2020 PhilPapers survey reaction

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  • Опубликовано: 28 ноя 2024

Комментарии • 159

  • @KaneB
    @KaneB  3 года назад +22

    Apologies for the audio problems. This happens whenever I record video + audio simultaneously. I tried using different software to record this one, but obviously it didn't make a difference.
    I think the problem is that the video records at a different rate than the audio, so the audio is stretched to match the video and this results in audio distortion. When I record the lecture videos, I use different programs to record the video and audio, and then I manually cut down the video to match.

  • @pinecone421
    @pinecone421 3 года назад +54

    You’re funny lol: “You’re all in your youth. You want memes and react videos.”

    • @thatonecrazybrownguy3631
      @thatonecrazybrownguy3631 3 года назад +2

      I mean it’s true tho truly has gotten us zoomers and what not

    • @burgle9262
      @burgle9262 3 года назад +1

      How about "discussion about" rather than gut emotion reactions?

    • @pinecone421
      @pinecone421 3 года назад +2

      @@burgle9262 What?

  • @baldomerian7742
    @baldomerian7742 3 года назад +50

    "62% of philosophers accept moral realism. That - that is an embarrassment."
    Beyond based.

    • @shannon8111
      @shannon8111 3 года назад +17

      so true, 38% of philosophers being wrong is terrible

    • @Sam-py9qq
      @Sam-py9qq 3 года назад +6

      Yes with the current state of academia 62% being right is impressive

    • @11kravitzn
      @11kravitzn 3 года назад +19

      Just goes to show that what passes for "philosophy" today is largely confirmation bias dressed up as something respectable, technical, "wise", etc. In other words, it's just secular theology (another name for moral realism).

    • @cultofscriabin9547
      @cultofscriabin9547 2 года назад +3

      @@11kravitzn 🤣🤣

    • @NicolasSchaII
      @NicolasSchaII 13 дней назад

      I'm sure he's right and not a large group of academic philosophers

  • @olivergroning6421
    @olivergroning6421 3 года назад +10

    With regard to the truth values of mathematics one needs to keep in mind that mathematics is a formal system. This means it is based on axioms. Axioms are true by choice or definition and cannot be proven to be true (otherwise they are not axioms). Statements in a formal system (theorems) are either 'true', if they can be derived from the axioms, 'false' if they contradict the axioms or 'undecidable' if they cannot be shown to be either true or false. The latter seems odd, but since Gödel's incompleteness theorem we need to expect such statements in any sufficiently complex formal system.
    Chess is an example of such a formal system, where the rules are true not by any natural law, but because of the choice of the players. Statements in this system are moves and piece configurations on the board. E.g. a board with 2 black kings is false or a knight moving just one field is false too. This is according to the orthodox rules of chess, but you are free to change them if both player agree.
    The apparently 'simple' truth value of 2+2=4 needs actually a quite involved proof based on the Peano axioms of counting arithmetic:
    Axioms (definition of '='):
    1) x=x
    2) if x=y then y=x
    3) if x=y and y=z then x=z
    4) if x belongs to M and x=y then y belongs to M
    Axioms (definition of natural numbers)
    5) 0 belongs to the natural numbers
    6) if n belongs to the natural numbers then S(n) is a natural number (S will be the successor function)
    7) if n and m are natural numbers and n=m then and only then S(n)=S(m)
    8) for every natural number n, S(n)=0 is false
    9) The symbols we use for the natural number are defined by 1=S(0); 2=S(1); 3=S(2); 4=S(3); 5=S(4)..... (inductive definition of all natural numbers)
    Axioms (definition of '+')
    10) n+0=n
    11) n+S(m)=S(n+m)
    And now the proof:
    2+2 = 2+S(1) = S(2+1) = S(2+S(0)) = S(S(2+0)) = S(S(2)) = S(3) = 4
    When moral realists claim objective truth in connection to mathematics, they are forgetting, that these apparently obvious truths of mathematical statements are a) not obvious at all and b) that their truth value to objectively exist requires axioms, i.e. statements being true by choice or definition.

    • @Dystisis
      @Dystisis Год назад +3

      Mathematics is not a formal system. Arithmetic, particularly, is used by billions of people every day. It is an elementary part of ordinary language. You seem to talk as if it were a creation of mathematicians.

  • @lolroflmaoization
    @lolroflmaoization 3 года назад +14

    I am a moral realist but i have the same exact reaction as your reaction about moral realism, when someone says that they believe in objective aesthetic value lol

    • @justus4684
      @justus4684 3 года назад +5

      Why are you moral realist?

    • @lolroflmaoization
      @lolroflmaoization 3 года назад +1

      @@justus4684 answering that question would realistically take many paragraphs but if i were to give a short answer it would be this, I personally find moral realism to be very intuitive, and i don't find the objections leveled against moral realism to be strong enough to counteract the intuitive force of moral realism for me, at least for the type of moral realism that i favor which is like Scnalon's in that it atl east doesn't requite any positive ontological implications or a moral metaphysical reality.

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 3 года назад

      @@lolroflmaoization What is it that it's intuitive to you? My concern with attempts to strip realism of its metaphysical content but still remain some kind of non-naturalist is that the position doesn't even seem false to me, it seems unintelligible.

    • @lolroflmaoization
      @lolroflmaoization 3 года назад

      @@lanceindependent well non-natuarlism in the case i opt for is perfectly compatible with naturalism, it's just that it doesn't non-naturalist in the sense of it's opposition with common naturalist accounts, there are many philosophers who have differing accounts of preserving mathematical truths without commitment to mathmatical abstract objects, do you also find these to be unintelligible?
      Being unintelligible is a reason to not believe in a certain view, fair enough, never the less, intelligibility is individual, and therefore isn't reason providing for other people, so if you are very interested then you ought to do the work of investigating various accounts and then judge how intelligible they seem to you, obviously it's not unintelligible to a good number of respected philosophers.

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 3 года назад +1

      @@lolroflmaoization I’d have to hear about the specific position on math to evaluate it.
      There is a serious limitation with moral realists claiming to have concepts that others don’t have, and that they cannot explain. Absent further argument, the realist can only claim that they are justified in believing something. But others, who cannot make sense of the concepts they appeal to, have no way to evaluate their claims.
      One problem with this is that anyone could appeal to concepts that entail their position is correct. I can claim antirealism is correct by appealing to some concept I just make up. When pressed, I can insist the concept is primitive, or basic, or unanalyzable, and if you don’t understand it, well, that’s unfortunate but there’s nothing more I can say to you. Some of us just “get it,” and, unfortunately, realists simply don’t. I don’t think you’d find this satisfying, and I don’t think you should find it satisfying. Non-naturalist realists routinely appeal to or rely on concepts that they are either unwilling or unable to explain.
      Maybe they “have” these concepts and they are intelligible, but it is possible that adherents to a position are confused and are caught in the grip of a commitment to vacuous or unintelligible positions. How can we distinguish cases where this is occurring from cases where it isn’t? And if we have no such criteria, why should I think the concepts moral realists appeal to are intelligible rather than unintelligible?
      If realists are going to appeal to concepts that others do not accept or cannot even understand, then disagreement cannot be resolved without further arguments or evidence.
      I have done the work to investigate various realist accounts. Every one of them is either unintelligible because its proponent appeals to unanalyzable concepts that seem vacuous, self-contradictory, and/or superfluous, or they make trivial claims that strip normativity out of their accounts (e.g. what naturalists often do). Every account of realism I’ve seen so far appears trivial (naturalism in general), unintelligible (non-naturalism in general), or false (any realism that requires theism, since theism is false).
      Regarding respected philosophers: I am not swayed by pointing out that these people are respected. Perhaps, with respect to this particular issue, they shouldn’t be.

  • @michaelmoran9020
    @michaelmoran9020 3 года назад +8

    The sheer amount of moral realists makes me lose faith in professional philosophers ability to reason and makes me question how much academic success is reccomendation by a majority who concur with you.

    • @michaelmoran9020
      @michaelmoran9020 3 года назад +3

      @Joseph the Wanderer I just think it's a fucking stupid position as Kane does

    • @jolssoni2499
      @jolssoni2499 3 года назад

      @Joseph the Wanderer If they were peers they wouldn't be moral realists.

    • @jolssoni2499
      @jolssoni2499 3 года назад

      @Joseph the Wanderer My point stands.

    • @ExistenceUniversity
      @ExistenceUniversity Год назад

      @@michaelmoran9020 Well you don't even exist so why should us that exist care what you don't think.

    • @NicolasSchaII
      @NicolasSchaII 13 дней назад

      I‘m sure you're correct and all those academic philosophers got it all wrong

  • @johnnyhugill6744
    @johnnyhugill6744 3 года назад +6

    Great vid Kane - and I share your bafflement about all these moral / aesthetic realists!

  • @lily-qn7jn
    @lily-qn7jn 3 года назад +4

    Kane starting the journey towards react andy/debate streamer ytuber

  • @jimitreweek9455
    @jimitreweek9455 3 года назад +6

    23:20 VIRTUE ETHICS
    Philipa Foot, Martha Nausbaum, Julia Annas, Rosalind Hursthouse - I think contemporary feminists lean into Virtue Ethics, which may partially explain the surge.

  • @andrew_nayes
    @andrew_nayes 3 года назад +9

    You could make a survey for your twentysomething audience. Memes and react videos, yes or no?

  • @JKLKJ
    @JKLKJ 3 года назад +3

    Hey, have you planning to cover Huemer's ontological argument for moral realism? You mentioned him in passing, and it's actually something I've been grappling with the past few days. I'd be interested in hearing your take on the partners in crime argument as well. How one would argue against both without epistemological nihilism.

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад +4

      I haven't covered Huemer's argument. I might do in the future, but there a lot of metaethics topics I want to do!
      I have a video on companions in guilt here: ruclips.net/video/7HHBNU_gXP0/видео.html
      I've also expressed my own views on companions in guilt this AMA, in response to Patrick Wilson at 1:11:24: ruclips.net/video/VGBRSYLrqx4/видео.html

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 3 года назад

      @@KaneB I would definitely like to see you address Huemer's ontological argument.

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 3 года назад

      Huemer’s argument hinges on the notion that moral realism is not absurd or self-contradictory. Though this would need to be disambiguated, since there are different forms of moral realism. Some forms of moral realism are not absurd or self-contradictory, but I think Huemer’s specific conception of moral realism is absurd; in fact, I think it is unintelligible.
      Huemer says this in the paper: “But while the view is thus highly controversial, moral realism is not contradictory or absurd. Intelligent and rational philosophers have held the view, the most important of these being Immanuel Kant, and some thoughtful and informed participants in contemporary philosophical debate continue to endorse it.”
      One response to Huemer is tos ay that, as a matter of fact, at least his conception of realism is absurd or contradictory. I am also completely unimpressed with the claim that “intelligent and rational philosophers have held the view.” Sure, and they have also endorsed theism and a host of silly or objectionable views. This persists in contemporary debates.
      Huemer then says, “Almost no one, not even confirmed Humeans, relativists, or egoists, would say that this version of moral realism has been conclusively refuted.”
      I think Huemer comes very close to making an error here. He does not explicitly say so, but it sounds like he’s conflating rejecting a view on the grounds that it’s absurd or contradictory with the notion that it has been “conclusively refuted.”
      But one need not be able to “refute” a claim in the conventional sense to reject it as absurd. A view can be rejected as absurd when its proponents offer an account that is vacuous or unintelligible. I suspect realists like Huemer rely on a host of mutually interdefined but vacuous pseudoconcepts or primitive/basic/unanalyzable concepts that have no content. In virtually any discussion with non-naturalist realists of this kind, I will be strung a long a set of circular and empty definitions: what are moral facts? Facts about what we should do. What are facts about what we should do? Facts that we have stance-independent reasons to comply with. What are stance-independent reasons? Reasons that count in favor of doing the thing that don’t depend on our goals or values. Why should we comply with these reasons? Because they’re good. What’s it mean for them to be good? It means they’re moral. What does that mean? That we should do them, and so on.
      Huemer endorses a word salad position that cannot be conclusively refuted because it cannot even be intelligibly articulated. He, and more generally non-naturalist moral realists, are conceptually confused. Their position relies on “primitive” concepts that they cannot explain. And they cannot explain these concepts because they are meaningless pseudoconcepts.

    • @JKLKJ
      @JKLKJ 3 года назад +1

      @@lanceindependent Your first point is one of the anti-realist (I'm one myself) arguments against premise 4 that I've heard but was unconvinced by. I think key here is how we're supposed to understand practical reasons that Huemer relies on:
      > First person reasons determine what it is rational to do, or what it makes sense to
      do, from the agent’s perspective, or, given what the agent is aware of at the time of
      decision-making. <
      But moving on, I don't think that even if you held a belief that you perceived as justified which said that moral realism is logically contradictory, that you'd be able to assign moral realism a probability of 0%. This is because we have to shift into the realm of epistemology and arguments stemming from epistemic humility which Huemer quoted, but I don't think you tackled well enough.
      There is a chance your proof is wrong. Can this be said equally of all imaginable beliefs? - no. Moral realism is more significant due to intuitions (this one is a topic in itself for Huemer, so ignore) and other professional philosophers just as intelligent as you who hold those views. Sure, you may still be convinced in your own, say, modal proof against moral realism, but this does not erase doubt, and still provides a practical reason for moral anti-realism through epistemic humility. Just to add as an example, you have some reasons to believe that it's you who doesn't entirely grasp non-naturalist moral realism too.
      As an analogy, imagine two Platonist mathematicians who disagree on a concept, both believing the others' formula to be logically contradictory. Yet they both have a practical reason to believe the other one may be right, even if that reason doesn't outweigh the reasons to retain their own position.
      Myself, I feel like agreeing that premise 4 of moral realism being possible is somewhat of a distraction and the error must be elsewhere. What is the nature of these 'reasons' acquired through the PRP, is it really how Huemer describes it? What about the combination of views that PRP produces to begin with, especially the skepticism some of its more absurd conclusions it evoke? And of course, what if we just abandon the epistemological model he works in, including the PRP.
      (PS: RUclips comments < Discord)

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 3 года назад +1

      @@JKLKJ I am not assigning a 0% probability to Huemer’s position. One cannot assign probability to the truth of “zlkjawlkt” or “put the shoes.” Just the same, I do not assign any probability to moral realism being true unless and until I know what the specific realist claim amounts to. In Huemer’s case, I think his notion of realism is literally unintelligible.
      If epistemic humility forces us to assign a nonzero probability even in this case, and if Huemer’s ontological argument worked, then we could devise parallel arguments for an infinite number of arbitrary bodies of nonmoral normative domains. For instance, I could propose that there are schmoral norms, bloral norms, etc., by arguing that there is a nonzero chance of each, then employing an ontological schmoral argument, ontological bloral argument and so on. And this could hold even if schmoral or bloral norms require us to scream at tables, eat babies, or torture everyone all the time.
      I’m not sure what you mean when you say there’s a chance my proof is wrong. What proof are you referring to?
      I also don’t know what you mean when you say “realism is more significant due to intuitions.”
      >>>Just to add as an example, you have some reasons to believe that it's you who doesn't entirely grasp non-naturalist moral realism too.
      I don’t think it’s possible for there to be square circles or for six to be a prime number. What I would say about these claims is that, given what I believe, the probability of them being true is 0%. Given what I currently believe, the probability that “moral realism is true” is either (a) indeterminate, since the realist position is unintelligible, (b) 0%, since it is impossible given what I believe, or (c) >0%. Some versions of moral realism do qualify for (c), e.g. some very minimal naturalist accounts. The problem is that all of these are, so far, trivial, so even if they were true they wouldn’t e.g., provide me with stance-independent reasons for action that somehow apply or are authoritative independent of my goals, standard, or values. “Realist” accounts that don’t do something like this are just uninteresting.
      With respect to Huemer’s position, I’d consider it indeterminate. But for those that are at 0%, they are similar to claims like “square circles exist.” If I’m required to assign a nonzero probability to Huemer and other nontrivial positions, then on similar grounds I might have to assign nonzero probability to claims like “there are square circles.” Never mind that I cannot think in such terms in the first place, but if we’re going to accept this to try to get Huemer’s argument through, we’re going to be able to craft an infinite number of parallel arguments for nonmoral normative positions that conflict with the substantive moral claims Huemer holds, and he won’t be in any better an epistemic position to favor his view over the views of, say some alien species equally committed to some conflicting nonmoral standards (e.g. schmoral standards). In that respect, Huemer’s argument would prove too much.
      >>>What is the nature of these 'reasons' acquired through the PRP, is it really how Huemer describes it?
      Yea, I agree with challenging the PRP, though our reasons may differ. Huemer says,
      “ The rough idea is that if some fact would (if you knew it) provide a reason for you to behave in a certain way, then your having some reason to believe that fact obtains also provides you with a reason to behave in the same way.”
      If anything, I have an even bigger issue with how realists talk about reasons than I do with how they talk about realism itself. I have no idea what it would mean to say that a fact could “provide a reason.” I don’t think facts can “provide reasons,” but I’m not even sure what that could mean. How can a fact “provide” a reason? What kind of reason? How does a fact “provide” it? Huemer and others seem to rely on a notion of “reasons” that is just as mysterious and seemingly vacuous to me as their realist positions.

  • @chasekanipe
    @chasekanipe 3 года назад +2

    I think the explanation for why fewer than expected people selected physicalism comes from the platonists.

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад +1

      A lot of physicalists are platonists. A common view among physicalists is that we are committed to the existence of whatever entities are indispensable to our best theories of the world, and abstract objects such as mathematical entities are indispensable to many sciences.

  • @mkhex87
    @mkhex87 3 года назад +1

    nice argument for "platonism more plausible than moral realism". . I bet this splits on how much people have been steeped in the (history of) "analytic tradition", because I was also thinking of these Ayer & Quine -style arguments

  • @patrickthomasius
    @patrickthomasius 3 года назад +2

    What do you think about the results on well being? I was heavily surprised by that.

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад +1

      Yeah, objective list theories seem crazy to me. I don't see why I should even care about well-being, if we're going with that approach. But I guess this result tracks with the large number of moral realists.

    • @patrickthomasius
      @patrickthomasius 3 года назад

      @@KaneB i dont see them as crazy as you do, I just found it really surprising, but the idea that was employed in the capabilities approach for example seems pretty plausible to me, I think I woild have voted for objective list, im just feeling that "objective" list is kind of misleading for some people, since I agree with them that flourishing requires developimg capabilities, eudaimonia etc, but I largely disagree on the "objective" part, I dont know if this makes sense to you haha.
      Edit: do you think it is plausible a view that we view welfare as something akin to fourishing like objective list theories, but reduce the focus on the universal or objective parts? Im generally interested in virtue ethicists views that are moral antirealiat, maybe you have some suggestions?

  • @BatmanArkham8592
    @BatmanArkham8592 3 года назад

    Do you have any links or video which gives Full Books recommendation, Syllabus, Lectures/videos ,Articles basically full detailed guide to study philosophy by yourself where you don't need to go university for degree but You can study everything from online

  • @allendoung3903
    @allendoung3903 3 года назад

    For footbridge, we are assuming that only pushing the person can stop the train right? Otherwise should not they choose to jump themselves?

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад +1

      Yeah, the original thought experiment is that there's a very fat man that you can push in front of the trolley. Only he would be massive enough to stop it.

  • @justus4684
    @justus4684 3 года назад +6

    17:32
    Hoho boi, the moral realists are coming for you
    21:13 38:26
    Love the sutil agression😂

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 3 года назад

      Moral realist will eventually lose. The position has little going for it.

    • @Hello-vz1md
      @Hello-vz1md 2 года назад

      @@lanceindependent what will happen to us then ?the world shall know the Pain

    • @jamesgl
      @jamesgl Год назад

      sutil is usually spelled “subtle”

  • @GottfriedLeibnizYT
    @GottfriedLeibnizYT 3 года назад +2

    46:30
    Wish you hadn't skipped "Rational disagreement".
    I think it's bizarre that 70% accept permissivism given that only 5% accept relativism.
    Am I missing something?

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад +1

      I don't think permissivism entails relativism. Somebody could hold that it is a fact, independently of any particular epistemic perspective, that for some bodies of evidence and for some propositions, there is more than one rationally attitude people can take towards those propositions.

  • @richardgamrat1944
    @richardgamrat1944 3 года назад +1

    19:05 What was the name of the second guy?

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад +1

      David Enoch. I outline one of his arguments in this video: ruclips.net/video/bKFue3EqbxM/видео.html

  • @SgtPwnVids
    @SgtPwnVids Год назад

    Thank you for giving me what i want as a youth Prof Kaneb 🙏

  • @chitranshsrivastav4648
    @chitranshsrivastav4648 3 года назад

    What are your views on the RUclips channel Philosophy Tube?

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад +9

      I saw a couple of her videos but they weren't really my kind of thing. Beyond that, I don't know enough about her work to comment.

  • @yuriarin3237
    @yuriarin3237 3 года назад

    hey what do you think that a global expressivist ( a la Huw Price) would say about the question of moral realism/antirealism? Like, I guess they would accept that there are true moral facts, but its explication of what 'being true' is is so distant from a correspondence view that nothing can be said about the 'metaphysics' that that would imply. Do you see a global expressivist as realist or antirealist on that question? (Interesting that Huw Price was led to expressivism from his inquiries into the philosophy of physics, of all things!)

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад +1

      I haven't read much on global expressivism, but I assume that they will still draw some distinction between things that they are realist (in some sense) about, and things that they are antirealist (in some sense) about. For example, presumably Price will say that there are trees, chairs, and oceans, but there are no unicorns, ghosts, or witches. So then it depends on how they draw that realism/antirealism distinction, and on which side of it morality falls. I don't see any reason to assume that all global expressivists would have to give the same answer about this.

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад +1

      Just to elaborate a little more, suppose that somebody denies the correspondence theory of truth, and instead takes the view the true propositions are those that would be accepted at the ideal end of inquiry, i.e. those that would be accepted by ideally rational agents who have access to all empirical information, or something along those lines. Obviously, even if we accept this view of truth, this doesn't in itself vindicate moral realism. There are serious challenges to the view that all rational agents will converge on a single moral theory over time. The point is, moral realism doesn't come for cheap. Just endorsing an alternative view of truth or representation or semantics or whatever isn't in itself going to get you to moral realism.

    • @yuriarin3237
      @yuriarin3237 3 года назад +1

      @@KaneB Yeah I guess the expressivist would come about explaining the truthfulness of moral expressions in terms of 'explications' of human behavior in 'rational' terms. Like Brandom's expressivist account of modality, what we do in stating something like "if you boil water to 100° degrees, it will boil", is not stating something that corresponds to some modal fact somewhere but 'making explicit' what is already implicated in our practices of chemistry, cooking, whatever (modal facts are sort of 'anthropological' facts, about what we do). Why torturing children is wrong? Well, human beings behave in such and such ways, and if applying a sort of 'bed-rock' conception of rationality is needed for making sense of anything (I have in mind something like D. Davidson's comment on the need of considering humans lovers of the good and seekers of the truth in the process of interpretation), then we have to postulate 'torturing children is wrong' to make sense of what humans already do. In that case, "fire burns" and "you ought to tell the truth" are both on the same footing (both are needed for making sense of what we do, 'unicorns roam around the earth' is not needed). But once you reach that point I don't know if the label of realism and antirealism gets a hold anymore. Also consider the fact that I haven't got a fucking clue about anything

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад +1

      @@yuriarin3237 I guess in this framework, we would be realist about those statements that are required in order to make sense of what humans do, and antirealist about those statements that are not. Then the question would be whether moral statements really are required for making sense of what humans do. Additionally, this kind of approach seems compatible with relativism, since prima facie, there are many alternative moral practices. So we could also frame the realism/antirealism question in terms of whether there is reason to expect convergence on a single moral system.

    • @yuriarin3237
      @yuriarin3237 3 года назад +1

      @@KaneB I'll soon read David Wong's 1986 paper "On moral realism without foundations" and then I'll come back here. He is a relativist-naturalist-socialconstructionist about morality but apparently he wants to endorse his own version of moral realism (sorry if you do treat him in your series and I'm not taking that into account but I haven't finished it).

  • @cultofscriabin9547
    @cultofscriabin9547 2 года назад +3

    It seems overwhelmingly clear that consciousness is present in every being which possess a functioning brain. I also think that neurosciences overwhelmingly support this view. Not sure AT ALL how you go to the dichotomy that it is either present only in highly sophisticated humans or pretty much everywhere.

  • @mrfishy3
    @mrfishy3 2 года назад +1

    Regarding the massive increase in virtue ethics, I think it was cause by The Good Place!

  • @aaronchipp-miller9608
    @aaronchipp-miller9608 3 года назад +2

    22:02 unfortunately none of the stores I frequent accept expected-dollars as payment, they only take real money :(

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад

      I'm not sure if that's supposed to be a "gotcha", but one-boxers are walking away from this with way more real money than two-boxers!

    • @aaronchipp-miller9608
      @aaronchipp-miller9608 3 года назад

      @@KaneB not as much as they would have gotten if they 2-boxed

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад

      @@aaronchipp-miller9608 If they'd two-boxed, they would have received £1000.

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад

      @@aaronchipp-miller9608 It is also true, of course, that if they'd two-boxed, they would have received £1,001,000. It just depends on what information you want to hold fixed when evaluating the counterfactual. This isn't a useful way of working out what's best to do, in my view.

    • @aaronchipp-miller9608
      @aaronchipp-miller9608 3 года назад

      @@KaneB you're saying that choosing to 1 box is not just evidence that there is a million dollars in there, but that 1 boxing causes that to be the case? Because it sounds like your saying here that the past isnt fixed

  • @PanLamda
    @PanLamda 3 года назад +1

    Even with mathematical cases there are excellent nominalist approaches, aka Field etc. among others I think for indispensability arguments they lie on some conceptual confusions IMO, like the mathematics must be actual and literal objects of the theories in order for these scientific theories to work.
    Physics don't have as its' objects mathematical objects but fields, waves, particles (whatever these concrete objects/structures are or which of these are "true") etc. and uses quantitative models to describe how much these things move, how much they change, the degree they do it, where they will land in space and after how much time after we have agreed on how to quantify space based on our anchors and measures etc. These quantitative descriptions are not the objects of the theories, they are quantitative dscriptions used by theories to describe objects/structures behaviors (which are the actual objects/structures of the theories). but anyway.

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад +1

      I agree -- to be clear, I'm also a nominalist, and I think that indispensability arguments for platonism are hopeless. I don't buy that explanatory indispensability justifies belief, and I don't buy that mathematical entities are explanatorily indispensable to our best theories anyway -- at least, not in a way that would be required for them to be among the ontological commitments of the theories.

    • @PanLamda
      @PanLamda 3 года назад

      @@KaneB right im with you! regardless, i am very much perplexed by the meta-ethical theories. I find it absolutely true that morals are about emotions, but arent'emotions (affective states more broadly)-in virtue of how they feel-intrinsically "good" or "bad"?
      I mean it seems intrinsically bad to feel pain, hence it is "bad" if someone cause pain (so from emotions, you get a sense or "reducing" "good/bad language" to "feel pain/feel pleasure". I understand, this is very simplistic and probably makes the classic is/ought jump (if pain only feels bad for you, why should i not cause it to you-at least if i gain from it?), but on the other side, i don't see it as much of a huge gap.
      I mean, why do we say "Boo-kill babies"? because through empathy we come to simulate a position of someone killing our own babies, or ourselves-when he was a baby (and we feel terrible at that thoight, we would never like to be found in such a position!). Or else, why it is "Boo!" and not "WHaa yip yip hooorraayyy kill babies"? What determines the difference in the emotions?
      I guess one can say that what determines the difference is based on some objective psychological conditions (despite these felt subjectively-it doesn't make them less objective) and one then maybe could make a transition from these conditions to a kind of realist (perhaps? like Railton's view?)-or at least quasi-realist naturalism. That is no abstract-object/divine command type of realism. Well, probably at this point it remains like a "jump" between these two "Worlds", but i don't see it as big, at least as the similar one found in the chasm of functional descriptions/phenomeanal qualities of experience (e.g. found in consciousness and perception debates-although all these are probably similar "chasms" between the objective and the subjective).

  • @jacklessa9729
    @jacklessa9729 3 года назад

    What do you Think about Derek Parfit "Future Tuesday"?

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад +2

      Pretty much agree with Street's response. Having said that, although that kind of response is important in addressing those who are inclined to agree with Parfit, from my own point it's not really necessary. I simply don't have the intuition that there's anything irrational about future Tuesday indifference. Certainly it would be strange for somebody to have such preferences, but it's not irrational to be strange.

    • @jacklessa9729
      @jacklessa9729 3 года назад +1

      @@KaneB If someone tell me that they prefer agony on any future Tuesday to slight pain on any other future day?! It do not sound strange to me, it sound this person went mad haha
      Thanks for your answer.

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 3 года назад +1

      Like Kane, I don't find anything irrational about future tuesday indifference.
      In these cases, it makes more sense that people who would judge someone to be "irrational" in such cases are inappropriately projecting their own values onto people's actions, and simply applying their own conception of what would or wouldn't be a good idea. If someone genuinely desired some outcome that would be inconsistent with my desires or what I think it'd be a good idea to do, I don't see anything irrational about that.
      I don't think proponents of these arguments have any way of demonstrating that anyone who reports a contrary reaction is incorrect. Those who think that there are substantive accounts of what it is "rational" to do that don't depend on the goals or standards of the agent are just non-Humeans, and they were non-Humeans before considering the argument. So these arguments are little more than window dressing for reiterating the stance those with intuitions that incline them towards moral realism already had to begin with. It isn't an "argument" so much as, I suspect, a convoluted distraction that could dupe some people into thinking Parfit is correct while reinforcing those who already agreed with them by assuring them that they have an intuitively appealing position.
      It's remarkably unimpressive, and I am shocked Parfit is revered as much as he is. What little I've seen of his work gives me the impression he's overrated.

    • @jacklessa9729
      @jacklessa9729 3 года назад

      @@lanceindependent What I think is cool about Tuesday Indifference is that no one would ever want that. No one seems to value that. Is not necessary the fact that nobody can want that, is that no one can see value in that.
      So exist things that no one wants, why?!

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 3 года назад

      @@jacklessa9729 Organisms that evolved via natural selection are going to reliably have psychological systems that motivate adaptive behavior. But we could design synthetic beings that wanted all manner of exotic things.

  • @LL-hh6xp
    @LL-hh6xp 3 года назад +5

    To me, the objective meaning of life tracks with the surge of Virtue Ethics, if you accept any kind of neo-Aristotelian telos, then it seems to imply an objective meaning of life (something like to do good human-ing). I don't think neo-Aristotelians ground that telos in anything like natural selection.

  • @therealtruthvideos2832
    @therealtruthvideos2832 3 года назад

    Hey there, im trying to make a brief article of all metaphilosophical issues such as progress, aims, methods etc.
    would you mind giving me a brief analysis or sending me to a source that you think covers all of them, cheers.

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад +2

      That's a huge field -- I doubt you'll be able to find a source that covers all of those issues. Even introductory articles on the topic are quite selective. The IEP article on metaphilosophy is good for methods... but even that's restricted to the main 20th century movements.

  • @Dystisis
    @Dystisis Год назад +1

    Your reasoning doesn't make much sense. E.g. "Prima facie plausible argument for the indispensability of mathematical entity that doesn't seem to apply for the case of morality." What is required of the philosopher is to acknowledge linguistic practice. In linguistic practice, people use moral terminology seriously all the time, just as scientists use mathematical terminology seriously all the time. If there is 'indispensability' in one case, there is in the other. However, since neither moral language nor mathematical calculi refer to objects (mathematical equations only 'referring to' parts of a symbolism), neither of them involve indispensable reference to objects.

  • @antirealist
    @antirealist 3 года назад

    They must be including theologians in this poll...

  • @leonmills3104
    @leonmills3104 3 года назад +4

    yay you made me reconsider relativism nice to see the polls up in this one

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 3 года назад +1

      Relativism isn't a bad view at all, and does not deserve the strong negative reaction it gets from most philosophers and many laypeople. It is routinely caricatured in ways that are completely misguided.

    • @leonmills3104
      @leonmills3104 3 года назад +1

      ​@@lanceindependent yes you're entirely correct there is a quote from Alasdair MacIntyre that I like to use "relativism may have been refuted a number of times too often, whereas genuinely refutable doctrines only need to be refuted once"

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 3 года назад +1

      @@leonmills3104 Haha. That's an awesome quote.

  • @entityidentity1773
    @entityidentity1773 3 года назад +18

    “This is what the youth wants - memes and react videos, so I’m doing a react video.”
    Well, yes, you are, but..
    *You* *are* *reacting* *to* *a* *PhilPapers* *survey*

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад +29

      Yes, the PhilPapers survey. That's what all the kids are into at the moment isn't it? I'm sure I've seen them all talking about it on twitter and tiktok.

  • @jmike2039
    @jmike2039 3 года назад +4

    Love everything you do Kane. You rock

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад +1

      Thanks!

  • @PhysicsPolice
    @PhysicsPolice 3 года назад +2

    28:00 Quantum physics has conclusively answered the transporter problem. The particles that make up your body e.g. pairs of electrons sometimes sporadically changes into virtual photons in what is generally called a scattering interaction. For some non-zero time they are embodied as a photon. And this is no challenge to our concept of the identify of particles or material made of particles. The thought experiment transporter is merely doing this to all your particles simultaneously.

  • @WorthlessWinner
    @WorthlessWinner 2 года назад

    Twice as many philosophers accept that true contradictions exist, than accept modal realism? At least MR only says every possible thing exists, not that impossible things exist lol

  • @GottfriedLeibnizYT
    @GottfriedLeibnizYT 3 года назад +1

    38:08
    Reject them ALL. Foundherentism for the win.

  • @justus4684
    @justus4684 3 года назад

    28:10
    Why do you think that it results in death?

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад +1

      Consider the alternative set-up: You step into box A and find that instead of just pressing one button to make the teleportation, there are two. First, you press a button which perfectly copies your body, then sends the information to box B, which creates a molecule-for-molecule replica of you. You are shown all of this on a live video, just so you can be sure that the process has worked. You see your copy get out of the receiving box and walk around. Next, there is a button which will completely obliterate your original body in box A. Do you press that button? If your answer is "no", well, I wouldn't use a standard teleporter for the same reason.

    • @justus4684
      @justus4684 3 года назад

      @@KaneB
      So you would avoid it to be extra safe?

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад +2

      @@justus4684 It's not about being extra safe. I think I'd just be straightforwardly killing myself if I used that machine.

    • @justus4684
      @justus4684 3 года назад

      @@KaneB
      I didn't really catch why tho.
      Why do you think that would be the case?

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад

      @@justus4684 Well, how do you respond to the alternative thought experiment I gave? Would you push the second button in that scenario?

  • @justus4684
    @justus4684 3 года назад +4

    0:35
    Ok boomer

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад +5

      Boomer? How old are you, grandad? We were done with the boomer thing ages ago. The current generation war is millennials vs zoomers.

    • @justus4684
      @justus4684 3 года назад

      @@KaneB
      I was born when Spock was a little boy

  • @justus4684
    @justus4684 Год назад

    8:24
    Moore

  • @Jorge-xf9gs
    @Jorge-xf9gs 2 года назад

    28:00 I don't see what's wrong with this "obliteration". I would've chosen "death", but I sincerely don't get why you're so disgusted at the thought of dying. Ok, so I die. So what? Don't we all "die" every night when we dream? Don't we die at every moment?

  • @asphaltpilgrim
    @asphaltpilgrim 7 месяцев назад

    Can we say gender is psycho-biosocial?

  • @not_enough_space
    @not_enough_space 3 года назад +1

    I'd like to see a meaning of life video. You seem baffled by the belief, but I'm baffled even by the desire. Why would anyone even want an objective meaning to their life?

    • @KaneB
      @KaneB  3 года назад +1

      That's equally baffling to me. If there were an objective meaning of life, I wouldn't care what it is. I mean, it might be academically interesting to know, but it wouldn't change anything about what projects I pursue in my life. I feel the same way about objective moral values and objective aesthetic values. Objectivist views in these contexts seem to completely miss the point.

    • @NicolasSchaII
      @NicolasSchaII 13 дней назад

      @@KaneB I tend to agree: like, even if it existed, I may be like: nah, that sucks ass. But I like to think of it more like this: there might be a reason / cause outside of our current knowledge, why we're here and why this universe exists. Could also pull the link to consciousness and that we have no clue what it is or how it comes to work, like it is strongly related to the nature of the universe (just fun speculations). But although it might be baffling we should not exclude it entirely imo.

  • @racoon251
    @racoon251 3 года назад

    we need to get those theistic numbers down so you become one

  • @2222cream
    @2222cream 3 года назад +1

    OMG TJUMP BTFO Hahaha muh consensussssss

  • @chitranshsrivastav4648
    @chitranshsrivastav4648 3 года назад

    28:10 that cracked me up xD

  • @RestIsPhilosophy
    @RestIsPhilosophy Год назад

    ‘There is no privileged method of how to conduct philosophy’ proceeds to conduct linguistic analysis to collapse the question