This is what is confusing to me. Some universals for example dogs, change over time. Dogs come in a variety of shapes and sizes and could be taken for two separate animals. Without scientifically classifying them, one could identity two universals for one dog. This gets interesting when attempting to define universals. Does the old two universal system get replaced for a wider universal range of dog which includes big ones, shaggy, etc (all dogs that could have been seen as something different). Or is the universals simply molded together? Could new information imply the universal becomes an old barely used abstract concept? I feel these definitions could only be applied to examples such as time, space, colors, squares. For example, a squares universal is completely defined by one experience with a square. Yet, the complete universal of dog is never actually complete? Not until every dog has been experienced?
You are not the only one who is confused. This is a significant problem in the history of universals. Okay, one thing to say right away is that you have already presumed there is a universal that covers both sorts of dogs-after all, you use ‘dog’ to refer to both. The reply might simply be, “If you want to know the meaning of “dog”, simply articulate the meaning of “dog”. If there is nothing in common, then this is not a problem for universals.” Another thing to say is that you have already mentioned two different senses of universals: scientific and common. Consider tomatoes. Botanically speaking, tomatoes are a fruit. As far as your typical grocery store and chef is concerned, tomato is a vegetable. The two universals are not melded together since they are different discourses. The same can be true for “dog”. There are other examples. For example, commonly speaking, we might consider hyenas to be dogs or dog like. However, taxonomically speaking, they are more like cats than dogs. This is, of course, not the final answer (and I am not necessarily taking the side of universals here) but it is an immediate reply to your comment. It is an interesting reply. Either you mean two different things when you refer to dogs from the past and current dogs, or you do not. If you mean two different things, then there are two different universals. No problem. If you mean the same thing, then there is no problem.
@@haugenmetaphilosophy Won’t monists jump to the fact that since universals can be particulars to other universals, eventually by moving up the chain, we will come to one single universal that contains all universals as its own particulars? Haha
@@mnemoneee I suppose. I do not know whether Russell mounts a defense agains Monism. However, Monism has its own problems. For example, you do not have universals at all with monism. Thus, a statement such as, “Monism is true” would be self-contradictory. I imagine any solution one offers to such a problem is something to which Russell could help himself. I found this article at the SEP on ‘Russellian Monism’-the title leads me to believe it is not Russell’s but Russell inspired.
subsistence? i would say persistence. in fact, the provision of persistence to "identities/concepts/whatever" is a(/the?) major purpose of language in the first place. imagine if the rate at which language changed matched the rate at which reality changes. language would suddenly become impractical for meager minds and thus lose any utility it once possessed. i have no idea how ppl believe in realism, invoking unnecessary, arbitrary, and frankly baseless complexity into their interpretation of reality
Hm. Good question. I am not entirely sure what Russell actually says, but I can offer a response that would work for Russell. There is no creature you can imagine that does not have some sort of reference from real creatures-even Pokemon. A unicorn is an easy case-part horse, part narwhal. Every imagined creature is merely a mix and match of other creatures. A universal of Pokemon, then, is merely a mix and match of other universals. Again, I am not sure this is what Russell says, but this is an answer compatible with Russell’s theory.
@@haugenmetaphilosophy An imagined creature that doesn't have very realistic reference from others is something I saw on some science fiction show, a "living" sun, or gas cloud. As far as I know gaseous things aren't alive (though their intent can be tricky sometimes [that's silliness from the 10-year-old in me]). It begs the deeper question of whether we need experience first, to imagine anything. Sounds like everything is a composite in that line of thought. Can the same be said about emotions? Can there never be anything "NEW"? I remember teenage experiences that certainly felt new. These new and deep vertical wrinkles on my forehead feel terrible to have, and I never thought some wrinkles would do that. They came practically overnight. This is a new feeling that I don't think is a composite of previous concerns -- my mortal health alarm is ringing. Is nothing novel?
@@schitlipz That the imagination is merely a composite of previous experiences does not mean that there is nothing new. By description, the experiences themselves are new. However, the imagination cannot create new experiences. We are limited creatures. This is merely one of those limits.
universals are not identical to a particular but the particular resembles the universals. horseness is not identical to a particular horse but the particular horse resembles the universal(this is kind of faulty I know..parmenides challenged Socrates in Plato's book ).. but this colour example baffled me...yes, I agree that the universal colour isn't anything like any colour...idk please enlighten me.
“Baffled” is an appropriate reaction. It is not as if the existence of universals, their nature, or how to understand them has been explained in a non-controversial or completely transparent manner. Russell’s conception-at least in this piece-is that the universal is what these various things of the same kind have in common. For “Square”, we seem to easily identify the universal: an equilateral, equiangular, quadrilateral. This defines square. The essence of square, however, does not look like any particular square. In fact, the essence of square does not look like anything-it is comprehended but not perceived. It is a concept-not a particular. It is the definition-not the individual. It is the abstract-not the concrete. Similar comments apply to most object, viz., horses, cars, houses, atoms, and so on. Colors are interestingly different and maybe a paradoxical case to use. Colors have no existence outside our consciousness. They are caused by reality external to our minds, but not a part of the physical reality. They are still a rather baffling thing much like anything else dealing with consciousness. In fact, we seemingly can define it only by pointing to something and saying, “See? That is blue” or by reference to some other color, viz., the color between violet and green. It appears to defy articulation. Nevertheless, we think we mean something by “blue”. If we mean something, there is an essence. If there is an essence, there is a universal. While we can easily define “Square”, defining “color” remains elusive.
@@haugenmetaphilosophy Thank you for a great video. Could you point us to other ideas related to this Universal and Particular conception? It seems to me that particular instances are an "actualized representation"/"realization" of the Universal. Would love to know more about what determines the Universal to be realized into different instance of particulars. It also appears to me that an "Universal" is quantized, as in an energy is quantized. For example, within a certain degree of variation, we agree the "redness" is all the same "redness", but if an Universal is outside of the tolerance bound of the "redness", we recognize it as "orangeness", for instance. What do you think about this argument?
@@haejinsong1835 You are welcome. As far as other videos, I am afraid I am not quite so knowledgable about other people’s videos. If you wish to follow the scholastic works on the matter, you can start at this page and follow the bibliographies: plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/#CatBeiUni You can also look here: www.iep.utm.edu/universa/ I am not sure about particulars as “quantized” universals. I am unfamiliar with the use of the term in any philosophical text. The term appears to be used with physics. This raises a problem since “quantized“ looks like a kind of causal relation. However, talking about universals as causally related to anything raises problems, viz., anti-realism about universals. Any talk about universals in that sense would be at best analogous, metaphorical, or some other sort of “convenient-yet-false” discussion about universals. Now, you might be able to use “quantized” as an analogy or metaphor between a universal and a particular-but it would, strictly speaking, be false. Illustrative, yes. But false.
I’ve been debating with friends over universals in shapes and colors recently and am stumped in that, say regarding circles, each circle will never be an actual circle, because the true perfect circle is a singular point surrounded by equal distant points, each point being infinitely small. As such, you can never really get a true circle. So then if you say each has the whatness of circle of all these approximations there is no true line where roundness. Don’t the dimensional, material limitations make this impossible? Thanks! I’m thoroughly stumped.
Honestly, I am not sure what Russell says in reply. I believe he does *somewhere*, but I cannot recall off the top of my head. If you want Russell’s reply, you might start looking over at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (plato.stanford.edu). If you want *a* reply, then you can probably start with acknowledging that we have not seen a perfect circle, but that does not mean we do not have the universal of circle. After all, and, I assume your friends are willing to grant this from Russell’s view, we have numbers and arcs. As long as they are willing to acknowledge that we have the concepts of degree, the number 360, and arc, then we have circle. There are alternate ways of constructing the universal; if you have point, equidistant (you don’t even really need line here), then you can construct circle. Russell, I think, does account for at least some concepts of mathematics without relying upon appearances or sensations. True, they are just in our heads, but they are there. If we some of the basics, then we can construct the rest-in theory. It is worth noting geometry does not define any figure or shape using appearances-they use concepts.
Hi, have you gotten an answer or clarification for this question. I was thinking, does that make the circle an ideal and therefore all universals simply approximations to the ideal (Shape, Colour or thingness) that is being categorised as such. And based on semantics, the ideal can shift, and therefore, the universals can shift as well?
This series of videos is only intended to explain Russell’s works-not necessarily to advocate for Russell. If you would like to see videos on the Greeks, I have several.
This was very informative thank you!
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Thank you
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Some universals are precisely defined some are more fuzzy at the boundaries, all are sets not essences.
Okay, sets are a way to go. However, you say some universals are fuzzy; and all universals are sets. How can a set be fuzzy?
nice
I am glad you enjoyed the video. Thanks for watching a spread the word.
He was the best man to answer it in a way (set theory). Poor Plato et al.
Why is Russell’s answer the best? What does Russell accomplish that the others lack?
This is what is confusing to me. Some universals for example dogs, change over time. Dogs come in a variety of shapes and sizes and could be taken for two separate animals. Without scientifically classifying them, one could identity two universals for one dog. This gets interesting when attempting to define universals. Does the old two universal system get replaced for a wider universal range of dog which includes big ones, shaggy, etc (all dogs that could have been seen as something different). Or is the universals simply molded together? Could new information imply the universal becomes an old barely used abstract concept? I feel these definitions could only be applied to examples such as time, space, colors, squares. For example, a squares universal is completely defined by one experience with a square. Yet, the complete universal of dog is never actually complete? Not until every dog has been experienced?
You are not the only one who is confused. This is a significant problem in the history of universals. Okay, one thing to say right away is that you have already presumed there is a universal that covers both sorts of dogs-after all, you use ‘dog’ to refer to both. The reply might simply be, “If you want to know the meaning of “dog”, simply articulate the meaning of “dog”. If there is nothing in common, then this is not a problem for universals.”
Another thing to say is that you have already mentioned two different senses of universals: scientific and common. Consider tomatoes. Botanically speaking, tomatoes are a fruit. As far as your typical grocery store and chef is concerned, tomato is a vegetable. The two universals are not melded together since they are different discourses. The same can be true for “dog”. There are other examples. For example, commonly speaking, we might consider hyenas to be dogs or dog like. However, taxonomically speaking, they are more like cats than dogs.
This is, of course, not the final answer (and I am not necessarily taking the side of universals here) but it is an immediate reply to your comment. It is an interesting reply. Either you mean two different things when you refer to dogs from the past and current dogs, or you do not. If you mean two different things, then there are two different universals. No problem. If you mean the same thing, then there is no problem.
thank you subscribed
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So it's possible for a universal to be a particular to another universal (like blueness to colorness)?
Bingo. In other language, “Blue” would be a subset of “Color”.
@@haugenmetaphilosophy Won’t monists jump to the fact that since universals can be particulars to other universals, eventually by moving up the chain, we will come to one single universal that contains all universals as its own particulars? Haha
@@mnemoneee I suppose. I do not know whether Russell mounts a defense agains Monism. However, Monism has its own problems. For example, you do not have universals at all with monism. Thus, a statement such as, “Monism is true” would be self-contradictory. I imagine any solution one offers to such a problem is something to which Russell could help himself. I found this article at the SEP on ‘Russellian Monism’-the title leads me to believe it is not Russell’s but Russell inspired.
@@haugenmetaphilosophy Thanks for humoring my questions! Please continue doing these videos!
@@mnemoneee You are welcome. Just curious, are you philosophy major?
subsistence? i would say persistence. in fact, the provision of persistence to "identities/concepts/whatever" is a(/the?) major purpose of language in the first place. imagine if the rate at which language changed matched the rate at which reality changes. language would suddenly become impractical for meager minds and thus lose any utility it once possessed. i have no idea how ppl believe in realism, invoking unnecessary, arbitrary, and frankly baseless complexity into their interpretation of reality
Is 'pokemon' a universal? Even if it referes to particular creatures that we invented?
Hm. Good question. I am not entirely sure what Russell actually says, but I can offer a response that would work for Russell.
There is no creature you can imagine that does not have some sort of reference from real creatures-even Pokemon. A unicorn is an easy case-part horse, part narwhal. Every imagined creature is merely a mix and match of other creatures.
A universal of Pokemon, then, is merely a mix and match of other universals. Again, I am not sure this is what Russell says, but this is an answer compatible with Russell’s theory.
@@haugenmetaphilosophy An imagined creature that doesn't have very realistic reference from others is something I saw on some science fiction show, a "living" sun, or gas cloud. As far as I know gaseous things aren't alive (though their intent can be tricky sometimes [that's silliness from the 10-year-old in me]).
It begs the deeper question of whether we need experience first, to imagine anything. Sounds like everything is a composite in that line of thought. Can the same be said about emotions? Can there never be anything "NEW"?
I remember teenage experiences that certainly felt new. These new and deep vertical wrinkles on my forehead feel terrible to have, and I never thought some wrinkles would do that. They came practically overnight. This is a new feeling that I don't think is a composite of previous concerns -- my mortal health alarm is ringing.
Is nothing novel?
@@schitlipz That the imagination is merely a composite of previous experiences does not mean that there is nothing new. By description, the experiences themselves are new. However, the imagination cannot create new experiences. We are limited creatures. This is merely one of those limits.
universals are not identical to a particular but the particular resembles the universals. horseness is not identical to a particular horse but the particular horse resembles the universal(this is kind of faulty I know..parmenides challenged Socrates in Plato's book ).. but this colour example baffled me...yes, I agree that the universal colour isn't anything like any colour...idk please enlighten me.
“Baffled” is an appropriate reaction. It is not as if the existence of universals, their nature, or how to understand them has been explained in a non-controversial or completely transparent manner. Russell’s conception-at least in this piece-is that the universal is what these various things of the same kind have in common. For “Square”, we seem to easily identify the universal: an equilateral, equiangular, quadrilateral. This defines square. The essence of square, however, does not look like any particular square. In fact, the essence of square does not look like anything-it is comprehended but not perceived. It is a concept-not a particular. It is the definition-not the individual. It is the abstract-not the concrete. Similar comments apply to most object, viz., horses, cars, houses, atoms, and so on. Colors are interestingly different and maybe a paradoxical case to use. Colors have no existence outside our consciousness. They are caused by reality external to our minds, but not a part of the physical reality. They are still a rather baffling thing much like anything else dealing with consciousness. In fact, we seemingly can define it only by pointing to something and saying, “See? That is blue” or by reference to some other color, viz., the color between violet and green. It appears to defy articulation. Nevertheless, we think we mean something by “blue”. If we mean something, there is an essence. If there is an essence, there is a universal. While we can easily define “Square”, defining “color” remains elusive.
@@haugenmetaphilosophy Thank you for a great video. Could you point us to other ideas related to this Universal and Particular conception? It seems to me that particular instances are an "actualized representation"/"realization" of the Universal. Would love to know more about what determines the Universal to be realized into different instance of particulars. It also appears to me that an "Universal" is quantized, as in an energy is quantized. For example, within a certain degree of variation, we agree the "redness" is all the same "redness", but if an Universal is outside of the tolerance bound of the "redness", we recognize it as "orangeness", for instance. What do you think about this argument?
@@haejinsong1835 You are welcome. As far as other videos, I am afraid I am not quite so knowledgable about other people’s videos. If you wish to follow the scholastic works on the matter, you can start at this page and follow the bibliographies: plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/#CatBeiUni
You can also look here: www.iep.utm.edu/universa/
I am not sure about particulars as “quantized” universals. I am unfamiliar with the use of the term in any philosophical text. The term appears to be used with physics. This raises a problem since “quantized“ looks like a kind of causal relation. However, talking about universals as causally related to anything raises problems, viz., anti-realism about universals. Any talk about universals in that sense would be at best analogous, metaphorical, or some other sort of “convenient-yet-false” discussion about universals. Now, you might be able to use “quantized” as an analogy or metaphor between a universal and a particular-but it would, strictly speaking, be false. Illustrative, yes. But false.
I’ve been debating with friends over universals in shapes and colors recently and am stumped in that, say regarding circles, each circle will never be an actual circle, because the true perfect circle is a singular point surrounded by equal distant points, each point being infinitely small. As such, you can never really get a true circle. So then if you say each has the whatness of circle of all these approximations there is no true line where roundness. Don’t the dimensional, material limitations make this impossible? Thanks! I’m thoroughly stumped.
Correction: “...there is no true circle with roundness, or circularity.”
Honestly, I am not sure what Russell says in reply. I believe he does *somewhere*, but I cannot recall off the top of my head. If you want Russell’s reply, you might start looking over at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (plato.stanford.edu).
If you want *a* reply, then you can probably start with acknowledging that we have not seen a perfect circle, but that does not mean we do not have the universal of circle. After all, and, I assume your friends are willing to grant this from Russell’s view, we have numbers and arcs. As long as they are willing to acknowledge that we have the concepts of degree, the number 360, and arc, then we have circle. There are alternate ways of constructing the universal; if you have point, equidistant (you don’t even really need line here), then you can construct circle.
Russell, I think, does account for at least some concepts of mathematics without relying upon appearances or sensations. True, they are just in our heads, but they are there. If we some of the basics, then we can construct the rest-in theory. It is worth noting geometry does not define any figure or shape using appearances-they use concepts.
Hi, have you gotten an answer or clarification for this question. I was thinking, does that make the circle an ideal and therefore all universals simply approximations to the ideal (Shape, Colour or thingness) that is being categorised as such. And based on semantics, the ideal can shift, and therefore, the universals can shift as well?
Give more credit to the Greeks, they started this
This series of videos is only intended to explain Russell’s works-not necessarily to advocate for Russell. If you would like to see videos on the Greeks, I have several.
Ok