This was really good. It seems Idealism and Non-Physicalism are all the rage these days in public philosophy circles so it's nice to see someone take the gauntlet and defend old-fashioned type-B materialism/physicalism. Fantastic show once again.
Philip - would love to sometime hear your rendition of how panpsychism might address Chalmers's Meta-Problem of Consciousness and see if you can do it in a way that satisfies Keith. I've been particularly obsessed with this one tricksy knot which seems to get at the heart of the matter. Thanks!
Janet is brilliant! This is the first time I've heard a materialist really engage with the 'hard problem' - she's actually tackling it by honing in on what is special about introspection, rather than trying to sweep it under the rug as Dennett etc would. But I'm struggling to really understand her position: she's both a materialist and a realist with respect to qualia. In which case I would expect her to say, that brain state A *gives rise to* qualia A' (e.g. as an emergent property of the pattern of neural firing), but instead she says brain state A *is identical to* qualia A'. Like Philip, I'm left asking - what allows you to make this identification between two things that appear so different? I prefer this to Keith's eliminativism though!
Yeah, and this is why identity theory fell out of favor in the late 20th century, giving way for other physicalist theories like functionalism and emergentism. Personally, I'm fond of embodiment theory - mental states are caused by states of not just the brain but the whole organism including its body, its physical and social environment. Different types of bodies will necessarily have different types of conscious experiences due to the nature of their sensory-motor organs which interface with the world in different ways. It's just too simplistic to say "brain state = mental state" and we've known this for a long time.
What do u think.....*What about the hard problem of fire???* How come our models and descriptions of combustion do not give us heat and light??? You could (naively) create a hard problem of every scientific model??? *Because they are just simplified descriptions!!! Just like pictures!!!* There is no heat and light in hydrocarbons and oygen, (or our description of the process), yet there is in combustion? *But doesn't mean our science is lacking*, rather it works very well!
@@origins7298 There is no hard problem of fire because there is no *explanatory gap*. We have a full account of how fire results from the interaction of molecules with chemical bonds, of soot particles and convection, of photons and energy levels. There is no explanation of how consciousness results from neurons, action potentials and neurotransmitters. This is the hard problem that physicalists who glibly claim that consciousness is an emergent property like temperature fail to tackle. I understand *how* temperature emerges from atomic theory. When someone shows me *how* consciousness emerges from brain activity, I'll consider it an emergent property. Until then, it's a hard problem.
@@jonstewart464 define what u mean by consciousness... if u give a specific such as the sensation of our body, Vision, hearing, taste touch smell. Then the explanatory Gap magically goes away Consciousness is the product of trillions of nerve connections. So of course it's difficult to give a straightforward account of literally trillions upon trillions of chemical interactions. That's what Consciousness is! it is sum total of our bodies and brain and the laws of physics.... When you're dealing with such complex systems then of course you will have difficulty giving straightforward explanations Take the idea of pain. We have an incredible understanding of pain. We can mediate and radically alter the experience. Are there going to be some questions that are difficult to answer of course it's trillions upon trillions of connections. All of the hard problem of Consciousness is caused by fuzzy words like Consciousness itself. And other fuzzy words like qualia, and neural correlates Qualia is just a poetic metaphor we see colors we understand that process completely. The redness of red is just poetic Embellishments And poetic embellishment is just a happening of a really complex chemical system
@@jonstewart464 oh so you're basically just admitting it's a god of the gaps. All right so then we have a hard problem of information and entropy in black holes Or the hard problem of the early moments of the universe It's all just god of the gaps. You might as well replace all of the vernacular use with Holy Spirit or ghosts and goblins... just pseudo-scientific jargon!
*What about the hard problem of fire???* How come our models and descriptions of combustion do not give us heat and light??? You could (naively) create a hard problem of every scientific model??? *Because they are just simplified descriptions!!! Just like pictures!!!* There is no heat and light in hydrocarbons and oygen, (or our description of the process), yet there is in combustion? *But doesn't mean our science is lacking*, rather it works very well!
50:46 What do you think Ezekiel's and Alex Grey's eye-monsters are, Philip!? They're zooming in all the way to the "pixels" of their fkn imagination! They're literally perceiving their own neural activity! I was able to tie my own eye-monster experience to my own neural activity, so there you go! QED! Goff's Error! Idealism is Bunk! 🤪
wouldn't the H2O/Water and Superman/Clark Kent examples just get you to property dualism? So Clark Kent has a sense characterized by a certain set of properties that are collocated and concurrent with those that we associate with Superman. So qualia would be a brainstate qua the properties we recognize through introspection that would be distinct from properties recognized by fundamental physics and chemistry.
This was really good. It seems Idealism and Non-Physicalism are all the rage these days in public philosophy circles so it's nice to see someone take the gauntlet and defend old-fashioned type-B materialism/physicalism. Fantastic show once again.
Philip - would love to sometime hear your rendition of how panpsychism might address Chalmers's Meta-Problem of Consciousness and see if you can do it in a way that satisfies Keith. I've been particularly obsessed with this one tricksy knot which seems to get at the heart of the matter. Thanks!
Janet is brilliant! This is the first time I've heard a materialist really engage with the 'hard problem' - she's actually tackling it by honing in on what is special about introspection, rather than trying to sweep it under the rug as Dennett etc would.
But I'm struggling to really understand her position: she's both a materialist and a realist with respect to qualia. In which case I would expect her to say, that brain state A *gives rise to* qualia A' (e.g. as an emergent property of the pattern of neural firing), but instead she says brain state A *is identical to* qualia A'. Like Philip, I'm left asking - what allows you to make this identification between two things that appear so different? I prefer this to Keith's eliminativism though!
Yeah, and this is why identity theory fell out of favor in the late 20th century, giving way for other physicalist theories like functionalism and emergentism. Personally, I'm fond of embodiment theory - mental states are caused by states of not just the brain but the whole organism including its body, its physical and social environment. Different types of bodies will necessarily have different types of conscious experiences due to the nature of their sensory-motor organs which interface with the world in different ways. It's just too simplistic to say "brain state = mental state" and we've known this for a long time.
What do u think.....*What about the hard problem of fire???* How come our models and descriptions of combustion do not give us heat and light??? You could (naively) create a hard problem of every scientific model??? *Because they are just simplified descriptions!!! Just like pictures!!!* There is no heat and light in hydrocarbons and oygen, (or our description of the process), yet there is in combustion? *But doesn't mean our science is lacking*, rather it works very well!
@@origins7298 There is no hard problem of fire because there is no *explanatory gap*. We have a full account of how fire results from the interaction of molecules with chemical bonds, of soot particles and convection, of photons and energy levels. There is no explanation of how consciousness results from neurons, action potentials and neurotransmitters.
This is the hard problem that physicalists who glibly claim that consciousness is an emergent property like temperature fail to tackle. I understand *how* temperature emerges from atomic theory. When someone shows me *how* consciousness emerges from brain activity, I'll consider it an emergent property. Until then, it's a hard problem.
@@jonstewart464 define what u mean by consciousness... if u give a specific such as the sensation of our body, Vision, hearing, taste touch smell. Then the explanatory Gap magically goes away
Consciousness is the product of trillions of nerve connections. So of course it's difficult to give a straightforward account of literally trillions upon trillions of chemical interactions. That's what Consciousness is! it is sum total of our bodies and brain and the laws of physics....
When you're dealing with such complex systems then of course you will have difficulty giving straightforward explanations
Take the idea of pain. We have an incredible understanding of pain. We can mediate and radically alter the experience. Are there going to be some questions that are difficult to answer of course it's trillions upon trillions of connections.
All of the hard problem of Consciousness is caused by fuzzy words like Consciousness itself. And other fuzzy words like qualia, and neural correlates
Qualia is just a poetic metaphor we see colors we understand that process completely. The redness of red is just poetic Embellishments
And poetic embellishment is just a happening of a really complex chemical system
@@jonstewart464 oh so you're basically just admitting it's a god of the gaps. All right so then we have a hard problem of information and entropy in black holes
Or the hard problem of the early moments of the universe
It's all just god of the gaps. You might as well replace all of the vernacular use with Holy Spirit or ghosts and goblins... just pseudo-scientific jargon!
Very intelligent lady
Very god, in a future is a traduccion a other lenguajes. Thanks por todo.
Un saludo.
I ended up agreeing with all three of you. :)
1:27:26 Goff wouldn't know dialectics versus metaphysics if it bit his arse! The absolute state of modern philosophy! Oh the Humanities!
*What about the hard problem of fire???* How come our models and descriptions of combustion do not give us heat and light??? You could (naively) create a hard problem of every scientific model??? *Because they are just simplified descriptions!!! Just like pictures!!!* There is no heat and light in hydrocarbons and oygen, (or our description of the process), yet there is in combustion? *But doesn't mean our science is lacking*, rather it works very well!
I don't think there analogous. Has you heard of zombie argument?
50:46 What do you think Ezekiel's and Alex Grey's eye-monsters are, Philip!? They're zooming in all the way to the "pixels" of their fkn imagination! They're literally perceiving their own neural activity! I was able to tie my own eye-monster experience to my own neural activity, so there you go! QED! Goff's Error! Idealism is Bunk! 🤪
Seems like quite a leap of faith.
Unintentional ASMR
Lol! Drove me nuts! She seemed to have plenty of interesting things to say, but I couldn't make out half of it.
How about zombie Suns that are exactly like ours except produce absolutely no heat!
wouldn't the H2O/Water and Superman/Clark Kent examples just get you to property dualism? So Clark Kent has a sense characterized by a certain set of properties that are collocated and concurrent with those that we associate with Superman. So qualia would be a brainstate qua the properties we recognize through introspection that would be distinct from properties recognized by fundamental physics and chemistry.
how does materialism explain or describe gravity or immaterial forces in nature?
by saying they are material forces