A useful philosophical method - Do not vigorously condemn opinions or beliefs which you or which others appear to hold strongly - simply to annoy them - or simply to annoy yourself. Do not demand evidence or justification for beliefs which others hold strongly. Ask yourself why you don’t support the opinions which other men hold?
I read this book. I was a fan of analytic philosophy, so without a single doubt I must do it. Well, I do like the style of Ayer, however can't say it was an easy reading for me so I'm planning to reread this. Besides, I do not like when about philosophical ideas is said that 'it's a mistake'. Really? A philosophical idea is a mistake? How possible is it?
@@TeacherOfPhilosophy If a theory T is not a philosophical one, then it could be proved or disproved. (Let's imagine we can prove or disprove any non-philosophical theoreis.) But let's say we've got another theory P such as this can be proved (or disproved). If we claim that this theory P is a philosophical, how at all could we say that we proved or disproved it? We must have some methods M such that they will be able to prove or to disprove any P if and only if P are philosophical. But again, if M is a philosophical theory, then we can continue the questioning. So, P for being proved or disproved must be equal to T. That's why no materialisms, platonisms, aristotelianisms, whatsoever cannot be proved or disproved. We may either believe or not to believe in them. Some philosophicals theories as you said are contradictory to each other. But since there's no chance to check it out one of them, we cannot be certain about whether or not some of them false or true. Why so? Let's say that P (=philosophical theories) have something in their theories that allow them to not be sensitive to the proofs. In other words, P have some S such that S don't allow P to be like T. Until P have S we cannot say whether or not P is true or correct, therefore we cannot say the same about P1, P2, ..., Pn. It's simple. If P1 is indefinite, this can be true or false; if P2 is indefinite it also can be true or false. Let's say that we've got P1->P2. What is the answer? There is no answer since P1->P2 will produce different answers, and we don't know which is correct. So, this is a philosophical misleding of the mind to think that their theories are the same as the other sane ones. No, philosophy is wandering the circles.
My friend, the view you have just articulated in your comment here is a philosophical view, and it was a disagreement with my own philosophical view. If your view is correct, then there can be no way of knowing it is correct, because it is philosophy. But if there is any way of knowing whether it is correct, then there is such a thing as philosophy that can be confirmed or disconfirmed.
@@TeacherOfPhilosophy Cannot agree completely. What your said about my point - this wasn't incorrect, but if this was true, then my point was as indefinite as your now. In this situation both of us are facing the stalemate. And you've got your opinion, while I've got mine. I'm completely okay with it, since I like your channel, and I don't think that lectures are just wasting of time. But I was sincere last time. I said just what I had been thinking. I am a positivist, so surely I don't accept philosophical theories seriously.
But there are only the two theories. My theory says some philosophical theories can be wrong. Your theory says mine is wrong. But if yours is right, then mine is wrong and so yours is wrong also.
The answer to the problem of induction is that generally speaking there is no such thing as induction. We KNOW that the past causes the future not by experience, but because that is what we define the past and future to be - precisely cause and effect in the general. Similarly for the specific: we KNOW how billiard balls and coffee cups behave precisely because if they behaved in any other way they would NOT be billiard balls or coffee cups, they would be illusions or tricks or hallucinations, but not the truly described physical object. The problem of induction arises from a misunderstanding as to what a physical object is: that is a vector or connector in the network of causality. Hume extracts some trivial aspects of an object to create a sort of sudo-object removed from its causal net, and then says: "look causality doesn't exist!"
Its not that we know past/future from cause/effect, they are just different terms for the same dichotomy. A dichotomy or temporal divide that is foundational and obvious in ANY observation of actuality. Particular physical objects constitute a process of particular causes linking into particular effects, or equivalently of particular pieces of the past flowing into particular pieces of the future. The being of a physical object therefore IS JUST the sum of its causes on one side of this temporal divide, and the sum of its effects on the other.
So do we know the effects of the next tragic event where I accidentally cause one of my teacups to fall to the floor? And how we know it? Where did this knowledge come from?
Two points here: 1/ Calling this "Knowledge" is to endow it with a possibly unjustified kudos , where the term awareness or presumption might be a less loaded. 2/ If it is knowledge then it is not knowledge about teacups, but knowledge about fundamental temporal existence. Hume frames this question as "How can we presume the continuity of nature", as though one small part of actuality might perform differently to how we expect while leaving the rest unchanged. But in posing this scenario he is making a massive assumption. An assumption that goes against all we know of the interconnectedness of actuality. What Hume is really saying is "what if actual reality disappeared and was replaced by something completely different." And this question may be asked, but it has no relevance to the philosophy of the actual. Yes our conception of actuality is discovered through experience. But this experience is not represented by some arbitrary collection of inductive sequences. It is a much more holistic, integrated process that is married to rational cognition.
I am asking what Hume also _actually_ asked--a question about knowledge. You seem to think we have this knowledge--there are things we "know about the interconnectedness of reality." Ok. I agree. We do have knowledge of that sort of thing. But I am asking you _how_ we know it, and you are not answering.
By knowing what it means. But it looks like what you’re asking me for is the _correct_ criterion of meaning-whatever criterion can replace the Logical Positivists' Verifiability Criterion of Meaning. Well, _I_ don’t have a criterion of meaning. I just know the Verifiability Criterion is not correct!
Utmost? That's a new claim you seem to be disagreeing with there. My only point is that it's not the _only_ . If is the only, then there is no knowledge at all of any world outside the mind. Bertrand Russell's critique of Logical Positivism is correct! But what you really seem to be asking about is: _What other criterion for knowledge is there?_ Whatever it is, it's going to be the criterion that describes how we know the Principle of Induction or the Uniformity of Nature.
You want more? I got more! I got Kant, Reid, Plantinga, and William James! They have a lovely extended answer! If you need tips on where to find it on this channel, lemme know. Or email me at PlatoAndAugustine@Gmail if you want a text version.
Ive just begun reading this book. Thank you so much sir. This helps a lot
A useful philosophical method - Do not vigorously condemn opinions or beliefs which you or which others appear to hold strongly - simply to annoy them - or simply to annoy yourself.
Do not demand evidence or justification for beliefs which others hold strongly.
Ask yourself why you don’t support the opinions which other men hold?
Thanks for this video. Very insightful for me.
I read this book. I was a fan of analytic philosophy, so without a single doubt I must do it. Well, I do like the style of Ayer, however can't say it was an easy reading for me so I'm planning to reread this. Besides, I do not like when about philosophical ideas is said that 'it's a mistake'. Really? A philosophical idea is a mistake? How possible is it?
Very possible. Many philosophical ideas are mistakes. Materialism, Platonic Forms, Aristotelian universals: at least two of them are mistakes.
@@TeacherOfPhilosophy
If a theory T is not a philosophical one, then it could be proved or disproved. (Let's imagine we can prove or disprove any non-philosophical theoreis.) But let's say we've got another theory P such as this can be proved (or disproved). If we claim that this theory P is a philosophical, how at all could we say that we proved or disproved it? We must have some methods M such that they will be able to prove or to disprove any P if and only if P are philosophical. But again, if M is a philosophical theory, then we can continue the questioning. So, P for being proved or disproved must be equal to T.
That's why no materialisms, platonisms, aristotelianisms, whatsoever cannot be proved or disproved. We may either believe or not to believe in them.
Some philosophicals theories as you said are contradictory to each other. But since there's no chance to check it out one of them, we cannot be certain about whether or not some of them false or true. Why so?
Let's say that P (=philosophical theories) have something in their theories that allow them to not be sensitive to the proofs. In other words, P have some S such that S don't allow P to be like T. Until P have S we cannot say whether or not P is true or correct, therefore we cannot say the same about P1, P2, ..., Pn. It's simple. If P1 is indefinite, this can be true or false; if P2 is indefinite it also can be true or false. Let's say that we've got P1->P2. What is the answer? There is no answer since P1->P2 will produce different answers, and we don't know which is correct.
So, this is a philosophical misleding of the mind to think that their theories are the same as the other sane ones. No, philosophy is wandering the circles.
Why is there no chance to check it out?
My friend, the view you have just articulated in your comment here is a philosophical view, and it was a disagreement with my own philosophical view.
If your view is correct, then there can be no way of knowing it is correct, because it is philosophy. But if there is any way of knowing whether it is correct, then there is such a thing as philosophy that can be confirmed or disconfirmed.
@@TeacherOfPhilosophy
Cannot agree completely. What your said about my point - this wasn't incorrect, but if this was true, then my point was as indefinite as your now. In this situation both of us are facing the stalemate. And you've got your opinion, while I've got mine.
I'm completely okay with it, since I like your channel, and I don't think that lectures are just wasting of time. But I was sincere last time. I said just what I had been thinking. I am a positivist, so surely I don't accept philosophical theories seriously.
Thanks for this
But there are only the two theories. My theory says some philosophical theories can be wrong. Your theory says mine is wrong. But if yours is right, then mine is wrong and so yours is wrong also.
The answer to the problem of induction is that generally speaking there is no such thing as induction. We KNOW that the past causes the future not by experience, but because that is what we define the past and future to be - precisely cause and effect in the general. Similarly for the specific: we KNOW how billiard balls and coffee cups behave precisely because if they behaved in any other way they would NOT be billiard balls or coffee cups, they would be illusions or tricks or hallucinations, but not the truly described physical object.
The problem of induction arises from a misunderstanding as to what a physical object is: that is a vector or connector in the network of causality. Hume extracts some trivial aspects of an object to create a sort of sudo-object removed from its causal net, and then says: "look causality doesn't exist!"
So we know these things about the past and the future because we know about causality? But how do we know so much about causality?
Its not that we know past/future from cause/effect, they are just different terms for the same dichotomy. A dichotomy or temporal divide that is foundational and obvious in ANY observation of actuality. Particular physical objects constitute a process of particular causes linking into particular effects, or equivalently of particular pieces of the past flowing into particular pieces of the future. The being of a physical object therefore IS JUST the sum of its causes on one side of this temporal divide, and the sum of its effects on the other.
So do we know the effects of the next tragic event where I accidentally cause one of my teacups to fall to the floor?
And how we know it? Where did this knowledge come from?
Two points here: 1/ Calling this "Knowledge" is to endow it with a possibly unjustified kudos , where the term awareness or presumption might be a less loaded. 2/ If it is knowledge then it is not knowledge about teacups, but knowledge about fundamental temporal existence. Hume frames this question as "How can we presume the continuity of nature", as though one small part of actuality might perform differently to how we expect while leaving the rest unchanged. But in posing this scenario he is making a massive assumption. An assumption that goes against all we know of the interconnectedness of actuality.
What Hume is really saying is "what if actual reality disappeared and was replaced by something completely different." And this question may be asked, but it has no relevance to the philosophy of the actual. Yes our conception of actuality is discovered through experience. But this experience is not represented by some arbitrary collection of inductive sequences. It is a much more holistic, integrated process that is married to rational cognition.
I am asking what Hume also _actually_ asked--a question about knowledge.
You seem to think we have this knowledge--there are things we "know about the interconnectedness of reality."
Ok. I agree. We do have knowledge of that sort of thing. But I am asking you _how_ we know it, and you are not answering.
Ifu cant verify something, how d u know if its meaningful or not?
By knowing what it means.
But it looks like what you’re asking me for is the _correct_ criterion of meaning-whatever criterion can replace the Logical Positivists' Verifiability Criterion of Meaning.
Well, _I_ don’t have a criterion of meaning. I just know the Verifiability Criterion is not correct!
@@TeacherOfPhilosophy if sense verfication is not our utmost guide for truth or falsity then tell me what is?
Utmost? That's a new claim you seem to be disagreeing with there. My only point is that it's not the _only_ .
If is the only, then there is no knowledge at all of any world outside the mind. Bertrand Russell's critique of Logical Positivism is correct!
But what you really seem to be asking about is: _What other criterion for knowledge is there?_
Whatever it is, it's going to be the criterion that describes how we know the Principle of Induction or the Uniformity of Nature.
You want more? I got more! I got Kant, Reid, Plantinga, and William James! They have a lovely extended answer!
If you need tips on where to find it on this channel, lemme know. Or email me at PlatoAndAugustine@Gmail if you want a text version.