Why destroying Germany’s WWII oil sources doomed their ability to wage war
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- Опубликовано: 7 фев 2025
- In 1944 the combing bomber offensive targeting committee selected oil as the primary target to attack. The consequences of the attacks was almost immediate and severe. The movement of German tanks aircraft was curtailed and severe fuel rationing policies were implemented. After the war German military and government officials indicated the loss of oil was a major contributing factos to Germany’s defeat.
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A great uncle of me was working in a sythetic oil factory from 1937 to 1945. He told me, if the allies would have started boming the sythetic oil factories in early 1943 with all their air power, the war would have ended in early 1944. But they decided bombong the cities in 43, which had no significant effect on the ongoing war. The oil plant he was working had full output until September 44, was then bombed and after this the production was close to zero. There were efforts made to repair it, but until March 45 the output was just increased to about 10% of the capacity before. Major problem he said in repair was the lack of railway transportation caoacity for the heavy equipment needed for reconstruction. My great uncle died in 1986.
RAF was indescriminantely bombing cities in 43 because that's all they could do at that time, the USAAF was targeting factories and marshalling yards.
TO canuckter: In theory right but in practice no
Bombing of the Synthetic Oil refineries was deliberately timed until early 1944 a few months before the Overlord Landings. This was to damage the oil industry and not give the Germans time to react to restore production before the Invasion. As it was the German reaction was the Geilenberg Plan (formally Mineralölsicherungsplan or mineral oil security plan) was named after one of Albert Speers most capable subordinates. Geilenberg was given 150,000 skilled workers at his disposal to repair damage which soon became 350,000. He ordered thousands of FLAK guns to protect the plants. The plan involved building one or more underground bergius hydrogenation plants and 6 dispersed bomb hardened Undergrounds fischer tropsch plants. I belive were also about 46 mini plants.
-As can be seen the resources (350,000) required was enormous and cost a lot at the time they could be producing weapons.
At the end of the war the Luftwaffe didn't have fuel to train its pilots and often couldn't even fly night fighter missions. It was crippled.
Jet fuel was much easier to make but the jets were only just being introduced.
It's worth looking at the
"Oil campaign chronology of World War II" on wikiepda which lists all allied bombing raids. They started in 1940 but became far more aggressive in 1944.
The allies probably did not realize how the oil would have shut them down
A little window to a sense of humour 😂 well done, another excellent video.
As Speer said
If you had started the oil
campaign 1 year earlier, the war would have ended exactly 1 year earlier
Maybe you can do a video segment on~The Poliesti of the East? (Bailikpan)! My grandfather was a B-24 crew member and was on the 1st U.S. Strike sent there. 5AAF 380th BG 531st bomb 💣 squadron.
Longest. Mission of war until B-29 strikes.
A book you might be interested in is "King of the Heavies" 380th Bomb Group 1942-1945 by Glenn R. Horton Jr and
Gary L. Horton. Copyright 1983. Libarary of Congress Catalog Number 83-90348.
I got my copy during a FB-111 reunion. I was a FB-111 pilot in the 529th Bomb Squadron, 380th Bomb Wing, Plattsburgh AFB Plattsburgh, NY 1982-1985.
Another great presentation and deep dive. A society utterly and completely dependent on the chemical bond energy in hydrocarbon molecules. Truly the weakest link. Well done.
All of this incredible content needs to be turned into the definitive book on the Allied bombing campaign of WW2
As for the mistake of not going all in on targeting oil, according to Max Hastings in his book Bomber Command, the strategic bomber forces brass had so many blown calls about previous claims they were going to end the war, by the time they finally hit paydirt with the synthetic oil plants they’d used up so much of their credibility already that it was difficult to get political backing. Bomber Harris also dismissed those calling for oil as “panacea merchants” and obfuscated as much a possible. The bombers were also tied up in mid-1944 attacking French transportation links in support of Operation Overlord.
oil was one of Japans weak points too, and a big reason for them attacking the US to begin with.
It's one of your most interesting video docuseries to date from my perspective. Riveting!
My father was a B-24 pilot in the 15th, late '44 till the end. Most of his mission targets were synthetic oil plants, plus a few marshalling yards. German fighters were scarce at that point, but the flak was murder. Dad said after an especially hairy attack on a synth plant (I forget which, Wiener Neustadt?) the brass said the target was completely destroyed. Yet, at a briefing couple days later, they were heading back. A pilot spoke up, "Colonel, if the place was destroyed, why we going thru all that again?" The Germans, be it thru forced slave labor or what, had a remarkable ability to recover from even the heaviest raids.
Very interesting. It really calls into question the point of the costly and often unsuccessful attacks on the likes of ball bearing production.
"it is now known that on the day after the American attack of the 14th October (1943, Second Raid on Schweinfurt), Göring summoned a meeting. the gross Reichmarschall appeared to be shaken and doubtless under the influence of the first reports of damage then streaming in, issued immediate orders that he plans for dispersal of the ball-bearing industry, drawn up months before but never put into effect, should be carried out immediately. All stocks of bearings were to be pooled and a Doctor Kessler, in his capacity as special commissioner, was given plenary powers to control the industry. manufacturers making use of ball-bearings were urged to do without them wherever possible. They responded with true German efficiency and those making airframes duly succeeded in removing four fifths of the bearings from their product. The pooling of the resources and the energetic action of Kessler prevented any critical shortage in the German aircraft industry and therefore to a great extent undid the effect of the American attack."
page 26 Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Vol III
You bring so many niche subjects to the table and really cover them to a great extent.
Yes, Any modern army runs on fuel.
Japan was in a similar situation in which they had to import every drop of oil. The USN submarine campaign against Japanese shipping was devastating and they would have starved to death if the A-bombs were not used.
Real eye opener, excellent presentation
Germany launched "Fall Blau" in 1942 specifically to secure the Soviet oil fields of the Caucasus. The operation failed catastrophically at Stalingrad. Ploesti, Romania fell to the Red Army in August, 1944. Without Ploesti, Germany was in the words of a historian, "a big dog on a short leash," WWII was arguably a war for oil.
Ploiesti may have been over run by the Soviet army, and of course it was since it was on that side of everything, but they're not what was responsible for shutting down oil production there.
When it comes to Ploiesti most everyone mistakingly believes that Operation Tidal Wave was the do all end all story of Ploiesti, not hardly, it was simply the beginning, the USAAF pounded away at Ploiesti until oil production less than 30% of capacity by the time they were done.
My mothers cousin was a navigator on a B24 in the 15th Air Force, of the 20 missions him and his crew went on in Aug of 44 three alone were to Ploiesti.
Operation Tidal Wave most certainly didn't work out the way they wanted it to but it wasn't the end of things when it comes to Ploiesti, they hammered away at that place until the Soviet army over ran it.
@@dukecraig2402 very true, there are some historians that believe that Ploesti was continuously hammered right up until the moment the Soviets occupied it to show the Soviets the might of US/British strategic airpower. Not saying I believe that, but the Soviets were indeed very impressed by the devastation of the oil fields and refineries.
Don't forget, the reason the battle of the bulge wasn't worse for us is because of the German fuel shortage. The german plan relied on capturing enough gasoline from the US army to fuel its drive to Antwerp. They failed to do so and then their thousands of vehicles had to be abandoned in the feild as they ran out of gas. They had many other problems of course but this one hurt them the most.
That's a myth that's right up there with the "ball turret gunners ground into hamburger during wheels up emergency landings".
The German battle plan for the Ardennes Offensive most certainly did not rely on capturing American fuel supplies, even Der Fuhrer wouldn't have been dense enough to have a strategy that relied on capturing an enemies supplies, especially fuel which is so easily destroyed, that's a myth that got started with the movie Battle of The Bulge, another myth that lasted for years because of a war movie was everyone believing that German tanks were diesel powered thanks to the movie Patton.
Germany had stockpiled fuel and ammo for the offensive, however as they were critically short on fuel they didn't have enough for anything to go wrong, plenty enough did despite the misconception that everything went perfectly for the Germans and everything went horribly wrong for the Allies.
The reality is the Germans got held up and diverted just enough for their fuel supplies to be inadequate to get to Antwerp, they also couldn't get what little they had forward quickly enough, especially after the first couple days when the weather cleared up and Allied air power started cutting their supplies to their forward units.
Also quite a few of those abandoned vehicles were a result of them breaking down, not running out of fuel, which was a common problem with German tanks especially the Tigers and King Tigers, those things couldn't make it around the block without breaking down.
@dukecraig2402 no. I've never seen the movie "Battle of the Bulge" nor "Patton". My source is the Time-Life history of WWII series The Battle of the Bulge. It was written and edited by historians. The Germans were critically low on fuel. It affected their planning and execution of the attack. They didn't have anywhere near enough fuel to get to Antwerp. They made it to within about 2-4 miles of the Meuse river despite capturing tons of US army fuel in the first week of the attack. Lack of fuel was the primary reason they didn't get farther.
@dukecraig2402 I've never heard the . myth about ball turret gunners, but I do know that it did happen at least once. Obviously the only way that happens is if the gunner can't egress from the turret before landing and that did happen once that I know of. I think a better example of a myth is the idea that US soldiers or Marines would throw an empty en bloc clip at a rock to make enemies think they were out of ammo and charge.
@davidhoffman6980
No, it never happened to a ball turret gunner not even once, despite Andy Rooney's WW2 Stars and Stripes magazine article he wrote about it when he was a war correspondent assigned to the 8th Air Force, various researchers over the years have contacted the Air Force historical research department as to the identity of the unfortunate ball turret gunner from Rooney's wartime article and they've all received the same response, "It never happened", one researcher pressed them about why Rooney would have written about it if it never happened and they told him "You'll have to take that up with Mr Rooney, all we can tell you is that it never happened", this channel even did a video pointing out all the facts that make the story virtually impossible to have happened.
Those ball turrets were far from a fragile glass greenhouse, they were so strong that during a wheels up landing they'd break the back of a B17 and tear it in half, they wouldn't shatter and grind down to nothing like people imagine, it's also virtually impossible for the gunner to get stuck in one, the designers of it weren't idiots, there was hand cranks both inside and outside of the turret that enabled it to be positioned hatch up so the gunner could get out in the event of a power failure.
Nobody knows for sure why Rooney wrote that story but being an Army veteran myself I've got a pretty good idea of how it happened, what you have to understand is that the military is full of characters, that's the one thing about M*A*S*H, both the movie and TV show, that's 100% accurate, it's an endless parade of characters, pranks, rumors and insanity, it's the one thing I miss about being in the Army, the endless entertainment that comes from being surrounded by that environment.
Here's most likely what happened, a couple characters in the chow hall, knowing that Rooney was in earshot, started out with "Hey, Joe, did you hear about that guy in the 67th Bomb Squadron?"
"Why no Bob, please, enlighten me about it"
"Yea, some poor ball turret gunner who got stuck in his turret during a wheels up emergency landing..."
And they sat there laughing themselves silly as Rooney took off leaving his meal uneaten running for the nearest typewriter.
I can almost 100% guarantee you that was the genesis of the ball turret gunner myth, what's amazing is how many books it's been referenced in all because of that article and that hardly anyone ever took the time to fact check it, and why would anyone, after all it was in a wartime Stars and Stripes article written by America's grandpa Andy Rooney, so what would anyone even question it in the first place, and it'd probably still be considered true if some researchers hadn't been curious about the actual identity of the ball turret gunner himself.
Glad you were there
By the way this was an outstanding presentation. What the air war on oil needs is exactly the kinds of charts that you presented. Thanks.
Great Video !... I hope Ukraine watches it !
One wonders why oil was not targeted far earlier...Those in charge made a number of errors in their bombing campaign...including daylight bombing and target selection ...at the cost of thousands of young lives.
With few exceptions, such as Normandy campaign, targets were selected by the Ministry of Economic Warfare.
Bomber Losses, Germany and Northern Europe
HC Deb 13 October 1943 vol 392 cc863-4863
§28. Mr. Stokes asked the Secretary of State for Air how many British bombers were lost over Germany and Northern Europe during the month of September; the total for the nine months ended 30th 864September; and whether he has any information as to the figures for American bombers over the same periods?
§Sir A. Sinclair 193 British and 92 American bomber aircraft operating from this country were reported lost over Germany and Northern Europe during September. The totals for the nine months ended 30th September are 1,844 British and 539 American.
What seems obvious to you in your perfect world of 20/20 hindsight was less obvious at the time. There is a learning process in warfare.
@@gort8203except the signs were there in ww2, which many saw at the time. Oil and natural resources was always Germany's main limiting factor, which was true going back to ww1.
German oil production was a priority from day one, but WANTING to do something and having the ability to do it is two different things, most German oil production came from the east, out of range of the 8th Air Force and Bomber Command early on.
Plans to bomb Ploiesti went back to the summer of 1942, but the original operation was planned as a night mission, that combined with the distance Ploiesti made finding it problematic so that idea was scrapped after a small practice run to see if it was feasible.
The 9th Air Force B24's that flew Operation Tidal Wave on Aug 1st 1943 were originally 8th Air Force B24 units, they'd even removed their Norden bombsights and exchanged them for special low level "rifle sights", as they were called, and were flying low level nap of the earth training missions over England when they were still part of the 8th Air Force, nobody knew what they were training for as everything was so secret, the biggest guess was that the target was going to be a German warship in a Norwegian fjord, little did they know that they'd be transferred to the 9th Air Force in Libya and an oil production facility in Romania would wind up being the target.
In the summer of 43 when the 8th Air Force saw how disproportionate the losses of B24's were when they flew on missions mixed in with B17's, because the German fighters for a variety of reasons would single out the B24's, it was decided by the 8th Air Force to use B24 units for what became known in the 8th Air Force as the Oil War, because of the B24's increased range over the B17's and the distance to the oil facilities in the east it was considered best for the job.
They knew about the importance of striking Germanys oil production from day one, it just took a while to build up to where they were able to do it.
@@dukecraig2402 did you watch the video? It shows that oil was not the priority until later in the war. Sure the allies targeted oil production before that, but it did not become top priority until 1944. There were plenty of oil production sites in Germany that the allies could have concentrated on earlier, but chose not to.
Looking forward to the video covering why oil was not hit earlier!
Woah- the RAF went HARD against cities!
I noticed that too. Cities are large and are easier to hit at night than most military targets.
So did the USAAF. The pie chart just shows what was targeted, not what was actually hit.
According to Albert Speer, bombing German electricity production, depriving the nation of vital electrical power, and bombing chemical factories, depriving the nation of the means to produce gunpowder, explosives, even fertilizers, both of these could have had a major impact.
Speer had no idea how bombing actually worked, unsurprising given his lack of military experience.
Bombing required a continous effort and runs to disable a specific target, as bombing was generally very inaccurate in targeting specific structure, more so when Flak guns were in place and forced the bombers to fly higher, so it was unlikely a single bombing run could completely destroy and generally follow up runs were needed. There was only a few arms and tanks assembly plants, but power generators and chemicals factories were way more numerous and the cost would go up exponentially, hence they were targeted specifically
in 1939 to 1941 Germany imported around 2,4 Mio t of Oil from Russia. this equals 17 month of crude oil production in 1943 standard. so it was russia that kept the nazi warmachine going in the first two years of war...
Russia invaded eastern Galacia which was part of Poland at the time. It was here that the oil was . It’s properly Ukrainian not Polish or Russian. It had been of the Austro Hungarian Empire. Russia started the First World War to take eastern García now called Ukraine away from Austria to do that. It had to destroy Germany first as Germany was friendly with Austria. Worth reading Sean McMeekins the Russian origins of the First World War.
@@williamzk9083 Do you have a problem with auto-translation? It was Germany who started the I.WW. Cause they only had one plan in the drawer, the Schlieffen-Plan. and they feared by waiting to long the russian build-up would make this impossible. The russian attack to help their western allies and Serbia was faster than expected. Whereas the Germans could stop their attack in north, the Austrians took so much casualties that they never recovered and lost Galicia, like you said.
The importance of oil fields, synthetic fuel plants, and refineries to the German war effort seems so obvious that it is puzzling why took until mid 1944 for the allies to begin focusing on it. The 1943 raids on the Ploesti oil fields and refineries had huge losses for the USAAF, but there were refineries in Germany that were closer and could have been attacked with fighter escort.
What seems obvious to you in your perfect world of 20/20 hindsight was less obvious at the time. There is a learning process in warfare.
I think they prioritize other targets like a previous comment alluded to. Also, I think they went after what they could see. I.e. Ploesti, Romania, and Hungary. Given those targets, it became a formidable mission given the distance and protection that those fields had. The B24 was the only bomber I think suited for it, given its improved range and that it had to attack basically on the deck. The raids were almost suicidal heavy losses, and they had to account for that. Also, there are different bombing tactics and training for that.
Probably because you get the most out of creating one big bottleneck in the supply chain. Germany had little shortage of industry and refinery capacity, but was already much short on fields/crude access without the Caucasus they never seized.
Sneeed
Ending the war early would hardly have been conducive to the American military industrial complex or beneficial to the cause of supplanting the established global superpower Great Britain.
Most of us brits are aware of the phrase, "Lions lead by donkeys".
Not quite as familiar is the phrase, "Tigers pulled by oxen".
My guess is that the fuel production sites were avoided early on because of the tremendous AA and fighter defenses around them. If that wasn't the case then there is no excuse for not targeting these sites as early in the war as possible. All I can think is that Ploesti scared off the allies in attacking these sites for a while.
The Pie chart at 2:00 is shocking.
From ‘42 to mid ‘43, the 8th Air Force was in its infancy. It gained air superiority after Big Week in early 1944, then it was diverted to DDay missions. After DDay it could go after the refineries. The USAAC did bombed Ploesti in ‘43 at great loss.
Refineries are spread over acres. Daylight bombing was imprecise and could not securely hit the refinery vitals. So several missions required to eliminate a plant and there were 50 plants. Too, the Germans kept slave and material on hand so when the bombers flew off, they went in and had the plant up in a week.
In the Pacific, USN subs ambushed Japans tankers which plodded up the E coast of China to Japan. That campaign ensued early ‘44. The lack of fuel informed many of the desperate measures the Japanese took towards the war’s end.
“The Prize”, by Daniel Yergin, chronicles the oil industry. It has a chapter on oil and WW2. It’s a good read on THE vital resource. Cheers
Very interesting. This appears to be a segment from a longer documentary. Am I correct, and if so, how can one view that?
This is a stand alone video. I will address the why oil targets were not selected sooner, I need to research the archive a bit more to support the video's story flow.
@@WWIIUSBombers
Search
Royal Air Force 1939-1945
Thanks for the quick response.
It does really seem odd that the allies determined that oil and synthetic fuel production were the most vital targets but instead mostly hit other targets until the last year of the war. Especially the British that just seemed fixated on area night bombing cities instead.
Oil & chemical plants were always part of the Allied bombing campaign in Europe. RAF night time targetting of installations was ineffective thus the tendency was to go for area bombing of urban areas which could be accomplished in all visibility conditions [assuming home airfields are clear for flying]. It is very, very difficult to go for small targets unless it's a clear moonlit night & then the flak losses are high.
Yes, I would like to see the reason the oil/petrol operations weren't targeted sooner. Also, why the Japanese didn't destroy the fuel reserves at Pearl Harbor.
There was an author on WW2 TV who stated that at the beginning of the war the German army employed 1.5M horses. By the end of the war it was 5M! Strange to think that a teamster with Alexander the Great would have recognized the situation instantly and may even have been able to make some suggestions. LOL
Bombing oil earlier would have been a positive, but I can see that it wouldn't have been the priority when bomber losses were so heavy at first.
Passing all those shiny war factories to get to the oil might have had an effect on crew morale.
When did the allies learn that the hydrogenation plants fed the luftwaffe? Then, when did bombing targets shift to the hydrogenation plants?
Hitler screwed up by trying to capture the Soviet oil fields instead of focusing on Leningrad and Moscow because Germany didn't have the capability to transport the oil back to German refineries. The Soviets wouldn't leave behind intact railroad tank cars, oil barges and refineries so Germany would've needed to stop production of arms to switch to manufacturing rail tankers, flat cars, railroad track and construction equipment to build new rail lines to Germany. Germany lacked the heavy trucks, tanker trailers and the fuel needed to haul it overland on new roads that also needed to be built. Germany also couldn't lay long distance oil pipelines due to having no experience with that. The only Europeans that did were the Dutch engineers that were captured by the IJA at the Dutch East Indies oil fields.
The Allied Forces could've forced an early end to the war faster by concentrated bombing of German coal mines, their railroad yards and their canal system that transported coal to their electric generation plants and synthetic fuel refineries. The German railroads were in sad shape before 1940 plus were short on rolling stock (RR cars) so were using rail cars taken from captured countries. The Germans also looted their captured factories of machine tools and materials to send back to Germany which left behind empty factories that could've manufactured railroad cars to replace those destroyed by bombing. Their canal system could've been put out of operation for months repeatedly by bombing the locks where loaded and unloaded barges waited in long strings to get thru. Destroyed locks and pump houses take time to remove and replace along with sunken barges and their loads. The German power plants and steel industries would've been forced to reduce power generation and steel production as their stocks of coal became low. Germany had coal fields and synthetic fuel refineries in the east along with some steel plants in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Austria that would've kept them in the fight against the Soviets for a while longer.
Hmm, I wonder what modern-day military actions mimic the WW2 Allied strategy. I'm sure it will come to me if I think harder...
Also, your clear labeling of AI-generated pictures is appreciated, hope that becomes standard procedure.
You made this in response to the operations room video didn't you 🫡
It's great to learn more about the topic and you quite literally back EVERYTHING you say up in a fascinating way.
How did synthetic fuel compare to petroleum in terms of effects on engines and fuel systems, aircraft performance, etc.? Was there no difference or was one type better than the other? For example, did synthetic fuel leave deposits or have contaminants that petroleum-based fuel did not?
US refining experts tested captured German motor fuels and lubricating oils from 1940 thru to May of 1945 to find those were of good quality until the last month of the war.
@@billwilson-es5yn In general the Germans were slower in adopting their version of 100/130 fuel which was dyed green and called C3. The actual RON and PN ratings varied throughout the war and were improved. For instance the green dyed fuel was around 94/115 at the beginning of the war. The reason for this is mainly that the German Investment and R&D effort went into just producing basic blue dyed 87 octane fuel (called B4).
-Major improvements in octane rating in 1942 of the C3 fuel allowed the supercharger boost of the BMW 801D2 to be raised to about 1.65 ata which in conjunction with injection of the fuel into the supercharger for ground attack aircraft or for fighters into the injection system increased power from about 1700hp to 1950hp in 1943. The systems were unified with the BMW801TU in 1944.
-Fuel came out of the Bergius hydrogen plants at about 72-74 octane. In the Bergius process pulverised coal was mixed with toluene and pressurised at 700 atmospheres with hydrogen. The resultant product was then refined using traditional fractional distillation methods. Cracking did not work to upgrade. The addition of TEL upgraded the product to 87 RON.
-Pure iso-octane was made by synthesising butanol over chromium catalysts. The resulting methanol 82% and butanol 18% was distilled and the methanol passed through the reactor again. The butanol was dehydrated to iso-buylene and this was polymerised to iso-octane. Adding about 22% iso-octane basically turned the B4 into C3. Later on much if not most of the iso-buytlene was collected from the Bergius plants.
-Construction of acid alkylation plants (which BP pioneered and was the primary source of 100/130) commenced in 1940 but only 1 was complete and the other didn't quite make it.
Great coverage. I love the documentation footage and care you take. Authoritative archival stuff.
I expect you know that the CEO of Texaco continued to supply the Nazis with oil (as they had supplied the Spanish fascists under Franco) through to August 1940 and were only stopped by US government intervention.
We were not at war with Germany until Dec 8 1941
The chart at 1:30 shows a huge spike in production beginning around May 1940 and then a major drop back near prior baseline around September 1940. What's going on there? Also, stocks does not track difference between production and consumption. Is the difference captured supplies and imports? It would be interesting to see other sources of oil than domestic production in chart.
Captured stocks.
I saw The Sandman and instantly clicked.
Well machines need oil
I have read that it was, to some extent, inadequate allied intelligence in the early years of the war, that failed to understand oil was Germany's Achilles heel. Indeed, the RAF seems to have had very poor understanding of the best ways to damage Germany's war economy, relying on vague and wishful generalizations.
But - as @Rjayboxing said - after oil became officially the bombing priority in 1944, the RAF Bomber Command leader, Arthur Harris, resisted and eventually refused to make oil the RAF priority even when directly ordered to Chief of Air Staff Charles Portal. Harris should have been sacked at this point, but Portal was too weak, timid and careerist a personality to do what needed to be done.
But the result was that the war lasted weeks or even months longer than would have happened if Bomber Command had made oil its priority target.
There was also the possible loss of the factor that the RAF mostly dropped considerably heavier individual bombs than the USAAF's usual 500 pounders; and the heavier type bombs (when they hit) were apparently more effective at destroying (rather than just damaging) industrial machinery.
I have always been surprised they didn't go after the power plants.
The heavy machinery in a power plant (turbines and generators) is resistant to destruction with high explosive unless a very rare direct hit on the machinery is achieved.
This channel is at the same level, or should I say altitude?, as Dr. Feltons.
Higher, depending on what you're looking for. I'd say more comparable to Greg's Airplanes in the level of analysis.
Yeah but Mark's channel is not as fact-based as this one
Felton makes stuff up. This guy doesn't.
"Not too bad!"... 🤣🤣
Based on the info presented, yes, the Strategic Bombing Committee should have targeted oil sooner. Would be interesting to hear if there were valid reasons for the delay.
Definitely a huge miss. Another huge miss was the tetra-ethyl lead facilities, which Britain helped build pre-war. This was an additive to improve fighter engine performance, would have shatter german aircraft performance if these had been targeted.
"Why not attack oil sooner" Because they took a craftsman's approach to dismantling the war machine. Couple that with Battle of Britain experience.
What do airplanes and tanks need? Engines. What do engines need to run? Bearings. Destroy component manufacturing and disrupt their ability to produce war machines. And the British had first hand experience with this problem during the Battle of Britain. Domestic fighter production was decentralized because of the attacks on manufacturing. It was heavily disruptive to their efforts.
The British did not feel a pinch from having their oil production destroyed, because that was safe in Texas and Pennsylvania.
....yes, the US oil, the main target of the U-Boats, we were so lucky that the Kreigsmarine didn't get their full quota of vessels earlier in the war.
"Safe in texas" ... Uboats heavy breathing 😅
True, the u-boats were disruptive and a concern. But that was the extent. A concern. Italian Navy was laid up in port without fuel while the British Navy roamed freely. On a strategic scale Britain did not suffer from fuel starvation.
Pennsylvania? Had no idea they had oil
@ PA is actually where modern industrial era oil industry began, with Edwin Drake in Titusville. Some of the early fields had dried by the war, Bradford field was still producing, but by WW2 the area had a plethora of refineries and labor that was crucial.
It was that plus their steel production, Bethlehem Steel etc., that allows for things like Philadelphia Navy Yard.
The synthetic oil they made, is that similar to the oil we have in our cars today?
Synthetic oil is made by filling a pressure vessel with water and coal. Water is H2O and coal is carbon, C. At high temperature, the oxygen and hydrogen dissociate. The hydrogen then combines with the carbon forming hydrocarbons..synthetic oil.
It is not an energy efficient process, but Germany had no choice. Evidently the refined synthetic fuel made high octane gasoline.
If I remember the process is the Fischer-Tropsch. Cheers
I know US terminology for petrol is "gas", but there were vehicles on both sides in WW2 powered by gas rather than petrol, so why not quote what the document actually says?
Everyone used coal and wood gasifiers. United States actually produced documentation on how to make these in case it became necessary to power farm machinery and so forth. I read the journal of a couple who literally drove around Australia using wood gasifier to power their van. They used scrap wood that had fallen. The Germans went as far as operating training tanks with coal gasifiers
History is repeating itself today.
I NEVER understood why the Allies didn't have fuel as their highest priority right from the start. The only causes I could think of made no sense.
* Didn't know where they were: surely most locations would have been known before the war, and harder to find once war started.
* Didn't realize oil's importance: The Royal Navy switch to oil from coal was delayed precisely because they were worried about having no domestic production. They knew about U-boat attacks on tankers. They knew very well how important it was.
* Targets too well protected: If that were the case, they should have attacked farms and other unprotected areas and stayed away from factories and armed forces.
Just imagine what thousands of small cheap drons will do 2 Russian oil production right now 😅
With hindsight, it is clear that bombing the German oil industry was the key to bringing a swift end to the war in 1944-5, and this was probably understood by late 1943. There were two problems for the Allies to overcome. (1) Night bombing by the RAF was too inaccurate to hit a target as small as an oil plant. (2) The USAAF could not operate at acceptable cost over Germany until, by early 1944, the GAF had been sufficiently reduced by the long-range P51 fighter.
On a longer perspective, strategic bombing, which began in earnest in mid 1942 by the RAF and about a year later by the USAAF, made a big contribution to the Allied victory. This was mainly by drawing a large part of the German war effort into the aerial defence of the homeland. The limitation of growth in German war production was significant, but secondary until 1944.
The same strategy NATO/UKR is following against Russia. I expect them to succeed and in a short time(combined with sanctions, of course)
ive gotten into arguments about the us bombing campaign against oil production with people saying it was a waste of time. to which i reply; "yeah thats why a german division in 1944/45 used more horses than a division in 1939/40"
The majority of Wehrmacht infantry advanced on foot during Operation Barbarossa, lack of mechanisation was a huge problem which predated any allied bombing campaign. The problem was not a lack of oil as the many civilians driving around Berlin show but of complacency and not taking the enemy seriously.
@@user-ou9ft9th3h im talking about their support collumns, not the average foot soldier. the problem absolutely was lack of oil, as well as a lack of 100 other things we bombed into the stone age. but it is correct that germany didnt take war production seriously enough soo enough. doesnt change the fact they didnt have oil for training etc after the us oil campaign.
Tanks can't run on hopes and dreams. Armoured Division what important for all armies in WW2. But Germany set that trend. So would have felt it the worst when Tanks were just armoured bunkers.
I'd suggest you widen your sources. Not that these were necessarily wrong, but trusting the 8th air force to accurately judge the effect of their attacks is like trusting a fighter pilots to give you an accurate number of planes they shot down. Even the post-war interviews were suspect. Consider, if those German officers had been captured by the Soviets would they even have mentioned US contributions? I think not. Again, I think those intelligence assessments were off by a percentage, not an order of magnitude. But if there were German documents on-hand, that would add confidence to your conclusions.
Loved the AI image. 😂
The same priority is happening in Russia today.
Why was diesel preferable to petrol for the Germans ?
Diesel is less refined. It's safer to use in combat vehicles. Using gas is the reason allied tanks burned.
@ I meant from a production point of view.
Great analysis U cannot buy compare this to current air war on fuel production and wonder if commanders there have studied this campaign for tips
In WW1, much was done by horse, mule, and ox. Perhaps the strategists didn’t fully comprehend the critical need for oil in a modern war machine. I’m not going to try and second guess people 80+ years ago.
WW2 started the same as ww1 - first troops entering Poland did it on foot, officers, messengers and artillery units were still using horses since Germany didn't have enough trucks. Main tanks were tiny pzk III, mighty tigers were years away. We went from horses to ballistic rockets in 6 years.
Yes
G'day,
AHOY...!
Blooper ALERT.....
In the Clip Description.
"Combed Bombing Offensive"
????????????
Nope.
That's
WRONG.
Try,
"COMBINED Bombing Offensive ..."
And, then...;
Shoot your Spellchecking
Software.
Use a big Gun, and lots of Ammunition.
Such is life,
Have a good one...
Stay safe.
;-p
Ciao !
And yet there are thise who will argue with a straight face that strategic bombing was an utter failure in WWII because because the bombing wasn't as accurate in combat as it was in controled conditions and because the attempt to destroy civilian moral failed.
The attempt to destroy civilian morale didn't quite fail, as civilian morale in Germany became quite low in the latter part of the war. The problem is that totalitarians don't care much about civilian morale. Low civilian morale actually contributed to Hitler's desire to fight to the death of Germany rather than surrender.
@gort8203 well it it failed in that it didn't end the war, but yes civilian moral was pretty bad, and after Hamburg was destroyed there were a few weeks when the general public felt safe in openly suggesting that the Nazi party wasn't handling the war well and maybe should be replaced. However, the pre war idea that causing mass shell shock in cities would cause the civil population to demand an end to the war or would topple the government didn't pan out.
@@davidhoffman6980 That prewar fear/hope about winning a war by destroying civilian morale was just a theory, one not widely accepted or counted upon by military leaders the way it was by politicians and civilian strategists. It seems those that believed in this theory were protecting a perceived lack of resilience in their own democratic societies upon their potential adversaries. In WWII the British talked themselves into hope for that strategy when they shifted from daylight to night bombing, but it was never a component of USAAF strategy.
The war proved that effective strategic bombing certainly could destroy civilian morale, but also that this doesn't necessarily translate into suing for peace by an autocratic government that is little influenced by such low of morale.
@gort8203 I'm sorry but I'm going to have to disagree with you. The undermining of civilian moral was one of the joint strategic bombing objectives.
@@davidhoffman6980 It was a British objective that the U.S. agreed not to disagree with because it cost them nothing to pay lip service even though they did not believe in it. Winning the war by destruction of morale was not a component of USAAF strategic thinking. Winning the war by destroying the enemy's means to fight was the strategy behind daylight precision bombing.