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It would be nice to have a subtitle (English or Hungarian).

Gyönyörű! Jó lenne ha megismételnék egyszer szélesebb nézőközönséggel.

Lenyűgöző!... Gyakran kicsordult a könnyem is. A szövegek, a versek,a zenék, és maga az előadás, a rendezés, a szereplők, - csodálatos! Ugyanakkor fájdalmas is... Köszönöm.

Kösz a fordítást. Átküldöm a háziorvosomnak, most adott egy tájékoztató füzetet a homeopátia előnyeiről...

For hundreds of years, Hungarians proved that they absolutely cannot deal with minorities in their own territory (more than 50% of the population). During the Habsburg empire, they vetoed any plan by Austria that would have given more autonomy to the bigger ethnic groups in Hungary. The Entente therefore figured, let's give all the nations their own country, and everyone will be happy, to which Hungarians replied "No, no, this whole territory is ours, as it was given to us by God". The Entente was baffled by the profound disconnection to reality and the insatiability of the Hungarians (who hadn't have a territory of their own for 400 years), and so drew the borders in ways to 1 : Give every nation their own countries, 2 : Not give territories where different ethnic groups were living together to Hungarians. And Hungarians, since then, have kept proving that this was the right choice, showing times and times again that they absolutely can't handle minorities, and are incapable of having a regional foreign policy that would amount to more than simply trolling their neighbors with infinite whines and wails about the Hungarian lost mini-empire.

Várjuk a zenéket külön-külön is.❤

*Bryan Cartledge, The Will to Survive. A History of Hungary, Hurst &Company, London, 2011:* <<When the [Hungary's] delegation, led by Count Albert Apponyi and including, among others, István Bethlen and Pál Teleki, arrived on Paris on 6 January 1920, it was handed the draft treaty (...). In response, the Hungarians submitted a number of memoranda (...) of which Apponyi gave an oral summary in his address to the Supreme Council on 16 January. Making the focus of his speech the transfer to foreign rule of half the Hungarian population, including (he claimed) 3.5 million Magyars, Apponyi demanded plebiscites in the region of Hungary affected, in accordance with Wilsonian principles.(...) The Council heard Apponyi out in silence; there was no subsequent discussion. Apponyi and most of his delegation returned to Budapest two days later.(...) The conference's formal response to Hungary's representations came under cover of a letter from [Etienne] Millerand [new French prime-minister that had replaced Clemenceau] to Apponyi on 6 May 1920. Its tone was harsh, its content uncompromising. Dismissing Apponyi's references to the consecration of Hungary's frontiers by a thousand years of history, the letter brusquely stated: _'A state of affairs, even when millennial, is not meant to exist when it has been recognized as contrary to justice'._ Apponyi demand for plebiscites received equally short shrift: _'The will of the people was expressed in October and November of 1918 at the collapse of the Dual Monarchy when the populations, oppressed for so long, united with their Italian, Roumanian, Yugo-Slav and Czecho-Slovak kindred. The events occurring since that epoch constitute so many proofs the more of the sentiments of the nationalities formerly subjected to the Crown of St. Stephen. The tardy measures taken by the Hungarian Government to satisfy the need felt by the nationalities for an autonomy is not able to create any illusion; they do not change at all the essentials of historical truth: notably, that during long years all the efforts of Hungarian policy were directed to stifling the voice of the ethnical minorities.'>>_ (pp. 329-330) <<In many respects the task that had faced the Peace Conference, that of giving precision to new frontiers already drawn by events, could not have been completed with justice or in ways conducive to a peaceful future for east-central Europe. The major transfers of territory, already determined by a combination of popular will and military occupation, could have been reversed or significantly modified only by the use or threat of force by the Allied Powers against successor states: this was inconceivable. Even with regard to the aspects of Trianon most open to criticism, those that placed so many Magyars under alien rule, the conference had only limited discretion. The fate of the Magyar-speaking Székely, for example, living for centuries in the south-east corner of Transylvania adjacent to Romania, had been determined by history and geography; it was not susceptible to revision by diplomats or cartographers. The same applied to many ethnic islands of Magyars in Transylvania, Slovakia and the Bánát. Plebiscites, which Hungarians vainly requested, might have modified the outcome - particularly in Slovakia, where enthusiasm in Turoczentmárton for union with the Czechs was less marked than in Prague - but only at the margins. Too much should not be read into the outcome of the one plebiscite that was eventually held, in Sopron and a few neighboring villages, resulting in a substantial majority against incorporation into Austria; it was possible, in that case, to draw he new frontier around the loyal districts. But a plebiscite could not have helped the Szekely in Transylvania or the Magyars in Pozsony and Kassa.(...) Nevertheless, in acknowledging the evident injustice of an outcome in which Versailles cost Germany only 10 per cent of her territory against the 66 per cent of which Trianon formally deprived Hungary, a caveat must be entered: the major part of Hungary's losses stemmed not from the Peace Conference, nor even from the defeat of Austria-Hungary in war, but from the policies which for three-quarters of a century had made Hungarian rule unpalatable, sometimes intolerable, to the non-magyar nationalities of Hungary. Those policies helped to ensure the eventual victory of the national idea in a kingdom whose heterogeneous ethnicity had been determined by geography, migration, historical accident and, in her medieval past, over-ambitious expansion; and they must, therefore, bear much of the responsibility for the kingdom's dissolution.>> (pp. 330-331)

For those interested in the events that paved the way for Trianon: "The basic problem in Hungary was that less than half of the population were ethnically Hungarian. After the Ausgleich the Hungarians made at least one attempt to solve the cultural problem involved in the situation with the nationality law of 1868. The intent of this law was to arrange for a compromise between the non-Magyar nationalities and the Hungarians. The fact was, however, that the nationalities demanded more than cultural nationalism. They were in the process of establishing ties with their co-nationals - the Rumanians, Serbians, Czechs - living outside the monarchy or in the Austrian half, and were working for political independence. Moreover, the nationality law was seldom observed in Hungary; the rights of the nationalities were violated continuously by the Hungarian government. Their schools were closed and confiscated; their protests were suppressed by the police; their leaders were jailed for long periods of time. Hungarian propagandists spoke of a country of thirty million Hungarians, and of the sacred right of Hungary to “ Magyarize ” its nationalities." Source: Joseph Held, "The Heritage of the Past: Hungary before World War I", in Ivan Volgyes (editor), "HUNGARY IN REVOLUTION. 1918-19. Nine Essays", University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1971, pages 6-7. <<The survival of Magyar supremacy in Hungary depended on keeping the kingdom’s Slavs and Rumanians cowed in a system that gave the Hungarians, with only 55 percent of Hungary’s population, 98 percent of its 405 parliamentary deputies. By now, this medieval arrangement had become an international embarrassment even for the thick-skinned emperor. Franz Joseph recoiled at the publication (and international sensation) of Oxford scholar R. W. Seton-Watson’s 1908 book Racial Problems in Hungary, which detailed Budapest’s myriad abuses of non-Hungarians in Transleithania. To end the scandal and persuade Hungarian lawmakers to do what the Austrians had already done-and what they had expected Hungary to do as well-the emperor took the highly unusual step of transferring his court to Budapest in the fall of 1908 to implement electoral reform. After enduring a jolting ten-hour train ride from Ischl to Budapest to settle the issue of male suffrage, the seventy-eight-year-old emperor-king was jilted instead. Magyar supremacy rested on rigged elections, and Hungarian “Liberals” saw no reason to change this state of affairs, even at the emperor-king’s orders. Actual Hungarian suffrage “reform” in 1908 amounted to this: one out of every ten illiterates-more than 25 percent of the population-was conceded one vote in elections (the other nine could not vote at all); high school graduates, all of whom were educated in Magyar, received two votes each; university graduates and wealthy taxpayers could vote three times. Nor was voting secret; ballots had to be cast publicly so that “voters would not break their promises under the veil of secrecy.” With rules such as these, Magyar-speaking gentry and professionals would have little trouble ruling the roost in Hungary forever against the wishes of less privileged Hungarians, Slavs, and Rumanians.>> Source: Geoffrey Wawro, "A Mad Catastrophe. The Outbreak Of World War I And The Collapse Of The Habsburg Empire", Basic Books, New York, 2014, page 63. <<Faced with the danger of national competition, the Magyar gentry dared not fulfil the provisions of the Nationalities Law of 1868; on the other hand, to make their work easier, they demanded a knowledge of Magyar from all the inhabitants of Hungary. No state school, elementary or secondary, was ever provided for any national minority; the secondary schools which the Slovaks had set up for themselves were closed in 1874; Magyar was made compulsory in all schools in 1883. The highest expression of this policy was the Education Law promoted by [Prime minister, Count] Apponyi in 1907, which imposed a special oath of loyalty on all teachers and made them liable to dismissal if their pupils did not know Magyar. Similarly, the Magyar gentry attacked any political display by the nationalities -drove their few members from parliament and condemned their organisations. By these means, the Magyar gentry gained and kept a monopoly of state employment and of the liberal professions. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 95 per cent of the state officials, 92 per cent of the county officials, 89 per cent of the doctors, and 90 per cent of the judges were Magyar. Eighty per cent of the newspapers were in Magyar, and the remainder mostly German: three million Roumanians had 2,5 per cent of the newspapers, two million Slovaks had 0,64 per cent.>> Source: A. J. P. Taylor, "The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918 : A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary", Hamish Hamilton, London, 1948, page 186. <<As the content of Hungarian nationalism in the decades leading up to World War I became increasingly ethnic and exclusionary, nationalism as a political project was used to maintain the structure of class hierarchy. By defining the boundaries of national belonging more narrowly and demanding political and cultural Magyarization, the ruling class of lower nobility sought to tightly control access to power, privilege, and opportunity, thereby preventing the development of an indigenous democratic middle class. While serfdom had been abolished by the late 1800s, the nobility used nationalism to restrict the franchise by allowing very little political representation to the minorities, or to the peasant and lower classes, who were less interested in loyalty to the Hungarian nation than in land reform and economic rights. As the historian Joseph Rothschild described this period: “The bulk of even the ethnically Magyar population was refused enfranchisement with the chauvinistic argument that any extension whatsoever of political participation would endanger Magyar supremacy. The rhetoric of ‘national survival’ was thus used as a fig leaf for social and political privilege.” By defining themselves as the true representatives and protectors of the Hungarian nation, the ruling nobility attempted to merge loyalty to the nation with loyalty to their political position. The calculated nationalist position of the Hungarian nobility was temporarily bolstered both by the hierarchical authority enforced by the Hapsburgs, and by the racialized conceptions of identity hierarchies that were in vogue at the turn of the century. Magyar cultural superiority joined ideas of racial superiority and anti-Semitism to help justify the privileged political position of the Hungarian nobility.>> Source: "Between State and Nation Diaspora Politics and Kin-state Nationalism in Hungary", by Myra A. Waterbury, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2010, page 29-30. <<The Austro-Hungarian monarchy had been a conglomerate of various nations. From any logical and pragmatic point of view, some form of federalism should have been accomplished. However, the two ruling nations, the Germans in Austria and the Magyars in Hungary, clung stubbornly to the maintenance of “dualism” which was based on a joint rule of Germans and Magyars. The resentment of the other nations was boiling beneath the surface, and the monarchy’s defeat in World War I brought to the fore their bitterness, and by 1918, their wish to secede. Croats, Serbians, Slovaks, and Rumanians harbored a long list of grievances against the Magyars, and the chaotic conditions of 1918-disintegrating armies, fluctuating demarcation lines, ambiguous armistice terms-only intensified them. Above all, active Entente support played into their hands. It would be futile to argue the issues from a legal viewpoint, or even from an ideological viewpoint, because in 1918, the military and political atmosphere was charged with emotions, and conflict between the onetime rulers and onetime subjects was not to be solved in a rational and sensible way.>> Source: Gabor Vermes, "The October Revolution in Hungary: from Karolyi to Kun", in Ivan Volgyes (editor), "Hungary in Revolution. 1918-19. Nine Essays", Univ. of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1971, page 47.

Hiszek egy Istenben. Hiszek egy Hazában. Hiszek egy Isteni örök isgazságban. Hiszek Magyarország feltámadásban .

Köszönöm a feltöltést....

Laczik Fecó basszusgitár játéka!!!!!!

A homeopátiás sör a legjobb. 🤣🤣

Zseniális, meg csodálatos is, és sajnos valószínüleg teljesen hatástalan.

🥰❤

A homeopátia azokon segít hatásosan, akiknek több a pénze, mint az esze :D

Csodalatos, koszi :)

Homeopátia - a gyógyító semmi

Fantasztikus!

Az akvárium korábban volt a Frizbiben, mint a villanykörte a Showderben, pont én is figyeltem, tehát ez az 1.0. :)) De egyébként mindkettő nagyon jó! Jó az alap, Amerikai városi legenda a villanykörtés sztori.:)

Zseniális! ::::")

Kár, hogy a felirat nem megy.

Szuper ez igen Hang! Hajra Magyarok !! (Erdelybol

<3

szép

köszi ezt a videot :) állatiyooo

ez nagyon szép nóta:)

Ez igen!

Ebből az albumból max ha 3 szám jó..Szerintem ez gyenge lett de hát ha másnak tetszik akkor jó .

NAGYON SZÉP!!!

alig várom, hogy megjelenjen az új album :D :)

már várom az új albumot...holnap koncert felsőzsolcán....

Timi, ez gyönyörű volt <3

Ez a nászing elsz mádörsz nagyon gáááz XD