The problem of agent causation is since the will is not determined by anything but the will (which is circular), it is like a blind man in a dark room throwing darts at a dartboard that isn't there and saying he hit a bullseye. No matter what reasons a person bases a choice, the will can just choose the opposite. This seems random to me. Sure there are influences, but the will can just go against the influences. Secondly, this theory would mean chemistry and physics in human brains doesn't act like in the rest of the universe. Seems rather unlikely.
Yes, indeed that is the difficulty when arguing against deterministic ideas. However, Campbell's point is not about that. It is how we feel within ourselves an "effort of will" to take the more difficult path. Such an effort wouldn't need to exist if it was all going according to reason, since it will in fact be the path of least resistance. My upcoming video on Reid articulates the flaw in the determinist argument concerning motive, basically, that what the determinists consider as evidence, is in fact merely assuming that they are right since they have not provided a test [beforehand] of what is the stronger motive/better reason. If they argue that whatever outcome did result IS the stronger motive, then they have assumed what they instead were supposed to prove. Additionally, between 2 reasons, what decides which reason to be the better one if the reasons are incommensurable? It is not a case of, which weight is heavier between 2 rocks. It is asking, which is better, say between patriotism and filial piety. As for how life seems to go against "nature," indeed I think that is precisely the point Bergson and agent causalists make, that sentient beings or souls, have something MORE that allows them to really have agency, fundamentally. That there is an additional fundamental force [called will] that is not reducible to mechanical forces. Actually it is not as hard to imagine as you say. Do you think there's a fundamental difference between a living thing and a non-living thing? If so, what is it and why is it different?
@@PhilosophicalBachelor We both know the counter arguments. Here is a few. It is more parsimonious to believe there is one kind of thing, matter than an additional thing, this soul/free will thing. Life seem a temporary state of matter. Evolutionarily, we are descended from much simpler things that have no discernible consciousness and seem to work in accordance of chemistry and physics. Again, it is more parsimonious to believe consciousness is just a continuation of chemistry and physics. Chemistry in human brains acts the same as chemistry and physics in the rest of the universe. I don't understand a person's "nature" other than a description of what they are. In terms of going against one's nature, that seems incoherent. How can a person be what they are not? Sure we have competing wants. What I don't understand is why the will chooses one want over another. Besides the luck objection you have the uncased cause objection. You get the will chooses, because the will chooses. This is not informative. You also have the randomness objection. I think the strongest evidence for LFW is the intuition/feeling we are not forced into making decisions. This is a strong intuition. If we didn't have the scientific method and advancements in science that has shown many of our intuitions are so wrong, I'd probably believe LFW, even with the above counter arguments. Without science my intuitions would also be very strong my table is solid, the earth was flat and evil spirits make us sick. We have a will, but probably not a libertarian free will. As a side note, I believe the conscious brain is a workspace for focusing on things so we are not distracted by the machinery of the subconscious brain. The subconscious brain makes all decisions where the decisions just appear to the conscious brain and the conscious brain thinks the decision is free, because it doesn't feel like they are forced and cannot sense the mechanistic workings of the subconscious brain.
@@gabrielteo3636 Thanks for your reply. I of course understand your counterarguments. I am going to refer to Reid a lot and I think you'd like my upcoming video on him because he deals with some of your objections. Nonetheless ... On Ockham's razor, firstly, other than being an assertion, what is its proof? But even if we accept it, it doesn't say that parsimony is the be all and end all. What is more parsimonious than this universe of things is a universe of nothing, of a universe mixed with 2 things [living and non living] but a universe with only 1, but that doesn't make the latters true. Theory is supposed to explain reality and hence if an entity needs to be postulated to better explain reality, then it creates a better fit making it a better theory compared with a worse theory with more "parsimony." It is assumed that the burden of proof lies with the libertarian. Reid makes an interesting point that it in fact lies with the one making the assertion that is counter-intuitive, that is against "common sense." Indeed I get your point that common sense has been proven to be wrong in quite a few instances. But in each of these, eg heliocentrism v geocentrism, it was up to the one making the counter-intuitive claim to show proof [eg Galileo, Corpenicus and not the Catholic church]. On where then does a choice come from if not mechanism/motives: This one troubled me quite a bit also. Reid answers that if the libertarian already can point to something prior and say that that is the thing that determined what happened next, in a chain of causation all the way back, then he has already given up his argument and agree with the determinist. It is precisely the libertarian's argument that things are not determined the way a determinist claims. But it isn't as if the libertarian has given up the principle of sufficient reason. But that the sufficient reason is the agent herself. Hence agent causation. Based on the evidence of the felt "effort of will." What evidence do determinists provide other than begging the question? Do I hear 'Science'? As for 'science' being the basis of determinism, actually that is mythical. First, quantum mechanics has indeterminism at its heart [Schrodinger's cat etc etc]. And if science is able to explain how consciousness arises, well, let's hear its proof. O, wait, it hasn't yet managed to prove it [YET!], but it MIGHT. O, how do we know it might until it has done so? To claim determinism in the name of science and scientific proof when it has not provided the proof is the very opposite of how science should be conducted. As for science being truth, whatever science says must be right: O, didn't science say phlogiston, Aristotelian geocentrism, planetary model of the atom, Newtonian mechanics, etc etc, which it now says is wrong? So science is not the bearer of truth, it is a method which involves contestation of ideas, experimentation and repeatability. It is not the completion of knowledge as the provider of absolute truth. But yes, I do of course get why determinism is compelling as an argument against free will. I might even have been a determinist previously. In the spirit of inquiry, I suppose we should always look, not just for things that confirm our beliefs but counter-evidence. So kudos to you:) Cheers, PB.
@@PhilosophicalBachelor I appreciate your well thought out response and of course it depends on our prior experience we bring to the arguments. I probably put more weight on the scientific evidence than you. I think you mentioned this, but in agent causation the will is an uncased cause. That is incoherent to me. Assuming it is true, I have no idea why the will chooses anything. You have to say the will chose because the will chose. That's not informative. Additionally we will never know why the will chose. If we don't know why the will chose, how can we be morally responsible? The will is like a magic eight ball spitting out decisions. I understand giving a reason would entail determinism, but no reason entails randomness.
@@gabrielteo3636 Yes, I get the difficulty. But before talking about the question, you mention you put weight on scientific evidence. So what is the evidence for determinism you refer to? And what about the evidence of quantum indeterminism? [i only cite it because you talk about science. There are libertarian thinkers such as the pre-quantum mechanics agent causalists that do not rely on quantum mechanics as an argument] Back to your key point, where does free will come from. Reid puts it down to a power we have within us called active power. Bergson calls it elan vital. Others may call it soul, spirit, mind, consciousness or agency. It is not so much uncaused cause, but self-caused. If your question is, what is the mechanics of it, well, thinkers like Christian List has explained it as the supervenience of higher order phenomena by lower level physical phenomena. Others talk about how spirit/consciousness is a fundamental force in the universe, one as fundamental as the forces in physics such as the strong or weak atomic forces. For those who don't want to accept such a postulation of extra entities, they may want to say how consciousness emerged or evolved out of lower level forms. [on this last point, I think it cannot be all the way down to inanimate matter but an evolution from low level living things to higher level ones, in line with biological evolutionary theory which never claimed life coming from what is not alive. I'd return to this] Bergson does have a pretty neat explanation. Essentially living things are growing and changing, where all its past accumulates and impacts its present, he calls it duree or duration. And not the way science describes, where each instant of time is the same length and same thing. My example on this is, if you hit a person or a ball with a bat, the first time, he might get hit, the same way the ball gets hit. But the 2nd time, the person responds differently. Maybe he puts up his hand to block it. The ball does not do this. It gets hit the same way each time, mechanically. So it seems a person does not obey physics the way an inanimate object does, no? Why? Bergson explains that the experience of the person accumulates [within his consciousness] and results in a different response. So the effect resulting may be different, since the situation is not the same. And why? It is because a sentient being with intellect is different FUNDAMENTALLY from inanimate matter. I know that the idea that there is a fundamental difference may present difficulties that take some overcoming. But actually, it isnt as hard to imagine as all that. You had mentioned how living things is reducible finally to chemistry and physical processes, same as all other "matter." Is that true? Has non-living matter ever managed to become alive, using physical/chemical processes and techniques, WITHOUT starting from an organic [living] substrate? If it has, then perhaps you are onto something, but so far, the scientific record is that it has not been done. The idea that living things are different fundamentally from non-living things is nothing new really, and even today, scientists admit it also. That is why we have a separate science of biology. Biology isn't reducible to physics and chemistry. In fact, chemistry isn't reducible to physics either. And neither is economics reducible to any or all of the exact sciences. [If you want to test this, consider how you'd explain and predict the workings of an economic system with only physics or if you like, all the 3 exact sciences. You won't be able to, or if you are, then you should be getting the next Nobel prize in all 3 sciences at once as you'd be the 1st.] It will seem the "scientific" worldview of determinism is in fact not really grounded or based on science at all [and this is accepting the worldview that science will provide all the answers, when it firstly does not, cannot and secondly never even claimed to.] Btw, I am not anti-science. I have 2 degrees in engineering [and also a Bachelor's in philosophy] [I only mentioned this not because it adds anything to the argument but just so you get that it isn't coming from a person who knows nothing about science]. Anyway, some thinkers have tried to think how agent causation can come about in nature, meaning, the scientific or natural basis of it. I made a video of this here: ruclips.net/video/TnkM_TLlb0E/видео.html and it may interest you. I have also just published my Reid video ruclips.net/video/M2AkLAR8_iI/видео.html, which might answer some of your points concerning method also. Cheers, PB.
The problem of agent causation is since the will is not determined by anything but the will (which is circular), it is like a blind man in a dark room throwing darts at a dartboard that isn't there and saying he hit a bullseye. No matter what reasons a person bases a choice, the will can just choose the opposite. This seems random to me. Sure there are influences, but the will can just go against the influences. Secondly, this theory would mean chemistry and physics in human brains doesn't act like in the rest of the universe. Seems rather unlikely.
Yes, indeed that is the difficulty when arguing against deterministic ideas. However, Campbell's point is not about that. It is how we feel within ourselves an "effort of will" to take the more difficult path. Such an effort wouldn't need to exist if it was all going according to reason, since it will in fact be the path of least resistance. My upcoming video on Reid articulates the flaw in the determinist argument concerning motive, basically, that what the determinists consider as evidence, is in fact merely assuming that they are right since they have not provided a test [beforehand] of what is the stronger motive/better reason. If they argue that whatever outcome did result IS the stronger motive, then they have assumed what they instead were supposed to prove. Additionally, between 2 reasons, what decides which reason to be the better one if the reasons are incommensurable? It is not a case of, which weight is heavier between 2 rocks. It is asking, which is better, say between patriotism and filial piety.
As for how life seems to go against "nature," indeed I think that is precisely the point Bergson and agent causalists make, that sentient beings or souls, have something MORE that allows them to really have agency, fundamentally. That there is an additional fundamental force [called will] that is not reducible to mechanical forces. Actually it is not as hard to imagine as you say. Do you think there's a fundamental difference between a living thing and a non-living thing? If so, what is it and why is it different?
@@PhilosophicalBachelor We both know the counter arguments. Here is a few. It is more parsimonious to believe there is one kind of thing, matter than an additional thing, this soul/free will thing. Life seem a temporary state of matter. Evolutionarily, we are descended from much simpler things that have no discernible consciousness and seem to work in accordance of chemistry and physics. Again, it is more parsimonious to believe consciousness is just a continuation of chemistry and physics. Chemistry in human brains acts the same as chemistry and physics in the rest of the universe.
I don't understand a person's "nature" other than a description of what they are. In terms of going against one's nature, that seems incoherent. How can a person be what they are not? Sure we have competing wants. What I don't understand is why the will chooses one want over another.
Besides the luck objection you have the uncased cause objection. You get the will chooses, because the will chooses. This is not informative. You also have the randomness objection.
I think the strongest evidence for LFW is the intuition/feeling we are not forced into making decisions. This is a strong intuition. If we didn't have the scientific method and advancements in science that has shown many of our intuitions are so wrong, I'd probably believe LFW, even with the above counter arguments. Without science my intuitions would also be very strong my table is solid, the earth was flat and evil spirits make us sick. We have a will, but probably not a libertarian free will.
As a side note, I believe the conscious brain is a workspace for focusing on things so we are not distracted by the machinery of the subconscious brain. The subconscious brain makes all decisions where the decisions just appear to the conscious brain and the conscious brain thinks the decision is free, because it doesn't feel like they are forced and cannot sense the mechanistic workings of the subconscious brain.
@@gabrielteo3636 Thanks for your reply. I of course understand your counterarguments. I am going to refer to Reid a lot and I think you'd like my upcoming video on him because he deals with some of your objections. Nonetheless ...
On Ockham's razor, firstly, other than being an assertion, what is its proof? But even if we accept it, it doesn't say that parsimony is the be all and end all. What is more parsimonious than this universe of things is a universe of nothing, of a universe mixed with 2 things [living and non living] but a universe with only 1, but that doesn't make the latters true. Theory is supposed to explain reality and hence if an entity needs to be postulated to better explain reality, then it creates a better fit making it a better theory compared with a worse theory with more "parsimony."
It is assumed that the burden of proof lies with the libertarian. Reid makes an interesting point that it in fact lies with the one making the assertion that is counter-intuitive, that is against "common sense." Indeed I get your point that common sense has been proven to be wrong in quite a few instances. But in each of these, eg heliocentrism v geocentrism, it was up to the one making the counter-intuitive claim to show proof [eg Galileo, Corpenicus and not the Catholic church].
On where then does a choice come from if not mechanism/motives: This one troubled me quite a bit also. Reid answers that if the libertarian already can point to something prior and say that that is the thing that determined what happened next, in a chain of causation all the way back, then he has already given up his argument and agree with the determinist. It is precisely the libertarian's argument that things are not determined the way a determinist claims. But it isn't as if the libertarian has given up the principle of sufficient reason. But that the sufficient reason is the agent herself. Hence agent causation. Based on the evidence of the felt "effort of will." What evidence do determinists provide other than begging the question? Do I hear 'Science'?
As for 'science' being the basis of determinism, actually that is mythical. First, quantum mechanics has indeterminism at its heart [Schrodinger's cat etc etc]. And if science is able to explain how consciousness arises, well, let's hear its proof. O, wait, it hasn't yet managed to prove it [YET!], but it MIGHT. O, how do we know it might until it has done so? To claim determinism in the name of science and scientific proof when it has not provided the proof is the very opposite of how science should be conducted.
As for science being truth, whatever science says must be right: O, didn't science say phlogiston, Aristotelian geocentrism, planetary model of the atom, Newtonian mechanics, etc etc, which it now says is wrong? So science is not the bearer of truth, it is a method which involves contestation of ideas, experimentation and repeatability. It is not the completion of knowledge as the provider of absolute truth.
But yes, I do of course get why determinism is compelling as an argument against free will. I might even have been a determinist previously. In the spirit of inquiry, I suppose we should always look, not just for things that confirm our beliefs but counter-evidence. So kudos to you:) Cheers, PB.
@@PhilosophicalBachelor I appreciate your well thought out response and of course it depends on our prior experience we bring to the arguments. I probably put more weight on the scientific evidence than you.
I think you mentioned this, but in agent causation the will is an uncased cause. That is incoherent to me. Assuming it is true, I have no idea why the will chooses anything. You have to say the will chose because the will chose. That's not informative. Additionally we will never know why the will chose. If we don't know why the will chose, how can we be morally responsible? The will is like a magic eight ball spitting out decisions. I understand giving a reason would entail determinism, but no reason entails randomness.
@@gabrielteo3636 Yes, I get the difficulty. But before talking about the question, you mention you put weight on scientific evidence. So what is the evidence for determinism you refer to?
And what about the evidence of quantum indeterminism? [i only cite it because you talk about science. There are libertarian thinkers such as the pre-quantum mechanics agent causalists that do not rely on quantum mechanics as an argument]
Back to your key point, where does free will come from. Reid puts it down to a power we have within us called active power. Bergson calls it elan vital. Others may call it soul, spirit, mind, consciousness or agency. It is not so much uncaused cause, but self-caused. If your question is, what is the mechanics of it, well, thinkers like Christian List has explained it as the supervenience of higher order phenomena by lower level physical phenomena. Others talk about how spirit/consciousness is a fundamental force in the universe, one as fundamental as the forces in physics such as the strong or weak atomic forces. For those who don't want to accept such a postulation of extra entities, they may want to say how consciousness emerged or evolved out of lower level forms. [on this last point, I think it cannot be all the way down to inanimate matter but an evolution from low level living things to higher level ones, in line with biological evolutionary theory which never claimed life coming from what is not alive. I'd return to this]
Bergson does have a pretty neat explanation. Essentially living things are growing and changing, where all its past accumulates and impacts its present, he calls it duree or duration. And not the way science describes, where each instant of time is the same length and same thing. My example on this is, if you hit a person or a ball with a bat, the first time, he might get hit, the same way the ball gets hit. But the 2nd time, the person responds differently. Maybe he puts up his hand to block it. The ball does not do this. It gets hit the same way each time, mechanically. So it seems a person does not obey physics the way an inanimate object does, no? Why? Bergson explains that the experience of the person accumulates [within his consciousness] and results in a different response. So the effect resulting may be different, since the situation is not the same. And why? It is because a sentient being with intellect is different FUNDAMENTALLY from inanimate matter.
I know that the idea that there is a fundamental difference may present difficulties that take some overcoming. But actually, it isnt as hard to imagine as all that. You had mentioned how living things is reducible finally to chemistry and physical processes, same as all other "matter." Is that true? Has non-living matter ever managed to become alive, using physical/chemical processes and techniques, WITHOUT starting from an organic [living] substrate? If it has, then perhaps you are onto something, but so far, the scientific record is that it has not been done. The idea that living things are different fundamentally from non-living things is nothing new really, and even today, scientists admit it also.
That is why we have a separate science of biology. Biology isn't reducible to physics and chemistry. In fact, chemistry isn't reducible to physics either. And neither is economics reducible to any or all of the exact sciences. [If you want to test this, consider how you'd explain and predict the workings of an economic system with only physics or if you like, all the 3 exact sciences. You won't be able to, or if you are, then you should be getting the next Nobel prize in all 3 sciences at once as you'd be the 1st.]
It will seem the "scientific" worldview of determinism is in fact not really grounded or based on science at all [and this is accepting the worldview that science will provide all the answers, when it firstly does not, cannot and secondly never even claimed to.] Btw, I am not anti-science. I have 2 degrees in engineering [and also a Bachelor's in philosophy] [I only mentioned this not because it adds anything to the argument but just so you get that it isn't coming from a person who knows nothing about science]. Anyway, some thinkers have tried to think how agent causation can come about in nature, meaning, the scientific or natural basis of it. I made a video of this here: ruclips.net/video/TnkM_TLlb0E/видео.html and it may interest you. I have also just published my Reid video ruclips.net/video/M2AkLAR8_iI/видео.html, which might answer some of your points concerning method also. Cheers, PB.