After reading several scientists' counter-critiques of critiques of science by postmodernists, rad feminists, critical theorists, strong programme sociologists and science and technology studies, I got a great insight into what was seriously wrong with all these trendy postmod academics. The first thing I noticed is that they are basically illiterate in either science generally, or in the specific field they are critiquing, or in the history of science, or in the philosophy of science. Secondly, they don't seem to be able to get out from under their own criticisms. Saying that there are no universal truths is itself a universal statement; (or saying that all is culturally relative or that everything is a construct). Thirdly, if logic and reason are supposedly 'male' or 'Western', how does one construct an argument that makes sense when logic or reason have been jettisoned? When they do talk about actual science, the conversation quickly slides over to the applied science and technology side where they begin their veiled condemnation of all the disasters that science has supposedly wrought. Einstein's famous equation, E=mc2 is forever conjoined to that atomic mushroom cloud. They invariably ignore basic scientific research. I also noticed that they like to misinterpret Kuhn and Feyerabend.
All philosophies of science that can be, or are, interpreted in order to attack science, should be banned, along with any and all media that's potentially or actually anti -science. All discredited scientists, such as Rupert Sheldrake, and perhaps even Carl Bohm, should be completely silenced. After all, Sheldrake's book ought to have been "burned". And we should sweep aside and forbid all and any discussions about the "limits of logic". The set of all null sets contains itself, PERIOD. No further discussion. The reasons for this should be very clear: Like Sabine Hossenfelder said, such ideas are often seized upon by science deniers (God forbid!). And then you know what THAT leads to: Donald Trump in office, a global shift to the right, antivaxxers, COVID denialism, climate change denialism, Creationism. In short, all of the evils that could possibly befall democracy, and freedom. If outright bans are just too much for you, then there should be nonstop, consistent, continuous counter information, created by our best and brightest marketers, that's broadcast on all media 24/7. Wouldn't that be best? Isn't science denialism, or anti-science thinking a serious danger to humanity? Isn't science the best, and perhaps the only method we have of understanding the natural world, which DEFINITELY is an objective reality?
In regards to the end and epistemic skepticism, I've always thought that Aristotle's argument against epistemic skeptisim to be highly persuasive, at least rhetorically. To paraphrase: "If you can't know for certain that you will fall off this cliff, then give it a test by jumping." Like you said, such questions are good intellectual question for our amusement late at night, but they're things that shouldn't be taken too seriously. They're questions that are good exercises for the mind, and could potentially give us insight into other questions, but its important to not take them so seriously; at least we shouldn't take the questions seriously that we're not even willing to take a chance to act on. The amount with which we should take questions seriously ought to be relative to the commitment to our willingness to act on the beliefs that are in question.
"The amount with which we should take questions seriously ought to be relative to the commitment to our willingness to act on the beliefs that are in question." Are you familiar with American Pragmatism? That's basically exactly what Charles Sander Peirce says.
Unfortunately, I don't think that I've even heard the term "American Pragmatism." While I definitely wouldn't reject a position without first understanding it, I'm a little hesitant to accept the term "pragmatist" (or "pragmatism"), as I'm not completely comfortable with the suggestion that a belief's value is dependent upon its "real world" consequences; it certainly is a good refutation to the infinite regress of "why." On a side note, I'm thoroughly pleased that Aristotle has been revived a bit in the recent past. I realise Aristotle may have been over appreciated in the Middle Ages, but I think in, at least, the Early Modern era up to now he has been extremely under appreicated. I remember one of the books that you considered using for this series on the Philosophy of Science was Alan Chalmer's "What is this Thing We Call Science?" I really like how at the end of that book Chalmers makes a very Aristotelian argument about the direction he thinks the Philosophy of Science ought to go. His argument might not be the best out there, but I really think we've missed out a lot by being so reactionary to the adoration of Aristotle from the Middle Ages.
*The amount with which we should take questions seriously ought to be relative to the commitment to our willingness to act on the beliefs that are in question.* Beliefs drive actions. Actions have consequences. Consequences are objective.
I think one of the central questions that arise from the various (relativistic) critiques of science is; do socio-cultural or psychological factors predominate over empirical, rational ones in science? The relativists would answer yes, while probably every scientist or philosopher in the know would answer no. Certainly, at the outset, there may be social, cultural or psychological factors motivating or even biasing scientists in their knowledge pursuits; but over time, mounting empirical investigations and/or rational reasons begin to predominate.
Great lecture. Do you mean "can we find a synthesis" of the different philosophies of science in a Hegelian sense? If so, that's quite interesting. And is Quine best known for the claim that "philosophy should be continuous with science"? I think he said that philosophy should clarify what is, and what it means to say something is, and the only way to discover what is -- is by using the scientific method and a close analysis of how we use language.
Thanks. The 'Hegelian sense' can mean different things. I definitely don't mean in his sense of a continual dialectic of 'thesis/antithesis/synthesis.' I think that model only fits intellectual history if your shoehorn the history into it. But in the sense of 'finding some truth in every major point of view', sure. Yeah, Quine argued that epistemology would eventually give way to a mature cognitive science. But I don't think that precludes his agreement with naturalism, as I've defined it here.
After reading several scientists' counter-critiques of critiques of science by postmodernists, rad feminists, critical theorists, strong programme sociologists and science and technology studies, I got a great insight into what was seriously wrong with all these trendy postmod academics. The first thing I noticed is that they are basically illiterate in either science generally, or in the specific field they are critiquing, or in the history of science, or in the philosophy of science. Secondly, they don't seem to be able to get out from under their own criticisms. Saying that there are no universal truths is itself a universal statement; (or saying that all is culturally relative or that everything is a construct). Thirdly, if logic and reason are supposedly 'male' or 'Western', how does one construct an argument that makes sense when logic or reason have been jettisoned? When they do talk about actual science, the conversation quickly slides over to the applied science and technology side where they begin their veiled condemnation of all the disasters that science has supposedly wrought. Einstein's famous equation, E=mc2 is forever conjoined to that atomic mushroom cloud. They invariably ignore basic scientific research. I also noticed that they like to misinterpret Kuhn and Feyerabend.
All philosophies of science that can be, or are, interpreted in order to attack science, should be banned, along with any and all media that's potentially or actually anti -science.
All discredited scientists, such as Rupert Sheldrake, and perhaps even Carl Bohm, should be completely silenced. After all, Sheldrake's book ought to have been "burned".
And we should sweep aside and forbid all and any discussions about the "limits of logic". The set of all null sets contains itself, PERIOD. No further discussion.
The reasons for this should be very clear: Like Sabine Hossenfelder said, such ideas are often seized upon by science deniers (God forbid!). And then you know what THAT leads to: Donald Trump in office, a global shift to the right, antivaxxers, COVID denialism, climate change denialism, Creationism. In short, all of the evils that could possibly befall democracy, and freedom.
If outright bans are just too much for you, then there should be nonstop, consistent, continuous counter information, created by our best and brightest marketers, that's broadcast on all media 24/7.
Wouldn't that be best? Isn't science denialism, or anti-science thinking a serious danger to humanity? Isn't science the best, and perhaps the only method we have of understanding the natural world, which DEFINITELY is an objective reality?
Sorry! the mic popping does not paly well with my headphones :( I am calling it at 4:21
Sorry about that! I will be getting a pop filter soon, I promise!
sok pal, i think it is just these headphones
This was an excellent video!!!
In regards to the end and epistemic skepticism, I've always thought that Aristotle's argument against epistemic skeptisim to be highly persuasive, at least rhetorically. To paraphrase: "If you can't know for certain that you will fall off this cliff, then give it a test by jumping."
Like you said, such questions are good intellectual question for our amusement late at night, but they're things that shouldn't be taken too seriously. They're questions that are good exercises for the mind, and could potentially give us insight into other questions, but its important to not take them so seriously; at least we shouldn't take the questions seriously that we're not even willing to take a chance to act on.
The amount with which we should take questions seriously ought to be relative to the commitment to our willingness to act on the beliefs that are in question.
"The amount with which we should take questions seriously ought to be relative to the commitment to our willingness to act on the beliefs that are in question."
Are you familiar with American Pragmatism? That's basically exactly what Charles Sander Peirce says.
Unfortunately, I don't think that I've even heard the term "American Pragmatism."
While I definitely wouldn't reject a position without first understanding it, I'm a little hesitant to accept the term "pragmatist" (or "pragmatism"), as I'm not completely comfortable with the suggestion that a belief's value is dependent upon its "real world" consequences; it certainly is a good refutation to the infinite regress of "why."
On a side note, I'm thoroughly pleased that Aristotle has been revived a bit in the recent past. I realise Aristotle may have been over appreciated in the Middle Ages, but I think in, at least, the Early Modern era up to now he has been extremely under appreicated.
I remember one of the books that you considered using for this series on the Philosophy of Science was Alan Chalmer's "What is this Thing We Call Science?" I really like how at the end of that book Chalmers makes a very Aristotelian argument about the direction he thinks the Philosophy of Science ought to go. His argument might not be the best out there, but I really think we've missed out a lot by being so reactionary to the adoration of Aristotle from the Middle Ages.
*The amount with which we should take questions seriously ought to be relative to the commitment to our willingness to act on the beliefs that are in question.*
Beliefs drive actions.
Actions have consequences.
Consequences are objective.
I think one of the central questions that arise from the various (relativistic) critiques of science is; do socio-cultural or psychological factors predominate over empirical, rational ones in science? The relativists would answer yes, while probably every scientist or philosopher in the know would answer no. Certainly, at the outset, there may be social, cultural or psychological factors motivating or even biasing scientists in their knowledge pursuits; but over time, mounting empirical investigations and/or rational reasons begin to predominate.
Great lecture.
Do you mean "can we find a synthesis" of the different philosophies of science in a Hegelian sense? If so, that's quite interesting. And is Quine best known for the claim that "philosophy should be continuous with science"? I think he said that philosophy should clarify what is, and what it means to say something is, and the only way to discover what is -- is by using the scientific method and a close analysis of how we use language.
Thanks.
The 'Hegelian sense' can mean different things. I definitely don't mean in his sense of a continual dialectic of 'thesis/antithesis/synthesis.' I think that model only fits intellectual history if your shoehorn the history into it. But in the sense of 'finding some truth in every major point of view', sure.
Yeah, Quine argued that epistemology would eventually give way to a mature cognitive science. But I don't think that precludes his agreement with naturalism, as I've defined it here.
nice!!ヽ(≧▽≦)ﾉ