Kant's Critique of Pure Reason - Video 39: Second Analogy: Causality
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- Опубликовано: 29 сен 2024
- The second analogy is one of the most famous passages of the Critique. Here, Kant argues that the representation of an objective time order requires a universal application of the category of causation to appearances.
Required reading: Critique of Pure Reason, A189/B232-A211/B256.
Victor Gijsbers teaches philosophy at Leiden University in the Netherlands. This video is part of his 2021 lecture series "Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason": • Kant's Critique of Pur...
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This video is sooooo helpful! Thank you !!!
Glad it was helpful!
Great section Victor, I’m torn. The rhizomic nature of causation unfolding before us, entwined with the empirical need to stop the clock.
These are very good explanations - just from listening to 38 and 39.
Gratitude from China for this wonderful, erudite, well-versed lecturer.
"These states had to follow each other in this particular order"
How is this necessary? We think that because we saw apples falling (and not going up to the trees) our whole lifes, so isn't this a posteriori?
How is moving our head any less objective than an apple falling? Isn't my head, or my field of vision, an object, in Kant's sense?
Is Kant's notion of causality any different than what today call correlation, i.e. observed rules, not necessary laws that have "power" in themselves?
Is it a priori that nature has any laws at all?
What we see is nothing but what is in our head , in fact we see only the results of our sensory perception processing ..AND NOT WHAT IS IN EXTERIOR ...
""How can something in general be changed, how is it possible that a state of a moment in
time to succeed at another time a contrary state: about this we have no a
a priori not even the most insignificant concept. This requires knowledge of real forces,
which can only be given empirically, for example of the driving forces or, what is the same, a
certain successive phenomena (such as movements), which indicate such forces. But the shape of any
changes, the condition under which it can take place as a birth of another state (whatever its content, ie the state that is changed), therefore the succession of the states themselves (what happens) can still be considered a priori according to the law of causality and according to the TIME conditions .
take my comment with a grain of salt, but the way I understand it is that it isn't important whether or not the apple goes up or down, but rather that to have an experience of an apple doing anything at all (other than just random unsorted impressions of apples which would leave us not having any experience at all), we need to have some notion of time.
Nature doesn't have a priori laws neccesarily, but it is neccessary to our perception of nature to have time and therefore causality.
I think it goes something like that
What is the experience of animals/creatures without understandings like if we say that the arrow of time is dependent on the category of causation?
I tend to think that the best Kantian answer to the question "what is the experience of animals/creatures without understanding like?" is... we can't possibly have any conception of that! But this is certainly related to questions about whether Kant thinks there is non-conceptual perception at a certain level in our mental lives. This might be an interesting source for you, if you can get ahold of the book:
global.oup.com/academic/product/kant-and-animals-9780198859918?cc=nl&lang=en&#
@@VictorGijsbers Thanks so much - that looks very interesting, and I'll definitely be able to get ahold of it through my uni! It looks like it will resolve lots of the outstanding issues I have with understanding Kant's theoretical philosophy. (great video by the way, as always)
Thanks again for the videos! If I may ask, do I follow the logic anywhere close to correctly here, albeit simplified; we can't think of objects without placing them in a time series, otherwise we would just have a flood of unconnected impressions, and we can't imagine time unless we presuppose causality. We have to contribute causality to our representations to even think about objects and to place them in time. But this can't be all in our heads, since the transcendental subject and object are inextricably linked - the one can not be thought without the other, as we saw in the transcendental deduction. And we need to have intuitions to even have cognition - something out there is affecting us, otherwise our concepts would be completely empty. All this taken together means that even just in thinking of an object, it necessarily already has cause and effect as a precondition, giving causality objective validity, as well as transcendental certainty even though we can't observe it empirically, but we are not in pure idealism since the things-in-themselves affect us through sensibility, enabling our way of thinking?
Yes, that sounds good. Instead of "we can't imagine time unless we presuppose causality" I suppose it might be slightly better to say "we can't imagine objects being in time unless we presuppose causality", since that leaves open the possibility that we could do mathematics using the pure forms of intuition without involving causality. But that's a side issue. (Whether it's the things-in-themselves affecting us is also a bit controversial; but certainly we must be in touch with objects.)
@@VictorGijsbers Thank you, I appreciate the clarification! I suppose I should have said "empirical objects" or "sensible objects" rather than things-in-themselves, to separate them from the transcendental object, which is not really an object but rather a precondition for thinking in objects - it's hard to find the right terms. I still struggle to understand, from Kant's point of view, how much we as cognizers contribute to objecthood, exactly where to place his intersection of empirical realism and transcendental idealism, but looking at the secondary literature, I'm probably not alone. Cheers again!
I have this topic as my final essay for my philosophy course and I'm not in a good mental state at all so I've been rereading this section out of pure confusion and completely unsure if im putting things together correctly. I usually can understand Kant quite well but all these terms have tripped me up so I really appreciate the summary as it makes my understanding feel validated. I also really appreciate this video too and the examples and reading straight from the text!
@@aeime6747 u in phl210 at uoft? i got this for my final essay too, have no idea what i'm doing and it's due in 4 hrs lol
@Aidan M655 yes I am. I have accommodations so I have till Sunday but I'm so stressed about this
In Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit where does this kind of argument fit in?
In the Perception section Hegel talks about the concepts like Also and Universal moments in salt example, Kant's argument relatable here?
Great question, but the Phenomenology of Spirit is one of those book I still have to get to. So someone else will have to answer this. :-)