Can any Muller/historical reformed orthodoxy fans help me? I've been chatting with a Muller fan recently, and he tells me that a proper understanding of pre-edwards reformed theology is NOT deterministic, NOR is it compatibalistic? He explained that God "determines" in his divine decree, all that comes to pass, but that this isn't determinism. Can anyone help me understand this? He specifically said agents do things "freely", but he's clearly anti-LFW, but by freely he doesn't mean compatibalism... but he's also not Lutheran, which denies tulip, so he doesn't embrace the Lutheran separation of election from effectual grace. I'm confused... any help on how to make sense of this?
Honestly, I’m confused by your friend’s response, position and definitions. Is there a paper or document… something that he can share for you/us to chew on? Blessings
@@Kenneth-nVA that was a year ago and I haven't spoken with him in perhaps 10 months or so. Since then I've ran into multiple "calvinism isn't determinism" calvinists, but unlike the aforementioned fellow, (who seemed very well educated and thoughtful,) they seem to simply be naive about calvinism. The Muller "pre-determinism" take (or pre-Edwards take) seems to be an artifact of reformed era context causing unresolved ideological discontinuities to coexist in the rhetorical space surrounding dogmatics... issues that (maybe?) get resolved by Westminster and the London Baptist Confession? Is what I'm saying making sense?
Sorry I’m a little late to the party, but perhaps I can point you in a direction of better understanding Muller’s assertion contra Edwards. The philosophical foundations of many of the Reformers were Aristotelian in nature (especially as employed by medieval theologians like Thomas and Scotus), whereas Edwards’ own philosophical views were impacted by enlightenment and post-enlightenment philosophy, particularly that of men like Locke, Hobbes, Melenbrache, and Leibniz (there are different theories of who was most impactful). The Reformed orthodox also formed their view in the context of a causal system wherein God is primary cause (prima causa) of all things as creator and sustainer of the universe, and mankind is the secondary cause (causae secundae). They also stressed the significance of the doctrine of concurrence (concursus) in the role of free choice. WCF 3.1 is the best summary in confessional form of the Reformed orthodox view of the relation between God’s will (pc) concurrently related to the free choices of man (sc): God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established. Muller’s dictionary has entries on those words that you might find helpful, it in particular, he has a book that deals directly with this topic (Divine Will and Human Choice). It’s a highly nuanced discussion and he find himself in the middle of other popular views, including the so-called compatibilist view. In a word, Muller says that the term compatibilist is incapable of accurately encompassing the Reformed view of free choice because it is devoid of the causal and concurrent emphases as well as the ontological framework of the Creator/creature relationship. His critiques of Edwards (found in his book, Providence, Freedom, and the Will; or his essay, Jonathan Edwards and the Absence of Free Choice) are similar, but due to the aforementioned philosophical differences, Edwards’ view falls far closer in line with a philosophical determinist rather than the Reformed orthodox. I hope this helps!
@@jackreid4527 the thing is, the language of westminster, while different from the language of Edward's, seems to be saying the same thing in essence. So I'm not sure how one can say it's not still determinism if in the end it means the same thing, just formulated at a different time with different vocabulary.
@@ravissary79 The point that Muller, and others like him, are trying make us that because of his explanation and the philosophy behind it, there is a substantial difference between the two. Muller has pointed out as interesting historical facts that Joseph Priestly, a Unitarian determinism of the 18th century, praised Edwards’ work and thought it was a “nail in the coffin” so to speak to “Calvinism”. Another interesting point of fact is that George Hill, a contemporary of Priestly, and an orthodox Presbyterian in Britain, considered Edwards’ view as outside the bounds of the WCF. I won’t belabor the historical evidences too much, but other notable Presbyterian theologians such as Dabney and Thornwell had little regard for Edwards’ philosophical formulation of “free will”. With regard to the substantial difference, space does not permit an in-depth analysis/explanation, and I would still highly recommend Muller’s essay(s) on Edwards, but I will try nonetheless. Edwards shifted the traditional language of cause, necessity, and contingency to freedom of will. Again, space does not permit an in depth explanation of the differences between voluntarism (freedom of the will) and intellectualism (free choice) (Muller’s book, again, is helpful on this), but Edwards cannot even be seen as a traditional voluntarist because he shifts again from “freedom of the will” to “freedom of will”. The difference appears subtly but has dramatic ramifications. By foregoing traditional definitions of terms such as necessity and contingency in favor of his own, which are undoubtedly influenced by enlightenment thought, Edwards flattens the distinction between the mind and the will (making him neither a traditional intellectualist or voluntarist). He also confuses essential terms, messily of the consequent and necessity of the consequence (the former being an absolute sort of necessity; the latter being conditioned on a previous contingent act), which causes a host of issues. I’m doing so, Edwards’ definition of Arminianism actually encompasses his Reformed predecessors like Turretin, Ames, Van Mastricht, and others. Obviously, that’s an issue. The importance of properly understanding/explaining contingency, necessity, and possibility when dealing with the relation of God’s immutable will and man’s finite freedom of choice cannot be overstated. The entire system of explanation rests on it. Turretin began his explanation by saying that the Reformed “establish the doctrine [of genuine freedom of choice] better than their opponents [Arminians, Lutherans, and Socinians]” and he said that because of the complex doctrine of explanation that separates them. Edwards does not follow in that tradition of explanation. For reasons unknown, he deviates in his formulation.
Simplicity is a term of negation about God, that He is uncomposed. Efforts to explain what it is positively deny this, and make it a analogical positive attribute: leading to speculations that are errors, and are more Neoplatonic than Biblical. It is the same with the debate between supralapsarian and infralapsarianism as if we know how God reasons ie. logical order etc. Forcing this was a solution to the paradox of God's sovereignty and human freedom which scripture does not give. An impersonal election, mechanical regeneration, irresistible (coercive) grace and fatalism result. The Occamist God of arbitrary will competes with human freedom and both cannot coexist, so Scriptures concerning human freedom, personal response, must be explained away, which they are. The concurrence of God's primary causality being the ground of human secondary causality by human freedom is destroyed and the mystery of that in salvation is also destroyed. God's providence is not destroyed because man makes free choices. God is immanently present in all created things actualizing them to be what they are and what they do, just as the Holy Spirit is immanently present in the believer too actualize them to will and do God's will..
It is strange that you call it Neoplatonic as you simultaneously promote a theology of negation when arguably the most influential proponent of the Negative Theology, Psuedo-Dyonisius, was incredibly influenced by Neo-Platonism
This is literally just Ockham's concept of creation ex nihilo except the arbitrarily willed forms of God are placed in the intellect of God. Just a nuanced form of the Anti-Trinitarian voluntarism that's characteristic of liberal Christianity. Gotta applaud Ames on his creativity though.
Placing something in the intellect and not the will seems the opposite of voluntaristic. I'm also not sure calling Ames liberal even means anything, though even if it it did, is Voluntaristism Liberal? Are liberals voluntaristic?
Doesn't begin until (03:48)
HERO
Grace and peace! ✌😎✌
it begins at 3:48
Could you please turn on subtitles?
I can not hear it. Turn the volume up!
Is there a PDF of this lecture?
Purely Presbyterian you like to read too? 😁👌
I hope there is.
I hope we have a pdf for this.
Can any Muller/historical reformed orthodoxy fans help me?
I've been chatting with a Muller fan recently, and he tells me that a proper understanding of pre-edwards reformed theology is NOT deterministic, NOR is it compatibalistic?
He explained that God "determines" in his divine decree, all that comes to pass, but that this isn't determinism.
Can anyone help me understand this? He specifically said agents do things "freely", but he's clearly anti-LFW, but by freely he doesn't mean compatibalism... but he's also not Lutheran, which denies tulip, so he doesn't embrace the Lutheran separation of election from effectual grace.
I'm confused... any help on how to make sense of this?
Honestly, I’m confused by your friend’s response, position and definitions. Is there a paper or document… something that he can share for you/us to chew on? Blessings
@@Kenneth-nVA that was a year ago and I haven't spoken with him in perhaps 10 months or so.
Since then I've ran into multiple "calvinism isn't determinism" calvinists, but unlike the aforementioned fellow, (who seemed very well educated and thoughtful,) they seem to simply be naive about calvinism.
The Muller "pre-determinism" take (or pre-Edwards take) seems to be an artifact of reformed era context causing unresolved ideological discontinuities to coexist in the rhetorical space surrounding dogmatics... issues that (maybe?) get resolved by Westminster and the London Baptist Confession?
Is what I'm saying making sense?
Sorry I’m a little late to the party, but perhaps I can point you in a direction of better understanding Muller’s assertion contra Edwards. The philosophical foundations of many of the Reformers were Aristotelian in nature (especially as employed by medieval theologians like Thomas and Scotus), whereas Edwards’ own philosophical views were impacted by enlightenment and post-enlightenment philosophy, particularly that of men like Locke, Hobbes, Melenbrache, and Leibniz (there are different theories of who was most impactful). The Reformed orthodox also formed their view in the context of a causal system wherein God is primary cause (prima causa) of all things as creator and sustainer of the universe, and mankind is the secondary cause (causae secundae). They also stressed the significance of the doctrine of concurrence (concursus) in the role of free choice. WCF 3.1 is the best summary in confessional form of the Reformed orthodox view of the relation between God’s will (pc) concurrently related to the free choices of man (sc):
God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.
Muller’s dictionary has entries on those words that you might find helpful, it in particular, he has a book that deals directly with this topic (Divine Will and Human Choice). It’s a highly nuanced discussion and he find himself in the middle of other popular views, including the so-called compatibilist view. In a word, Muller says that the term compatibilist is incapable of accurately encompassing the Reformed view of free choice because it is devoid of the causal and concurrent emphases as well as the ontological framework of the Creator/creature relationship. His critiques of Edwards (found in his book, Providence, Freedom, and the Will; or his essay, Jonathan Edwards and the Absence of Free Choice) are similar, but due to the aforementioned philosophical differences, Edwards’ view falls far closer in line with a philosophical determinist rather than the Reformed orthodox.
I hope this helps!
@@jackreid4527 the thing is, the language of westminster, while different from the language of Edward's, seems to be saying the same thing in essence. So I'm not sure how one can say it's not still determinism if in the end it means the same thing, just formulated at a different time with different vocabulary.
@@ravissary79 The point that Muller, and others like him, are trying make us that because of his explanation and the philosophy behind it, there is a substantial difference between the two. Muller has pointed out as interesting historical facts that Joseph Priestly, a Unitarian determinism of the 18th century, praised Edwards’ work and thought it was a “nail in the coffin” so to speak to “Calvinism”. Another interesting point of fact is that George Hill, a contemporary of Priestly, and an orthodox Presbyterian in Britain, considered Edwards’ view as outside the bounds of the WCF. I won’t belabor the historical evidences too much, but other notable Presbyterian theologians such as Dabney and Thornwell had little regard for Edwards’ philosophical formulation of “free will”.
With regard to the substantial difference, space does not permit an in-depth analysis/explanation, and I would still highly recommend Muller’s essay(s) on Edwards, but I will try nonetheless. Edwards shifted the traditional language of cause, necessity, and contingency to freedom of will. Again, space does not permit an in depth explanation of the differences between voluntarism (freedom of the will) and intellectualism (free choice) (Muller’s book, again, is helpful on this), but Edwards cannot even be seen as a traditional voluntarist because he shifts again from “freedom of the will” to “freedom of will”. The difference appears subtly but has dramatic ramifications. By foregoing traditional definitions of terms such as necessity and contingency in favor of his own, which are undoubtedly influenced by enlightenment thought, Edwards flattens the distinction between the mind and the will (making him neither a traditional intellectualist or voluntarist). He also confuses essential terms, messily of the consequent and necessity of the consequence (the former being an absolute sort of necessity; the latter being conditioned on a previous contingent act), which causes a host of issues. I’m doing so, Edwards’ definition of Arminianism actually encompasses his Reformed predecessors like Turretin, Ames, Van Mastricht, and others. Obviously, that’s an issue. The importance of properly understanding/explaining contingency, necessity, and possibility when dealing with the relation of God’s immutable will and man’s finite freedom of choice cannot be overstated. The entire system of explanation rests on it. Turretin began his explanation by saying that the Reformed “establish the doctrine [of genuine freedom of choice] better than their opponents [Arminians, Lutherans, and Socinians]” and he said that because of the complex doctrine of explanation that separates them. Edwards does not follow in that tradition of explanation. For reasons unknown, he deviates in his formulation.
4:40
Simplicity is a term of negation about God, that He is uncomposed. Efforts to explain what it is positively deny this, and make it a analogical positive attribute: leading to speculations that are errors, and are more Neoplatonic than Biblical. It is the same with the debate between supralapsarian and infralapsarianism as if we know how God reasons ie. logical order etc. Forcing this was a solution to the paradox of God's sovereignty and human freedom which scripture does not give. An impersonal election, mechanical regeneration, irresistible (coercive) grace and fatalism result. The Occamist God of arbitrary will competes with human freedom and both cannot coexist, so Scriptures concerning human freedom, personal response, must be explained away, which they are. The concurrence of God's primary causality being the ground of human secondary causality by human freedom is destroyed and the mystery of that in salvation is also destroyed. God's providence is not destroyed because man makes free choices. God is immanently present in all created things actualizing them to be what they are and what they do, just as the Holy Spirit is immanently present in the believer too actualize them to will and do God's will..
Michael Moore
Good point, critics of absolute divine simplicity are always accusing the other of holding to neoplatonism
It is strange that you call it Neoplatonic as you simultaneously promote a theology of negation when arguably the most influential proponent of the Negative Theology, Psuedo-Dyonisius, was incredibly influenced by Neo-Platonism
The sound is atrocious.
Platform? LOL!
This is literally just Ockham's concept of creation ex nihilo except the arbitrarily willed forms of God are placed in the intellect of God. Just a nuanced form of the Anti-Trinitarian voluntarism that's characteristic of liberal Christianity. Gotta applaud Ames on his creativity though.
Where do you get "Anti-Trinitarian Volutarism" from?
Placing something in the intellect and not the will seems the opposite of voluntaristic. I'm also not sure calling Ames liberal even means anything, though even if it it did, is Voluntaristism Liberal? Are liberals voluntaristic?