How One Phrase Crashed A Passenger Jet | TWA 514
HTML-код
- Опубликовано: 12 янв 2023
- Get 25% off Blinkist premium and enjoy 2 memberships for the price of 1! Start your 7-day free trial by clicking here: www.blinkist.com/miniaircrash
on the first of december 1974, a TWA 727 was on the way from indianapolis international airport to washington national airport with a stopover in port columbus international airport in ohio. The flight to columbus went off without a hitch and when the plane took off from columbus they had 85 people onboard and 7 crew members, although the flight departed columbus a bit late it was nothing that the pilots couldnt make up enroute. But at 10:36 am the pilots got some bad news from the controllers on the ground at cleveland,they said that No planes were landing at washington national airport due to high crosswinds. Due to the cross winds everyone was diverting or being put into a hold the captain of flight 514 got on the phone with the dispatcher, he needed more information to decide what to do. After talking to the dispatcher they decided to divert to washingtons dulles airport as the winds were more favorable there. Cleveland atc then asked flight 514 to descend down to 23000 feet and after a while control was handed over to washington ARTCC. As the plane was being handed off from one ATC region to the other the pilots went over the approach that they would be flying into dulles international, they talked about the runway that they would be landing on, in this case runway 12 and the navigational aids that they would be using to land. After those discussions were done the captain handed the 727 off to the first officer. Now, he would be the one making the landing. As they got in touch with washington ATC the pilots discussed the possible routings that they might get from the controller and how they would go about the approach. At 10:51 am the controller wanted to know what heading flight 514 was on and the pilots told him that they were on a heading of 100 degrees, the controller wanted them to turn left to 090 degrees. Which would allow them to intercept the 300 radial of this VOR in the area called Armel. This would set them up nicely for a straight in appraoch to runway 12. Now that last bit had a bunch of terminology, a VOR is a beacon that pilots use to navigate and think of radials as 360 spokes coming off of the VOR beacon. Flying along a radial takes you away or towards from the VOR beacon in a particular way. With the landing information received the pilots started prepping the plane for landing. As they did the math needed for the landing a landing reference speed of 127 knots was set. All this while the crew went over even more details of the landing like the runway lights, the intersections that they would need to fly through and the airport diagram. As the plane left 11,000 feet for 8000 feet the captain asked the 
Наука
Get 25% off Blinkist premium and enjoy 2 memberships for the price of 1! Start your 7-day free trial by clicking here: www.blinkist.com/miniaircrash
Can You Make A Video About The SAS Crash In Stockholm?
I would not say AT ALL that your scripts are repetitive. You comment on flight incidents, and flight procedures and checklists are repetitive. You merely on them and the unique story surrounding each incident. Keep it up mate, I enjoy the new video drops.👍👍
Congrats on the sponsor!
Hello sir a plane crash has been reported from nepal i would like you to follow it (with 68 passengers and 4 crew members )
@@waitingforanalibi2224 mate? i thought it was a girl 😀
Today's very high levels of safe operations were mostly born out of failures, human and mechanical, over more than 100 years. As a pilot, now retired, who began his professional career after the date of this accident, it was blindingly obvious to me that the pilots should have been flying the descent profile of the approach plate, but then it occurred to me, that's taken for granted today.. not so back then. A lot of blood has been spilled before we achieved the high standards of aviation safety we enjoy today.
The unrealized detail is the 300-degree radial is on the plate but at their distance it wasn't part of the procedure.
@@gerardmoran9560 Understood, but the sector from which their approach was made would have depicted an MSA for, typically, within 25 miles of the airport.
@@jamesgraham6122 Indeed. We'll never know what was going through the crew's mind. MVAs are often lower than MSAs but thankfully we've learned a lot from this unfortunate accident and our clearances and phraseology should prevent a future mishap of this sort.
More than the altitudes on the approach plate which are minimum altitudes. No reason to dive and drive for any portion of the arrival. This crew went down to 1800’ more than 20 nautical miles from touchdown for RW12. Using simple math says at 20 miles they should have been no lower than 6000’. Using distance to calculate a 3 degree profile (glide slope). The three times the distance rule is taught around the world but U.S. have never taught it. Using it allows you never to be too high or too low. The Flying Tiger fatal B747 crash at KL in early 1989 was another example of failure to use the rule. I was a DC8 Captain at Tigers when it occurred. The Tiger 747 crew was planning to use the ILS for RW33. The ILS was NOTAM’d out of service which caused some confusion when ATC told them it was INOP. They could expect the NDB. The F/O was flying and ATC cleared them two four zero zero feet(2400) but the Captain read back they were cleared to four hundred feet(400). They descended in the dark, ignored the GPWS for an extended period until about one second before impact someone said 100’ which was finally noticed on the RA. They were 5+ miles from the runway which the distance rule said they should have been 1580’ which was 1500’ above airport elevation.
I was once on a flight and some passenger was complaining about why he had to put his laptop away during takeoff. The FA said:”if it’s a rule, then someone died from it previously. Put your laptop away.” Never forgot that.
Perhaps it's already been noted in the comments, but this accident resulted a very important element being added to all approach clearances: "Airliner 543, you are cleared for the ILS runway 22 approach to the Podunk airport. MAINTAIN 3,500 (or whatever) FEET UNTIL ON A PUBLISHED PORTION OF THE APPROACH. Contact Tower now on 119.25."
As a humbling sidelight: I failed my first instrument practical test in 1971 for the same reason that TWA 514 hit Mt. Weather. When I was cleared for the approach, I immediately began my descent to the altitude of the initial approach fix. As soon as I cut the power to begin that descent, the examiner immediately said, "Okay, Bill, let's head back to Madison. You failed." He went on to explain why I failed. I passed the test a year later, and after the TWA 514 accident, I realized how lucky I was to have failed that first test.
If this TWA flight was at the proper altitude of 7500’ passing Mt. Weather there would have been no accident.
So....what did you do wrong?
Like the crew of 514, I assumed that when I was cleared for the approach, I could immediately go down to the initial approach altitude. That is not correct. You cannot leave the minimum safe altitude for the area you are in, until you are on a published portion of the actual approach.
I was a TWA pilot and a Captain for 27 years. We were taught to do exactly what the crew did on this approach. TWA later changed their training and I asume ATC did also.
You were taught to fly into a mountain..??
@@toddkallenbach3904 of course not. it was the terminology used in this accident by ATC and the response to it.
@@GreyEagle42That being said the crew was never taught that distance from touchdown determines the altitude the airplane should be at any point on an arrival. When this flight hit the small mountain they intended to be at 1800’ MSL but were I believe 1675’ probably caused by the high winds. The impact occurred at 25+ miles from RW12. At that distance they should have been no lower than 7500’.
@@georgeconway4360 are you even a pilot. descents into an airport do not follow the 3° descent profile to the runway. the glide slope is always intercepted from below.
They do if the pilot is smart enough to fly a 3 degree profile. There is never any reason too be below that profile with the exception ATC airspace restrictions because of multiple airports. Yea I’m a retired airline pilot, flew F/O at age 21 and retired as a Captain age 65. I even have 8.5 years of furlough time where I learned things that were never taught to Americans so accidents like the TWA crash going into Dulles. They had no business being at that low altitude when they hit that mountain they should have been above 7500’ based on their distance from touchdown.
I remember this one. The new procedure was initially called “The Dulles Rule.” You were no longer allowed to descend to a lower altitude until established on a segment of the airway or approach that had a lower MEA.
Goes to show why proper terminology and phrasing is so crucial for safety. Just today I've seen a footage where the ATC needed an aircraft to abort take off and the phrase used was "cancel take off clearance" which led to the pilot's confusion and a delay in reaction. Were the reason something/someone being on the runway, it could have ended tragically
ATC: delta 123, ***interference*** take off clearance.
Delta 123, roger. (engine spooling up noise)
Cancel take off clearance is the appropriate phraseology when the aircraft hasn't started its takeoff roll. If it's already rolling, then it would have been Stop immediately. So may be the roll hasn't started in this scenario
@@thewhitefalcon8539 The term takeoff can be used in transmission only in two occasions. One is while issuing takeoff clearance and other is when cancelling takeoff clearance. If Delta hears their callsign and the words take-off clearance after its been already issued, they'll surely reconfirm.
@@thewhitefalcon8539 I would therefore have said "cancel take off cancel".
It's so weird that some people would say that you're repetitive. I never noticed that. All I know is you sound so passionate about what you're talking about that I can't help but listen intently to your every word! I sort of had an interest in planes, mostly disasters before I found your channel but you're turning me into a plane nerd and I love it😂❤
The only thing that I would call "repetitive"is the format of the introduction, and that is a good thing.
As my father and older brother were then both active professional pilots at the time, my father an airline pilot based in KDCA and my brother a corporate pilot, both flying into KDCA and KIAD regularly - this was a most disturbing accident!! Once I became a professional pilot and ultimately an airline pilot flying in and out of KDCA and KIAD, this accident was discussed in several recurrent ground schools. It would seem to me that there was plenty of blame to go around. Indeed if the pilots would have gone strictly by the approach plate they would have been fine [as I understand it, neither pilot had ever done this particular approach into KIAD before], yet because of the ambiguous language of the time, ATC to the pilots of the time and their understanding of it [or lack of..], there was a deadly scenario in play. Even up to my own retirement in 2014, the pilot - ATC language issue, was still being addressed! All my professional ground schools addressed potential communication issues. I, many times, questioned controllers as to exactly what they expected me to do with a stated clearance. This was particularly done when in mountainous terrain such as KROA or KAVL. Yet - the ultimate responsibility for the safety of any flight is that of the PIC, only he or she can say the final yes or no to any plan of action. There is a saying in the biz - “A Lawyer visits his mistakes in prison, a Doctor buries his mistakes, BUT, a pilot is buried with his mistakes!” If there is even the slightest doubt about a clearance, it is for one’s own self-preservation that the pilots seek and get a satisfactory clarification! Always think - what could go wrong here!
My ATC instructor in USAF told us that the ATC Handbook (the 7110.65) was written in the blood of 1000s of crash victims. There is probably an incident behind every bit of phraseology. You should use that as your source material for future videos.
I love your videos. You explain things in a way that everyone can understand. Thank you for that!
my step dad was a responder too that crash....stayed up there for several days going thru wreckage. it should have never happened
Some time ago I was watching an ATC video where there was a miscommunication between pilots and ATC. They did figure out the error, and part of the communication afterwards was "we're a team here." IMHO, the team failed.
I really like the coverage of the bigger picture of the effect this had on the practice of aviation. Extra context like that and the similar incident just weeks before are the difference between good content and great content.
Neither the pilots nor the controllers were to blame; it was a system failure. (Though a better situational awareness might have led the crew to take heed of the radar altimeter's warning.)
The crew knew exactly where they were and what the minimum altitude was. It was clearly stated on the instrument approach chart. The chart shows a profile of the approach and the minim altitude between waypoints. They chose to ignore it. This is clear from the CVR transcript. For the full transcript search for "twa flight 514 crash cockpit voice recorder".
I think the investigators start with the understanding that to conclude the study with 'human error' isn't really satisfactory. Why did the pilot act a particular way or believe something was happening when it wasn't. It could be tiredness, lack of training, spatial awareness, stripping of confidence. Any number of factors.
@@wtorules4743 I would have been fine if that had been the official determination. Instead they chose to blame the controller despite the fact that the air crew KNEW where they were and what the minimum altitude was that was specified on the approach profile.
@@mikepennington8088 Except on the 1974 chart the approach profile starts at the FAF at 1800', it's one of the recommendations of NTSB report to start that profile at MSA or intermediate fix. The captain saw the 3400' restriction on the leg from IAF to IF at Round Hill but thought it did not apply as he was not following that but instead had been vectored to the VOR radial and cleared for the approach. Overall a tragic misunderstanding.
@@mikepennington8088 But the pilots were under the impression that ATC was watching out for them. That was the crux of the whole problem.
“Victor Omni Radio” VOR great video. I started flying C150’s in Southern California “TOA” in November of 1977 and I got my private pilots license in March of 1978. Radar was antiquated controllers were over worked and everything depended on staying out of the TCA I remember the Huges Air West Collision with a F4 Fantom jet and the Cerritos Air disaster. Back then the smog in the LA basin was so bad much of the summers were barely five mile visibility so see and avoid “VFR” kept you looking outside the cockpit. Frank Sinatra’s mother was vectored into MT San Gragornio because of non standard radio communication. It wasn’t that uncommon that aircraft would fly into terrain because of the lack of transponders and adequate radar. I’ve got to think that in 2023 with aircraft that practically won’t let you crash them that aviation in general is so much safer but every once in a while a misunderstanding leads to disaster. I guess Murphy’s Law comes into play “if something can go wrong eventually it will go wrong”.
Maybe this standard phraseology should've been adopted much sooner, especially with air travel becoming more common and knowing that some things get lost in communication, whether by the speaker or receiver. But, as you said, hindsight is always 20/20.
And then you go to Montreal, home of ICAO, and they speak French on the radio more than half the time!
This has been the evolution of flight. We should be at a point where mechanical issues can be all that is left for planes falling out of the air.
@@BobbyGeneric145 really? Wow...
@@BobbyGeneric145 Then you go to France where they have airports where they speak French all the time. You're not allowed to land if you don't speak French.
@@hugovandenberg313 my point is that its a bit of irony they use something other than the official language in the home city of the organization that decided on the official language. I realize that every country switches back and forth between English and their local language.
The way you provide detailed yet easy to understand explanations of complex accidents is very helpful. Seems this was very significant in improving safety. Thank you.
They went down to the MDA- Minimum Descent Altitude- when they were cleared for the approach,. . The final approach fix is a point where after passing they can then descend to the MDA. They descended well before they got to the Final approach fix. The captain was hired by TWA with no flying time at all. He started as a Flight Engineer, then on his own, got his pilots license and then moved up the ladder at TWA. Cleared for the approach is standard terminology. It is always given before the final approach fix. The pilots messed up. I had 35 years with TWA/American as a captain/ FO and FE plus 15 years in General Aviation and corporate flying. So I know a little bit. Also flew the 727 as a FE,FO and captain.
So what I gather from this incident is that it's one thing to know how to fly an aircraft, but it's a whole other ballgame to be able to communicate and follow instructions from the ATC properly, but not to expect them to see everything and bail you out of trouble guaranteed. I think they would've been safe if they'd hit TOGA after the first radio altimeter warning. The circumstances seem so similar to the Polish president plane crash in 2010.
They never tried to descend to the MDA, the tried to descend to the Initial Approach altitude of 1800’ MSL unfortunately they were at 1800’ 20 miles too early. Then the also hit even lower than 1800’ because they had an altimeter error because of the high winds.
@@georgeconway4360 altimeter error because of high winds? That’s a new one.
@@markmartin9346 It’s new to Americans but an issue. Just one of the things like very low temperatures causing altimeter errors that impact the safety of flight. I learned about it after my company switched from Jepps to LIDO charts(Lufthansa I believe). In the section providing information on altimeter errors with very low temperatures was another section about altimeter errors in hilly or mountainous areas due to high winds caused by the Bernoulli effect of high winds over uneven ground. The charts showed errors of hundreds of feet. I believe this error impacted this TWA flight and probably the AA MD80 that hit the trees going into BDL.
@georgeconway4360 the AA flight, they used QFE and I think misread that. After that, they switched to qnh.
I grew up very close to Dulles (IAD, KIAD), close enough to hear the ground control and ATIS radio signals, and all approaches from the west go over the Blue Ridge Mountains and the terrain in that area of West Virginia and then north-western Virginia is mountains and valleys and hills and valleys. I could see how them flying so close to the same height as the mountaintop could cause issues with the VOR bearing indicator.
I also did flight training out of Manassas Regional Airport (KHEF) and remember flying due West towards the mountains (using VORs and NDBs for navigation practice - along with a sectional chart….which includes safe minimum altitudes for a given area. Once you get j to the mountainous area. The safe minimums do jump up and down a bit, but the solution is to keep your aircraft above the highest safe minimum possible in your area. The area around Dulles has grown a LOT in the past 20-30 years, and with RNAV and other modern equipment (EGPAWS, EPWS and others), an accident like this should not happen again.
That doesn’t detract from the important of correct use of radio procedures (old term “radiotelephone”) are one of the most important things in, well, anything. Aircraft, military operations, maritime operations (seamanship). If you didn’t understand or there was another transmission on frequency causing interference (it happens, 99% of the time it’s accidental), request SAY AGAIN. Don’t use the term “repeat”. That’s almost as ignorant as saying “over and out.”
This still happens in S America. It was a systemic problem here, but if it happened before and was apparently known about, ATC was directly at fault for giving the same clearance again. Glad we learned a bit from it and have improved our culture and practices.
Flying into the ground can often lead to sticky situations. They taught me that first day at Flying School.
It’s certainly a paperwork heavy situation afterwards.
I think the technical term in this case is "controlled flight into terrain"
@@disorganizedorg unscheduled landing
@@garand70 Impromptu landing with disassembly ;o)
@@gnarthdarkanen7464 Arguing with the ground.
I can see mt weather from where I live, and those hills will come out of nowhere in low visibility. I’ve flown over it a few times VFR, it’s always strange to imagine a crashed 727 down there.
Bro in your ad you say you think your content is repetitive. Trust me I'm a long time watcher and no, it's really really not. Don't get in your head man, i love your videos.
I prefer to listen to your voice documenting these air crash investigations than any apps!
I would put the bulk of the blame for this one on ATC, as they should have been clearer in what they were telling the pilots to do and what they were and weren't doing for them, but the pilots aren't completely absolved of blame as they did have charts warning them of the terrain situation. The discrepancy between the charts and the ATC instructions should have prompted the pilots to query ATC. "Are you sure about that clearance? Isn't there some high terrain around here?"
But ultimately, the blame has to lie with a system that allowed different people to have different understandings of the same phrasing which had already resulted in a near-miss.
Aviation language is very strict. You have to keep your communications down to a minimum, it's not the ATCs job to make you understand it's more their job to communicate in a timely and prompt manner. It's the FAA's job to make sure everything is standardized so that everyone is on same page.
Read the comment just above your comment from a twa captain.
ATC didn't instruct them to descend. ATC said they were cleared to descend, which means once they got to the final approach fix, they had clearance to descend.
It wasn't an instruction to immediately descend. But this crew misunderstood that, as apparently some others had in this very same place.
I like your plainly presented videos, It's always good to progress and get better, but your style is something I personally like. It's stable, simple and you don't bullshit about unknowns. I like the way you write and present and I haven't missed an episode. I do hope that you don't fall into the "stock video" and "stock images" that so many channels are relying on. Nothing worse than a story from the 50's using graphics from modern China. Anyway I like what you do the way you do it. I have a really hard time thinking of how you could improve your channel, but I'll keep coming back no matter how you experiment.
Not sure if I heard how many were hurt and killed. A quick Google search said 93. Great job still. I look forward to your videos.
Yah, I always listen for that and didn't catch it either. Thx for the search !
Placing the ad before the story and not in the middle is the best way. Thanks
Great video again. Thank you for taking out the expletives...
Excellent coverage. I Flew as copilot and captain fly for TWA. Never heard d about this. Spot on. Verbiage TWA and atc had, changed for the better!
That was a terrible day. IIRC, the Northwest charter 727 also crashed that day on a flight from JFK to Buffalo.
Wind and clouds near DC contributed to one crash. Cold and ice near NYC contributed to the other one. Was the same storm covering the region that day?
@@FameyFamous Yes, it was the same storm system covering the entire northeast. The planes crashed for two different reasons, but weather was a contributing factor in both as well. By coincidence, I was flying from New York to Buffalo at the same time as the Northwest flight, but from LaGuardia, on American. It was very bumpy, but that’s not what brought either plane down. It was the reaction of the pilots to faulty information that caused them to make fatal errors.
The Somebody Else's Problem Field strikes again! The fault lies with everyone in the situation who assumed someone else would take care of the problem of safety.
Best channel of it's kind never change please ♥️
The Boeing B727-200 is one of Boeings' best-looking airplanes ever! Simply, it is one sexy beautiful machine.
You got a sponsor. Well done. A milestone for your channel.
Excellent video MACI!
When I was a kid we used to go out for drives on the weekend (if anyone remembers people doing that), and a few days after this accident we drove past the spot. I can still remember it clearly. On the hillside looking out from the road every tree was sheared off just as level and clean as if with a saw. Up to the road, which was the point where it hit the ground. On the other uphill side of the road the trees were unscarred, untouched, and there was nothing there but thousands of what looked little white scraps of paper scattered amongst the trees, and nothing else.
When you say a similar incident occurred just 6 weeks ago,was that from the time of the crash or from upload date?
Thank you for another great video..
At 7:11 the NTSB chart calls it TRAM World Airlines!
That’s a new one on me 🤣
I thought I was paying attention to the narration of this video. I am accustomed to TheFlightChannel's videos with no narration and read the typed comments to find out if all survived, how many survived, or if none survived. I either missed this info or it was not mentioned so I searched for it and found out, from an entry in Wikipedia, that all 92 on board, 85 passengers, and 7 crew members, were killed. It is hoped that the understandable misunderstandings between the pilots and ATC has been corrected if not done away with altogether.
He said it really early 2:11
Great explanation
I’m going to say if blame needs to be assigned… the FAA or NTSB or whoever was in charge of procedures. I know rules are often written in blood but it seems like “let’s set some standard terminology so we’re all on the same page” would be a pretty good first step when you are handed responsibility for a safety system. How do you even make rules/procedures on how to respond to things without first defining what you’re responding to? 🤷🏼♀️
I go to this crash site pretty often. Still plenty of clothes and plane pieces around. On my first trip out there I found a broken and warped credit card belonging to one of the passengers. It's heart sinking.
I've been trying to get in contact with his only remaining family to return it to them but no reply from them...
My uncle and his wife were on this plane. It was 8 years before I was born, but I honestly don't remember a time in my life not knowing about them
"Any Damn Fool" can understand...until someone doesn't. Human potential for vagueness and omission is immense.
As always a great video.
Good suggestions from the board.
I think it was a communication problem on both sides. I am amazed at how many crashes are the result of miscommunication.
It's very sad.
Great content. Your voice is perfect.
Well.... IMHO the pilots are to blame here. Why? On all approach plates there are navaids and fixes, all complemented with a minimum altitude to overfly it.
These pilots were obviously not aware of their exact position nor the required minimum altitude at that position and therefore could not verify if the clearance given by ATC was feasible. The approach plate shown clearly said 1'800 ft NoPT (means 'no procedure turn required when on approach track). So, the minimum altitude to maintain were these 1'800 feet until arriving at the proper descent path for the approach in question.
Me too received a non flyable clearance once in my career (ex ATPL here...). And this even was in an radar environment... Always cross check on what you receive - that's what pilots are paid for.
I enjoy your calm, systematic, understandable narration of these videos. Try not to focus too much on the critics, many of which have never successfully accomplished anything but receiving a welfare check. In other words, keep doing what you're doing as many love your format.
Another great video.
I used to drive past the impact point of TWA514 every day going to and from work. You can still kind of see the trees along the plane's path are all the same height, even almost 50 years later. It's unfortunate that the land where the wreckage was scattered has been sold and developed into homes. I wonder if the people living there realize that they are living where almost 100 people died.
There should be an automatic order by the computer to go up if a certain height is reached which is deemed dangerous...
Well there is now. Terrain warning, sink rate warning, synthetic vision etc. But these pilots had radar altimeter as well but probably not in 1974 the systems and training to do a terrain avoidance manoeuvre.
Excellent video on a not so well known, but very important incident. There was also an aside to this accident - This is the first time the public became aware of what's now FEMA's Mt Weather complex, their primary command post/bunker. Flight 514 took out the primary phone line into the complex, and already knew something happened up there. The Feds were none too pleased the cat came out of the bag on their facility. There is a monument in the area for TWA Flight 514, just can't remember well. The rescue effort was also hampered by the horrid weather, thick woods and terrain. There was a second B727 crash in the same day, Northwest Flight 6231 crashed thanks to a stall from incorrect airspeed readings from an iced over pitot tube. That plane was heading to Buffalo to pick up the Baltimore Colts, and crashed in a wooded marsh. The only people on were three pilots, all killed on impact.
The phrases used by pilots and controllers DIDN'T HAVE STANDARD MEANINGS?
That is utterly terrifying.
You never say how many died in this accident, and how many survived
All 92 people on board died
It was close to my home town and the weather that day was so bad snowing ,and sletting,it was bad for many years you could see where the plan cut through the trees it was very sad
Damn bro your channel got big! I subscribed at 7k and came back to 200 lmao
Thanks for all the support!
While the crash could have been avoided with better situational awareness from the pilots, I think that the systemic failure in communications standardization was the root cause. Yes, the pilots had the charts, and yes, they should have remained alert during approach, just in case, but the system should remove as many points of failure as possible from the process.
I have long believed that this is one aspect of instrument flying which is often glossed over and not given its due respect: Minimum Altitudes. The minimum altitudes to maintain on each segment of each approach should be hammered into a flight student's mind from grade school to the bar stool. There should be no questions about it during any phase of any approach. Not only that, but each student should be taught to keep a very close watch of rapidly changing (lowering) barometric pressures on approaches. High winds can mean rapidly falling pressures.
Who was in the wrong? Both ATC and the pilots. But it was those on the plane that suffered the consequences, so...
I have been watching the Smithsonian channel's tv show Air Disasters for years and I have never seen an episode on this crash. With all the improvements in air safety you would think this crash would have been covered.
Thanks indeed for uploading this episode.
I guess both ATC and pilot made mistake:
When pilot receives transmission of " cleared to land" normally he/she expects to be in final, keep descending looking for PAPI etc. While he had received this quote much sooner than expected.
Furthermore it is somehow shocking that flight charts ( at least as I understand)had not specified the landing pattern and trigger points and the pilot himself kept descending with no clue of runway.
The inset side view of the final approach (only shown on another channel) was in part to blame. I looked down the dashed vertical line at the high end of the approach, saw NO ALTITUDE indicated, and my blood ran cold.
Apparently they crashed into a cia listening post on mt weather. At least that is what my mentor told us, as he was a twa captain.
Wiki: ‘The flight is also of note in that the accident drew undesired attention to the Mount Weather facility, which was the linchpin of plans implemented by the federal government to ensure continuity in the event of a nuclear war. The crash did not damage the facility, since most of its features were underground. Only its underground main phone line was severed, with service to the complex being restored by C&P Telephone within 2½ hours after the crash.’
Regrettably, much of the knowledge acquired to this day in world aviation comes from errors or, rather, the careful analysis of mistakes made.
From these analyzes made by these valuable research teams is that today, without doubt, we have a much safer aviation than 10, 20, 30 years ago.
Either one of the participants thought the other had them radar covered, this is why they crashed.
11:00 "Always wasn't the case", this means that phrase NEVER means they're in a radar controlled environment. Did you mean "Wasn't always the case"? Which would mean that it was sometimes the case, but not always.
I find it morbidly funny that your little slip up of words completely changes a key point you're making, in a video about exactly that, haha. As always, great video ☺️
"cleared for the approach" does not allow descent below published altitudes on the approach plate, regardless of radar availability. The minimum altitude for each segment of the approach must be respected...for non-precision approaches. In the case of an ILS, the clearance is 'cleared for the ILS 12, maintain xxxx altitude until passing ..a particular fix/distance or other reference, then follow the glideslope down to DH decision height, at which point either land if required visual reference obtained, or go missed approach
I sail, depth of water is a major concern of mine, so much so, that my sailing friends call me "shallow water Warner". And we use charts, these are never out of my consideration. Also, diminishing depth alerts my senses, so, wtf were these pilots clucking about at? Peace be unto you.
The more I watch these the more I get scared to fly! I can't believe all the flights I had taken in the mid 60s to the 70s to the 80s thank God everything was ok considering statistically that was a more dangerous time for accidents.
Fault is not mutually exclusive. Both ATC and the flight crew were clearly at fault. It's on both to cross check everything to ensure safety.
I'd put most of the blame on the crew. They had the best situational awareness and acted against the data they had on hand.
CFIT controlled flight into terrain....was reading an 1975 article in Popular Mechanics on Internet Archive about ground proximity warning system mandated after this very preventable catastrophe. The 1970s was a dark age for aviation disasters. People take for granted the relative modern aviation safety record but even still anything human is still fraught with errors and mechanical failings.
Another common term that makes no sense, "The alarm went off", referring to when an alarm actually goes on.
When I hear that over the radio, I followed up with "has it gone off or is it still going off?
The term is so common, I used this in a training class once and most of the students didn't get it.
I was waiting to here, "Pull up, Pull up."
Ultimately it is the pilots who control the aircraft..
You mentioned "jumping" indicators a couple of times. Were investigators able to explain? Is this normal considering the winds?
That's very likely wind related. Turbulence tended to reek havoc on the old analog instruments like that. The needles would bounce around under their own inertia.
video starts at 1:53
The main goal of an air crash investigation is to determine what went wrong, learn from it and prevent the same thing from happening again. Not to play the blame game. That allows pilots and controllers to be very open in their communication with an investigation team and ultimately gives better information on the crash and how to avoid a repeat. This crash led to clearer terminology, Tenerife led to the word 'Takeoff' only being used in clearances and 'Departure' everywhere else. Had the investigators in these investigation been out for blame, those improvements might never have happened, leading to more crashes. Not looking for blame is one of the foundations of today's aviation safety. So 'Who's to blame' is always the wrong question in aviation accidents.
Poor communication KILLS. This crash was the result of a flaw in the system. I'm not sure that either the pilots or the controllers are at fault. Both were following their training.
I have thought of the phrase outer marker outbound, is very similiar sounding outer marker inbound, they should be unique sounding so everyone knows which direction an aircraft is flying.
When and why would anyone fly "outer marker outbound"?
5 minutes in, and still everything sounds really great flying 😮
6 minutes in, and it kind of got very bad…
Can you link to a report of the United incident?
I'd like to read the story, but not have to wait for whatever blinkist is. I'm gone.
your commercials is why I never end up watching the actual content
You ever gonna do a plane spotter backdrop vid for old time sake
Funny voicecrack at 10:07 😂😂😂
So first you show the plane crashing into terrain. Then you show that same plane making perfectly safe landings with no mention at all of anyone dying in a crash. So I guess the plane crashed then miraculously pulled itself back together and made a perfect landing with no deaths. Very confusing.
I don’t know, I’m currently doing my instrument training and cleared for the approach never means unrestricted descent for me. I’m not sure how it was in the 70’s, but there are always minimum descent altitudes for each phases of the approach and never would I descend below that unless ATC explicitly states that
The altitude alert isn't a "horn!" It's an "altitude warning, altitude alert." Cockpit alerts and warnings aren't "horns."
Apparently during the NTSB investigation, it was discovered that a United Airlines flight had very narrowly escaped the same fate during the same approach and at the same location only six weeks prior. This discovery set in motion activities that led to the development of the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) by the FAA and NASA in 1976 to collect voluntary, confidential reports of possible safety hazards from aviation professionals. (From Wiki.)
Why would you want an unrestricted approach knowing there’s 1800 feet high mountains? They looked at the maps and everything.
Crazy how different your voice sounds in an year
One of the consequences of this crash was the accidental discovery of the deep underground bunker located inside Mt Weather, which has been operated as a way to secure the federal government, including congress and the Supreme Court, inside, in the case of a nuclear war.
The base is now operated by FEMA, and is rumored to be massive. It’s a easy wreck site to get to, as it hit near the road.
Tragically, General Roscoe “Rock” Cartwright was on this flight. He was the first black field artilleryman to be promoted to the rank of Brigadier General. He is also the grandfather of former Redskin Rock Cartwright.
Ironically, Rock trained out of the Redskin Park facility in Ashburn, which is very close to where his grandfather died.
@@snookerman you’re absolutely right
@@snookerman he was his granddad
Yep. Pretty sure it's still used as a contingency site for various government agencies....
In ATC communication, numbers are spoken in group form. TWA five fourteen (not five one four). A Boeing seven twenty-seven, not seven two seven.
Also, your model shows a 727-200 series with the newer paint livery. The one that crashed was a 727-100 series (with the classic twin globe design on the tail).
I wonder if this is why IAD never lands on runway 12 anymore, even in high winds, I live nearby and can’t ever recall them using it. The approach to that runway would require you to fly over those mountains at a lower altitude than if you were approaching runway 1/19 that they do normally. Just an observation
They almost never land on RWY12, because the winds rarely favor using it. The vast majority of the winds at Dulles come from the West or Northwest. I have actually landed on RWY12 before, though. It has nothing to do with this crash.
Sad thing is, I believe, (other than people dying) the flight engineer told the pilots that they can’t descend yet. But they disregarded his advice.
This accident was a real shocker! I had not heard about this critical misunderstanding of terminology as a factor. I'm not an air carrier pilot so I can't comment on "fault". The very same thing can be said about Avianca 52 which had used the word "priority" in expressing their dire need for immediate landing as they were running out of fuel and pancacked into a hillside in Glen Cove Long Island on a second approachto JFK.
That was an accident totally the fault of ATC for allowing this dreadful situation to develop with a foreign non proficient english crew. Captain spoke none as the other crew members became increasingly frantic and engines started shutting down.
To be fair: JFK controllers don't know how proficient any foreign crew are with English. They get hundreds of non-native English speakers every week. They can have strong accents and lack-luster pronunciation, and still be extremely proficient. Truth is, standard phraseology in place at the time of Avianca 52, "Priority" is a request, "please put me near the front of the line." Emergency means "I'm not asking, I'm telling you, I am at the front of the line!" That's how JFK understood them, and they had no reason to think otherwise.
You could say that the controllers took on more traffic than they could handle at the time, and that is a fair statement. But that doesn't mean the accident was totally the fault of ATC. I have to ask why Avianca had a captain flying internationally, that could not speak the only internationally recognized language? Did they allow other pilots to fly internationally without knowing English? How did they know if the scheduled crew had an English speaker on board?
The official ICAO language is English. If that crew were not proficient in it, enough to do their job, then they had no business flying in North America. That is precisely WHY there is one official aviation language. Furthermore, the pilot in command, is ultimately responsible for his/her aircraft. That includes having enough fuel, or diverting to a closer airport, if you do not. That is not the responsibility of ATC.
www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR9104.pdf
I would put the blame on the FAA for not requiring standardized communication protocols between ATC and pilots, specifically aimed at preventing these types of misunderstandings.
The only "false note" to this otherwise praiseworthy simulation is the livery. TWA was still using the 'twin globe" livery in 1974. If the markings on the "huge bird" in the recreation had been as rigorously researched as the circumstances of the aircraft's final flight, it would be truly first rate.