I was clearing out my room a couple of days ago and came across an essay I wrote six years ago for an undergrad philosophy of art course. This video is based entirely on that, and I haven't researched this topic at all since then. But I figured some folks might still find it interesting.
Kane, do you think you will do a video on AI art? A lot of the arguments I see about it are pretty bad which is a shame because it seems like an interesting topic. Also, while most debates seem to be about the ethics of it, I watched a video from Destiny where some people were more focused on the question of whether it is really art. I couldn’t help but wonder what you’d have to say on this topic.
I think it's partly the story you buy when you buy some artwork. Being able to tell the story about the mad artist that went insane just after painting or imagining what the da Vince thought when painting the Mona Lisa. In a forgery the story is crap. Some fellow just copied a thing and tried to earn a quick buck. But if the story of the forgery was really good then the forgery could probably be really valuable.
16:30 wouldn't the "intention" of an artwork in this "death of the author" sense be the same in the case of the original and the forgery? It seems like intention only helps the forgery issue, IF it's intention in the "authorial intention" sense.
I don't see why. My position is simply that the artist's intentions need not determine our interpretation of the point of the artwork, not that interpretation of art should only appeal to the intrinsic properties of the artwork, or anything along those lines. Indeed, I'm not sure it's really possible to attend only to the intrinsic properties when *interpreting* an artwork (as opposed to just describing the colours, shapes, etc.)
Hey Kane, there's an interesting debate (videos back and forth) between the RUclips channel of Dr Kristi Winters and "king crockaduck". The topic is scientific realism v social construction. Not sure if you want to just watch or maybe do a review? Its rather dramatic so far so maybe that's something to bear in mind, still I know how hard content can get sometimes. All the best.
Thanks for the suggestion. I just had a look at this and although their debate is on an interesting topic, it seems very acrimonious. Which is fine for folks into that kind of thing, but I'd prefer to stay out of it. I don't really do "debate review" videos anyway.
It seems to me that both: originality and being a forgery are not intrinsic properties. Intrinsicness/extrinsicness distinction is a tricky one, but still, these should be a clear cases of extrinsic properties. (I've just started watching a video, so I am not sure how much of a problem that poses for you or N. Stalnaker)
Yeah, whether or not an artwork counts as a forgery is dependent on its relations to other things. An object can only be a forgery if it has been created by copying a previously existing artwork, or creating something in the style of a previously existing artist. So being a forgery wouldn't just be a matter of intrinsic properties.
@@KaneB Pretty good job for an undergraduate :) I am not informed of this problem independently, so I don't know against whom is it offered, which could be an important part of the given problem. At this moment, I can sensibly interpret it only as if it is against die-hard aesthetic realism, claiming that all that matters for an aesthetic object and its value is somehow present and embedded in it (as its intrinsic prop.). It is not the most plausible position, to begin with, but this could be seen as a pretty elegant way of refuting it, thus making it imaginable that somebody came up with it. If this is so, then your answer (although, I am imagining you would not have tried to defend this position anyway) is not going to help, since it concedes exactly what is at stake. Sorry if I am completely off.
@@mjay9276 My argument isn't really offered against anyone in particular. It's simply intended as an explanation for why the aesthetic value of a perfect forgery could differ from that of the original. If we want to relate it to broader views in philosophy of art, then we can take it as an argument against the position that aesthetic properties are dependent on perceptual properties. This is, apparently, a widely accepted position among philosophers of art. For example, in his introduction to the Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, Jerrold Levinson says: "It is widely agreed that aesthetic properties are perceptual or observable properties, directly experienced properties, and properties relevant to the aesthetic value of the objects that possess them; but beyond that the demarcation of the class of aesthetic properties is subject to dispute." I don't know why this is widely accepted -- when I looked into the literature on this, I wasn't able to find any significant arguments for the position, and it seems to face obvious counterexamples.
@@KaneB Exactly. When I asked about the argument, I thought about the argument you've responded to, the argument from the very beginning of the video. The position that aesthetic properties are dependent (only?!) on perceptual properties is surely difficult to defend. Moreover, it is a bit complicated when the problem is framed in perceptual terms since literature and poetry are not enjoyed perceptually in some non-problematic way. Anyways... The objections come not only from the perspective of conceptual art or dadaism but even looking from the less controversial point of view. If we aesthetically value the satire (and many classical literature works are satire), that is surely not exclusively due to its perceptual, formal, or any intrinsic literal qualities (if they turn out to be perceptual or not) but probably mostly based on its extrinsic properties, having something to do with the context, society the artist had lived in, the zeitgeist... The same goes for many occasions when one painter makes the rendition of another painter's picture or graphic. Part of the aesthetic value of those works is only enjoyable if you know and understand the reference and can see the masterfulness behind the rendition. When you decontextualize art, you lose all the hints, references, and innuendos, and some artworks are less valuable taken into the consideration without them. Some other artworks are even not art without them. Take Picasso's Bull head for example.
I haven't watched the entire video yet, but you start by claiming that no perfect forgery of an art work actually exists. This seems wrong to me. A digital artwork can be perfectly copied. In this case most people just assume that the copy is literally the same piece of art. Therefore they are aesthetically identical and your thesis is wrong.
(1) I define a perfect forgery as a forgery that is molecule-for-molecule identical to the original. No such forgeries actually exist. (2) The whole point of introducing the fiction of a perfect forgery is so we can consider a case where the two artworks are totally indistinguishable in terms of their intrinsic properties. I then present an argument that, even in this case, they differ in their aesthetic properties, so they are not aesthetically identical. I don't think the case of digital art really challenges my claim. The copying of digital art does raise interesting questions about the individuation of art objects. But if A and B are literally the same piece of art, then A is not a forgery of B, so this example would be irrelevant to my thesis.
@@KaneB Doesn't this imply that digital art doesn't exist. If you move the data in memory it will be destroyed, then forged from a different collection of molecules. Did you destroy the original only to be left with a forgery? I don't believe that you believe that. Therefore its existence was preserved in the process of forgery. My point is that molecules need not be preserved in assigning identity so your concept of forgeries is inappropriate. The same piece of art can have none of the molecules in common and still have the same aesthetic value.
Maybe I missed the point of the entire video. I have thought about it and it seems to me the point you are trying to make is this: Forgeries have different value than originals therefore they are have different aesthetic value than originals. So it doesn't matter how good of a copy it was because it was a forgery it has a different value. I am I wrong that this is a pointless argument to make. Am I still missing something?
@@nrcbl I don't have any strong opinion about the ontology of digital art. It isn't something I've thought about. My inclination is to say that for digital art, like music, forgery isn't really possible. A digital copy of a piece of digital art would simply be the same piece of art, just as two performances of a piece of music count as performances of the same piece of music. But all of this is beside the point. Nothing in my argument actually hangs on my definition of perfect forgery, nor does it make any difference to my argument whether or not perfect forgeries exist. The notion of a "perfect forgery" was, as I said, simply a fiction introduced for expository purposes. I don't know why you're getting hung up on it. The video provides an explanation for why the aesthetic value of a forgery could differ from that of the original artwork. The explanation appeals to the fact that forgeries are almost always interpreted as having different points or purposes to the originals.
I was clearing out my room a couple of days ago and came across an essay I wrote six years ago for an undergrad philosophy of art course. This video is based entirely on that, and I haven't researched this topic at all since then. But I figured some folks might still find it interesting.
Definitely intresting, thanks Kane.
Kane, do you think you will do a video on AI art? A lot of the arguments I see about it are pretty bad which is a shame because it seems like an interesting topic. Also, while most debates seem to be about the ethics of it, I watched a video from Destiny where some people were more focused on the question of whether it is really art. I couldn’t help but wonder what you’d have to say on this topic.
Moral of the story: "Its the thought that counts".
but actually though, great video thanks a bunch
I think it's partly the story you buy when you buy some artwork. Being able to tell the story about the mad artist that went insane just after painting or imagining what the da Vince thought when painting the Mona Lisa.
In a forgery the story is crap. Some fellow just copied a thing and tried to earn a quick buck.
But if the story of the forgery was really good then the forgery could probably be really valuable.
16:30 wouldn't the "intention" of an artwork in this "death of the author" sense be the same in the case of the original and the forgery? It seems like intention only helps the forgery issue, IF it's intention in the "authorial intention" sense.
I don't see why. My position is simply that the artist's intentions need not determine our interpretation of the point of the artwork, not that interpretation of art should only appeal to the intrinsic properties of the artwork, or anything along those lines. Indeed, I'm not sure it's really possible to attend only to the intrinsic properties when *interpreting* an artwork (as opposed to just describing the colours, shapes, etc.)
Hey Kane, there's an interesting debate (videos back and forth) between the RUclips channel of Dr Kristi Winters and "king crockaduck".
The topic is scientific realism v social construction. Not sure if you want to just watch or maybe do a review?
Its rather dramatic so far so maybe that's something to bear in mind, still I know how hard content can get sometimes.
All the best.
Thanks for the suggestion. I just had a look at this and although their debate is on an interesting topic, it seems very acrimonious. Which is fine for folks into that kind of thing, but I'd prefer to stay out of it. I don't really do "debate review" videos anyway.
@@KaneB
It did make me think of you, yes im trying to watch from a distance myself.
Keep up the great content.
Nice vid
It seems to me that both: originality and being a forgery are not intrinsic properties. Intrinsicness/extrinsicness distinction is a tricky one, but still, these should be a clear cases of extrinsic properties. (I've just started watching a video, so I am not sure how much of a problem that poses for you or N. Stalnaker)
Yeah, whether or not an artwork counts as a forgery is dependent on its relations to other things. An object can only be a forgery if it has been created by copying a previously existing artwork, or creating something in the style of a previously existing artist. So being a forgery wouldn't just be a matter of intrinsic properties.
@@KaneB Pretty good job for an undergraduate :)
I am not informed of this problem independently, so I don't know against whom is it offered, which could be an important part of the given problem. At this moment, I can sensibly interpret it only as if it is against die-hard aesthetic realism, claiming that all that matters for an aesthetic object and its value is somehow present and embedded in it (as its intrinsic prop.). It is not the most plausible position, to begin with, but this could be seen as a pretty elegant way of refuting it, thus making it imaginable that somebody came up with it.
If this is so, then your answer (although, I am imagining you would not have tried to defend this position anyway) is not going to help, since it concedes exactly what is at stake.
Sorry if I am completely off.
@@mjay9276 My argument isn't really offered against anyone in particular. It's simply intended as an explanation for why the aesthetic value of a perfect forgery could differ from that of the original.
If we want to relate it to broader views in philosophy of art, then we can take it as an argument against the position that aesthetic properties are dependent on perceptual properties. This is, apparently, a widely accepted position among philosophers of art. For example, in his introduction to the Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, Jerrold Levinson says:
"It is widely agreed that aesthetic properties are perceptual or observable properties, directly experienced properties, and properties relevant to the aesthetic value of the objects that possess them; but beyond that the demarcation of the class of aesthetic properties is subject to dispute."
I don't know why this is widely accepted -- when I looked into the literature on this, I wasn't able to find any significant arguments for the position, and it seems to face obvious counterexamples.
@@KaneB Exactly. When I asked about the argument, I thought about the argument you've responded to, the argument from the very beginning of the video.
The position that aesthetic properties are dependent (only?!) on perceptual properties is surely difficult to defend. Moreover, it is a bit complicated when the problem is framed in perceptual terms since literature and poetry are not enjoyed perceptually in some non-problematic way. Anyways...
The objections come not only from the perspective of conceptual art or dadaism but even looking from the less controversial point of view. If we aesthetically value the satire (and many classical literature works are satire), that is surely not exclusively due to its perceptual, formal, or any intrinsic literal qualities (if they turn out to be perceptual or not) but probably mostly based on its extrinsic properties, having something to do with the context, society the artist had lived in, the zeitgeist...
The same goes for many occasions when one painter makes the rendition of another painter's picture or graphic. Part of the aesthetic value of those works is only enjoyable if you know and understand the reference and can see the masterfulness behind the rendition.
When you decontextualize art, you lose all the hints, references, and innuendos, and some artworks are less valuable taken into the consideration without them. Some other artworks are even not art without them. Take Picasso's Bull head for example.
I haven't watched the entire video yet, but you start by claiming that no perfect forgery of an art work actually exists. This seems wrong to me. A digital artwork can be perfectly copied. In this case most people just assume that the copy is literally the same piece of art. Therefore they are aesthetically identical and your thesis is wrong.
(1) I define a perfect forgery as a forgery that is molecule-for-molecule identical to the original. No such forgeries actually exist.
(2) The whole point of introducing the fiction of a perfect forgery is so we can consider a case where the two artworks are totally indistinguishable in terms of their intrinsic properties. I then present an argument that, even in this case, they differ in their aesthetic properties, so they are not aesthetically identical.
I don't think the case of digital art really challenges my claim. The copying of digital art does raise interesting questions about the individuation of art objects. But if A and B are literally the same piece of art, then A is not a forgery of B, so this example would be irrelevant to my thesis.
@@KaneB Doesn't this imply that digital art doesn't exist. If you move the data in memory it will be destroyed, then forged from a different collection of molecules. Did you destroy the original only to be left with a forgery? I don't believe that you believe that. Therefore its existence was preserved in the process of forgery.
My point is that molecules need not be preserved in assigning identity so your concept of forgeries is inappropriate. The same piece of art can have none of the molecules in common and still have the same aesthetic value.
Maybe I missed the point of the entire video. I have thought about it and it seems to me the point you are trying to make is this:
Forgeries have different value than originals therefore they are have different aesthetic value than originals.
So it doesn't matter how good of a copy it was because it was a forgery it has a different value.
I am I wrong that this is a pointless argument to make. Am I still missing something?
@@nrcbl I don't have any strong opinion about the ontology of digital art. It isn't something I've thought about. My inclination is to say that for digital art, like music, forgery isn't really possible. A digital copy of a piece of digital art would simply be the same piece of art, just as two performances of a piece of music count as performances of the same piece of music. But all of this is beside the point.
Nothing in my argument actually hangs on my definition of perfect forgery, nor does it make any difference to my argument whether or not perfect forgeries exist. The notion of a "perfect forgery" was, as I said, simply a fiction introduced for expository purposes. I don't know why you're getting hung up on it.
The video provides an explanation for why the aesthetic value of a forgery could differ from that of the original artwork. The explanation appeals to the fact that forgeries are almost always interpreted as having different points or purposes to the originals.