Everyone should be commended for not biting on the trolling attempts in the comments. It's good to see that a civilized discussion is still possible. Thanks to ABT for the quality videos; they're always fun to watch.
I went to the Gettysburg battlefield in 2013. I was in awe at how far the large group of trees and the Pennsylvania memorial looked from the Confederate line and how small the Virginia monument looked from the angle from the Union line. The average human can walk one mile in around 16 minutes. I doubt I will ever understand how those men could walk into all that destruction.
I know and agree. I just find it hard that I could find that determination of walking into a hail of gunfire and cannonballs knowing there was a high chance that myself and the guys beside, in front, and behind me would be dead or wounded by marching over open ground for 1.5 miles. I often tell marine and army infantry that their either very brave or crazy to do their job, but whichever it is, I love them for it.
I walked Pickett's charge 3 years ago. There are undulations that protected their approach. However, when they approached Emmitsburg road, they were wide open targets.
Also I studied it for decades, how much I was broken hearted, indeed. The immensely brutally and viscous costly toll was. For those who destroy or denigrate monuments, try to erase our struggle for Federal government. Those are leftists not liberals. And should be exhibit as such.
"General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know, as well as any one, what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arranged for battle can take that position." -Longstreet
Johnny Tex, 95% of Americans did not care who was sitting on the throne in Great Britain. What makes you think it affected the way they talked. Especially since Queen Elizabeth ascended to the throne in 1837. How did people talk in 1836?
As others have stated, one of the most underrated channels on youtube. The fact that you also detail your own differing opinions on the battle really adds depth; history is largely written by the victors after all.
@@joeysausage3437 no he knows he runs out of ammo and food Lee See his only big Point here and gets blind He should move all forces to defend Richmond and Vicksburg Tired of the war North would make peace soon or later
@@totallynotalpharius2283 with soldiers that where running around 14 miles in the summer heat fighting the whole day with no rest Running up a Hill in Darkness not knowing how much enemy force is up there...
Very well put together guys, very well... A great 👍 light hearted open and honest conversation with Professional people about their field of expertise. On Absolutely a Horrible loss of life Between the brave, brave Americans on both sides of the conflict.
Gentlemen, I enjoyed your conversation about Pickett's charge and would like to add my own opinion for consideration. As a Christian pastor serving in England, I had the opportunity to visit the battle of Waterloo site. For an amateur historian this was fascinating. years later, I stood at the point where you are all sitting and could not help to see the similarities to Waterloo. Allow me to list them: - the ending battle in both locations happened between 2 farm complexes - the French, like the Confederates, had a long way to go and had to move slightly uphill - the British and the Union soldiers were in a protected position: the British behind a small crest of a hill and the Union soldiers behind a stone wall. - the preceding artillery bombardment was ineffectual both for the French and Confederates. Napoleon was considered at that time as he greatest general in history. Every soldier who went through West Point, or any other military college, would have studied all his battles. Lee is no exception, which begs the question you all were discussing. Why would he do this knowing what he knew and with Longstreet insisting that it would end in failure? I cannot imagine that Lee did not see the similarities. this is what I believe: Lee was a Christian and had to believe he was doing God's will. I suspect that at this battle his doubts were surfacing. Was this rebellion really God's will? How to know if it is? Perhaps he looked at the similarities with the ground before him with what Napoleon faced and thought, "If I can succeed where the greatest of generals failed then I must be in God's will". It is recorded historically that as the men retreated, he apologized to them claiming it was his fault. it is also clear that after Gettysburg Lee lost heart and finally surrendered. for your consideration. Alan Elliott
I walked the length of Pickets Charge, I cannot imagine the courage of the soldiers given that task. I've also been to Waterloo, the incline at Waterloo is deceptively more difficult, particularly after a heavy rain. For all though, Napolean having to deal with the soaked ground took away his plan to first beat Wellington and then move on to Blucher. Even had he won against Wellington would the French still have the combat power to win against Blucher ? The French would have been tired, low on ammunition, food, and beaten up, not a recipe for success.
Aperrently people forgot this lesson siehe Battle of the Somme, british boys just casually walking over a open field over a mile long towards entrenched German positions -.-
Yes, what could possibly go wrong with Pickett's charge. 10,000 to 15,000 men ( number varies in different texts as does the # of casualties-50% generally) Pickett is not the only one responsible for this debacle. Generals Pettigrew & Trimble also had men in the mix that day. Ultimately the charge was Lee's doing and responsibility. Pickett never forgave General Lee for the losses of the charge. Longstreet was against the action. If only Lee had listened to wiser. & more cautious advice that day! I don't think Lee was using the best judgement with his plan. Was this due to his heart attack in March, 1863? Was Lee missing the support & advice of Stonewall Jackson who had died and. JEB Stuart who was MIA with info.of reconnaisance the first day & 1/2 at Gettysburg? It was a long long time ago. We can only surmise or maybe even guess why different men made the decisions during those tragic 3 days in July of 1863! Norma Jean-history lover
Grant did it many times. He attacked Vicksburg the same way and attacked a fortified position with 3 divisions, he did it at the Mule Shoe, he did it at Petersburg. Grant just had the advantage of a never ending supply of manpower and the end justifies the means for him.
1000 years from now, there will still be salt over the outcome of this war. As long as that continues, yes people will continue debating what in most eyes is seen as the turning point.
@@drspaseebo410 Shelby Foote is not a historian, and holds no credentials in history. His Civil War series is a well written narrative, but by no means is it a genuine historical record. He lacks to cite any sources, which is the biggest crime of writing historically, and because of this fact his books are dubious in accuracy at best.
@@benjaminlee4937 That's because he's a novelist and isn't writing for the academic community. Foote still probably knew more about the Civil War than 90% of historians today. He talked to a few men who fought in it when he was younger.
Really enjoyed this! Well done gentlemen. I've studied the 20th century wars but avoided the Civil War because it was such a heart breaker for my family. This type of discussion makes it more accessible for me.
Gettysburg's Pickett charge remains an epic example almost legendary of the unfortunate bravery and the tragic courage of the confederates during the civil war.
@@radrook4481 yes. General Grant told Lee at Appomattox that never in human history had so few fought so hard with so little albeit for an abysmal cause. That's what Grant said.
Beautiful Landscape and views Ya'll have in the background. God's Country. I hope to have a similar view from my front porch after I retire. I fell in love with the Southern States during a short vacation. Loved each and every minute. Absolutely beautiful. Southern hospitality was beyond anything I've seen. Ya'll be sweet, hope to be there soon. God Bless.
I wonder if even Lee had won at Gettysburg if his army would have had enough juice to go much farther. I suspect they would have been so beat up that they would have had to retreat back to the south anyway.
Yeah, a lot of people overlook the fact that even if Lee had won, it could have very well been a pyrrhic victory. With the North having the manpower to replenish even heavy losses, if the South couldn't afford one thing, it was losing a lot of people. Which makes the Charge all the more tragic and all the more questionable. Without having clear intelligence to be reasonably certain that this charge succeeds, committing to the advance was a serious mistake.
Longstreet wanted to attack to the right instead of the center. He thought they could sweep the enemy from the field and march 70,000 Confederate troops into Washington, 30 miles away.
@@ohauss Your point is reasonable but I think what gets overlooked is the overall mindset of Lee. Lee knew the only way to get any real victory for the south would be at the negotiating table. It would take a significant battle victory to achieve that. I think in Lee's mind this was that moment of opportunity. I realize he had a big moment with Chancellorsville in particular. But his strategy at that moment was defensive and counter attacking by surprise. Here he found a rare offensive opportunity to strike a blow.... knowing what might be achieved from a psychological standpoint . I think Lee knew the risks and odds were against him but in the end determined that it was his only real chance. I think the sorrow he expresses to the soldiers was an admission he let this thinking override what should have been the more obvious prudent choice. As to whether this is the true turning moment of the war I am not certain. But I think you can make the argument that it is by far his most damaging decision in all of his career as a battlefield commander. Lee deserves criticism obviously but I think all criticism should be leveled with an understanding of all the possibilities and limits available to him at the time. Some desire to detract from his stature as a leader because of Gettysburg more than is reasonable is my belief.
If Lee won the battle, he would have England and France for support. Just like Washington had France. If he didn’t, we would of lost the Revolutionary war.
Good video & liked. I became interested in Gettysburg watching RUclips videos like this and it inspired me to visit the battlefield. It was worth it and my only regret is that I could not visit longer than 1 day. If you enjoy videos like this and have never gone to Gettysburg then you are missing out. Go see it!
Thanks from Scotland for an entertaining discussion by people who know their stuff. Shame it wasn't longer! For what it's worth, I have always regarded Pickett's charge as Lee's biggest blunder. Uphill charge over a mile long, with huge risks of being flanked by the Yankees. Particularly after witnessing the slaughter at Fredericksburg in similar circumstances.
That would have been Henry Hunt, the chief of artillery for the AOP. He actually met with some opposition for that decision, from Mead for one. I don't think he was trying to fool anybody, he just wanted to conserve ammo for the attack that was coming.
@@mecallahan1 I agree. Hunt was not a fan of counter-battery fire. He believed that artillery was more effective in support of infantry attack or repelling enemy assaults. This philosophy of indirect fire-support has served the US well over the years.
A couple of things to consider about general George Gordon Meade. One Meade had just taken command of the Army of the Potomac, in fact he didn't arrive on the battlefield until after dark day 1. Second, Meade was the 1st commander to correctly anticipate Robert E. Lee's next move by guessing that lee would strike the center.
I loved hearing these gentlemen exchanging ideas at this Rock Wall conference. These talks bring about what if ideas and I think we all love that. More please boys.
The bravery of Pickett's Officers was incredible, going up that ground on horseback where they were basically entering a shooting gallery with them as a target. They knew they were going to die, but they went anyway. The Army of Northern Virginia is revered in history, especially in Virginia, especially by this son of Northern Virginia. Growing up my father took my family to Gettysburgh over a dozen times, at least 4 of them right around the time of the battle so that we'd have perspective. Each time he had others following us around because everywhere he went he would tell stories about the battlefield. When he told the story about Pickett's charge I was crying half-way thru the explanation, and so were numerous others around us.
The "turning point" of the War Against The Rebellion was the day in May of 1864, directly after The Wilderness, when Grant ordered the Army of the Potomac to march south {by the left flank), instead of going back across the river to safety, like everyone before him.
Many people forget the battle of Helena, Arkansas that happened at the same time as Gettysburg and Vicksburg where the Confedrates nearly regained control of the Mississippi River. July 3rd and 4th 1863 was the turning point of the war as a whole. The Confederacy suffered too many setbacks in those two days to ever recover.
Hello !! Iam a dilettante researcher of the history your civil war and as far as I know, from the information you publish that I analyzed (as I would like to research and know more!!!!!) the famous fence "worked". It stopped an entire advance of men, a bunch of men became easy targets because it was necessary to climb the fence since passing between the wooden sticks was practically impossible. I believe this was decisive...that fence should have been destroyed before the artillery attack. Greetings from Brazil .
Love you all's channel! Will you all ever do a video on the Battle of Williamsburg(1862)? I feel as though it was one battle that is overshadowed by the Seven Days Battle in the Peninsula Campaign, yet there is still so much original history there...redoubts, rifle pits, roads, etc. Anyways, would love to see The Civil War Trust shine some light on it!
This is speaking from a southern perspective Born in the south raised in the south studied Civil War tactics and battles pretty much my whole life Lee couldn’t’ve taken that hill even if he had 30,000 more troops even Lee and other campaign said you can’t fight an enemy when they have the Highground The only answer I can have after thinking about this whole situation Lee had given up in his mind and he just wanted to glorious battle to go out on he sent those troops to die it’s sad but there’s no way he could’ve taken that ground and I believe he knew it
In further defense of Meade's not immediately pursuing Lee after the victory at Gettysburg. Along with the thousands of wounded that needed care, there were also tens of thousands of horses and mules which needed to be fed and rested or they would die.
Excellent!, thank you gentlemen that whole terrible event helped mould today's great America as we know around the world .enjoyed and! could listen and learn more from your historically enlightening views far more often , 🕊to you all..
I've been to Gettysburg. I stood approximately where Lee did. You just look at out over that distance, know anything about the weapons and strategy of the time, and you know. No way that was going to work Lee never had a chance. That's not twenty-twenty hindsight, it's not Monday morning quarterbacking. It's obvious when you're standing there. I have no idea what Lee was thinking (especially after watching nearly the same thing in reverse at Fredericksburg) , or why there's even a debate about this. The guy who said it wasn't even close is right
Why does no one address the political infighting within the AOP's command structure . You really can't get a fair evaluation of an AOP commander's performance without it. No one even mentions that Slocum camped within 5 miles of Gettysburg, heard the sounds of the battle all day long, refused orders by Reynolds to come to his aid, and only arrived on the battlefield near sunset of the first day.
PIckett's Charge was a legacy of Malvern Hill, which was the forge upon which the Army of Northern Virginia was created in Lee's image. Standing where the Union gunners could see Lee surveying the battle, Lee's will to win is a palpable presence, even today. Regarding Meade's failure to pursue Lee vigorously, as Lincoln was demanding from Washington, overlooks the fact that the Army of the Potomac was as badly wounded as the Army of Virginia and Meade's trains had been pretty completely scrambled by the southern bombardment. In contrast, Lee's trains were untouched and already position to begin its withdrawal immediately. This disparity in organization accrued to Lee's benefit and, as the commentators reflect. Lee was not inclined to give up. Comparing Gettysburg and Vicksburg, which resolved on the same day, reflects a difference between Lee's larger strategy, which was theatrical to the extent that he was trying to entice Britain into an intervention, while Grant's intent was always purposeful and never meaningful. Lee's thrust into the North was informed, to some small degree, with the same expectation of a chocolates and roses reception from the Marylanders that the neo-con cheerleaders for the invasion of Iraq anticipated with their conceit of liberation. Like the invasion of Iraq, the Southern rebellion was then, and, to some degree, remains, firmly anchored by wishful thinking. This is not intended to refute anything this video presents, but merely my own thinking on the subect over the years. Until I saw this video, I held the belief that another division, or even a regiment, at the cockpit, could have provided the results Lee desired, mass representing a quality of its own.. I was unaware of Meade's energetic response behind the forward positions, which has revealed the futility of the assault to my satisfaction (as a combat veteran, the fact that soldiers on both sides continued to respond to the alignments and evolutions of their commanders in this chaos is sobering. It is well we preserve this hallowed ground and enterprise). Excellent presentation. Every time I have had the advantage of the observations of the Gettysburg docents, I have been enlightened and humbled by their command of their subject matter.
Meades trains were further back and were not disrupted by the artillery assault, except for some caissons that were supporting 2nd Corps artillery. This is contrasted by Lee who had to move his caissons about a mile back because Federal artillery were disrupting them. In addition, Lee's supply wagons were empty of long range shot and critically short of powder.
Another factor that isn't usually mentioned is that on the night of July 3rd, 1863, a torrential rain fell, timed as to allow some, if not most of the surviving Confederate units to cross the Potomac, while those Union troops who attempted pursuit found the fords at flood stage.
Jefferson Davis never had to admonish General Lee to put into battle all of his men, as Lincoln had chided General Hooker after Chancellorsville. Combative as he was, there was no way Lee leaves that battlefield with the 15 Virginia regiments in Pickett's Division unbloodied. Whether or not the following 10 months of stalemate and inaction in Virginia was worth the sacrifice of Pickett's Division is debatable, but General Meade was disinclined to repeat Lee's example and conduct frontal assaults against fixed defensive positions, especially against the field fortifications Lee employed after Gettysburg.
It is my opinion that Gettysburg was THE turning point strategically, considering that the entire Southern policy was hinging on bloodying the North to such a degree that they would be willing to cede to a political solution and allow the Confederacy to exist as a sovereign nation. Davis, Lee, and all of those involved in shaping Confederate policies and strategies understood that they could not win a war of attrition. But, what happens if you simply keep the Union army at bay, while remaining in-being as a fighting force and political entity? You will essentially be fighting a war of attrition, which the South could keep up for only so long. Therefore, by winning a great military victory one could persuade the Union to capitulate in the sense that their will to fight is reduced. And Gettysburg was the turning point of the war because after the Union's victory on the battlefield, there was no longer any question as to whether the Union could continue to go toe-to-toe with the Confederate forces. It was seen that they could prevail, and not only that, but Lee's battle plan failed, as did the greater strategic plan. Had lee won at Gettysburg, it is entirely plausible that a political solution would have come about, with the AoNV being so close to Washington, and with little to stop them, the only hope being to slow them down. But once it was clear that Lee had lost, not only was Northern morale bolstered past the point of no return, it was clear that the South's plan had failed, and that they were once again forced back into a war of attrition, whereby they would have to re-equip their army once back in Virginia, attempt to find any replacements they could, etc., reducing their limited resources further. This likely had an immeasurable impact on foreign powers choosing not to support the South, a fact which, by itself, could be argued to be a major turning point of the war. As far as the battle itself, I've said many times that I do not think Lee's blunders were numerous, and do not even consider ordering Longstreet to attack the center to be that big of a mistake considering the available intelligence. Lee's biggest mistake was not utilizing his means properly, as he had cavalry brigades that were present yet inactive under his command. It is easy to wonder why Lee did not agree with Longstreet's opinion that by swinging around the Union army they AoNV could get between the Union army and their capitol, as well as choose a battlefield where they held a terrain advantage, or perhaps win the battle at Gettysburg through a flanking maneuver. Yet, I think people forget that Lee well knew that it would be extremely dangerous, a huge risk, to attempt to manuever such a large force in the presence of the enemy, who could choose offensive action at any time, and thereby crush Lee's army. It could be argued that we are talking about a portion of the army's forces, and not the entire army, but there would still be some danger, especially if the maneuver was defeated, as the army's right flank would then be wide open. There was also the morale factor to consider. By abandoning ground that had already been won, there would be a demoralizing effect on the troops no doubt, although it is difficult to say with any certainty. Withdrawing from Gettysburg was not an option either, considering the AoNV had not been beaten, plus the fact that the dangers of maneuvering described above would still be present, the morale effect, and most importantly that this would have completely ignored Lee's entire reason for invading the North to start with. I would argue that once Lee assembled his army at Gettysburg, his operational plan, if not his entire campaign plan, was ruined. Lee's plan was, to put it simply, to swing through the valley, up to the general area to the North/Northwest of Washington, around the Union forces, forcing them to hurry northward to oppose him, where he hoped their formations would be strung out as opposed to concentrated, where they could be defeated in detail. Lee was the one who ended up being caught off guard, and he had to order what was essentially an emergency concentration at Gettysburg, where contact had been made. The Union army simply moved faster than he anticipated. My point is that Lee's operational plan of defeating Union formations piecemeal had failed. The only hope now to accomplish the more strategic objective of peace through military victory. Thus withdrawing was not an option, and although Longstreet's option was better, it too was not guaranteed to succeed. And in Lee's mind he is thinking that he cannot withdraw, and cannot maneuver, therefore an attack seems to be the only option left, and the one option which is guaranteed to produce results in line with the original campaign plan if it succeeds. And having already attacked the Union on both of their flanks, if another attack had to be made it is logical to conclude that since Union formations would have been moved to support the flanks, that their center must have suffered as a result, and that this is the best place to attack. Except that this was so obvious that Meade also anticipated it. The main pointed I wish to make is that all of these things I've mentioned have influenced my opinion that Gettysburg was THE turning point of the war. It is difficult to hold an opinion that disagrees with notable and knowledgeable persons, but I must stay true to my analysis of the situation. Regardless, this was a good watch, and I will certainly subscribe and check out the channel's other videos.
Gettysburg AND Vicksburg were the double hinge that shut the door on the South. Even if Lee had won his battle Virginia and the other southern states would find themselves poor and starved of resources. The US would still have their barricade on the southern ports and the Mississippi. The Europeans would not help the CSA. Mexico might shut the Texas border or even try to take it back (now that it is no longer in the Union). The CSA might emerge as an independent nation but would not survive long.
The Lee plan to make the North tire of war was flawed, based on hoping to make a decisive blow while attacking the North. Staying on the defensive may have been the better plan.
Interesting perspective and not without its supporters. I don’t believe that Gettysburg by itself would have turned the tide in either direction. As is shown bu the press of the time (almost all from the east) there was a large impression at the time that the victory/defeat was significant. But for the public at that moment it was just another battle, and the same was true of Vicksburg. The public didn’t have the context to appreciate what those events could have meant. Amateur historians and the public tend to be enticed by what if. Faulkner’s short quote about how it all hangs in the balance is a classic example. Part of that was created for us by the cult of Lee, the gentleman general, that was created as part of the Lost Cause narrative. All the sub-narratives they describe in this piece descend from the Lost Cause narrative. By definition the Lost Cause relies on the unimportance pf Vicksburg and of Tennessee because Lee wasn’t there. It relies on the Butcher Grant narrative despite the Vicksburg campaign’s status as one of the most creative and successful in US military history. It ignores the impact that freeing the Army of the Tennessee along with Grant and its leadership had on the long term strategic prosecution of the war and Grant’s and Scott’s vision for that. Another unmentioned event is that the US Colored Troops at Port Hudson, Milliken’s Bend, and Battery Wagner had fought bravely and shown the value of these troops in combat. By June 1863 a lot of them were moving into the armies or fighting ongoing conflicts in the deep south freeing up the veterans of the Army of the Tennessee to fight major battles. The Lost Cause has pointed us away from all of these truths and made Gettysburg larger in the public mind than it really was. Because it was Lee. Gettysburg had an important role in the turning point idea. But as much as we’d like it to be a competition between Grant and Lee, it wasn’t. All of those events and more added up to July 1863 being pivotal. None of them happened in a vacuum.
I've always wondered if word coming from Mississippi and Tennessee made Lee gamble on Pickett's Charge to force a win out of desperation. It was a do or die, losing Vicksburg cut the Confederacy in half.
"There was a death torn broken mile of ground to cross/With a low stone wall at the end./And behind that wall the men of the Second Corps./And behind them another force, fresh troops who had not yet fought./They began to cross the ground. The guns began to tear at them." John Brown's Body by Stephen Vincent Benet. I think it says it all. Visiting Gettysburg it like visiting the First World War battlefields (and the cemetaries) in France. I'm from Britain and have done both. It's sad but we should remember them all on both sides for their bravery.
I had ancestors in the 36th Va. and 6th Ohio and am very grateful neither of them had to fight in the Army of Northern Virginia or the Army of the Potomac.Being in that area between the Potomac River and Richmond would have been like 4 years at Stalingrad.
That was a lot of fun. I have to agree with Sam; the loss of Chattanooga has a profound impact on Confederate logistics which surpasses the loss of the Mississippi
I have to agree. The loss of the Mississippi was bad, but the trans-Mississippi states were not making a significant strategic impact by that point. The loss of Chattanooga made a profound logistical impact, as you say, and also opened the door to Georgia and the endgame.
Agreed on the point that the AoP had a great deal to do with the defeat of the AoNV. General Meade was a great general. Very professional and knew what he was doing. He had a great record in command positions before he took overall command of the Army. He knew how to fight on the brigade, division and corps levels. Also. After the battle of Chancellorsville (and probably before) many of the corps commanders called for the dismissal of Hooker with Meade (after Reynolds refused) as his successor.
It still boggles my mind that there are real images of this period in time. Brings to life the conflict that can only be imagined when you look at other conflicts in time like the Roman Empire etc.
Gettysburg is important because Lee got whipped in a major battle for the first time. This had to be a huge psych boost for the Union. If for no other reason it is a huge moment and turning point in the war.
Thank you for this perceptive presentation. I have some “ifs” for the third day; What if Ewell and Longstreet’s attack s had been better coordinated and Custer with an amazingly small force had not stopped Stuart then Confederate victory becomes very possible. Meade is one of my greatest heroes. He faced Lee with minimum preparation taking the responsibility of command extremely smoothly, he fought Lee who had not lost so many fine commanders yet and with a unique parity of forces, he had many Union generals unfriendly to him who subsequently tried to undermine him and the few he could really trust like Hancock were wounded. At the end of the third day with the Farnsworth setback fresh he also could not organize his army quickly enough for the counter attack he wished also realizing that he could not be that sure that Lee was that badly hurt and being quoted as saying Lee was the best counterpuncher . In his memoirs he explains how he sent a corps up and around that found Itself thwarted by very effective mountain defences. Due to his emergency efforts to supply support where needed his army was terribly mixed. On banning newsmen from camp for giving away too much vital info they banded together to never mention him in a positive light. When Grant finally faced Lee his army was twice as large and Lee had lost and continued to lose irreplaceable commanders. Grant’s retaining Meade says much for Meade. After Gettysburg Meade complains to his wife about the subtraction of troops to Chattanooga, interestingly Lee experiences the same thing only larger. They had possibly fought themselves out. Couldn’t resist carrying on like this and thank you again
Custer's force was part of a larger force of federal cavalry. They were outnumbered, but Stuart's men and horses were exhausted. Civil War cavalry forces weren't built for extended knock-down, drag-out fights; it's not surprising that Stuart was driven back despite his numerical advantage.
Wow!! Never heard anyone put the name Lee and “waffling” “half baked” in the same sentence. It was his subordinates that waffled. Lee was quoted as saying, “If I had Jackson at Gettysburg we would have won that battle”. See if you can get your hands on “Life and Letters of RE Lee” by Jones.
This guy talking about Lee and surrender!! The federal, government troops (“those people” Lee) invaded Virginia! General Lee wanted peace at any cost!! I hate watching debates.
Yeah, yeah. Well what if Reynolds hadn't gotten shot in the opening hours of the battle? Maybe the Union line wouldn't have collapsed on the first day. Or go back to Antietam...what if Kearny and Reno hadn't been killed just days before the great battle, and Mansfield killed in the opening hours? That's two corps commanders and the arguably best division commander.... Lee wasn't the only guy to lose a key subordinate at an inopportune moment. He was the guy who wasn't able to adapt and find or develop a suitable replacement.
What is NOT known about the aftermath of the Battle of Gettysburg: Meade DID pursue Robert E. Lee's troops until they were able to cross back over the Potomic. He sent several cavalry divisions to harrass Lee's long baggage trains, in an attempt to slow or even stop their escape.
Pickets brigade was sent into the meat grinder 1 mile open field 1 fence to cli.b 2 hundred cannons thousands of guns trained on open field what a military disator
Lee's original plan of campaign (made clear by Lee's after action report and Longstreet's memoirs) in June of 1863 was to maneuver the AotP into attacking the AoNV and defeat that attack. In effect, he attempted to carry out a strategically offensive campaign which was defensive tactically. To do this, Lee needed timely information as to the strength and location of the AotP. Only Stuart's cavalry possessed the mobility to get out and obtain this information. Stuart's ability to do this was compromised- not by Stuart, but by Lee. Lee violated the military axiom of "one force, one objective", and gave Stuart two objectives for one force. Lee did this by instructing Stuart to gather both information and provisions. These two objectives were contradictory in nature because gathering information required mobility which only cavalry could provide- but gathering provisions would inevitably impede that very mobility. Thus, excelling at one made accomplishing the other more and more unlikely. Furthermore, Lee made it clear in his orders to Stuart that he wished Stuart to gather provisions not simply for the three brigades which Stuart had with him, but for the AoNV as well. Probably the worst aspect of Lee's orders to Stuart was that these two objectives coincided in time- and Stuart literally lacked the time to accomplish first one, and then the other. Lee's lack of information resulted in the unexpected meeting engagement between advanced elements of the AoNV and the AotP on 1 July. The minor Confederate victory was actually a disaster for Lee's plan of campaign. In this meeting engagement, elements of the AoNV attacked and defeated elements of the AotP. In so doing, Lee's army assumed not only the strategic offensive, but now, the tactical offensive as well. Having been attacked and defeated, the AotP was now unlikely to simply go over to the tactical offensive in turn. Two additional factors made a Union counterattack even more unlikely. The first was that the AotP had a newly appointed commander in General George G. Meade (an appointment which Lee had been made aware of). Meade assumed command of an army already in motion, and- as one historian put it- he was faced by a man who had been "the ruin of McClellan, Pope, Burnside, and Hooker". The second factor was that the two recent offensives by the AotP- and Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville- had resulted in a bloody repulse in the first battle, and a stunning counterattack and defeat in the second. In their entirety, these factors combined to make a Union counterattack unlikely in the extreme. This saddled Lee with a tactical initiative which he had never wanted- and now, two time constraints operated against him. The first was that the strategic objective of the campaign had been to relieve pressure on the Confederate defenders at Vicksburg- and Vicksburg had been placed under siege before Lee's campaign had even gotten underway. The second was that the AoNV had been foraging off of enemy territory, and Lee's foraging parties could not operate in the immediate presence of the AotP. Lee was now reduced to living off of the stocks in the army's supply train, so he could not remain in any one area for more than 3-5 days. Since the army had not foraged since Lee's concentration order of 29 June, the clock was ticking for Lee. It appears clear in retrospect that Lee had little confidence that Meade would launch an attack of his own, and Longstreet's suggestion of a flanking maneuver- while tactically possible to carry out- stood little chance of eliciting a Union counterattack. These factor may well explain Lee decision to execute what became known as Pickett's Charge.
Lincoln desperately wanted to destroy Lee's army, but he was not there to see the results of the three day battle. In my opinion, Meade did not pursue Lee's battered Army of Northern Virginia because of the equally battered condition of his Army of the Potomac. Meade basically had one corps still in good shape, the 6th Corps, along with hundreds of dead to bury and thousands of wounded to treat medically. Additionally, Lee anticipated that Meade would try to pursue him and established a defensive line along Seminary Ridge late on July 3rd. Meade knew what an assault on prepared defenses looked like and he was not about to repeat the mistake Lee had made on July 3rd. As to the Battle of Gettysburg being the "turning point of the Civil War", look at it in terms of the crippling loss of the large numbers of experienced officers and troops that Lee could not replace for the remainder of the war in the east. For all intents and purposes, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had lost its' ability to conduct another major offensive. But, I have to agree that the loss of Vicksburg was a major blow to the Confederacy. That combined with Lee's loss at Gettysburg was the death knell for the Confederate States.
Thank you all, gentlemen, for this immersive commentary. However, after reading Edwin C. Bears on Petersburg, I feel the same way about General Meade as Colonel Pleasants felt after their post-Crater debriefing at Meade's HQ.
If I was Robert E. Lee I would've likely made the same move. The defensive victory at Fredericksburg and offensive victory at Chancellorsville really showed Lee that no matter what circumstances his men were in, even if badly outnumbered, could easily defeat their opponent. Lee's army had significantly swelled from less than 60,000 men in May to more than 75,000, and Hooker's army numbered about 95,000 and he was repeatedly unable to cope with Lee's genius, finally Lee receives word of Meade's command and he correctly predicted Meade would be cautious. Lee's army was the strongest it could get, it now had 75,000 men and was organized into four corps, the I Corps under his old war horse James Longstreet, a very capable and battle hardened commander, the II Corps under Richard S. Ewell who replaced the legendary Stonewall Jackson, although not as experienced or brilliant as Jackson, Ewell was a battle hardened soldier and had repeatedly proven his ability to fight, especially in the Valley, the III Corps under General Ambrose P. Hill, another very competent commander, possibly Jackson's best subordinate despite being the one he hated the most, and the Cavalry Corps under Jeb Stuart, Lee's trusted young cavalry officer, the man Lee could not succeed without. So he had a large and well fed, well rested army, a series of very capable commanders, and a cautious commander which he was used to defeating such as McClellan or Hooker. Everything sounded perfect for Lee, but Stuart wasn't present so he had to rely on his senses, Henry Heth's division of Hill's Corps got incidentally tied up with Buford's dismounted cavalry, initially thought to be militia units, Ewell misunderstanding Lee's orders to seize the high ground, and being at the wrong location. Although everything seemed perfect for Lee, at Gettysburg a lot went wrong for Lee as well. Gettysburg does not change my opinion of Lee whatsoever, I still see him as a brilliant commander, and although I respect Grant as a leader, I do think Lee was superior.
I've often wondered how much Lee knew about what was happening on the Union side of Chancellorsville. In specific: Did he know that Jackson's "sneaky" flank attack had been observed and reported, and that Hooker ordered Howard to prepare for an attack...and that Howard flat-out disobeyed the order? And furthermore, that Howard's pickets had reported heavy troops concentrations nearby, and Howard ignored those reports as well, even though they confirmed with Hooker's warning? If Lee knew those things, he might have realized how amazingly lucky he got at Chancellorsville, and he might have looked back to Malvern Hill for his lessons instead.
I think the main reason that Meade doesn't get much credit for the battle is that things just fell into place for him. He didn't select the field, most of the credit for that goes to John Buford who's cavalry made first contact with the enemy and found the delaying action that bought the time necessary for the Union forces to gain the high ground. He didn't do anything particularly compelling either - he just didn't make a mistake and Lee happened to make the worst mistake of his military career that day.
There was also the congressional investigation afterward that did a lot to tarnish his reputation. Also, it's amazing what one can accomplish by just not screwing up fantastically, haha.
Michael Morris Meade didn't fall for the "Robert E Lee" mystique. He, with only 3 days in command, faked Lee out, knowing from Lee's West Point classes that he would attack the center on Day 3, and he even knew it would be Pickett's men because he had prisoners from every other corps and good intelligence. Not making mistakes takes hard work and ingenuity.
It was Buford's cavalry that delayed the Confederate advance, and got Lee tangled up there; but, it was the Corps Commander Reynolds whom made the decision to fight the battle at Gettysburg. Reynolds arrived with reinforcements and determined that it was a good place, shortly before he was killed by a sharpshooter.
I have bee to Gettysburg and Vicksburg both and felt I was on hollow ground on both of them. Thia discussion really helped me see that as far cutting into the South's resources that the loss at Vicksburg had a greater impact.
Who are the 103 people that gave this video a thumbs down? Very entertaining. You don’t usually hear a Civil War “experts“ talking so calm and casual. Very fun video!
The attack by R.E. Lee did not surprise me at all. Lee had ordered disastrous attacks before such as Malvern Hill. His troops were slaughtered by cannon fire going up a slope. Second Manassas was a defensive-counter offensive battle, Antietam and Fredericksburg were purely defensive battles. At Chancellorsville however, Lee was planning an all out attack on a very entrenched Union army. What saved him was Hooker retreating overnight. Even Edwin Porter Alexander exclaimed in his memoirs that he "dreaded" the assault and was relieved when Hooker retreated. This was two months before Gettysburg. This was R.E. Lee's way and a determined Union army made him suffer for it. People called Grant a butcher, but % wise R.E.Lee was worse in offensive situations. He asked the impossible of his men and THEY paid for it.
No no, the reason the Army of Northern Virginia lost the battle was due to poor communication and unusually decisions made by Lee when is staff and other generals under his command warned him not to fight there at Gettysburg. The plan was to draw out the Union armies and get between them and DC. In that defensive position they would have waited for Meade and slaughtered them in detail. The Union army would have no choice but to attack a well dug in Southern army. Gettysburg should not have happened. It’s was a mistake and over confidence in Lee
I know a descendant of Jeb Stuart's family, John Stuart, and he said it is the family's belief that Jeb Stuart was visiting a lady during the time he was away from the Confederate army. Finally, I think the initial mistake by General Heath to engage the dismounted Union cavalry on Union soil was probably a mistake that couldn't be overcome. The idea was to force the Union army to pursue the Confederates until the Confederates decided to basically turn and fight on the ground of their choosing. General Heath allowed the Union army to choose the ground.
Agree, it was never a close battle. A poor decision by Lee arising from over confidence after several impressive victories. He thought he couldn’t lose, so he made a foolish decision. Good General, but with flawed judgment like the rest of us. Imperfect humans doing what imperfect humans do.
Lee fully understood that the Southern Government had no more soldiers, cannon, medical supplies, or rations to send him, while the North could replace fallen soldiers almost at will. The North had the manufacturing to mass produce weapons and ammunition. I personally believe this played a role in Lee's decision making that day. The Army of the Potomac was right there in front of him. Lee, knowing that the longer this war dragged on, it heavily favored the North. Lee always wanted to destroy the enemy, on that battlefield, at that time, to him seemed to be his best shot.
That may have been what Lee thought, but as history turned out, he was wrong. Lincoln could easily have been voted out and a peace candidate elected if the Confederacy had still been viable in late 1864. Lee's chronic waste of manpower left the Confederacy too weak to hold onto Richmond and Atlanta in '64.
@@aaronfleming9426 even Confederate victories were losses because the south had no way to replace the soldiers it had lost. I personally believe that after the Battle at Antietam the proverbial writing was on the wall.
@@57clc That could be, but it's certainly not how Lincoln, and many others on both sides, saw it in the summer of 1864. I think it's a fallacy that the north had some sort of endless supply of manpower. Just because the people are there doesn't mean they're willing to fight, or that they'll be effective if they're forced to fight. Then there's the financial part...the national debt had doubled from 1856-1860 to about $80 million. By 1865 it was *$3 billion*.
Things didn't work out for Lee because he had a huge union army in his way who had their own plans. No battle plan survives first contact with the army.
I love these videos. Not enough genuine discussion regarding the Civil War anymore. Just more hate these days. Thank you for making such discussions and points of views available. I can see how Gettysburg can be seen as a turning point in the war. Lee was winning a lot of battles at the time and seemingly escalating the war. However when you look at the overall picture of what was going on that year... It really looks as if the war is going to come to a close. The South just didn't have what they needed to continue fighting. They were dealing with mounting desertions, supplies weren't as strong anymore, etc. Even without Grant's famous "March to the Sea", or the fall of Vicksburg, the South would have been crushed under just the financial weight of trying to supply an army. Considering Lee's goal was to crush the Potomac Army and threaten D.C.... such a goal almost smacks of desperation.
Having just returned from a visit to Gettysburg, I think this analysis is very accurate. Though, I believe Lee expected Ewell's assault on Culp's Hill on the morning of July 3rd to be more concurrent with Longstreet's assault on the union center.
The South’s artillery barrage failed because of new fuses that burned longer than the old fuses. This caused the shells to explode behind the Northern lines. Unfortunately for the South they didn’t have time to properly test the fuses before the battle took place. Just another quirk in a battle of many lost opportunities.
I'll bite at the end and actually agree with him. Symbolically, Gettysburg was a turning point for morale and preventing, same for Vicksburg. But overall tactically, Chattanooga was the beating heart of transportation for most of the South. It connected nearly all points in the south by rail. Cutting that line spread out supply lines even farther. Strained the system to the breaking point, then Sherman broke it.
A descent Commander, surrounded by competent staff and field officers commanding veteran infantry. A cavalry that knew their job. NCOs with experience. Lee ran into officers who did not panic while leading men who had been there before. He ran into Chamberlain and the 20th Maine and Wisconsin Iron Brigade. The Union Army had matured.
In all fairness, a far less mature Union army had whipped Lee on the tactical level throughout the Seven Days battles, especially at Malvern Hill. It is a bit shocking that Lee could overlook his experience at Malvern Hill and think that he would achieve better results.
I visited Gettysburg on a holiday to the USA from Australia in 2006 and can say without hesitation that I had a much better time there than those present in 1863.
If you did absolutely nothing, you had a better time than anyone there civilian or military. I can't imagined what it must of been like, the dead, the wounded, the screams, the smoke, the cannon noise, the heat and humidity, the smell of death, you name it. It's a good thing for the north that the south did not recruit Australia on there side. Had they done so, the north would have lost and the USA would probably still be fighting! Ga-day mate or is it good day mate?
@@kennyw871 Actually, the Southern Confederacy did recruit Australia. Several Australians joined the crew of CSS Shenandoah when she visited Melbourne. There was a legal claim for damages against the Victorian state government brought by the US because the Australian state did not impound the Shenandoah when requested by the US ambassador. I don't know what the result of that court case was though. www.tracesmagazine.com.au/2016/08/confederate-ship-in-1860s-melbourne-the-last-voyage-of-the-shenandoah/
@@kennyw871 We see whole dead bodies and whole wounded. The reality was there were parts of human beings scattered all over the field and some actually hit by the exploding shells were in a fine red spray on the ground. the smells would have been horrible particularly 2 or 3 days later in that heat and humidity.
I stood at Pickets Charge and thought I can't believe anyone could be so stupid to think sending 15,000 men almost a mile on open ground up hill and think it would work.
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I really liked this format. It's like I am part of the discussion, sitting right there with them. Hold on I need another beer - anyone?
Yes please.
Everyone should be commended for not biting on the trolling attempts in the comments. It's good to see that a civilized discussion is still possible. Thanks to ABT for the quality videos; they're always fun to watch.
Multiple turning points:
- East: Gettysburg
- Centre: Chattanooga
- West: Vicksburg
CHATTANOOGA!
@@xotl2780 No ChooChoo!
The most underrated channel on youtube. No question.
Jemenes Jingslenes agreed
I went to the Gettysburg battlefield in 2013. I was in awe at how far the large group of trees and the Pennsylvania memorial looked from the Confederate line and how small the Virginia monument looked from the angle from the Union line. The average human can walk one mile in around 16 minutes. I doubt I will ever understand how those men could walk into all that destruction.
Soldiers on both sides had a devotion to duty that is hard for those of us in today's world to understand. To me, they deserve admiration.
I know and agree. I just find it hard that I could find that determination of walking into a hail of gunfire and cannonballs knowing there was a high chance that myself and the guys beside, in front, and behind me would be dead or wounded by marching over open ground for 1.5 miles. I often tell marine and army infantry that their either very brave or crazy to do their job, but whichever it is, I love them for it.
Brent Granger they were men! and most knew they would dye!
I walked Pickett's charge 3 years ago. There are undulations that protected their approach. However, when they approached Emmitsburg road, they were wide open targets.
Also I studied it for decades, how much I was broken hearted, indeed. The immensely brutally and viscous costly toll was. For those who destroy or denigrate monuments, try to erase our struggle for Federal government. Those are leftists not liberals. And should be exhibit as such.
"General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know, as well as any one, what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arranged for battle can take that position." -Longstreet
smizdeazy you are attempting too correct a quote that you do not understand. Today's grammar was not the same as the Victorian era.
smizdeazy *cannot is what you were looking for.
Johnny Tex, 95% of Americans did not care who was sitting on the throne in Great Britain. What makes you think it affected the way they talked. Especially since Queen Elizabeth ascended to the throne in 1837. How did people talk in 1836?
@@zettle2345 *I DON'T SEE ANY Johnny TEX!!!*
@@zettle2345 Queen Elizabeth's coronation was in 1953. You are thinking of Queen Victoria.
Excellent discussion and “gentlemanly” debates ! Great stuff men !
As others have stated, one of the most underrated channels on youtube. The fact that you also detail your own differing opinions on the battle really adds depth; history is largely written by the victors after all.
I finally got there and stayed at Gettysburg Hotel last year. A highlight in my amateur historian life.
I don't know how Lee thought this could succeed after he saw what had happened in Fredericksburg and Malvern's hill
He just have to pull back after day one
Find a good place to dig in wait for Meade to attack victory so simple
He was a idiot.
@@joeysausage3437 no he knows he runs out of ammo and food Lee See his only big Point here and gets blind
He should move all forces to defend Richmond and Vicksburg
Tired of the war North would make peace soon or later
“If practicable”
@@totallynotalpharius2283 with soldiers that where running around 14 miles in the summer heat fighting the whole day with no rest
Running up a Hill in Darkness not knowing how much enemy force is up there...
Another great video from The Trust. BRAVO!!!
Very well put together guys, very well... A great 👍 light hearted open and honest conversation with Professional people about their field of expertise. On Absolutely a Horrible loss of life Between the brave, brave Americans on both sides of the conflict.
Gentlemen, I enjoyed your conversation about Pickett's charge and would like to add my own opinion for consideration. As a Christian pastor serving in England, I had the opportunity to visit the battle of Waterloo site. For an amateur historian this was fascinating. years later, I stood at the point where you are all sitting and could not help to see the similarities to Waterloo. Allow me to list them:
- the ending battle in both locations happened between 2 farm complexes
- the French, like the Confederates, had a long way to go and had to move slightly uphill
- the British and the Union soldiers were in a protected position: the British behind a small crest of a hill and the Union soldiers behind a stone wall.
- the preceding artillery bombardment was ineffectual both for the French and Confederates.
Napoleon was considered at that time as he greatest general in history. Every soldier who went through West Point, or any other military college, would have studied all his battles. Lee is no exception, which begs the question you all were discussing. Why would he do this knowing what he knew and with Longstreet insisting that it would end in failure? I cannot imagine that Lee did not see the similarities.
this is what I believe: Lee was a Christian and had to believe he was doing God's will. I suspect that at this battle his doubts were surfacing. Was this rebellion really God's will? How to know if it is? Perhaps he looked at the similarities with the ground before him with what Napoleon faced and thought, "If I can succeed where the greatest of generals failed then I must be in God's will".
It is recorded historically that as the men retreated, he apologized to them claiming it was his fault. it is also clear that after Gettysburg Lee lost heart and finally surrendered.
for your consideration. Alan Elliott
I walked the length of Pickets Charge, I cannot imagine the courage of the soldiers given that task.
I've also been to Waterloo, the incline at Waterloo is deceptively more difficult, particularly after a heavy rain.
For all though, Napolean having to deal with the soaked ground took away his plan to first beat Wellington and then move on to Blucher.
Even had he won against Wellington would the French still have the combat power to win against Blucher ?
The French would have been tired, low on ammunition, food, and beaten up, not a recipe for success.
Charge a mile in the wide open in daylight.... what could go wrong?
Aperrently people forgot this lesson siehe Battle of the Somme, british boys just casually walking over a open field over a mile long towards entrenched German positions -.-
Yes, what could possibly go wrong with Pickett's charge. 10,000 to 15,000 men ( number varies in different texts as does the # of casualties-50% generally) Pickett is not the only one responsible for this debacle. Generals Pettigrew & Trimble also had men in the mix that day. Ultimately the charge was Lee's doing and responsibility. Pickett never forgave General Lee for the losses of the charge. Longstreet was against the action. If only Lee had listened to wiser. & more cautious advice that day! I don't think Lee was using the best judgement with his plan. Was this due to his heart attack in March, 1863? Was Lee missing the support & advice of Stonewall Jackson who had died and. JEB Stuart who was MIA with info.of reconnaisance the first day & 1/2 at Gettysburg? It was a long long time ago. We can only surmise or maybe even guess why different men made the decisions during those tragic 3 days in July of 1863! Norma Jean-history lover
Grant did it many times. He attacked Vicksburg the same way and attacked a fortified position with 3 divisions, he did it at the Mule Shoe, he did it at Petersburg. Grant just had the advantage of a never ending supply of manpower and the end justifies the means for him.
@@fateagle4life grant is a butcher without tactic
@@fateagle4life the only one to both see and do what needed to be done
I have visited Gettysburg. Main Battle Tanks could not have made it across that valley in the face of a determined defense.
Excellent analysis, and I appreciate the differing viewpoints.
but Meade was no US Grant
A thousand years from now they will still be discussing this battle.
Lee gets insane... Thats all
1000 years from now, there will still be salt over the outcome of this war. As long as that continues, yes people will continue debating what in most eyes is seen as the turning point.
I doubt humanity will survive that long unless we finally
"Gettysburg is the price the South paid for RE Lee."
-- Shelby Foote, US Historian
the only sensible thing that guy has said
Your right Robert e lee wanted to destroy the northern he hat the guts but failed he lost stonewall a couple weeks before
What a truly GREAT historian Shelby Foote was; I'm proud to own his books.
/
@@drspaseebo410 Shelby Foote is not a historian, and holds no credentials in history. His Civil War series is a well written narrative, but by no means is it a genuine historical record. He lacks to cite any sources, which is the biggest crime of writing historically, and because of this fact his books are dubious in accuracy at best.
@@benjaminlee4937 That's because he's a novelist and isn't writing for the academic community. Foote still probably knew more about the Civil War than 90% of historians today. He talked to a few men who fought in it when he was younger.
Really enjoyed this! Well done gentlemen. I've studied the 20th century wars but avoided the Civil War because it was such a heart breaker for my family. This type of discussion makes it more accessible for me.
Can't believe I'm just seeing this 5yrs later but it was a great video...The discussion intercut with animation describing the battle was PHENOMENAL
Gettysburg's Pickett charge remains an epic example almost legendary of the unfortunate bravery and the tragic courage of the confederates during the civil war.
Is it true that the survivors wanted to charge again?
@@radrook4481 yes. General Grant told Lee at Appomattox that never in human history had so few fought so hard with so little albeit for an abysmal cause. That's what Grant said.
Beautiful Landscape and views Ya'll have in the background. God's Country. I hope to have a similar view from my front porch after I retire. I fell in love with the Southern States during a short vacation. Loved each and every minute. Absolutely beautiful. Southern hospitality was beyond anything I've seen. Ya'll be sweet, hope to be there soon. God Bless.
My 3rd great grandfather fought at Gettysburg in Pickett's Charge. He was wounded and captured at the wall.
@Hiccum Blurpaedius he probably didn't have a choice
Do you have any memorial items from your great grandfather? Thank you for sharing part of your family's history.
i had relatives there. both sides of the family too. been there and got chills...
How interesting. It's amazing how much information can be packed into such a short discussion.
I wonder if even Lee had won at Gettysburg if his army would have had enough juice to go much farther. I suspect they would have been so beat up that they would have had to retreat back to the south anyway.
Yeah, a lot of people overlook the fact that even if Lee had won, it could have very well been a pyrrhic victory. With the North having the manpower to replenish even heavy losses, if the South couldn't afford one thing, it was losing a lot of people. Which makes the Charge all the more tragic and all the more questionable. Without having clear intelligence to be reasonably certain that this charge succeeds, committing to the advance was a serious mistake.
Longstreet wanted to attack to the right instead of the center. He thought they could sweep the enemy from the field and march 70,000 Confederate troops into Washington, 30 miles away.
@@ohauss Your point is reasonable but I think what gets overlooked is the
overall mindset of Lee. Lee knew the only way to get any real victory
for the south would be at the negotiating table. It would take a significant
battle victory to achieve that. I think in Lee's mind this was that moment
of opportunity. I realize he had a big moment with Chancellorsville in
particular. But his strategy at that moment was defensive and counter
attacking by surprise. Here he found a rare offensive opportunity to
strike a blow.... knowing what might be achieved from a psychological
standpoint . I think Lee knew the risks and odds were against him
but in the end determined that it was his only real chance. I think the
sorrow he expresses to the soldiers was an admission he let this
thinking override what should have been the more obvious prudent
choice. As to whether this is the true turning moment of the war
I am not certain. But I think you can make the argument that it
is by far his most damaging decision in all of his career as a
battlefield commander. Lee deserves criticism obviously but
I think all criticism should be leveled with an understanding of
all the possibilities and limits available to him at the time.
Some desire to detract from his stature as a leader because
of Gettysburg more than is reasonable is my belief.
If Lee won the battle, he would have England and France for support. Just like Washington had France. If he didn’t, we would of lost the Revolutionary war.
It depends a lot on how he would have won it. The only way that might have led to victory was by taking all the high ground on June 30 or early July.
Good video & liked. I became interested in Gettysburg watching RUclips videos like this and it inspired me to visit the battlefield. It was worth it and my only regret is that I could not visit longer than 1 day. If you enjoy videos like this and have never gone to Gettysburg then you are missing out. Go see it!
Thanks from Scotland for an entertaining discussion by people who know their stuff. Shame it wasn't longer! For what it's worth, I have always regarded Pickett's charge as Lee's biggest blunder. Uphill charge over a mile long, with huge risks of being flanked by the Yankees. Particularly after witnessing the slaughter at Fredericksburg in similar circumstances.
Thank you so much American battelfild...
One of the things that wasn’t mentioned was that the union general ordered the cannons to silence to fool Lee into making his assault.
That would have been Henry Hunt, the chief of artillery for the AOP. He actually met
with some opposition for that decision, from Mead for one. I don't think he was
trying to fool anybody, he just wanted to conserve ammo for the attack that was
coming.
@@mecallahan1 p
@@mecallahan1 I agree. Hunt was not a fan of counter-battery fire. He believed that artillery was more effective in support of infantry attack or repelling enemy assaults. This philosophy of indirect fire-support has served the US well over the years.
A couple of things to consider about general George Gordon Meade. One Meade had just taken command of the Army of the Potomac, in fact he didn't arrive on the battlefield until after dark day 1. Second, Meade was the 1st commander to correctly anticipate Robert E. Lee's next move by guessing that lee would strike the center.
A great history lesson to help understand this important battle. ( I am a re-enactor.)
I loved hearing these gentlemen exchanging ideas at this Rock Wall conference. These talks bring about what if ideas and I think we all love that. More please boys.
The bravery of Pickett's Officers was incredible, going up that ground on horseback where they were basically entering a shooting gallery with them as a target. They knew they were going to die, but they went anyway. The Army of Northern Virginia is revered in history, especially in Virginia, especially by this son of Northern Virginia. Growing up my father took my family to Gettysburgh over a dozen times, at least 4 of them right around the time of the battle so that we'd have perspective. Each time he had others following us around because everywhere he went he would tell stories about the battlefield. When he told the story about Pickett's charge I was crying half-way thru the explanation, and so were numerous others around us.
The "turning point" of the War Against The Rebellion was the day in May of 1864, directly after The Wilderness, when Grant ordered the Army of the Potomac to march south {by the left flank), instead of going back across the river to safety, like everyone before him.
Many people forget the battle of Helena, Arkansas that happened at the same time as Gettysburg and Vicksburg where the Confedrates nearly regained control of the Mississippi River. July 3rd and 4th 1863 was the turning point of the war as a whole. The Confederacy suffered too many setbacks in those two days to ever recover.
Hello !! Iam a dilettante researcher of the history your civil war and as far as I know, from the information you publish that I analyzed (as I would like to research and know more!!!!!) the famous fence "worked". It stopped an entire advance of men, a bunch of men became easy targets because it was necessary to climb the fence since passing between the wooden sticks was practically impossible. I believe this was decisive...that fence should have been destroyed before the artillery attack. Greetings from Brazil .
Yes 👍
Love you all's channel! Will you all ever do a video on the Battle of Williamsburg(1862)? I feel as though it was one battle that is overshadowed by the Seven Days Battle in the Peninsula Campaign, yet there is still so much original history there...redoubts, rifle pits, roads, etc.
Anyways, would love to see The Civil War Trust shine some light on it!
Thank all of you for this film-- Bravo !!!
This is speaking from a southern perspective Born in the south raised in the south studied Civil War tactics and battles pretty much my whole life Lee couldn’t’ve taken that hill even if he had 30,000 more troops even Lee and other campaign said you can’t fight an enemy when they have the Highground The only answer I can have after thinking about this whole situation Lee had given up in his mind and he just wanted to glorious battle to go out on he sent those troops to die it’s sad but there’s no way he could’ve taken that ground and I believe he knew it
In further defense of Meade's not immediately pursuing Lee after the victory at Gettysburg. Along with the thousands of wounded that needed care, there were also tens of thousands of horses and mules which needed to be fed and rested or they would die.
Gettysburg and Vicksburg were a turning point it’s weird to talk about one and not the other
"General Lee sir, I have no division"
Excellent!, thank you gentlemen that whole terrible event helped mould today's great America as we know around the world .enjoyed and! could listen and learn more from your historically enlightening views far more often , 🕊to you all..
I've been to Gettysburg. I stood approximately where Lee did.
You just look at out over that distance, know anything about the weapons and strategy of the time, and you know.
No way that was going to work Lee never had a chance.
That's not twenty-twenty hindsight, it's not Monday morning quarterbacking. It's obvious when you're standing there.
I have no idea what Lee was thinking (especially after watching nearly the same thing in reverse at Fredericksburg) , or why there's even a debate about this. The guy who said it wasn't even close is right
Why does no one address the political infighting within the AOP's command structure . You really can't get a fair evaluation of an AOP commander's performance without it. No one even mentions that Slocum camped within 5 miles of Gettysburg, heard the sounds of the battle all day long, refused orders by Reynolds to come to his aid, and only arrived on the battlefield near sunset of the first day.
I'm really interested in the Civil War and these presentations are very helpful and informative. Thank you.
PIckett's Charge was a legacy of Malvern Hill, which was the forge upon which the Army of Northern Virginia was created in Lee's image. Standing where the Union gunners could see Lee surveying the battle, Lee's will to win is a palpable presence, even today.
Regarding Meade's failure to pursue Lee vigorously, as Lincoln was demanding from Washington, overlooks the fact that the Army of the Potomac was as badly wounded as the Army of Virginia and Meade's trains had been pretty completely scrambled by the southern bombardment. In contrast, Lee's trains were untouched and already position to begin its withdrawal immediately. This disparity in organization accrued to Lee's benefit and, as the commentators reflect. Lee was not inclined to give up.
Comparing Gettysburg and Vicksburg, which resolved on the same day, reflects a difference between Lee's larger strategy, which was theatrical to the extent that he was trying to entice Britain into an intervention, while Grant's intent was always purposeful and never meaningful. Lee's thrust into the North was informed, to some small degree, with the same expectation of a chocolates and roses reception from the Marylanders that the neo-con cheerleaders for the invasion of Iraq anticipated with their conceit of liberation. Like the invasion of Iraq, the Southern rebellion was then, and, to some degree, remains, firmly anchored by wishful thinking.
This is not intended to refute anything this video presents, but merely my own thinking on the subect over the years. Until I saw this video, I held the belief that another division, or even a regiment, at the cockpit, could have provided the results Lee desired, mass representing a quality of its own.. I was unaware of Meade's energetic response behind the forward positions, which has revealed the futility of the assault to my satisfaction (as a combat veteran, the fact that soldiers on both sides continued to respond to the alignments and evolutions of their commanders in this chaos is sobering. It is well we preserve this hallowed ground and enterprise).
Excellent presentation. Every time I have had the advantage of the observations of the Gettysburg docents, I have been enlightened and humbled by their command of their subject matter.
Meades trains were further back and were not disrupted by the artillery assault, except for some caissons that were supporting 2nd Corps artillery. This is contrasted by Lee who had to move his caissons about a mile back because Federal artillery were disrupting them. In addition, Lee's supply wagons were empty of long range shot and critically short of powder.
Another factor that isn't usually mentioned is that on the night of July 3rd, 1863, a torrential rain fell, timed as to allow some, if not most of the surviving Confederate units to cross the Potomac, while those Union troops who attempted pursuit found the fords at flood stage.
Jefferson Davis never had to admonish General Lee to put into battle all of his men, as Lincoln had chided General Hooker after Chancellorsville. Combative as he was, there was no way Lee leaves that battlefield with the 15 Virginia regiments in Pickett's Division unbloodied. Whether or not the following 10 months of stalemate and inaction in Virginia was worth the sacrifice of Pickett's Division is debatable, but General Meade was disinclined to repeat Lee's example and conduct frontal assaults against fixed defensive positions, especially against the field fortifications Lee employed after Gettysburg.
It is my opinion that Gettysburg was THE turning point strategically, considering that the entire Southern policy was hinging on bloodying the North to such a degree that they would be willing to cede to a political solution and allow the Confederacy to exist as a sovereign nation. Davis, Lee, and all of those involved in shaping Confederate policies and strategies understood that they could not win a war of attrition. But, what happens if you simply keep the Union army at bay, while remaining in-being as a fighting force and political entity? You will essentially be fighting a war of attrition, which the South could keep up for only so long. Therefore, by winning a great military victory one could persuade the Union to capitulate in the sense that their will to fight is reduced. And Gettysburg was the turning point of the war because after the Union's victory on the battlefield, there was no longer any question as to whether the Union could continue to go toe-to-toe with the Confederate forces. It was seen that they could prevail, and not only that, but Lee's battle plan failed, as did the greater strategic plan.
Had lee won at Gettysburg, it is entirely plausible that a political solution would have come about, with the AoNV being so close to Washington, and with little to stop them, the only hope being to slow them down. But once it was clear that Lee had lost, not only was Northern morale bolstered past the point of no return, it was clear that the South's plan had failed, and that they were once again forced back into a war of attrition, whereby they would have to re-equip their army once back in Virginia, attempt to find any replacements they could, etc., reducing their limited resources further. This likely had an immeasurable impact on foreign powers choosing not to support the South, a fact which, by itself, could be argued to be a major turning point of the war.
As far as the battle itself, I've said many times that I do not think Lee's blunders were numerous, and do not even consider ordering Longstreet to attack the center to be that big of a mistake considering the available intelligence. Lee's biggest mistake was not utilizing his means properly, as he had cavalry brigades that were present yet inactive under his command. It is easy to wonder why Lee did not agree with Longstreet's opinion that by swinging around the Union army they AoNV could get between the Union army and their capitol, as well as choose a battlefield where they held a terrain advantage, or perhaps win the battle at Gettysburg through a flanking maneuver.
Yet, I think people forget that Lee well knew that it would be extremely dangerous, a huge risk, to attempt to manuever such a large force in the presence of the enemy, who could choose offensive action at any time, and thereby crush Lee's army. It could be argued that we are talking about a portion of the army's forces, and not the entire army, but there would still be some danger, especially if the maneuver was defeated, as the army's right flank would then be wide open. There was also the morale factor to consider. By abandoning ground that had already been won, there would be a demoralizing effect on the troops no doubt, although it is difficult to say with any certainty. Withdrawing from Gettysburg was not an option either, considering the AoNV had not been beaten, plus the fact that the dangers of maneuvering described above would still be present, the morale effect, and most importantly that this would have completely ignored Lee's entire reason for invading the North to start with. I would argue that once Lee assembled his army at Gettysburg, his operational plan, if not his entire campaign plan, was ruined.
Lee's plan was, to put it simply, to swing through the valley, up to the general area to the North/Northwest of Washington, around the Union forces, forcing them to hurry northward to oppose him, where he hoped their formations would be strung out as opposed to concentrated, where they could be defeated in detail. Lee was the one who ended up being caught off guard, and he had to order what was essentially an emergency concentration at Gettysburg, where contact had been made. The Union army simply moved faster than he anticipated. My point is that Lee's operational plan of defeating Union formations piecemeal had failed.
The only hope now to accomplish the more strategic objective of peace through military victory. Thus withdrawing was not an option, and although Longstreet's option was better, it too was not guaranteed to succeed. And in Lee's mind he is thinking that he cannot withdraw, and cannot maneuver, therefore an attack seems to be the only option left, and the one option which is guaranteed to produce results in line with the original campaign plan if it succeeds. And having already attacked the Union on both of their flanks, if another attack had to be made it is logical to conclude that since Union formations would have been moved to support the flanks, that their center must have suffered as a result, and that this is the best place to attack. Except that this was so obvious that Meade also anticipated it. The main pointed I wish to make is that all of these things I've mentioned have influenced my opinion that Gettysburg was THE turning point of the war. It is difficult to hold an opinion that disagrees with notable and knowledgeable persons, but I must stay true to my analysis of the situation. Regardless, this was a good watch, and I will certainly subscribe and check out the channel's other videos.
Gettysburg AND Vicksburg were the double hinge that shut the door on the South. Even if Lee had won his battle Virginia and the other southern states would find themselves poor and starved of resources.
The US would still have their barricade on the southern ports and the Mississippi. The Europeans would not help the CSA. Mexico might shut the Texas border or even try to take it back (now that it is no longer in the Union).
The CSA might emerge as an independent nation but would not survive long.
Seems that Antietam/Sharpsburg has many of the same arguments, along with the Emancipation Proclamation, for it being the most pivotal battle .
The Lee plan to make the North tire of war was flawed, based on hoping to make a decisive blow while attacking the North. Staying on the defensive may have been the better plan.
Interesting perspective and not without its supporters. I don’t believe that Gettysburg by itself would have turned the tide in either direction. As is shown bu the press of the time (almost all from the east) there was a large impression at the time that the victory/defeat was significant. But for the public at that moment it was just another battle, and the same was true of Vicksburg. The public didn’t have the context to appreciate what those events could have meant.
Amateur historians and the public tend to be enticed by what if. Faulkner’s short quote about how it all hangs in the balance is a classic example. Part of that was created for us by the cult of Lee, the gentleman general, that was created as part of the Lost Cause narrative. All the sub-narratives they describe in this piece descend from the Lost Cause narrative. By definition the Lost Cause relies on the unimportance pf Vicksburg and of Tennessee because Lee wasn’t there. It relies on the Butcher Grant narrative despite the Vicksburg campaign’s status as one of the most creative and successful in US military history. It ignores the impact that freeing the Army of the Tennessee along with Grant and its leadership had on the long term strategic prosecution of the war and Grant’s and Scott’s vision for that. Another unmentioned event is that the US Colored Troops at Port Hudson, Milliken’s Bend, and Battery Wagner had fought bravely and shown the value of these troops in combat. By June 1863 a lot of them were moving into the armies or fighting ongoing conflicts in the deep south freeing up the veterans of the Army of the Tennessee to fight major battles. The Lost Cause has pointed us away from all of these truths and made Gettysburg larger in the public mind than it really was. Because it was Lee.
Gettysburg had an important role in the turning point idea. But as much as we’d like it to be a competition between Grant and Lee, it wasn’t. All of those events and more added up to July 1863 being pivotal. None of them happened in a vacuum.
Excellent insight Sir. Thank you
Great stuff, can't believe it took me 6 years to find this video!
I've always wondered if word coming from Mississippi and Tennessee made Lee gamble on Pickett's Charge to force a win out of desperation. It was a do or die, losing Vicksburg cut the Confederacy in half.
"There was a death torn broken mile of ground to cross/With a low stone wall at the end./And behind that wall the men of the Second Corps./And behind them another force, fresh troops who had not yet fought./They began to cross the ground. The guns began to tear at them." John Brown's Body by Stephen Vincent Benet. I think it says it all. Visiting Gettysburg it like visiting the First World War battlefields (and the cemetaries) in France. I'm from Britain and have done both. It's sad but we should remember them all on both sides for their bravery.
Nice discussion very commendable.
I had ancestors in the 36th Va. and 6th Ohio and am very grateful neither of them had to fight in the Army of Northern Virginia or the Army of the Potomac.Being in that area between the Potomac River and Richmond would have been like 4 years at Stalingrad.
I'm curious of what OTHER battles were taking place during Pickett's Charge.
That was a lot of fun. I have to agree with Sam; the loss of Chattanooga has a profound impact on Confederate logistics which surpasses the loss of the Mississippi
I have to agree. The loss of the Mississippi was bad, but the trans-Mississippi states were not making a significant strategic impact by that point. The loss of Chattanooga made a profound logistical impact, as you say, and also opened the door to Georgia and the endgame.
Agreed on the point that the AoP had a great deal to do with the defeat of the AoNV. General Meade was a great general. Very professional and knew what he was doing. He had a great record in command positions before he took overall command of the Army. He knew how to fight on the brigade, division and corps levels. Also. After the battle of Chancellorsville (and probably before) many of the corps commanders called for the dismissal of Hooker with Meade (after Reynolds refused) as his successor.
It still boggles my mind that there are real images of this period in time. Brings to life the conflict that can only be imagined when you look at other conflicts in time like the Roman Empire etc.
Outstanding
Gettysburg is important because Lee got whipped in a major battle for the first time. This had to be a huge psych boost for the Union. If for no other reason it is a huge moment and turning point in the war.
Thank you for this perceptive presentation. I have some “ifs” for the third day; What if Ewell and Longstreet’s attack s had been better coordinated and Custer with an amazingly small force had not stopped Stuart then Confederate victory becomes very possible. Meade is one of my greatest heroes. He faced Lee with minimum preparation taking the responsibility of command extremely smoothly, he fought Lee who had not lost so many fine commanders yet and with a unique parity of forces, he had many Union generals unfriendly to him who subsequently tried to undermine him and the few he could really trust like Hancock were wounded. At the end of the third day with the Farnsworth setback fresh he also could not organize his army quickly enough for the counter attack he wished also realizing that he could not be that sure that Lee was that badly hurt and being quoted as saying Lee was the best counterpuncher . In his memoirs he explains how he sent a corps up and around that found Itself thwarted by very effective mountain defences. Due to his emergency efforts to supply support where needed his army was terribly mixed. On banning newsmen from camp for giving away too much vital info they banded together to never mention him in a positive light.
When Grant finally faced Lee his army was twice as large and Lee had lost and continued to lose irreplaceable commanders. Grant’s retaining Meade says much for Meade. After Gettysburg Meade complains to his wife about the subtraction of troops to Chattanooga, interestingly Lee experiences the same thing only larger. They had possibly fought themselves out. Couldn’t resist carrying on like this and thank you again
Custer's force was part of a larger force of federal cavalry. They were outnumbered, but Stuart's men and horses were exhausted. Civil War cavalry forces weren't built for extended knock-down, drag-out fights; it's not surprising that Stuart was driven back despite his numerical advantage.
Wow!! Never heard anyone put the name Lee and “waffling” “half baked” in the same sentence. It was his subordinates that waffled.
Lee was quoted as saying, “If I had Jackson at Gettysburg we would have won that battle”. See if you can get your hands on “Life and Letters of RE Lee” by Jones.
This guy talking about Lee and surrender!! The federal, government troops (“those people” Lee) invaded Virginia! General Lee wanted peace at any cost!!
I hate watching debates.
Yeah, yeah. Well what if Reynolds hadn't gotten shot in the opening hours of the battle? Maybe the Union line wouldn't have collapsed on the first day. Or go back to Antietam...what if Kearny and Reno hadn't been killed just days before the great battle, and Mansfield killed in the opening hours? That's two corps commanders and the arguably best division commander....
Lee wasn't the only guy to lose a key subordinate at an inopportune moment. He was the guy who wasn't able to adapt and find or develop a suitable replacement.
Died of a theory , the most profound summary of the CSA
What is NOT known about the aftermath of the Battle of Gettysburg: Meade DID pursue Robert E. Lee's troops until they were able to cross back over the Potomic. He sent several cavalry divisions to harrass Lee's long baggage trains, in an attempt to slow or even stop their escape.
Pickets brigade was sent into the meat grinder 1 mile open field 1 fence to cli.b 2 hundred cannons thousands of guns trained on open field what a military disator
Mr Smith is wonderfully assured in his arguments.
Lee's original plan of campaign (made clear by Lee's after action report and Longstreet's memoirs) in June of 1863 was to maneuver the AotP into attacking the AoNV and defeat that attack. In effect, he attempted to carry out a strategically offensive campaign which was defensive tactically. To do this, Lee needed timely information as to the strength and location of the AotP. Only Stuart's cavalry possessed the mobility to get out and obtain this information.
Stuart's ability to do this was compromised- not by Stuart, but by Lee. Lee violated the military axiom of "one force, one objective", and gave Stuart two objectives for one force. Lee did this by instructing Stuart to gather both information and provisions. These two objectives were contradictory in nature because gathering information required mobility which only cavalry could provide- but gathering provisions would inevitably impede that very mobility. Thus, excelling at one made accomplishing the other more and more unlikely. Furthermore, Lee made it clear in his orders to Stuart that he wished Stuart to gather provisions not simply for the three brigades which Stuart had with him, but for the AoNV as well. Probably the worst aspect of Lee's orders to Stuart was that these two objectives coincided in time- and Stuart literally lacked the time to accomplish first one, and then the other.
Lee's lack of information resulted in the unexpected meeting engagement between advanced elements of the AoNV and the AotP on 1 July. The minor Confederate victory was actually a disaster for Lee's plan of campaign. In this meeting engagement, elements of the AoNV attacked and defeated elements of the AotP. In so doing, Lee's army assumed not only the strategic offensive, but now, the tactical offensive as well. Having been attacked and defeated, the AotP was now unlikely to simply go over to the tactical offensive in turn.
Two additional factors made a Union counterattack even more unlikely. The first was that the AotP had a newly appointed commander in General George G. Meade (an appointment which Lee had been made aware of). Meade assumed command of an army already in motion, and- as one historian put it- he was faced by a man who had been "the ruin of McClellan, Pope, Burnside, and Hooker". The second factor was that the two recent offensives by the AotP- and Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville- had resulted in a bloody repulse in the first battle, and a stunning counterattack and defeat in the second. In their entirety, these factors combined to make a Union counterattack unlikely in the extreme.
This saddled Lee with a tactical initiative which he had never wanted- and now, two time constraints operated against him. The first was that the strategic objective of the campaign had been to relieve pressure on the Confederate defenders at Vicksburg- and Vicksburg had been placed under siege before Lee's campaign had even gotten underway. The second was that the AoNV had been foraging off of enemy territory, and Lee's foraging parties could not operate in the immediate presence of the AotP. Lee was now reduced to living off of the stocks in the army's supply train, so he could not remain in any one area for more than 3-5 days. Since the army had not foraged since Lee's concentration order of 29 June, the clock was ticking for Lee.
It appears clear in retrospect that Lee had little confidence that Meade would launch an attack of his own, and Longstreet's suggestion of a flanking maneuver- while tactically possible to carry out- stood little chance of eliciting a Union counterattack. These factor may well explain Lee decision to execute what became known as Pickett's Charge.
Lincoln desperately wanted to destroy Lee's army, but he was not there to see the results of the three day battle. In my opinion, Meade did not pursue Lee's battered Army of Northern Virginia because of the equally battered condition of his Army of the Potomac. Meade basically had one corps still in good shape, the 6th Corps, along with hundreds of dead to bury and thousands of wounded to treat medically. Additionally, Lee anticipated that Meade would try to pursue him and established a defensive line along Seminary Ridge late on July 3rd. Meade knew what an assault on prepared defenses looked like and he was not about to repeat the mistake Lee had made on July 3rd. As to the Battle of Gettysburg being the "turning point of the Civil War", look at it in terms of the crippling loss of the large numbers of experienced officers and troops that Lee could not replace for the remainder of the war in the east. For all intents and purposes, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had lost its' ability to conduct another major offensive. But, I have to agree that the loss of Vicksburg was a major blow to the Confederacy. That combined with Lee's loss at Gettysburg was the death knell for the Confederate States.
Thank you all, gentlemen, for this immersive commentary. However, after reading Edwin C. Bears on Petersburg, I feel the same way about General Meade as Colonel Pleasants felt after their post-Crater debriefing at Meade's HQ.
If I was Robert E. Lee I would've likely made the same move. The defensive victory at Fredericksburg and offensive victory at Chancellorsville really showed Lee that no matter what circumstances his men were in, even if badly outnumbered, could easily defeat their opponent.
Lee's army had significantly swelled from less than 60,000 men in May to more than 75,000, and Hooker's army numbered about 95,000 and he was repeatedly unable to cope with Lee's genius, finally Lee receives word of Meade's command and he correctly predicted Meade would be cautious.
Lee's army was the strongest it could get, it now had 75,000 men and was organized into four corps, the I Corps under his old war horse James Longstreet, a very capable and battle hardened commander, the II Corps under Richard S. Ewell who replaced the legendary Stonewall Jackson, although not as experienced or brilliant as Jackson, Ewell was a battle hardened soldier and had repeatedly proven his ability to fight, especially in the Valley, the III Corps under General Ambrose P. Hill, another very competent commander, possibly Jackson's best subordinate despite being the one he hated the most, and the Cavalry Corps under Jeb Stuart, Lee's trusted young cavalry officer, the man Lee could not succeed without.
So he had a large and well fed, well rested army, a series of very capable commanders, and a cautious commander which he was used to defeating such as McClellan or Hooker.
Everything sounded perfect for Lee, but Stuart wasn't present so he had to rely on his senses, Henry Heth's division of Hill's Corps got incidentally tied up with Buford's dismounted cavalry, initially thought to be militia units, Ewell misunderstanding Lee's orders to seize the high ground, and being at the wrong location. Although everything seemed perfect for Lee, at Gettysburg a lot went wrong for Lee as well.
Gettysburg does not change my opinion of Lee whatsoever, I still see him as a brilliant commander, and although I respect Grant as a leader, I do think Lee was superior.
I've often wondered how much Lee knew about what was happening on the Union side of Chancellorsville. In specific:
Did he know that Jackson's "sneaky" flank attack had been observed and reported, and that Hooker ordered Howard to prepare for an attack...and that Howard flat-out disobeyed the order? And furthermore, that Howard's pickets had reported heavy troops concentrations nearby, and Howard ignored those reports as well, even though they confirmed with Hooker's warning?
If Lee knew those things, he might have realized how amazingly lucky he got at Chancellorsville, and he might have looked back to Malvern Hill for his lessons instead.
I think the main reason that Meade doesn't get much credit for the battle is that things just fell into place for him. He didn't select the field, most of the credit for that goes to John Buford who's cavalry made first contact with the enemy and found the delaying action that bought the time necessary for the Union forces to gain the high ground. He didn't do anything particularly compelling either - he just didn't make a mistake and Lee happened to make the worst mistake of his military career that day.
There was also the congressional investigation afterward that did a lot to tarnish his reputation. Also, it's amazing what one can accomplish by just not screwing up fantastically, haha.
Michael Morris Meade didn't fall for the "Robert E Lee" mystique. He, with only 3 days in command, faked Lee out, knowing from Lee's West Point classes that he would attack the center on Day 3, and he even knew it would be Pickett's men because he had prisoners from every other corps and good intelligence. Not making mistakes takes hard work and ingenuity.
It was Buford's cavalry that delayed the Confederate advance, and got Lee tangled up there; but, it was the Corps Commander Reynolds whom made the decision to fight the battle at Gettysburg. Reynolds arrived with reinforcements and determined that it was a good place, shortly before he was killed by a sharpshooter.
I have bee to Gettysburg and Vicksburg both and felt I was on hollow ground on both of them. Thia discussion really helped me see that as far cutting into the South's resources that the loss at Vicksburg had a greater impact.
I’m glad you didn’t fall through.
Who are the 103 people that gave this video a thumbs down?
Very entertaining. You don’t usually hear a Civil War “experts“ talking so calm and casual.
Very fun video!
Very interesting discussions/points/opinions... Thank you!
The attack by R.E. Lee did not surprise me at all. Lee had ordered disastrous attacks before such as Malvern Hill. His troops were slaughtered by cannon fire going up a slope. Second Manassas was a defensive-counter offensive battle, Antietam and Fredericksburg were purely defensive battles. At Chancellorsville however, Lee was planning an all out attack on a very entrenched Union army. What saved him was Hooker retreating overnight. Even Edwin Porter Alexander exclaimed in his memoirs that he "dreaded" the assault and was relieved when Hooker retreated. This was two months before Gettysburg. This was R.E. Lee's way and a determined Union army made him suffer for it. People called Grant a butcher, but % wise R.E.Lee was worse in offensive situations. He asked the impossible of his men and THEY paid for it.
No no, the reason the Army of Northern Virginia lost the battle was due to poor communication and unusually decisions made by Lee when is staff and other generals under his command warned him not to fight there at Gettysburg. The plan was to draw out the Union armies and get between them and DC. In that defensive position they would have waited for Meade and slaughtered them in detail. The Union army would have no choice but to attack a well dug in Southern army. Gettysburg should not have happened. It’s was a mistake and over confidence in Lee
Nice presentation gentlemen.
From the Suwannee 😎🇺🇸👍
I know a descendant of Jeb Stuart's family, John Stuart, and he said it is the family's belief that Jeb Stuart was visiting a lady during the time he was away from the Confederate army. Finally, I think the initial mistake by General Heath to engage the dismounted Union cavalry on Union soil was probably a mistake that couldn't be overcome. The idea was to force the Union army to pursue the Confederates until the Confederates decided to basically turn and fight on the ground of their choosing. General Heath allowed the Union army to choose the ground.
JEB got his in the end about 10 months later.
Good punani wins every time
Gen. George Custer's cavalry charges also humiliated him at Gettysburg.
My family has some of George Pickett’s things because he was my one of my ancestors. We have his sword. So this video was kind of interesting.
Pretty Sure I'm related on my Moms Side.
Does you family still have no division?
A spirited discussion that covers more topics than just Lee's head-scratching charge at Gettysburg.
Agree, it was never a close battle. A poor decision by Lee arising from over confidence after several impressive victories. He thought he couldn’t lose, so he made a foolish decision. Good General, but with flawed judgment like the rest of us. Imperfect humans doing what imperfect humans do.
Very interesting conversation, Gentlemen.
Lee fully understood that the Southern Government had no more soldiers, cannon, medical supplies, or rations to send him, while the North could replace fallen soldiers almost at will. The North had the manufacturing to mass produce weapons and ammunition. I personally believe this played a role in Lee's decision making that day. The Army of the Potomac was right there in front of him. Lee, knowing that the longer this war dragged on, it heavily favored the North. Lee always wanted to destroy the enemy, on that battlefield, at that time, to him seemed to be his best shot.
That may have been what Lee thought, but as history turned out, he was wrong. Lincoln could easily have been voted out and a peace candidate elected if the Confederacy had still been viable in late 1864. Lee's chronic waste of manpower left the Confederacy too weak to hold onto Richmond and Atlanta in '64.
@@aaronfleming9426 even Confederate victories were losses because the south had no way to replace the soldiers it had lost. I personally believe that after the Battle at Antietam the proverbial writing was on the wall.
@@57clc That could be, but it's certainly not how Lincoln, and many others on both sides, saw it in the summer of 1864.
I think it's a fallacy that the north had some sort of endless supply of manpower. Just because the people are there doesn't mean they're willing to fight, or that they'll be effective if they're forced to fight.
Then there's the financial part...the national debt had doubled from 1856-1860 to about $80 million. By 1865 it was *$3 billion*.
Things didn't work out for Lee because he had a huge union army in his way who had their own plans. No battle plan survives first contact with the army.
I love these videos. Not enough genuine discussion regarding the Civil War anymore. Just more hate these days. Thank you for making such discussions and points of views available.
I can see how Gettysburg can be seen as a turning point in the war. Lee was winning a lot of battles at the time and seemingly escalating the war. However when you look at the overall picture of what was going on that year... It really looks as if the war is going to come to a close. The South just didn't have what they needed to continue fighting. They were dealing with mounting desertions, supplies weren't as strong anymore, etc. Even without Grant's famous "March to the Sea", or the fall of Vicksburg, the South would have been crushed under just the financial weight of trying to supply an army.
Considering Lee's goal was to crush the Potomac Army and threaten D.C.... such a goal almost smacks of desperation.
I would like to watch the whole conversation.
Did not even recognize Garry without the hat lol
I like the unvarnished conversational format. Even if it might drift occasionally.
Love these small videos!!
Meade had a chance to roll up the Army of N VA before it crossed below the M-D Line. Disagree with the experts, agree with Lincoln on that point.
Having just returned from a visit to Gettysburg, I think this analysis is very accurate.
Though, I believe Lee expected Ewell's assault on Culp's Hill on the morning of July 3rd to be more concurrent with Longstreet's assault on the union center.
The South’s artillery barrage failed because of new fuses that burned longer than the old fuses. This caused the shells to explode behind the Northern lines. Unfortunately for the South they didn’t have time to properly test the fuses before the battle took place. Just another quirk in a battle of many lost opportunities.
General Longstreet and general Armistead, my favorits!
Wonderful! Thank you so much!
I'll bite at the end and actually agree with him. Symbolically, Gettysburg was a turning point for morale and preventing, same for Vicksburg. But overall tactically, Chattanooga was the beating heart of transportation for most of the South. It connected nearly all points in the south by rail. Cutting that line spread out supply lines even farther. Strained the system to the breaking point, then Sherman broke it.
Well said. Thanks for the excellent comment.
A descent Commander, surrounded by competent staff and field officers commanding veteran infantry. A cavalry that knew their job. NCOs with experience. Lee ran into officers who did not panic while leading men who had been there before. He ran into Chamberlain and the 20th Maine and Wisconsin Iron Brigade. The Union Army had matured.
madrick100 Correct. And Meade, even with only 3 days in, knew what to ask for from them. No more bumbling.
In all fairness, a far less mature Union army had whipped Lee on the tactical level throughout the Seven Days battles, especially at Malvern Hill. It is a bit shocking that Lee could overlook his experience at Malvern Hill and think that he would achieve better results.
I visited Gettysburg on a holiday to the USA from Australia in 2006 and can say without hesitation that I had a much better time there than those present in 1863.
If you did absolutely nothing, you had a better time than anyone there civilian or military. I can't imagined what it must of been like, the dead, the wounded, the screams, the smoke, the cannon noise, the heat and humidity, the smell of death, you name it. It's a good thing for the north that the south did not recruit Australia on there side. Had they done so, the north would have lost and the USA would probably still be fighting! Ga-day mate or is it good day mate?
@@kennyw871 Actually, the Southern Confederacy did recruit Australia. Several Australians joined the crew of CSS Shenandoah when she visited Melbourne. There was a legal claim for damages against the Victorian state government brought by the US because the Australian state did not impound the Shenandoah when requested by the US ambassador. I don't know what the result of that court case was though.
www.tracesmagazine.com.au/2016/08/confederate-ship-in-1860s-melbourne-the-last-voyage-of-the-shenandoah/
@@kennyw871 We see whole dead bodies and whole wounded. The reality was there were parts of human beings scattered all over the field and some actually hit by the exploding shells were in a fine red spray on the ground. the smells would have been horrible particularly 2 or 3 days later in that heat and humidity.
Great open discussion
I stood at Pickets Charge and thought I can't believe anyone could be so stupid to think sending 15,000 men almost a mile on open ground up hill and think it would work.
It was crazy. General Insanity.