Antinomies (Impossible Paradoxes)

A definition of Antinomies in contrast with veridical and falsidical paradoxes as defined by Quine.
Information for this video gathered from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy and more!
Information for this video gathered from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy and more!

[@trumpsupporter1016]

Umm, that is not what an antinomy is.
Antinomies come in pairs which contradict one another, but both are logically solid -
a contradiction between two beliefs or conclusions that are in themselves reasonable;

[@Filomatia]

Well... it's an antinomy if we assume that a sentence may adress itself.

[@sonhale2522]

I'm here from nier automata

[@Sci0927]

Not to be confused with antimony, however.

[@imran19187]

Omg the latest comment s 5 years ago😂

[@whatislifebro]

Jesus

[@thiagomiyazaki8883]

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[@LaureanoLuna]

Propositions are the primary truth bearers, not sentences. Some sentences are unable to express propositions. Such is the Liar sentence, the sentence on screen and all such that could only express propositions that are about themselves, for no proposition is about itself (e.g. if proposition p is about x, it is not about p's being about x; however, a proposition can be about the sentence expressing it, as in 'this sentence has five words'). The secondary truth bearers are not sentence-types but sentence-tokens (sentences used in contexts): two tokens of the same type-sentence may possess different semantical values. The Strengthened Liar (s = 's is not true') is a sentence-token unable to express a proposition though another token of the same sentence-type can be used (on an another context) to express a truth, namely, that s is not true. Nonpropositionalism plus tokenism solves the Liar without touching either the concept of truth or logic.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

+Laureano Luna Interesting idea. Please correct me if I am wrong, but it seems to me that this position will collapse on itself. So you are asserting the proposition "All propositions do not reference themselves" but this is not itself a proposition, since it references itself and therefore you are claiming that your own position cannot bear truth. You cannot assert your own position since, in doing so, you must, by your own definitions, be speaking statements that are not true (or even have true values).

[@LaureanoLuna]

+Carneades.org Yours is the classical objection to restrictive theories of reference. Well, consider a nonreferential but intensional version of my position: 'the concept of proposition implies the trait of non being able to refer to itself'. The idea behind is this: it is the extensions of concepts that are not always definite, not their intensions. When we seem to be making claims about an extension that is not definite (about all sets, all propositions, all truths...), we are using a pseudo-reference and (possibly) pseudo-quantifiers, for actually what we mean to express is a relation of implication between the intensions of the concepts involved. The concept of proposition would imply being non-self-referential, being either true or false, and so on. Just like the concept of set would imply being non-self-membered, being either empty or not empty, etc.

[@therealfriday13th]

My thoughts are that it's falsidical. Rewording the sentence to "if P, then Q" where P="this sentence is true" and Q="a and not a", we see that Q cannot be true (law of non-contradiction). Since Q cannot happen, P must also be false (IIRC in if-then statements, if Q is false, P must also be false, as there is no P without Q, though there can be Q without P), therefore the sentence must not be true. Granted I'm no prfessional philosopher, but that's just how I see it with my limited understanding.