Why One Nuke Is Never Enough - Myth of the Overkill
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- Опубликовано: 29 май 2024
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- Sources / Visuals -
Brent D. Ziarnick, 21st Century Power - Strategic Superiority for the Modern Era, Naval Institute Press: 2018,
Brent D. Ziarnick, To Rule the Skies - General Thomas S. Power and the Rise of Strategic Air Command in the Cold War, Naval Institute Press: 2021,
Charles Ziegler, Waiting for Joe-1: Decisions Leading to the Detection of Russia’s First Atomic Bomb Test, Social Studies of Science, May 1988, Vol. 18, No.2,
Gen. Thomas Power, Myth of the Overkill, October 1963, reproduced in: Brent D. Ziarnick, 21st Century Power - Strategic Superiority for the Modern Era, Naval Institute Press: 2018,
Melvin G. Deaile, Always at War - Organizational Culture in Strategic Air Command 1946-1962, Naval Institute Press: 2018,
Trevor Albertson, Winning Armageddon - Curtis LeMay and Strategic Air Command 1948-1957, Naval Institute Press: 2019.
Visuals: NARA/ USNIP
- Timecodes -
00:00 - Disclaimer
00:10 - Strategic Air Command (SAC) - The 'big nuke' force
01:03 - Winning the war, losing the peace
04:48 - Strategic Air goes nuclear
09:33 - Reading recommendations [sponsored segment]
10:58 - 'Traditional' deterrence
12:58 - 'SAC-Style' deterrence
17:08 - Myth of the Overkill
18:31 - The battle for deterrence
23:07 - The final word
- Audio -
Music and Sfx from Epidemic Sound
#mythoftheoverkill #militaryaviationhistory #deterrence
It feels a bit weird publishing a video today given current events...having been asked multiple times today, I thought about making something on the role of aviation with Ukraine-Russia but I don't want to jump on the bandwagon and add to the speculation and potential misinformation out there. This video was finished about a week ago when the world still looked somewhat different, which I take some solace in. It looks like deterrence (any form of deterrence) seems to be as relevant as ever.
Thank you very much.
I already can’t stand how someone everyone is now an absolute expert for Ukraine and Russia.
So it’s nice, dass du nicht auch deinen Senf dazu gibst.
*_Stay safe everyone, peace not war-!_*
Ironically I did share you video "Russian Air Power: An OVERHYPED Threat?" to a lot of friends do to people asking about Russian Air Force ability.
I mean not really a week ago Russia was in the middle of a build up and it was pretty clear it was only a matter of when not if... Which since you want to make a video on the air war why not one being an armchair general and say what you would do to win the war from both sides point of veiw... Or how intesteresting it is as it is the first major air war of the 2020s and both sides having nearly idenical aircraft. Which An idea I had to prevent the war was to put NATO troops in Ukraine in large enough numbers to deter Russia from invading as it had no change of winning then... I really don't know why we diddn't do that but did the bone headed thing of putting troops in poland and giving Putin Ukraine for free.
@@GreenBlueWalkthrough Ukraine is not part of NATO. You can't just put troops there
just imagine though for a moment being the guy on the ground and you get nuked 11 times because SAC decided your area has to be six-sigma dead
The problem is that even one U. S. city nuked was too much. I suspect a problem without a solution, hence the almost run-away arms race.
@@inyobill
I can think of some coastal cities that could use it.
To be honest, after the first air burst, successive airbursts on the same target in a short time period don't really add to the destruction. And, due to the issues of fratricide, multiple strikes on the same target with nuclear weapons *must* be successive, not simultaneous.
The best way to envision this is by analogy. Ten hand grenades tied together and detonated together have far more destructive power than a single hand grenade (not 10x as much, but significantly more). However, throwing 10 hand grenades to exactly the same point of detonation, one after another, doesn't really do significantly more damage than the first grenade. This is why "overkill" is a myth - the extra nukes aren't being spread out to cover *more* targets, nor are they adding their destructive force to each other, as if you melted 10 nukes into one nuke 10x as large a yield. They're just "bouncing the rubble". The net effect of nuke #10 isn't significantly additive to the destruction caused by nuke #1 - and being the intended detonation altitude is an *airburst* (for maximum destruction) in almost all cases☆ , the additional bombs aren't even causing that much additional fallout.
Trying to limit your number of weapons to "just enough" is no different than assuming that 30 rounds of ammunition in your rifle is sufficient for dealing with 30 enemy soldiers.
.
☆ There are edge cases, such as hardened dug in targets like Cheyenne Mountain or the "Really Bad Idea" nuclear subsurface naval weapons, where a ground burst is better.
@@geodkyt No, you are wrong, this is not what kill ratio means in the formula.
If you could ensure 100% detonation and the missile hit exactly the weakest spot, all you need is one missile.
To launch 10 missiles in a target means that at least one good detonation is achieved, the others might have failed at some point. One eventuality is that one or more missiles hit around the target, didn't destroyed it, but weakened it enough for the next missile to achieve destruction. They do add.
After the successful kill, which might be achieved by the first two missiles, all other missiles, detonation or not, are irrelevant.
A kill is a kill and destruction around doesn't matter if more soldiers and material were destroyed by the other missiles.
One basic assumption is that the target _can_ be killed by one perfect missile. If, on principle, the target can only be destroyed by two missiles, this affect the formula greatly.
Maxim 37: There is no “overkill”. There is only “open fire” and “time to reload”.
Maxim 6: If violence wasn't your last resort, you failed to resort to enough of it.
"Fire our Attorney!"
*THROOOM*
"I said fire our attorney not fire at him!"
Maxim 34; if your leaving scorch marks, you need a bigger gun!
Maxim 34: If you're leaving scorch marks, you need a bigger gun.
@@ImmortanDan *points to his post above about scorch marks* we've already done 34.
Prevention of violence is such a twisty maze. If you refuse to be violent yourself to the extent of not even defending yourself from attempted murder, some nut is going to find you. The only way to deter violent thugs is a credible return threat, which mainly works because you become a less profitable target than others. To paraphrase that old Latin saying, if you want peace, you must publicize a credible violent response to violence.
It's not that everyone in society is a violent thug. Very few people are. Most people can get through life without ever needing to defend themselves from aggression. But the risk is not zero, and what applies to individuals applies to businesses and countries too. You have to be ready to hire a lawyer if someone else attacks you legally, and you have to be ready to use violence against those who attack illegally.
It gets very complicated.
It's the tolerance paradox on a different playing field. The one thing that cannot be tolerated is intolerance; the one think you can be a pacificist about is violence. It's not a direct apples to apples comparison but it's similar enough to be relevant.
Though that being said there is a way to remain pacifist in the face of violence. Be really good at prevent violence before it happens. Tie up your enemies in as much bullshit as possible so they never have the time or desire to get violent with you. Never present yourself as the easiest target.
Thanks for sharing. I liked that latin saying
In spite of a popular saying, violence, or more often the threat of violence has solved most of the conflicts and disagreements in history.
@@armadillotoe well..... it has ended them. I don't think it's necessarily resolved anything.
@@grizwoldphantasia5005 soldiers end conflicts, civilians resolve them
“Managed the incredible feat, of missing with a nuclear bomb” made me crack up
The counter-argument to the binomial probability based way of determining kill probability is the realization that some of the failure point factors are shared, rather than independent factors. The pre launch stage for example. There is an outsized probability that either all bombers assigned to a target will take off, or none will. If the target coordinates are completely and utterly wrong for one bomb, chances are that they are for the others as well. So there's a good chance that you'll either drop and detonate most bombs assigned to a target ("overkill"), or none.
And then you add in factors along the way; interceptors, SAM and ADA, ECW, weather, fatigue, stress, emotions, etc. So much can go wrong you so you *must* have a backup plan.
I'd guess that the target coordinates were assumed right, but more that maybe the precision might be off due to something. Obviously if target coordinates are just wrong, no amount of bombs is going to change that, so such scenario's should just be ignored.
@@MDP1702 just ignore that problem LMAO
@@mobilemarshall In that situation, ofcourse. If you have wrong coordinates, no amount of bombs will change that. Ofcourse you'd have a program to get the most accurate coordinates possible, that just doesn't have anything to do with the idea of overkill.
@@MDP1702 THe first thing to go down will be GPS.
_"The idea of deterrence is to create in the mind of the enemy the FEAR to attack."_ - Dr. Strangelove
And to keep them from getting your precious bodily fluids...
@@TheConjurersTower ... to get to the root motivation. I'm pretty sure that the reference to the film in his slide was reconized at something in excess of a 99% rate by his viewers. I don't know the presenter's name, apologies to all.
That bit with your HS math teacher is funny, especially since mine basically taught us practically like that. He was a former F-4 pilot and his classroom was decorated like your background, really made math more interesting when you add in the element of airplanes and munitions :)
Plus! It's like them there Video Games. Gotta prepare that next generation for War (Rubber and Tin in Vietnam, energy pipelines in Ukraine, Oil in Venezuela). Just don't ask for Healthcare, "can't afford it".
G'day,
Maths teacher was a Fighter Pilot, that's nothing mate.
My High School Science Teacher was an Undergraduate on the University Project which first isolated Vitamin B-12, in the 1930s in Britain...; and then in the Great Waaauugh(!) of Two he was a foundation member of the Unexploded Bomb Squad, in 1939 and he put in about 2 years doing that...; but he said that he realised that it was time to back off when he noticed that he was drinking a bottle of Scotch every night, to get to sleep.
I/we didn't learn much Chemistry, but we sure heard a lot of interesting stuff about Brass Spanners to defeat Booby-Traps triggered by the Magnetic Field of any Ferrous Tools, when opening and disarming the Sea-Mines which either washed up on beaches, or were sprinkled over the adjoining shores by off-course Luftwaffe Crews.
We had a Maths Teacher who was at the Seige of Tobruk who was also pretty easy to distract into telling War Stories...
But the pick of the litter was Georges Szonyi, the General Studies teacher..., he represented Hungary in the 1936 Olympics - Discus, Javelin, Pentathlon and Heptathlon, he spoke 9 languages, could read and write 3 others..., was licenced to teach every Instrument in a Philharmonic Orchestra except the Violin..., and one of his best retorts to anybody who complained went thusly :
"Vat you know ?
You know nussink...
Ven I vas your age, I marched - triumphantly from Berlin to within 12 Kilometres of Moscow...; und zen ve turned around und I walked back again.
On ze vay back it vas so cold zat I slept vit mein Horse - I vas in an Artillery Regiment and ve pulled our Guns mit Horses...
Ven mein Horse died, I cut it up and put it in mein Backpack, und I ATE mein Horse...
Vat you know ?
You know NUSSINK !
You have done NUSSINK !
You know SHIT !"
And his response to being teased about being an immigrant was,
"I am an Australian by Choice, but you are an Australian only by accident of Birth...!"
High School in the 1970s taught some very interesting things, indeed.
Such is life,
Have a good one...
Stay safe.
;-p
Ciao !
@@WarblesOnALot he did not use the term "Rucksack" instead of "backpack"?
@@ulrichkalber9039
G'day,
Thanks,
Ya almost got me...
On reflection he said ,
"Pack",
And I added the "Back" to it out of contemporary habit.
"Rucksack" (a corruption of "Rug-Sack", perhaps, as in a bag of folded blankets...?) is what my mother would call it, as learned in her time the Girl Guides in Sydney in the 1940s...
I'm pretty sure Georges said
"Pack".
Such is life,
Have a good one...
Stay safe.
;-p
Ciao !
@@WarblesOnALot actually it has nothing to Do with rugs, ruck most likely refers to Rücken (back) sack is obvious...
Most likely because it could also refer to the movement with wich the sack is thrown to the back, Ruck can be translated with jerk, the noun describing a movement. But that is not probable.
Excellent summary. I was five years old when the B-52 came into squadron service, my dad was a pilot for those. It wasn't very long before I knew three truths in my life. 1, If the balloon went up dad was going to fly away and most likely not come back. 2. That the place where I lived was a big bulls eye on some Soviet map. 3. There was no use trying to run away because you couldn't get far enough away to survive the coming blast. I had that worked out by the time I was twelve in 1962. I went on to join the Navy and spent 20 years tracking Soviet SSBNs from the back of a P-3 Orion.
I had close professional contact with Naval and Marine Corps aviators over my long career. Nothing but respect.
Thank you sir
The nuclear arms race is like two sworn enemies standing waist deep in gasoline, one with three matches, the other with five.
“We don’t have enough matches” - some idiot
Not the worst analogy I have ever seen.
@@inyobill
RE: "Not the worst analogy I have ever seen."
It's also not very original.
I love the fact that you put Major "King" Kong (Slim Pickens) on the delivery symbol. Good show. Oh and of course, the video was great as always.
Bloody genius right there.
I loved that too! This is a movie that must be watched by anyone wanting to know how the popular culture understood SAC and the cold war. On a pedantic note: Maj. Kong should have been drawn facing the rear of the bomb, which is what occurred in the movie. 🙂
I laughed when I saw that reference to "Dr. Strangelove."
Thomas the Tank Engine was up a few seconds earlier.
That was a classic scene in a very classic movie.
That was a decent, quick, summary of the issue. Overkill was a myth for the reasons stated; too many fail points. I certified under four SIOP revisions during the early '80s. While my LGM-30G missiles were generally reliable, as were the Mark 12A RVs, perfect performance was never guaranteed. This resulted in "two on one" (or more) targeting of hard targets. I'm happy that you didn't "go deep" into the issue. It quickly fries your mind.
"The nature of war is violence. The notion of 'restraint' in warfare is imbecility."
@@edwardcullen1739 it's all just psychopaths, lacking empathy for fellow men, instinctively tribal and gynocentric
@@memespeech sure, supposing all your apparent axioms hold. Of the following options, which is more kind? More humane?
1. Absolutely preventing nuclear war by making the mathematical probability of an adversary achieving its war aims vanishingly small-and patently so.
2. Ditching your offensive capabilities and hoping no one is going to attack.
It must be driven by the instinctual need for statistical rigor. Tribal statistical rigorousness.
Most people are not psychopaths. Most men who have fought in war have been normal men, like you, capable of empathy.
Dont underestimate what so-called "normal" people are capable of doing under specific circumstances.
What I understand from this video is that the general public saw nuclear deterrence as denying the opponent victory in a nuclear war. With MAD meaning that neither side could launch nukes witout getting completely obliterated themselves.
But the SAC undertood it as being able to win a nuclear war. They wanted to break MAD. Be able to conduct a first strike (or possibly even a second strike) without getting completely destroyed. And that needs lots of resources because it requires to destroy pretty much any means of your opponent to shoot back.
Indeed, but that is worthless unless you can destroy the means to shoot back before the enemy shoots(back), wich is the flaw in the logic: the enemy has radar and would shoot before his means are destroyed.
@@ulrichkalber9039 In the age of strategic bombers, it was a lot more feasible.
@@vaclavjebavy5118 in that age the attack would have needed a lot of time from radar detection to reaching targets, bombers can evade destruction on the airfield by simply starting an own attack.
@@ulrichkalber9039 And they can be intercepted, unlike modern MIRV warheads. Meanwhile, if they also manage to penetrate with their own bombers, they can destroy critical military infrastructure, not necessarily bombers.
Though you're right; it seems completely improbable that any first strike or second strike for that matter would by itself destroy any strike capability.
the first point also brings up the hilariously absurd possibility of a nuclear war being averted simply by both forces losing all their bombers.
@@ulrichkalber9039 Though airfield strikes wouldn't require radar detection necessarily.
I had always heard that the USN was especially at odds with the USAF over budgets during this time, but I did not understand the mechanisms and disproportionate magnitude of the resources needed to accomplish SAC's goals. (..."Sorry USN, no money for your aircraft carriers!" 😠) I now have much better insight to this topic. Really appreciate your efforts and enthusiasm.
The missile submarines changed a whole lot, not necessarily in the Air Force's favor. Nuclear subs can hide, unlike missile silos. They can get a lot closer, needing less rocket to boost more warheads. The Air Force was already seeing missiles make bombers obsolete, and now the navy was threatening to make its missiles obsolete. The only card they had left was that submarines might take longer to notify than land missile silos, and I don't know what they delay was in the 1960s or now. Well, the subs are probably more expensive too, but that difference is something else I wouldn't know how to calculate.
@@grizwoldphantasia5005 Until ELF came along, there was no way to communicate with a submerged submarine.
The subs used to raise an antenna above the surface at predetermined times to check for messages.
Imagine surfacing to check messages, and finding out a full nuclear exchange occurred hours ago and you missed it.
@@patrickkenyon2326 I knew that in general, but not the interval. But didn't ELF come along pretty quickly? I'd always assumed ELF was just the final nail in land missile primacy, at least as far as the Air Force was concerned.
Missing in the video; 1. The USAF in general, and SAC in particular desired the advent of the Polaris system to add redundancy to the deterrence forces, 2. SAC never advocated for all resources to be bound into nuclear deterrence. That was congress' way of looking at the war and caused the massive drawdown of the Army in the late 40s and again in the late 50s. 3. SAC had non-nuclear missions as well. They well understood that assets performing one mission could not also be performing the other. 4. Powers was correct in his assessment that overkill doesn't really exist in the sense of MAD. Today, we have precision weapons in the form of both gravity bombs and missiles. This did not exist in the SAC era. As the US deterrence force was based on a triad of aviation, aerospace, and maritime systems (bombers, missiles, subs), they were well aware that the response to an attack would "roll" those capabilities. As the USSR would have to strike first, the potential loss of most or all of any one capability had to be considered in the C4 and delivery equation. We forget that at our peril. 4 decades of fighting insurgencies and small nations has removed from public (and shamefully, academic) thinking the concept of a peer adversary with their own unique capabilities for both defense and offense.
@@grizwoldphantasia5005 I believe ELF deployed in the early 1980s?
Pretty cool! My Dad was in USAF/SAC for 20 years as an Electrical-Electronics Master Sargent working on everything from permanent radar electrical systems for radar installations to aircraft electronics and electrical systems repair. He did a tour of Nam at Phu Cat AFB from 1969-1970, and ended up as a teacher stationed at Chanute AFB in Illinois. I remember very vividly growing up on bases like MacDill AFB which was a major hub for SAC and TAC with huge squadrons of B-52s, F-4s, F-105s, etc. Back at Chanute I got 'fly' F-4 and C-141 simulators, the 'newest thing!' when my dad took me in to the sim hall on an off day. That was really amazing for kid of my age back then.
All the planes that we can only see pictures of on a screen these days, or museum, if we're lucky enough, I got to see in person and touch. I've stood face to face with the B-36 and B-58, two of my personal favorites, as they sat on static display on base grounds, as well as Minuteman, Atlas, and Snark missiles. I watched the men and machines around me as I grew up. I also saw decay in the society as I got older. My father did as well and he was relieved to get out after his 20, although he did do 5 years with the NJANG and their KC-135s and 'new' KC-10s. See you in the skies!
As I understand it. From what I recall of a classified lecture in the late 70's, USSR missile guidance systems were not nearly as accurate as the US systems. So they just made the bombs 10 tens more destructive and built larger missiles to deliver them. Spin off was having the capability to put a man in space. Spud boy nik
Great video. From someone who pulled actual nuclear alert on the F-111 and F-16 in the Cold War days, albeit on the tactical sire of things vs SAC (but still part of SIOP). My take: people in general vastly over estimate the power and efficacy of nukes (especially when, as pointed out in this video, you take into account the probability of failure. But also the actual effects are overestimated, mostly). Yes, they are very powerful, but not nearly as much as you imagine. Still, it surely would have sucked to actually launch on such a mission...
One thing is for damn sure, in most popular accounts of the effects of nuclear war and the casualties produced, every single estimate relies on the assumption that absolutely no warning will be given, and absolutely no preparations are made.
It may have been a long time since we conducted national civil defense drills, but I still know where the nearest fallout shelter is.
@Karl Gruner Well, said. I too had some “hands on” experience in the Hahn AB Victor Alert (W. Germany) on a weapons load crew. Yep…didn’t want to see the Victor jets launch out of Blue Section.
@@millerdp Hey, when were you at Hahn? I flew F-16s there 1988-1990. Including nuke mission (although we no longer pulled continuous Victor alert by that time).
@@KRGruner I thought you might recognize my reference to Flugplatz Hahn! I recognized your name from your Sierra Hotel Aircrew Interview talks. We missed each other by a few years. I was at Hahn from 1981 to 1984. When I arrived I worked F-4Es (sitting alert) and then was assigned to the initial maintenance cadre that bedded down the F-16As…”First in USAFE.” We were still looking eye to eye with “Ivan” so Victor was still taking exchange badges at the ECP! With recent events I wouldn’t be surprised (unfortunately) if Victor Alert was revived. Germany was great duty… I could chat anytime with you about Hahn!
@@millerdp Oh, man! Fantastic! Yeah, Hahn was an awesome place, wasn't it? I did pull Victor Alert a lot when I was flying F-111s at Lakenheath, UK. And we still had the mission when I was at Hahn, just not full time, unlike in your days there. But we would still exercise it fairly regularly. Anyway, good ol' days, in a way, even if the threat of nuclear war was no fun...
The Peacemaker (both the bomber and the missile) may sound a bit ironic as a name, but they both actually went a long way to doing just that. In both instances, the Soviets were rattling their sabers pretty hard and talking about acceptable losses in a nuclear exchange. Both of those weapons systems put the fear of unacceptable losses back into the equation and squashed the threat of nuclear war.
Also, you underestimate the Navy/USAF budget battle calculus involved in each's position on the amount of nuclear warheads needed. Both sides knew that the Navy would never get enough submarines to support the USAF's number, thus making the USAF the only viable option if the nation went that route.
@Peter Allen
RE: "The Peacemaker (both the bomber and the missile) . . ."
Peacemaker: B-36 bomber; capacity: 72,000 lb or 6 Mk-4 fission weapons (10,900 lb each; yield: 31 kt (max)).
Peacekeeper: LGM-118 Peacekeeper was a MIRV-capable intercontinental ballistic missile with a capacity of 12 Mk.21 reentry vehicles, each armed with a 300-kiloton W87 warhead.
You forgot to mention General Buck Turdgeson's contribution to SAC. He's the one that got SAC pilots to avoid radar by flying so low they were fry'n chickens in the barnyard. He's also famous for the statement "WE MUST NOT ALLOW A MINESHAFT GAP!"
I'm 46 and remember, vividly, the end of the cold war. I remember the constant drumbeat of fear at so many levels - this was a world in which The Day After was shown on TV all the time (look it up, it was scary stuff in a world where it felt like that could happen at any time). We'd be told in *elementary* school that, if there was a nuclear war we'd better hope we died in the first strike. We were fed a constant stream of "you're gonna die, it's gonna be awful, sorry kids." In talking with other Gen Xers, this is why we were so disaffected and.... Sorry, tangent.
I think SAC wasn't wrong. I'm not sure they were the most right, but they were operating with what knowledge, experience, and data they had. And, in the end, there was no nuclear war because everyone knew it was a suicide pact. If the kill probabilities were lower, it would have been easier to rationalize away the fact that it would be the end of multicellular life.
Besides, if not for SAC, where would the Stargate program have been headquartered?
(From Spain) I am 45. I was in the Soviet Side. My family was Red. I lived in Panic for many many years.
"be the end of multicellular life."
Well even a full out nuclear war at the height of nuclear capabilities between the US and Soviet Union, wouldn't result in the end of multicellular life; nor humanity even; it wouldn't even kill all humans in the US and the Soviet Union.
But it would result in the virtual end of society for the US and the Soviet Union. The insane lost of life, along with mass death among survivors due to the lost of critical infrastructure; both countries would effectively be over. No more USA, no more Soviet Union; merely survivors on the land that used to be the USA and Soviet Union. What forms up in the ashes of the Soviet Union and the USA is anyone guess; but one thing can be for certain, there is no more superpower nations left among the rubble.
As for other nations not hit within the Nuclear war; while they may have a slight increase in cancer rates, the biggest issue is the famines caused from the reduce sunlight. Contrary to popular belief, nuclear winter wouldn't actually be severe enough to freeze the globe, and thus wouldn't kill off humanity. But it would cause mass famines which will claim many lives even in places far away from any detonations.
Nuclear war is absolutely horrific, but it isn't capable of ending the human species.
I grew up back then, and we were note told we were going to die in a nuke war. Rather we knew that our strong SAC will deter the communists from war. yeah we had air raid drills, but we were confident that we had enough nukes to prevent a war.
peace through strength!
@@dave8599 I wonder if it's something that varied from region to region, the US not being as monolithic as people tend to think
@@josephburchanowski4636 How many would it take?
Certainly seems reasonable tribes of humans would survive the initial explosions, the radiation, the famine, but if someone was disaffected enough to wish revenge on humanity, how many would it take to wipe us all out?
I think the United States Navy was in a long-term proven correct. The single mind focus on nuclear war and the weapons to deliver them would become apparently clear when trying to fight the conventional and unconventional War in Vietnam. I. E. Trying to use weapons like the f105 and the B-52. It also led to the Navy's funding fights for its own nuclear delivery programs.
Ugh. You win the war with nukes
@@kakerake6018 regular stuff got the job done. Just had to hit the right targets.
@@WALTERBROADDUS nuclear is as much a psychological weapon as a physical one. Vacuum bombs hit in the right spots will be indistinguishable from a small nuclear warhead since the devastion is massive and also vaporizes people like nukes.
@@deleqtronica8733 "Vacuum bomb?" You may be thinking of a Fuel air explosion?
I was a kid at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. My father worked for an Army weapons lab in Washington, DC (where I was born). They had involvement in nukes, as well as many other weapons systems. Now my father had high level security clearances (as I did later). We had a neighbor who all of a sudden bought and had delivered a large number of solid concrete blocks. All we knew about him was that he has a very secret job for some government agency. We didn't know which. As it later turned out, he worked for the NSA and was translating a lot of the intercepted Soviet message traffic. He never ended up building the bomb shelter as he planned, and he gave us the concrete blocks, which we used to good effect around the yard.
Off topic a bit, but when I first called for air-support in an Army training exercise 30 some years ago, the F16 missed by 3km and that was supposed to be CAS. They missed like that for the rest of the day so it wasn't just me being a bad FO. I was kind of depressed by it. We became convinced that only planes using guided bombs would be worth calling.
One reason we haven't dropped an unguided bomb for the last fifteen years.
Sorry if this sounds ignorant but how can you miss by 3Km?
@@finnzy2315 I don't know anything about being a an Air Force CAS pilot... but maybe he was just following a peacetime protocol that was designed to make sure nothing bad happened at the expense of accuracy. Things get super political/bureaucratic in peace time and performance suffers. I have seen 155mm guns and even mortars miss by almost (2km) that far too.
@@finnzy2315that is not that hard to explain. You just need to consider that you release the bomb fron a high altitude, with a high speed and if you combine this facts you can miss your target by far in an blink of an eye.
The low tech measures to counter this would be to use the bombs in masses/ to use clusterbombs (increase the field of destruction), or classical dive bombing (reducing the high of the drop off and guiding the momentum of the bomb to the target before the drop off).
The guided bombs of today are an hightech approach to an old problem.
@@dr.wahnsinn9913 "... use the bombs en masse ...", See: A-6 Intruder "Dumptruck of Death". An F/A-18 with a couple of 250 LGBs is more lethat than an Intruder with 7 tons of bombs (yah, six 500 lbers on each of the four wing stations, four on the belly station, not enough ground clearance for the other two bombs on the MIR). First to Laser self-designate.
Another fascinating video, Chris. My father served in SAC for about half of his career, so military aircraft and air forces have always been part of my life. I had always wondered how the US and Soviet Union accumulated such enormous nuclear arsenals, and your video provides a part of the explanation that I'd not really absorbed (the math behind the need to ensure destruction of targets). I think I'd just assumed that it was just a matter of having more nukes than the other side, and doing whatever it took to ensure that the US stayed ahead. Even today, we spend far more than the next five or so countries combined. However, even if you never use them, I would argue that nuclear deterrence is a valid theory. It's clear that possession of some weapons completely changes the situation when a country considers going to war with another.
Thanks for the feedback :)
Remember NORAD headquarters, under Cheyenne Mountain?
Estimates were it would take 17 ICBMs to assure destruction of that one, vital target.
@@patrickkenyon2326 Wow, just 17? That is fewer than I would have expected.
A grim topic for a grim day. Much to think about. Thanks for publishing and for the explanatory note that you pinned.
For most of WW2, precision bombing didn't really exist either. The British tried it, but a report somewhere around the winter of 41-42 found most bombs weren't even within 5 miles of the target!
It is, in my view, far cheaper to do it the French way. You can live with a far smaller deterrent if you give up on counterforce, first strike capability and focus your resources entirely on ensuring the survivability of second strike weapons targeted purely on enemy population centres, agricultural zones and ports. Morally repulsive, yes, but the money saved can be used to bolster your conventional capabilities to avoid having to come to such a juncture in the first place.
Target the power reactors and the agricultural is sorted.
Basically what China does as well, and China is still looking to become the second superpower in the next few decades.
Honestly to me this seems a lot more honest/pragmatic when the goal is actual peace. The lack of first strike capabilities paints a clear picture.
Although I do not really understand what exactly defines 'first strike capacity'. Forgive my ignorance, but when you have a nuclear arsenal, you _could_ launch it first at any time, couldn't you? Or does 'first strike capacity' mean being capable of a first strike that has the potential of hitting so hard, your enemy won't be capable of making a retaliatory strike afterwards?
@@Furzkampfbomber A 'first strike' is a pre-emptive attack aimed at neutralising the enemy's nuclear capabilities. Because you are aiming at the enemy's missiles and bombers, it is also known as a 'counterforce strike' (i.e. as opposed to targeting cities and other strategic targets, what's known as a 'countervalue strike').
Countries can protect themselves from a counterforce strike by building ballistic missile submarines and ensuring that they have a few on patrol at all times. That way, even if an enemy first strike is successful, your ability to retaliate is guaranteed.
The UK and France have adopted the posture of not bothering with a full nuclear triad and basing their nuclear capabilities wholly (in the case of the UK) or predominantly (France) with their submarines. This is what I was advocating for in my first comment.
In thinking about US deterrence policy, one cannot ignore the role of diplomacy. SAC based most of its estimates on the "no warning" attack response. With both a military triad of capability and a diplomatic effort to reach limitation treaties, SAC identified the minimum capability set required to deal with the USSR directly SHOULD THE DIPLOMATIC SYSTEM FAIL. War is the continuation of policy, but for the defending nation, it is the response to policy failure as well. In order to make the deterrent viable, the capability of striking first had to exist, even if it was a policy no-go. This is what LeMay and Powers were talking about. The spoiled heirs to the peace these men provided have grown up in a world of high tech precision weapons that were visualized, but decades away in the 50s and 60s. Lack of precision means that a nation must be able to mass enough capability to overcome the precision disadvantage at a decisive point. Failure to credibly demonstrate this capability means that your only actual deterrence is diplomatic. We won't discuss the complete failure of Western diplomacy during the post WW2 era, but suffice to say that we in the military were keenly aware of it.
To add to this; our intelligence community has never been right about...well...anything. They missed the North Korean build up, missed the 56 and 68 Soviet incursions in Hungary and Czech affairs, missed the IRBM build up, missed the economic problems in the USSR that Reagan exploited, missed the WMD question in Iraq, missed Al Queda's capabilities, missed the collapse of the USSR, missed the potential in the new Russian state, missed the Russian invasion of Crimea, Georgia, etc, and were completely fooled by the Taliban. No competent General would have been ignorant of the scandalous state of the IC, therefore, the base planning assumption that LeMay and Powers HAD to make was that any nuclear attack would be completely no warning.
@@CB-vt3mx Well, they didn't get the WMD question "wrong" in Iraq. Rather, they lied about it. British military intelligence told Tony Blair the truth that there were no WMDs in Iraq, but he chose to kowtow to the USA and accept their fiction when faced with reality.
Well said.
@@CB-vt3mx Just because they didn't do anything about it doesn't mean they missed it. Certainly they missed some of the events, like Korea and Al Qaeda, but with respect to Georgia, for instance, it's much more likely that they saw it and it was decided that politically "we were completely surprised" is a much better move than "We saw it coming but decided that Georgia wasn't important enough for us to bother".
@@thekinginyellow1744 exactly.
For all its importance, SAC and its doctrines really remain unknown un the public sphere. Informative video Chris.
Child of the Cold War (1978) and 22-yr USAF officer now.. I very much appreciated the analysis! Some historical bits I didn't know
I have a copy of Douhet's "Command of the Air" and his calculations on how many tons of high explosives, incendiaries, and poison gas would be required to knock out a major city fell short for a number of reasons. His proportion of high explosives to incendiaries to poison gas was 10:30:60. It was the same error that the anti-aircraft artillery people made, and the anti-tank gunners: they were calculating based upon optimum conditions with known values. During World War Two all sorts of unexpected surprises basically made the strategic bomber a failed concept. Even General LeMay's city-busting campaign against Imperial Japan--burning out 65 cities before the atomic bombs were used--failed to force Imperial Japan to surrender.
Determining how many nukes are needed to achieve deterrence is an art--not a science. Deterrence is about perceptions and must be credible. When the perception is that the decadent Western nation won't fight, and if it does fight it won't win against the holy warriors of Empire, and if the decadent nation does win, it won't be a REAL victory...
When at around 2am on August 10, 1945 the Emperor gave his reasons for agreeing to the terms of the Potsdam Conference, the bombing combined with the blockade was one factor he supposedly pointed to, along with displeasure with preparations for Ketsu go (the final battle to force a negotiated peace) and the dropping of two nuclear bombs.
I would suggest the B29 campaign against Japan did win the war, they did far more damage than the nuclear strikes. Japan was already very close to the edge of capitulation, the nuke strikes and Russia's overwhelming invasion of Manchuria were just the tipping point. Eisenhower years later said the Atomic Bombs were unnecessary to force Japan to capitulate.
@@hiddendragon415 You have a good suggestion but my reading is that a synergy created by unrestricted submarine warfare, burning out 65 Japanese cities through B-29 raids, mining of inland Japanese waterways (submarines and B-29's), sweeping the merchant fleet from the ocean (by mines, submarines, aircraft, and finally by patrolling Allied surface ships), reverses in China, loss of island fortified bases (which were turned into B-29 bases), Soviet Red Army advances into Manchuria and Korea and the threat of Soviet and Allied invasion of the home islands, breakdown of Japanese society caused by all of the above, AND two atomic bombs with the promise that "they are only the beginning" with zero possibility of stopping those bombs all ganged up on the Emperor. American battleships and cruisers were sailing off-shore and shelling the Home Islands with their main guns. It was important for World Peace that Imperial Japan have no "stabbed in the back" myth like Germany had between the two world wars. B-29's were a big part of Imperial Japan's total defeat. Even so, Japan's militarist acted like Monty Python's Black Knight--"COME BACK AND FIGHT, COWARD! I'LL BITE YOU WITH MY TEETH! I'LL BUTT YOU WITH MY HEAD!" The Imperial Palace guards rebelled and attempted to stop the surrender--fortunately they failed.
Eisenhower may have thought that atomic bombs were unnecessary, an opinion shared by General Curtis LeMay (commander of the XXth Air Force and after the war the commander of the Strategic Air Command and finally the Air Force chief of staff) but there was no do-over. It's difficult enough to determine "what happened" in the past. One urgent reason Japan invaded the Philippine Islands was American B-17 bombers based there were in range to bomb Formosa (present-day Taiwan). What would have happened if the USAAF had a force of 1000 B-29 bombers based close enough to bomb the Home Islands with at least 13 raids and knocking out at least 13 Japanese cities between December 9, 1941 (Tokyo time) and Christmas, 1941? What would this textbook Douhet campaign of a bit over two weeks have done? Do not forget that Imperial Japan hadn't capitulated by August 6, 1945, after those 65 cities had been destroyed--on top of all the other disasters suffered by Imperial Japan to that date.
@@alancranford3398 You make good points mentioning other events that pushed Japan further towards capitulation although I think it just supports the argument that Atomic Bombs weren't necessary. One sticking point on Japan's decision to surrender was Japan's desire to retain their Emperor. Once the Allies made it clear to Japan that they could determine their own political system with the Potsdam Declaration it was much easier for Japan to accept surrender. I think Japan would have surrendered without the Atomic Bombs although I do think they certainly hastened Japan's surrender.
I might be miss-remembering something, but I think it was on Fred Kaplan's book that said that SAC failed to notice some of the targets were quite close to one another, and although they had enough bombs to get a 90% destruction on each, several targets could be destroyed with the same strike rather than having to launch a strike for each one.
They also forgot to factor in the devastating global cumulative effect of hundreds of nukes going off within a short time.
@@0MoTheG I would imagine that the prevailing thought was that if you're dead you probably don't give a flying fart about the global devastation you just caused. Although, conversely, if you manage to survive only at the expense of a slow death caused by that same devastation, I'm not so sure that's really a "win" either. I imagine to someone like Powers, a death that you caused yourself is preferable to giving your enemy a chance to revel in victory.
If each missile silo needs 7 missiles to take out with a 99% chance, and both sides come to the same conclusion, there would always need to be 7x more nukes on "our" side than the enemy's. But the enemy keeps building more nukes! It's as if they are aiming to have 7x as many nukes as we do... Confound them!
That's where the Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) comes in. One missile can hit several targets. The US had MIRV on Submarine launched missiles.
As I see it, deterence should be acheived through the most extreme threat of violence possible. That to risk incurring it is as unthinkable as possible.
I think that for the most pragmatic detterence policy, population centers must be the target, and it must be made clear to those living there that if they let their leaders chose to go to war, they will be the ones who pay the most.
Nuclear war is not a situation in which anyone can win, so when the only way to win is not to play, you must do everything in your power to make sure your opponent doesn't decide to play
Yeah, its bleak, but thats kinda the point
But there's also a problem when someone calls your bluff or your in a situation where that's excessive force.
"If you do X; we'll nuke you." is all well and good until they do X and you're forced to either back down or unleash an apocalypse.
Think of it like that Simpsons episode where Homer is going around challenging people to a duel. Yeah, it works until someone calls your bluff and they might have the means to nuke you back.
I'm glad you don't decide our nuclear military doctrine.
@@OOPS-All-Discord-2022
same. While I think that's the most appropriate strategy, that doesn't mean I like it
Thanks for the great video. One of my favorite movies from SAC was the Power of Decision. It follows a 1957 war game. And has the Strangelove-ian moment where winning is the US with 10s of millions dead and the USSR with 100s millions dead.
The Dr Strangelove and Thomas the Tank Engine graphics were a real highlight of this video.
…..LaMay the fat controller.
The "Delivery" graphic/reference, with Slim Pickens riding a nuke, is pretty great.
I found it funny when you asked your initial question "What do all these things have in common", I practically yelled "Curtis LeMay". When you said "Strategic Air Command" I was half right.
Corndog holding, chest pumping macho is the best phrase I've heard all week! xD
Loved the Slim Pickens "Delivery" icon!
Good to learn this stuff about SAC and the use of nuclear weapons. The most I had know about nuke delivery before was LABS on fighter and attack aircraft
I cannot stress enough the value of the book, _"On Thermonuclear War,"_ by Herman Kahn.
It's the only book I've ever read that treats the subject academically, instead of strategically.
What's the nuance between academically and strategically in this context ? I'm not sure to understand the distinction here.
Also, my table salt is fluoridated and iodized ; is the purity of my essence at risk ?!
@@KenshiroPlayDotA I would say your precious bodily fluids are already compromised, sorry, bro. Glad I wasn't taking a sip of hot coffee when I read your comment.
@@KenshiroPlayDotA Sorry I did not see your comment until now.
Herman Kahn treats the subject of nuclear war as a scientific experiment, instead of just going over the strategy and weapons, he talks about not just the effects, but the limitations of the bombs. Their inefficiencies, human factors, limitations of various force postures, medical effects of radiation and fallout, and how one can win a war using them.
HINT: It's not the same as just "nuking their cities" there's a lot more to it. Did you ever think to use atomic bombs on your enemy's farmland? Turns out that's a great target. Maybe even too great. _"Instead of trying to eliminate your enemy's metropolitan areas, which can either be rebuilt elsewhere, or decontaminated without too much trouble, the way to prevent his recovery in the post war environment is to destroy his food supply, or poison his major aquifers."_
You've never heard THAT particular tidbit in the strategy lecture circuit. I'll let the book do the rest of the talking, I really do recommend it.
I had always wondered why we had so many nukes. That makes a lot more sense now.
Thomas was cross at being called a low priority target. He was after all, a really useful engine
Maxim 37: There is no Overkill, there is only Open Fire and Time To Reload
Thank you and well done. One of my concerns as a nuclear emergency responder is our current lack of civil defense measures which we once had in the event of a strike whether it is single or multiple. This deficiency should be addressed by the government and measures taken. In other wordsFallout shelters and more trained volunteers in the civilian sphere.
Civil defense was determined (by the *very same folks* who decried SAC's approach as being "warmonging overkill") as being *destabilizing* and likely to make nuclear war *more probable*, as the Soviets would assume that the purpose of the Civil Defence program was "obviously" so the US could launch a preemptive first strike. Bomb shelters and such were considered by the civilian technophiles and anti-nuke fanatics to undercut the very deterrent value of MAD, by seeking to eliminate the "Mutually Assured" part of the phrase.
He used the the Kentucky derby donkey analogy again 🤣 plz never stop being you, i loved that TBFL video
18:28 teacher responds : I am very happy that you were able to discuss the extermination of humanity and of Europe in particular with such apparent precision.
Loved the Slim Pickens reference at 15:50!
18:30 If your math teacher were not German he would be doing a dance. But as he is German he is probable just giving a little nod.
I love how you don't take a position on these really highly complex issues of historical import. It is the mark of a true historian.
Fascinating video, never thought about it this way. Thanks!
Great video! I've been a student of the Cold War for most of my life, and I enjoyed this thorough and accessible discussion of nuclear deterrence, which is often misunderstood by the public.
Nice video Chris. I've been waiting about the SAC for quite awhile. One question tho, was the transfer of nuclear capabilities to the navy the main reason for the decline of the SAC like how the V-bombers in Great Britain were slowly being phased out in favour for submarines launching nuclear ICBMs? Or was there any other major reasons in play as well that led to the decline of the SAC?
Oh and nice Thomas the tank engine cameo in your video btw ;)
There are multiple reasons next to that one. On the one side, the later administrations focused more on limited wars and while this was under the umbrella of a stand-off with the USSR, it was a mutual stand-off where one more or less nuke was no longer considered relevant. Then especially public criticism of SAC made them an unpopular institution to back politically while SACs critical role during the Cuban Missile Crisis was also not used as PR, which was odd because in the 1950s SAC had been an avid supporter of movies and features about its organisation. Power also tried to turn SAC into an 'aerospace force' (Project Orion) which put him on another collision course with administrators who saw the project as too high-risk.
The UK had a very different set of problems from the US. Simple geography meant that, with the dawn of the missile age, they could only count on about 5 minutes' warning of an impending attack - thus most of the V-bomber force was guaranteed to get hit on the ground, no matter what. Land-based missiles had much the same problem, especially in the days of liquid-fueled rocket motors, which needed a lot of prep time to be fired. That left Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) as the *only* credible way for the British to guarantee that their deterrent force would survive a Soviet first strike long enough to launch in return.
In the US, it was more about the politics. President Kennedy didn't like Curtis LeMay as a person, which - because he was mentally a child - meant he automatically came down on anybody's side *except* SAC's in any decision; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, wanted a bigger Army with more toys (and was willing to lunge the US into war in Vietnam in order to justify that); and the Secretary of Defense, Robert MacNamara, hated the thought that the US might actually have a strategic advantage over the USSR and did everything in his considerable power to destroy that edge, justifying his degradation of the force structure by claiming that various "studies" he commissioned "proved" that his assumptions were correct.
It wasn't as much of a transferral, as an added strike capability.
LeMay was right. In the early 60’s we had a significant missile advantage over the Soviet Union, and our intelligence incorrectly over estimated their strength for years. Had we launched a surprise first strike, our casualties would’ve been moderate, but by no means enough to render our forces ineffective. We would’ve destroyed their communications network immediately, and at least 3/4 of their land based ICBMs early in the campaign, and rendered their ability to respond marginal at best. We would have achieved a total victory, and forced them to sue for peace. Which would’ve left the US as the sole super power on the planet, and discouraged other nations from building nuclear arsenals of their own.
_"I'm not saying we wouldn't get our hair mussed, but it would be no more than 10-20 million killed, tops. Depending on the breaks."_ - General 'Buck' Turgidson
@@GeneralJackRipper Exactly. But I believe there would’ve been much fewer. With the element of surprise, and a carefully studied plan covering all of the contingencies, I don’t believe there would’ve been 5 million immediate American deaths. There would’ve been a great number of wounded, but with a coordinated medical response and the stockpiling of medical supplies specifically for radiation related burns, we could’ve achieved a high survival rate. Civilian targets on a large scale would’ve been impossible for the Soviets because their only choice would’ve been to neutralize as many land based missiles as possible to stop the bleeding. By then most of their force would’ve been destroyed, and their communications badly compromised. They would have more likely went after targets in Europe like West Germany and other NATO countries where we had short range missiles.
@@robertclark9 It does make sense that numerous nukes are needed to have a good chance of destroying most of the Soviet arsenal, but there's a problem with using too many nukes ; the nuclear winter would likely kill way more than a few dozen millions across the globe. Recent studies of a limited nuclear war between India and Pakistan have some pretty scary numbers about the number of people starving to death because of all the black carbon released by cities burned by a few dozen nukes in the region, which then reduces the incoming sunlight across the planet and sends crop yields into a nosedive.
A first strike with multiple nukes per target may have been an option when the Soviets had a very limited arsenal, but it would probably have been out of question once the number of needed nuclear detonations reached ~100.
@@KenshiroPlayDotA Nuclear winter has been largely debunked. The people who ran even that simulation admitted they fudged the numbers.
@@KenshiroPlayDotA They said the same about the Kuwaiti oil well fires in the first gulf war. NASA scientists said the greenhouse gasses being released from the burning oil wells could cause global cooling and nothing happened.
Very informative presentation. Thank you so much.
I think reconnaissance is underrated in the discussion of nuclear deterrence. It's involved in identifying targets, accurately determining their locations, and damage assessment of course. At least as important, however, is that it is vital in determine the enemy's ability to attack and defend. Without that knowledge, you can't tell if the enemy can credibly attack you or stop your attack. Not only that, unlike pretty much every other aspect of warfare, it is vital that the enemy have a good idea of your ability to attack and defend. Without that, they might underestimate your capabilities and decide they can win a nuclear exchange, and deterrence has failed. So SAC needed to ensure that the Soviets knew at least in general terms what SAC was capable of.
This is about perfect timing. Thank you, great job as always.
My dad was an Air Police man in the USAF 1957-1963. He once stood honor guard for General LeMay when he visited a SAC base. My parents were at Seymour-Johnson AFB during the Cuban Missile Crises. My dad was one of those walking armed guard post around B-52's ready for 5 minute scramble. My mom once told me during the crises the USAF officer responsible for liaison with the families called the wives into a large auditorium. The officer told them that if they heard the sirens not to try to leave because they could not get far enough fast enough.
Thanks for this timely video.
My mother worked for the Institute, many, many decades ago. Glad to see them supporting your content.
I wonder how many people in Germany remember "Reforger Exercises"? I was with the "Big Red One'" stationed at Fort Riley, Kansas in 1973 where I was sent to Germany to participate in "Refoger IV" (Certain Shield), which was a "Rapid Action" deployment from the US to Germany to test our abilities to get to & be ready for War Games. I was with the "Jump Team" quickly followed by the Main Body. I was in Germany from JAN 73 to early MAR 73. Our convoys of vehicles & tanks sometimes rumbled down several narrow streets " I was not happy about that -- it bothered me. At that time NATO was growing up & "The WALL" exsisted...!
First I must say, I absolutely L♥️VE your Channel. I only came upon it 2 months ago, but I already know that you are the Military Analyst on RUclips today.
You provide a cogent, incredibly well rounded a gas EXCEEDINGLY WELL INFORMED episodes and channel, without bias, I have ever seen.
Congratulations and Bravissimo‼️
As an amateur military historian, I respect and admire the depth and FACTUAL composition of you presentation and analysis.
You should be very proud of what you have achieved con your channel‼️‼️‼️
Im amazed you remember something 2 decades later from school. I forgot my friends asked me for a ride to the airport 2 weeks ago. Luckily she sent me a reminder text the day before.
I just liked the Slim Pickins graphic riding the nuke! Classic!
Delivery @ 15:41 Slim Pickens makes an appearance LMAO!
I was stationed at Vandenberg AFB in the 80s. Even though VAFB was a SAC base, I was not in SAC. I was assigned to a tenant unit. But we got all the SAC news.
I don't know how widely this story is known.
Every year SAC chose one ICBM at random, yanked the warhead off it, and transported the missile to VAFB to launch it to see if it worked. SAC's version of quality control.
One year, the missile chosen was a Titan II. The test crew installed the range safety package (a bomb to blow the missile up in case it went off course), lit the fire, and let it go. Did not work right so they detonated the RSP.
The failure caused several sphincters to pucker, but, hey, shit happens. So they pulled another Titan.
Did not work right, either.
Pants were shat at VAFB and Offut AFB.
So SAC pulled TWO Titans out of their holes and sent 'em to VAFB to be fired downrange.
This time, both missiles flew according to plan. Many sighs of relief.
Titan II was notoriously hard to maintain and unreliable. The only reason they kept them in the arsenal til the 80s was its ability to carry a large warhead. Shit, the Air Force almost blew up Arkansas cuz of a dropped wrench.
@@dongately2817 The Titan was liquid-fueled. The Minuteman missiles were solid-fueled. The Titans had longer range. They needed it 'cause the fuel had to be pumped aboard when they got launch orders. Don't know how long that took. I am certain that information was classified.
AFAIK all the Russian ICBMs were liquid-fueled. Still are.
@h_lynn_keith Titan II had storable propellants(Aerozine 50, N2O2) , so they could sit on 24/7 alert for many week or years at at time. "the record for remaining in the silo without a propellant download was 10 years" - Stumpf Titan II page 69. Vandenberg Titan II missiles were test vehicles (for crew), fueled on site before launch. Atlas (RP-1/LOX) and Titan I had to be filled just (30 minutes or less) before launching.
@@markbike5288 Thank you for correcting me. I mean that. No sarcasm.
I know the Russian missiles operate under the same fueling restraints as the Titan I.
@@hlynnkeith9334 Early Soviet missiles like the R-7 ( - which became Soyuz booster/first stage) was LOX/kerosene and _did_ have those constraints. Later missiles with a hydrazine/N202 propellant mix were storable, ie they could sit in silos filled, ready to launch on minimal notice. That is the point of storables. example is the R-36 NATO SS-18 Satan, roughly similar to the Titan II . nuke fas org guide russia icbm r-36m Stumpf's book goes in to some detail about the difficulties storing N2O2 in aluminum rockets. As soon as N2O2 hits air with _any_ humidity, it becomes Red Fuming Nitric Acid (RNFA) with corrosive consequences. Kept in a closed container, it doesn't corrode much. YMMV :-) Thank you for the civil response.
Everybody talks about the lifes that would be lost in a nuclear war, but nobody talks about that wars that were avoided just because of the mere existence of nuclear weapons.
SAC did the best they could to think a strategy on how to use them.
Great video Bismarck! I will buy some of those books!
Had the psychopathic war criminal in charge of SAC had his way human history would have ended in November 1962.
fascinating.....I had never heard of the Dayton practice raids
Great video and yes, in light of current events, a sad video to watch. Thank you for your intelligence and sensitivity.
As I understand it SAC wanted an offensive nuclear deterrence while nearly everyone else was content with passive nuclear deterrence. For SAC it wasn't enough to have the capabilities to annihilate the enemy if he attacked with nukes because that offer no strategic or political advantage. SAC wanted to have the capabilities to prevent mutually assured destruction by striking first, effectively, with devastating force because that means the US would be able to go nuclear and "win" if they didn't like the USSR using conventional or underhanded means to salami slice ... Europe for example and as long as the USSR knew it or at least believed there was a good chance SAC could do that they were less likely to do stuff like that. Given what's happening in Ukraine right now, with Putin believing him self safe behind his own nuclear deterrence, I can't say I blame them for wanting that. Would he still be this aggressive if there was the real possibility that he could be nuked without being able to launch his own nukes? The idea was sound and it had merit IF it could be achieved, which was and still is a big if (I believe that was part of the US push for Stealth).
I think “peacemaker” is an incredibly bone-chilling, yet accurate name; as in there will be no other option than peace after those planes deliver their payload for the wasteland of a former nation that lay beneath them.
Got a chuckle out of the Slim Pickens graphic at 15:57 :D
Deterrence works, but potential enemies need to acknowledge both the ability and willingness to back it up. Despite you knowing you can and will, if they think you can't or won't, you might find yourself forced to prove them wrong.
As always, concise and clear, and very very interesting. Couple of points. (1) The Navy actually had a slightly better idea with its subs. They can't be targeted because they can't easily be found, thus, their value as a deterrence is much higher than land-based forces. (2) the Rooskies realized at some point that continuing to expand their nuclear arsenal in lockstep with the US was a mug's game. Towards the end of the Cold Wart they put a lot of money into chemical and biological weapons as a cheaper way to create a deterrence, because it is inherently harder to calculate the effectiveness of such weapons, should a war break out.
One final note. Reports today on the invasion of Ukraine suggest that Putin is psychologically isolated and surrounded by yes-men; kind of like Stalin on a bad day. Under those conditions, he may choose to use a nuke against a Ukrainian target. I hope he doesn't, but his televised speech and "meeting" of his security and military team suggest that he's not quite all there, mentally speaking.
Not really
The Soviet Union continued to expand its nuclear arsenal until the end of the Cold War (40,000 devices) Whereas the US started to reduced numbers from its height of 30,000 in the 1970s.
The numbers were about status...Oppenheimer when ask in the late 40s advised that 40-50 atomic(as opposed to thermonuclear devices) was sufficient to wreak ever grand city in Eurasia so ought to be sufficient.
Remember the UK even built their chicken powered bomb and NORAD planned to detonate h-bombs over US territory... there is logic to nuclear warfare but that isn't it
It's an issue of scope. SAC's concerns are valid when considering the immediate direct effects of nuclear weapons on specific individual targets, but those are irrelevant for deterrence purposes because the broader indirect effects have an astronomically greater impact on the strategic scale. It matters relatively little what a nuclear weapon hits since the simple act of detonating more than a handful of them in quick succession in an uncontrolled environment can easily have world-changing consequences in and of itself.
As an old SAC airman, we always were ready to do the mission if required. We always never wanted to see the mission called for. If you ask the men and women who were in combat, or in our case, were ready and able to deliver the weapons, it is a nightmare in the back of your mind. You really can't tell somebody who hasn't been there what it is like. Good video. o7
I live right next to the sac museum! Definitely worth a visit. The sr71 alone is worth the visit
Although there may be a mathematical logic to attaining delivery to target reliability, it comes to a point circumstances defy any logic. By the mid-1980's, there were over 65,000 nuclear weapons deployed around the world. The Soviet Union alone had 40,723 nuclear weapons in 1986. The United States nuclear weapons inventory peaked in the 1970's and then started to decline, as the USSR ramped up. There came a point where American weaponeers were developing so many nukes that the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff had so many weapons available that warheads were allocated well beyond what was required. Retired CINCSAC Gen. Lee Butler was surprised to see that 10% of the Minuteman 1000- ICBM missile force were targeted against Soviet ABM sites. Furthermore 69 warheads were targeted against the Soviet ABM Radar at Pushkin near Moscow. Since the Soviet ABM sites were situated in a ring around Moscow, well over 100 nuclear warheads would be detonating in and around Moscow. This is the result of targeting ABM sites which are defensive rather than offensive weapons. I feel that this redundancy of weapons to targets was more a function of overwhelming weapons availability against a limited number of offensive targets than a true strategic need.
This is some very fascinating history! Greetings from Omaha, home of SAC (now STRATCOM), and not from the SAC Museum in Ashland NE... So, good to know more about the local history...
My father was stationed at a SAC base during the Cuban crisis, and we all lived in base housing. I was fascinated with the bull dowsers at the end of the runway, as I watched all of the B52’s taking off. Many years later I asked my father what were the bull dowses for….he told me they were there to push any planes off the runway which were damaged or couldn’t take off….that was SAC.
Great video and thanks for highlighting Naval Institute Press research.
Feel free to explore their work on the aerospace part of airpower history ;)
It is a gross and dangerous misnomer to believe that nuclear weapons alone convinced Imperial Japan to surrender.
My Dad was a SAC B-36 & B-52 pilot from ~1953 to~1964? Before he retired he worked at SAC HQ making all of these plans, basically. After he retired to his hometown in SW Oregon when I was in High School, we were driving to the SW coast to go Salmon fishing. There's a lot a very rough terrain between the town, Medford OR, through the Coastal Mountain Range requiring travel into Northern California to get to the SW Oregon Coast. At the time, ~1975-76, it was rumored that there were groups of survivalists that lived in these rugged areas. They did this because they felt that radioactive fallout would need to cross the Pacific before it got to them. In the event of a global thermo nuclear war. I'm sure there is some truth about the existence of these people, but I have no idea on the numbers.
I mentioned this to my Dad while driving and he said they would get a rude awakening. Because the incredibly small Salmon fishing town, where we were going, called Brookings OR would be targeted with at least 3 nuclear bombs. Brookings/Harbor are the "town". A very, very small town with a small bay and ~population in the 1970s of ~5,000. Lumber and Salmon fishing were its economic base. Only paved access to the town is the N & S Coastal Highway. When I asked my Dad why Brookings? And why 3 bombs? You have answered the question of 3 bombs that he gave me. The reason for targeting was that between the Astoria/Portland OR and San Francisco/Oakland CA Large ports there are only 3-4 medium ports and ~5 small ports. I asked what could the military do at the small port at Brookings OR? Dad said because it's a Deep Water Port due to the coastal underwater geography that could allow it to be rapidly enlarged to accommodate submarines and large military ships. Look at a SW Oregon Map and find Brookings just N of the CA border. It's tiny.
Two other interesting (to me) things related to how and why they used a~50% estimated failure rate. Dad added that the true effects (physical, EMP, atmospheric, etc.) of so many simultaneous thermonucuclear, augmented fission and standard fission bombs could only be modeled and never tested. (No s**t).
The other relates to the SIOP. At least up to the early 1960s it was, as the acronym applies, a Single plan against all potential nuclear armed enemies and, at different times, enemies with large conventional force potential. One Single Plan. No options. Totally Binary. Go or No Go. That meant both the Soviet Union and Communist Chinese would be attacked simultaneously. No matter which Communist country was the belligerent enemy. As it happens, he remembered that his B-52 Primary was a Soviet target with a Chinese Secondary target. Quick, Efficient, Highest level of "success", minimizes chances for last minute confusing or conflicting alterations. Fortunately, although My Dad flew those gigantic bombers for thousands of hours. While carrying gigantic multi-MT thermonuclear weapons all around the Northern Hemisphere. He never dropped any type of bomb on humans. He didn't fly a bomber in the Vietnam war.
So...Deterence Worked. After all, SAC's motto was "Peace Is Our Profession".
Thanks for the informative video and the great book recommendations. I have read one biography on Curtis LeMay. Amazing leader. He earned every promotion he got. He openly admitted that had the US lost the Pacific or European wars? That he would have been executed for War Crimes.
I love your graphics! Great video.
As the most beloved Marine of all time - Chesty Puller said - "the noise of your rifle fire doesn't mean anything; it's the hits that count." So SAC was dead right, mutually assured destruction doesn't work if you can't guarantee that you can kill the other guy. The closer you are to someone thinking I could get away with this the more chance there is for nukes to fly. So if you don't want nukes to fly you want to get as close to %100 kill probability as possible.
"They" in that phrase could refer to everyone, not just SAC. The motto of SAC was "Peace is our profession."
Maybe that was the motto of Norad, which would have given SAC its marching orders.
18:27 if your high school math teacher had given story problems with nukes rather than a man trying to buy bananas maybe more kids would have paid attention
Mutually Assured Destruction only works when both leaders are sane and rational.
Adding this to the “list of RUclips videos that make me double check the channel before watching”
As one descriped the MAD overkill; Like 2 guys standing wastedeep in gasolin, one has 3 matches, the other 5...
SIOP was created because it was found that naval nuc subs, and USAF bombers & ICBM forces were not coordinating their target selections resulting in redundancies and/or missing gaps in target planning. The S in SIOP meant 'single' plan, not each service having their own plans.
SIOP was run by the Joint Chiefs of Staff not by Navy or USAF commands. I served in the mid sixties at a Montana missile base and latter in Hawaii working at a communication facility responsible for sending SIOP orders to the pacific area. Fun times for me as I trusted in MAD concept and just did my job(s).
That does sound like overkill. I can see why post-launch mitigation could be more cost-effective and flexible. Only the most critical targets might require that sort of overkill. It begs the question Why wasn't SAC more interested in what to do if any Russian missiles got through? 'Duck and Cover' doesn't seem to cover it.
Offutt air forces base is on sac Blvd in Bellevue Nebraska. I still call it sac when referring to the command that replaced it.
I think it's really interesting that SAC's policy heavily involving kill probability principles derived from an understanding of such are pretty readily understandable for anyone who has played table top games. Although the latter are vastly simplified into systems involving dice rolling mechanics the principles remain the same. Made it a lot easier to intuitively understand the central argument of overkill being a myth. Whenever there is an element of chance involved nothing is guaranteed.
Amazing video!!!
“Well, boys, I reckon this is it. New-q-lure combat, toe-to-toe with the Rooskies.”
Major T.J. Kong USAF
Commander of B-52 - Leper Colony
Thank You.
If anyone could turn a "ragtag" air force into a lean, mean, nuke dropping machine, it would be LeMay. He did have very similar experience afterall.
A superior commander, deplorablle world view.
There is a lesson to be drawn from the Princess Bride. No not the bit about land war in Asia or the bit about Sicilians. I’m thinking of the poison cup challenge, specifically the guessing of an adversary’s intentions, especially with regard to 1st strikes. Every shift in parity increases the possibility of one side or the other of launching a first strike. There will be constant shifts in parity, as each side doesn’t want to fall too far behind in capabilities, and if possible, they want an advantage. (We call this the arms race.) At some point, deterrence undermines itself. It encourages the use of nuclear weapons. Thank god we never reached that point, and I pray we never again approach it.
I’m not talking about the increased chance of an accidental triggering of nuclear war when tensions are high. That is a related problem. What I’m saying is that the concept of deterrence itself eventually causes the thing it seeks to avoid.