的话直接去找当时签署的文件和报道，不用瞎猜
不客观，他的视频不看也知道他的言论都是讨厌俄罗斯的，如果是客观的得看完视频才知道俄罗斯做法对不对，其实每个人都有自己主观历史观，但没有人承认自己不客观
大致符合你观点的思想，你就会觉得客观，这也叫洗脑
@@蔡国文 是这样，其实不客观正常，人嘛本身就是自私的。没私心的那叫佛，一个人的历史观一定是自己的价值观自己利益观决定的，怎么可能象个机器人一样的无个人观点的叙述历史呢，那种人我还没见过
霍去病和卫青的部队也使用了大量匈奴投降的部队，这些人都熟悉匈奴和当地地理的情况，所以不但不容易迷路而且往往能抓住对方主力决战，也敢深入追击敌人。
與其說是北約東擴不如說是前蘇聯加盟國西進，俄羅斯要真這麼好加入都來不及了還讓你北約東擴？
拜占庭名字的由来： 康斯坦丁占领之前这座城市叫着：拜占庭，后来改名君士坦丁堡，后来被土耳其人占领叫：伊斯坦布尔
不，罗马人自己叫他新罗马。那可是统一帝国时代就这样做了
谢谢会员老爷们了！
袁老师，您一直说你不喜欢装古剧，我想请问您一下，您对「走向共和」这部电视剧是什么看法？谢谢。
袁老师您好！我想问一下为什么南斯拉夫解体以后塞尔维亚类似于俄罗斯，会这么不受西方的待见？历史上塞尔维亚和南斯拉夫的这些国家到底和其他欧洲国家是个啥关系？大塞尔维亚主义是不是和俄罗斯的大斯拉夫主义有类似之处？谢谢！
也想了解，Serbian旁边好多国家都加入北约和欧盟了。
你问问题的方式就不客观，你内心里已经站在了西方那边。
不是西方不待见塞尔维亚，是塞尔维亚不待见西方。北约把南斯拉夫肢解了，你还要尸块感谢北约？
塞尔维亚是之前南斯拉夫首都所在啊. 我觉得确实是跟俄罗斯之于苏联很相似
今天俄国对乌克兰的所作所为都是美国西方玩儿剩下的，半斤八两，谁也别说谁非法，大家都非法。但要承认一点，自冷战后，所有侵犯其他国家主权干涉别国内政这样违反国际法的行为，美国是始作俑者，而且做的最多，在全世界也最为广泛。俄今天对乌的入侵说是以美国为师不为过也。
我有那邊的朋友。基本上他們跟前蘇聯及俄羅斯的關係就像是巴基斯坦跟中國的關係，只是他們親密關係更長久，有幾百年的歷史，再加上都是信奉東正教有相同斯拉夫人血緣。
请问袁老师，1953年朝鲜停战协议，只有中国朝鲜对美国签署了停战协议，韩国并没有签署和中国和朝鲜的停战协议。但1992年中韩建交。那请问中韩之间现在是处于敌对状态还是友好状态。近30年，中韩过于亲密，让朝鲜产生了极度不满，一旦半岛出现战争，中国将处于什么样的位置，毕竟和韩国没有签署停战协议，但和朝鲜是友好国家和同盟国家。
朝鮮是中國的爹 上海餓死多少人也得給朝鮮人運糧食
你想多了，半岛分裂是中国最希望看到的局面，朝鲜半岛目前是不可能发生战争的，不要忘记，朝鲜现在也是核武国，只有朝鲜统一南韩，现在南韩已经不可能统一北朝鲜了，但是就用常规武器的话，北朝鲜肯定干不过南韩！
其实俄罗斯就是受害者心态，你要是真的很牛，制度也好，社会先进，那么你可以向北约方向西扩么，什么波兰，乌克兰北约可以争取，你俄罗斯也可以啊，你去争取才是正经的工作，怎么可能说争取不来我就揍，那一揍它肯定是彻底倒向北约，成了世仇，这不是很简单的道理么？你得对邻居好才行，北约对你有多好，我得对你更好，让你有好处有甜头，周围小国才能“归顺”；所谓远功近交么，这么简单的道理我真是不理解这个普丁为什么就不明白呢？真是莫名其妙，结果来硬的，即使是你生个娃想教育他也得给糖吃，一味的揍他肯定不听你的
這就是專制帝國與民主制度差別;畢竟集團智慧比一人決策的高明機率是多一點;這種強人專制有一定知識盲區
“自由也有难处，民主并不完美，但我们从来没有需要用一堵墙来防止我们的人民出逃。”约翰·肯尼迪评柏林墙
他尝到了车臣战争，格鲁吉亚战争和克里米亚叙利亚战争的甜头，再加上下面人不断地溜须拍马，真以为自己无所不能了
为躲避一个穷强盗，去投奔一个富黑帮大哥……，你整这么复杂。
你的意思就是要拉邦结派，这就和黑社会之间争地盘性质一样，如果各大国都这样，世界就永不安宁。
是只有我一个人看不到腾飞五千年了吗？？为什么我循迹讲堂里的所有袁老师的课都消失了。。有人遇到过相同的情况吗？
当时俄罗斯自己就想加入北约，让北约东扩到西伯利亚
一眼丁真
四次申請入北約，三次普京+一次葉利欽（新聞可查證）
可惜人家不要它这个“流氓”🤣
按照这个逻辑，俄罗斯加入北约威胁中国，中国应该出兵俄罗斯
为啥不让俄罗斯加入北约呢？
袁老师好，见到你真高兴！
北約何時東擴了???
分明就是人家害怕俄羅斯的侵略才紛紛加入北約尋求北約保護的,
請不要用那些一人一黨法西斯獨裁政權的政治正確來扭曲事實!!!
俄罗斯侵略谁了？
北約確實東擴，英文媒體確實也是用擴張這個字，只是擴張的緣由確實是因為俄羅斯
@@ottod4713 ？
波兰芬兰波罗的海捷克土耳其罗马尼亚克里米亚大清阿富汗匈牙利保加利亚觉得很赞
@@ottod4713 俄罗斯吞中国三百万平方公里！
@@uu7429 华约都解散了北约还有什么用
请问俄罗斯与北约打成和解的文件在哪里可以查到？ 有公开过吗？150亿美元也是不是真的？
袁老师，我也是从你在北京高中补习班就开始听你的讲课。有个问题想请教一下：为什么印度、以色列这两个国家也别擅长产生宗教？虽然可以理解宗教为何而存在，但为什么对这两个国家这么重要？谢谢袁老师！
不懂你的问题，对这两个国家重要?伊朗还是政教合一国家伊朗怎么说？
@@张东东-n9h 伊朗不是原创
@@south_cruiser 必须原创宗教才算啊？
大哥逻辑是这样的，就是像演化论，这两个国家产生了这两个宗教，中国产生了儒家思想，希腊苏格拉底带来了西方哲学思想等等。。各国都有各国的文化思想吧。
@@张东东-n9h 的确是。不过我的疑惑在于，不同民族在社会治理时可能选择不同道路，比如犹太人选择宗教，希腊人选择哲学，罗马人则选择法律。为什么这两个国家或民族选择了宗教，而不是哲学或法律呢？为什么当地人会把宗教在其社会生活中看得这么重。
@@south_cruiser 可以看看犹太教的历史
esaint CHANG :袁老师！翻我！🤣🤣🤣 听到这句话为啥笑了😂
袁老师您好。想问个问题，吾族家谱中有写到以字来命名辈份儿的事，即“兆，占，绍，德，化，建，立，庆，思”等等共计二十个字。想问下袁老师以字来命名辈份儿是从什么时候开始的；为什么祖上先辈们有些备份的字有些排在名字的第三个位置，有些排在名字的第二个位置；再者就是为什么要定这些字，由谁定的，有没有什么讲究。谢谢袁老师
老师早就讲过了，你去翻翻以前的视频
@@小陈分享美食爱好 我翻遍了袁老师的视频，没看到有翻牌这个的😂，兄弟给指个名路，能具体说说是哪一期么学习了🙏
這可以是個數學題
兄弟又来问了呀。上次你问了后，我大概查了些文字，目前自己感觉比较合理的是这样的：
家族同辈用字最早可以见于东晋，但是当时还不普遍也不严格；
唐朝开始，开始普遍一些，但是也不很严格。有考证认为唐代韩愈编写的《韩氏字辈》是最早的，但是有较大争议，因史书记载不全，并且有记载的例子是用偏旁。可能只是字辈雏形。
真正的关键点有两个，宋朝和明朝。
史书有完整正式记载的是宋太祖赵匡胤首创了严格的字辈。用来避免重名和犯长辈名讳。“于是联名之制始定”。联名就是字辈谱。
“字辈无疑很重要，被人们赋予好的寓意，比如修身齐家、治国安邦、吉祥如意、兴旺发达等等，通常代表着后代对先祖的尊敬、赞颂，或者祖宗前辈对后代的殷切希望与祝福。
字辈谱的形式主要有两类，一类可以看作诗体，另一类则是对联的形式。当然，第一类不属于真正的诗体，因为它不太讲究对仗或平仄。如果归类为诗体的话，四言和五言的格式居多，五言体的字辈用得更广泛一些，因为读起来顺口。此外也有六言、七言、八言体。”。这些原则是主流，还有类似的，比如记载家族历史。方式也有用字的，用偏旁的，五行的。比如流行起单字名 的年代，很多就是用部首。流行双字名的年代，第二第三字，是都可以，还是一代第二一代第三，还是一句第二一句第三，有的严格规定，有的就没有导致后代理解不一致出现第二第三不一样的情况都有。
有了皇家做榜样，宋朝字辈开始蓬勃发展，但是只局限于大族和士大夫阶层。因为在王朝时代，世家大族是很重要的。大族，门阀长居一地，长期积累关系，有的甚至能影响皇权，所以比较重视宗族。
明代朱元璋创造了更讲究的朱氏取名法，同时规定字和五行，给各个支脉不同的序列。同时，又给孔家赐字，并规定孔家以后的字都由皇家来定，不够了再请赐新字。此后孔、孟、曾、颜四家都按这个取名。一直延续到清朝和民国政府赐字。也就是明清开始，字辈走入普通百姓。
为什么明代开始呢？我个人分析，有三方面原因，一是皇家和孔家做了榜样，士族和儒生开始模仿，然后走入民间。二是元代蒙古人入侵，导致一些家族传承断绝，元末的蒙古高层内乱和各路汉人起义军，尤其是朱元璋北伐，导致北方大量地区人口规模消失，战乱中家族资料丢失。同时，与宋代相比，明朝得到了大量蒙古人带来的新领土，比如云南，需要军队驻守和人口支持。对此，明代初年，发生了两种类型的居民大规模迁徙，一是军事机构，比如山东沿海，北方和西北的卫所，南京派去云南的驻军等。二是从战乱影响程度低的地方迁徙人口去填充战乱损失大的地方的人口。有政府强制的，也有自发的。比如湖广填四川，比如传说的洪洞大槐树迁徙到山东，河南河北等地。迁移之后，产生了修谱和取字辈的需求。修谱和字辈是互相有关系又一定独立的两个系统。比如都是为了寻根。那迁移之后到了外地，有的人为了防止丢了族系，就把以前能找到的记载下来。可能更多的是刚迁徙的时候忙于繁衍谋生，顾不得修谱，或迁到一地，可以当一世，不一定有需要继承前面谱系的意愿。
然后就是第三个原因，就是明代开始，相对以前基本无大战乱，大航海发现的高产美洲作物陆续传入推广，人口稳定增加，各个迁徙出来的独家很多形成了家族树，后代繁衍兴盛，子孙安居乐业，解决了温饱，有了文化和声望，可能就有愿望组织修谱了。清朝入关后为了笼络汉人知识分子，顺治开始尊孔读经。促进了又一个小高潮。从明初大迁徙到这时候，大概二十代左右，把零星记载系统整理成家谱，这些家谱很多就把从明初迁来的祖先作为支系的一世祖了。而字辈不一定初次修谱就定好。可能等到后世出了个有名望的有见识的，或者中了举人进士，或者做了官的。组织重修族谱时顺便把字辈定下来，这中间可能间隔百年。普通百姓的家谱和字辈很多是这个模式。而普通百姓一般没有儒家四大姓那样的通天字辈，大多是循环使用。
等到文革初四旧，烧族谱，烧拜祭家族记载，到了70年代，有些家族的这些字辈记载就又丢了，and/or听了号召,有的就完全不按族谱了，有的还按，有的恢复了宋以前的约定俗成模式，比较近五服内几家，长子家里用了哪个字，其它家可能有的就用同样的，但是和族谱不一致。到了改革开放后，又产生了两个分化，一是日子过好了，又有了寻根和重修族谱的愿望和条件，把以前的族谱和字辈又整理出来了。但是这时候时代不同了，有的人觉得又找到传统找到根了，重新按照字辈来，而有的，尤其是到了城市的，不知道新族谱或者已经没有这个概念了，取名个性化，父母这一代开始读言情小说，于是子梓涵晗萱轩大行其道。
@@gerrygai5151 感谢大哥，我一字不拉的看完了，谢谢您这么耐心的解答，我对自己家族的事情特别在意，总想沿着血脉寻找和自己的哪怕一丝丝足迹，有先祖们的传承才有了我，虽然平凡，但有后人为他们祭奠也会倍感温情吧。再次感谢老老哥解答心中的疑虑，谢谢了
请问袁老师，海洋帝国在哪里买 网上都搜索不到 是不是被禁了
本人分享一下拜占庭的说法，如有错误望批评指正：
中古欧洲，一般称之为“东罗马帝国”，而非“拜占庭帝国”。1526年，德意志历史学家沃尔夫首次使用“拜占庭帝国”一词。而后诸多历史学家皆采用此名。
“拜占庭”原为博斯普鲁斯海峡的古希腊殖民古城，三世纪危机后，罗马帝国陷于混乱，而东部相对稳定，政治地位逐渐超过西部。四世纪君士坦丁大帝重建古城，命名“君士坦丁堡”。后人就特指“定都古城拜占庭的东地中海国家”为拜占庭帝国
大致上正確了，不過「拜占庭帝國」這個名字的背後其實承載的是神羅、東羅的法統之爭與羅馬跟君士坦丁堡（後來的西方天主敎跟東方正敎）的敎統之爭。西歐人故意去用「拜占庭帝國」這個名字去稱呼東羅馬其實就是爲了從語言層面上否定東羅馬的法統。
東羅馬人從始至終都是以「羅馬人」而不是「希臘人」或「拜占庭人」自居的。在君士坦丁堡淪陷於鄂圖曼後，鄂圖曼境內的希臘人還是繼續稱呼自己爲「羅馬人」，直到希臘民族主義興起才逐漸改稱自己是「希臘人」的。在東羅馬時代，把東羅馬人叫成「希臘人」基本上跟「尼哥」一類的稱呼差不多。
@@MarkLinJA 確實也有想到東西教會大分裂的問題，可能是故意排斥東羅馬的實質法統(相對於羅馬天主教庭和法蘭克/神羅)，以彰顯自己的權威性。
不過東正教與天主教的分裂與東正教史似乎在世界史中較少被提到。可能是因為之後東正教世界並不如天主教/新教世界對世界影響那麼深遠而導致的吧～
@@MarkLinJA 没错，就可以约等于日本人看蒙古灭了中国, 自称中国，并且管原来的老中国叫“河南帝国”. 然而人家日本人并没有这么无耻
@@TRTCC301 還有一點，就是東羅馬帝國有一位女皇登基，忘記名字了，西歐各國與教廷一看，怎麼能是女性當羅馬帝國皇帝呢。而且又遇到宗教分裂問題，於是直接不在稱呼東羅馬為羅馬而稱拜占庭，等於做了切割，而羅馬自然就是由教宗加冕的神羅皇帝取代。
@@muic4880 當時教皇排斥君士坦丁堡很久了，所以當伊琳娜女皇竄她兒子皇位登基的時候，教皇就趁虛而入，以「羅馬皇位不可由女性繼承」的原因，先宣告「羅馬皇位從缺」，然後就把皇冠戴在查理曼的頭上了。
「拜占庭」這個稱呼其實也是到16世紀才由一位德意志史學家發明的。在這之前，神羅將東羅馬皇帝稱爲「希臘皇帝」或者是「希臘國王」
请问 腾飞五千年专辑需要加入会员才能看到完整的吗
永遠支持袁老師
有没有好心人告诉我那个海洋帝国的系列在哪找找半天找不到😭
先赞后看，养成习惯
袁sir请讲讲俄罗斯申请加入北约的事吧？也许已经讲过了？
想问问袁老师您觉得《竹书纪年》和《史记》对五帝夏商的描述哪个更接近真实史实，我个人觉得竹书更符合人性，想听听袁老师看法。另外像《竹书纪年》这样的古籍还有机会被发现吗？国家还有相关的机构在整理古人墓穴吗？谢谢袁老师
历史，本就没有真相，你爱信那个，那个就是真的。
@@aigirl008 历史怎么可能没真相？！只是你愿不愿意相信真相而已
@@master-qiumingshan 历史上的很多事，没有绝对的对错，并且对后世的影响也无绝对的好和绝对的坏一样，历史的描述机遇立场不一样，会出现相反的描写。
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战争给人类带来灾难，也能促进科技的发展，战争是解决危机的手段，是人类的一种自我调节，不管你愿不愿意接受这个观点，但战争在历史中一直扮演着这个角色。
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每个人都口口声声要和平，但一战二战恰恰是这个星球上“最文明”的地区发起的。写历史书的人，本身就有认知的局限，不可能写出客观的历史。
梁老师不是讲了吗？
@古或今 那我问你，美国去阿富汗打了20年的仗，这仗是打对了还是打错了？
袁sir 求翻盘 能不能讲一下 美国格兰特总统对中美关系发展的影响
诶，没想到袁老师的信息没有更新，也难怪会偏了。承诺是确实存在的，只不过不是签了字的协议，是一系列的会谈保证。
U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous “not one inch eastward” assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by Western leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University
The documents show that multiple national leaders were considering and rejecting Central and Eastern European membership in NATO as of early 1990 and through 1991, that discussions of NATO in the context of German unification negotiations in 1990 were not at all narrowly limited to the status of East German territory, and that subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels.
The documents reinforce former CIA Director Robert Gates’s criticism of “pressing ahead with expansion of NATO eastward [in the 1990s], when Gorbachev and others were led to believe that wouldn’t happen.”[1] The key phrase, buttressed by the documents, is “led to believe.”
President George H.W. Bush had assured Gorbachev during the Malta summit in December 1989 that the U.S. would not take advantage (“I have not jumped up and down on the Berlin Wall”) of the revolutions in Eastern Europe to harm Soviet interests; but neither Bush nor Gorbachev at that point (or for that matter, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl) expected so soon the collapse of East Germany or the speed of German unification.[2]
The first concrete assurances by Western leaders on NATO began on January 31, 1990, when West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher opened the bidding with a major public speech at Tutzing, in Bavaria, on German unification. The U.S. Embassy in Bonn (see Document 1) informed Washington that Genscher made clear “that the changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an ‘impairment of Soviet security interests.’ Therefore, NATO should rule out an ‘expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.'” The Bonn cable also noted Genscher’s proposal to leave the East German territory out of NATO military structures even in a unified Germany in NATO.[3]
This latter idea of special status for the GDR territory was codified in the final German unification treaty signed on September 12, 1990, by the Two-Plus-Four foreign ministers (see Document 25). The former idea about “closer to the Soviet borders” is written down not in treaties but in multiple memoranda of conversation between the Soviets and the highest-level Western interlocutors (Genscher, Kohl, Baker, Gates, Bush, Mitterrand, Thatcher, Major, Woerner, and others) offering assurances throughout 1990 and into 1991 about protecting Soviet security interests and including the USSR in new European security structures. The two issues were related but not the same. Subsequent analysis sometimes conflated the two and argued that the discussion did not involve all of Europe. The documents published below show clearly that it did.
The “Tutzing formula” immediately became the center of a flurry of important diplomatic discussions over the next 10 days in 1990, leading to the crucial February 10, 1990, meeting in Moscow between Kohl and Gorbachev when the West German leader achieved Soviet assent in principle to German unification in NATO, as long as NATO did not expand to the east. The Soviets would need much more time to work with their domestic opinion (and financial aid from the West Germans) before formally signing the deal in September 1990.
The conversations before Kohl’s assurance involved explicit discussion of NATO expansion, the Central and East European countries, and how to convince the Soviets to accept unification. For example, on February 6, 1990, when Genscher met with British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, the British record showed Genscher saying, “The Russians must have some assurance that if, for example, the Polish Government left the Warsaw Pact one day, they would not join NATO the next.” (See Document 2)
Having met with Genscher on his way into discussions with the Soviets, Baker repeated exactly the Genscher formulation in his meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on February 9, 1990, (see Document 4); and even more importantly, face to face with Gorbachev.
Not once, but three times, Baker tried out the “not one inch eastward” formula with Gorbachev in the February 9, 1990, meeting. He agreed with Gorbachev’s statement in response to the assurances that “NATO expansion is unacceptable.” Baker assured Gorbachev that “neither the President nor I intend to extract any unilateral advantages from the processes that are taking place,” and that the Americans understood that “not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.” (See Document 6)
但Gorbachev本人不是這樣說. 2014年, Gorbachev接受Russia Beyond的訪問. 當年談的只是在東德地區駐軍問題, 根本沒談過北約擴張問題, 也沒有人提出過.
RBTH(Russia Beyond): One of the key issues that has arisen in connection with the events in Ukraine is NATO expansion into the East. Do you get the feeling that your Western partners lied to you when they were developing their future plans in Eastern Europe? Why didn’t you insist that the promises made to you - particularly U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s promise that NATO would not expand into the East - be legally encoded? I will quote Baker: “NATO will not move one inch further east.”
M.G(Mikhail Gorbachev): The topic of “NATO expansion” was not discussed at all, and it wasn’t brought up in those years. I say this with full responsibility. Not a singe Eastern European country raised the issue, not even after the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in 1991. Western leaders didn’t bring it up, either. Another issue we brought up was discussed: making sure that NATO’s military structures would not advance and that additional armed forces from the alliance would not be deployed on the territory of the then-GDR after German reunification. Baker’s statement, mentioned in your question, was made in that context. Kohl and [German Vice Chancellor Hans-Dietrich] Genscher talked about it.
Everything that could have been and needed to be done to solidify that political obligation was done. And fulfilled. The agreement on a final settlement with Germany said that no new military structures would be created in the eastern part of the country; no additional troops would be deployed; no weapons of mass destruction would be placed there. It has been observed all these years. So don’t portray Gorbachev and the then-Soviet authorities as naïve people who were wrapped around the West’s finger. If there was naïveté, it was later, when the issue arose. Russia at first did not object.
The decision for the U.S. and its allies to expand NATO into the east was decisively made in 1993. I called this a big mistake from the very beginning. It was definitely a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made to us in 1990. With regards to Germany, they were legally enshrined and are being observed.
访谈回忆录不是正式历史文件。 即使形成了备忘录， 离正式协议也有距离。 这是国际政治常识。
中国因为没签旧金山和约， 对于台湾就缺乏法理基础， 哪怕美国出于政治让步，事实承认。 威斯特伐利亚到维也纳， 国际政治外交有一套既成的被认可的框架。
不是个别媒体可以瞎twist的。 这套体系不是完全不可挑战， 在实力的基础上。
@@brucel7430 嘿，“戈尔巴乔夫2014的访谈回忆” vs “美、苏、德、英、法等多国1990-1991当年的诸多文件”。有趣不！
续上文：
Afterwards, Baker wrote to Helmut Kohl who would meet with the Soviet leader on the next day, with much of the very same language. Baker reported: “And then I put the following question to him [Gorbachev]. Would you prefer to see a united Germany outside of NATO, independent and with no U.S. forces or would you prefer a unified Germany to be tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO’s jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position? He answered that the Soviet leadership was giving real thought to all such options [….] He then added, ‘Certainly any extension of the zone of NATO would be unacceptable.’” Baker added in parentheses, for Kohl’s benefit, “By implication, NATO in its current zone might be acceptable.” (See Document 8)
Well-briefed by the American secretary of state, the West German chancellor understood a key Soviet bottom line, and assured Gorbachev on February 10, 1990: “We believe that NATO should not expand the sphere of its activity.” (See Document 9) After this meeting, Kohl could hardly contain his excitement at Gorbachev’s agreement in principle for German unification and, as part of the Helsinki formula that states choose their own alliances, so Germany could choose NATO. Kohl described in his memoirs walking all night around Moscow - but still understanding there was a price still to pay.
All the Western foreign ministers were on board with Genscher, Kohl, and Baker. Next came the British foreign minister, Douglas Hurd, on April 11, 1990. At this point, the East Germans had voted overwhelmingly for the deutschmark and for rapid unification, in the March 18 elections in which Kohl had surprised almost all observers with a real victory. Kohl’s analyses (first explained to Bush on December 3, 1989) that the GDR’s collapse would open all possibilities, that he had to run to get to the head of the train, that he needed U.S. backing, that unification could happen faster than anyone thought possible - all turned out to be correct. Monetary union would proceed as early as July and the assurances about security kept coming. Hurd reinforced the Baker-Genscher-Kohl message in his meeting with Gorbachev in Moscow, April 11, 1990, saying that Britain clearly “recognized the importance of doing nothing to prejudice Soviet interests and dignity.” (See Document 15)
The Baker conversation with Shevardnadze on May 4, 1990, as Baker described it in his own report to President Bush, most eloquently described what Western leaders were telling Gorbachev exactly at the moment: “I used your speech and our recognition of the need to adapt NATO, politically and militarily, and to develop CSCE to reassure Shevardnadze that the process would not yield winners and losers. Instead, it would produce a new legitimate European structure - one that would be inclusive, not exclusive.” (See Document 17)
Baker said it again, directly to Gorbachev on May 18, 1990 in Moscow, giving Gorbachev his “nine points,” which included the transformation of NATO, strengthening European structures, keeping Germany non-nuclear, and taking Soviet security interests into account. Baker started off his remarks, “Before saying a few words about the German issue, I wanted to emphasize that our policies are not aimed at separating Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union. We had that policy before. But today we are interested in building a stable Europe, and doing it together with you.” (See Document 18)
The French leader Francois Mitterrand was not in a mind-meld with the Americans, quite the contrary, as evidenced by his telling Gorbachev in Moscow on May 25, 1990, that he was “personally in favor of gradually dismantling the military blocs”; but Mitterrand continued the cascade of assurances by saying the West must “create security conditions for you, as well as European security as a whole.” (See Document 19) Mitterrand immediately wrote Bush in a “cher George” letter about his conversation with the Soviet leader, that “we would certainly not refuse to detail the guarantees that he would have a right to expect for his country’s security.” (See Document 20)
At the Washington summit on May 31, 1990, Bush went out of his way to assure Gorbachev that Germany in NATO would never be directed at the USSR: “Believe me, we are not pushing Germany towards unification, and it is not us who determines the pace of this process. And of course, we have no intention, even in our thoughts, to harm the Soviet Union in any fashion. That is why we are speaking in favor of German unification in NATO without ignoring the wider context of the CSCE, taking the traditional economic ties between the two German states into consideration. Such a model, in our view, corresponds to the Soviet interests as well.” (See Document 21)
The “Iron Lady” also pitched in, after the Washington summit, in her meeting with Gorbachev in London on June 8, 1990. Thatcher anticipated the moves the Americans (with her support) would take in the early July NATO conference to support Gorbachev with descriptions of the transformation of NATO towards a more political, less militarily threatening, alliance. She said to Gorbachev: “We must find ways to give the Soviet Union confidence that its security would be assured…. CSCE could be an umbrella for all this, as well as being the forum which brought the Soviet Union fully into discussion about the future of Europe.” (See Document 22)
@@marcoc2706 我覺得有些人就是選擇性失明。
上星期我经过水果摊，荔枝标价一斤二十五，我问老板荔枝一斤二十卖不卖，老板不肯卖。今天我经过水果摊，荔枝标价一斤八元，老板竟然说上星期我承诺一斤二十买他的荔枝，非得要我按一斤二十买。
说得好！秦是大一统的开创者，用南丁格尔开创护士说明，通俗易懂。
东欧国家加入北约是那些国家的主权，北约接纳，也就是那些北约国家同意，也是那些北约国家的主权，属于国家的内政。
@Tomas Lau 难道古巴需要别人允许吗，内政的意思就是自己内部的事情。它想怎么做，都是自己的事。除非他攻击你，否则你不能攻击它。你可以制裁它，那也是你的主权。
@Tomas Lau 你是想和俄罗斯入侵乌克兰比较吗？我想那是人类和魔鬼的区别。
@Tomas Lau 这两件事能相提并论吗？苏联是直接在古巴建了导弹发射井，核弹可以几分钟打到华盛顿的，北约有在靠近俄罗斯的新成员部署核力量了吗？更何况乌克兰的申请一直被拒绝，俄罗斯就因为自己 “觉得“可能有威胁就可以公然发动攻击？
明明是東歐國家西進,非要說成北約東擴,混淆是非!
西班牙在俄乌战争是否加入战争的问题上新闻都有报合同上注明北约不东扩，你怎么给改了……！
请问袁老师的腾飞五千年是在哪个平台播出的？
以讹传讹的始作俑者是谁？大家也心知肚明
youtube上有大把的英文节目证实过这项承诺。袁以讹传讹，大家也心知肚明。欺负你不懂英文是吗？
袁老师求翻牌，我想购买袁老师腾飞五千年以及您团队制作的您其他节目的永久下载保留，请问能在哪里买？我曾经在寻迹讲堂App买了一些，但现在您的节目已经下架了……求指教，谢谢！
There was, he said, no promise not to enlarge the alliance, though in the same interview Gorbachev also stated that he thinks that enlargement was a “big mistake” and “a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made” in 1990.
an oral "statement" means nothing in this matter.
@@advancedmonkey7702 it meant war and war is not "nothing". An oral argument on the other hand, meant nothing at all.
@@advancedmonkey7702 The agreement to resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis was also an "verbal agreement"
@@aussieebayfashion Well said.
@@petershen6924 Oral statements have no meaning in any diplomatic setting thus no side is able to use them as the bases to demand further action from the other. so in this case, the Russians hold no high ground just because they think "someone promised us something."
but the threat of war is, in its essence, an ultimatum. at that point, the diplomatic setting is already ended.
袁Sir，在节目里穿一件北约的T恤，向代表什么吗？
就跟日本侵略要找个士兵丢了的借口一样
老師好，老師長期的說發都有穿透力.史學家腰桿硬梆梆.
聽說的一種說法是北約向戈爾巴喬夫保證不東擴，不過是口頭承諾，沒有官方簽字的那種承諾。
听说的一种说法是你爷爷的爷爷保证给我爷爷的爷爷100万，不过是口头承诺，没有官方签字的那种承诺。
@@williamyao4304 特朗普撕毁了一堆协议，就算签字又如何？
@@williamyao4304 有道理
@hell what 那要看是不是做出的公开承诺了，是不是有记录画面，否则口头承诺随便你怎么说也没办法证实
不必聽說，National Security Archive at George Washington University解密的文件中明確記錄了在1990-1991一系列會談中西方陣營給予的保證。
一年多没上油管了，袁老师眼睛怎么感觉跟以前不一样了
化妆了
身體健康了一些
支持袁老師說明真相，
袁老师求翻牌，我想问下苏联在戈尔巴乔夫刚上台的时候经济状况怎么样，看一个纪录片，戈尔巴乔夫的一个智囊好像说过如果有戈尔巴乔夫200亿美元的改革经费，根本没人敢反对改革。诺大的苏联连200亿美元的改革经费都拿不出来了吗……
俄罗斯无数次申请加入北约，被美国拒绝，如果美国接纳俄罗斯加入北约，还会有今天的俄乌战争吗？袁老师不要选择性失明。
北约的目的就是防范俄罗斯，你这不是胡搅蛮缠嘛？
@@advancedmonkey7702 孩子，北约的军费多少，俄罗斯军费多少？北约多少人口，俄罗斯对少人口？北约多少GDP，俄罗斯多少GDP？北约多少核弹头，俄罗斯多少核弹头？麻烦你说话之前动动脑子行吗，到底是谁威胁谁？
孩子，为什么一定要接纳你？你脸大么？
@@bloodyChina 所以俄罗斯现在打乌克兰也没有任何问题。让那些整天想着给美国人当儿子的人清醒一下。
@@benjaminliu2654 你还是在继续胡搅蛮缠，我就不参与了。
1991年3月6日的美、英、法、德高级外交官波恩会晤纪要，其中最有价值的发现在于西方国家外交官们明确提及在两德统一“2+4”谈判期间，的确向当时的苏联承诺过北约不会延展到东德以东的区域。参会的西德外交官于尔根·克罗伯格 （Jürgen Chrobog）也重复了这一观点，并进一步强调北约的界限不能超过奥德河（德国与波兰界限），不应该将波兰等其他国家纳入北约。
北约不东扩的事情，我认为讲的不对。包括我查到当前西方对于这件事的说法里，两德合并时，北约确实向苏联做出承诺，不东扩一英寸。在1990年2月9日的美苏会谈上，时任美国国务卿詹姆斯·贝克（James Baker）告诉苏联当时的最高领导人戈尔巴乔夫：“如果能够保持德国作为北约成员的地位，那么北约的管辖权将不会向东扩展一寸。”现在西方说这件事，着重强调的是苏联已经不复存在，所以承诺是从未向俄罗斯说过的。当然也有说法是这个承诺没有落在纸上，不算。至于各位看官怎么认为是否做出过承诺，见仁见智吧。
1 政治協商、談判中的口頭承諾保證，甚至聯合公報- 如中美上海公報， 均沒有法律效力，單方面可以反悔、改變，也沒有什麼道德不妥。
2 而且此種政治協商，僅僅引述某一階段的說法，也是斷章取義。比如此文引用的傳聞，Baker 等承諾北約不東擴，可能早已在此後的進一步的協商談判中被否決、改變、取代了
3 事實上，關於北約是否承諾不東擴的議題，就完全如此。因為1990年代，連俄羅斯自己都討論過是否加入北約，北约與俄羅斯一度有很多聯席會議，互派代表等合作安排。可見Baker 、戈巴喬夫不東擴的談話，早已被包括俄羅斯自己在內的所有參與者掃入歷史。
4 Baker 談話的對手是蘇共總書記，而此後不僅蘇聯解體，而且蘇共 還被俄羅斯宣布為非法組織，所以早已滄海桑田，沒有任何意義。俄羅斯有權要求美國履行對俄羅斯宣布非法的組織的「承諾」嗎？
5 即便是「信守」當年「承諾」，而承諾的對象是蘇聯，是華約，不是俄羅斯。烏克蘭也是蘇聯、華約的繼承人，烏克蘭當然有權解釋、修改、同意廢除當年的「承諾」。
即便假设这个谈话，不仅仅是谈话，而且是白纸黑字、签字画押、议会批准、本国刊宪，联合国备案的国际协议（如中英联合声明）， 但是，乌克兰也是苏联继承人，乌克兰是不是也有权与北约共同自愿同意，将其废除？
@@fukfukccp 我的回复竟然莫名其妙没有了。
在哪里看袁老师的视频节目？求推荐个软件
相比于欧盟，北约加入的门槛并没有这么高，连土耳其都可以加入，乌克兰加入是自家内部的问题，能否定这件事的只有乌克兰人民而不是俄罗斯政府。
@tony tony 成功了是战争，失败了那叫灾难
@Tomas Lau 美國有出兵打古巴嗎?真是會混水摸魚
我暸解的與老師不同，是「切支丹」大名
謝謝老師解惑，原來不能東擴根本是以訛傳訛
北约能東擴才根本是以訛傳訛。袁再次发挥历史发明家的实力。
@@sjsupa 我自己也有去查，很抱歉，當初東西德合併時簽署文件確實沒看到相關內容喔，代表的是實際并未列入，後來葉爾欽抗議後也確實沒有下文，相反是進行經濟相關的協定及援助沒錯啊～
Byzas 是个希腊人的名字，来自雅典西面的一个地区，拜占庭以此人命名
老师求解惑，为什么欧洲国家的周制能一直延续下去，而中国却变成了中央集权？是不是因为物极必反导致的结果啊？
欧洲的周制之所以能一直持续，是不是因为国王一直以来都没有被贵族架空过？王权与贵族互相制衡，谁也不能消灭谁，最后反而能长期共存，而中国的周天子却被诸侯彻底架空，王权无法与贵族抗衡，分封领地实际上成了独立国家，最后互相争斗养蛊使得秦制国家的集权优势击败非秦制国家，最终从一个极端走向另一个极端。
神聖羅馬帝國被諸侯肢解所以才會「不是帝國」，法國在百年戰爭之後肅清諸侯，英國很早就變成了議會在治國⋯⋯🤔貴族跟國王互相牽制的大概就波蘭了嗎🤔
@@konradmoien4734 英国议会不恰恰正是王权和贵族博弈的结果吗？毕竟英格兰议会最初没有下议院，本质上还是王权与贵族的博弈吧
百年战争前的法国难道没有体现王权和贵族的博弈嘛，为什么非要盯着百年战争之后说呢，百年战争后，国王的确是与市民联手消灭了贵族，但是国王也没笑到最后，因为法国大革命市民又消灭了王权。
因为欧洲在山沟沟里，东面又没有特别多的野蛮游牧帝国。他们的诸侯国不容易被皇帝灭国。
@@HereIAM-l2z 搞反了吧，不是周天子灭诸候，而是诸侯灭周天子，所有人最后都被秦制国家消灭，而欧洲的天子们 几乎没有被诸侯干掉的吧
我有說議會是平民嗎
袁老師，你好。我是新加坡人。
想請問一下。華人最早是幾時移民到南洋的？歷朝歷代對華僑的看法如何？是把華僑當外國人還是本國人？
最早期是鄭和下西洋留在當地的人, 這些人叫做Nyonya (娘惹), 在這之前有零星移民, 但是紀錄都不夠清楚.
之後比較大規模是清末時期, 鴉片戰爭後開放通商去南洋賺英鎊, 這些人叫做新客, 今天當地華僑主要就是這些人.
傳統中華思想從來就是地緣觀念強過血緣觀念, 只要不是天朝當地子民那都是番人.
只是因為南洋華人賺英鎊, 這些第一批富起來的華商出錢出力幫助推翻清朝, 到此為止華僑的存在才出現在中華文化的政治版圖裡面.
袁老师对王安石的理解还是差了点，留在拗相公是好人的层面上，王安石是桑弘羊，王莽的精神同道，其目的本就是中央集权制度下的聚敛，所以新党皆蔡京之流，绝非偶然。
说白了王朝缺钱能敛财就重用
不是袁老师理解差点，是你不能拿20，21世纪的观点去看古人。古代所谓的国家强大就是中央强大，士大夫为国敛财就是他们爱“国”的表现，更多的是得过且过，官官相护加中饱私囊，其中出几个有能力为国敛财的就已经是皇帝眼中的能臣干吏了，上到皇帝下到县官，所谓勤政爱民的最终目的都是为了维护那一套统治，用现在党国的话讲叫“维稳”，整个官僚系统在乎的不是现代意义上的把整个市场经济的蛋糕做大，而是户籍有没有增加，税收有没有增加，国库的银子有没有增加，是谓富国也。你不能拿现在的民主思想去要求他们从人民权益的角度去富国强兵。
张居正么
@@nwtdbssb 正相反，自汉以降，正统儒家意识形态，恰恰是王道天下，百姓乐业，而不是什么富国强兵。富国强兵，那是秦政、日本军国主义，和近代受德国霸权及苏俄影响到国共两个列宁式政党塑造的价值观。至于有宋的王安石改革虽能聚敛，但不能强军的关节，说来太长。
@@CO8848_2 秦后都是秦制两千年了，所谓王道天下百姓乐业都是个幌子而已。那是周制不是秦制。后面的所有朝代都是实行秦制，秦制就是中央集权，在王安石当时所处的环境和立场，就是要强国，维护统治者的核心利益，这点袁老师讲的非常的透彻，出发点和实施效果是两回事。
想請教袁老師與各方賢達，1997年北約與俄國150億美元的協議有詳細資訊或條約嗎？
1997年北約跟俄羅斯簽署合作協議。北約承諾不在新成員國部署核武器或者部署新的武裝力量。雙方同意不把對方視作對手。
當然我也不認可這就等於把之前不東擴的承諾作廢了。如果兩者是相互衝突的，這就意味著北約的擴張，是衝著俄羅斯去的。
北约是否有和俄罗斯达成不东扩协议非常重要，华语圈里我没有找到太多讨论这个话题的内容，搜索“北约东扩”，yt里全是上海东方卫视cctv的谣言，非常可怕，对华人的误导非常之大。尊重合同与协议是华人非常必要的融入文明社会的思想过程，请历史老师多讲这方面内容
1、美国放弃布雷顿森林，搜刮全世界财富
2、退出伊核协议
3、绕开联合国决议打伊拉克
4、一战参战国都不遵守协议，才爆发战争
5、欧洲二战参战国都不遵守协议，战争才爆发
……
你怎么好意思说西方世界比中国人更遵守协议？
//
我来回答你，为什么你有错觉：近两百年来，都是西方强迫东方国家签署不平等协议，结果肯定是大多数协议被东方国家中止。
西方世界只遵守对自己有利的协议，一旦协议对自己不利，一刻也不会遵守。
美国撕毁伊朗核协议、退出巴黎气候协定后，混的比以前还好！
美國向前蘇聯口頭承諾過北約不東擴，談話備忘錄影印件在喬治華盛頓大學國家安全資料庫上面有。
中文就是個籠子
@@petershen6924 回应过你这个问题了，那个是谈判备忘录，不是协议，29页的协议里没有一条提过东扩
伊斯坦布尔之前叫君士坦丁堡，君士坦丁堡之前就叫拜占庭，16世纪的西欧历史学者们为了区分罗马帝国与后来的东罗马，就把拜占庭城的名字冠以东罗马了。希腊语与拉丁语这个问题是逐渐分开的，东西罗马本身就是一家，是同血缘分家，而不是完全前后无关联
沒有侵略哪有戰爭？
為什麼人家會怕俄羅斯呢？
侵略他國前科累累誰在旁邊誰都怕。
真正惠及你我普通人的就是科学、技术、思想，科学家和思想家
原來荷蘭和日本有這樣的歷史，怪不得日本的西方思想被稱爲蘭學
所以當時日本人會說荷蘭話的很多，反而之後美國人上岸，沒人會說英語，還要靠再翻譯
荷兰人的宗教，叫兰教（闽台人应该知道这个梗）
@@terrorgen 哈哈，粗了
@@terrorgen 马来西亚人路过 😂
袁老師晚上好！ 我問你喔。
烏俄戰爭之後， 接下來，
是不是就換台灣了？🐥🐥🐥🐥
之前國內的軍機在來台灣領空飛來飛去，這點我覺得大概可以了解目的意思，但今天看新聞有盜沙的船隻來台灣。 用這種方式統一台灣，我好不服氣😫😫😫😫
@tony tony 對吼 我怎麽沒想到🙄
但我覺得這樣不舒服，感覺好像老大放任小弟胡作非為的感覺耶😩
袁老師，我聽您節目也有一段時間了，可我對您關於東羅馬帝國後來爲甚麼叫「拜占庭帝國」的意見實在是不敢苟同。
首先，古羅馬從共和國晚期就已經是一個雙語國家了。在很早的時候，羅馬就已經非常崇尚希臘文化，並連帶在羅馬貴族圈裏形成了一股學習希臘語的風氣。這一點在西塞羅曾經撰文反駁羅馬「希臘粉」的行爲中就已經可見一斑了。自羅馬共和國征服希臘以來，亞歷山大大帝時期確立的通用希臘語更是成爲了羅馬帝國的第二國語，而羅馬也保留了帝國東部希臘語爲通用語的現狀。自此，羅馬帝國「西拉丁、東希臘」的語言版圖就基本確定了下來。
第二，「拜占庭帝國」這個名字其實跟西羅馬覆滅後的法統、敎統之爭關係很大。自羅馬淪陷於日耳曼征服之後，東羅馬忽然間成爲了羅馬法統以及敎統的唯一繼承者。日耳曼人迫切想得到西羅馬的法統，而當時的羅馬牧首（也就是天主敎的羅馬敎皇）也不願意一直受在君士坦丁堡的皇帝的控制（當時的羅馬牧首是要經過君士坦丁堡的皇帝欽點過後才能上任的）。兩者遲遲沒有找到推翻君士坦丁堡法統的機會，直到後來伊琳娜女皇在君士坦丁堡即位後，羅馬牧首宣示「女性不得加冕爲羅馬皇帝，羅馬皇位從缺」之後才加冕查理曼爲「羅馬人的皇帝」的。後世西歐使用「拜占庭帝國」來稱呼東羅馬帝國也是爲了削弱君士坦丁堡的法統，並也從實際上反映了西歐人一直覺得神聖羅馬帝國法統不穩的心境。
最後希望＠Jiasheng Wang能看到我的這篇回覆！我其實是東正敎徒，自然而然也在這件事上有一定的主觀見解，不過也希望這篇回覆能幫到你！
這只是在於沒有人能重新統一羅馬帝國的問題，就像中國統一了，就不會有誰該不該叫中國的問題。
袁在这一题上回答的过于简单。和“东扩”一提一样。
周和后周都是中国法统上认可的朝代和中国的统治者。
@@mayorduran685 不不不，西罗马没有了，不是统一的问题了。西罗马那片地方后来就没啥罗马人了。
您说的好！
@@HereIAM-l2z 鞏固羅馬帝國最重要的兩個組織單位是什麼您知道嗎?一個是政府組織，一個是羅馬教會。羅馬帝國的擴張，就會伴隨羅馬教會劃分新的教區，直到今天的教會都是如此，像是台灣有台灣天主教總教區，高雄市有在地的牧區，牧區又在每個小鄉鎮有地方教會，跟劃分行政區沒兩樣，中國也是如此，只是你們的總教區，包括底下牧區都要由共產黨指導指派。而羅馬帝國的結束，是伴隨教會正統的爭奪，雖然西歐再也沒有了羅馬帝國，但是至少在中世紀政權與神權還是緊密的靠攏去穩固該國王權利。另外東羅馬甚至俄國所說的羅馬也是如此，因此今天如果有統一的羅馬政體，必定會有統一的教會，那當然就不會有誰正不正統的問題。
老师右边眉毛啥时候这么上挑了？
北约那叫被动东扩，毕竟要东欧国家有加入意愿，北约才能东扩啊，而且就算国家想加入，北约还不一定肯呢。那么下一个问题来了，为啥你俄罗斯周围的国家，当年苏联的卫星国甚至直接是加盟国，都一股脑想加入北约呢？一国说你俄罗斯坏，有可能是那个国家不好，所有国都说你俄罗斯坏，那一定是俄罗斯的问题。
所以说，一个人是不能有立场才能用逻辑来判断问题的，否则只能自己说服自己，但没有立场的人往往是不存在的。“一国说你俄罗斯坏，有可能是那个国家不好，所有国都说你俄罗斯坏，那一定是俄罗斯的问题”。这句话看上去很正确，其实有一个前提，就是各成员国之间没有互相影响、也不受其它势力的影响、都是基于自身条件下独立作出来的判断。但其实这种理想环境只存在于教科书或者实验室，在地球上是不存在的，因为大国的影响无处不在。当俄周围美国的软实力超过了俄国后，即便俄没对其构成威胁，美国也会透过其势力让其感觉到被威胁了。很简单的例子，中国并没有打算威胁一下奥大利亚和去北美打击一下加拿大，中国已经近半个世纪没打战了，甚至连家门口的台湾都还解决不了，打开地图看看周边，美军基地多达140多个，但这两国国内的“中国威胁论”却经常甚嚣尘上，尤其你看看澳洲的那光头防长的讲话，时常让人感觉到中国明天就要去澳洲扔核弹了，为什么会这样？因为他们是美国的势力外延，美国需要丑化中国以动员其势力来对付中国。
@@yode_me 别的不说，80年代中国就侵略过越南。曾经我也同意你的想法，感觉中国周边欧美军事基地太多了，但是打开各种论坛，视频平台，都说这些曾经的藩属国应该属于中国，周边国家害怕也是正常的。
@@FoxChestnut 你这就是胡扯，仅就越南战争来说，是越南扰中国边境，不听警告。
中国武力警告一下，开战前定的目标就是警告，不是占领。
乌克兰和俄罗斯本是兄弟关系，现在反目成仇，你不思考一下为什么？
你去看看乌克兰颜色革命是怎么回事
你去看看乌东地区为什么要独立，还不是国内遭政治打压，乌克兰国内搞去俄罗斯化
……
乌克兰战争的爆发西方资本和ngo 组织功不可没。
@@aigirl008 照你这么说，8国联军也不是侵略。
顺便说一下，罗马帝国时期成书的圣经新约是希腊语写的。可见罗马人（统一帝国时期）是大量使用希腊语的。
基督教合法化是君士坦丁大帝米兰敕令之后，那都帝国末期了，而且基督发源地本地就在帝国东部，用东方最流行的希腊语是一种自然选择，另外，大量使用希腊语和把希腊语正式当做官方语言完全是两回事
说起内阁那个话题真的很搞笑。有的人真的以为明朝的内阁等于欧洲的内阁。他们可能也以为大学士等于大学毕业生吧。
能不能讲一讲科索沃和俄乌战争 有人将其类比
美利坚合众国万岁！🎉🎉🎉
我還是反對拜占庭帝國的名稱，拜占庭只是地名。當時分裂前的羅馬帝國是一國兩府，拉丁文、古希臘和埃及聖書體都是通用語文。東羅馬到1453年滅亡前都一直稱呼自己為羅馬帝國。
请您看我其他的评论。我每次都不厌其烦地指出来：他的理论是文艺复兴的一家之言。没有全面讲解，非常不客观。
“拜占庭”带有歧视意味
@@HereIAM-l2z 拜占庭聽成"敗戰"庭。
@@yankj7647 这个词在罗马文化就是有歧视意味。
俄罗斯和小粉红的逻辑真奇怪，个人的口头承诺根本算不了什么。我邻居的爷爷当年还承诺给我爷爷100万元呢😂
黑紙白字寫下來的共慘黨都告訴你只是歷史文件
照你這個邏輯打烏克蘭也根本算不了什麼
你去查维基。其实不是袁老师说的那样。要核实一下。尤其英文版，
现在就打你，咋地？
@@HereIAM-l2z 他是说一半隐瞒一半，比方说两人结婚，誓言，证书一大堆，没有提到关于婚内出轨，那么婚内出轨对吗？
戈尔巴乔夫说虽然北约没有做出不扩张的保障，但是扩张的行为违反了协约的精神，与协约的承诺冲突。
虽然北约东扩没有违反协议，但是却引发了战争，这就是事实。
那裡有軍援，真相是全世界都不給人使用，都是用自己的
有一講法北約是排除不守規則的國家，之後組成的一個縮小版本聯合國。
當有國家文明水平提升而後自然會慢慢成為新成員。
假設北約裡有像牛二的國家在，到處去碰瓷說什麼自古以來之類的話😂
那结束五代十国的宋为啥兴旺发达了呢
他会跟你说宋不是统一王朝
美國向前蘇聯口頭承諾過北約不東擴，談話備忘錄影印件在喬治華盛頓大學國家安全資料庫上面有。
Link??
是东欧西逃
并没有实质性的文件，而且俄罗斯当年也多次申请加入北约可见北约当年并没有实质性的承诺。
@hell what 美国自己也不能代表北约
如果你是東歐國家，面對惡毛子 就問你要不要加入北約自保？你是要為了惡毛子的利益著想還是東歐的利益？
袁老师，您好，您怎么看《竹书纪年》？
10多年前，我看袁老师精华学校的课堂录像，觉得还挺有意思，只是觉得袁老师是对中国近代史有自己想法的人，对美国有好感，对苏联反感，这也符合那个时期的知识分子的普遍潮流。如今再看袁老师的视频，只是觉得，他实在是走在亲美的道路上一骑绝尘，只是不知道这是出于恰饭还是信念，我只希望袁老师是出于前者吧。但看看现在每期视频的标题，真的是倾向太明显了，人当然可以有自由的思想，但是抛开民族身份和立场毕竟是不现实的。真希望袁老师不要在汪化的道路上走的太远，给自己留点余地吧，好自为之。
你的留言应该被置顶
跳出来，看看天，你还要亲俄吗？
有屎的饭和有饭的屎，你选哪个还需要考虑立场和阶级吗？
同感，我也是老粉。袁老师最近的视频，倾向性很明显。给自己留点余地，日后好相见。我不是谁的粉，事实上谁都不干净，所以粉谁无从谈起，只是觉着这么恰饭很难看。
抛开民族身份和立场是比现实的？这就是典型的我D的逻辑，党虽然恶心，但是作为中国人他们代表了中国的利益你不支持你就是汉奸！党国连体造成了民族被邪恶政权裹挟着走，那问你纳粹德国的人民也要支持日本侵华吗，德日可是盟友一荣俱荣一损俱损。袁老师确实亲美，人家摆事实列道理，凭啥不行呢。文明程度来说欧美就是比前苏联高。
苏俄侵略乌国（中俄称特别军事行动）的时候乌已申请加入北约，还是已经加入北约？
真可憐🤭
還在那邊擴不擴，洗衣粉都能當開戰藉口了
袁老师现在在国外吗？
要说卫霍是靠骑兵肉搏赢匈奴，但记得看有关书籍说直到三国时期马镫才刚发明，那么西汉时期的军队是怎么实现骑兵肉搏的呢？没有马镫的话骑枪的使用就是非常困难的，不可能靠马力的冲击力直刺，那只会在刺中敌人时自己也会被反冲力一起落马啊。或者那时的骑兵并不冲阵，而只是像弯刀似的从敌阵边缘一层层削过去？
袁先生说说“家里有不用钱的”那梗
袁老师您曾多次讲过英国以前的外交政策是联合欧洲第二打欧洲第一，这个英国人把自己包括进去了吗？自己当欧洲霸主的时候会联合第三打第二吗？
我就是主观喜欢看袁大师
王安石青苗法的执行方式怎么看都觉得是“动态清零”的翻版啊。
拿破仑出生时，科西嘉岛刚脱离意大利成为法国领土，所以拿破仑是法国人
搜标题：
The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia （2009年4月发表）
大概时间线是：
1. 90年代末北约自82年吸纳西班牙加入以来第一次打算吸纳新的成员几个原华约国进入，俄国政客批评这违背了90年北约和美国许下的北约不东扩承诺，戈尔巴乔夫同样表态，甚至当时的驻俄美官员也有部分表示赞同俄的这一说法。
2. 之后美国官方包括小布什等说北约或者美国未曾有过这种允诺，倒是承认有过关于东西德的一些约定，但从未约定过北约未来的路线图。
3. 虽然当时东西德会谈资料详实，很多东西都有笔录，但是还未解密，谁撒谎说不清楚。但双方继续扯皮，大众只能看罗生门。
4. 幸亏我们又活了几年能等到资料解密，多方资料显示谁在撒谎一目了然。
本人比较懒，关于论文后面的具体资料分析就没有兴趣再看了，希望不服气的朋友继续看完告诉大家这论文还是有问题。
至于为什么早就真相大白了还一直扯，那这个技巧大家都很熟悉了。
2017年解密的關於德國統一的會談記錄，當時美國國務卿貝克就給戈爾巴喬夫承諾北約不東擴。影印件在George Washington University National Archive 可以查閲。
那你解释为什么叶里亲要给克林顿竖中指?
袁老师好，请问古代打仗士兵有没有类似压缩饼干那种易携带又能吃好几天的食物，在没有后方补给的情况下军队最多能多久？
烙餅鍋盔炒麵
馒头
用拉丁語還是希臘語不重要，國家政治制度，宗教信仰，意識形態等上層建築才是核心，所以東羅馬帝國當然是羅馬
请您看我其他的评论。他每次说这个，我都不厌其烦地讲出来：他这个仅仅是文艺复兴时代的一家之言。非常不全面、不客观。让我们一起为客观站台.
他偏向可以现代西方，我也觉得西方目前制度还是不粗的。但是，不应该把这种偏袒态度带到史观上。
对，袁老确实博学。
俄羅斯默認北約能東擴就相當於美國默認蘇聯可以在古巴部署導彈，等於中國默認美國可以在韓國部署薩德…解讀還是客觀點比較好