sorry to be so off topic but does someone know of a method to log back into an instagram account? I stupidly forgot my login password. I appreciate any help you can offer me
@Adrien Everett Thanks for your reply. I got to the site on google and im in the hacking process atm. I see it takes quite some time so I will get back to you later with my results.
I rarely subscribe to channels but this video was wayyy too helpful! It literally had EVERYTHING I needed and was explained super concisely. Thanks you!!!!!!
Thank you for the great vidéo! I think you just did a little typo fault at the last slide where 2q = 2 - 2q should be 3q = 2 - 2q. But that's just a detail, thanks for the clear explenation of the subject :)
Hi Irma. We know this because when q < 2/5, (see 5:28 or so in the video), the red line is higher than the blue line, which means that player 1's expected payoff from bottom is greater than their expected payoff from top. When q > 2/5, the the blue line is above the red line, meaning that player 1's expected payoff from top is greater than their expected payoff from bottom. You find q = 2/5 by finding where the red line and the blue line cross. To do this, set 3q = 2(1-q) and solve for q. Hope this helps! Thank you for watching!
Hi Katherine, thank you so much for the video! Is it possible to create another video which shows how to find the mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium for a 3-player game. I can share with you via email the question I'm struggling with.
I will add your request to the list - but I might not be able to get to that right away. Feel free to send me your question to my gmail: ksilzcarson@gmail.com.
The way that you get the fractions is to solve for the probabilities that make the other player indifferent between his/her pure strategies. The details are in the video.
I think how you would write out the equilibrium depends on the notation that your textbook/professor uses. There is no standard notation for this. Sorry I couldn't be of more help!
There are a few differences. (1) the game I am using in the example is not a prisoner's dilemma game. Usually, it's called "Battle of the Sexes." (2) The one-shot prisoner's dilemma does not have a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Only a pure strategy equilibrium. In fact the strategy is a dominant strategy for each player. (3) The infinite prisoner's dilemma is a repeated game that goes on forever, not a one-time game. Thus, there are many more possible strategies for each player. The one that usually wins out in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is called "tit-for-tat" which means that each player chooses to cooperate as long as the other one also cooperates. As soon as one doesn't cooperate, the other exacts a punishment by not cooperating in the next round. Over many repeated plays, this strategy generally generates higher payoffs for a player. Hope this helps - these are really very different types of games.
phenomenal, you made a concept I couldn't understand for so long so clear and concise
Thank you, Celia for your comment and for watching my video. I am happy that you found it helpful!
I have my game theory midsem tomorrow and its absolutely graded rather than based on a curve. This helps me loads. Thank you so much!
I am glad this was helpful! Thank you for watching and good luck on your exam!
Explained it much better than my professor! Thank you very much!!
I am glad it was helpful! Thank you for watching!
sorry to be so off topic but does someone know of a method to log back into an instagram account?
I stupidly forgot my login password. I appreciate any help you can offer me
@Crosby Billy Instablaster ;)
@Adrien Everett Thanks for your reply. I got to the site on google and im in the hacking process atm.
I see it takes quite some time so I will get back to you later with my results.
@Adrien Everett it worked and I now got access to my account again. I'm so happy:D
Thanks so much you saved my ass :D
What the best useful video on Mixed Strategy and providing clear summary as to why we need to use Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium! Thumbs up.
Thank you for the compliment - and thank you for watching!
I rarely subscribe to channels but this video was wayyy too helpful! It literally had EVERYTHING I needed and was explained super concisely. Thanks you!!!!!!
Thank you for the comment, Abdu, I'm glad it was helpful! Thank you for watching!
Oh my god
Was having a mental breakdown over my homework assignment, you explained this perfectly!
Glad I could be of help! Thank you for watching!
ahhhh thankyuuu mam maza aagya padhai krke aapse
Thank you for watching!
This explanation is gold. Thanks a lot ma'am!!
Thank you for watching! I am glad this was helpful!
Great content, thank you❤
Thank you for your comment and for watching!
this is an underrated channel. wonderful logic flow. subscribed!
Thank you for your comment, Zheping! And thank you for subscribing!
You just saved my day, thanks for great explanation
Thank you! And thank you for watching!
Just come on here to say thank you and subscribe. You explain the concept in a manner that's easy to follow and understand.
Thank you for the compliment - and thank you for watching!
Thank you 🙏, you are an amazing teacher!!
Thank you for watching!
Great explanation! Saved me a lot of times and nerves. Thank you!
I am glad it was helpful, Matteo. Thank you for watching!
Thank you.. i am training to be an evolutionary biologist .. it helped me a lot
Thank you for watching! These ideas definitely have applications to your field. Good luck with your studies!
wonderfully explained finally I feel I've really understood the topic. Thanks!!
Thank you for watching, Oscar!
Thank you so much ❤❤
Thank you for watching, Albert!
You're a life-saver =D
Thank you for the comment - and thank you for watching!
Thank you for the great vidéo! I think you just did a little typo fault at the last slide where 2q = 2 - 2q should be 3q = 2 - 2q. But that's just a detail, thanks for the clear explenation of the subject :)
that was excellent.
Thank you, Winston! And thank you for watching!
thanks for help
Thank you for watching, Daniel!
Thank youu 🫶🏻
Thank you for watching!
Hi, the video is great. I am wondering how do you decide that for values of q>2/5 , player should play top and for q
Hi Irma. We know this because when q < 2/5, (see 5:28 or so in the video), the red line is higher than the blue line, which means that player 1's expected payoff from bottom is greater than their expected payoff from top. When q > 2/5, the the blue line is above the red line, meaning that player 1's expected payoff from top is greater than their expected payoff from bottom. You find q = 2/5 by finding where the red line and the blue line cross. To do this, set 3q = 2(1-q) and solve for q. Hope this helps! Thank you for watching!
Hi Katherine, thank you so much for the video! Is it possible to create another video which shows how to find the mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium for a 3-player game. I can share with you via email the question I'm struggling with.
I will add your request to the list - but I might not be able to get to that right away. Feel free to send me your question to my gmail: ksilzcarson@gmail.com.
@@KatherineSilzCarson Thank you, appreciate it!
how can you get the fraction? like how do you get 2/5 for player 1 and 3/5 for player 2?
The way that you get the fractions is to solve for the probabilities that make the other player indifferent between his/her pure strategies. The details are in the video.
thanks
Thank you for watching!
Thanks for the explanation.
So the Mixed strat NE would be written out as [(3/5,2/5),(2/5, 3/5)]?
I think how you would write out the equilibrium depends on the notation that your textbook/professor uses. There is no standard notation for this. Sorry I couldn't be of more help!
I wasted 75 minutes in class. Thank you!
Thank you for watching!
Please may you explain to me the difference between the infinite one. It's shown here
There are a few differences. (1) the game I am using in the example is not a prisoner's dilemma game. Usually, it's called "Battle of the Sexes." (2) The one-shot prisoner's dilemma does not have a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Only a pure strategy equilibrium. In fact the strategy is a dominant strategy for each player. (3) The infinite prisoner's dilemma is a repeated game that goes on forever, not a one-time game. Thus, there are many more possible strategies for each player. The one that usually wins out in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is called "tit-for-tat" which means that each player chooses to cooperate as long as the other one also cooperates. As soon as one doesn't cooperate, the other exacts a punishment by not cooperating in the next round. Over many repeated plays, this strategy generally generates higher payoffs for a player. Hope this helps - these are really very different types of games.
thanks