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Nuclear Engineering Lectures
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Добавлен 12 окт 2011
My name is Christopher Perfetti and I am an Associate Professor of Nuclear Engineering at the University of New Mexico. One of my longterm goals is to improve the accessibility of educational resources in nuclear engineering, and to help realize that goal I've created a series of online lecture videos for the courses that I teach at UNM. In addition to videos about my courses, I plan on uploading more videos on other nuclear engineering hot topics. I hope that you enjoy these videos!
Nuclear Waste Series - 4: Should we dump our nuclear waste into the ocean!?!
The first three videos in this series presented safe and effective solutions for disposing of our nuclear waste. This video "waves" our right to a pragmatic solution and "tests the waters" of less pragmatic solutions, such as dumping our nuclear waste into the ocean! This video explores the practicality of ocean disposal and calculates how much radiation dose you would receive from drinking radioactive ocean water. Is ocean disposal a "sound" plan, will it keep large radiation doses "at bay," or is it just a "fission" expedition?
Просмотров: 14 604
Видео
Nuclear Waste Series - 3: Reprocessing and Recycling Spent Fuel
Просмотров 1,1 тыс.10 месяцев назад
In this video I discuss options for chemically reprocessing our spent nuclear fuel to separate radioactive fission products from useful, fissionable isotopes. I explore options for recycling these fissionable isotopes using fast breeder reactors; medical and industrial uses for fission product radioisotopes; and just how long we need to store the remaining radioisotopes in a geological reposito...
Nuclear Waste Series - 2: Yucca Mountain and Geological Repositories
Просмотров 63711 месяцев назад
In this video I discuss the potential to dispose of nuclear waste underground in geological repositories in various forms. In particular, I discuss how long we need to store the waste before it reaches safe levels of radioactivity, and how much radiation dose the public would receive if events such as volcanoes, earthquakes, or groundwater corrosion distributed radioisotopes in the spent fuel. ...
Nuclear Waste Series - 1: What is Nuclear Waste?
Просмотров 905Год назад
In this video series I discuss our options for disposing of waste from civilian nuclear power in a manner that is both safe and cost effective. This video introduces the problem by discussing what nuclear waste is, how much nuclear waste exists, and how we will pay for disposing of nuclear waste.
NE410/510 - Lecture 19: A Reactor Physics Explanation of the Chernobyl Disaster
Просмотров 11 тыс.2 года назад
In this lecture we combine the reactor physics knowledge we have gained from this course to explain the worst nuclear power accident in history: the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. We will examine why the Chernobyl RBMK design's features and the operators' actions led to this accident, and why a similar accident could not occur in a modern reactor. For those interested in learning more about radiation...
NE499/515 - Lecture 21: Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations
Просмотров 6932 года назад
In this lecture we discuss nuclear criticality safety evaluations (NCSE's), which criticality safety analysts prepare to document that a fissile material operation will remain subcritical. In this lecture I reference the DOE 3007-2007 Standard, which was prepared by criticality safety experts to serve as a general guide for preparing NCSE's in DOE facilities. This Standard is available at: www....
NE499/515 - Lecture 20: The TSURFER Data Assimilation/Data Adjustment Method
Просмотров 4072 года назад
In this lecture we discuss the TSURFER data assimilation/data adjustment method, which uses Bayesian statistics to compare the observed results of critical benchmark experiments with high-fidelity calculated eigenvalue estimates, and solves for a set of adjustments to the nuclear data that maximizes agreement between the two. These nuclear data adjustments can then be extended to approximate th...
NE499/515 - Lecture 19: The Whisper Extreme Value Theory Method
Просмотров 4262 года назад
In this lecture we discuss the Whisper Upper Subcritical Method, which uses Extreme Value Theory to estimate the subcritical margin for an application by examining the worst-case possible computational biases present in a library of benchmark experiments. Instructions for running Whisper (including the Whisper user manual) can be found online via the MCNP Reference Collection at: laws.lanl.gov/...
NE499/515 - Lecture 18: Benchmark Similarity Coefficients and the TSUNAMI-IP Code
Просмотров 4292 года назад
In this lecture we discuss c(k) similarity coefficients, which describe the fraction of nuclear data-induced uncertainty shared between a benchmark case and some application. We discuss the theory behind these similarity coefficients, how to use them in tending analysis for USL estimates, and how to compute them using the SCALE TSUNAMI-IP code.
NE499/515 - Lecture 17: Sensitivity Analysis in Nuclear Criticality Safety
Просмотров 8882 года назад
In this lecture we discuss what eigenvalue sensitivity coefficients are, we review a history of sensitivity analysis methods, and we review the Iterated Fission Probability and CLUTCH methods for estimating eigenvalue sensitivity coefficients in the MCNP and SCALE/KENO/TSUNAMI codes. For those interested in learning how exactly these methods estimate sensitivity coefficients, I recommend review...
NE499/515 - Lecture 16: Trending Analysis and Upper Subcritical Limits
Просмотров 4922 года назад
In this lecture we discuss the USLSTATS code, which uses t-distribution statistics and linear regression to estimate 95/95 confidence intervals.
NE499/515 - Lecture 15: A Statistics Review for Upper Subcritical Limit Estimates
Просмотров 4962 года назад
In this lecture we review the normal distribution, t-distribution, and non-parametric methods for estimating 95/95 confidence intervals for C/E values and upper subcritical limits.
NE499/515 - Lecture 14: Introduction to Code Validation and Upper Subcritical Limits
Просмотров 5822 года назад
In this lecture we discuss how uncertainty in nuclear data drives biases in computational modeling and simulation tools, how we can use libraries of integral benchmark experiments to estimate the likely computational bias in a target application, and how the 95/95 Confidence Interval provides confidence that a fissile material operation will remain subcritical.
NE499/515 - Lecture 13: Nuclear Data and Integral Benchmark Experiments
Просмотров 1,4 тыс.2 года назад
In this lecture we dive into the world of nuclear data, reviewing what nuclear data is, how we measure it, and how we verify its accuracy.
Nuclear Science Week Shorts: The Monte Carlo Method, Using Random Numbers to Design Nuclear Reactors
Просмотров 1,3 тыс.2 года назад
In this video we discuss the Monte Carlo Method, which Nuclear Engineers use to predict the behavior of groups of neutrons inside of nuclear reactors! You can watch more Nuclear Science Week demos from the great Carl Willis at: ruclips.net/video/3kHfXntPMoI/видео.html ruclips.net/video/Gza6Cc8XOCA/видео.html
Uncertainty Quantification in Nuclear Engineering Applications
Просмотров 1,4 тыс.2 года назад
Uncertainty Quantification in Nuclear Engineering Applications
NE499/515 - Lecture 12: Postings, Procedures, and the Wood River Junction Accident (CA-9)
Просмотров 4452 года назад
NE499/515 - Lecture 12: Postings, Procedures, and the Wood River Junction Accident (CA-9)
NE499/515 - Lecture 11: Interactions with Operations and the LASL 1958 Accident (CA-8)
Просмотров 3232 года назад
NE499/515 - Lecture 11: Interactions with Operations and the LASL 1958 Accident (CA-8)
NE499/515 - Lecture 10: Safety Culture and the Boeing 737 MAX Airplane Crashes
Просмотров 5352 года назад
NE499/515 - Lecture 10: Safety Culture and the Boeing 737 MAX Airplane Crashes
NE499/515 - Lecture 9: Criticality Accident Alarm Systems and the Y-12 1958 Accident (CA-7)
Просмотров 8052 года назад
NE499/515 - Lecture 9: Criticality Accident Alarm Systems and the Y-12 1958 Accident (CA-7)
NE499/515 - Lecture 8: Nuclear Reactor Kinetics and the Tokai-Mura Criticality Accident (CA-6)
Просмотров 1 тыс.2 года назад
NE499/515 - Lecture 8: Nuclear Reactor Kinetics and the Tokai-Mura Criticality Accident (CA-6)
NE499/515 - Lecture 7: Process Analysis and the Tomsk 1978 Criticality Accident (CA-5)
Просмотров 4762 года назад
NE499/515 - Lecture 7: Process Analysis and the Tomsk 1978 Criticality Accident (CA-5)
NE499/515 - Lecture 6: The MAGIC MERV Criticality Safety Controls
Просмотров 8163 года назад
NE499/515 - Lecture 6: The MAGIC MERV Criticality Safety Controls
NE499/515 - Lecture 5: Limits and Controls and the Mayak 1953 Accident (CA-4)
Просмотров 6633 года назад
NE499/515 - Lecture 5: Limits and Controls and the Mayak 1953 Accident (CA-4)
NE499/515 - Lecture 4: ANSI/ANS Standards in Criticality Safety
Просмотров 6203 года назад
NE499/515 - Lecture 4: ANSI/ANS Standards in Criticality Safety
NE499/515 - Lecture 3: The Boltzmann Transport Equation and the Mayak 1958 Accident (CA-3)
Просмотров 1,1 тыс.3 года назад
NE499/515 - Lecture 3: The Boltzmann Transport Equation and the Mayak 1958 Accident (CA-3)
NE499/515 - Lecture 2: Health Effects of Radiation and the "Demon Core" Accidents (CA-1 and CA-2)
Просмотров 1,5 тыс.3 года назад
NE499/515 - Lecture 2: Health Effects of Radiation and the "Demon Core" Accidents (CA-1 and CA-2)
NE499/515 - Lecture 1: Introduction to Nuclear Criticality Safety
Просмотров 3,1 тыс.3 года назад
NE499/515 - Lecture 1: Introduction to Nuclear Criticality Safety
NE410/510 - Lecture 18: Nuclear Reactor Kinetics
Просмотров 3,6 тыс.3 года назад
NE410/510 - Lecture 18: Nuclear Reactor Kinetics
NE410/510 - Lecture 17: Homogenization
Просмотров 1 тыс.3 года назад
NE410/510 - Lecture 17: Homogenization
Neil Breen is a blessing and curse and also a blessing.
Truth.
sir how can i calcualate the find the expression for the transmission coefficient 𝑇(𝐸) in the context of a compound nuclear cross section.
It would be good if we could make more Pu238 for the Radioactive Thermionic Generators I guess from neptunium. This generates the heat for spacecraft like the Voyagers, but also might be able to be used for small generators here on Earth. I enjoyed you video, thank you.
Good news, ORNL is working on producing more Pu238 and I am doing research that supports this effort!
Aww, I wanted to hear him talk about spaceships exploding :(
Professor the pnly issue I take with your presentation, and it is an excellent presentation, is that you mostly ignore climate change. Ground water tables and whatnot move. Desert climates change and people in the future might move to lands that are barren now. Also ice sheets can melt. While these don’t really change the outcomes of any analysis they should be kept in mind when presenting for completeness sake.
Nevermind. You literally address this issue right after I wrote my comment. Great video
Thank you for this lecture! Excellent explanation and analysis.
Glad you enjoyed it!
Cool video! However, there is one potential flaw in your "conservative" assumptions: the health effects from ingesting radioisotopes depend on not only their activity (so, half-life) but also the particular energies and types of radiation (alpha, beta, gamma) they emit. Assuming that all radioisotopes in nuclear waste can be "at worst" assumed to be tritium because it is a middle-weight isotope in terms of half-life, and then comparing your calculations to EPA limits for this isotope, ignores all of this. Tritium in particular is an extremely low-energy beta emitter, so your body can handle quite a bit more of its radiation than that from a much higher-energy beta emitter such as cesium-137 or especially an alpha emitter such as plutonium-239. Of course, the vast majority of radiation from nuclear waste is going to be due to beta-emitting fission products, so making the assumption that it's all beta is probably good enough. But you would also need to calculate an average beta energy to properly consider health effects, and also consider the metabolic pathways and biological half-lives of the various elements involved. In short, I am not sure how useful your assumed scenario is. At the very least, given the extremely low energy betas from tritium, I strongly suspect that the reality would be significantly worse, although I can't tell you by how much.
.....and now a giant lizard roams the earth. Quick we need to find a giant ape to counter it.
I have been preparing for this day for my entire life.
Just came here via Reddit
but would this only "work" if the waste disposal was perfectly distributed over the whole of the ocean? ie each country dunping their waste in their specific dumping point would just lead to aress with much higher pCI/L in those areas and would likely take years to "equal out" over the whole ocean?
You are correct that hotspots could be a problem. That is why the “just dump it into the ocean” plan would implode the waste at a significant depth. Plenty of time for it to mix with the surrounding water and approach a uniform distribution.
Thank you, Reddit Man.
Amazing and very interesting!
"I don't want to cure cancer! I want to make dinosaurs!" From a villian in a Spiderman comic
Forget radioactive ocean water, I'm now sinking in the Swamp of Sadness after seeing that Artax gif
Great job! Thank you.
How long would it take to disperse the waste across the ocean? Would it be particularly harmful in localized areas
One thing to consider is your assumption that the volume of ocean water is ## L, as if we would evenly distribute the nuclear waste across every part of the world's oceans. However, the fact is that this wouldn't be feasible, so certain areas (such as that near the Mariana Trench) would receive a higher dose compared to (in that example) the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. That means that anywhere the concentrated nuclear waste would flow would be more impacted than if the waste were to be evenly distributed. Not to say that this would be "dangerous", but something that should be considered during this exercise.
You are correct that hotspots could be a problem. That is why the “just dump it into the ocean” plan would implode the waste at a significant depth. Plenty of time for it to mix with the surrounding water and approach a uniform distribution.
I'm glad I had this video recommended on reddit, because I never would have known any of this! Knowing the facts makes it less of a scary thing.
From reddit o/
Love drinking some drinkable ocean water 🤤
Reddit brought me here
Me too
There are dozens of us! Dozens!
I was so sure this was gonna be a rickroll lmao
Welcome brother
Bro just slapped us all with some Atrax trauma.
5:05 perfect cat 👍
O boy. This cubes on top are not reactor rods. They are just covers. Nuclear fuel is in direct contact with water. Well the same way as it is in normal reactor. It has cladding on it. Graphite tips are not graphite tips but graphite displacers. They are there so water is not there when roads are out. Also can you remind me. You are also talking about rules they added after explosion happen and lied about that. 720 limit, 30 limit, 15 limit, coolant flow... And from data we have yes they were at about 6-8 equivalent rods. But not at the time of explosion. They were at about 20. And they did not shut down cooling pumps. They just used power from turbine to power them when it was spinning down. Did you read INSAG 1 or 7? You shuld if you plan to talk about it and not saying Sovien propaganda. Also you do need to read also some analysis of it since this was done listening to Soviets. Do you know how you know they are lieing? They speak... So they figure out a lot of lies after INSAG 7 was finished.
OMG the Pro amerikan egalitarianism is Soooo Palpable heré SMH. 😟😰😩😰😟😩😧😦😧😳😵😵
What saddens me most about this entirely avoidable accident is that it has reinforced the western over complicated designs that are problematic from the basic economics standpoint. The economics simply doesn’t stack up with current accepted designs. The western regulatory regime for nuclear power has almost single-handedly destroyed the sector with its excessive zeal. The RBMK was\is a splendid piece of value engineering that allowed a clear economic case for nuclear power. From the lack of energy required to produce the low enrichment fuel to the low cost and carbon footprint of the reactor construction were a triumph of design. I understand that the UK reactors used to produce our plutonium actually consumed more power over their lives than they generated. Chernobyl’s failure required a staggering level of hubris and management system incompetence to induce and has reinforced the myth of the superpowers surrounding the use of containment vessels. If you had removed the gross human error element from Chernobyl then it would never have occurred. Operating procedures are as much a part of the system as the cooling circuit and you might as well set about the plumbing with an angle grinder as deliberately disregard the safe operating procedures.
Fukushima is way way worse in the long term.
Looks like I will need to make a video explaining Fukushima too! 🙂
@NuclearEngineeringLectures you know alot more about it than me it's different classes or severity of disaster, I understand that, but what do you think on a scale of 1-10 on severity?
Neil Breen movies? Really?
Only the best content on this channel.
19:40 missed a detail in the delay of the turbine test. The day shift lowered power from 3200mw to 1600mw over the course of their shift in preparation for the test. This began creating the xenon pit that then became worse when test was delayed and night shift lowered power even more
Well this is not the case... Time for Xenon is too short to be an effect. Is 6 hours. So Xenon pit was not in effect. It was just a propaganda from Soviet union.
At 1:00, are you sure we could add λ (or k) to the F term? It seems to me that λ (or k) is meant to account for the time derivative when this latter is implicit. However, since the time derivative is explicit in this equation, adding λ (or k) would be accounting for the same thing twice. In fact, in your following videos, you didn't insert such a λ (or k) into the equations despite working in non-critical regimes, and that's because time derivatives were explicit. Am I wrong?
I remember when Chernobyl happened, there were all kinds of units of Sv, rad, rem flying around on the news and I also remember that, even though I was into physics at that young age, I did not understand any of it. What was worse, I had the distinct feeling that none of the newspapers reporting these figures had any idea what they were talking about. The German newspaper, well tabloid, BILD, from April 29 on, had the word "ATOM" in its headlines on a daily basis. But already on May 21, it was back to normal with a headline on the net worth of then famous tennis player Steffi Graf. Three weeks afterwards, Chernobyl was already yesterdays news.
Class lecture with clarity . This is superb. Just wanted to add the six factor formula which is presented more as a probability ( which it is ) - Keff = ε.Lf.p.Lth.f.η
can you show how those constants that you eliminated are calculated? i know power normalisation is needed but am unable to do it
I wish i could have your slides
which book do you follow sir???
I use Duderstadt and Hamilton for this course. The University of Michigan offers a PDF of this textbook for free at: deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/89079/1976_Nuclear_Reactor_Analysis.pdf
@@NuclearEngineeringLectures thanks a lot ❤️
"It even has its own sauna, which is probably a great place for storing caesium and Stro-" ahahaha
A lot of errors and incorrect information in this video.
😢
@@NuclearEngineeringLectures There is no evidence that RBMK reactors were used to produce plutonium, although it was an option they could pursue. They had other breeder-type reactors producing a lot of plutonium, such as AD/ADE-1/2/3/4/I-1/EI-2/AI/A/AW-1/AW-2/AW-3 and heavy water: OK-180/OK-190. In fact, Efim Slavsky (Chief of MinSredMash), where RBMK reactors was designed, was quoted as saying, "Slaventiy, enough plutonium. Build for me a good power reactor; I have a lot of plutonium without your reactor (RBMK)" here:ruclips.net/video/GDonDx_1les/видео.html. The fuel elements did not resemble Lego blocks; those are the channel caps. All the channels, including the control rod channels, have square caps made with concrete and serpentine to minimize radiation leaks. Under the caps is the plug, and under the plug is the upper biological shield. Under the upper biological shield is the actual channel itself, which was cylindrical and passed through the graphite blocks. Diesel generators did not take 3 minutes to start. They started within 15 seconds of power loss, but they took 60-75 seconds to reach full speed. According to the INSAG-7 report (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group), a power station in the region unexpectedly went offline at 2 PM. Thus, the grid controller requested Chernobyl NPP to pick up the load. It wasn't necessary because of the holiday; in fact, "May holiday" is on May 1st, not April. There is no evidence that Toptunov decreased the power too fast and that led to xenon flooding. The core was already xenon-poisoned, running at half power, but the neutron flux was at an equilibrium to stabilize the reactor output at half power. Decreasing it further flipped the equilibrium in the poison's favor, and it started absorbing all the neutrons, effectively stalling the reactor. Xenon is not produced at a delay; I think you are referring to xenon having a delayed effect. Xenon produced from a couple of hours ago can still poison the core later. The high coolant flow rate caused the coolant not to have enough time to dump its heat in the steam separator drums or the condensers. This caused the coolant inlet temperature to rise. Firefighters did not extinguish the graphite fire 5 hours later. They extinguished the roof and surrounding areas. The actual firefighting of the reactor started on April 27th, the next day morning at 10 am, with helicopters dropping sand, boron, dolomite, and clay with lead. I think your knowledge of nuclear engineering is on point but some of the details regarding the incident itself can be hard to find.😅
@@NuclearEngineeringLectures There is no evidence that RBMK reactors were used to produce plutonium, although it was an option they could pursue. They had other breeder-type reactors producing a lot of plutonium, such as AD/ADE-1/2/3/4/I-1/EI-2/AI/A/AW-1/AW-2/AW-3 and heavy water: OK-180/OK-190. In fact, Efim Slavsky (Chief of MinSredMash), where RBMK reactors was designed, was quoted as saying, "Slaventiy, enough plutonium. Build for me a good power reactor; I have a lot of plutonium without your reactor (RBMK)" here:ruclips.net/video/GDonDx_1les/видео.html. The fuel elements did not resemble Lego blocks; those are the channel caps. All the channels, including the control rod channels, have square caps made with concrete and serpentine to minimize radiation leaks. Under the caps is the plug, and under the plug is the upper biological shield. Under the upper biological shield is the actual channel itself, which was cylindrical and passed through the graphite blocks. Diesel generators did not take 3 minutes to start. They started within 15 seconds of power loss, but they took 60-75 seconds to reach full speed. According to the INSAG-7 report (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group), a power station in the region unexpectedly went offline at 2 PM. Thus, the grid controller requested Chernobyl NPP to pick up the load. It wasn't necessary because of the holiday; in fact, "May holiday" is on May 1st, not April. There is no evidence that Toptunov decreased the power too fast and that led to xenon flooding. The core was already xenon-poisoned, running at half power, but the neutron flux was at an equilibrium to stabilize the reactor output at half power. Decreasing it further flipped the equilibrium in the poison's favor, and it started absorbing all the neutrons, effectively stalling the reactor. Xenon is not produced at a delay; I think you are referring to xenon having a delayed effect. Xenon produced from a couple of hours ago can still poison the core later. The high coolant flow rate caused the coolant not to have enough time to dump its heat in the steam separator drums or the condensers. This caused the coolant inlet temperature to rise. Firefighters did not extinguish the graphite fire 5 hours later. They extinguished the roof and surrounding areas. The actual firefighting of the reactor started on April 27th, the next day morning at 10 am, with helicopters dropping sand, boron, dolomite, and clay with lead. I think your knowledge of nuclear engineering is on point but some of the details regarding the incident itself can be hard to find.😅
@@NuclearEngineeringLectures There is no evidence that RBMK reactors were used to produce plutonium, although it was an option they could pursue. They had other breeder-type reactors producing a lot of plutonium, such as AD/ADE-1/2/3/4/I-1/EI-2/AI/A/AW-1/AW-2/AW-3 and heavy water: OK-180/OK-190. In fact, Efim Slavsky (Chief of MinSredMash), where RBMK reactors was designed, was quoted as saying, "Slaventiy, enough plutonium. Build for me a good power reactor; I have a lot of plutonium without your reactor (RBMK)" here: youtu. be /GDonDx_1les?t=2584. The fuel elements did not resemble Lego blocks; those are the channel caps. All the channels, including the control rod channels, have square caps made with concrete and serpentine to minimize radiation leaks. Under the caps is the plug, and under the plug is the upper biological shield. Under the upper biological shield is the actual channel itself, which was cylindrical and passed through the graphite blocks. Diesel generators did not take 3 minutes to start. They started within 15 seconds of power loss, but they took 60-75 seconds to reach full speed. According to the INSAG-7 report (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group), a power station in the region unexpectedly went offline at 2 PM. Thus, the grid controller requested Chernobyl NPP to pick up the load. It wasn't necessary because of the holiday; in fact, "May holiday" is on May 1st, not April. There is no evidence that Toptunov decreased the power too fast and that led to xenon flooding. The core was already xenon-poisoned, running at half power, but the neutron flux was at an equilibrium to stabilize the reactor output at half power. Decreasing it further flipped the equilibrium in the poison's favor, and it started absorbing all the neutrons, effectively stalling the reactor. Xenon is not produced at a delay; I think you are referring to xenon having a delayed effect. Xenon produced from a couple of hours ago can still poison the core later. The high coolant flow rate caused the coolant not to have enough time to dump its heat in the steam separator drums or the condensers. This caused the coolant inlet temperature to rise. Firefighters did not extinguish the graphite fire 5 hours later. They extinguished the roof and surrounding areas. The actual firefighting of the reactor started on April 27th, the next day morning at 10 am, with helicopters dropping sand, boron, dolomite, and clay with lead. I think your knowledge of nuclear engineering is on point but some of the details regarding the incident itself can be hard to find.😅
@@NuclearEngineeringLectures There is no evidence that RBMK reactors were used to produce plutonium, although it was an option they could pursue. They had other breeder-type reactors producing a lot of plutonium, such as AD/ADE-1/2/3/4/I-1/EI-2/AI/A/AW-1/AW-2/AW-3 and heavy water: OK-180/OK-190. In fact, Efim Slavsky (Chief of MinSredMash), where RBMK reactors was designed, was quoted as saying, "Slaventiy, enough plutonium. Build for me a good power reactor; I have a lot of plutonium without your reactor (RBMK)" here: The fuel elements did not resemble Lego blocks; those are the channel caps. All the channels, including the control rod channels, have square caps made with concrete and serpentine to minimize radiation leaks. Under the caps is the plug, and under the plug is the upper biological shield. Under the upper biological shield is the actual channel itself, which was cylindrical and passed through the graphite blocks. Diesel generators did not take 3 minutes to start. They started within 15 seconds of power loss, but they took 60-75 seconds to reach full speed. According to the INSAG-7 report (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group), a power station in the region unexpectedly went offline at 2 PM. Thus, the grid controller requested Chernobyl NPP to pick up the load. It wasn't necessary because of the holiday; in fact, "May holiday" is on May 1st, not April. There is no evidence that Toptunov decreased the power too fast and that led to xenon flooding. The core was already xenon-poisoned, running at half power, but the neutron flux was at an equilibrium to stabilize the reactor output at half power. Decreasing it further flipped the equilibrium in the poison's favor, and it started absorbing all the neutrons, effectively stalling the reactor. Xenon is not produced at a delay; I think you are referring to xenon having a delayed effect. Xenon produced from a couple of hours ago can still poison the core later. The high coolant flow rate caused the coolant not to have enough time to dump its heat in the steam separator drums or the condensers. This caused the coolant inlet temperature to rise. Firefighters did not extinguish the graphite fire 5 hours later. They extinguished the roof and surrounding areas. The actual firefighting of the reactor started on April 27th, the next day morning at 10 am, with helicopters dropping sand, boron, dolomite, and clay with lead. I think your knowledge of nuclear engineering is on point but some of the details regarding the incident itself can be hard to find.😅
The lectures are amazing, but it would have been better if you had spoken a bit slower. 😊😊😊
Glad you enjoy these lectures! And sorry if I spoke too quickly, TSURFER is clearly an exciting topic for me!
The ocean water is already saturated with uranium so adding more uranium to it will cause uranium precipitate out on the bottom of the ocean, not increase its concentration.
Once you remove all the actinides and put them back in a reactor the remaining fission products CK away to less than uranium war in under 300 years and therefore don't even require a deep geologic repository let alone 5% fuel. This can be surface stored as it is currently being held and then wants us decay do near surface burial like we do for uranium or tailings.
Why design a canister the last for millions or billions of years when the fuel is only radioactive for 2000 years or less? That seems over designed and overly expensive. Same goes for the repository costs
0 spent fuel inside the zirconium fuel rod is not solid ceramic It has been broken up by the fission process and it's more like a ceramic sand with clumps of ceramic.
Uranium ore out of the ground Yes contains things other than uranium such as other minerals which dilute the ore but the line that you talk about is more representative of not yellow cake because the yellow cake has all the things that are actually controlling radioactivity removed IE. The fission products. So what it actually is is if you concentrated the fission products with the uranium in the yellow cake and not yellow cake because the yellow cake is hardly radioactive at all compared to even uranium ore this diluted by other minerals. This actually cannot happen because when you remove the other minerals you remove the vision products and the fission products go with the other minerals as tailings from refining the uranium to yellow cake. So clearly this line is totally wrong and wrong by almost an order of magnitude furthermore thorium ore is more radioactive than uranium ore, and is more abundant by a factor of 3 to 4, so should be the standard not uranium ore. Therefore this curve is definitely off by an order of magnitude to low.
A counter example to Betteridge's law
Nope, this ends in an exclamation point.
I think equation at 12:03 should read J(r)=-\frac{1}{3*\Sigma_{tr}(r)} * \grad \phi(r)
Whoops, you are correct! Thanks for the catch!
Just one minute into this video, and we are told all of the same misconceptions and propaganda that led to the Chernobyl distaster, which was also the point at which I stopped watching. Because on the contrary, the more that one knows about nuclear science, the more one should fear what nuclear accidents can and will do. Given a long enough timeline all nuclear reactors chances of not having a meltdown drop to zero, with meltdown chances exponentially multyplied by Murphy's Law, the law of averages, and the Wigner effect also known as the discomposition effect or Wigner's disease. This displacement of atoms in a solid caused by neutron radiation, assures old ageing reactor failure, due to the degredation of the materials that a nuclear reactor is made of. Meaning from pipes to concrete structures these events are assured, and guaranteed. So you can spew your Nuclear Death Cult propaganda all you like... but it only takes a bit of common sense to know this nuclear nonsense is untenable.
What? Am I to trust a nuclear scientist or a troll? Its in your profile name.
@@mightypsychobat9144 You can believe whatever you like friend, but I suggest you learn for yourself what radioactive isotopes that enter your body do to you. Cause the truth is only one of us is getting paid to troll you, the other one is giving you a fair warning.
Nice nod to Rumsfeld :) "You pay for safety whether you like it or not" reminds me of Davis-Besse and their almost-accident.
4:25 "My only regret is that I have...bonitis!"
Are there any of those values that we've sort of maxed out, with not much room to improve via advances in materials or design?
Of firearms and security, here's a different and difficult problem to think about! Recently some worthwhile information on the 1986 Chernobyl / Pripyat disaster exists online. It's all very well to blame Soviet engineering but the final look reveals one terrifying fact! There were no control room readings could indicate such a disaster and inclusive "compulsory automatic shutdown" had been invoked! What all this means, particularly with "total opposite effect" is the control system may not been operating the reactor, the compulsory shutdown robotics were operating but failed only because of the overload explosion, not by any other means! What NEVER has been considered is "resource theft by corruption and direct rechanneling" , one of the problems of scheduling the tests at the time was having to delay the test because full power output had been argued in Ukraine to remain for some extended period. Was the control room fully connected, one point is clear, the tests ran at half and quarter power to detect vibration, that itself may been enough too for some cover up. It is not known if there are any "talk between" reactor-gemerator sets for power output compensation or with auto balancing. That is a piece halarious you mention "parts of walls found inside the reactor"! Two serious points, 1. The person responsible for the building of Chernobyl was also an inspector of the buildings after it was put into operation 2. Dyatlov whom was often present with the reactor controllers although he was not considered a physicist, but a nuclear industry building builder and was present in the control room when the explosion occurred was second in line to the person whom built Chernobyl NPP. A. The building 4 had many structural and physical faults found but not repaired before the explosion. B. The record of either of these was found to be awfully close to corrupt and at least "pass by" would been the correct action for the initial project management personnel appointment. A final note! In essence what little is known from the final reactor readout parameters is difficult to decide a nuclear detonation from a meltdown clearly showing either being beyond achieving by direct concious operation without knowing it would occur! The AZ-5 at no time could ever achieved beginning sequence before the explosion blasted everything straight upward (95 percent of direction everything travelled). They often blame the AZ-5 but actually ! That is obviously Completely Impossible!!!! - from the.operational time of reactivity and mainly nuclear detonation requirements being similar to meltdown start.(around 30 seconds from start of rapid increase to instrument failure from the explosion). There is only one other discernable characteristic in the data information a valid clue, the vibration during shutdown at some RPM! It is cited Toptunov brought the reactor power down below a level of "operation" (where the legal argument goes either way, it's a "shutdown test" not operation! ) and the reactor temperature began to fall uncontrollably and the reactor was considered to be uncontrollable below a particular thermal mega-wattage (this is considered to be a direct operator mistake - the trouble is it is ACTUALLY a run-down EXPERIMENT). The "vibration" and uncontrollability of the reactor is probably a "main reactor water circulation" ONE WAY VALVE that behaves too violently at lower pressure , rather than compensating with smoother flow it opens and closes sporadically, and could cause violent "hydraulic back pulse" shock waves through the reactor!