Destined to Fail? | The Collapse of Nationalist China | Dr. Parks Coble

This is an interview with Dr. Parks Coble for his book "The Collapse of Nationalist China: How Chiang Kai-shek Lost China’s Civil War."
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Topics Discussed
0:00 Historical Context
1:51 Inflationary Policy
6:00 Excessive Military Spending
8:08 The CCP
10:09 The Soong Family
11:57 Elites’ American Education
13:40 Primary Sources
15:17 Chiang’s Daily Routines
16:13 Dependence on American Aid
17:40 Over-centralization of Power
19:37 Legacies of Nationalist China
21:42 Conducting Fieldwork in China
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Guest
Parks Coble is the James S. Sellers Professor of History, having joined the department in August 1976. He teaches surveys of general East Asian history, covering China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, and specialized courses on modern China and Japan.
Parks Coble's research field is 20th century China with special emphasis on the political history of Republican China (1911-1949), the history of Chinese business in the 20th century, and Sino-Japanese interactions. Recent publications have included a study of Chinese businessmen living in occupied China during World War II, and of the anti-Japanese movement in China in the 1930s. His current project examines the collapse of the Chiang Kai-shek government in China in 1949 by analyzing the tragic consequences of hyperinflation in China during the period from 1944 until 1949. The Japanese conquest of East China had isolated the Chiang stronghold in the interior and left the Chinese government with few financial resources. Chiang chose to simply print money which lead to disastrous consequences. After Japanese surrender there was no “peace dividend” so the erosion of the currency simply accelerated. New archival sources permit an in depth analysis of the decision making process within Chiang’s government.
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Book Description:
When World War II ended Chiang Kai-shek seemed at the height of his power-the leader of Nationalist China, one of the victorious Allied Powers in 1945 and with the financial backing of the US. Yet less than four years later, he lost the China's civil war against the communists. Offering an insightful chronological treatment of the years 1944-1949, Parks Coble addresses why Chiang was unable to win the war and control hyperinflation. Using newly available archival sources, he reveals the critical weakness of Chiang's style of governing, the fundamental structural flaws in the Nationalist government, bitter personal rivalries and Chiang's personal lack of interest in finance. This major work of revisionist scholarship will engage all those interested in the shaping of twentieth-century history.