"For him, the status of the unconscious is not ontological - it's not a thing. It's rather ethical, in other words it's something that has to do with subjectivity and how subjectivity may be reformed or transformed or changed within the ethical domain of clinical psychoanalysis itself. [...] Lacan doesn't like the whole idea of objects. Objects are in the imaginary domain. He's very opposed to thinking a psychology that always wants to have objects, measurable objects, objects of knowledge, objects of psychical understanding and the crucial moment of phenomenology is that conscioussness is not an object; consciousness is not objectlike like things in the world are objects. Why? Because it's fundamentally intentional, it's fundamentally directed to the world and perceptual experiences and so on. And so that anti-objectivism is inherited by Lacan and he inherits it both to make a critique of what he understands as the residual and constant objectivism of psychology and as a way of saying that when we think about the unconscious we should think of it as a verb, as a doing, as an opening - not as a storehouse, a container and most fundamentally not as an object". Not a very precise transcript, but I thought this was a high point and wanted to write it up
I like how you synthesize in a didactic way, and it'd be cool if you did a brief compare/contrast between Lacan and Bracha Ettinger. i may have said this before but i tend to memory-hole my RUclips comments
I think the point of hermeneuein od dasin is that the phenemenology has to be aware that it is always situated, mediated, incomplete and because of that needs to be hermeneutical.
This series is worth gold!!! Thanks a lot
"For him, the status of the unconscious is not ontological - it's not a thing. It's rather ethical, in other words it's something that has to do with subjectivity and how subjectivity may be reformed or transformed or changed within the ethical domain of clinical psychoanalysis itself. [...] Lacan doesn't like the whole idea of objects. Objects are in the imaginary domain. He's very opposed to thinking a psychology that always wants to have objects, measurable objects, objects of knowledge, objects of psychical understanding and the crucial moment of phenomenology is that conscioussness is not an object; consciousness is not objectlike like things in the world are objects. Why? Because it's fundamentally intentional, it's fundamentally directed to the world and perceptual experiences and so on. And so that anti-objectivism is inherited by Lacan and he inherits it both to make a critique of what he understands as the residual and constant objectivism of psychology and as a way of saying that when we think about the unconscious we should think of it as a verb, as a doing, as an opening - not as a storehouse, a container and most fundamentally not as an object".
Not a very precise transcript, but I thought this was a high point and wanted to write it up
I like how you synthesize in a didactic way, and it'd be cool if you did a brief compare/contrast between Lacan and Bracha Ettinger. i may have said this before but i tend to memory-hole my RUclips comments
Does Heidegger say anything about immediate experience? His notion of alethea seems to be very against it.
I think the point of hermeneuein od dasin is that the phenemenology has to be aware that it is always situated, mediated, incomplete and because of that needs to be hermeneutical.
When you mention “law” you don’t describe what you are referring to!